Carbon Budgets Positioning - Policy Background

AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

Temperature Target

1. What level of temperature increase relative to pre-industrial / 1880 levels, is it appropriate for FoEI to call for, based on our climate justice principles and scientific uncertainties? 2. Why do you think we should call for this temperature target, as opposed to other options? 3. How will your member group primarily use this position? (e.g. in public materials? for lobbying? for media work? in discussions and work with allies and social movements?)

Level of risk

1. What is an acceptable level of risk for the temperature target we are calling for? 2. Why do you think this should be FoEI’s position?

This process

 Please include any other comments or information about the involvement of your member group or region on the issue of the global carbon budget which might be of relevance for this internal process in FoEI.

Carbon Budgets Positioning Process – Policy Background / Options Paper (Version 1 – 26 July 2011)

1 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

What is this document? This is the version 1 of the formal policy background / options paper for the FoEI carbon budgets positioning process. It provides background policy information and scientific modelling on the key decision areas in the forthcoming positioning process on carbon budgets. This version of the document will be used to inform discussions on the first decision area under the process – temperature target and risk. It sets out the main options for discussion / decision in each area where these are clearly identifiable; and includes recommendations to narrow down the options under discussion.

A second version will be circulated at the start of the second phase of discussion on effort- sharing1 framework and implementation which will commence in September. The second version will include additional information of relevance to the second phase of discussion.

NB. Please note that: 1. This document is not supposed to be exhaustive. There is a lot more information available which is relevant to this debate and we very much hope that member groups will input additional information into the positioning discussions as they see fit. 2. While the goal of this positioning process is to agree new binding FoEI positions. However, the recommendations set out in this document for the narrowing of the options under discussion are not binding. Member groups can support options outside of these recommendations if they so wish.

Decision-making on the contents of this paper This document has been drafted by the Coordinator of the FoEI Climate Justice & Energy Programme Sarah-Jayne Clifton. Support and inputs – including the detailed scientific modelling on the global emissions pathways – were provided by Sivan Kartha, senior scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute and one of the lead scientists on the chapter on equity in climate mitigation in the forthcoming IPCC report. This document has been reviewed and agreed by the Climate Justice & Energy Steering Group.

Overall Positioning Process The overall process for this positioning discussion, including the timeline, approach to discussions and decision-making, and how outstanding differences in opinion will ultimately be resolved is set out in the accompanying outline process document distributed alongside this paper. If you have any questions please contact the Climate Justice & Energy Programme Coordinator Sarah-Jayne Clifton: [email protected] .

DECISION AREA 1: Global temperature target and level of risk: What level of temperature increase relative to pre-industrial / 1880 levels, with what related level of risk, is it appropriate for FoEI to call for, based on our climate justice

1 NB. The term effort-sharing is also frequently referred to as burden-sharing. In some discussions / contexts, the two terms have different implications, and are associated with more or less equitable approaches. In the context of this paper the two are seen to be inter-changeable, with both broadly referring to how we divide up the remaining carbon budget. The use of the term effort-sharing is not intended to have any implication in terms of the actual answer to that question, i.e. to what position FoEI should adopt in this respect. Nor does it bring into question FoEI’s agreed positions on climate debt and historical responsibility. 2 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only principles and scientific uncertainties? a. Global Temperature Target This area is known in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations as the “long-term goal”. It is extremely important from a climate justice perspective because developing countries and poor communities – those who have done the least to cause the problem of climate change – are likely to bear the brunt of climate impacts, and the likelihood of severe impacts increases with the degree of warming. It is also significant for the subsequent decision area in this positioning process – on effort sharing framework and implementation. Effort-sharing refers to the differing levels of responsibility for reducing emissions assigned to each country in order to meet the global temperature target. This is because the temperature target determines the remaining “carbon budget” – i.e. the amount of greenhouse gas emissions that can still be emitted globally whilst keeping warming below the target temperature.

According to NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, average temperatures have climbed 0.8 degrees Celsius around the world since 18802. However, further warming of 0.6 degrees Celsius is already believed to be locked in without any further increase in the concentration of global greenhouse gas emissions3. This means there is a very strong likelihood that exceeding a 1 degree Celsius temperature increase is already unavoidable.

