Unhooked and Paying for It

Communitarian Letter #25

In this issue: Unhooked—and paying for it? Unhooked: A Response by Professor Paula England Export Security, Not Democracy On Deterring Iran Freedom's Unsteady March: A Response Coming to, and Living in, America Upcoming Events Another Illiberal Moderate Muslim Leader Doing Good Feedback Endorsements

Unhooked—and paying for it? Washington Post reporter Laura Sessions Stepp’s recent book Unhooked is a rich sociological vineyard. It revisits a theme flagged by Tom Wolfe in his 2004 novel I am Charlotte Simmons. Both are studies of new sexual norms that have emerged on college campuses in which millions of students have sexual relations with one another while avoiding social relationships. They do not “waste” time on dating, seeking to avoid both the “costs” of developing relationships and the pangs of loss when relationships sour and then break-up. Instead, students engage in sexual relations with partners who are, as the catch-phrase puts it, “friends with benefits”; only the focus is on the (sexual) benefits, not on friendship. The energy conserved by avoiding relationships, we are told, is then invested by students in their careers. Some feminists celebrate this development, arguing that all that has changed is that women now do what men long did: f— and hurry along. To an old sociologist like myself, especially one with my communitarian inclinations, these developments raise many questions. One cannot but note that this is not the first time people tried to separate sexual encounters from social relationships. During the early days of the Soviet revolution, Communists promoted sexual liberation and suggested that engaging in sex should be like playing chess. You play, you mate, and you move on. Soon, however, the Soviets retreated from this position. In my student days at Berkeley, at the height of the sexual liberation movements (or, at least, what we thought was the height), various experiments were made with group “marriages”, in which several students lived together, rotating who slept with whom on a weekly basis. For the most part, these experiments did not last long, as participants became attached to one another and refused to rotate; i.e. people had a hard time separating their sexual and social relations. Which brings us to the question: are students these days content with their hookups? I am not talking about casual sex here and there, but rather, about a systematic avoidance of lasting and meaningful relationships; about the nature of a lifestyle consisting of random sex, study, and sports, but no intimate affect-laden and expansive relationships. This question has long commanded the interest of social science. Once upon a time we all lived in traditional villages, in which social norms were very strong, relationships very binding, and where anyone who engaged in untraditional behavior— including premarital sex, extra-marital affairs, or homosexual sex—was ostracized. Modernization, with mass movement into cities, provided a great measure of liberation from all these norms and bonds, but also left people feeling isolated, lost, without a moral compass—and lacking friends. Hence, the rise of various modern forms of social relationships and commitments which are neither as tight and oppressive as villages were, nor as loose or lacking as living in a barracks (as many early industrial workers were required to do) or in a central city high-rise building. People, sociologists long have demonstrated, are social animals; they need relationships to flourish. All this leads one to ask whether today’s students are a new breed. Can they do without relationships? In her book, Unhooked, Laura Sessions Stepp addresses this question, citing both numerous studies as well as personal interviews. The answer is far from unanimous. Many students, especially women (albeit not all of them), are profoundly uneasy about hooking up. They fall in love, though they are not supposed to; they yearn for more than just a ‘roll in the hay’ (or whatever is the current equivalent). At the same time, as one of them put it, they have no time for a ‘we’. They begrudge the energy it takes to develop and maintain a relationship. Above all, we do not know (and we ought to) what the consequences are of the unhooked lifestyle for post-college life. Is college merely a passing phase in which people experiment in relation-less sexual contacts, or are these habits carried into post- college life? Are colleges supposed to serve, among other things, as dry runs for the life to follow? If relationships in college are frowned upon and often avoided, what does this spell for the lives of graduates? Does an unhooked college life bespeak of an unhooked society? True, sociology stresses that one cannot generalize; that people differ. Obviously, not all students merely hookup, and quite a few graduates do have close intimate relationships and even marry. Still the questions stands: what is the trend? Where are more and more students and graduates headed? And what kind of society are we to expect to live in?

