Subject: AEI Conference on the Future of the United States Navy

T H E J O H N S H O P K I N S U N I V E R S I T Y A p p l i e d P h y s i c s L a b o r a t o r y S c i e n ti f i c a n d T e c h n i c a l I n t e l l i g e n c e L i a i s o n O f f i c e ( S T I L O ) J o h n s H o p k i n s R o a d , L a u r e l , M a r y l a n d 2 0 7 2 3 - 6 0 9 5

J o s e p h M . M a z z a f r o ( 2 4 0 ) 2 2 8 - 5 6 9 8 J o s e p h . M a z z a f r o @ j h u a p l . e d u

I n r e p l y c i t e : ILO-05-235 1 July 2005

To: Distribution

Subject: AEI Conference on “The Future of the United States Navy”

On 20 June I attended an all day conference sponsored by AEI at their Washington D.C. headquarters on the “The Future of the United States Navy” This was the second in a series of conferences AEI is sponsoring on the future of the U.S. military services. A session on the Army was held on 11 April with the Marine Corps Conference scheduled for 18 August and the Air Force look is yet to be scheduled in the fall.

The conference was organized into panels presentations followed by questions and answers on the following topics:

Panel I Strategy and Missions for the Future Navy

Panel II Sizing, Shaping, and Posturing the Fleet

Panel III Budgeting, Transformation and the Defense Industrial Base

The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vernon Clark gave a lunchtime “key note” address. The conference was entirely unclassified and “on the record” with many attendees being from the press. Parts of this event have been broadcasted on C-SPAN. Video of the entire conference is available at http://www.aei.org/events/eventID.1051,filter.all/event_detail.asp# What follows is my summary of this conference’s proceedings; my personal opinions and editorial commentary will appear in bold font.

Conference Summary

A theme running throughout the entire conference was the increasing tension on the USN regarding an expanding mission set in an environment of rising costs and flat to decreasing budgets. Related to the cost issue was a general concern shared by most of the speakers as well as a majority of the 100 or so attendees about the health of the US ship building industrial base. The designed in modularity of the DD(X) family of ships is seen as the best answer for providing a Navy at reasonable costs capable operating across the mission spectrum described in the Navy’s 3/1 Strategy from presence for regional stability, to maritime interdiction operations (MIO) to major combat operations (MCO) against a peer competitor. A need for naval infantry to deal with the conditions of maritime irregular warfare was also raised. Retired Radm. Robinson from Northrop Grumman said without caveat that the DD(X) program is on schedule and within budget; the CNO observed that DD(X) is the incubator for the technologies needed by the fleet. Despite the tenets of Seapower 21 and the CNO Guidance for 2005, I sensed throughout the day’s discussions a subliminal struggle within the Navy to find an articulation for an affordable mix of future capabilities that will insure the Navy’s relevance to protecting the security and national interests of the United States. Assuring access appears to be the Navy’s “hole card.”

CNO’s Lunch Time Keynote Address

Admiral Clark spent about 50 minutes talking to the conference. He limited his prepared remarks to less than 20 minutes in order to take as many questions as possible. Without the use of notes or view graphs the CNO made the following points in his address:

 Both national security and economic policies assumes U.S. dependence on the Sea. Access is something the Navy can uniquely provide without being intrusive.

 Because navies take a long time to build (70% of today’s Navy will still be in still be in the fleet in 15 years) it is important to begin now to reposture the Navy for the emerging missions of the 21st Century.

 The Navy is being shaped by the current security environment, which puts a premium on maneuver. The Army and Marine Corps are students of maneuver warfare, and the Navy needs to increase its understanding of maneuver in its domain. Sea and space are where the U.S. has its greatest maneuver advantage.

 The Navy needs to better enable ground forces with precision weapons delivery on call, providing a more distributed force, and reducing the ashore foot print with a viable seabase.

 To insure that the Navy invests only the maritime capabilities the nation truly needs, rigorous analysis must to be done [continuously?] to determine the trade space between force structure and force posture.