The scientific analysis of the risks associated with different levels of temperature increase is constantly evolving. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – the leading scientific body for the study of climate change – recently updated its analysis on this question. In 2007 it concluded that failing to prevent a 2 degree temperature increase would lead to significant sea level rise, mass extinctions of species, and put millions of people globally at risk of crop failures, water shortages, flooding and homelessness4.

However, research published in 2009 scaled up the assessment of the risk, with “large-scale discontinuities” - i.e. dangerous tipping points which could give rise to irreversible climate change – now considered moderately significant below 2 degrees on industrial levels (approx 1.4 degrees on 1990 levels, the baseline used in the diagram below) and risks of extreme weather events considered substantial or severe with warming of 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels (approx 0.9 degrees on 1990 levels). Figure 1 below summaries the findings. The diagram shows climate impacts for five different categories from the original IPCC report in 2001 (on the left) and updated in 2009 (on the right). Red corresponds to ‘substantial or severe risks’, and yellow to ‘moderately significant risks’. While some text from this assessment, published by Smith et al (2009), was included by the IPPC, this diagram was not. By some accounts this was because governments were unhappy with how strong an image it presented.

Figure 1. Burning Embers diagram (Smith et al (2009))

2 http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/temp-analysis-2009.html 3 Hansen et al, Earth’s Energy Imbalance: Confirmation & Implications, Science, Vol 308, June 2005: http://pubs.giss.nasa.gov/docs/2005/2005_Hansen_etal_1.pdf 4 Bernstein et al, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Summary for Policymakers, IPCC, 2007. http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/main.html 3 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

Regional variations in warming Scientists predict there will be a large amount of variation in temperature rise around the world, so that warming will impact differently on different countries and regions with some regions warming considerably more than the global average. The maps below show the distribution in temperature rise for a global average warming of 1.5 degrees (top), and 2 degrees (bottom) 5. Earlier research from the IPCC has indicated that Africa is amongst the regions expected to face the largest above-average temperature increase, with warming in the region likely to reach around 1.5 times the global average. This means that average warming of 2 degrees could mean 3 degrees of warming for Africa or more6.

5 These figures were produced using the MAGICC/SCENGEN model. (Note, the legend in the figure states global mean temperature rise of 0.9C (top map) and 1.4C (bottom map), rather than 1.5C and 2.0C. This is because MAGICC/SCENGEN reports temperature rise relative to 1990, at which time global mean temperature rise was already approximately 0.6C.) 6 Contribution of Working Group I to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Chapter 11, Regional Climate Projections, at page 866-867 4 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

Potential Impacts of Warming The direct physical impacts of climate change are already being felt and the potential impacts are extremely destructive and wide-ranging, including:  sea level rise, including the possible submersion and disappearance of some islands and island nations;  the increased incidence of extreme weather events like heavy rainfall, severe floods, droughts, and tropical storms;  severe impacts on ecosystems with the significant possibility of mass extinctions;  significant changes to and falls in crop yields because of changes to rainfall patterns;  increased incidence of water-borne diseases like malaria and dengue fever;  changes in vegetation cover, including further loss of rainforest because of changes in rainfall patterns

Vulnerability to climate change depends on the interaction of multiple factors including the regional and local variability in warming levels examined above, on geographical factors like height above sea level, topography, vegetation, and levels of ecosystem degradation; and complex socio-economic factors like poverty levels, governance and institutional conditions, infrastructure, access to markets, finance and technology, and the presence and/or legacy of complex disasters and conflicts.

Because of their physical geography, the impacts of warming will be felt disproportionally by low-lying countries, small island states, and Africa as a region. 2 degrees of warming could threaten the existence of low-lying small island states, and in Africa, the IPCC has indicated that without dramatic action, climate change could lead to:  Reductions in crop yields in some countries by as much as 50% by 2020  Increased water stress for 75-250 million people by the 2020s, and 350-600 million by the 2050s  A cost of adaptation to sea level rise of at least 5-10% of gross domestic product7.

In terms of geo-physical factors, according to a report by the Global Humanitarian Forum (GHF) on vulnerability to climate change, people who are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change live in semi-arid dry land belt countries, sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, Latin America, Small island developing states and the Arctic8.