What say you? Send your responses to [email protected]

The following is an initial response from a distinguished sociologist:

Unhooked: A Response by Professor Paula England Etzioni interprets Stepp's book, Unhooked, to imply that college youth are abandoning ideals of committing to one partner, and he sees it as part of a more general and troublesome slide into individualism. While I agree with Etzioni that the level of individualism in the U.S. is troubling, I think he is overinterpreting Stepp's data. I too have been studying the college scene, in which students “hook up” with no necessary interest in a relationship. (For those who don't know what a "hook up" is, in data from my online survey from a number of universities, about 35% of these "hook ups" involve sexual intercourse, while the rest are oral sex or just making out and a bit of "groping.") When I ask students if they want to marry eventually, only 2% say no! And by their senior year, over 70% have been in a steady relationship that lasted at least 6 months while in college. So, whether or not one approves of casual sex (and I don't think we yet know what experience with it will do to the ultimate quality of long-term relationships), its rise by no means implies that young people are abandoning serious relationships or marriage—they are often just putting them off till later. What I find troubling about the hook up scene is that the double standard (where women are judged more harshly for sexual activity) is alive and well, and the focus is more on men’s than women’s pleasure.

Paula England Professor of Sociology Stanford University

Export Security, Not Democracy By Jonathan Rauch, National Journal "'Six years after September 11,' wrote Krauthammer, 'there is still no remotely plausible alternative to the Bush Doctrine for ultimately changing the culture from which jihadism arises.' If that ever was true, it ceased to be as of last summer. That was when Amitai Etzioni published an important book called Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy..." To read the rest of this review visit www.securityfirstbook.com

Survival Review A publication of the International Institute for Strategic Studies Vol 50, No 2, April/May 2008 “The wide-ranging essays in [Security First] add up to a comprehensive strategy for the West informed by Etzioni’s ‘neo-communitarian’ perspective. At the heart of his approach is the notion of the ‘Primacy of Life.’ He makes a credible case that the right to physical security is the foundation of all other rights.... In a world where much of the ‘global public opinion’ is determined by moral and religious perceptions and fiercely resistant to…Western models, the United States should eschew counterproductive attempts at regime change, democratization, and ‘social engineering’ and base its foreign policy on the ethical (and practical) principle of ‘security first’… [Etzioni] argues convincingly that declaring ‘either you are with us or with the terrorists’, and dividing the world – especially the Muslim world – into supporters for liberal democracy and the rest, serves to alienate the majority who do not wish to embrace Western political and social values but who oppose violence…[Etzioni] has written a wise and stimulating book.” If you wish to read the full review, it is available for purchase here.

On Deterring Iran “We just have to get used to a nuclear Iran.” Because of Chatham House rules, I am not allowed to inform you who said that. The rules permit quoting what has been said at a meeting, but forbid indicating by whom or naming the group that hosted the event. The Council on Foreign Relations, the Nixon Center and quite a few other groups in Washington conduct their meetings in accordance with these rules, named after the highly respected London think-tank credited with first introducing this form of deliberation. Trust me, the person who made this statement was a high ranking adviser to one of the leading presidential candidates—someone likely to make it into 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. Behind this simple phrase looms an important and influential foreign policy thesis; namely, that a nuclear-armed Iran could be reliably deterred from employing nuclear weapons. After all, we are often reminded, despite the dire warnings of scores of experts, scholars, and peace activists (myself included), quite a few nations have acquired nuclear arms over the last several decades, and none have employed them… For the rest of “On Deterring Iran”, visit here.

Freedom's Unsteady March: A Response A little over a month ago we published a blog post [here], titled “If wishes were horses--liberals could democratize,” in which we discussed Tamara Cofman Wittes’ new book, Freedom’s Unsteady March. The following is her response, in which she makes many interesting and valuable points:

