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Mid-term Evaluation of the International Peace and Prosperity Project’s Work in Guinea-Bissau (October 2004 – February 2006)

Prepared for the International Peace and Prosperity Project, Ottawa, Canada

An Early Response Project of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation www.ciian.org

By Paz Buttedahl, Ph.D. and Rosemary Cairns, M.A. Royal Roads University Victoria, B.C., Canada

April 2006 2

1. INTRODUCTION...... 3 2. THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND PROSPERITY PROJECT. .3 a) Guinea-Bissau: A Test Case...... 4 b) Finding the IPPP Niche...... 6 c) A Base for Action...... 7 d) Reconciliation as a Way Forward...... 8 e) The Citizens Goodwill Task Force...... 9 f) The Second Round Campaign...... 10 g) The Challenges of Army Reform...... 12 h) Expanding Its Network of Relationships...... 13 i) Taking Practical Action to Realize A New Future...... 15 j) Finding the Resources...... 16 3. ASSESSING THE RESULTS OF IPPP’S WORK...... 17 a) The Value of Flexibility...... 18 b) Relationship-building with the Army...... 20 c) The Value of Short-term Actions...... 21 d) The Challenge of Building Capacity...... 24 e) The Importance of Rural Agricultural Development...... 26 f) Assessing Achievement...... 28 4. THE POTENTIAL FOR AN EXPANDED IPPP...... 30 REFERENCES:...... 32 3

1. Introduction The International Peace and Prosperity Project is a unique citizen-initiated attempt to deal effectively with factors contributing to state failure through a rapid, flexible, and collaborative approach that mobilizes local and international resources and skills to set a weak state on the road to peace and prosperity for all of its citizens. Begun in 2004 as a pilot project in the troubled West African state of Guinea-Bissau, the IPPP now is exploring whether its evolving model has possible application in other potentially-failed states. As IPPP noted earlier this year, “Guinea-Bissau is a microcosm of the circumstances in the marginalized parts of the developing world [and] thus a test case of whether the leading actors in the international community are truly able to respond to the renewed post 9/11 anti-poverty and broader development agenda that they have set for themselves, even where the opportunities to do so are likely to bear real fruit.”1 This mid-term evaluation builds on earlier internal and external studies of IPPP’s activities, philosophy and learning to produce an overarching statement of lessons learned and recommendations for the project’s work in Guinea-Bissau as well as possibilities of replicating this work elsewhere. The evaluation, based on external review of project documentation and correspondence, has been carried out by a team that has extensive experience in human security and peacebuilding analysis and community development and earlier study of Guinea-Bissau. Evaluating a project at a distance inevitably means that more questions are asked than are answered, due to lack of access to informants; however, given IPPP’s action- oriented research focus and the project’s mid-point status, these questions may feed effectively into its evolving model as well as its ongoing work in Guinea-Bissau. This evaluation begins with a narrative summary of IPPP’s first 16 months of activity (October 2004-February 2006), compiled from project documentation and selected email correspondence supplied by IPPP. Additional information from other sources has been included where it appears relevant and helpful.

2. The International Peace and Prosperity Project IPPP grew out of the observation that despite extensive study of state failure, the international community often does not respond early enough, or effectively enough, to the catalysts or triggers that often set off violence in poor and politically unstable countries. In 2002, retired American business executive Milt Lauenstein invited a small, multinational group of specialists to help him design a small project to reduce such violence and bloodshed. The group identified effective early action on threats to a fragile state whose development potential was being hampered by political instability and social deterioriation as a project that could add value to existing international aid practice and development strategies. The group suggested that working closely with individuals and organizations to manage social and political tensions peacefully, strengthen the state’s institutional capacity for development, and identify the country’s vulnerabilities, strengths and opportunities could help local and international actors focus on building a prosperous and peaceful future. Thus the IPPP approach was born – collaborative, research-based, action-

1 Guinea-Bissau: “Failed state” looking to recover. Jan. 2006, page 2. 4 oriented, strategic, flexible and catalytic, working with existing local and international capacities to create a shared, coherent, indigenously-designed and adequately-resourced approach that would move a country away from unproductive tension and thus achieve maximum peacebuilding and development effectiveness in a weak state.

a) Guinea-Bissau: A Test Case Based on work being done through a Canadian university2 to identify conflict risk that could facilitate effective early international response, IPPP chose to work in Guinea- Bissau, a small multi-ethnic West African country whose post-independence economic and social progress had been severely interrupted by a 1998-1999 conflict that destroyed much of its infrastructure and drove away donors on whose aid it was heavily reliant. Agricultural development in its 90,000 tiny rural villages or tabanças anchored its fragile economy, but in the 1990s, many people had been reduced to the “one-shot diet” – one meal a day – as the country turned from food producer to food aid recipient.3 Extreme poverty, high income inequality, low human development, few businesses, low private and foreign investment, high state debt, and government reliance on aid4 to pay soldiers, teachers and other public servants, left Guinea-Bissau vulnerable to recurrent social and political tensions that could spark destructive ethnic violence and destroy its fragile post- 1999 recovery. However, Guinea-Bissau’s history also showed signs of hope. Its people had fought hard for a decade to achieve their independence – so hard, in fact, that they helped restore democracy to the colonial power that had ruled them for more than 500 years. They had greatly improved on the poor human development legacy of the colonial era, although this was still very low.5 Unlike neighbouring states, its people had never turned on one another in bloody internecine war and, in fact, civil society had played a key role in peacefully resolving the 1998/99 conflict, which removed a long-serving President, and a peaceful 2003 coup, which removed his successor. While the coordinated and integrated forward movement in key sectors that was needed seemed out of reach due to severe economic crisis, political rivalries among its small elite leadership, and military instability, Guinea-Bissau had reached out for help when it was offered. When the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) began work in 2002 to create a comprehensive, integrated and coordinated approach to support for African countries emerging from conflict, for example, Guinea-Bissau was the first country to ask ECOSOC to create such an advisory group.6

2 The Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project being carried out by David Carment, principal investigator, and a team at Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University. 3 A detailed description of the country’s agricultural situation can be found in the African Development Bank’s 2005 appraisal report that forms part of the Guinea-Bissau, Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Project (PRESAR) (North, west and east regions). 4 Net ODA dropped sharply after the war, from $177.9 million in 1996 to $52.4 million in 1999. While UN assistance declined as well, from $11.1 million in 1996 to $9.0 million in 1998, UN aid increased in response to the country’s post-conflict needs, to $14.9 million in 1999.(ECOSOC 2003 28) 5 Life expectancy in 1960 was 34; now it is 45 for men and 48.9 for women), while mortality for children under five has dropped from 336 per 1000 in 1960 to the current rate of 204 per 1000. (CIDA)

6 In 2002, ECOSOC created an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on African Countries Emerging from Conflict to help examine the humanitarian and economic needs of individual countries; to review relevant programs of support; to prepare recommendations for a long-term program that integrates relief, rehabilitation, 5

Guinea-Bissau’s most capable leader, agronomist and PAIGC founder Amilcar Cabral, had been lost to the country only months before independence was declared. His assassination in Guinea set off a chain of purges within PAIGC that regularly reduced the country’s small leadership pool, especially because PAIGC and FARP, its armed wing, had provided the only education and leadership training available to most of the country’s citizens. His half-brother, Luis, became President, in September 1973 and led the country until he was removed in a coup led by João Nino Vieira, the former head of FARP, PAIGC’s armed wing, who had served as Prime Minister since September 1978. Vieira subsequently held the Presidency for almost 20 years until he was forced into exile in 1999 after he attempted to remove the army chief of staff.7 In the 2000 election, Kumba Yala, who was defeated by Vieira in the country’s first multi-party presidential election six years earlier, rallied his Balanta supporters and won a large majority. Despite having a competent core of cabinet ministers, Yala proved an unpredictable and erratic leader who did not effectively manage military-government relationships or the economy, and he was removed, to popular relief, in a bloodless coup in the fall of 20038 and agreed not to seek office for five years. Two weeks later, respected businessman Henrique Rosa became interim president. Rosa worked with the National Assembly elected in the spring of 2004 to deal with the country’s many economic and social challenges including finding funds to hold a new presidential election in 2005. In the fall of 2004, as IPPP was beginning its work, both Yala and Vieira were rumoured to be seeking a return to the country’s top office. Given past history, there was concern that Yala might stir up his Balanta supporters to win election, and that the army might once again become involved in the political process. The Presidential election thus represented a potential trigger for violence.

b) Finding the IPPP Niche The threats to Guinea-Bissau’s tenuous stability came into sharp focus even as the IPPP team was planning its first visit to Guinea-Bissau. In early October 2004, the army’s reconstruction and development in a comprehensive approach; and to provide advice on ensuring the adequacy and coherence of international assistance. Guinea-Bissau was the first country to ask for such an Advisory Group to be formed. ECOSOC established the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau in October 2002, and the group visited Guinea-Bissau in November 2002 and prepared a report that was tabled early in 2003. (ECOSOC 2003b) 7 “The first decade of President Vieira’s presidency was characterized by power struggles in the single- party political system. In March 1984 Prime Minister Victor Saúde Maria was accused of plotting to overthrow the government, dismissed and imprisoned. The position of Prime Minister was abolished and President Vieira formally assumed the role of Head of Government. In August 1985 about 100 soldiers and some civilians, mainly of the Balanta ethnic group, were dismissed or arrested in the context of another alleged plot to overthrow the government. After a grossly unfair trial, Paulo Correia, a popular independence war veteran who had become the First Vice President of the Council of State, was executed by firing squad together with five other prominent figures.” (Amnesty International 1999) 8 “As soldiers took over the presidential residence in the early hours of September 14th, the main reaction from the people of Guinea-Bissau was ‘about time too’. Yet Kumba Yala had won the presidency in January 2000, with 72% of the vote, in an election considered fair. Much hope had been placed in the teacher-turned-politician, who promised to heal this small West African country torn by civil war, and with a messy history of military coups and chronic mismanagement. But Mr Yala managed to squander all that goodwill. His style of government was wilful. Ministers were arbitrarily sacked, and fearsomely scolded. He fought with the judiciary and the media. Public-service salaries went unpaid for months, and schools stayed empty. Subjected to a vote of no confidence last year, Mr Yala simply dissolved parliament. Foreign donors complained of corruption and erratic shifts in policy.” (Economist 2003) 6 chief of staff and its head of human resources were killed in a dispute over salaries that had not been paid to soldiers who had served in a UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia. Despite the increased tensions that resulted, the five-person IPPP team decided to go ahead with its visit in mid-October after consulting with local people. Although senior government and army officials were not available, the team met with a wide range of individuals and organizations, facilitated and guided by the team’s local NGO contacts that included a civil society leader. Representatives of the nongovernmental peace and development communities, businesses, international institutions, political actors, and diplomats shared their views, and the team visited the northern border region, destabilized by long-running conflict within Senegal’s southern Casamance region, that was a trigger for the 1998/99 conflict in Guinea-Bissau. During its meetings, the IPPP team focused on action-oriented questions: what were the basic social, cultural, economic and institutional conditions? How were these concerns being addressed by existing in-country capacity? What programs, projects, policies or other activities being carried out by government, domestic civil society, international NGOs and international IGOs addressed these concerns? What significant and needed activities could IPPP contribute that would add real value in helping Guinea- Bissau build its stability and capacity so as to make progress toward prosperity?9 The trip was cut short by rumours that a coup was planned for October 23-24, and IPPP was asked to sound an international alert. This early request helped crystallize one of the useful roles that IPPP has subsequently played – informing the wider audience outside Guinea-Bissau of the country’s challenges and progress. Thus, in addition to its October email alert to key actors and supporters, the IPPP team began preparing a larger document that would begin to gain wider international attention and support for the country’s efforts to move forward. This document, entitled “Mission Possible: A Ripe Opportunity to Avert Violent Conflict and Achieve Sustainable Peace in Guinea-Bissau”, reviewed the most urgent threats to stability and outlined a possible collaborative strategy for addressing them. Distributed widely in February 2005, this document fed into a one-day roundtable that was held in Washington DC the following month. Arranged by IPPP through the Alliance for International Conflict Prevention and Resolution (AICPR), the round table session was attended by two people from Guinea-Bissau and the country’s consul in the US capital who participated actively.10 This blend of active local participation, and outreach to external actors, gradually built a two-way network of support and interest11 that has often had ripple effects far beyond the initial splash of meetings and reports.