7 Contribution of Working Group II to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, Chapter 9, Africa, at page 435 8 Global Humanitarian Forum, Human Impacts Report: Climate Change – The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis: 5 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

According to the GHF report, the impacts of climate change are already being strongly felt by large parts of the world. In total, the report estimates that four billion people are vulnerable, 500 million people are at extreme risk, and that climate change is already responsible for forcing some fifty million additional people to go hungry and driving over ten million additional people into extreme poverty9.

It also estimates that every year climate change leaves over 300,000 people dead, and 325 million people seriously affected, in addition to causing economic losses of US$125 billion. Of the deaths, over nine in ten deaths are related to gradual environmental degradation due to climate change — principally malnutrition, diarrhoea, and malaria – with the remaining deaths being linked to weather-related disasters brought about by climate change. In terms of future vulnerabilities, it is estimated that lives lost due to climate change could rise to approximately half a million per year within 20 years if impacts are unabated.

Finally, according to the GHF, developing countries currently bear the over-whelming burden of these impacts – 98 percent of the seriously affected and 99 percent of all deaths from weather-related disasters, along with over 90 percent of the total economic losses10.

Options under consideration in the climate talks At the COP 16 climate talks in Cancun in 2010, UNFCCC countries agreed (without unanimity – Bolivia refused to support the final Cancun outcome) to a target of keeping overall warming below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The Cancun outcome also recognises the need to consider strengthening the long-term goal to a global average temperature rise of 1.5 degrees “on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge” with a review of the temperature goal to be concluded by 201511.

In the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, the 2 degree target is supported by most Annex I (developed) countries, while more than 100 developing countries, including the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Africa Group, have called for a target of 1.5 degrees or less. The 1.5 degree call was recently supported by the UN Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres.

In the environmental movement, the Climate Action Network, of which FoEI is no longer a member but some of our members groups are, is now supporting a 1.5 degree target (although it is unclear whether this is an officially agreed CAN position) while many social movements are calling for a target of 1 degree after this target was agreed at the World Peoples Summit on Climate Change in Cochabamba in 201012.

www.eird.org/publicaciones/humanimpactreport.pdf 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 UNFCCC, The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Decision 1/CP.16, Article 4: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2 12 Working Group 9: Shared Vision, Final conclusions, Cochabamba Peoples Agreement, May 2010. http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/30/final-conclusions-working-group-n%c2%ba-9-shared- vision/#more-1623 6 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

FoEI’s current position – Global Temperature Target

FoEI does not currently have an agreed position on our acceptable temperature target. Our closest relevant position is our demand for a total phase out of carbon emissions by mid- century in order to minimise the chances of runaway climate change, and for a return of atmospheric concentrations to an upper limit of 350 parts per million. We are committed to revise this in line with new emerging scientific evidence.

Options for Carbon Budgets Positioning Discussion

It is recommended that FoEI confine our discussion to consideration of whether we want to support at global average temperature target of 1, 1.5 or 2 degrees.

Rationale: The spectrum of 1-2 degrees is the space currently within which the broad spectrum of civil society and scientific discussion is taking place, and there is very little attention to incremental targets such as 1.3 degrees or 1.8 degrees, or available scientific research to support those discussions. b. Level of risk Because of the complexity of the climate system and uncertainties about what emissions reductions are necessary to avoid dangerous climate change, it is not possible to identify an emissions reduction pathway that will lead to a particular temperature change with complete certainty. Instead, computer models are able to identify probabilities arising from particular pathways.

As a result all discussions around temperature targets are underpinned by an assumption about tolerable levels of risk. For example, conditional commitments by the EU and UK to reduce their emissions by 30 per cent and 42 per cent by 2020 are based on a greater than 50% chance of avoiding 2 degrees13. It makes no sense to argue about “1.5 vs. 2” degrees without knowing what level of risk is being talked about. It will therefore be necessary for us to pin down what we consider to be an acceptable level of risk as well as what we consider to be an acceptable temperature target.

While the question of the risk or probability of avoiding certain temperature increases is not discussed widely, together with the specific temperature target it defines the remaining carbon budget available for the entire world, and the emissions reduction pathway, i.e. the pace at which global emissions cuts need to be realised.