Thanks for giving some ink to my new book, Freedom's Unsteady March. I am not surprised that you found the thesis disagreeable, given your own views on the subject as expressed in Security First. But I think you did not fully engage with the book's arguments. Let me lay out a few points which I think deserve your closer attention. My argument in Freedom's Unsteady March rests on two premises: first, that the United States has crucial national interests in the Middle East - stability of energy supplies, security of major allies (Israel), and open navigation through the Suez - and therefore is not about to disengage militarily, politically, or economically from that part of the world; second, that changes in the social and economic balance in the region make it harder and more costly - indeed, ultimately untenable - for the United States to secure its interests via a "status quo" policy regarding the region's autocratic regimes. I do not believe the United States faces a real choice about whether it will influence the future direction of Arab politics, for better or worse - America's influence is quite palpable all over the region, and has been for decades. America remains the largest economic, political, diplomatic and military actor in the Middle East because America has important interests in the Middle East and is willing to make major investments to protect those interests. Arabs know well that American influence over their lives is not something they can escape. To my mind, the question is rather in what manner American influence will affect Arab politics, and to what end. I care about this, because US-Arab cooperation is more important than ever right now to contain the regional radicalism spearheaded by Iran and its Lebanese and Palestinian allies. The first half of my book outlines the global and regional changes underway that are compelling Arab states to change the way they govern - though not necessarily to change in a democratic direction. In fact, I argue that, absent external pressure, Arab governments are likely to survive by becoming more and more repressive. This increased repression is going to make it very hard for the United States to cooperate with those states to secure its core interests in the Middle East. I consider and reject alternatives to a policy of advancing democratic reform such as promoting economic development or supporting gradual, limited liberalization. The second half of the book is focused on answering the question of how to advance democratic reform in a manner consonant with American interests and cognizant of the risks involved in political change. Your review did not really engage with this part of the argument, other than to accuse me of embracing regime change (which I explicitly do not) and to dismiss my ideas as tinkering with bureaucracy (some of them do propose tinkering, but many go well beyond that). In fact, what I am advocating is what Brent Scowcroft calls encouraging democracy "with assistance, and aid, the traditional way." I argue that real conflicts of interest exist that will produce inconsistency in our policy, and that we should be frank and honest about that. I argue specifically (with respect to your Security First argument) that states plagued by conflict, where governance is weak, are the worst places to press for democratic growth - and that one of Bush's biggest mistakes in pressing his Freedom Agenda was pushing elections in weak places like Iraq, Lebanon, and the non-state Palestinian Authority. But I also note that there are many times when conflicts of interest are more apparent than real, when we engage in preemptive self-censorship on questions of internal governance when we actually have useful advice to give and positive leverage to employ, for example using trade agreements and multilateral institutions to induce changes in a state's conduct. And I argue, overall, that when the United States chooses to put its political capital at risk with an autocratic ally in the name of democracy, it should emphasize not democratic processes (elections) but rather the expansion of political freedoms. Among other effects, political freedom also facilitates the sort of societal adaptation that you argue societies must undergo before they can emerge as successful democracies. So you and I are in agreement that weak, conflict-ridden societies are bad places in which to try and promote democracy, and that democratic elections there are likely to produce perverse outcomes. Most of the Middle East, however, is not made up of weak states, but of states that are, if anything, too strong. The kinds of social changes you see as important prerequisites for democracy simply cannot occur under strong autocratic government - something must ease before social debates can emerge, and new social institutions can form, to produce a political culture more conducive to democracy. If you care to avoid the negative outcomes that accompany suddenly "lifting the lid" on repressed societies, then American diplomacy to press for basic political rights in Arab autocracies is a crucial first step. I could point out to you that a large body of cross-regional evidence exists to contradict your thesis that certain levels of macro-economic development, education, and social modernization are necessary before stable democracy can emerge. But I take your point that all these factors are helpful to democracy's growth. I think what troubles me most about your view is that it leaves no room whatsoever for human agency, for the impact of local political actors. Democracy never just "emerges" magically from ripe conditions, like seeds sprouting from a field that has been carefully tilled, watered, and fertilized by outsiders. Rather, democracy (like other less benign forms of government) always emerges out of struggle – the struggle of individual citizens and of political entrepreneurs, would-be leaders, who compete to mobilize citizens around compelling visions of an alternative future. America and other Western states can cultivate the right conditions all we want, but without local actors who seek democracy, it will never emerge. Social changes are roiling the region, and many political actors - not all of them democrats, to be sure - are competing to define what will emerge from the current ferment. For good or ill. America's engagement in the Middle East is deep enough, and our interests there strong enough, that we are necessarily implicated in the fate of our regional "partners." That is why my book is subtitled "America's ROLE in Building Arab Democracy" – we cannot build Arab democracy ourselves, and should not seek to do so. But we should recognize the inescapable reality of our own role in democracy's success or failure in the Middle East. We should judge our interests relative to that reality, not to wishful thinking of any variety. We cannot export democracy to the Middle East. Neither can we pretend that by refraining from such attempts, we are effectively doing nothing. We can no longer avoid difficult choices flowing from our relations with the Middle East - and my book aims to be a guide for recognizing and making those choices in a manner that promotes our long-term interests.