c) A Base for Action After its initial visit to Guinea-Bissau in October 2004, the IPPP team prepared a report summarizing what they had learned, identifying the concerns, strengths and actions already underway, and identifying the next steps IPPP planned to take. They “reported back”, sending the report to those they had interviewed in Guinea-Bissau, and “reported out” - to external agencies working in or interested in Guinea-Bissau and to IPPP’s own

9 Scouting Trip to Guinea-Bissau, Nov. 15, 2004, pages 2, 5-6. 10 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 4. 11 To use Ken Menkhaus’ term in his assessment of the WSP International/Somaliland Academy of Political Development project, these contacts, friends and supporters constitute IPPP’s “social capital”. (Menkhaus 2002:7) 7 network12. As well as identifying opportunities for lobbying and advocacy that IPPP regularly followed up, this process modelled a constructive communication process and began the process of sharing information widely, and horizontally as well as vertically, both within Guinea-Bissau and within various external agencies with an interest or stake in the country.13 As the IPPP team discovered in October, there was a general consensus about the country’s problems and how these should be addressed, and a number of people and groups – local and international - were already active in peacebuilding and development. Two chambers of commerce were mobilizing the small but determined private sector, a new Western Union office had been established, and one Mauritanian and two Senegalese banks planned to being operating in 2005, and a Portuguese company had been contracted to rehabilitate the airport. A local NGO was employing former soldiers in a de-mining program, and international NGOs were carrying out community-based education, social service, refugee assistance and economic development activities with USAID funding. Work was underway on electoral reform and human rights and the small but active nongovernmental community, with strong female leadership, was holding dialogues with mid-rank military officers, working to build schools and mobilize women in public issues. The Ghana-based Western African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), which had mobilized women during the 2004 National Assembly elections, was opening an office in November through which WANEP-trained monitors would take part in the ECOWAS14 “early warning” system that would start up early in 2005. The Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) was following up its earlier government-army mediation by sending unarmed monitors. The UN Office in Guinea- Bissau (UNOGBIS) was led by a former soldier15 knowledgeable in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and had run reconciliation workshops with community and military representatives, but the office’s mandate was up for review in December. The UN Development Program (UNDP) also was active. “Before and during the Scouting Trip to Guinea-Bissau, we were encouraged to focus on action. We were encouraged to look seriously at the need to reform the military. We were encouraged to consider the economic needs of the country and think of ways to respond to those. We also wanted to build on what is known and what exists of promise, including efforts to stimulate the economy and bolster community-based efforts at building a vibrant civil society.”16

12 Early on, it had created a system of real-time analysis whose feedback loops included news and internet information sources; resource people, civil society and government in Guinea-Bissau; other regional NGOs; and governments active in Guinea-Bissau. (IPPP Internal Evaluation, Hoffman 2005) 13 One of the organizational management lessons that came from chaos theory is that open flow of information creates a much larger range of possibilities for action than occurs when information is tightly controlled within an hierarchical management system. 14 Economic Community of West African States. 15 João Bernardo Honwana of Mozambique was named the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Guinea-Bissau and Head of UNOGBIS as of Sept. 15, 2004. (UN Security Council 2004) UNOGBIS was established in June 1999 in response to ECOSOC’s request for recommendations on what could be done to support peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. UNOGBIS mandate was subsequently extended to Dec. 31, 2003. A Trust fund in support of UNOGBIS activities was established July 29, 1999. (ECOSOC 2003a 24) 16 Scouting Trip to Guinea-Bissau, Nov. 15, 2004, page 7. 8

d) Reconciliation as a Way Forward Following its visit, IPPP created a small seed grants fund to allow it to meet needs as they became evident, which proved to be a far-sighted development that shortly would play a key role in galvanizing local activity, and made plans to meet with the newly- appointed head of the armed forces. General Tagme Na Wai had surprised many observers by pledging to keep the army out of politics and to work towards reconciliation in the army. During their January meeting, the IPPP team was impressed by his candor and concern for his soldiers and this contributed to IPPP’s decision to place a new importance on reconciliation as a solid foundation for building peace and prosperity. IPPP found itself focusing on reconciliation as both a precondition, and a uniting theme, for helping Guinea-Bissau move forward, even if this did not seem as direct a route as the detailed action planning IPPP had thought would be the next step. This soon led into two activities that would have an impact on the election – the creation of the citizen-driven task force to work on the election campaign, and activities to support the army’s neutrality by helping to address the poor living conditions of its soldiers and thus facilitating reconciliation. In February 2005, IPPP prepared and circulated a concept paper outlining the idea of a Year of Reconciliation and Renewal as a possible umbrella theme for a variety of peacebuilding and conflict resolution activities.17 The idea was welcomed warmly enough that IPPP director Ben Hoffman went to Guinea-Bissau in April to meet with stakeholders and explore the possibilities.18 While he hoped to form a steering committee that would develop practical steps across a range of issues and sectors, he found stakeholders had a more immediate focus – ensuring a peaceful election process. That was because the situation had rapidly become critical, as IPPP explained in another international alert issued on April 11, 2005. Three former presidents were among the potential candidates. Malam Bacai Sanha represented the ruling PAIGC party; Yala, despite his earlier agreement to stay out of politics, had announced himself as the PRS candidate before thousands of cheering supporters; and Vieira, who had been living in Portugal for the past six years, descended from a helicopter and announced to a political rally in the Bissau sports stadium that he was an independent candidate. It became increasingly evident that political leaders had been trying to stir up ethnic rivalries, and Tagme Na Wai’s determination to keep the army out of politics left him feeling alone and under great pressure.19 The country was facing three triggers of potential violence within a very short period of time – the Supreme Court ruling on candidates’ eligibility in late April, the expiry of the interim presidency in May (only Yala’s party had refused to extend it until the election), and the election in June. Representatives of local NGOs, the army, UNOGBIS and other UN agencies, and various international agencies including the Dutch NGO SNV attended the April meeting. “Participants responded favorably and began to plan specific actions in response to the emerging pre-election tensions. IPPP provided a small grant on the spot to make possible the formation and activities of a GB-generated, multi-actor, collaborative Task Force.”20 This was the genesis of the Citizens Goodwill Task Force (CGWTF), which played a

17 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 4. 18 IPPP email alert April 11, 2005, “Urgent call to action now in Guinea-Bissau”. 19 Ibid. 20 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 5. 9 vital role in ensuring that both rounds of the Presidential election (June 19 and July 22) took place peacefully and that voters were encouraged to consider the issues thoughtfully. The Task Force started work immediately to create a national campaign involving all sectors, political parties and the military that would include a pre-election dialogue and a code of conduct that would commit the major stakeholders to respect the election results and existing laws, use the courts to resolve complaints, and support the army’s neutrality. In its April alert, IPPP suggested that high-level mentors and technical support would be needed to support the army chief of staff, encourage statesmanship by potential candidates, and assist the Supreme Court’s decision-making. These needs were subsequently facilitated, in various forms, by IPPP, ECOWAS and the CGWTF.

e) The Citizens Goodwill Task Force The first trigger for conflict had been resolved when the Supreme Court validated the applications of 17 of the 21 candidates, including Yala.21 Yala, who apparently felt the court decision invalidated the charter under which the transitional presidency operated, then announced that he had decided to resume his presidential term and postpone the elections. The next week, although he later denied it, he apparently tried to occupy the presidential palace but was forced to leave by the army. His actions sparked peace marches throughout the country, including a march by thousands of school children and their teachers in Bissau. The police dispersed an unauthorized demonstration by his supporters, and the President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Electoral Commission reaffirmed their commitment to holding the election as scheduled.22 In effect, then, public support for a peaceful election appeared to deal with Yala’s disrespect for the charter he had signed. That left only the third trigger – the election itself. Buoyed by IPPP’s technical help, encouragement and $3,500 grant, the CWGTF was already working hard to make the June 19 election peaceful, free and fair. The group drafted an Electoral Code of Conduct using several sample codes provided by IPPP, and obtained the signatures of all candidates except Yala, who refused to sign. The Task Force then distributed and explained the code widely through religious and other civil society organizations, and publicized it through the media. The next step was to organize a national campaign to promote peaceful elections by sponsoring media events and distributing t-shirts, hats and banners that encouraged voters to make their decision on the issues rather than ethnicity or the promise of favours.23 As the CGWTF campaign picked up speed and momentum, others offered encouragement, help and support. In mid-May, an ECOWAS team24 which met with the

