Foundation Briefs Advanced Level January Brief

Resolved: Development assistance should be prioritized over military aid in the Sahel region of Africa. January 2014 Table of Contents Table of Contents

foundationbriefs.com Page 2 of 128 January 2014 Definitions Definitions

The Definition of the Sahel Region AMS Merriam Webster Dictionary. 2013. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/sahel Definition of SAHEL the semidesert S fringe of the Sahara that stretches from Mauritania to Chad Teams must become familiar with the Sahel region to remain topical. Sahel Region AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. UN Secretary General. “Report of the Secretary- General on the Situation in the Sahel Region .”June 2013. http://africacenter.org/2013/06/report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in- the-sahel-region/ The Sahel stretches from Mauritania to Eritrea, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and the Sudan, a belt dividing the Sahara desert and the savannahs to the south. The historic trade routes across Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger are the most vulnerable to terrorist and criminal networks. The terrain is harsh and, in the best of cases, extremely difficult to control. The Algeria-Mali border alone stretches for 1,300 km. Moreover, developments in the Sahel-Sahara region affect and are affected by developments in North and West Africa. It will therefore be necessary to remain flexible and inclusive, engaging Governments and the population in Sahelian States as and when problems affect them.

Definition of Developmental Assistance AMS Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. “Official Developmental Assistance Definition.” 2013. http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage. htm The DAC defines ODA as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to

foundationbriefs.com Page 3 of 128 January 2014 Definitions multilateral institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).”

Definition of Military Aid AMS Anup Shah. “Definition of Military Aid.” May 3, 2010. http://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-aid Military aid can be controversial. Its stated aim is usually to help allies or poor countries fight terrorism, counter-insurgencies or to help fight drug wars. The aid may be in the form of training, or even giving credits for foreign militaries to purchase weapons and equipment from the donor country. It is argued that strengthening military relationships can strengthen relationships between nations and military aid may be a way to achieve that. Where the two nations are democracies, it is believed such relationships can be strengthened even further when the militaries of the respective nations are fully behind the principles of democracy. But military aid may even be given to opposition groups to fight nations. This could be understandable if the opposition is a potential democratic force standing up against authoritarian rule.

foundationbriefs.com Page 4 of 128 January 2014 History History

Background of Somali Crisis AMS Sally Healy and Mark Bradbury. Endless War: a Brief History of the Somali Conflict.” Conciliation Resources. 2010. http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/endless-war-brief- history-somali-conflict Over the past two decades the nature of the Somali crisis and the international context within which it is occurring have been constantly changing. It has mutated from a civil war in the 1980s, through state collapse, clan factionalism and warlordism in the 1990s, to a globalised ideological conflict in the first decade of the new millennium. In this time the international environment has also changed, from the end of the Cold War to the ‘global war on terror’, which impacts directly on the crisis and international responses to it. This poses a problem for Somalis and international actors working to build peace. Initiatives that may have appeared to offer a solution in earlier years may no longer be applicable and there is a risk of fighting yesterday’s war or building yesterday’s peace. How the Arab Spring Affected the Sahel Region AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. http://africacenter.org/security/country/sahel/ The historic inability of North African countries to cooperate effectively on joint security and counter- terrorism operations will likely be exacerbated in the wake of the Arab awakening. Already fractious domestic and regional political environments in North Africa mean that tensions between Algeria and countries such as Libya, Morocco and Tunisia could prevent more effective regional coordination as a result of historical tensions and in light of the Arab awakening. Relations between Algeria and Libya for example, have cooled significantly as a result of Algeria’s support for the Gaddafi regime during the uprising. Recent joint security meetings have therefore been hamstrung by the inability of regional players to agree or even appear around the same table. The unresolved status of the Western Sahara, which is a former Spanish colony but was annexed by Morocco in 1975, remains elephant in the room during talks on regional political, security and economic cooperation and the revival of the Arab Maghreb Union. Specifically, failure to address the concerns of the Polisario separatist movement which has been agitating for independence and controls the

foundationbriefs.com Page 5 of 128 January 2014 History large Algerian Tindouf Sahrawi refugee camp near the tripartite border with Morocco and Mauritania remains problematic. It continues to serve as a rallying cry for dissidents. Development of the Mali crisis: Tuareg rebels, terrorist activity, and the French military DAT Alexander, Yonah. “Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications.” Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. February 2013. Web.

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Sahel agricultural conditions and the international philosophy of food aid DAT “Sahel: Food and Nutrition Crisis.” European Commission. November 2013. Web.

foundationbriefs.com Page 7 of 128 January 2014 History http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/sahel_en.pdf The most vulnerable households in the Sahel are still struggling to recover after the severe food and nutrition crisis that affected 18 million people in 2012 (source United Nations). An estimated 11.3 million people are facing food insecurity in 2013 across nine West African countries: Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, northern Cameroon and Nigeria. The crisis is exacerbated by the spill over from the conflicts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire and now from the impact of the major political crisis in Mali and the growing civil insecurity in Northern Nigeria. A massive decline in the scale of the remittances sent by migrants working abroad as a result of the slowdown in economic activities in many parts of the world has also aggravated the situation. The region is still reeling from the aftershocks of the three previous severe food crises (2005, 2008 and 2010). Nutrition care and supplementary feeding will continue to be a massive need in 2013 with an estimated 1.4 million children under five at risk of SAM and another 3.1 million at risk of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM). The underlying causes of persistent food insecurity and chronic high acute malnutrition rates in the Sahel are deep poverty (the countries of the region are amongst the poorest in the world), limited access to basic services, poor education opportunities and environmental degradation. Very high demographic growth is another major issue as the population of the Sahel is growing at 3-4% per year, three times the world's average rate, outpacing economic growth and the growth in agricultural production. At the current rates the population in Niger for example doubles every 20 years. In 2013, the humanitarian community, together with development partners, donors and governments in the context of the AGIR Alliance will focus on strengthening the resilience of the 20% of ultra-poor population in the Sahel, approximately 12 million people to withstand future shocks.

foundationbriefs.com Page 8 of 128 January 2014 Topic Analysis Topic Analysis One

About the resolution: observations and potential pitfalls Let’s get this out of the way: this resolution is huge, and it will lead to some of the most varied arguments and frameworks we will see in Public Forum this year; there is enough to work with here that petty ancillary points and specificities may not warrant much airtime, particularly with a lay judge. Any team that wants to maintain a consistent and persuasive argument on either side of this resolution will have to be locked on to whatever framework they are pursuing. There is simply too much material at hand here for teams to just be shooting ancillary points, particularly given the precious limited time Public Forum rounds afford for constructive arguments. That said, this topic shouldn’t be seen as more daunting or difficult: in fact, pulling away from focusing on the United States and being given so much leeway with advocacies can feel like a breath of fresh air. At any rate, some initial observations: Teams on both sides need to remember their audience. Preparation for this debate is likely going to involve a far greater depth and breadth of research, simply because there are two different policy options that need to be evaluated with respect to a multitude of actors (those delivering military and development assistance) and logistical situations that vary across the Sahel. While we always implore for you to do extensive research on background and arguments outside of what we provide in our briefs, this is especially true for a resolution like this. There is a higher ceiling for preparedness with this resolution arguably than any other one this season. The implication, of course, is that there is then a much higher disparity between a) what kind of information both teams are bringing into the round, and b) what a lay judge is aware of at the start. Even multiple rounds into a tournament, when lay judges have typically become acquainted with background information and stock arguments, this isn’t necessarily the case with this resolution; there are enough countries and enough factors at play that judges likely will not be familiar with certain policies or the situation in certain countries that teams may use in nuanced arguments. If I’m a lay judge going into a round, here’s what I know: there’s a genocide going on in Darfur, there’s been unrest in Egypt and Libya (and are those even in the Sahel? Chances are I’m not too familiar with what the Sahel is, really), there’s some violence in the Niger Delta, and northern Mali has seen a French invasion on account of Tuareg rebel and terrorist activity. I know that the United States has some military involvement in the region and that food aid is likely coming in as well. This would seem to place an excessive burden on first-speaking teams to waste time delivering background information, but both teams can still focus on argumentation (and spend a majority of their time on it as well) by simply prefacing any complex or region/policy-specific arguments with short context: judges just cannot be left completely in the dark about an argument’s context, unless it is a theoretical foundationbriefs.com Page 9 of 128 January 2014 Topic Analysis argument—the rhetoric loses its effectiveness. Remember who the actor is Much of the leeway afforded by the resolution is by virtue of no actor being specified. That is, the mention of development aid and military assistance is not accompanied by mention of who is providing it. Neither team can afford to base preparations or arguments from an America-centric viewpoint. This isn’t to say that the United States can be discarded entirely. The United States provides a massive percentage of development assistance to the Sahel region through the USAID, as well as military aid (generally aerial support) through Africom and other initiatives. That said, the African Union also has a heavy presence through peacekeeping efforts in the Sahel, alongside the European Union and its individual member states. Because of the ambiguity in the resolution, there are two readily-apparent ways around this: The first is simply not to acknowledge the actor. The resolution is far more clear about the recipient of the aid and what kinds of aid to discuss, so simply focusing research and argumentation around that would be a simple course of action. It’s taking the attitude that the source of aid is inconsequential; it is what happens to the aid and what kind of aid is provided that matters. A trickier, though plausible, proposition would be to focus arguments based on who provides the aid. For instance, a possible Con against aid could concern the idea that aid from the European Union has come in the form of paying off militant groups in exchange for handing over hostages; that is, it could be argued that certain brands of what might be considered development aid are really just paying off governments. Theories and hypotheticals are not all that necessary The resolution fails to specify a certain kind of development aid or military assistance. It fails to advocate for a concrete course of action, leaving that burden on the teams arguing the resolution. With this in mind, it can be tempting to dive immediately into theories on international aid. In compiling this brief, we came across a litany of advanced economic papers arguing for certain types of development aid and throwing around macroeconomic simulations to prove theoretical points. Those papers largely were not utilized. The last few decades in the Sahel have been a massive case study of what works and does not work. The volatility of the region, coupled with the perpetuity of its need for infrastructure and agricultural development, have ensured a constant influx of both military assistance and development aid from the international community. This means that virtually aid strategy one could conceive in theory has likely already been implemented. There is no need to get into the theory of whether funding governments or directly allocating resources is better, and under which conditions, this is true, when both approaches have been taken under a multitude of conditions by actors in the international community. For both teams, then, this opens up a fairly simple strategy of how to put together evidence for theoretical foundationbriefs.com Page 10 of 128 January 2014 Topic Analysis arguments or simply how to find a good advocacy: look at what has been implemented in the Sahel, see what has worked, see what happens, and figure out the reasons for that. Because there is already essentially a case study for every implementation of aid (development or military), teams can bring arguments that are both genuinely impactful and grounded in the real world simply by analyzing past and present efforts to assist the Sahel region.

