Cited. 9 CA 686. Penal Code Cited. Id

TITLE 53a*

PENAL CODE

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*Although title has no definition of “extreme indifference to human life”, extensive charge on meaning of “recklessly” coupled with the evidence adequately indicate nature of acts qualifying. 176 C. 227. Cited. 180 C. 557. Cited. 201 C. 505.

Cited. 9 CA 686. Penal code cited. Id.

Cited. 35 CS 519. Sec. 53a-1 et seq. cited. 40 CS 498.

CHAPTER 952*

PENAL CODE: OFFENSES

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*Cited. 191 C. 73. Cited. 192 C. 571. Cited. 202 C. 629. Cited. 204 C. 630. Cited. 209 C. 75.

Person convicted, pursuant to chapter 359 (368p), to be sentenced in accordance with this chapter where no inconsistency results. 31 CS 350.

PART IX*

LARCENY, ROBBERY AND RELATED OFFENSES

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*Annotations to former section 53-28:

Violation of this statute necessarily involves an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. 146 C. 227. Cited. 160 C. 42. Cited. 162 C. 6.

Annotations to former section 53-40:

Words “such communication” mean a communication by spoken words as well as one transmitted on a piece of paper. 146 C. 605. Cited. 147 C. 704. Cited. 151 C. 547.

Sentence of three to seven years found proper by Review Division in view of heinous nature of crime and defendant’s poor juvenile record. 25 CS 5.

Cited. 94 C. 701. Taking must be without excuse or color of right, i.e., felonious. 96 C. 421. See note to former Sec. 53-63, infra.

Under information charging theft of motor vehicle, accused cannot be convicted of taking motor vehicle without permission. 113 C. 103. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within provisions of this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum). Evidence taken from stolen motor vehicle in possession of driver, after arrest of driver and detention of vehicle, not admitted into evidence as removed without a search warrant, under rule in Chimel v. California. 395 U.S. 752. 158 C. 641. Since larceny is continuing offense, operating stolen car in Connecticut is theft of that car in state regardless of where defendant had first stolen it. 159 C. 201. Cited. 166 C. 289. Cited 169 C. 38.

Cited. 23 CS 5. Cited. 24 CS 310; Id., 388. In view of defendant’s long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence if not more than five years in reformatory for one count of theft of motor vehicle under this section, in addition to counts of burglary, breaking and entering and larceny, should stand. 27 CS 105. Cited. Id., 108; Id., 220; Id., 272.

Offense not within provisions of Sec. 53-63. 77 C. 140. Cited. 95 C. 602. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within provisions of this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum).

Stealing horse in one state and bringing it into this state is punishable here. 3 C. 186. Value of horse of no consequence. 77 C. 140. Burden of proving additional element to bring crime within this section rests on state. 153 C. 215 (Dictum).

Annotation to former section 53-61:

Information charging theft of “chickens” sufficient. 85 C. 323.

What description of property sufficient. 6 C. 103. Finder of goods knowing owner and not returning them guilty of larceny; 9 C. 529; but finder must originally take with felonious intent. 22 C. 161. Larceny not merged in burglary. 24 C. 57. Jurisdiction of superior court when jury finds value of property to be less than fifteen dollars. Id., 316. Duplicity cured by verdict. 28 C. 231. Bailee opening and converting part or all of package animo furandi is guilty of larceny. 29 C. 49. Dog not the subject of larceny at common law. 31 C. 128; 48 C. 336. Bringing stolen goods into this state is larceny here. 33 C. 264. Theft of horse distinct offense; so of bicycle. 77 C. 136. Larceny defined; 70 C. 269; nature and elements. 72 C. 643; 75 C. 55; 95 C. 38; id., 191; 96 C. 421. Securing property by threat. 70 C. 398. Appropriation by one entrusted with possession; accepting with intent to appropriate. 79 C. 714; 96 C. 426. Embezzlement distinguished. 83 C. 449; 102 C. 659. Taking property lost or mislaid; subsequent intent to appropriate. 89 C. 564. Does not apply to fixture unless it has been detached; lessee in possession as owner; purpose of alleging value; effect of general verdict. 83 C. 286. Taking goods to secure claimed debt held not larceny. 95 C. 35. Securing property by fraud is larceny. Id., 193. Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536. Cited. 110 C. 411. Cited. 127 C. 400. Cited. 154 C. 259. Prosecution for stealing dog may be based on this statute. 127 C. 690. Cited. 139 C. 626. Elements of larceny are (1) wrongful taking and carrying away of personalty of another, (2) felonious intent to deprive owner of it permanently, (3) lack of consent of owner. 140 C. 118. Cited. 143 C. 559. Cited. 149 C. 643, 644, 648. Where larceny of goods falls within provisions of subsection (a), burden of proving additional element essential to bring it into provisions of subsection (b) rests on state. 153 C. 215. Larceny of goods from trading stamp redemption center falls within the provisions of subsection (a). 153 C. 215. Cited. Id., 555. When principal is tricked into parting with possession by agent who, at time of his taking, has felonious intent to convert the property to his own use, offense is larceny and not embezzlement. 154 C. 255. Statute embraces common-law crime of larceny. Id. Goods stolen from trading stamp redemption center were not “goods offered or exposed for sale” within meaning of this subsection. Id. Circumstantial evidence held ample for conviction. 155 C. 297. Cited. 156 C. 391; 158 C. 322; 159 C. 434. Charge stating that it is unnecessary to prove breaking and entering for conviction of larceny upheld. 161 C. 117. Cited. Id; Id., 404. Cited. 162 C. 442. Cited. 165 C. 163.