 A new human capital strategy that allows greater mobility for both the uniformed and civilian elements of the force to move back and forth between the service and the private sector is essential for the Navy to succeed. A modern alternative to the twenty year all or nothing retirement system is necessary to recruit and retain the people the Navy needs. The Navy needs to lose its sense of paternalistic management. People today do not want to be taken care of --- they want to be challenged and lead without micro- management.

Responding to questions Admiral Clark said the following:

 In response to my question, the CNO said N7 has just completed a classified study that looks at the trade space between capabilities investment in platforms verses investment in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) resources that will effect PR07 budgetary decisions. He continued that the shift from Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) to FORCEnet (FN) was driven by NWC close association with hardware. The CNO said FN reflects the human centric nature of a truly netted force. He continued that bandwidth is not the challenge, but bandwidth management is! The CNO also made reference to N80 study that found the Navy is better served investing in how to use the ISR capability it has vice buying more or newer sensors. Finally the CNO opined that “it will be a courageous commander who ventures into the US Navy’s network.”

 The CNO sees China building a “competent” navy and the U.S. Navy must maintain its advantage. China’s anti-access strategy for East Asia means the Navy’s missile defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities embedded in Seapower 21’s Sea Shield pillar are critical mission areas for assuring U.S military access. With regard to ASW the CNO said FN will make attrition based ASW an obsolete concept.

 Why DD(X)? The CNO says it is needed to drive technical innovation for the future fleet in areas such as high-energy weapons, low observables, reduce crew size, etc. [I am not sure if not mentioning electric drive/propulsion technology was just an oversight or a purposeful omission]. He said $7.7 billion in research and development investment is associated with the DD(X). [The CNO did not say how much of this investment was related to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) nor did he say how many DD(X)s he thought the Navy needed or would be able to procure].

 Regarding the Navy’s contribution to assisting Army and Marine forces in Iraq, the CNO proudly said there are 8000 Navy personnel serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. He noted, however, that the Navy’s strategic contributions to these forces as well as future forces ashore lays centered in assuring access, projecting power in support of their needs and providing a sea base to support their mission vice being a source of manpower. PANEL I: Strategy and Missions for the Future Navy

Thomas Manhnken from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) spoke to the following points:

 The USN makes six important contributions. At the level of grand strategy the USN provides the President with a strategic shaping tool and the U.S. with global military presence. In the realm of military strategy the USN is providing sea control, protecting forces/interests, projecting power, and doing “everything else” (e.g. humanitarian relief, logistics, training foreign navies, etc. I would have included “marketing” American technology).

 A strong Navy gives the U.S. a strategic advantage that adversaries lack. While USN has no peer competitor, it is important to the strategic security of the U.S. that the USN maintains its advantage of overwhelming superiority.

 The maritime requirements of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) gives the USN the opportunity to return to its historical roots of an expeditionary surface force of small combatants able to interdict and/or blockade the use of the sea by irregular forces. [It was unclear to me how this “Navy of Decatur” would assimilate its considerable ISR needs, be sustained, or project power ashore in support of land operations.]

Rdml (s) Mike Mahon Director “Deep Blue” on the OPNAV Staff used a power point presentation (available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050620_Mahon.pdf) in making these observations:

 The Navy is currently insuring that it continues to be a globally distributed force postured for the GWOT and Deterrence that uses the current forces to leverage new capabilities and exploit advance technologies.

 In the Navy’s 3-1 Strategy GWOT, Homeland Defense, and Stability Ops are not wholly “lesser included cases” of major combat operations (MCO), which is dramatically different from the strategic environment of the Cold War. [Of course, MCO capabilities trickle down to the other three missions more than capabilities from them funnel up to meet MCO needs]

 The Navy’s Flexible Deployment Concept centered around expeditionary strike groups and the fleet response plan allows the Navy to meet more requirements with the same number of forces.