This isn’t an all or nothing resolution As the next topic analysis will discuss, debaters are left to their own devices when defining terms to their advantage. A big word in the resolution is “prioritize”. Both teams need to make very clear what that term means, and this will depend on the type of arguments being made. Does it entail more money? More personnel? More countries aided? Given that there are small, focused areas of unrest in the Sahel, Con teams will likely focus on policy and personnel as entailing priority, while the growing overall need for development will warrant funding being synonymized with priority by Pro teams. Frameworks Without a tight framework for a resolution of this many possible scopes, teams risk muddling debates and losing arguments despite (or even on account of) superior preparation of evidence and facts. These approaches came to mind when compiling evidence on the resolution, though they in no way entail the entirety of acceptable approaches to the resolution. Cost vs. benefit as efficiency This is, obviously, the de facto PF framework that’s implicit to every resolution. It’s dead simple to evaluate the costs of both development aid and military aid: they’re pretty much financial tallies. While there are certainly ancillary costs—the African Union in particular has lost personnel while intervening in the conflicts across the region—the costs to the U.N. and the United States are primarily financial. So this framework really comes down to which policy is more efficient—which policy leverages money and personnel into the greatest positive demonstrable impact? Pro teams will find the seeming perpetuity of insurgency in the Sahel helpful, while Con teams can demonstrate the relatively massive harms of continued violence and instability as helpful to their own advocacies Greatest need This is different from cost vs. benefit in that teams don’t necessarily have to take efficiency into perspective. Under such a framework, a team would essentially have to establish that the situation is worse in the Sahel from a developmental or military perspective. Con teams using this framework can use the precarious positions

foundationbriefs.com Page 11 of 128 January 2014 Topic Analysis of besieged governments and armies (e.g. Mali), while Pro teams can cite increasing famine rates and slowing economic growth as legitimizing a ramping up of outside aid. Long-term gain This is asking the question, “what’s the real end goal in the Sahel region?” This is also taking the efficiency framework and extrapolating it over time. It allows teams to directly evaluate the impacts of certain policies without getting into chicken vs. egg arguments (see Topic Analysis 2). Pro teams can find this framework particularly helpful with using the impacts of climate change as a justification of immediate emphasis on development aid. Utilitarianism This is a variation on the harms v. good framework that also takes into account the actors. If teams find that they are willing and able to cover a larger swath of this resolution, they can frame a debate around what is good for everyone involved. The upside is that teams on both sides can bring in evidence concerning outside players in the Sahel—how they benefit politically or are harmed economically from certain policy actions. Con teams in particular may find such a perspective useful for linking military aid to the enhancement of security for outside entities like the United States, as well as how military assistance bolsters the soft power of African states. Final thoughts This resolution gives teams a lot to work with; that’s a positive aspect, not a negative one. With a clear focus and well-distilled evidence, teams can have a simple job of bringing the resolution down to size and engaging in clear debates. It will be genuinely exciting to what kind of debate will emerge from this resolution as teams get a grasp of it, so have fun with it and best of luck.

-Daniel Tsvankin

foundationbriefs.com Page 12 of 128 January 2014 Topic Analysis Two Topic Analysis Two

This resolution provides a welcome break from this year’s primarily U.S.-centric topics to focus on a different region of the world. Because it is unusual teams will need to do their research and delineate carefully for judges. With this in mind, I have the following advice:

1. Review the region

While the topic refers generally to the “Sahel region,” this is a diverse area which should not be treated as a whole. Look into the different problems facing each country in the region and search for commonalities to build a case. In particular, teams should be familiar with the problems in Mali, Nigeria, and the Sudan because many debates will focus on these critical nations.

2. Define terms to your advantage

As mentioned in the first topic analysis, this resolution leaves a lot up to the debaters. Each team should define both “developmental assistance” and “military aid” to their benefit. Pro teams should use the evidence in this brief to argue that developmental assistance can be used to combat the problems which lead to military conflict. For example, organizations like USAID target schools and governments in programs which attempt to stop conflicted youth from turning to military organizations. On the other hand, con teams should define developmental assistance as narrowly as possible, focusing on programs which give programs to Sahel governments. Con teams can argue that Sahel governments are so unstable that military aid must be prioritized to create a stable situation before developmental assistance can be enacted successfully. Both teams also need to be careful in defining the Sahel region. Focus on the region overall rather than arguing one particular case.

3. Avoid chicken or the egg arguments

It will be easy for these debates to devolve into questioning whether military aid can be dispersed without first offering developmental assistance for problems like widespread famine and on the other hand, whether military aid can be reasonably given to governments facing unrest and in many cases, revolution. Pro teams can use the numbers showing the success of developmental assistance programs to focus their debates on developmental assistance as a means to an end, and not just a precursor for military aid. Con teams should focus on the corruption of Sahel governments and leaders to prove that military aid must be used to stabilize the region before giving money to any regional leaders.

foundationbriefs.com Page 13 of 128 January 2014 Topic Analysis Two

This topic leaves room for some creative arguments. Do your research and have fun  --Amanda Sopkin--

foundationbriefs.com Page 14 of 128 January 2014 Defend Your Source Defend Your Source

Africa Center for Strategic Studies The Africa Center is the pre-eminent Department of Defense institution for strategic security studies, research, and outreach in Africa. The Africa Center engages African partner states and institutions through rigorous academic and outreach programs that build strategic capacity and foster long-term, collaborative relationships. AL-Monitor The Al-Monitor brings together top journalists from across the Middle East. Including Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Turkey. The news network has daily translations from 20 major news organizations in the region. Carnegie Endowment The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a unique global network of policy research centers in Russia, China, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. Our mission, dating back more than a century, is to advance the cause of peace through analysis and development of fresh policy ideas and direct engagement and collaboration with decision makers in government, business, and civil society. Working together, our centers bring the inestimable benefit of multiple national viewpoints to bilateral, regional, and global issues. Chatham House Chatham House, home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading source of independent analysis, informed debate and influential ideas on how to build a prosperous and secure world for all. The institute engages governments, the private sector, civil society and its members in open debates and confidential discussions about significant developments in international affairs.

foundationbriefs.com Page 15 of 128 January 2014 Defend Your Source Conciliation Resources Conciliation Resources is a research group which focuses on seven conflict-affected regions around the world and we take a further in-depth look at specific conflict contexts and peacebuilding themes through our Accord publication series. In addition, we work to improve global conflict policies, with a focus on the UK, EU and UN, and the regions in which we work. Global Issues.org Global Issues.org looks into global issues that affect everyone and aims to show how most issues are inter- related. The issues discussed on this site range from trade, poverty and globalization, to human rights, geopolitics, the environment, and much more. Spread over these articles, there are over 7,000 links to external articles, web sites, reports and analysis to help provide credence to the arguments made on this web site. Huffington Post The Huffington Post is an American online news aggregator which offers news, and original content and covers politics, business, entertainment, environment, technology, popular media, lifestyle, culture, comedy, healthy living, women's interests, and local news. IRIN News IRIN – standing for Integrated Regional Information Networks – has its head office in Nairobi, Kenya, with regional desks in Nairobi, Johannesburg, Dakar, Dubai and Bangkok, covering some 70 countries. The bureaus are supported by a network of local correspondents, an increasing rarity in mainstream newsgathering today. IRIN is an award-winning humanitarian news and analysis service covering the parts of the world often under- reported, misunderstood or ignored. Merriam Webster Dictionary Merriam-Webster, Inc., which was originally the G & C Merriam Company of Springfield, Massachusetts, is an American company that publishes reference books, especially dictionaries that are descendants of Noah Webster's An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828).Merriam-Webster, Inc. has been a subsidiary of Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc. since 1964.

The New York Times The New York Times (or NYT) is an American daily newspaper, founded and continuously published in New

foundationbriefs.com Page 16 of 128 January 2014 Defend Your Source York City since September 18, 1851. It has won 112 Pulitzer Prizes, more than any other news organization. Its website is one of America's most popular news sites - and most popular among all the nation's newspapers - receiving more than 30 million unique visitors per month. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) The mission of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is to promote policies that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around the world. The OECD provides a forum in which governments can work together to share experiences and seek solutions to common problems. We work with governments to understand what drives economic, social and environmental change. We measure productivity and global flows of trade and investment. We analyse and compare data to predict future trends. We set international standards on a wide range of things, from agriculture and tax to the safety of chemicals. Oxfam International Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations networked together in more than 90 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty. We work directly with communities and we seek to influence the powerful to ensure that poor people can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a say in decisions that affect them. Sahel Working Group The Sahel Working Group (SWG) is an informal inter-agency network, focusing mainly on Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. It was formed to identify and implement solutions to the chronic vulnerability and hunger of communities, as highlighted by the chronic food crises in 2005 and 2010. Somali Current News Somali Current News is an independent, bilingual news site that covers Somalia and beyond. The idea to launch this site was born out of, primarily, the necessity in demonstrating professional journalism, independent reporting and critical analysis. In addition to news sites, it also strives to create a cyber platform in which Somalis of all walks of life can engage a discourse on any given issues, from politics to business, environment to entertainment. Telegraph The Telegraph provides the latest World news and international news from the Telegraph. Your source for US, Europe, China and African news. It’s internationally recongized journalists have worked to procure the most up to date news around the world since 1855.

foundationbriefs.com Page 17 of 128 January 2014 Defend Your Source United Nations Security Council Under the Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security. World Food Programme The World Food Programme is the world's largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger worldwide. Born in 1961, WFP pursues a vision of the world in which every man, woman and child has access at all times to the food needed for an active and healthy life. We work towards that vision with our sister UN agencies in Rome -- the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) -- as well as other government, UN and NGO partners.

foundationbriefs.com Page 18 of 128 Pro Evidence

foundationbriefs.com Page 19 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Acute Need for Developmental Assistance Crises Facing Sahel Region AMS World Food Programme. “Sahel Crisis.” 2013 http://www.wfp.org/crisis/sahel

We are in the middle of the ‘lean season’, which normally goes from June to September. But for a large proportion of the population the lean season actually started much earlier this year. This is especially true for the agro-pastoralists [who live from a mixture of agriculture and livestock herding and are particularly vulnerable to drought -ed].