21 In a decision announced on 18 May 2005, the Supreme Court validated the applications of 17 of the 21 candidates, including former Presidents Yala and Vieira, former Prime Ministers Francisco Fadul and Faustino Imbali, and Malam Bacai Sanha, the interim President in 1999. Although some national actors criticized the Supreme Court’s ruling, stressing that it was not strictly based on interpretation of the law, but on political considerations and the fear of violence, the Court’s ruling was nevertheless accepted by Guinea-Bissau society at large. (UN Security Council 2005c 10) 22 Summarized from the Report of the Secretary-General (UN Security Council 2005c 11-14). 23 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 5. 24 “On 21 May 2005, President Obasanjo of Nigeria and current Chairperson of the AU, President Tandja of the Niger and current Chairperson of ECOWAS, President Wade of Senegal, Prime Minister Diallo of the Republic of Guinea and the ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Mr. Chambas, visited Bissau to assess the situation in the country and to meet with key national stakeholders on the forthcoming presidential 10 group was amazed at what it had accomplished. The ECOWAS team offered additional funding, undertook to help ensure that the parties and candidates respected the Code of Conduct, and contacted UNDP to urge it to provide financial support for the group’s work.25 The Dutch NGO SNV, which had been working on rural development for many years, proposed an agreement to provide support.26 CGWTF co-ordinator, Macaria Barai, who kept IPPP up to date on developments by email, described the whole process as “amazing”.27 IPPP provided encouragement, support and congratulations, noting that the CWGTF efforts seemed to be mobilizing civil society on a large enough scale to influence the political dynamics, encourage political actors to behave responsibly, and encourage public respect for the rule of law.28 In a July 2005 update, IPPP advised its international network of the positive developments but urged vigilance during the potentially volatile and politically critical period between the first round election and early July run-off, as well as the immediate post-run-off period. While the election law only allowed for party and international observers, the CWGTF mobilized many people around the country to help the National Electoral Commission distribute ballots to polling stations on June 18, the day before the election, and to work in “peace brigades” on election day, June 19. The brigades worked through the day to monitor the situation outside polling stations, ready to intervene in case of disturbances.29 Regional and international agencies, and General Tagme Na Wai, commended the CWGTF’s work. The EU observer mission noted that “civil society groups positively contributed to reducing political tension during the election process by joining together in the so-called 'citizens of good will' campaign and disseminating a message of peace, unity, reconstruction and social and economic development”.30 The effort also inspired many ordinary people in Guinea-Bissau, including one young IPPP interpreter who began looking for ways to get involved as a volunteer.31

f) The Second Round Campaign Yala finished behind Malam and Vieira in the first round of the election, meaning that the July 24 runoff would be a contest between Malam and Vieira. Yala refused to accept the results, until Senegal’s President Wade invited Malam, Vieira and Yala to Dakar to discuss the way forward. After returning home, Yala announced that he would support Vieira in the second round.32 Even as the provisional first-round results were being announced on June 22, the CGWTF was already at work on its second round campaign, with banners supporting the Electoral Commission’s work and encouraging the army to remain neutral and maintain order.33 As tensions grew between the supporters of the two candidates, the CGWTF met with the media to discuss its important role in elections. The AU/ECOWAS delegation requested all candidates to play a positive role during the electoral process and accept the election results.” (UN Security Council 2005c 13). 25 Email from Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman dated May 20, 2005. 26 Email from Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman dated May 19, 2005. 27 Email from Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman dated May 19, 2005. 28 Email from Ben Hoffman to Macarai Barai dated May 20, 2005. 29 Email from Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman dated June 22, 2005. 30 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 6. 31 Guinea-Bissau: Failed state looking to recover, Jan. 2006, page 6. 32 Email from British Ambassador, Dakar, to Ben Hoffman dated July 14, 2005. 33 Email from Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman dated June 22 2005. 11 promoting the code of conduct and reporting the campaign impartially. Representatives from the three main newspapers and radio stations, national television, president of the Social Communication National Council, representatives of UNOGBIS, ECOWAS and the CPLP, and CGWTF members attended the July 14 meeting.34 Learning that lack of resources meant that journalists, in order to cover the campaign, had to rely on candidates for food, lodging and transportation, the CGWTF sought funding from IPPP to $10,000 to hire vehicles and provide food and lodging for the 10- day period leading up to the election in order to encourage impartial reporting of the campaign. A committee was created, made up of a representative from each media, to work with the CGWTF on this project. IPPP, noting the urgency of getting the project underway, committed the necessary funds but hoped other agencies such as UNDP, UNOGBIS or ECOWAS also would contribute. Based on the IPPP guarantee, the project was officially inaugurated at a July 18 ceremony attended by all media, the journalists union and CGWTF members.35 While CGWTF coordinator Macaria Barai was being interviewed about the grant on the television news, another group member was seeking funding from the Open Society Initiative for West Africa, based in neighbouring Senegal but no reply had yet been received from ECOWAS or UNOGBIS. 36 IPPP arranged for international legal advice that the CGWTF used effectively in the debate surrounding the run off campaign.37 During the week before the election, CGWTF held a series of meetings with key actors in the electoral process: General Tagme Na Wai to encourage the army to remain neutral and to maintain order; the Police Commissioner, about public order; the President of the National Electoral Committee to advise that the CGWTF would provide support in the regions as well as Bissau city, including 19 personal vehicles; the two candidates to remind them that the code of conduct bound them to respect the election results; and the candidates’ campaign managers to encourage their supporters to avoid conflicts “as we’re brothers and sisters and after the elections we’ll have to live together.” The CGWTF also brought representatives of the national youth organizations and childrens’ parliament to meet with the candidates to urge them to respect the promises they had made to the women, youth and children and to respect the final results, the separation of powers and the constitution.38 When the final results were announced on July 28, things were calm except at the headquarters of the two candidates, where the police and army had been forced to step in to maintain order. General Tagme Na Wai issued a press release urging the public to be calm and accept the results. As a result of the interventions, the situation returned to normal and Bissau was very calm. Ms. Barai was overwhelmed and suggested that the “partnership with all of you has some sort of power that I can’t tell.”39

g) The Challenges of Army Reform As in other former colonies, Guinea-Bissau’s army had been an integral part of post-independence government until 1991 and thus its role had been as much about safeguarding independence as providing traditional military services. Even after 1994,

34 Email from Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman dated July 14, 2005. 35 Email Macaria Barai to Ben Hoffman July 18, 2005. 36 Email correspondence between Ben Hoffman and Macaria Barai, July 14-16, 2005. 37 Internal evaluation of IPPP (Hoffman 2005). 38 Email Macarai Barai to Ben Hoffman July 26, 2005. 39 Email message to IPPP team dated July 28, 2005. 12 when Guinea-Bissau became a multi-party state, the army had intervened several times in governance but had always returned power to a civilian-led government. While officially the army numbered only 5,000, some people suggested to IPPP in October that it actually was closer to 30,000. As the core of Cabral’s independence army, the Balanta were thus over-represented in the officer corps,40 a cause for unease in a multi-ethnic country. If Guinea-Bissau was to achieve peace and prosperity, the army had to become smaller, more professional, and politically neutral, but reducing its size and improving professionalism needed care and thought, as well as a stronger economy that could provide alternative employment and business opportunities for young men and demobilized soldiers. Soldiers lived in barracks that were in poor condition,41 often with only one meal a day, and while salaries were very low, non-payment was a periodic trigger for unrest. Improving living conditions could be an important step towards creating the trust needed to begin and sustain reform. As UNOGBIS appeared to be a key player in security service reform, IPPP began lobbying key international actors in November to renew and strengthen the UNOGBIS mandate to allow a stronger focus on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration42. In December, UNOGBIS received a stronger mandate and began reporting quarterly to the Security Council on developments in Guinea- Bissau.43 The newly-appointed army chief of staff, General Tagme Na Wai, had begun army life as an ordinary soldier and his lifestyle appeared modest and low-key. Despite initial concerns about his appointment44, he soon proved determined to keep the army out of politics, improve life for soldiers, and end destabilizing factionalism. In January 2005, the IPPP team learned of his hopes to blend reconciliation and improved living conditions through a pilot project to build a new barracks for a full battalion of 600 soldiers, drawn equally from all tribal groups and integrated through the construction work and life as a new integrated and professional unit.45 This conversation began an ongoing relationship that led IPPP to look for mentors with a professional military background who could provide advice and support for the General. Thus in June, the IPPP team included two retired military men, one from Zimbabwe and one from the United Kingdom. The general’s proposed project suggested a practical opportunity for IPPP to both reward the military for its neutrality during the election process and help pave the way towards the sustained reforms that UNDP and UNOGBIS were discussing with the

40 IPPP email alert April 11 2005, “Urgent call to action now in Guinea-Bissau”. 41 In summarizing a meeting of the Guinea-Bissau leadership held at Goree Institute December 20, 2003, the Goree Institute reported that “People spoke of "la misere des casernes," the misery of the barracks. The general described army life as being in a pig-sty. That something must be done, urgently, to give the soldiers the means to survive with dignity and for those who retire to be integrated into an alternative life, was clear and unanimously agreed.” 42 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 4. 43 Mission Possible, March 2005, page 4 44 “Under pressure from the military forces, the President appointed General Tagme Na Wai as the new Chief of Staff. This led to great concern that Tagme’s ethnic group, the Balanta, comprising about 1/3 of Guinea-Bissau’s 1.3 million population, was gaining even more dominance within the military ranks and that Guinea-Bissau’s politics were taking on more pronounced ethnic overtones. General Tagme surprised many observers, however, when he announced his strong desire for national reconciliation.” (Guinea- Bissau Update, July 4, 2005.) 45 IPPP Alert, April 11, 2005,entitled Urgent call to action now in Guinea-Bissau. 13 government, by offering a small grant for quick repair of some of the dilapidated army barracks46. After consultations with General Tagme Na Wai and his staff, the offices of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and UNOGBIS and UNDP, IPPP and Gen. Tagme Na Wai developed a memorandum of understanding to cover the grant, which also would be used to advise soldiers around the country about the repairs and to encourage professional conduct and political neutrality.47 IPPP also worked to build reconciliation and connection between civil society and the army, funding a reconciliation meeting held in the countryside between the women “soldiers of peace” and the army48, and involved the CGWTF in the army project by giving it responsibility for administering the funds and monitoring project implementation, thus helping to ensure transparency and accountability as well as building links. By January 2006, helped by its strengthened DDR mandate, UNOGBIS had completed an agreement to work with the government, through UNDP, on a program of security sector reform with initial funding from the Brazilian government and potential contributions by other governments, and had also begun a weapons collection program.49

h) Expanding Its Network of Relationships During its fourth visit in June 2005, IPPP continued to nourish and expand its network of relationships within Guinea-Bissau and the region as part of exploring how to move the peace and prosperity agenda forward once the election was over. This network had matured into a two-way communication system, in which IPPP’s contacts in the country kept it up to date on events that were not always reported, or reported in detail or in a larger context, in mainstream media. In turn, IPPP fed much of this information back through regular updates, creating an open communication system that helped overcome ‘silo’ structures within Guinea-Bissau and the international development community. This time, IPPP’s action-oriented focus was on actions it might be able to catalyze through collaboration, as well as continuing to learn about the country’s security and development needs and to explain IPPP’s goals and philosophy to new contacts. In Dakar, Senegal, the IPPP team met with British and American diplomats and the World Bank regional representative. In Bissau, the team met with the Prime Minister and top cabinet and government officials and withthe director of INEP, the country’s main research institute, as well as with Gen. Tagme Na Wai and his staff, UNOGBIS, UNDP, ECOWAS, the UK and Dutch consul, and local and international NGOs active in Guinea- Bissau. The IPPP team also toured an army barracks, Bissau’s port, the university, a landmine removal program, a cashew processing operation, and construction sites for new rural schools.50 During this visit, as it explored the impact of its earlier activities, IPPP came to appreciate more fully the unique role it was playing by fostering synergy and making small strategic grants, especially in comparison with the time frames and constraints in