 GWOT requirements to find, fix, and finish the adversary are driving the Navy to pursue new capabilities in the areas of data mining, visualization, biometrics, intrusive/persistent ISR, time sensitive/precision strike, distributed ASW, missile defense, etc.  The GWOT seems to imply that the Navy needs a “back to the future” pre carrier and submarine force that is surface ship centric that possess more capabilities in the areas of civil affairs, expeditionary training teams, riverine forces and armed expeditionary sailors (i.e. naval infantry). [at this point I along with several others where curious about how many carriers and submarines Rdml (s) Mahon thought the Navy would need in the future].

Robert Work, a retired Marine Colonel who on active duty was the first Director of the Marine Corps’ Strategic Initiatives Group and is now a senior analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, talked to a power point presentation (available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050620_work.pdf) about the following:

 In 1890 the USN shifted from strategy of hemispheric blockade to competing with and surpassing the naval powers of the world, which it did circa 1944.

 The relative power of the USN compared to over Navies is staggering. Besides possessing a 17 Navy tonnage standard, operating 12 of the world’s 15 aircraft carriers as well as 12 of the 19 light carriers in the world, the USN has magazine capacity in its 71 major combatant (thanks to Vertical Launch Systems) equal to the total capacity of 366 combatants in the next 17 largest navies.

 Joint operations are generally facilitated by the US’ command of the sea, which Samuel Huntington says allows military commanders to think of the “sea as base” --- which should not to be confused with the Seapower 21 construct of “sea base.”

 There have been four “national security eras” in the history of the U.S. each there own signature element of naval power: o The Continental Era (1783-1889)/Frigate-Cruiser Era o The Oceanic Era (1890-1946)/Battleship Era o The Transoceanic-Garrison Era (1947-1988)[Cold War]/Carrier Era o The Joint Expeditionary Era )1989-present)/none identified [Relative to the Transoceanic Era, it occurred to me that the USN is still an expeditionary service, but operating more from its Continental US (CONUS) than forward deployed bases like it did in the Cold War.]

 The 2005 QDR promises to the first true defense review of the Joint Expedition beary Era. Look for the metrics of force planning and sizing to change.

 In the GWOT the enemy may not have a navy but they do have a naval strategy of “guerre de course” (i.e. irregular warfare at sea to disrupt U.S. use of the sea). To be successful against this strategy the USN must be able to deny the enemy the use of seas for operational purposes and deter/defend the enemy’s “threat-in-being” from attacking CONUS from the sea.  Conceptually the Navy needs four different fleets, which are virtually unaffordable with a shipbuilding budget of $9-11 billion a year. o A Strategic Deterrent/Dissuasion Fleet o A Homeland Defense/Irregular Warfare/Global Patrol Fleet o A Sea as Base Power Projection Fleet o A Counter Anti-Access Fleet A modular fleet platform architecture designed to leverage net centricity appears to be the best course for the USN. The Navy, because of its vast superiority can also adopt a “strategy of the second move” where it can afford to wait for foreign naval developments to unmask themselves before responding.

Retired Navy Radm. Mike McDevitt from the Center for Naval Analysis painted a picture of how the strategic landscape probably looks from China’s perspective:

 China has a long sea coast where most of its population and new found economic strength are concentrated that appears vulnerable to sea attack, while China’s traditional adversaries in South Korea and Japan have have capable navies and military alliances with the US. Besides Taiwan, China has other island/economic disputes in the East and South China Sea. Access to Middle East oil is becoming increasingly important to China’s continued economic growth. For these reasons China has purposely chosen to overweight it’s military spending on naval and air forces.

 It appears that China is developing a Soviet like sea denial/anti-access Navy built around land based maritime aviation, a significant submarine order of battle, a land based anti-ship ballistic missile capability, and amphibious lift. [Such a Navy could clearly hold Taiwan at risk, but is not one capable of projecting power at great distance.]

 An appropriate USN response to a Chinese Sea Denial Navy is one that can maintain air superiority over Taiwan; can confound ballistic missile targeting while also having a missile defense capability; and has a robust distributed ASW capability.