This in turn has implications for the implementation of effort-sharing (part of decision area 2 below). By way of example, the following graph shows two possible global emissions reduction paths based on an uncertainty analysis by the C-Roads-CP climate simulation model14

13 Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland: Reckless Gamblers – How politicians inaction is ramping up the risk of dangerous climate change (December 2010)(page 6): http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/reports/reckless_gamblers.pdf 14 This is the recently released version of C-Roads model developed by Climate Interactive (v2.154b.69). The C-Roads model has been calibrated to general circulation models of the ocean-atmosphere system, providing 7 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

Path 1 (the brown path) gives a roughly 35% chance of exceeding 2 degrees of warming by 2100 (i.e. an 65% chance of avoiding 2 degrees), and a roughly 50% chance of exceeding 1.5 degrees of warming in 2100 (i.e. a 50% chance of warming below 1.5 degrees in 2100, though possibly temporarily exceeding 1.5C before 2100).

Path 2 (the green path) gives less than 10% chance of exceeding 2 degrees by 2100 (i.e. a greater than 90% chance of avoiding 2 degrees), and a roughly 15% chance of exceeding 1.5 degrees of warming by 2100 (i.e. a 85% chance of avoiding 1.5 degrees, again with the possibility of temporarily overshooting 1.5C before 2100).

(NB. Path 2 is based on recent analysis by NASA scientist Jim Hansen as to the global carbon budget and emissions reduction pathway necessary to return atmospheric CO2 concentration to 350 parts per million (ppm) – the level identified by increasing numbers of climate experts, and progressive national governments as the safe upper limit for CO2 in our atmosphere).

The red path in the graph shows the business as usual emissions trajectory, which has virtually 100% chance of exceeding – perhaps by a large amount – both 1.5C and 2C by 2100.

The following two graphs and table show what these trajectories would look like in terms of emissions from different sources for the two paths indicated above.

NB. Please note that:  The breakdown of emissions reductions between sources is only illustrative and the levels could change between the different sources. We will need to have a

confidence in the model’s results when examining typical emission paths. These paths examined here are more ambitious than those typically explored by GCMs, and the calibration is not as reliable. This is especially relevant with respect to the estimates shown below of the probability of exceeding 1.5C. Personal communication with developers of C-Roads. 8 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

conversation about what kind of emissions decreases are possible in different sectors as part of our discussions in phase two of this process on effort-sharing implementation.  The peak year used in these graphs is 2015. However, there is some flexibility around the peak year, with the later the peak year, the steeper the subsequent emissions decreases that are needed.

The graph for path 2 indicates that, to realise a <10% chance of exceeding 2 degrees, and a ~15% chance of exceeding 1.5 degrees by 2100, would require global emissions from fossil fuels, fluorinated gases, methane, and nitrous oxide to have been reduced nearly to zero by 2070, and for negative forestry emissions from 2030 onwards. In similar research, the UK AVOID programme has asserted that a 90% chance of staying below 2 degrees will probably necessitate negative emissions and/or some form of geo-engineering intervention15.

Path 1: (35% chance of exceeding 2 degrees of warming by 2100 and a roughly 50% chance of exceeding 1.5 degrees of warming by 2100).

Path 2: (<10% chance of exceeding 2 degrees by 2100 and a roughly 15% chance of exceeding 1.5 degrees of warming by 2100).

15 http://www.metoffice.go v.uk/media/pdf/9/8/avoid2.pdf 9 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

Quantities of emissions reductions by source for each path: Reference Path 1 Path 2 Cumulative fossil CO2 ~7600 GtCO2 ~1350 GtCO2 ~820 GtCO2 Cumulative deforestation ~600 GtCO2 ~200 GtCO2 ~150 GtCo2 Cumulative afforestation ~50 GtCO2 ~50 GtCo2 ~370 GtCO2 Cumulative non CO2 ~2300 GtCO2 ~500 GtCO2eq ~340 GtCO2 Cumulative CO2eq ~10400 GtCO2 ~2000 ~940 GtCO2eq GtCO2eq

Probability of exceeding 100% ~35% <10% 2C by year 2100 Probability of exceeding 100% ~50% ~15% 1.5C in year 2100 (possibly with temporary overshoot before 2100)

Formal definitions of risk levels

10 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

The IPCC formally defines a 33 per cent chance of exceeding a certain temperature as “unlikely” and a 10 per cent chance as “very unlikely”.

FoEI’s current position – Level of risk

FoEI does not currently have a position on level of risk, beyond our position above of wanting to minimise the chances of runaway climate change.