Regards, Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D Senior Fellow Director, Middle East Democracy and Development Project Brookings Institution

Coming to, and Living in, America A new study by the Manhattan Institute finds that immigrants to the United States are assimilating at a faster rate than they had in previous generations. The study looked at economic, civic, and cultural factors to create an assimilation index which measured similarities between the U.S. foreign-born and native-born populations. The study found that new arrivals to the country are acquiring native-born traits at an increased speed since the 1990s. The final results of the study also demonstrated that economic integration happens at the highest rate, with civic, and the cultural integration following. This study helps show that our Diversity Within Unity approach to immigration is achievable and already, in some ways, happening in the United States. The DWU approach presumes that all members of a given society will fully respect and adhere to those basic values and institutions that are considered part of the basic shared framework of the society. At the same time, each group in society should be free to maintain its distinct subculture - those that do not conflict with the shared core - and a strong measure of loyalty to its country of origin, as long as doing so does not trump loyalty to the society in which it lives. At the same time, diversity in cultural tastes and religious traditions would be welcome, as would immigrants' special interest in their history.

Original study published by the Manhattan Institute’s Center for Civic Innovation, and titled “Measuring Immigrant Assimilation in the United States.” More on Diversity Within Unity can be found here.

Upcoming Events Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics Annual Meeting San Jose, Costa Rica July 21-23, 2008 Several sessions on Communitarianism will take place during this annual meeting.

American Political Science Association Annual Meeting Boston, Massachusetts August 23-31, 2008 “Global Inequalities, Global Insecurities, Global Government” Panel Chair Luis Cabrera Panel Participants Brooke A. Ackerly Amitai Etzioni Daniel Deudney Darrel Moellendorf Jamie Mayerfeld

Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting January 6-10, 2009 San Diego, California Law and Communitarian Studies Section: “Community as a ‘Third Force’ in Domestic and International Relations”

Another Illiberal Moderate Muslim Leader In Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation (Yale University Press, 2008) Marwan Muasher, Jordan’s first ambassador to Israel, gives a rare behind the scenes look at the Middle East peace process from the perspective of an Arab insider. Muasher makes a strong case that the prospect of peace hinges on the rise or fall of a credible moderate “Arab Center.” In his definition of this Arab Center, Muasher does not include on the face of it a commitment to the full plethora of human rights, nor to a democratic polity. For Muasher, and for us as well, the Arab Center disavows violence and wants peace, regardless of whether or not it is prepared to fully embrace all the norms of Western liberal society. Perhaps even more importantly, Muasher shows his Western audience that such a center exists and has been behind some of the major successes over the last 20 years. Muasher finds one of the chief reasons for the failures of recent years to be the West’s inability to recognize the importance of this “Arab Center” and to effectively promote its crucial efforts. He writes that “without the active support of the United States—in deeds, not just words—the center will soon be overwhelmed by radicalism.” This means that the United States may well have to work closely with illiberal states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan—“as a partner rather than as a patron.” For more on illiberal moderates, visit here. Doing Good Visit www.kiva.org! Kiva is the world's first person-to-person micro-lending website, with a mission is to connect people through lending for the sake of alleviating poverty. The organization seeks to empower individuals to lend directly to unique entrepreneurs in the developing world.

Feedback Response to “Should Israel be a Jewish State?” Originally published here. Israel and Palestine should create a confederation of the two states. Then Israel can retain its Jewish character under a secular confederation, just as Palestine would retain its Arab character. Arabs living in Israel would be free to become citizens of Palestine even when they live in Israeli territory, just as Israelis in the West Bank settlements would be citizens of Israel even while living in what would be the Palestinian state. A Jewish community and state within a secular Confederate government would be the ideal communitarian solution. The confederate government could also provide a neutral corridor between Gaza and the West Bank.