 The Chinese Navy will continue to add capability through modernization but not overnight making the “strategy of the second move” a reasonable one.

 Most nations in Asia do not want to be forced to having to chose between the U.S. and China; none seem to want China to be the only great power choice in Asia. [With three of the four panelists calling for a Navy outfitted with a larger number of small combatants to meet both GWOT and homeland protection missions, I asked how this frigate/Decatur like Navy would be differentiated from the Coast Guard and its Deepwater program. In responses from Rdml (s) Mahon and Thomas Manhken I heard that it would be on the basis of traditional missions and home verses away fleets. I was surprised that this question did not cause a discussion about the need for a “National Fleet” and why the Navy and Coast Guard could consider using common hulls.

PANEL II: Sizing, Shaping, and Posturing the Fleet

Terry Pudas, Acting Director Office of Force Transformation, used a power point briefing (available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050620_Pudas.pdf) to present a “Cebrowskiesque” view along the following lines:

 The new strategic environment demands the US increase all its sources of power so it can move from the “domains of military victory” and “strategic primacy” to the “domain of political victory.” In terms Tom Barnett would use: shift from a strategy of containment built around military power to a strategy of connectedness based on all attributes of national power.

 Achieving coherence in national security policy means having elements of national power that are capable of both intervening and achieving strategic effects.

 Access, Speed, Distribution, Mobility, and Networking are the new attributes and metrics of military capability. The USN can use all of these to create/preserve options, employ higher transaction rates, achieve faster learning rates, and create complexity that will over match any adversary’s abilities.

[The issue not addressed in this presentation is where is the tipping point that makes investment in increased complexity/transaction rates through net centricity yield a higher rate of return than investment in platforms with kinetic power?]

Karl Hasslinger, a retired Navy Captain and submarine commanding officer now with General Dynamic’s Electric Boat Division offered the following comments:

 The Navy’s shipbuilding plan is in disarray and if DD(X) is cancelled it will be the fourth surface combatant program to meet such a fate since the fall of the Soviet Union (Arsenal Ship, DD 21, and CVNX). Its time for the Navy to take hard look at why its surface building programs are failing.

 Conversely, the Virginia and Sea Wolfe class SSN and Ohio class SSGN conversions programs are all successful . [Sounded like a GD/Submarine community infomercial to me.]  Foreign submarines are a high leverage force that puts pressure on the Navy’s ability to assure access. This along with ISR requirements and seabed cable vulnerabilities makes for strong case that the Navy needs a fleet of 55 submarines; however, with no change in current funding the Navy is headed towards an inventory of 30 boats.

 Without work in hand the shipbuilding industry can not retain its skilled work force nor can that work force retain its skills. There are currently no new submarines under design.

 Escalating shipbuilding costs weaken the USN and stability of the shipbuilding base is the key to shipyards controlling costs.

Robert Work, from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, gave a second power point presentation (also available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 20050620_work.pdf). His points included:

 A shifting strategic environment usually results in a confused shipbuilding plan.

 The Navy should be sized for a one-one-one paradigm that provides for maritime defense-in-depth of the homeland; is able to fight the persistent irregular war (i.e. GWOT); and is prepared to support one MCO power projection operation. [It was not clear to me if Colonel Work envisioned the Navy taking these missions on sequentially or concurrently.]

 Colonel Work presented a detailed presentation for the “National Maritime Battle Network” that he thinks suits the nations needs. In this construct he sees a National Navy-Coast Guard fleet of 239 “small battle network combatants (mix of LCS, national security cutters, offshore patrol cutters, fast response cutters, and patrol boats).

 Colonel Work also recommends establishing five “Fleet Stations” around the world in the Mediterranean, West Africa, Indian Ocean, East Asia, and Western Pacific to provide infrastructure support to GWOT and/or MCO operations.