As regards the situation right now, we have a worrying locust situation in Northern Mali and Niger. They are now breeding and if measures are not taken to stop that, it could seriously impact this year’s food production. So we are making plans to cope with such a situation.

The security situation in Northern Mali is also a compounding factor. [The conflict] could produce more refugees. We already have 180,000 refugees in three neighbouring countries and more than 150,000 internally displaced persons inside Mali. We don’t expect the situation to be resolved very soon and we are in fact worried that there might be an escalation in the coming weeks or months.

This piece mentions three severe problems facing the Sahel Region: agricultural famine, locusts, and an influx of refugees from conflict in Northern Mali. These problems demonstrate the need for developmental assistance in the Sahel. Oxfam Reports Need for Assistance in Sahel AMS Oxfam International. “Food Crisis in Sahel.” 2013. http://www.oxfam.org/en/sahel Last year, over 18 million people in the Sahel region of West Africa were affected by a severe food crisis caused by drought, a failure of several crops, and sharp rises in food prices. With the current conflict in Mali, more than 350,000 people have been forced to flee their homes, both in Mali and its neighbors in Sahel, adding more pressure on already vulnerable communities. The lives of over 1 million children were at risk from severe malnutrition. Communities across the Sahel suffered (and malnutrition rates remain dangerously high) but a major humanitarian operation, acting earlier

foundationbriefs.com Page 20 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need than ever before, managed to protect the lives and livelihoods of millions of people.

The situation in the Sahel AMS Oxfam International. “Food Crisis in Sahel.” 2013. http://www.oxfam.org/en/sahel A range of factors contributed to the latest food crisis: Low rainfall and water levels, poor harvests and lack of pasture, high food prices and a drop in remittances from migrants all caused serious problems. At the end of 2012, good rainfall and better harvests have provided some relief. Cereal production is 13 percent higher than last year, but this does not mean the crisis is over. Food prices remain high and many farmers were unable to take advantage of the better rains to plant their crops. Malnutrition rates for children remain above emergency levels in many parts of the region. Millions of people still require sustained support to recover from the crisis, to rebuild their assets and livelihoods, and to be able to support their families. As well as dealing with the immediate challenges of helping people recover, we need to work together to tackle the underlying causes of food crises in the Sahel. Even when the harvests are good, 230,000 children die of malnutrition-related causes each year. Oxfam is dedicated to supporting small-scale farmers so they can produce more food, supporting the incomes of the poorest people through cash-for-work programs, and building systems of food reserves. These are just some of ways we can help to build the resilience of communities to future shocks, and avoid crises in the future.

foundationbriefs.com Page 21 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Meningitis Threat Requires Developmental Assistance AMS Irin News. “Meningitis Vaccine a ‘Stunning’ Success.” IRIN Global. September 12, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98733/meningitis-vaccine-a-stunning-success Meningitis, particularly the A strain of the of the infection, is a major health problem in the Sahel, the semi-arid zone to the south of the Sahara Desert, which stretches from Senegal in the west to Ethiopia in the east. Many residents carry the bacteria harmlessly in their throats, but in the early months of each year, the dry, dusty wind known as the Harmattan sweeps down from the desert. Doctors believe that the dryness and dustiness cause irritation and reduced resistance, leading the disease to flare up.

Bad meningitis years bring outbreaks across the Sahel; an outbreak in 1996-1997 is believed to have killed 25,000 people. Existing vaccines were not very effective, especially for young children, and because they did not confer long-lasting protection, they were usually only used during outbreaks, and often arrived too late to be useful. The new vaccine, known as MenAfriVac, is a conjugate polysaccharide-tetanus toxoid vaccine for type A meningitis, and it was developed specifically for use in the region. (…) When researchers compared the two areas, the results were striking: In the areas that had received the new vaccine, the incidence of meningitis of all kinds was only 2.5 per 100,000 people, compared with an incidence of 43.6 per 100,000 in the unvaccinated areas. This card both shows a substantial problem for the Sahel region and demonstrates that developmental assistance (a vaccine) was very effective in this instance.

foundationbriefs.com Page 22 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Bovine Disease Attacks Sahel Region AMS Irin News. “Curbing Deadly Bovine Disease Faces Hurdles in Sahel.” IRIN Global. August 8, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98538/curbing-deadly-bovine- disease-faces-hurdles-in-sahel Long eradicated in developed countries, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) - a highly infectious respiratory disease - remains a huge threat to cattle production in the Sahel and West Africa, where cross-border migration by pastoralists is customary.

The disease persists in many developing countries and is particularly prevalent in West Africa, where weak regional control policies, lack of resources and technical capacity by governments, as well as lack of interest by donors have made it difficult to wipe out, experts say. (…) This is likely what happened in 2012 in the Gambia, when CBPP appeared for the first time since 1971 and killed nearly 10,000 heads of cattle. While the exact cause of the outbreak is unknown, experts believe that it re-emerged due to unregulated cattle trade with Mali and Mauritania, where CBPP remains a problem. (…) FAO says it was able to reach more than 340,000 of the Gambia’s estimated 400,000 heads of cattle. Senegal’s Ministry of Livestock says it has successfully administered around 300,000 vaccine doses.

Authorities say the outbreak appears to be under control for now as no new cases have been reported since January 2013, but specialized teams continue to sensitize pastoralists and farmers and periodically check blood samples from different herds and meat samples from slaughter houses. They say the threat of another outbreak still lingers. Much like meningitis, the outbreak of CBPP is a problem that can only be remedied by developmental assistance.

foundationbriefs.com Page 23 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Statistics Explain the Dire Sahel Situation AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. UN Secretary General. “Report of the Secretary- General on the Situation in the Sahel Region .”June 2013. http://africacenter.org/2013/06/report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in- the-sahel-region/

The Sahel is confronted with acute development and humanitarian challenges. Human development in the region is among the lowest in the world. Over the years, recurring food and nutritional crises caused by climate change, environmental degradation, drought, floods, poorly functioning markets, low agricultural productivity, poverty and conflict have seriously eroded the ability of households to withstand repeated and increasingly frequent shocks. Good rains and better harvests in 2012 notwithstanding, at least 11.4 million people in the Sahel remain food insecure. Some 5 million children under the age of five are at risk of acute malnutrition, of whom some 1.5 million are at risk of severe acute malnutrition. The prices of cereal, the staple food in the Sahel, have been increasing since October 2010 and area above the five-year average, leading to a significant decrease in the purchasing power of vulnerable households. In addition, the Sahel faces major and recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases, such as meningitis, polio and cholera, which present significant challenges for weak health-care systems and can be addressed only through a long-term regional approach aimed at building resilience. The Sahel cannot hope to ward off terrorism when facing acute malnutrition, famine, and disease. Pro teams should open with these statistics to stress the importance of developmental assistance before military considerations.

foundationbriefs.com Page 24 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need The Sahel is not a self-sustaining region, DAT Naudet, Jean-David. “Finding Problems to Fit the Solutions.” OECD Library. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. n.d. Web. The Sahel’s poverty is a permanent justification (or appeal) for external support. Nearly everything in the Sahel appears to deserve support from the international community. The extent of this poverty leads to disproportion and imbalance between donor and recipient. The total GDP of the Sahel countries and their 45 million people in 1993 was $13 billion, roughly the same amount as total US or Japanese official development assistance ($11 billion each), managed by a few thousand officials. The total budget resources of all Sahelian countries in that year were equivalent to Denmark’s official assistance. The same disproportion can be found at the level of institutions, individuals and activities. This makes partnership a particularly complex matter. The second characteristic of the Sahel is its vulnerability. This imposes a special mission, perhaps a duty, on aid: to attempt to prevent and manage crises and help the region strive for control over its environment. But this permanent uncertainty also affects aid activities themselves, especially the ability to forecast, program and make commitments in consequence. One poor harvest can upset all current projects. At the macro-economic level, what is the point of ritually repeating, year by year, growth forecasts of 3%, 4% or 5%, when we know that rainfall is the determining factor in actual performance? Worsening climatic conditions in the past half decade necessitate a proportional response, DAT “It’s Getting Harder All the Time.” The Economist. 2 December 2010. Web. But now the rains have started bringing problems too. Farmers and aid workers say rainfall has been more erratic and stormy for at least the past five years, though it is unclear whether any areas are getting more water overall. Kagara is just one pocket of woe; an hour's drive north, this year's floods left over 50,000 people homeless in the desert country of Niger. Ruined harvests caused crippling food shortages that put more than half of the population at risk of going hungry in the spring. Countries across the Sahelian belt have suffered similar deluges. The number of those who routinely lose crops, cattle or houses in such floods has been rising steadily since 2005. So the Sahel's inhabitants are increasingly facing a cycle of extreme dry and wet spells, raising doubts as to whether the region is really habitable at all. Each season seems to exacerbate the problems of the next. When torrential rains destroy crops, Sahelians are even likelier to suffer from food shortages in the following dry months. “This next season will be very worrying,” says Carlos Muñoz, an adviser in west Africa for Oxfam, one of several aid agencies in the area. foundationbriefs.com Page 25 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need

Situation in Mali Demands Developmental Assistance

Problems in Mali Demand Developmental Attention, not Military Aid AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. UN Secretary General. “Report of the Secretary- General on the Situation in the Sahel Region .”June 2013. http://africacenter.org/2013/06/report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in- the-sahel-region/ For much of the past year, the world watched in horror as long-standing political grievances in Mali were overshadowed by appalling acts of violence carried out by insurgents linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Since the beginning of the Malian crisis in January 2012, more than half a million people are estimated to have fled and sought refuge either in Malian host communities or in neighbouring countries. Serious human rights violations committed by armed groups and Government soldiers, including summary executions and illegal arrests, recruitment and use of children, sexual violence against women and children, abductions of children and destruction and looting of property, are currently under investigation, while access to basic social services is limited, particularly in the north. In the regions of Timbuktu and Gao, 53 per cent of schools remain closed, while in the Kidal region, schools have not reopened at all.

foundationbriefs.com Page 26 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Developmental Assistance Lacking in Sahel AMS IRIN News. “Humanitarian Needs Rise in Sahel.” IRIN News. July 4, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98361/humanitarian-needs-rise-in-sahel Some 11.3 million Sahelians are estimated to be short of food this year and 1.5 million under-fives acutely malnourished. As of May 2013, 345,000 acutely malnourished children had been treated in UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and NGO-run nutrition centres. But despite year-on-year nutrition support, surveys show malnutrition rates of over 10 percent in almost all of the countries, and above the 15 percent threshold in parts of Chad, Mauritania and Niger.