46 It should be noted that while the IPPP did offer a small grant for this activity, the full amount was not drawn. 47 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page7. 48 IPPP Internal Evaluation (Hoffman 2005). 49 Details are provided in the Secretary-General’s March 2006 report to the Security Council. (UN Security Council 2006 20) 50 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, pages 6-7. 14 which larger organizations worked. While the large governmental or non-governmental organizations were “clearly indispensable for the heavy lifting needed for comprehensive peacebuilding”, their clearly-defined mandates and complex procedures made it difficult for them to play a catalytic role. As an “agile, wide-ranging, initially funded, small and informal group”, IPPP was able to play a unique role by brokering and energizing change and quickly taking advantage of opportunities as they arose. While IPPP had made regular reflection and evaluation part of its process, it decided to build on this realization by arranging for more formal external evaluation of its strategy. 51 IPPP also helped to facilitate wider connections for the CGWTF, making it possible for them to share their story with a wider audience by sponsoring two members to attend meetings of the International Conflict Prevention Consortium in Belfast in October 2005. An earlier visit to Belfast in October 2004 had created connections that brought ICPC members to Guinea-Bissau in June to observe the election.52 As well as encouraging the CGWTF to continue its work after the election, IPPP saw a need to find ways to give practical effect to the various visions that leaders had developed for Guinea- Bissau but which always seemed to stall when it came to implementation. Starting at the grassroots level, with the kind of comprehensive, bottom-up, community-based peacebuilding process in which WSP International specialized, seemed hopeful, and IPPP decided to follow up its initial discussions with WSP. In September 2005, WSP International signed a memorandum of understanding with the Bissau-based National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP) creating a framework for collaboration in developing a joint program53, and began recruiting international staff.54 By January 2006, UNOGBIS had agreed to fund a grass-roots reconciliation and consensus-building project to be carried out by WSP International and INEP, and a project proposed by SNV to conduct conflict resolution training for the Parliament.55 IPPP also found ways to combine the reconciliation focus with its task of making the world more aware of Guinea-Bissau. In June, two independent Canadian filmmakers traveled with the IPPP team to obtain footage for a documentary on reconciliation that would show how Guinea-Bissuans were seeking to repair the wounds and damage of the past and move the country forward. The film crew filmed street scenes, the Task Force’s election activities, met several officials and attracted the attention of several presidential candidates and their supporters.56

i) Taking Practical Action to Realize A New Future IPPP saw the CGWTF’s election work as the first step in a larger campaign to involve civil society in energizing the peace and prosperity process. As it had done earlier in the year, IPPP prepared and circulated a concept paper in September that suggested building on success thus far by developing a vision, strategy and plan for peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau.57 Circulating the paper in advance gave people time to think

51 Guinea-Bissau Update, July 4, 2005, page 8. 52 Internal evaluation of IPPP (Hoffman, 2005) 53 WSP International website. 54 ReliefWeb. 55 UN Security Council 2005a 11, and Guinea-Bissau, Failed state looking to recover, Jan. 2006, page 4. 56 Guinea-Bissau Update July 4, 2005, page 6. 57 Concept Paper: the vision, strategy and a plan for peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau. 15 about and discuss the ideas, as well as encouraging people to become fully aware of how much the country had already achieved – a democratic and peaceful Presidential election; the army’s professional conduct and steps toward internal reconciliation; the CGWTF’s mobilization of civil society for full participation in the democratic process; and the increased focus on Guinea-Bissau by key members of the international community. As IPPP wanted the process to be designed as much as possible by local people, circulating the paper also gave potential committee members a chance to decide if they wanted to be involved in this work. IPPP suggested that a small committee made up of representatives of government, the CGWTF, INEP/WSP, SNV, UNOGBIS and UNDP, facilitated by an IPPP team, could plan the proposed new year meeting. The process would be semi-structured, guided by a framework that posed some key questions, and would build on previous visioning exercises by analyzing the sources of conflict and obstacles to achieving that vision. The three action paths identified to IPPP by local leaders - dialogue among political leaders to develop a culture of political negotiation and accommodation; economic development; and national reconciliation – would help structure the session. The goal, from IPPP’s point of view, was to produce a “fairly detailed, integrated, and sequenced plan of action” that identified a timetable for action, resources needed, and strategies for implementing, supporting, monitoring and evaluating activities and that was feasible in terms of local capacities for action. The planning session held Feb. 15-18 in Guinea-Bissau was organized by IPPP in collaboration with a committee drawn from Guinea-Bissau’s community organizations and attracted 20 key actors, including politicians, army personnel, religious workers, youth and women’s association members, and social communicators. Using a method known as the “conflict tree”, they identified eight major problems, their causes and consequences, and a series of actions to address these.58 The eight key problems included: lack of trade culture; lack of education and professional training; lack of political tools to solve ethnic, religious and military issues; lack of a national image; lack of good administration; army; economic stagnation; lack of justice. These problems were caused by a crisis in state affirmation; lack of qualified human resources; inadequacy and lack of clear goals in the educational and profession training systems; mistrust in win-win dialogue; manipulation of national security and defense force for political means; lack of favorable climate for business and investment; increase of non-conciliatory interest groups; and struggle for power. The visible results of the problems included political instability; corruption; lack of a national image; rise of HIV; unemployment; extreme poverty; strikes and late payment of salaries; criminality; lack of development; permanent conflicts; permanent political crisis; lack of democracy; violence; and lack of good political will.59 Using a force field analysis, the participants identified a series of practical actions that could be taken immediately, on a short-term basis, and on a longer-term basis. IPPP then circulated this plan widely, making it available through the IPPP page on the website of the Canadian International Institute of Applied Negotiation (CIIAN)60.

58 National action plan for peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau, Feb. 18, 2006. 59 Ibid. 60 The IPPP is the first of several planned Early Response violence prevention projects at CIIAN. See: www.ciian.org 16

j) Finding the Resources IPPP had not lost sight of the need for additional resources that would help Guinea-Bissau move beyond crisis management to constructive forward movement, or of the need for increased economic opportunities. As part of its research, IPPP had begun assessing and compiling information about a range of possible short-term economic activities, and promoted the need for such projects whenever and wherever possible. IPPP supported a presentation made to NATO to encourage its involvement in dredging the port at Bissau, one of the projects it considered vital in helping to resuscitate the country’s economy.61 Having learned that the World Bank would soon be reassessing its level of involvement in Guinea-Bissau and that the regional director was proposing a dramatic increase in funding over the next two years, IPPP wrote to the bank’s newly appointed president in mid-September 2005 to support the need for increased funding. “We see many signs that the country is ready to take positive advantage of increased assistance”, IPPP said, and shared its own first-hand knowledge of the effectiveness of “practical levels of funding that enables projects to proceed in increments, where small successes may be built upon.” Relatively small projects, such as dredging the port to increase wharf space, developing export markets for mangos and cashews, and supporting the tourism industry, could have much larger socio-economic benefits, IPPP noted. IPPP highlighted the local sources of information, including the Bank’s regional director and the CGWTF, and noted its plans for developing an integrated national action plan for peace and prosperity early in 2006. Showing part of IPPP’s uniqueness, the letter was signed by Mr. Lauenstein as a private donor and Mr. Hoffman on behalf of IPPP itself.62 In December, the UN Security Council urged governments to step forward to support quick impact projects in Guinea-Bissau. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his September 2005 quarterly report, had urged the international community to show “quick and visible dividends of the present peacebuilding efforts” by supporting a $1.5 million portfolio of community-directed quick-impact projects that would be carried out by non- governmental organizations and would address the needs of vulnerable groups.63 Early in 2006, IPPP also met with the newly-confirmed US ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, veteran diplomat Janice Jacobs, who had indicated during her Senate confirmation hearings that she planned to travel regularly to Guinea-Bissau and that one of the embassy’s political officers already devoted about 80 per cent of his

61 IPPP Internal Evaluation (Hoffman 2005) 62 Letter to Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, dated Sept. 15, 2005. 63 “In the long term, Guinea-Bissau hopes to benefit from the decision of the Group of Eight at its meeting in Gleneagles, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, to cancel multilateral debt for the poorest countries. In the shorter term, the donor round table, scheduled for November 2005, would present an important opportunity for Guinea-Bissau to address the development challenges facing the country. However, the organization of the round table requires institutional stability and substantive support by the international community. Prior to the meeting, it is urgent for the international community to show the population of Guinea-Bissau quick and visible dividends of the present peacebuilding efforts. To that end, a $1.5 million portfolio of community-directed quick-impact projects that can be executed by non- governmental organizations has been submitted to donors for funding to help address the needs of vulnerable groups and mobilize additional popular support for the peace process.” (UN Security Council 2005b, 14) 17 time to following events in Guinea-Bissau.64 The fact that the Senate asked the question appeared to show that Guinea-Bissau now had a higher international profile. IPPP also continued to be active in advocating Guinea-Bissau’s cause with a wide range of organizations whose mandate or interests included peacebuilding in fragile states.