 In questions and answers Colonel Work made several significant observations:

o The Navy’s contribution to ground operations in theaters like Iraq will be mostly giving up budget and ultimately developing a naval infantry capability. o The case for strategic speed is not clear because it allows for action without sufficient thought or analysis; the cost of speed has to be measured against the value of time. o Expeditionary warfare is not the same thing as forward presence o Modularity comes with the presumption of “plug and play,” which experience shows is not realistic. o China taking SA-10s to sea is more dangerous to the USN than China building aircraft carriers.

I unfortunately missed the remarks made by David Trachtenberg from National Security Research.

PANEL III: Budgeting, Transformation, and the Defense Industrial Base

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition John Young made the following points:

 Rigorous analysis of what the Navy needs and can afford is of critical importance; we must escape from the “death grip of inaccurate cost projections.”

 The Navy cannot run shipyards and the Navy can only buy to fleet validated requirements.

 The Navy understands the importance maintaining/improving the stability of the industrial base.

 The Navy currently has 10 ship and 14 aircraft programs in progress.

Retired Radm. Paul Robinson from Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding offered the following:

 The DD(X) program is on schedule and within budget with risks being retired.

 Capability and affordability questions have accompanied the introduction of every post Cold War ship introduced.

 Low rate production schemes to save money threaten cost targets and slow the rate of technical insertions.

Andrew Ross, from the Naval War College, spoke about what he thought Navy transformation means for industry:

 Technical innovation associated with LCS and DD(X) will likely introduce disruptive innovation into the shipbuilding industry because of non-traditional developers/suppliers [e.g. software, sensors, etc.]. Conversely technical innovation in surface combatants will be least disruptive to the large Defense Integrators (i.e. Lockheed Martin, Boeing, etc).

Ron O’Rourke from the Congressional Research Service was the last speaker of the day:

 Limited budgets have the salutatory effect of forcing efficiency; he sees more opportunity for the Navy in the areas of organization and CONOPs than in acquisition.

 The Navy says its shipbuilding plan will cost between $11 and 12 billion a year, but the Congressional Budget Office puts the costs at $14 to 16 billion. Creative funding approaches by the Navy will only be effective in the margins of meeting the service’s needs.

 Due to structural and political reasons, he does not expect the Navy’s share of the DoD budget change much.

 A likely option is that the Navy will build only one or two DD(X) ships as technical demonstrators in order to free up money to buy less expansive ships in greater numbers.

Conclusions

As with any conference of this import what is not said is often as important as what was is. I was surprised by how little mention was given to the Navy’s natural mission partners in the Coast Guard and Marine Corps and the contributions the Navy can make to their operational success. The CNO highlighted the importance of manuver warfare, but without questions there would have been little mention during the day of the ISR needed to enable it. By induction, I thought a compelling case was made throughout the day for the Navy to figure out how to make its current programs of record more effective before it sought new capabilities. There was also no discussion about the lack of a civilian shipbuilding industry in the U.S. and the impact this has on the cost of military contracts. The idea of outsourcing military shipbuilding (as is the case with certain military aircraft), amazingly to me, was not brought up at all.

This interesting six hour conference did not challenge my perception based on previously observed institutional behavior that the Navy’s thinking about its strategic vision for itself remains very disrupted by the GWOT and the nature of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The demands of irregular warfare at sea suggest the Navy should be looking to acquire a large a number of lower cost small surface ship combatants whose power and reach is enchaned through networking, but this is at odds with the force Navy sees as necessary (and I believe wants to build) for disuading/winning a force on force naval campaign with a near peer competitor (i.e. China. Access assurance is what the Navy sees as making itself unique to a joint force, but there is a non sequeter here. With the Navy’s current overwhelming superiority there is no navy (or even combined with an air force) on the immediate horizion that could deny the US access to a theater of operations.

What this conference did was crystalize in my mind the need for the Navy to come to grips with whether it sees the GWOT or a maritime centric MCO as representing the greatest threat to national security and then weight its investment strategy for available resources accordingly. Getting this wrong will put a risk the future relevance of the USN, while betting equally on both risks having insufficient capability for either one.

Warm regards,

Distribution:

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