In Mauritania one third of the population is food-insecure.

Most vulnerable are families who were affected by the 2012 drought, and who have not yet recovered their animal or seed stocks, and the half a million Malians displaced by conflict in the north. But even Mali - the most "visible and acute" crisis in the region, with 3.5 million people estimated to be food-insecure - has received just 29 percent of the funding called for.

Just 35 percent of the amount needed - US$607 million - has been received thus far, leaving a US$1 billion shortfall. The funds received are unevenly spread, said Piper. "We recognize the response that has been given, but we are concerned that it is not equally spread across all sectors."

Agriculture is just 23 percent funded, meaning it is already too late to get the necessary seeds to farmers to plant in time for the rains. (…) Other severely under-funded sectors include water and sanitation (11 percent) and health (26 percent), both of which underpin infant nutrition; as well as education (10 percent), and early recovery (8 percent).

foundationbriefs.com Page 27 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Agricultural Need in Sahel AMS IRIN News. “Analysis: Short-term Fixes: the Bane of West African Agriculture.” IRIN News. July 5, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98367/analysis-short-term-fixes- the-bane-of-west-african-agriculture While there has been a renewed interest in investing in agriculture over the past five years, partly spurred by a drive towards more self-sufficiency given rising food prices (which spiked in 2008 and remained high), the sector is still under-served.

In 2009 the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) renewed the 2003 Maputo pledge to commit at least 10 percent of their national budgets to agriculture. But as the accord approaches its 10-year anniversary later this month, only 10 of the 54 African Union countries have met this goal.

While growth in small-scale agriculture can benefit the poor twice as much as growth in other sectors, global development aid for agriculture declined by 77 percent between 1983 and 2006, according to a report by NGO Oxfam.

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The Threat of Climate Change

Climate change will make the Sahel nearly inhabitable and requires long-term solutions, DAT The biggest fear is that climate change will make survival for the people of the Sahel impossible. Scientists disagree on whether the belt will get drier or wetter in coming decades, but either is generally bleak. Some predict 25% less rain a year by 2100. Others predict a 25% increase that, if the rain came in isolated bursts, would mean more of those destructive floods. In any case, Petra Tschakert, an expert in climate-change adaptation in west Africa at Pennsylvania State University, says the main concern is the ever more unpredictable and violent rainfall, not the amount. “Farmers can adapt to trends. They cannot adapt to extreme weather,” she says. One of the few areas of scientific consensus is that Sahel temperatures are rising and will rise further in the coming years. This can disrupt rainfall patterns and provoke storms, as warmer air is capable of holding more moisture. Some farmers in northern Nigeria are already noticing such changes. “We had to plant four times last year,” says a villager in Kagara, who lost of a third of his maize crop through false starts. “Each time the rain had started but then it suddenly stopped.” Some longer-term solutions are being tried out. Mali's government has made big efforts to irrigate farmland, largely thanks to loans from outfits such as the African Development Bank. A project near its Bani river began in February. Farmers in several countries are planting “short-cycle” crops, such as a kind of maize that can be harvested in three months instead of the more usual five. Given the drastic changes the Sahel will see coming in the next century, coupled with the resources required to sustain human life in the Sahel amid the extra pressure of changing environmental factors, a priority on development aid is requisite to sustaining human life in the Sahel.

foundationbriefs.com Page 29 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Poor agricultural households face the greatest threat from changing climatic conditions, DAT “Facing the Consequences.” The Economist. 25 November 2010. Web. Many of the millions of poor farming households in poor countries, who make up the bulk of the world's agricultural labour force if not its agricultural output, already face more variable weather than farmers in temperate countries do. That and a lack of social safety-nets makes most of them highly risk-averse, which further limits their ability to undertake some adaptation strategies, such as changing crop varieties and planting patterns. They will often prefer surer chances but lower yields. Worse, in bad weather a whole region's crops suffer together. … Statistical analyses by Salvador Barrios of the European Union's Joint Research Centre and his colleagues suggest that climate change is already a factor in African urbanisation. A related study shows strong climate effects on sub-Saharan agriculture in Africa not seen elsewhere, which is not perhaps surprising given the huge effect of the 1980s droughts across the Sahel. The Sahel already faces frequent crop failures and problems meeting basic needs, which will almost certainly get worse with time. Given the disproportionate harms to the region in particular, an emphasis on development is warranted.

foundationbriefs.com Page 30 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need Climate change-induced hardship has driven insurgent recruitment, DAT “A Perfect Desert Storm.” The Economist. 17 March 2012. Web. http://www.economist.com/node/21550324 Once a playground for adventurous tourists, the arid lands south of the Sahara desert known as the Sahel are fast becoming a no-go zone. Chad, Mali and Niger are the countries most affected, but the convergence of jihadist extremism, a sudden influx of heavy weapons and a severe drought threatens the wider region. Low precipitation may seem normal near the Sahara. In fact, much of the Sahel normally gets enough rain to allow modest farming. But a rise in water temperatures in the nearby Gulf of Guinea has shifted the flow of rain clouds southwards, meteorologists say. Livestock have died in droves. Long-term overgrazing and fast population growth have made the problem worse. … Misery has made the Sahel's thousands of unemployed an easy target for recruiters from extremist groups. Their main base lies across Niger's badly patrolled border with Algeria, where the Sahel becomes outright desert. A two-decade-old Islamist insurgency there has adopted the mantle of global jihad and renamed itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Having failed to dislodge the military regime along Algeria's densely populated Mediterranean coast, these extremists are increasingly focused on the sandy hinterland. Unless development aid can avert people’s descent into poverty, the climatological changes from global warming essentially drive the cost up for both development and military aid.

foundationbriefs.com Page 31 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Acute Need The international community cannot put off increasing aid to cope with climate change DAT Tran, Mark. “Sahel’s Food Crisis Gets Swift Response but No Long-term Answers.” Our World. U.N. University. 11 January 2012. Web. Encouraging as it is, the early response cannot mask the increasing frequency of droughts in the Sahel, which means communities are lurching from crisis to crisis with little time to recover from previous shocks. And things are not going to get better. A UN study last month said climate change is already having an impact on the livelihoods of millions of people in the Sahel and west Africa. Climate change, combined with population growth and weak governance, has intensified competition over scarce resources as well as changing migration patterns, increasing the risk of conflict, it said. Security analysts fear that Al-Qaida in the Maghreb will seek to exploit instability in the region. The UN study identified “hotspots” where changing temperature trends over the past 40 years have caused severe flooding and droughts, significantly altering people’s livelihoods. Many of these hotspots are in the central part of the Sahel, in Niger, Burkina Faso, northern and coastal Ghana, as well as northern Togo, Benin and Nigeria. By addressing agricultural infrastructure through development aid now, the international community will effectively fulfill the imperative of matching aid to need while also ameliorating the future need for military aid due to violence stemming from instability.

foundationbriefs.com Page 32 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Success of Programs Success of Relief Programs

Agricultural Relief Programs’ Success

The World Food Programme’s Success AMS  WFP is currently reaching around 6 million people with food assistance across the Sahel region  In Niger, WFP's operation during the June-September hunger season will reach 2.6 million people. Over the course of 2012, WFP programmes will reach a total of 4.2 million people.  In the wake of the conflict in Mali, WFP is supporting internally displaced people, refugees and their host communities in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania. We aim to reach 550,000 people.  In Chad, WFP’s current operation aims to assist a total of 1.5 million people. In June, we reached 855,000 people.  In Mauritania, WFP is supporting 574,000 people through a range of programmes including cash transfers, food for assets and nutrition and cereal bank support  Regular food distributions are also underway in Senegal and Gambia. Over 700,000 people were reached in the two countries in June.  The UN Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS), operated by WFP, is operating and has scaled up its operations to fly in Chad, Niger, Maliand Mauritania. This piece quantifies the substantial impact of the World Food Programme on the Sahel Region. It is a vital resource for pro teams.

foundationbriefs.com Page 33 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Success of Programs Regional Director Describes Developmental Assistance in Sahel Region AMS Interview with Thomas Yanga, World Food Programme’s Regional Director.World Food Programme. “Sahel Crisis.” 2013 http://www.wfp.org/crisis/sahel

One of the major differences in this year’s response has been the inclusion of resilience-building work within relief activities. WFP has taken a phased approach. Early on we implemented resilience-building activities, followed by emergency relief programmes and then by some other mitigation work.

I have had a chance myself, through my visits to Chad and Niger, to see very effective resilience-building activities done with 'cash-for-work' or 'food-for-work' programmes. These have helped communities to cope with the situation and prevented them from migrating, taking their children out of school and generally seeing their nutritional intake deteriorate. We will develop our resilience-building activities – this is part of our response strategy. We will put more emphasis on those activities in October in order to prepare vulnerable communities to face the next crisis.

Success of Focus on Shareholders AMS IRIN News. “Analysis: Short-term Fixes: the Bane of West African Agriculture.” IRIN News. July 5, 2013. http://www.irinnews.org/report/98367/analysis-short-term-fixes- the-bane-of-west-african-agriculture Todd Crosby, the assistant director for YaaJeende, USAID's Feed the Future's Senegal programme, told IRIN: "The idea [behind investing in smallholder farmers] is to give them everything they need in order to succeed. It's to provide them with things like seeds, fertilizer, tools, and crop and livestock insurance. Teach them better land preparation and irrigation techniques, if they need. Help them get their product to the market."

By doing so, farmers can not only produce more, high-quality crops - which will increase their incomes - but can also help reduce the rates of undernutrition and malnutrition in the country.