It is recommended that we consider levels of risk of exceeding a certain temperature threshold at the IPCC definition of ‘unlikely’, (i.e. levels of risk below 33%), or “very unlikely” (i.e. levels of risk below 10%).

Rationale: Not specifying the level of risk for meeting a specific temperature target, or specifying a level of risk that is high (e.g., 50%), would allow for inadequate policy responses that pose a high probability of failing to protect people and the climate.

It is therefore recommended that, for simplicity, we make the decision on temperature target (decision 1 above), our primary decision. It then follows that for our decision on level of risk we would want to achieve a reasonable level of certainty that that temperature target could be realised.

DECISION AREA 2: Effort-sharing and Implementation: What framework, in line with our agreed positions on historical responsibility and climate debt, should we use for sharing the effort of reducing greenhouse gas emissions between and within countries to achieve our agreed temperature target; and how should this framework be implemented?

NB. The questions above will be the focus of phase 2 of the carbon budgets positioning process starting in September 2011. Before the start of phase 2, a second, updated version of this background policy / options paper will be distributed, with additional background information included of relevance to phase 2 of the discussions. a. Framework for effort-sharing The question of how we divide up the remaining carbon budget is a central area of disagreement amongst countries in the UNFCCC negotiations, where pressure from civil society and social movements is needed to increase the likelihood of outcomes in line with climate justice.

Basic principles as to how effort-sharing should be undertaken are set out in the Convention, including the core principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibility and Respective Capabilities (CBDRRC) in Article 3.1. This is the core principle recognising the historical responsibility of rich industrialised countries in creating the problem of climate change and the increased resources they have available to tackle the problem. In consequence, the 11 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

Convention asserts that: “UNFCCC parties should take action on climate change on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities”. Accordingly, it goes on to state that: “Developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and adverse effects there-of”16.

The current deadlock in the UN climate negotiations is centred around how this basic principle is interpreted in terms of responsibility to reduce emissions and responsibility for providing climate finance and technology transfer. Essentially, there is a battle over who gets what share of the remaining atmospheric space. A large number of proposed effort- sharing frameworks are out there as to how the remaining carbon budget should be allocated. These range from:  The US model of pledge and review which rejects the basic premise of a top-down agreement on emissions reductions with an aggregate target based on science and equity and individual country responsibility based on the aggregate target. It instead asserts that countries should unilaterally decide on their own commitments, thus avoiding having any agreed collective limit on emissions, and sanctioning a situation where high level emitters and rapidly growing emitters use up the remaining carbon budget. It also rejects the common but differentiated responsibilities principles by calling all countries to make individual pledges.

 Per capita emissions approach: where all countries are awarded a share of the global emissions budget (including the historical budget) in proportion to their population.

 Greenhouse Development Rights approach: which distributes the effort of protecting the climate in proportion to countries’ responsibility (i.e., emissions, including past emissions) and capability (i.e. wealth), both of which are defined with respect to a “development threshold”, so as to shield people who are still striving for a basic level of welfare from mitigation and adaptation costs.

 Brazil’s interpretation of historical responsibility: where countries are allocated emissions cuts according to the total contribution of their historic emissions (going back to the 1800s) to the current global temperature increase.

Obviously, different frameworks along this spectrum have different equity implications between countries. In addition, the equity implications of any given framework also depend on the level of ambition with regard to temperature increase (i.e. decision area 1. above).

(NB. The second version of this paper distributed before the start of discussions on this section (effort-sharing frameworks and implementation) will contain more detailed information of available options for effort-sharing frameworks and their implications in terms of required emissions reductions for key countries and regional groups (including Annex I / non-Annex I, the US, EU, China, India, South Africa and an example LDC)

FoEI’s current position – Framework for Effort-sharing

16 United Nations Framework Conference on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Article 3,1: http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf 12 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only

The sharing of this burden must be based on historical responsibility and capacity to act in order to enable a global just transition towards sustainable low carbon economies and societies.

Industrialized countries have accrued a climate debt to developing countries which must be reflected in ambitious emission reduction targets in Annex I countries, as well as financial and technology transfer support for mitigation and adaptation requirements in southern countries.

FoEI encourages developing countries to take national actions towards sustainable societies and calls for Annex I countries to fulfill their obligations as part of the repayment of the ecological and climate debt.