Cited. 22 CS 198, 200. Cited. 23 CS 319. Cited. 24 CS 127. Concealment includes all acts done which render discovery or identification of property more difficult. Id., 392. Subsection (a) cited. 25 CS 454, 457; Id., 489. Cited. 26 CS 464. Cited. 27 CS 65. Where maximum sentence that could have been imposed under this section would be aggregate of one hundred twenty days except for reformatory commitment, sentence of not more than two years without parole possibility for nine months too severe. Id., 81. In view of defendant’s long record and recidivism it revealed, effective sentence of not more than five years in reformatory for one count of larceny under this section, in addition to counts of burglary, breaking and entering and theft of motor vehicle, should stand. Id., 105. Cited. Id., 149; Id., 220; Id., 237; Id., 244; Id., 272; Id., 318; Id., 341; Id., 347. Sentence of defendant modified where codefendants had received lesser penalties and theft had been for benefit of one codefendant. Id., 398. Cited. 28 CS 240; 357.

Cited. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 553. Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 116, 118, 119. Proof of ownership of property or that it is property of another need not be offered prior to admission of property as exhibit. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 50, 53. Subsec. (b). Intent of defendant not to pay for purchases he took out of supermarket through checkout operated by his wife may be established as inference from proved facts and circumstances, especially that he had not paid for them. Id., 682. Evidence, though conflicting, was adequate to support finding of trial court that defendant took goods of complainant store without paying for same and without its consent. 5

- 2 - Conn. Cir. Ct. 214. Cited. Id., 530. Carrying of merchandise through checkout counter of cash-over-the-counter self-service store constituted exportation of the goods although immediately thereafter store’s security agent apprehended defendant. Id., 648. Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 526, 527, 556. Cited. Id., 615.

Cited. 133 C. 604.

Theft of growing vegetables as larceny. 105 C. 536.

Collector of town taxes is a town officer or agent within meaning of this section. 73 C. 97. Former statute held not to support a prosecution of officers of a corporation trustee for misappropriation acting as such officers for the corporation. 112 C. 39. Whether corporation may be prosecuted for embezzlement, quaere. 114 C. 359. Cited. 128 C. 158.

Applies to national bank officer purloining special deposit. 34 C. 296. Whether this section applies to a consignee of goods to be sold, quaere. 56 C. 500. Charge of embezzling “moneys” cannot be supported by proof of embezzling a chose in action. 70 C. 265. Distinguished from larceny; claim collector as “agent”; retaining money to meet expenses of other collections. 83 C. 449; 102 C. 659. Elements of crime; agency need not exist before receipt of goods embezzled. Id., 660. Violation of this statute is distinguished from larceny in that latter is always characterized by a felonious taking. Id. Proof of fraudulent conversion; wide latitude in receiving evidence of fraudulent intent. 112 C. 54. Essentials of proof. 114 C. 458. Broker selling stock as owner is not agent of purchaser. Id., 463. Intent of accused to restore stock taken does not absolve him of guilt for unlawful appropriation. 115 C. 306. Defendant may be tried in any jurisdiction where any part of the embezzlement was committed. 128 C. 157. Not embezzlement by agent when title to property is intentionally transferred to defendant; may be obtaining under false pretenses. Id., 158. Possible for a person to embezzle from a corporation the stock in which is wholly owned by him. 147 C. 589. In a prosecution for embezzlement the range of relevant evidence is wide, especially as it bears on the essential element of an intent to defraud, which involves a state of mind and can generally be proved only by circumstantial evidence. Id. Defendant bookkeeper of corporation whose checks she embezzled held to be an agent within meaning of statute. History of statute reviewed. 156 C. 233.