Research from Feed the Future, which works with 12 African countries to reduce poverty and undernutrition through investing in agriculture, says it was able to increase the value of food exports by $84 million in 2012 by focusing on smallholder folders. This has meant that more than seven million smallholder farmers in the region saw increased profits last year.

foundationbriefs.com Page 34 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Success of Programs

Oxfam International’s Developmental Assistance Program AMS Oxfam International. “Food Crisis in Sahel.” 2013. http://www.oxfam.org/en/sahel Across the region, our response has reached more than a million people with essential support so far. Oxfam is continuing its work supporting communities who continue to struggle with high food prices, as well as to help them rebuild and recover their livelihoods. We specialize in programs improving food security, strengthening livelihoods and increasing access to safe water and sanitation. We continue to support communities in Mali (Gao and Kayes), Burkina Faso (North and Center-North), Mauritania (Brakna and Gorgol), Senegal (Kolda and Kedougou), Gambia (Kombo South), Niger (Tahoua, Maradi, Zinder, Tillabery, Dosso, Agadez, Maradi and Niamey) and Chad (Bar el Gazal and Guera). Our ongoing activities include food distribution, cash/voucher transfers, income generating activities and cmarket gardening, as well WASH activities to maintain latrines, well and pump rehabilitation, water quality monitoring and hygiene promotion. Oxfam is also responding to flood affected communities in Niger (Zinder, Maradi, Tahou and Niamey). So far over 16,000 people have been supported. Our longer-term programs will aim to build on the support provided to communities during the food crisis to strengthen the resilience of affected communities to future shocks. This includes, for example, social protection programs to support the incomes of vulnerable communities, programs to improve agricultural productivity, nutrition, and livelihood ofpportunities, and support to the development of local early warning systems to help communities adapt and respond to changing circumstances. Pro teams must clearly explain what is meant by “developmental assistance.” One of the best ways to do this is by using an example of a successful developmental program.

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Human and Social Development

Cultural and educational programs combat extremism in Mali, DAT “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region.” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Government Printing Office. 17 November 2009. Web. [EARL GAST, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT]: USAID’s TSCTP approach has concentrated on youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance—the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and progress. Each activity is tailored to meet the specific threat levels, political environments, and material needs of each country. Unlike traditional development programs, our counterextremism efforts, when necessary, target narrow populations that generally aren’t reached by other programs. We also specifically reach out to young men—the group most likely to be recruited by extremist groups. In Niger, we have been building the capacity of local leaders to launch and sustain community development projects. In Mali, the 11 community radio stations we’re building will reach 385,000 people with messages of peace-building, governance, and education. And in Chad, we are developing conflict mitigation and community stabilization projects that reach into the country’s remote north. While it can be difficult to measure success in countering extremism, we have seen some progress in our efforts. As a result of our outreach in Chad, the Association of Nomads and Herders has created a youth branch of its organization, which has given those young men who participate greater stature in their community. The promotion of youth participation in organizations such as this one helps to build stronger ties between youth and their communities, and provides them with a voice in society. Empowering youth in this way can greatly reduce the feeling of marginalization that feeds recruitment into extremist groups. In northern Mali, where one of the underlying drivers of extremism is the lack of educational opportunity, a USAID radio-based program has trained more than 1,400 teachers in 217 schools. And in Niger, our early partnership with a local imam has directly resulted in more than a dozen madrassas adding a course on peace and tolerance to their curricula. In the uranium-mining areas of northern Niger communities have formed listening clubs to discuss USAID- funded radio programs on good governance. One listening club even reports that they are pooling funds to purchase a phone card so that they can call the radio station with their feedback.

foundationbriefs.com Page 36 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Success of Programs The direct connection this source makes between development and anti-extremism efforts is important. It shows established anti-terror methods relying on development and provides backing statistics.

Health services in warzones, e.g. Darfur DAT “Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.” United States Government Accountability Office. November 2006. Web. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health sector, supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, and maternal health care. We visited five NGO- operated health clinics in Darfur IDP camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 IDPs per day, provided basic medical examinations, referring serious illnesses to Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided vaccinations, reproductive health services for pregnant women, and medical services for victims of gender- based violence. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health sector, supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, and maternal health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics in Darfur IDP camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 IDPs per day, provided basic medical examinations, referring serious illnesses to Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided vaccinations, reproductive health services for pregnant women, and medical services for victims of gender-based violence The United States provided about $53.5 million for water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and conducting hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp water facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and dispensed approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per day (above the Sphere standard of 15 liters) to provide for IDPs’ personal needs and to allow them to water their animals. According to NGO officials, in Abu Shouk camp, a water tank and hand pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per person per day An IDP is an internally displaced person, e.g. those in Sudan driven from their homes but still in Sudan.

foundationbriefs.com Page 37 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military Inappropriate Military Involvement is Inappropriate Military Involvement is Unwise for Sahel Region AMS Chester A. Crocker and Ellen Laipson. “The Latest Front in a Long War.” New York Times. March 7. 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/global/the- sahel-is-the-latest-front-in-a-long-war.html?_r=0 The Sahel divides the Sahara desert from the grasslands to the south. The unstable region stretches 3,400 miles west to east across parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea. Militias roam the region trafficking in drugs and arms, seizing hostages for ransom, and trading livestock. The turmoil in the Sahel is shaping up to be a long-playing conflict that will end well only with the help of African regional organizations, Western nations, nongovernmental groups, and the United Nations providing a mix of military, diplomatic and economic assistance. Collective conflict management carried out by improvised, case-specific networks operating in informal cooperation is urgently needed. While it draws scant attention from the Western media, the Sahel-North Africa region is actually more important than Afghanistan to the vital interests of Western powers. North Africa provides energy security for Europe with its vast oil and natural gas deposits, along with maritime security in the Mediterranean. Governments in the region have the potential to foster democratic change in post-authoritarian states. But the Sahel is unlikely to ever see large-scale troop deployments from NATO countries that are war-weary and financially tapped out from fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This piece both explains that only widespread developmental assistance can aid the Sahel region while demonstrating that military involvement is unlikely and therefore, inappropriate, because many troops are already bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan.

foundationbriefs.com Page 38 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military Inappropriate Military Involvement could Escalate Problems AMS Chester A. Crocker and Ellen Laipson. “The Latest Front in a Long War.” New York Times. March 7. 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/global/the- sahel-is-the-latest-front-in-a-long-war.html?_r=0 If the Malian government reaches out to rebuild the political fabric of the vast nation, it could isolate the jihadist element and reverse the negative dynamics in Mali itself. If not, a contagious and deadly interplay of people and violence could cross borders in many directions. North African states need to help their southern neighbors, and vice versa, to prevent lawlessness from spreading north or southeast across the Sahel into Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Tunisia, Libya and Egypt — where governments were overthrown in the “Arab Spring” — also remain vulnerable to violence and instability. Today Mali needs the sustained support of African and Western partners. The victory there must be carefully sustained using all the political, diplomatic and economic tools available. A counterterrorism strategy will not succeed in a political vacuum.

European aid in certain instances has harmed anti-terror efforts, DAT Goita, Modibo. “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting the AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy.” Africa Security Brief, No. 11. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. February 2011. Web. International partners beyond the Sahel can also contribute to addressing the growing threat posed by AQIM. The Economic Community of West African States and the AU can provide a venue and leadership to harmonize policies and institutionalize information-sharing and cross-border judicial cooperation. The United States, European Union, and other donors can provide assistance, communications capacity, and training to restructure and improve security forces and livelihoods within the Sahel. Cooperation with foreign governments is also essential for confronting AQIM’s transnational criminal enterprises, such as rising drug traffic bound for Europe and kidnap-for-ransom that targets foreign tourists, NGO workers, and employees of multinational corporations. Many of the ransoms paid to AQIM have reportedly come from European governments, including at least 12 million euros from Spain, Germany, and Switzerland in 2009 and 2010. Thus, while Sahelian countries must take the lead in shaping a response to AQIM, close coordination with other African and non-African governments is crucial to understanding and confronting AQIM’s Sahelian strategy.

foundationbriefs.com Page 39 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military Inappropriate Some money being funneled into the Sahel is being used to free persons of value Europe, while the requisite aid is actually in the form of development money, particularly for cooperation and capacity- building. Military restraint has already been used successfully in Mali, 2006-2009, DAT Rabasa, Angel et al. “From Insurgency to Stability, Vol. II: Insights from Selected Case Studies.” National Defense Research Institute. RAND Corporation. 2011. The winning strategy of the Malian government against the ADC was to focus on finding a political solution to the crisis while keeping a low degree of military pressure. It pursued the same strategy against the ATNM, but with sustained military action once it became clear that Bahanga’s rebellion, rather than losing momentum, was extending geographically and becoming more intense. This change of strategy was also a reaction to popular and army dissent in the face of the mounting casualties on the government side. Although the first phase of the strategy may appear far from optimal (it seems that mediation was pursued only to give Bahanga a face-saving way to surrender, and that the government had no intention of making any concession beyond what it had already granted in the Algiers Accord), it did play the role of showing all Malians, including Tuaregs, that the government had tried everything before resorting to more powerful means. Overall, the government also managed to circumscribe the rebellion to a limited number of Tuaregs, and to keep other communities (especially the Fula and Songhai) out of the fight. By choosing a defensive rather than offensive stance, and protecting the population (by clearing mined areas, for instance) rather than going after the group’s bases, the Malian army has followed a classic population-centric approach that has proven successful in preventing the insurgents from widening their support base. Bamako’s restraint paid off—a lesson that may be applicable to other theaters of conflict. This case study is in reference to the Tuareg rebellion that began in 2006 in northern Mali. The ADS (Democratic Alliance for Change) is a Tuareg rebel group, a splinter of which is ATNM. The idea of political aid being the mechanism for change subverts not only the emphasis on military aid, but on outside intervention into conflict in general.