FoEI does not call for differentiation that would mean calling for developing countries to accept binding emissions reduction targets for the next commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol

Our demands for potential future binding targets on developing countries would be based on historical responsibility and capacity to act indicators, and be dependent on steps taken by developed countries in the second commitment period to accept and carry out binding emissions reduction targets and finance for mitigation and adaptation in the global South.

Options in line with our agreed positions on climate debt and historical responsibility will be elaborated in the second version of this paper. b. Implementation of effort-sharing The decision on the effort-sharing framework for global emissions reductions will define FoEI’s position on what emissions reductions countries should undertake in order to do their fair share of keeping global temperatures below the agreed level, given the selected level of risk. While it there is not yet enough known about how some of the very deep global paths would actually be met in a safe and equitable way, neither is it known how we would cope with temperature rises of greater than 2C, or even 1.5C.

All of the likely outcomes of this process are likely to indicate the necessity for dramatic economic and social transformation in both in the North and South, which a significant departure from current scenarios and trends of so called development and growth. However, depending on what framework is agreed, it may be that the fair level of emissions reductions for certain countries – not necessarily just Annex I countries but also some advanced developing countries like those in the BASIC grouping17 – is simply unrealistic, without the use of Negative Emissions Techniques (NETs)18, even in the context of dramatic

17 BASIC is a group of four large developing countries: Brazil, South Africa, India and China 18 Negative Emissions Techniques are means of withdrawing CO2 (or other greenhouse gases) from the environment such that atmospheric concentrations are reduced below the level that would have resulted without the NET. Most NETs are classified as geoengineering, although of the category of 'carbon dioxide removal' rather than solar radiation management (Shepherd et al, 2009). However, some NETs do not involve geoengineering, these include biomass expansion, improved soil management, and peat bog restoration 13 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only global economic and social transformation. We will then need to have a conversation about how we deal with this situation.

Options include requiring countries unable to meet their fair share of emissions reductions to pay funding to other countries that are able to make additional reductions beyond their fair share, while keeping to our agreed position against carbon markets and making it clear that ambitious targets cannot be used as a window to increase space for new financial markets based on offsets for those countries not able to meet their fair share of emissions reduction. However, it may be that our overall carbon budget and the industrialisation needs of developing countries leaves insufficient space for this swap of emissions cuts for finance – both from industrialised to developing countries, and between developing countries – in which case there is a question over whether countries can use NETs to meet their required emissions reductions, and if so which ones. We will need to figure out the implications of such a possible conclusion for our federation, and depending on the outcome of this discussion, we may need to revisit our conclusions under decision area 1, which determines the overall budget that we are working with.

FoEI’s current position – Effort-sharing Implementation

Targets FoEI currently demands that industrialised countries must reduce their emissions domestically – without offsetting - by at least 40% by 2020.

Climate Finance FoEI has a specific demand for the recognition and repayment of climate debt of the global North, but does not currently have a specific demand in terms of the means and options for the repayment of this climate debt from Annex I countries to developing countries.

Negative Emissions Techniques (NETs) and Geo-engineering We have not formally explored our position on NETs and geoengineering as a federation. We seem largely agreed that large-scale geoengineering, i.e. the deliberate manipulation of Earth’s systems to alter the climate (including ocean-fertilization, cloud-seeding etc.) is unacceptably dangerous. However, there are a number of low-tech geoengineering technologies (e.g. algae sinks – not in the ocean but on land) and some other NETs like biomass expansion, improvements in soil management, and peat bog restoration which have received very little discussion and which some consider are worth investigating further, as supplementary solutions to be undertaken alongside the obvious solutions that FoEI member groups support as real solutions to climate mitigation and adaptation (i.e. the defence and expansion of small-scale, sustainable agriculture, the transformation of production and consumption patterns etc).

NB. Very little research has been done by scientists and policy-makers on the questions raised in this final decision area, i.e. how we actually get down to the very low targets globally, and in individual countries, as an equitable distribution of the remaining carbon budget will require. It is ‘terra incognita’ for climate policy. Some more information on the

14 AUDIENCE FOR THIS DOCUMENT: FOEI member groups and their staff only options available will be included in the second version of this paper, distributed before discussions begin on this second area of decision-making. However, these options are likely to be vaguer and less substantiated with existing research and policy analysis.

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