Cited. 25 CS 354.

What facts within this section. 12 C. 111. Particular kind of false pretense must be alleged. 27 C. 320. Mere naked assertion may be false pretense. Id., 591. Evidence of pecuniary ability inadmissible to rebut motive. Id. False pretense must be made before property is obtained. 43 C. 479. Distinguished from conspiracy to defraud. 75 C. 209. Conviction under this statute forfeits privileges of an elector. 86 C. 624. Liability of bank to depositor in damages for his arrest under this section when bank negligently returned check marked “no account”. 131 C. 167. A mere promise to do an act, even though the promisor has, at the time, no intention of keeping it, is not within the statute. 137 C. 140. Cited. 150 C. 197. Where one of alleged coconspirators to violate this section is acquitted, this does not necessarily make fatal convictions of other coconspirators. 151 C. 592. Cited. 153 C. 599. Cited. 158 C. 266. Cited. 161 C. 43.

Cited. 12 CS 44. Cited. 22 CS 345. Court not empowered to decide whether extradition from Florida was illegal or not. 25 CS 141. Cited. Id., 347; Id., 354. Sentencing for several crimes under this section modified on appeal. 27 CS 18. Cited. Id., 283. Sentence in excess of jurisdiction of circuit court is not invalid in its entirety but only for period in excess of one year. 28 CS 424.

Statute violated when goods were obtained by postdated check. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99. Subsequent return of goods did not purge offense. Id. Not error to deny motion for new trial even if witness’s testimony was false but it appears that result reached on new trial would not be different. Id., 257. Court held that pretense must relate to an existing or past fact and not to some future transaction. Id., 392. A false pretense is an untrue representation of some fact or circumstance calculated to mislead. The representation may be by conduct as well as words. Id., 516. History discussed. Id., 517.

States a rule for criminal prosecution and does not state a rule effective in a civil action under section 52-562. 136 C. 222.

- 3 - Not an additional remedy in a civil action; refers solely to a criminal prosecution. 16 CS 160. Action for defamation against bank for failure to honor checks discussed. 20 CS 115. Unless notice of dishonor was given, no statutory presumption of intent to defraud can arise. Conviction for the crime is still possible, but more difficult. 23 CS 374. The trier could consider defendant’s check transactions immediately preceding and following the drawing and delivery of the check in question as relevant not only to issue of intent but also to question of defendant’s knowledge. Id.

Crime distinguished from false pretenses, Sec. 53-360. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 99. Must be evidence of intent to defraud. Id., 349. Three elements in definition of offense. Id.

An employee of selectmen to assist in care of paupers an “agent” within meaning of this section. 58 C. 104.

Accused, guilty of embezzlement, may be prosecuted as an agent of the state for a lesser crime under this section; state held to be “public community”. 6 CS 252.

Cited. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 387.

Annotations to present part IX of chapter 952:

Cited. 43 CA 801. Part IX of penal code cited. Id. Cited. 47 CA 1.

Sec. 53a-128. Issuing a bad check. Penalties. (a) A person is guilty of issuing a bad check when: (1) As a drawer or representative drawer, he issues a check knowing that he or his principal, as the case may be, does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time of issuance that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation; or (2) he passes a check knowing that the drawer thereof does not then have sufficient funds with the drawee to cover it, and (A) he intends or believes at the time the check is passed that payment will be refused by the drawee upon presentation, and (B) payment is refused by the drawee upon presentation.

(b) For the purposes of this section, an issuer is presumed to know that the check or order, other than a postdated check or order, would not be paid, if: (1) The issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the check or order was issued; or (2) payment was refused by the drawee for insufficient funds upon presentation within thirty days after issue and the issuer failed to make good within eight days after receiving notice of such refusal. For the purposes of this subsection, an issuer is presumed to have received notice of such refusal if the drawee or payee provides proof of mailing such notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the issuer at his last known address.

(c) Issuing a bad check is: (1) A class D felony if the amount of the check was more than one thousand dollars; (2) a class A misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than five hundred dollars but not more than one thousand dollars; (3) a class B misdemeanor if the amount of the check was more than two hundred fifty dollars but not more than five hundred dollars; or (4) a class C misdemeanor if the amount of the check was two hundred fifty dollars or less.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 130; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 28; P.A. 80-109; P.A. 81-225; P.A. 83-137.)