foundationbriefs.com Page 40 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Stability is a prereq Development and Stability Enable Military Progress Insecurity and instability attract terrorist groups, DAT “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region.” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Government Printing Office. 17 November 2009. Web. [JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC]: We recognize, however, that the security environment in the Sahel requires sustained attention to address a wide range of vulnerabilities and capacity deficits. There is insufficient capacity to monitor and protect immense swaths of largely ungoverned or poorly governed territory. The arid northern half of Mali alone covers an area larger than Texas. Niger is the poorest country in the world according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and Mauritania and Mali rank near the bottom of the Human Development Index scale. The vulnerability of the northern Sahel has not only led AQIM to seek out safe havens in the region, but has also enabled the operations of a range of transnational criminal networks. Criminal traffickers in human beings, weapons, and narcotics also exploit parts of the region. West Africa has emerged as a major transshipment area for cocaine flowing from South America to Europe. Narcotrafficking poses a direct threat to U.S. interests since the proceeds of cocaine trafficked through the region generally flow back to Latin American organizations moving drugs to the United States. The committee has asked how our counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel relate to our long-term goals of good governance, civilian control over security forces, and respect for human rights. The first priority President Obama has identified for our Africa policy is helping to build strong and stable democracies on the continent. This is essential in West Africa. In recent years, the region has witnessed two military coups in Mauritania, deeply flawed elections in Nigeria, and an undemocratic seizure of power in Niger. Our experience in the region has underscored the urgency of improving governance, strongly promoting the rule of law, developing durable political and economic institutions at all levels of society, and maintaining professional security forces under civilian control. Meaningful progress in these areas is crucial to the success of ongoing efforts against AQIM and other criminal networks. The groups are drawn to areas where they can take advantage of political and economic vulnerabilities to safeguard their operating spaces and lifelines, cross borders with impunity, and attract recruits. They benefit when security forces and border guards lack the necessary training, equipment, intelligence, and mobility to disrupt their activities. Their cause is advanced when human rights

foundationbriefs.com Page 41 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Stability is a prereq abuses undermine the credibility of security forces. Terrorists and criminal organizations also take advantage of weak or corrupt criminal justice systems unable to effectively investigate, prosecute and incarcerate all forms of criminals. This card is essential for both contextualizing the arguments around development and giving a solution to the chicken vs. egg dilemma when it comes to the interplay between security and development. While outlining the perpetual problems of the Sahel—political instability, massive area—this card presents a solution as integrating and being based on fixing the problems that enable groups to operate ceaselessly and despite intervention. Without addressing the lax social and political structures of the Sahel, fighting security threats can be seen as a complete quagmire. Terror groups have an endless well of resources in underdeveloped areas, DAT “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region.” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Government Printing Office. 17 November 2009. Web. [JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC]: Underdevelopment in key areas represents a critical security challenge in the Sahel. The region is extremely diverse and the sources of insecurity in the region vary. In Northern Mali, for example, insecurity in isolated border areas and along traditional smuggling routes is perpetuated by unmet economic expectations and the lack of legitimate alternatives to smuggling or opportunistic commerce with criminal networks. Mali is one of Africa’s most stable democracies, but its efforts to address insecurity in the northern part of the country are severely hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability to provide adequate service delivery and educational and vocational opportunities to isolated areas. This dynamic can become particularly problematic in cases where AQIM has provided small amounts of food and other consumables to generate good will or at least tolerance from groups living in their vicinity. Although AQIM’s attempts to recruit in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel have been largely unsuccessful, its limited successes in countries such as Mauritania can largely be traced to its ability to capitalize on the frustration among the young over insufficient educational or vocational opportunities. AQIM has also attracted recruits and material support from isolated communities or neighborhoods in Mauritania and elsewhere that lack alternatives to schools, media, or networking centers that promote violent extremism. This card provides several pieces of large-scale anecdotal evidence. While military aid can be seen as combatting existing terrorist groups, development aid can be shown as precluding the need for military aid by mitigating the factors (namely all the problems associated with underdevelopment) which encourage the ranks of terrorist groups to swell in the first place.

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Mali’s long-term key to stability is economic and political, DAT Lyammouri, Rida. “Northern Mali: Armed Groups, State Failure, and Terrorism.” Homeland Security Policy Institute. George Washington University. 30 May 2013. Web. More importantly though, none of the long-term problems which allowed this unstable situation to arise seem any closer to being resolved. Northern Mali remains deprived of infrastructure and economic opportunity. As the southern Malian press makes clear, all the country’s groups have grievances against the central government; no one is satisfied with the way the country has been run; the most commonly expressed public sentiment is one of betrayal; and ethnic tensions are at an all-time high. Reports of the Malian military’s rampant corruption and abuses of the civilian population continue to emerge. While some Malians talk of getting democracy right this time, many are already settling back into fatalism as they see the same group of elites reshuffling for power. The most positive outcome of the elections planned for July, if they happen, may be that they fulfill the requirements for renewing the international aid flows upon which the national budget depends. Meanwhile, over 400,000 refugees and internally displaced people who fled the conflict are wondering when they might go home, and if they do, what they might be coming home to: herds and fields have been leg untended, homes and shops have been looted, and the economy shut down. If northern Mali is to be secured, its people must be reintegrated into the nation and its infrastructures restored. Emphasis on security and the military cannot conscionably occur in Mali given that without diplomatic aid coupled with political pressure, the violence plaguing the countries seems set to continue in perpetuity.

Humanitarian aid would serve as incentive to disarm potential conflicts in Sudan peacefully. JCD Frazer, Jendayi. "How to Defuse Sudan Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 26 Apr. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. No, it shouldn't be a mediator--no more than the United States should. The mediation should stay within the African Union. But China and the United States are two of the most important players here, from the point of view that they can bring pressure to bear on both parties. They can bring coercive pressure--i.e, sticks, sanctions--and they can also bring incentives to bear. They could bring the goods that would actually deliver parties to the mediator. So China has an essential role to play, as does the United States. And the United States and China working hand in hand is even better. foundationbriefs.com Page 43 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused Military Aid is Misused and Inefficient Tangled allegiances make providing military equipment problematic, DAT Jourde, Cedric. “Sifting Through the Layers of Insecurity in the Sahel: The Case of Mauritania.” Africa Security Brief, No. 15. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. September 2011. Web. Local politics can also seriously blur the differences between state and nonstate actors. It is no secret that some state officials from Mauritanian border regions (in the military, in the customs administration, and elsewhere) have used their positions and resources to further their private or clan’s business interests. Similarly, “many agents of the state on the Malian and Algerian sides of the border consider their position in the state apparatus as a means to feed their tribal solidarity with state money.” In the zones inhabited by Malian Tuaregs, “customs officials and the smugglers often belong to the same clan.” The argument that the state cannot control these illegal economic transactions, therefore, misidentifies the problem. In fact, some high-ranking military officers, as well as members of their families and tribes, play key roles in this illicit economy and are involved in numerous local power struggles. The result is a seemingly irreconcilable tension: the state as an abstract entity is threatened by this illicit business, yet simultaneously many state agents are deeply involved in these activities. The suggestion, then, that the Mauritanian state needs more technology, surveillance materials, vehicles, and capacity-building is true, but it misses the point. That state officials may follow private, social, and political incentives not congruent with the interests of the state indicates that the problem is less technical than political. Allegiances to one’s ethnic group, tribe, clan, or personal network can be stronger than those to the state. Without serious political reform, which outside actors typically cannot effect without full-scale invasion efforts, attempts at providing government directly with military aid in order to control their own territories and uphold their sovereignty has a low efficiency and success rate.

foundationbriefs.com Page 44 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused Military aid is wasted when Sahel governments are focused on sovereignty and development DAT Goita, Modibo. “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting the AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy.” Africa Security Brief, No. 11. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. February 2011. Web. For its part, Algeria has sought to lead regional efforts to unify counterterrorism strategies in the Sahel. It hosts the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism and more recently established a joint intelligence center in its capital, Algiers, and a joint military headquarters in southern Algeria with Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. However, it is much less welcoming of foreign support beyond the continent, which it sees as a possible pretext for foreign powers to establish military bases. Algeria’s suspicion of foreign assistance has constrained the flow of resources that could improve surveillance in the Sahel’s vast ungoverned areas that serve as AQIM sanctuaries. Resource limitations, in turn, prevent Sahelian governments from adopting a more comprehensive strategy to counter AQIM in the Sahel. As Malian President Touré has noted, it is not enough to focus entirely on security. Rather, in addition to coordination on military and intelligence matters, regional partners should engage in efforts to enhance the quality of development in the region.

foundationbriefs.com Page 45 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused Glib international military solutions undermine preexisting local solutions, DAT Berschinski, Robert G. “AFRICOM’s Dilemma: The ‘Global War on Terrorism,’ ‘Capacity Building,’ Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa.” Strategic Studies Institute.U.S. Army War College. November 2007. Web. National governments seldom play a hands-on role in the Sahel, but this condition should not be confused with a total lack of control. Instead, central governments and their distant citizenry have established a system of indirect rule, in which various ethnic tribal leaders are coopted to maintain peace and security. Such a policy is in place to ameliorate long-standing ethnic tensions between the southern capitals and their northern citizens. Both Niger and Mali have experienced significant Taureg revolts, and considerable strains exist in both states. As stressed in 31 2006 by former Ambassador to Mali Robert Pringle, such tensions are “a classic case of conflict between nomads and central authority.” This precarious balance between central authority and the hinterlands is threatened by injudicious U.S. military involvement. To give one example, at the conclusion of the last Malian Taureg uprising in 1995, Bamako incorporated many Taureg into its customs department. Such an arrangement allowed local leaders to profit from duties imposed on both legal and illegal goods. The arrangement mollified the Taureg and kept peace in Mali. Yet as the United States continues to prosecute the war on terrorism against elements of the GSPC in the region, it threatens to disrupt this bargain by shutting down the trade routes. Without providing an alternative means of sustenance, such actions will disrupt the region’s economy, and hence its political stability. The irony is that U.S. efforts to train Sahelian militaries through OEF-TS are often cited as examples of catalyzing “African solutions to African problems.” As long as the GWOT remains at the heart of U.S. capacity-building in Africa, however, “African problems” will be selected within predetermined U.S. boundaries. Malians sense that the greatest threat to their democracy rests with unsettling the precarious northern situation. Marauding Algerian terrorists and radical Islam, meanwhile, barely register as a concern. What does register is that U.S. pressure to hunt terrorists will destabilize the Taureg. As Ambassador Pringle has noted, “some Malians are no doubt worried about their ability to apply tough measures [in line with U.S. policies] in a manner that would not aggravate old political grievances.” Any outside aid is going to have a different agenda from that of locals’. The problem is that when large sovereign like the United States enter the picture, their disparate ideologies on military aid can have severe unintended destabilizing effects on the region.