Fred Foldvary Lecturer in Economics Santa Clara University

Response to “Should Israel be a Jewish State?” Originally published here. Your article states: "All this ignores that nations, even ones as large as the United States or China, have some of the attributes of communities: bonds of affinity, a core of shared values, history, and identity." Speaking as a Brit I agree fully with this. I accept the view that there is an essential '"Britishness" defined by core values, traditions and customs, though defining this is very difficult. I strongly believe that all who are citizens of the UK have an obligation to conform to core British values. As the grandchild of Jewish immigrants I regard myself every bit a Brit as someone whose descendants s have lived here for three thousand years. I can since the attributes of Britishness are cultural and do not flow from ascribed status. Indeed it would be antithetical to basic British values if 'true Britishness' was defined in terms of adhering to Christianity and (since Jewishness is defined in ethnic terms) of Norman/Saxon/Celtic descent. The problem is this: given Israel's definition of itself as a Jewish state how can the 20% of its population who are Arabs ever come to feel that this is their state - every bit as much as that of Jewish fellow-citizens. I believe that Israel must continue as a sanctuary for Jews. But Israel should be an Israeli -state - not a Jewish one.

Regards Dr. Eric Shaw Department of Politics University of Stirling Response to “Should Israel be a Jewish State?” Originally published here. Have I misunderstood? You seem to suggest that either Israel is a Jewish state or else it has no identity and common core values. But as I understand it a secular state was advocated by some of the Founders. Could there not be a state for Jews without its being defined as a religious state? The U.S. has no national religion, and Sweden recently separated church from state as well. Could not Israel do the same? You seem to suggest that one could end discrimination against non-Jews and still have a Jewish state, but isn't the essence of being a Jewish state that it discriminates in favor of Jewish practices and beliefs?

Rick Wicks Göteborg, Sverige (Sweden)

Response to “Should Israel be a Jewish State?” Originally published here. Israel’s society is most secular and its state is most religions. The majority of Israelis belong to no religious community, and do not partake in religious practices except once or twice a year and on some festive occasions. The Jewish state, however, speaks in the name of all Jews and takes for granted that there can be no conflict between Israel’s interest and the interests of any Jewish community in the world. The official Jewish religious leadership do all they can to impose Jewish rituals on all Israeli Jews on the condition that these rituals are devoid of social significance. Israel’s religious discrimination is flagrant: it has practically no non-Jewish civil servants, policemen, soldiers. Most job opportunities are for ex-soldiers only. Schooling is almost entirely segregated. Israel is not a republic, has no constitution, no state religion, no official national language, and no borders. The enforcement of the law is conditioned on what is known here as the arrangement. It is run as a ghetto. This is all because in Israel community and nation are deemed identical. There is now for years an appeal to Israeli courts to force the Israeli Ministry of the Interior to recognize the fact that they are Israelis by nationality (and Jewish by religious and ethnic and cultural affiliation). Refusal to allow for struggles against the blatant religious discrimination here is the real stumbling block to peace in the Middle East.

Joseph Agassi Herzliya, ISRAEL

Response to “Should English be everyone's second language?” Original study found here. Let us consider what the selection criteria of "everyone's second language" might reasonably be. I posit three criteria: The use of an alphabet, rather than pictographs, for purposes of visual representation. If nothing else, the use of an alphabet minimizes the number of symbols which must be understood. The English alphabet has 26 characters, relatively few punctuation marks, and no diacritical symbols, excepting those included in words imported wholesale from other tongues. In comparison (if my numbers are accurate), Chinese has over 8,000 pictographs. I posit the need for the language to be capable of conveying concepts precisely across the widest range possible. I would posit the need for the language to be unbounded, so that it would be capable of evolving as the need arose. If there is a competition for "everyone's second language," English has some advantages: English has the largest dictionary of any language. It is therefore the most precise, by default. It is therefore the only language that meets all three posited criteria. In some ways, the question has already been answered: all radio communications in international commercial aviation and maritime transport are already conducted in English. Further, English is the language of most international business transactions. Probably most importantly, it is the tongue of computer programming. In practical terms, the day has long passed when English was not "everyone's second language." The problem is that everyone just doesn't know it yet.

Robert Jansen Anaheim, CA

Endorsements The Responsive Communitarian Platform can be found here. We invite all people who agree to endorse it here. Recent endorsements have come from:

Jared Walker Farmington, UT

Todd R. Hall Denton, TX

Richard Turner Richmond, VA

Gordon Medlock LaPorte, IN

The Diversity Within Unity Platform is here. We invite all people who agree to endorse it by sending an email to [email protected] with the subject “endorse DWU.” Recent endorsements have come from:

Stephan E. Nikolov Senior Research Fellow Institute of Sociology Sofia, Bulgaria

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Edited by Radhika Bhat

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