3. Assessing the Results of IPPP’s Work The International Peace and Prosperity Project is an ambitious undertaking, focused as much on building a prosperous country as on preventing the conflict that has often hindered the creation of such prosperity. While prosperity can be and is quantified by international statistical indicators, evaluating the success of a catalytic approach that aims to energize both local and international capacity to peacefully create such prosperity presents considerable challenges. Additionally, because IPPP has deliberately chosen to work in collaboration and conjunction with all other agencies involved in and interested in Guinea-Bissau, much of its work has had a lower profile than if it had been a more established agency that needed to actively promote its activities in order to obtain funding. IPPP also chose to follow a transparent approach, both so others would be aware of its planned and ongoing activities and so any strategic or operational weaknesses could be identified and addressed. Given its goal of synergy, IPPP encouraged other organizations or NGOs to consider meeting urgent needs it was unable to undertake. IPPP also did not have an ongoing field presence in Guinea-Bissau, relying instead on good communication and local resources to facilitate its work. IPPP followed the “virtual business” structure that has become increasing common with globalization – a small core team that is expanded by adding specialists on a short-term basis to meet specific needs. During the first phase of its activities, for example, its team included specialists in conflict analysis, violence prevention, reconciliation and psychosocial needs, peacebuilding and mediation, training and facilitation, military, and the donor community.65 Thus, while it does not have field staff, IPPP also does not face the human resource and associated operational costs that go with maintaining a large organization. IPPP has been able to work in this way because it was endowed with resources by a donor committed to its goals and work and thus was able, like the CGWTF, to concentrate completely on its work without having to advertise and promote its activities widely in order to raise funds. The donor’s commitment to the work also facilitated IPPP’s flexible and synergistic approach: the core team did not have to deal with a large bureaucracy or spend much of their time proposing, defending or reporting on strategies, projects or approaches, as happens in many development organizations.66 However, some of these aspects of its work add to the complexity of evaluating the results of its work over the first 18 months of its activities. As Ken Menkhaus noted in a paper commissioned by WSP International, whose approach is similarly ambitious, evaluators of peacebuilding activities must compare “that which happened with that which would have happened, an exercise which is

64 Jim Fisher-Thompson, New American envoys to Africa will focus on public diplomacy US Dept. of State (Washington, DC) Feb. 9, 2006. 65 IPPP Internal Evaluation (Hoffman 2005) 66 Menkhaus’ evaluation of WSP International’s work in Somalia notes the effects of having to deal with bureaucratic constraints, and to continually explain and defend one’s strategy. (Menkhaus 2002) 18 essentially speculative, not empirical, in nature” and thus requires considerable caution in asserting causal links between a project or activity and a result67. While challenging, such evaluation is not impossible, he says. However, it must be much like “good detective work, which integrates a wide range of techniques – interviews of witnesses, observation, theory based deductions, and scientific examination of evidence – to piece together a narrative which comes as close as possible to the truth.” 68 IPPP’s choice to work in a catalytic, synergistic, flexible and collaborative manner makes it extremely difficult to make clear causal connections between its work and the situation within Guinea-Bissau, especially from a distance and in isolation from the participants. Thus, like Menkhaus’ good detective, the evaluators have put together an evaluation narrative that draws on the observations of the IPPP team itself, the key actors it worked with, and events in Guinea-Bissau, to suggest tentative conclusions.

a) The Value of Flexibility While IPPP’s overall objective and approach has remained constant, its strategy has had to be flexible in responding to the evolving situation in the country and taking advantage of opportunities as they arise, including strategic behind-the-scenes lobbying in support of involvement or activities by other organizations and agencies. Agility and adaptability, combined with the ability to provide technical assistance and small grants very quickly, appears to have been a considerable strength in such a volatile environment as well as a necessary approach in such post-conflict environments.69 Although such flexibility might suggest lack of a plan and could cause tension with more slowly-moving organizations, IPPP’s flexibility appears carefully-grounded and rooted in knowledge of the people, history and environment and of the plans of other actors, as well as a solid theoretical understanding of the realities of working in fragile states. IPPP’s modest assessment of its work is that “our collaboration with civil society organizations and with the army contributed to the national election of June 19 being orderly.”70 Certainly a range of other actors, including the Secretary-General, pay tribute to the role played by civil society and the army in ensuring a peaceful electoral process. Thus it is worthwhile to look at exactly how IPPP collaborated with civil society and the army, in trying to measure the extent of its contribution to a generally-desired goal. Providing funds immediately to the CGWTF allowed the group to focus completely on immediately preparing a national campaign for a peaceful and informed election and thus allowed it to develop a momentum that attracted a range of other regional and international organizations that wanted to provide support. Similarly, the immediate IPPP response to the CGWTF project to support journalists’ travel allowed for

67 Peace and conflict in a community are the results of such a range and combination of factors that causally linking “a change in the social or political environment and a single project, or even a bundle of projects within an aid program” is virtually impossible. Even if good indicators could be identified, measuring impact is constrained by such factors as the lack of reliable statistical data in poor and disrupted societies, time and resource constraints on evaluation, and the subjectivity and multiple meanings of such concepts as peace, reconciliation, conflict, justice and good governance which “can and do exist in tension with one another”. (Menkhaus nd: 8-9) 68 Ibid, 9. 69 This is reflected in the term peace guerrilla which IPPP began using to try and reflect the sense of taking advantage of opportunities as they became available. 70 Email to various, July 5, 2005, “IPPP trip report from Milt”. 19 much more impartial reporting during the last week of the runoff election campaign than would have been possible if the journalists had to rely on the candidates’ campaigns to pay their travel costs. The results would have been quite different if the CGWTF had to prepare funding proposals and find supportive organizations before they could start work; in such situations, a group’s energy is often depleted by arguing about strategy, identifying potential funding sources, preparing different proposals to suit agency funding, and waiting for the proposal to be evaluated. Certainly, no other agency in Guinea-Bissau appeared able to respond as quickly to funding requests as IPPP. Accountability for the use of the IPPP funds appears to have come through an assessment of the capacity of the people present at the meeting to make effective and responsible use of the funds; knowledge of what was planned (the CGWTF grew out of a meeting IPPP had convened to discuss its proposal to create a year of reconciliation), and regular reporting to IPPP by email by the co-ordinator, who had previous extensive experience in civil society organization in Guinea-Bissau. IPPP’s decision thus recognized and validated the existing local capacity for organization that had been honed by earlier elections and through capacity-building programs run by other organizations, and accommodated the realities of local capacity in terms of project development and financial monitoring. The speed with which the planning got underway also appears to reflect the value of the careful way in which IPPP has chosen to work – to ask questions, summarize and feed back its learning, and explore possibilities for action growing out of the ideas that attract the most energetic response. IPPP then brainstorms within the team, prepares a concept paper, and circulates it well in advance of any proposed meetings to allow widespread discussion and debate. But IPPP is prepared to change the proposed idea if events overtake the plan, as happened with the April 2005 meeting. Breaking strategic planning into smaller steps in this way is both a good learning process for participants and a way to keep IPPP activity in tune with local capacity. The CWGTF appears to have been a locally-driven process. IPPP provided technical support, by providing sample electoral codes and legal opinions, as well as funding and ongoing encouragement. But the main campaign planning and work was done by CWGTF participants themselves: interviewing candidates to obtain their agreement to respect the code, finding ways to distribute the code widely throughout the country, planning a populist campaign to encourage voters to make an informed decision, meeting with the army and police to encourage them to maintain public order, encouraging the army to remain neutral, helping deliver ballots, creating peace brigades to maintain order outside polling stations, meeting with the media to encourage informed and balanced reporting, and responding quickly to the media needs for help in achieving this goal. During this time, IPPP’s involvement was primarily what aid agencies call “backstopping” – support, encouragement and follow up from head office, including advocacy in support of CWGTF’s goals. A similarly named group had been formed in 1998/99 to help ensure a peaceful end to that conflict, led by the much-respected Bishop of Bissau. That group was strongly affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, which also participated in the CWGTF activities, but the scope and range of the CWGTF greatly exceeded the work of the earlier 20

Goodwill Commission.71 Although the CWGTF is not mentioned by name in the Secretary-General’s reports, he did acknowledge the value of civil society in ensuring a peaceful election process, and CWGTF’s work was acknowledged by international observers, an ECOWAS delegation, General Tagme Na Wai, and IPPP and its support network. IPPP team members felt the CWGTF’s work demonstrated the clear value of working with and supporting the rich human resources that exist even in fragile states and are a valuable resource in building stability.

b) Relationship-building with the Army Similarly, the idea to offer a small grant to the army chief of staff to help with his proposed project of modernizing barracks and achieving reconciliation in the armed forces grew out of the IPPP’s assessment of his character and the need for immediate activity that rewarded neutrality and built confidence to support the longer-term planning for security sector reform being done by UNDP and UNOGBIS. IPPP’s visits helped the team become aware that unrest in the armed forces was as much a function of poor living conditions and low salaries coupled with the lack of economic opportunity, as it was a result of ethnicity or politics. Thus they understood the peacebuilding significance of the proposal to build a new barracks that would house a multi-ethnic battalion. In line with IPPP’s concern for good process, careful thought appears to have gone into making this grant offer ‘conflict-sensitive’, by ensuring adequate consultation in preparation, transparency in terms of sharing information and administering the grant, and taking advantage of opportunities to build capacity and local collaboration. Pre-grant consultation with key government officials and UNOGBIS ensured they were aware of what was being planned. Part of the grant was to be used to inform soldiers about the repair program, proposals for security service reform, and the need to remain professional and neutral in terms of the political process. Building on earlier dialogues between civil society and the military, grant monitoring and administration was assigned to the CGWTF, creating an opportunity for civil society and the military to work together on a task that was important to both, for different reasons, but aimed at the same result – a professional military that did not intervene in the political process. This particular initiative appears to have had very positive results. The Secretary- General’s June 2005 report notes that “the armed forces Commission on Reconciliation and Reintegration, set up by the Chief of General Staff, held a series of awareness raising meetings in all regions and barracks between 28 February and 6 April 2005. UNOGBIS

71 The Goodwill Commission of parliamentarians, representatives of the three main religious groups and of non-governmental organizations led by the Bishop played a major role in trying to end the 1998/99 fighting two days after it began. Commission members met President Vieira and Brigadier Mané , trying to bring them to a less extreme point of view in order to expand opportunities for agreement. They urged the Junta Militar to accept ECOWAS as a mediating partner, and acted in liaison with CPLP and ECOWAS. In September, when CPLP and ECOWAS had failed to reach a common understanding, the Commission pursued internal mediation in liaison with Swedish, Portuguese and French diplomats, helping pave the way for the Abuja agreement. With the three ambassadors and others, the Commission ensured the safety of Junta Militar members who had been stranded in Gambia, after the 15 September Abidjan meeting. They had to be brought back in helicopters which could only land in the part of Bissau under loyalist control. Commission members and the ambassadors sat on either side of each Junta Militar member to protect them from snipers and deter other attacks, both in the helicopters and in cars that took them back to their base near the airport. (Amnesty International 1999) 21 provided logistical support for the Commission and participated in all the meetings to promote the idea and the content of a comprehensive reform. Participants stressed the importance of reintegration and dialogue. They called for an amnesty based on justice and transparency, the reorganization and restructuring of the armed forces and the compilation of a database in preparation for a future reform. The meetings resulted in a request for further technical advice and the provision of reference materials to help the armed forces formulate concrete reform proposals.”72 In his March 2006 report to the Security Council, Annan highlighted the continuing positive role being played by the military leadership, despite the political tensions dividing the National Assembly and the country’s political leadership. Arranging for retired senior military officials, one from Britain and one from Africa, to accompany the IPPP team in June 2005 also reflected an awareness of the value of peer mentoring or coaching in peacebuilding. These officials could speak with General Tagme Na Wai, and his senior officers, from a perspective of shared knowledge and experience and a position of neutrality, in that they were not affiliated with any existing government, intergovernmental agency or aid agency working in Guinea-Bissau. Awareness of the value of such peer support reflects IPPP’s view that peacebuilding is as much about building relationships as about delivering programs, especially when individual choices can have such a large impact on an entire society. Given that one of IPPP’s peer mentors came from the UK, it is interesting to note that the UK responded to a request from UNOGBIS for technical help by sending a security sector development advisory team to Guinea-Bissau in mid-October 2005 to help the authorities develop a road map for comprehensive and credible security sector reform.