foundationbriefs.com Page 46 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused Organizational entanglements waste military resources, DAT “Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.” United States Government Accountability Office. November 2006. Web. African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct the activities necessary to fulfill its mandate. A senior African Union official told us that AMIS’s reliance on outside donors has resulted in a lack of control for the mission because basic operational elements, such as facilities, logistics, and funding rest in the hands of other parties. According to January 2006 African Union documentation, the African Union has not been able to provide critical resources, such as vehicles and communications equipment, in a timely fashion; as a result, AMIS has functioned with about half of the needed logistical capacity. U.S. officials have countered that the African Union has at times been slow to respond to offers of assistance or to prioritize resource needs. During some periods, donor support for AMIS has been less than what the African Union had expected, with African Union documentation stating that a lack of funds has been a major constraint. AMIS is the African Union Mission in Sudan. Because military aid to Sudan (or any other Sahel country, for that matter) is typically a matter of outside actors (e.g. the African Union and United States) funding internal forces (the AMIS), there exists a tangle of dependencies which renders aid ineffective. The natural argument, then, is that prioritizing wasteful spending is a suboptimal option.

foundationbriefs.com Page 47 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused There is a low threshold on how much military assistance outside actors can provide, DAT Pezard, Stephanie and Michael Shurkin. “Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali.” RAND Corporation. 2013. Web. Second, in the absence of a large international presence, durable security in the north will have to be provided, to a large extent, by local actors. Specifically, the Malian government and the international community would have to delegate some amount of security responsibility to northerners. Only the northerners, who have an unparalleled knowledge of the region and its inhabitants and who are uniquely placed to prevent the reemergence of militancy, can provide, over the long term, the degree of stability and security the international community seeks. To work effectively with the northerners, however, France, the United States, and other interested parties need a precise knowledge of pertinent actors and their interests to limit the risk of negative unintended consequences, such as the confiscation of security provision by one community or another. In working with local parties, Western actors must avoid the danger posed by engaging actors without understanding the associated risks, as a January 2013 New York Times article claimed the United States had done in Mali by training Tuareg-led units that ended up defecting to the rebellion. Several historical examples, ranging from colonial France to modern-day Mali, show how such knowledge of local dynamics has been used in the past to establish some degree of stability in the north, and these examples offer some suggestions as to how it can be done better today. Although the context has markedly changed, a detailed understanding of the local environment in northern Mali is still necessary for finding short-, medium-, and long-term security solutions for the region, particularly if one wishes to keep the total cost and numbers of international “boots on the ground” to a minimum. With respect to the crisis in Mali, there’s no way for international aid to directly affect the military situation apart from better enabling local forces. This means there’s really no way to efficiently and successfully emphasize military aid in Mali; the imperative is on enabling local actors to do the heavy lifting.

foundationbriefs.com Page 48 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused In Mali, successful past military efforts have planted seeds for new failures, DAT Rabasa, Angel et al. “From Insurgency to Stability, Vol. II: Insights from Selected Case Studies.” National Defense Research Institute. RAND Corporation. 2011. Considering that the 2006–2009 rebellion was the third one of its kind since Mali’s independence, it is difficult to be overly hopeful that there will never be a fourth one. The last rebellion was caused, in large part, by the frustration of the population in the northern regions regarding the delays in the implementation of the National Pact signed ten years earlier. The Algiers accord of 2006 will be judged on how it is implemented by the Malian government. New delays or obstacles may re-ignite the situation at any time. An even more pessimistic view holds that claims for an independent, or autonomous, Tuareg state that would cover the three northern regions of Mali (as well as, possibly, Tuareg-populated regions in Algeria, Niger and Libya) are deep-rooted and likely to resurge in the coming years whether or not the government delivers on its promises to provide better development to the north. Another issue is the number of weapons handed in during the various collection initiatives that took place after the Algiers Accord; this number does not come close to the account of those that were stolen in Kidal and Menaka. Most of the weapons that were used during the insurgency are most likely still in circulation. The reasons for keeping a working weapon in this region are many, but it is likely that many people involved in the rebellion doubt that the crisis has been solved for good, and they keep arms “just in case,” as appears to have been true after the 1996 Flame of Peace. An important issue is the fact that few insurgent weapons were collected. A number of the young men who enrolled voluntarily in the militias will benefit from the socio-economic reinsertion program put in place by the Algiers Accord for young ex-combatants and unemployed people. This program will benefit former combatants and noncombatants alike, so as not to favor those who took up arms. However, because it is not specific to ex- combatants, it does not involve any disarmament initiative. The young members of these militias are therefore likely to still have the weapons with which they fought the ATNM in early 2009. Mali illustrates an instance where emphasizing military aid to the region would be untenable given that it would have to be sustained in perpetuity to have a shot at success. Any successful effort in Mali would have to center on taking away arms and disincentivizing conflict.

foundationbriefs.com Page 49 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Military aid misused The effects of US military assistance have been limited. JCD Shank, Michael. "Aid Gone Awry in Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 19 June 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The counter by U.S. officials is to claim that military aid is actually improving human rights, good governance and rule of law, arguing that, while complicated, this cooperation is necessary and effective in countering militant extremism. This assertion, however, has no backing. Given the recent U.S. track record in Mali, in which U.S.-trained officers both defected to the side of insurgents and undertook a military coup, there's reason to believe that U.S. assistance is neither effective nor supporting just governance. General Carter Ham, former Commander of the U.S. Africa Command, stated that U.S. training in Mali "didn't spend, probably, the requisite time focusing on values, ethics and military ethos." Since then, he and others at AFRICOM have told members of Congress that steps have been taken to improve related programs. But the necessary steps to ensure this doesn't happen again – that is, to regularly evaluate and hold this assistance accountable – aren't happening.

Current US military assistance in the Sahel region is insignificant. JCD Campbell, John. "How Does Nigeria's Boko Haram Affect U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region?" Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 25 Nov. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The response to Boko Haram and other "jihadist" insurgencies is shaping U.S. foreign policy toward Nigeria and the Sahel. But despite rhetoric to the contrary, the region remains a marginal U.S. priority. Official U.S. rhetoric is focused increasingly on security issues, rather than development or other conventional goals in the Sahel. Announcing the November 13 designation of Boko Haram and its splinter, Ansaru, as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," the U.S. Department of State said it would "assist U.S. and other law enforcement partners in efforts to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects." There are U.S.-sponsored counterterrorism initiatives in the Sahel but the funding and personnel devoted to them are small.

foundationbriefs.com Page 50 of 128 January 2014 Pro: Gov accountability Sahel Governments Cannot Account for Citizens’ Needs Agricultural development investment by governments in the Sahel is woefully inadequate, DAT Tran, Mark. “Sahel’s Food Crisis Gets Swift Response but No Long-term Answers.” Our World. U.N. University. 11 January 2012. Web. http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/sahels- food-crisis-gets-swift-response-but-no-long-term-answers Achim Steiner, executive director of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), said regional co-operation will be key to diffusing tensions, managing risks and limiting the possibilities of increased conflict and migration — particularly northern pastoralists pushing south into regions used by farmers. Against this bleak outlook, there are bright spots. The use of water retention techniques and the planting of trees to help soil conservation has enabled small farmers to regenerate thousands of hectares in Niger. The problem is one of scale, which needs money. As Waliyar points out, no country in the Sahel is anywhere near to investing 10 percent of GDP in agriculture under the Maputo accord by the African Union in 2003, a target that would help the Sahel to reach the holy grail of resilience as climate conditions worsen. UNEP says the Sahel needs long-term financial commitment and better coordination of investments, and should draw upon funding sources such as the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change’s “green fund” and the Clean Development Mechanism. With the agricultural situation projected to worsen, the logical (and remaining) outcome is to draw more heavily on international development funds.

Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts are working. JCD Costa, Antonio. "Nigeria's Corruption Busters." UNODC. N.p., 20 Nov. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. But Nigeria is fighting back. It has waged a war against inefficiency and endemic corruption and today it is winning. There is nothing short of a "corruption climate change" in the air. The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) led by fearless "crime-buster" Nuhu Ribadu is the most successful anti-corruption agency in Africa and is setting an example to the rest of the world. It is enhancing good governance and financial accountability while helping reduce fraud, waste and corruption.

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Corruption in Nigeria’s court system has been reduced. JCD Costa, Antonio. "Nigeria's Corruption Busters." UNODC. N.p., 20 Nov. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Last week, at the Nigerian All Judges Conference held in Abuja, UNODC assessed Nigeria's track record over the last seven years in important areas, such as improving the quality of justice, especially for the poor, and strengthening integrity, accountability and independence in the judiciary. It found that Nigeria had taken bold steps to remove corrupt justice officials and staff. Nigeria is making strides in improving citizens' access to justice. Such efforts are starting to show significant results. In three states that have established pilot programmes, public confidence has increased as bribery and political influence decrease. For example, whereas in 2002, prisoners in remand waited more than 30 months before their trial concluded, in 2007 the wait was down to less than 12 months. In 2002 more than 40% of court users were asked for bribes to expedite their court cases - in 2007 it were less than 10 per cent. And most importantly, while in 2002 more than 40 per cent of court users claimed that they would not use the courts again, in 2007 only 20 per cent shared that view. Nigeria's anti-graft war is proving that there are no sacred cows left when it comes to tackling corruption. That sends a strong message of hope across the continent and beyond.