History: 1971 act removed former Subsec. (a) containing applicable definitions, but see Sec. 53a-118(a); P.A. 80-109 amended Subsec. (b) to add provision re presumption that issuer has received notice of drawee’s refusal to pay; P.A. 81-225 included proof of mailing by payee as acceptable in presuming that issuer has received notice; P.A. 83-137 amended Subsec. (c) to reclassify the offense from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony or a class A, B or C misdemeanor depending upon the amount of the check.

Cited. 202 C. 443. Cited. 20 CA 811.

- 4 - Cited. 34 CS 584. Ability of court to order personal restitution in amount of bad corporate check when there is no finding as to the ability of the defendant to pay or as to the extent of his gain. Restitution properly ordered against individual defendant issuer of bad corporate check. 35 CS 536.

Sec. 53a-129a. Identity theft defined. (a) A person commits identity theft when such person intentionally obtains personal identifying information of another person without the authorization of such other person and uses that information to obtain or attempt to obtain, money, credit, goods, services, property or medical information in the name of such other person without the consent of such other person.

(b) As used in this section, “personal identifying information” means any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual including, but not limited to, such individual’s name, date of birth, mother’s maiden name, motor vehicle operator’s license number, Social Security number, employee identification number, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health insurance identification number, demand deposit account number, savings account number, credit card number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation.

(P.A. 99-99; P.A. 03-156, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 03-156 revised section to replace offense of identity theft with definition of identity theft by amending Subsec. (a) to replace “A person is guilty of identity theft when” with “A person commits identity theft when”, delete requirement that the use of such information be “for any unlawful purpose” and include “money” and “property” among items the person obtains or attempts to obtain, by designating definition of “personal identifying information” as new Subsec. (b) and amending said definition to add provision that such information means “any name, number or other information that may be used, alone or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific individual”, include such individual’s name, date of birth, employer or taxpayer identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, health insurance identification number, debit card number or unique biometric data such as fingerprint, voice print, retina or iris image, or other unique physical representation and replace “demand deposit number” with “demand deposit account number” and by deleting former Subsec. (b) classifying identity theft as a class D felony.

Sec. 53a-129b. Identity theft in the first degree: Class B felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the first degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds ten thousand dollars.

(b) Identity theft in the first degree is a class B felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 2.)

Sec. 53a-129c. Identity theft in the second degree: Class C felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the second degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a, and the value of the money, credit, goods, services or property obtained exceeds five thousand dollars.

(b) Identity theft in the second degree is a class C felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 3.)

- 5 - Sec. 53a-129d. Identity theft in the third degree: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of identity theft in the third degree when such person commits identity theft, as defined in section 53a-129a.

(b) Identity theft in the third degree is a class D felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 4.)

Sec. 53a-129e. Trafficking in personal identifying information: Class D felony. (a) A person is guilty of trafficking in personal identifying information when such person sells, gives or otherwise transfers personal identifying information, as defined in section 53a-129a, of another person to a third person knowing that such information has been obtained without the authorization of such other person and that such third person intends to use such information for an unlawful purpose.

(b) Trafficking in personal identifying information is a class D felony.

(P.A. 03-156, S. 5.)

Sec. 53a-130. Criminal impersonation: Class B misdemeanor. (a) A person is guilty of criminal impersonation when he: (1) Impersonates another and does an act in such assumed character with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (2) pretends to be a representative of some person or organization and does an act in such pretended capacity with intent to obtain a benefit or to injure or defraud another; or (3) pretends to be a public servant other than a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety, or wears or displays without authority any uniform, badge or shield by which such public servant is lawfully distinguished, with intent to induce another to submit to such pretended official authority or otherwise to act in reliance upon that pretense.

(b) Criminal impersonation is a class B misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 132; P.A. 97-123, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 97-123 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to exclude from the offense a person pretending to be “a sworn member of an organized local police department or the Division of State Police within the Department of Public Safety” and include the wearing or display of a “shield”.

Cited. 194 C. 213; Id., 233. Cited. 207 C. 109. Cited. 209 C. 23. Cited. 225 C. 650. Held not to be unconstitutionally vague. 2 CA 204. Cited. 18 CA 694. Cited. 32 CA 724. Cited. 40 CA 643. Does not require use of an official or real badge because statute’s goal is to prohibit criminal impersonation with intent of inducing another to submit to authority that he or she does not possess. 66 CA 819. Subsec. (a): Subdiv. (1): Statute as written does not prohibit giving a false name. 194 C. 213. Subdiv. (1) cited. 198 C. 68; 199 C. 146; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 235 C. 502. Subdiv. (1) cited. 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502. Cited. 37 CA 589. Subdiv. (3) cited. 45 CA 303. Statute prohibits impersonating another, not merely giving a false name. 60 CA 534.