c) The Value of Short-term Actions While IPPP was one of a number of groups working to achieve peaceful development in Guinea-Bissau, its catalytic mandate and its ability to recognize the importance of facilitating short-term actions as lever towards longer-term objectives and to respond flexibly to developments within the country seems to be exactly the kind of activity that the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Guinea-Bissau73 had urged in 2003. That high level panel said there was an urgent need for “creative and innovative ways” to help Guinea-Bissau despite its structural and political problems, in order to prevent it from relapsing into conflict. Such a response needed “to think outside the framework of classic models and solutions, bearing in mind that short-term support can be used to leverage longer-term change.” While the panel’s task was to make recommendations for a long-term program of support, their November 2002 visit showed that the country’s short-term challenges needed immediate, creative and innovative

72 In January 2006, this Commission expanded to cover the police, security and other paramilitary forces and began focusing on such issues as “the negative impact of ethnicity in the armed forces, the role the armed forces played in the recent presidential elections and the need to include in the reconciliation process those citizens of Guinea-Bissau who served in the Portuguese colonial army during the struggle for independence. The Commission has stressed the need for reconciliation, for subordination to civilian authorities and for staying out of the political arena, as well as the need to contribute to good relations with neighbouring countries.” (UN Security Council 2006 19) 73 The group, which included ambassadors from donor and African states, was created by the UN’s Economic and Social Council in October 2002, after Guinea-Bissau became the first state to ask for help in co-ordinating UN and international assistance. (ECOSOC 2003a: 2) 22 attention. The panel found that existing UN coordination mechanisms did not reflect the country’s structural impediments, did not analyze the root causes of conflict, and were not flexible enough to respond quickly to the country’s changing and fluid situation.74 The panel said Guinea-Bissau’s situation highlighted a more general need for the international community to find a predictable, coherent way of responding to countries emerging from conflict, especially for countries that no longer needed peacekeeping support but could not yet cope with the requirements associated with regular donor assistance.75 Given the magnitude and complexity of its transitional changes76, and severe destruction of human, social, private and public capital caused by a long liberation war and subsequent civil conflict, Guinea-Bissau would need far longer than the international community had thought to consolidate peace, meaningfully address longer-term sustainable development and governance, and learn to adjust to donor and aid requirements. Progress would depend on developing a new partnership approach between the government and international community, based on a long-term development strategy with common objectives and mutually-agreed benchmarks, and would need simultaneous action and strong will on both sides.77 One possibility was a compact that addressed social and economic issues simultaneously with political and security issues. The panel’s views appear to have greatly influenced the UN’s post-election peacebuilding strategy in Guinea-Bissau, which emphasizes capacity building, coordination and cooperation both within the UN and with other donors and agencies to create synergy. In his September 2005 report, the Secretary-General spoke of UNOGBIS playing the role of “a facilitator, within and outside the United Nations, in the

74 The UN had two mechanisms for coordinating its activities in Guinea-Bissau, both developed in cooperation with the government, but both had weaknesses. The Common Country Assessment prepared in 2001 “does not reflect the structural impediments facing the country or provide an analytical overview of the root causes of conflict”, and the UN Development Assessment Framework, developed in 2002, was not uniquely tailored to reflect Guinea-Bissau’s history and needs and “lacks the flexibility to respond quickly to the changing and fluid situation in the country.” Recognizing a need to improve the UN response to conflict prevention and reduction, UNDP’s Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Regional Bureau for Africa had visited Guinea-Bissau at the same time as the Ad hoc group, to carry out a strategic assessment of conflict risks and identify ways UNDP and the UN country team could strengthen and expand their conflict prevention and peacebuilding policies and programs in an integrated way. (ECOSOC 2003a: 25-27) 75 “…a clear need exists for greater coordination of priorities, programmes and related financial and technical support coming from the UN system, bilateral and other multilateral partners for broad-based recovery and reconstruction and to prevent the re-emergence of conflict. The gaps that are inherent in individual efforts must be plugged, including the gaps at the end of peacekeeping.” (ECOSOC 2003a: 41) 76 Guinea-Bissau was facing three simultaneous transitions - from centrally planned to market economy beginning in the late 1980s, from single-party state to multi-party system, beginning in the early 1990s, and from the 1998/99 civil war that caused further damage to a country not yet fully recovered from its war of independence. (ECOSOC 2003a 37) 77:”It is evident to the Advisory Group that a new development paradigm is needed for Guinea-Bissau, one based on a partnership between the government and the international community. This partnership should be based on common objectives and on a long-term development strategy. The government would define development priorities, through the early completion of the PRSP, and progress towards achieving those goals could be measured by mutually agreed benchmarks. The international community would support financially and otherwise national efforts. The partnership would only work if the actions by the country and the international community were simultaneous, and if there is a strong will to succeed from both sides. Only through a new approach, by international institutions, donors and Guinea-Bissau, will concrete and measurable progress be made towards the achievement of the goals and targets of the major UN conferences and summits, especially those contained in the Millennium Declaration. “ (ECOSOC 2003a: 42) 23 development of self sustainable national peacebuilding mechanisms and initiatives rather than that of a key protagonist in the peacebuilding process”. Its goal would be to facilitate a comprehensive peacebuilding strategy prepared and discussed with major national stakeholders that “aligns the short term objectives of consolidating peace and stability in the political sphere with the medium- to long-term objectives of promoting sustainable socio-economic development” and “will be implemented in synergy with United Nations agencies and programmes and will complement them, with a focus on governance, State- building, human rights and resource mobilization.” 78 The strategy “includes promoting self-sustaining dialogue among all major stakeholders; enhancing governance and the rule of law and respect for human rights; fostering harmonious relations between the organs of sovereignty; assisting in the creation of functional indigenous conflict prevention and national reconciliation mechanisms; supporting national efforts for security sector reform; supporting the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects; and mobilizing international support for quick-impact projects to address the country’s immediate challenges.” In implementing this strategy, UNOGBIS “will seek to merge the United Nations peace and security and development agendas and will form partnerships not only with executing agencies of the United Nations, but also with national and international non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations to follow up on implementation.” UNOGBIS will aim to help achieve “national ownership and accountability, self-sustainability in the medium and long term and a strong component of capacity-building.”79 Many of the themes and ideas in this plan are similar to the ideas and strategies promoted by IPPP during its work in Guinea-Bissau over the past 18 months. This is not surprising, given the similarities between the panel’s observations and IPPP’s philosophy. IPPP notes that working in fragile and failed states requires different sensitivities and different operating strategies than does working in more stable and secure developing countries. Fragile states cannot be assumed to have the functional institutional capacity or governance infrastructure to implement sectoral development programs. Thus development in such settings involves creating or fostering these governance and societal capacities, which requires a deeper, conflict-sensitive engagement attuned to state weaknesses and adapted to its particular environment. This means that “third party actors must show more cross-government, inter-agency cooperation in their own operations, so as to cut across the areas of development, diplomacy, democracy-building, humanitarian aid, security. Similarly, more multilateral collaboration in specific countries is required so as to achieve multiplier effects.”80 One of the valuable roles that IPPP may have played over its first 18 months is to “operationalize” the type of approach that the panel advocated in 2003. Its role in learning and sharing information, establishing wide networks and good communication channels, being well placed to take advantage of opportunities as they arise, supporting short-term activities in order to facilitate longer-term achievement, supporting existing local capacity and working to increase capacity, encouraging active civil society

78 UN Security Council 2005b 12,30-32. 79 UN Security Council 2005b 32. 80 Guinea-Bissau – Failed state looking to recover, Jan. 2006, page 5. 24 involvement in planning Guinea-Bissau’s future, and advocating for Guinea-Bissau internationally, have begun to create a model and explore the possibilities of a new international approach to work in fragile states.

d) The Challenge of Building Capacity A peaceful and prosperous future depends on full and active participation by Guinea-Bissau’s citizens both in governance and economic development. While this may seem a large challenge, given Guinea-Bissau’s colonial history and low levels of human development, mobilizing such capacity is essential given the government’s financial challenges. Approaches that focus positively on existing capacities often encourage citizens to begin development activities with available resources rather than looking to government or donor agencies for support. Even in developed societies, community development operated for a long time from what John McKnight calls a deficit model, focusing on what communities lacked rather than what they had. Asset-based community development grew from this theoretical basis, focusing on community strengths through an approach called appreciative inquiry, and has been applied successfully in settings very similar to that of Guinea-Bissau. The goal is for people to design, develop and maintain projects using their own resources and capacities, even in situations where people have few material resources. “Communities are helped to build an inventory of their assets and are encouraged to see value in resources that would otherwise have been ignored, unrealized, or dismissed. Such unrealized resources include not only personal attributes and skills, but also the relationships among people through social, kinship, or associational networks. By mobilizing these informal networks, formal institutional resources can be activated -such as local government, formal community-based organizations, and private enterprise. In fact, the key to ABCD is the power of local associations to drive the community development process and to leverage additional support and entitlements. These associations are the vehicles through which all the community's assets can be identified and then connected to one another in ways that multiply their power and effectiveness.”81 Some examples of kinship or associational networks include stokvels or savings groups in South Africa and self-help affinity groups in India. Strategic planning methods that rely heavily on writing are problematic in societies with high illiteracy rates such as Guinea-Bissau. Methods such as Participatory Rural Appraisal that use more accessible techniques were developed to facilitate community-based strategic planning in such settings.82 Appreciative inquiry has been incorporated into PRA with excellent results. Future Search offers a positively-focused approach to assessing a community’s past and present and creating a new future and has

81 Mathie, A. & Cunningham, G. (2002, January). This paper provides a detailed outline of the theory behind ABCD and its practical use in community development. 82 Originally called Rapid Rural Appraisal, this evolved into Participatory Rural Appraisal and then Participatory Learning and Action (PLA). “(g)ood PRA/PLA activities empower. They are different each time. They improvise and innovate. They fit our world in which change is accelerating not only for “us” but for those who are poor and marginalised. It is not easy to keep up-to-date. ….It is reflective practitioners in the field who are making the running and from whom those of us not in the field have continuously to learn.” (Chambers 2006:3) 25 been used with great success in communities in the Russian and Canadian North.83 Technology of Participation techniques have been honed in a variety of cultural settings over the past few decades and also work well in transitional societies. Such methods are helpful especially where people in colonial or authoritarian governance settings have internalized negative assessments of their capacity and while skilled in listing their problems, have difficulty moving beyond those problems to visualize and implement solutions. Chopra argues that many peacebuilding programs do not fully recognize the capacity that already exists within some traditional societies, who have often survived years of attempted social engineering, invasion and waves of cultural change.84 Somaliland, for example, built a new governance structure by returning to the traditional role of its elders. Sometimes authoritarian governance has convinced people that they no longer have social capital: people in Bosnia, responding to a 1997 study that identified a wide range of civil society structures, said that if they had known those structures existed, there wouldn’t have been a war.85 Positive capacity-based approaches could provide a great deal of the energy needed to “operationalize” the various national visions developed in recent years but which seem to become stuck at the implementation stage. Given the striking contrast between the effectiveness and energy with which the CGWTF tackled the challenge of ensuring a peaceful electoral process, and the deficit-based nature of the plan developed during IPPP’s February 2006 session, IPPP might usefully explore how to incorporate a more asset-based, appreciative inquiry approach into its detailed follow-up planning for the national action plan. Such an approach fits well with IPPP’s collaborative approach to working with local leaders and communities in order to develop an effective plan for achieving peace and prosperity for Guinea-Bissau. Such a locally-owned plan is crucial if Guinea-Bissau is to truly take hold of its future in partnership with the international development community.

e) The Importance of Rural Agricultural Development Given the extent to which Guinea-Bissau’s economy relies on rural agricultural activity, finding ways to support, improve, and expand such activity will be a key part of achieving prosperity. Some of these activities may require difficult tradeoffs – the

83 “At this stage in Russia's transition to democracy and a market economy, the future search method is appropriate for tackling a great many of the complex problems facing communities, industries and institutions. However, promoting the future search model in Russian is inhibited not only by economic conditions where money for any kind of conference hard to come by, but also by a general lack of experience with participatory methods. Past experience has left most Russians believing that their voice isn't very important in shaping their future. They tend to be fatalistic and focused on immediate survival strategies. Uncertainty makes planning for the future seem futile. In contract, we believe it is crucial to hear the voice of everyone, and for everyone to participate in defining the future together.” Secor, Tyasto & Marchuk, n.d. 84 Chopra & Hohe (2004). Chopra’s views are based in part on his work in trying to put theory into practice with the United Nations mission in East Timor. 85 A 1997 EU mapping project in Bosnia found nearly 400 voluntary groups and civil society organizations. “This was surprising to the international aid organizations operating in Bosnia, who saw themselves as operating virtually alone, or needing to "build up the NGO sector". But it also surprised ordinary Bosnians working in civil society who also felt tremendously isolated. During a meeting, one of them even declared, "If we had had 400 NGOs in our country before the war, there would have been no war." (Sampson 2002) 26 expansion of cashew nut farming, for example, which provides a great deal of the country’s export revenue, has come largely at the expense of rice farming.86 Participatory techniques, capacity building for farmers, and capacity building and equipment supply for government agricultural departments are featured in a major agricultural project designed to increase food production and rural incomes in the three poorest regions of Guinea-Bissau. The project, being funded by the African Development Bank and carried out in cooperation with government, is very detailed in spelling out the activities, obligations, procedures and requirements under which the project is being done. Through such an approach, donors help meet needs of rural people while simultaneously acknowledging and addressing the lack of government capacity.87 But there is also great scope for what South Africa’s Community Development Resource Association calls “horizontal learning” – effectively, learning from one’s neighbours. Such learning helps good ideas spread quickly. One Lesotho school developed a school lunch program that meant students learned more effectively, by encouraging parents to cultivate unused school land to grow crops. To raise crops year- round, parents had to learn new permaculture techniques, which they then incorporated into their own farming. The school’s domestic science program prepared the lunches, giving them useful practice. Soon a neighbouring school asked for help in developing a similar program and within three years, 58 schools had such programs, each taught by a neighbouring school and supported by a small part-time office in the original school. The idea has since spread to another four districts involving a further 200 schools.88 In Tanzania, the creation of Farmer Learning Groups to share working methods as a way of learning from traditional farmers led to improved farming practices and completely unprompted, to such groups beginning joint farming development projects or electing representatives to lobby local councils for better roads and marketing facilities. Some groups eventually banded together and formed branches of Mviwata, the national independent small farmers union. In Limpopo province, a workshop that raised awareness of the risks of genetically-modified seeds led more than 60 villages to revive their traditional annual seed-sharing festival. Now, at a different village each year, the farmers once again send representatives of each village to gather and congregate for several days, each bringing bags of their beans and grains to cook and taste and then to freely share as seed, with advice on how best to plant and grow. The Guineaspora, the organized body that represents the country’s diaspora and has expressed interest in supporting health, education and rural development, is one resource that could assist both in helping to plan and fund such community-based activities.89 Similar diasporic involvement played a key role in rebuilding education and health in Somaliland, where remittances from the diaspora far exceed the government’s budget. African countries and development agencies working in fragile states are

86 ADF 2005, 2 2-1.3 and 30 4.6.7. While rice production is the backbone of national food security, cashew production is less labour intensive and so villagers prefer to harvest cashews and buy or barter for rice with the proceeds, changing rural production strategies. Clearing large areas for cashew production is contributing to an increasing trend towards deforestation. 87 ADF 2005. 88 These three stories are told in Reeler (2004/5). CDRA, in line with its belief that well-crafted stories both encourage and evaluate development progress, regularly collects and shares such stories through its annual reports. 89 The Guineaspora meets regularly, including a 2004 session in Bissau. See http://www.guineaspora.org. 27 increasingly reaching out to the diaspora to support development activities and to help build human development within their former home states. China, whose relationship with Guinea-Bissau goes back to its independence struggle, has taken a capacity-building approach in aid delivered in other West African states and also could be a useful ally in supporting such strategies in Guinea-Bissau. Given that so much of the economic future of Guinea-Bissau lies with rural agricultural development, it would be useful to add to the IPPP team a facilitator from a “southern” country or region whose socio-economic situation is similar to that of Guinea- Bissau and works with appreciative inquiry in their region. One example is Myrada, which works with more than one million people in three provinces in poverty-stricken rural south India through programs of self-help affinity group development, watershed management, vocational skill building and non-farm enterprise promotion, primary health and education, and locally essentially infrastructure development. In partnership with Canada’s International Institute for Sustainable Development and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, Myrada convincingly field tested appreciative inquiry in its work between 1999 and 2001 and now uses it in all of its projects.90 Similarly, World Vision adopted an appreciative inquiry PRA approach in Mauritania, after testing the process with “some of the poorest people on earth, facing some of the toughest environmental conditions anywhere in the world, with a social structure that may have served some of them well in the past but which is now creaking under the strain of adaptation.” (Elliott 1999:184) The AI approach led to “an extraordinary shift in the mentality of the villagers with whom we had been working”, from an initial request to World Vision for the kind of community development programs it was delivering elsewhere in the region to “a clear sighted assessment of the needs of the village—in terms of water and income generating possibilities—but these were put into a context of sustainable action by the villagers themselves by the generation of clear action proposals…..Additionally we had a wealth and depth of factual information that ought to make it possible to generate a quality of partnership between the villagers and World Vision which each will find satisfactory and sustainable.” (Elliott 1999:199) Encouraging government to “think outside the box” in terms of its activities also could be a useful strategy in promoting prosperity. When one rural municipality in South Africa decided to reprofile highway maintenance as a poverty reduction activity, it opened up opportunities to use highway maintenance funds in a way that provided income security for a large group of rural families, encouraged increased school attendance, increased local business opportunities, improved banking system access, and maintained the rural roads.91

90 Ashford. & Patkar 2001:2. A series of reports on the project are available on the IISD website. 91 “The Zibambele model is clearly a superior response to the challenge of persistent poverty among people unable to migrate in search of work and who receive limited income from other sources. It provides a significant reliable and sustained source of supplementary income. It unquestionably relieves the poverty of participants; and, with the higher expenditure on education and nutrition which it induces, it also reduces the risk of poverty for the rising generation.” (ODI 2004). A similarly innovative approach is reflected in the First Mile project in Tanzania, being funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Swiss government with the Tanzanian government. The goal is to build the capacity of small producers, processors, traders and others in the market chain, in part by bridging the connectivity gap (the “first mile”) between a village with no electricity and no telephone line to the nearest online computer. The 28

f) Assessing Achievement As IPPP continues its work in Guinea-Bissau, one of the key emerging challenge it faces is how to measure the results of its work in clear and meaningful ways that blend three important kinds of measurement – quantitative, qualitative, and organizational learning – in an effective monitoring and evaluation system. Some useful lessons in this regard may come from an evaluation system developed for the Community Empowerment Program being delivered in South Wollo, Ethiopia, in the mid-1990s. It “adopted a flexible adaptive approach to evaluation which is based on perceptions of change, rather than confining itself to a narrow set of pre-determined indicators,” which proved useful in evaluating ideas such as increased participation, self-confidence, responsibility and problem-solving capacity. Terry Bergdall and his colleagues tried to combine three measures of change into the evaluation process – what happened in the program areas (quantitative), what changes resulted and how these changes were viewed (qualitative), and what new understandings of participation, community empowerment and bottom-up development emerged through the program’s work (organizational learning). This approach came from awareness that “quantitative information tends to abstract human experience and strip it of its context” while qualitative information complements the numbers by “bringing development work ‘to life’ through stories and understanding” that provides “crucial clues to understanding the dynamics of empowerment.” The resulting approach uses “a highly inductive approach in which unpredicted indicative events become the basis for drawing conclusions about results.” The following explanation of the system is adapted from a 1996 paper prepared by Bergdall and his colleague Frank Powell entitled “Institutional Learning in a Process Oriented Programme: Monitoring and Evaluation of the Community Empowerment Programme in South Wollo, Ethiopia”. CEP worked in six kires, small traditional self-help organizations that provide assistance to community members during important social events such as weddings and funerals, located in five woredas or districts within the region. The evaluation system, developed after the program had been in operation for a year, involved each level of the program identifying the most important changes it thought had occurred in the geographic area during the reporting period. Building from the bottom up, the process identified at least 288 important changes (4 changes x 6 kires x 3 facilitation units x 4 woredas). Each level chose the four changes it considered most important, resulting in a total of 16 significant changes reported to the zonal steering committee along with the explanations of why these were considered the most important. As the system evolved, quarterly facilitator meetings became the forum at which the kire stories were consolidated and the main changes across the woreda were selected. These stories were expanded to include changes observed among extension officers working the program areas, and woreda officials were asked to make verification trips. Follow up meetings in kires included discussion of the one story of change chosen as most significant by the woreda officials. Facilitators encouraged discussion by asking: two-year project will use a participatory approach that supports farmer to farmer learning. 29

What surprised you about this story? If you could ask questions of the actors in this story, what additional information would you like to have? In what ways do you think this story represents an important change (if you agree that it does represent an important change)? If something like the events reported in the story were to happen in this kire, what would you do the same and what would you do differently? How might such actions lead to an important change in this kire? Participants then identified the most important changes that had taken place as a result of program activities, and the impact of such changes on the kire. Facilitators said people were very interested in hearing what other kires had accomplished and what the woreda officials thought to be most important and after discussing the story, were eager to explain their own accomplishments in self-reliant development. The facilitators thought these discussions created new energy for the action plans participants had created earlier in the follow-up meeting, while woreda officials were surprised by what they saw and by the motivation, commitment and accomplishments of small local projects completed by kire members through the exclusive use of local resources and knowledge. Such a model could have been used for evaluating the changes that resulted from the work of the CGWTF, and could be adapted to allow IPPP to assess the range of changes being experienced by people within Guinea-Bissau, especially given the communication channels and networks it has already established and nurtured. As well as supporting and consolidating change by providing useful information and analysis to people at a variety of levels within Guinea-Bissau, such analysis would provide both qualitative and organizational change information that could guide IPPP’s further work. This is especially important because so much of IPPP’s work appears to be built around creating and nurturing relationships. As South Africa’s CDRA puts it: “Development happens not between things, but between people. Development interventions tend to be introduced on the understanding that all is not well within those relationships, and that something can be done about it.” Thus the major work of development, CDRA believes, takes place in changing relationships and it is in the “changing nature and quality of these relationships that development is ultimately measured”. (CDRA 2000/2001) CDRA, which does extensive work with community groups in southern Africa, thinks stories offer an appropriate way to measure social development. “Getting insight into others involves a cyclical process of observation and investigation, conceptualisation (including use of theoretical frameworks), testing (checking insights and conclusions against actual experience and understanding of those being observed) and re- conceptualisation. In time, and as things change, this process bears repeating so that a picture of development over time emerges. Regular practice in observation, woven into vivid and incisive stories, and then taken further, into the drawing of lessons, the formulating of concepts, is invaluable. In addition to sharpening the abilities of development practitioners to think-in-practice, such a discipline also ensures that the models and conceptual frameworks that are formulated and shared with others are grounded in real practice, not pure idealism or ideology.” (CDRA 2000/2001)

4. The Potential for an Expanded IPPP While there is general consensus on the need for a new international approach to working with failed and fragile states to both avoid conflict and build a society that will 30 provide adequate opportunity for all of its citizens, trying to expand the current IPPP operation to other countries that are also at risk of state failure may run the risk of damaging the features of its operation in Guinea-Bissau that seem to be at the core of its achievement thus far. As CDRA notes, development at its core is about relationships. IPPP’s achievement in Guinea-Bissau comes from putting a theoretical and strategic view of the nature of state failure into practical operation, and this has been largely achieved by building, nurturing and deepening relationships with people at a range of levels both within and outside the country. Such relationships help to provide the information, the ideas, the knowledge, and understanding that make a catalytic and synergistic approach work effectively. This kind of knowledge also builds influence with the external actors whose decisions influence Guinea-Bissau’s future. Building and nurturing such relationships takes time, effort and personal engagement. Seeing opportunities for making constructive change grows out of taking the time to ask questions, listen, understand, and then ask more questions. Growing trust between people allows more difficult questions to be raised, discussed and addressed, and such questions appear to be at the core of achieving IPPP’s goal of peace and prosperity. Moving forward, especially in challenging and difficult situations, may involve two steps backward for every step forward. For example, while the army now appears well on the way to reconciliation and reform, and civil society appears to have gained in strength and capacity, Guinea-Bissau’s political class has been engaged in divisive arguments since the election. As the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel on Guinea-Bissau noted, it may take much longer for Guinea-Bissau to work through the multiple transitions in which it is engaged than the international community had thought. The same may well hold true for IPPP’s work there: three years may not be long enough for its catalytic and synergistic approach to ensure Guinea-Bissau is well on the road to achieving. peace and prosperity. Exit strategies are always difficult moments for international agencies, especially when they have developed strong and deep relationships with the people in the country in which they are working. But like any other strategy, exit strategies offer opportunities as well as risks. Thinking ahead towards its exit strategies – in cooperation with people in Guinea-Bissau – may actually be a helpful step in capacity building for Guinea-Bissau as well as an opportunity to expand its work. Collaboratively developing the indicators that would mean IPPP could leave Guinea-Bissau, satisfied that its work was complete and had been well done, could assist in strategic planning for the third year of its work. One way to expand use of the IPPP model could be to “adopt” a new state and begin to develop similar kind of knowledge and similar kinds of relationships there, using the model developed in Guinea-Bissau. Doing this now, however, would require assembling a new team and thus expanding IPPP’s size, with the risk of losing some of the lightness and flexibility of operation that now characterizes its work, as well as distracting some of the energy of the IPPP team from its work in Guinea-Bissau. Another way would be to explore some of the possibilities of “horizontal learning” – what CDRA calls “learning from neighbours”. In some ways, people living in fragile states may be best placed to assist people in other failed states if they have learned effective strategies in creating change. One example of part of a state that has built effective post-conflict governance and begun to build its economy is Somaliland, in the 31 northern part of Somalia. WSP International helped launch the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development, which has developed an excellent reputation for community research and facilitating dialogue that could be helpful with the planned INEP/WSP project in Guinea-Bissau, for example. Creating a “virtual” think tank of people who have helped achieve peace and development in a fragile state, or perhaps a rapid reaction capacity-building team, would bring the voice of hard-earned personal experience to some of the theoretical discussions of how to work in fragile states that take place outside such states. Still another way is to share the evolving lessons of its work widely, by articles, presentations, or film, so that others can learn how to apply such strategies in other countries that also are at risk of failing but which appear to offer the possibilities of creating peace and prosperity. The UN Economic and Social Commission, given the particular work it is currently engaged in doing in Guinea-Bissau and Burundi, would likely be interested in learning about IPPP’s experience in operationalizing a strategy it recommended in 2003. 32

References:

International Peace and Prosperity Project Documents:

National action plan for peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau, a consensus document facilitated by International Peace and Prosperity Project, February 18, 2006, Guinea- Bissau.

Guinea-Bissau: “Failed state” looking to recover. Update and prospective. January 2006

Concept Paper: the vision, strategy and a plan for peace and prosperity in Guinea-Bissau. (Undated; circulated in September 2005)

Guinea-Bissau Update: Report from a recent trip of the International Peace and Prosperity Project, July 4, 2005

Letter to editors of Canadian newspapers, April 28, 2005, by IPPP director Ben Hoffman.

Mission Possible: A ripe opportunity to avert violent conflict and achieve sustainable peace in Guinea-Bissau. March 2005.

Reconciliation and renewal” in Guinea-Bissau. Undated.

International Peace and Prosperity Project, Scouting trip to Guinea-Bissau. Summary of observations and proposed next steps. November 15, 2004.

Various email correspondence 2004-2006 provided by IPPP.

Evaluations:

Hoffman, E. (2005) Internal Evaluation of the International Peace and Prosperity Project (IPPP) in Guinea-Bissau: Senior Staff Perspective & Consultants. Prepared in draft form November 2005, last revised January 2006. Confidential document.

WANEP (2006). External evaluation of International Peace and Prosperity Project.

Other Documents Cited:

African Development Fund (2005). Guinea Bissau, Agricultural and Rural Sector Rehabilitation Project (PRESAR) (North, west and east regions). Appraisal report. Department of Agricultural and Rural Development West and Central Regions, OCAR, May 2005. Updated through addendum January 2006. Report prepared by M.L. Kane, agricultural economist, following an appraisal mission to Guinea Bissau in March 2005. 33

Amnesty International (1999). Guinea-: Human rights in war and peace. . AI Index: AFR 30/07/99.

Ampleford, S., CIFP team & Wakaba, C. (2002). Conflict Risk Assessment Report: West Africa: Mano River Union and Senegambia (Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Senegal). Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, David Carment, Principal Investigator. Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

Ashford, G. & Patkar, S. (2001). The positive path: using appreciative inquiry in rural Indian communities. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

Chambers, R. (2006). Notes for participants in PRA-PLA familiarization workshops in 2006. Brighton UK: Participation Resource Centre, Institute of Development Studies. http:// www.ids.ac.uk/ids/particip/

Chopra, Jarat & Tanja Hohe (2004, July-September). Participatory intervention. Global Governance, 10(3), 289-305. Downloaded from Academic Search Premier.

Community Development Resource Association (CDRA) (2000-2001). “Measuring Development - Holding Infinity, a writing from the CDRA’s Annual Report 2000/2001, Woodstock, South Africa. http://www.cdra.org.za

Economist (2003). Coup in Guinea-Bissau: farewell to the red bobble hat, Vol. 368 Issue 8342, 9/20/2003. Downloaded from Academic Search Premier.

Elliott, C. (1999). Chapter 11: Testing the appreciative approach – to destruction? A case study from three Mauritanian villages. In Locating the energy for change: an introduction to appreciative inquiry. Winnipeg, Manitoba: International Institute for Sustainable Development.

INTRAC (1999). Section 3 Monitoring and evaluating processes of empowerment: a case study from Ethiopia. (Case study written by Terry Bergdall). In Resource Document, the Monitoring and Evaluation of Empowerment. INTRAC, November 1999.

Mathie, A. & Cunningham, G. (2002, January). From Clients to Citizens: Asset-Based Community Development as a Strategy For Community-Driven Development. January 2002. The Coady International Institute, St. Francis Xavier University.

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