foundationbriefs.com Page 52 of 128 Con Evidence

foundationbriefs.com Page 53 of 128 January 2014 Con: Ag efforts misguided Agricultural Development Efforts are Misguided Development and emergency aid are disjointed and ineffective, DAT “Hungry Again.” The Economist. 7 July 2012. Web. http://www.economist.com/node/21558315 Development agencies also share some of the blame. Though they are getting better at responding fast when an alarm is raised, emergency food aid often makes only a marginal difference. What the Sahel really needs is to make itself able to cope with the recurrent threat of famine. The main requirements are long-term agricultural improvements as well as institutions and safety-nets to respond to food crises fast—cash-for-work programmes, for instance, or food vouchers to stop people selling their animals out of desperation. Aid agencies and donors now talk about building up “resilience”—a new buzzword. In September 2011 the Sahel Working Group, a coalition of development and aid outfits, published an influential report on the subject. The European Union recently followed suit. Rob Bailey, a food-security expert at Chatham House, a London think-tank, says that, although the idea of resilience is not new, it calls for a change in development thinking. Humanitarian and development programmes are often divorced from each other. Emergency aid can only be released once a crisis has been formally declared, whereas development funding tends to follow rigid plans and timelines. Mr Bailey argues that development programmes should instead be devised so they can “flex” in times of crisis and provide emergency relief. There exists a two-fold agricultural threat: avoiding food crises, and handling them when they occur. Current development/aid efforts do not adequately address either option.

foundationbriefs.com Page 54 of 128 January 2014 Con: Ag efforts misguided Agricultural development and availability are not the impactful food-related problem, DAT “It’s Getting Harder All the Time.” The Economist. 2 December 2010. Web. Some Sahel-watchers say the inhabitants must seek alternatives to reliance on cattle or crops: easier said than done. “In most cases, there is food available but people cannot afford it,” says Sibiri Jean Zoundi, an agricultural economist at the Sahel and West Africa Club, a coalition of the region's governments and foreign- aid groups started by the rich-country OECD. Imported food is almost always available after failed harvests, but it is costly. Crippling poverty means that some families go hungry even after good harvests. Moreover, the Sahel's population is growing at 2.6%, more than twice the global rate, outpacing economic growth. The size of plots is ever diminishing. More people are being forced to settle in flood-prone areas. If the affirmative advocacy implies a continuation of present aid policy (heavily dependent on providing food), it can be shown as inefficient and misguided without a focus on improving wages.

foundationbriefs.com Page 55 of 128 January 2014 Con: Develop assist fail Failures of Developmental Assistance Humanitarian Intervention Fails AMS Sally Healy and Mark Bradbury. “Endless War: a Brief History of the Somali Conflict.” Conciliation Resources. 2010. http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/endless-war-brief- history-somali-conflict In December 1992 the outgoing US administration authorised the deployment of US forces to support the beleaguered UN mission in Somalia. Under US leadership, UNOSOM mustered a multinational force of some 30,000 troops. Ostensibly launched for humanitarian reasons, the intervention also responded to the challenge that the collapsed Somali state posed to a supposed ‘new world order’, proclaimed by President George Bush at the end of the Cold War. UNOSOM dominated Somali politics for the next three years. (…) However, the mission failed to mediate an end to hostilities or disarm factions. UN-facilitated peace conferences in Addis Ababa in 1993 and Kenya in 1994 did not engender a process of national reconciliation and state revival. The mission has been criticised for fuelling the war economy, causing a proliferation of factions and shoring up warlord power structures. Before long UNOSOM itself became embroiled in the conflict with General Aideed, leading to the infamous shooting down of US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces.

Some argue that the seeds of militant Islamist movements were planted in this period. Osama bin Laden, then based Sudan, denounced the UN mission as an invasion of a Muslim country.

foundationbriefs.com Page 56 of 128 January 2014 Con: Develop assist fail Historical Failure in Somalia AMS Sally Healy and Mark Bradbury. “Endless War: a Brief History of the Somali Conflict.” Conciliation Resources. 2010. http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/endless-war-brief- history-somali-conflict In the late 1990s regional rivalries were reflected in different approaches to statebuilding. The model favoured by Ethiopia and briefly supported by Western donors was the so-called ‘building-block’ approach. Taking a lead from developments in Somaliland and Puntland, the RRA administration in Bay and Bakool regions and an all-Hawiye peace conference in Beletweyn in 1999, the approach sought to encourage the emergence of regional authorities as a first step towards establishing a federal or confederal Somali state.

Donor and development organisations hoped to encourage the process by rewarding the areas of stability with ‘peace dividends’ of aid. Critics of the approach contended that it had limited applicability in the south, encouraged secessionism and was designed by foreign states to keep Somalia weak and divided. The alternative approach, supported by Arab countries, advocated reviving a centralised Somali state through a process of national reconciliation and the formation of a national government.

Current humanitarian efforts are clearly failing. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Nigeria’s population is among Africa’s poorest, and the distribution of wealth is highly unequal. As many as 70% of Nigerians live below the poverty line, and the average life expectancy is 52 years. Nigeria has the world’s second-largest HIV/AIDS population, after South Africa. Access to clean water remains a major problem—almost half the population has no access to improved sources of water and less than one-fifth of households have piped water. Thirty percent of people lack access to adequate sanitation. Diarrhea is the second-leading cause of death among children, and Nigeria ranks second only to India in the number of diarrhea-related child deaths globally. […] Nigeria is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa

foundationbriefs.com Page 57 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military Situation Demands Military Attention Growing Threat to Somalia AMS Somali Current News. “Al-Shabaab to Turn Somalia into a Shared Country.” http://www.somalicurrent.com/2013/11/27/al-shabab-to-turn-somalia-into-a-shared- country/ Somalia’s al-Qaeda linked, terrorist group in Somalia, al-Shabaab, which has been fighting for a longtime to rule entire Somalia has been frequently calling and inviting al-Qaeda extremists all around the world to come to Somalia and partake their war in the country. Top leaders among the militant group called for foreign fighters to come and fight in the country and claimed Somalia is shared between all Muslims in the world. Hence open for expatriates to come and launch their so called holy war to the elsewhere. Analysts and politicians believe that this call by al-Shabaab’s leaders brought the influx of foreign fighters in the country, and some of them became well respected among the group. The exact number of the foreign fighters in the country that are bolstering al-Shabaab is still unknown. (…) “There is a big number of foreign fighters in Somalia, and they all have one common agenda of launching holy war and they were brought to Somalia by other Islamist factions which formed in the country after the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991,” Jibril said. “They share one common concept which says all Muslims are brothers and sisters and have no boundaries that divides between them.” Some of the foreign fighters criticized the leadership of the group and caused internal conflict that claimed the lives of high ranking foreign officials. As foreign fighters become still more violent in Somalia, outside military aid is clearly necessary.

foundationbriefs.com Page 58 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military Corrupt Governments Demand Military Intervention AMS For the past decade, increasing instability in the Sahel and Sahara region has been a source of growing concern in Europe and the United States. Western governments have worried that the weakness of state control in the area would allow al-Qaeda in the Islamist Maghreb (AQIM) and other jihadist organizations to expand their influence and establish safe havens in areas outside government control. Such fears appear to have been vindicated by the recent takeover of northern Mali by AQIM and organizations closely associated with it. Western governments have focused heavily on AQIM’s presence, providing technical assistance in an attempt to strengthen the capacity of security sectors and justice systems to combat the group. But western governments have underestimated, if not ignored, the destabilizing, impact of organized crime in the region. AQIM itself is in part a criminal network, kidnapping Western nationals with the double aim of extorting ransoms and freeing the group’s imprisoned members. And up until Mali’s military coup of March 2012, state complicity with organized crime was the main factor enabling AQIM’s growth and a driver of conflict in the north of the country. Actors involved in organized crime currently wield decisive political and military influence in northern Mali. As they have in the past, Sahel governments will be tempted to use organized crime as a political resource by allowing their allies to benefit from criminal activities—which has clear implications for policy. Concentrating on capacity building in the judicial and security sector is the right approach only if governments stand behind efforts to combat criminal networks. The problem with developmental assistance is that many of the governments in question are very corrupt. In many areas military involvement will be necessary to directly tackle the problem.

foundationbriefs.com Page 59 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military State cooperates with Terrorist Groups Today AMS Wolfram Lacher. “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahara-Sahel Region.” Carnegie Endowment. September 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf The alliance between the Malian leadership and local notables based on organized crime also applied to AQIM’s kidnapping for ransom business. These arrangements go a long way to explain why the Malian security apparatus by and large stopped short of confronting AQIM and its practice of using northern Mali as a safe haven for its hostage cases. (…) The current conflict in Mali is not exclusively or even predominantly a clash between competing criminal networks. Other interests and grievances contributed to the eruption of the conflict in January 2012. Nevertheless, actors involved in organized crime play leading roles and wield decisive political and military influence—a fact that will have to be taken into account in any approach to containing or solving the conflict. As the evidence below will corroborate, aiding a corrupt government is entirely futile. Developmental assistance to such a corrupt actor will only further problems.

foundationbriefs.com Page 60 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military Problems with Aiding a Corrupt State AMS Wolfram Lacher. “Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahara-Sahel Region.” Carnegie Endowment. September 2012. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sahel_sahara.pdf Though the entire Sahel and Sahara region is affected by state-criminal collusion, the role of organized crime in northern Mali’s descent into conflict is particularly vivid, and it offers lessons not just for Mali’s donors but also for neighboring states. Organized criminal activity escalated in northern Mali during a period when the country was a major recipient of foreign assistance from the United States, the European Union (EU), and individual EU member states. External security-related aid was heavily focused on counterterrorism and stat capacity, with donors providing training and technical experience. Leading donors—particularly the United States and France—grew increasingly frustrated by the Malian leadership’s reluctance to tackle AQIM but saw this mainly through the lens of counterterrorism, paying much less attention to the wider problem of state complicity with organized crime. (…) A possible implication for donors from the Malian trajectory is that greater attention should be paid to the risks of state collusion with organized crime in Mauritania and Niger. Concentrating on capacity building in the judicial and security sector is the right approach only as long as there is political backing from governments for combating criminal activity—and in Mali, this was clearly not the case. In the past developmental assistance has failed in the Sahel region because of government collusion with corrupt actors. This approach is only effective where the government is clearly out for the donor’s best interests.

foundationbriefs.com Page 61 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military Instability in Mali AMS Mike Pflanz. “Mali Voters Stay Home amid Islamist Threats.” November 24, 2013. Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/10471105/ Mali-voters-stay-home-amid-Islamist-threats.html The threat of Islamist attacks kept many voters at home on Sunday as Mali held its first parliamentary polls since a coup last year led to al-Qaeda seizing control of the country's north, prompting French military action. More than six million people are registered for the elections, but observers and officials at many of the 25,000 polling stations reported poor turnout. The vote follows presidential elections during the summer, and marks the first steps back to democracy for what was one of West Africa's most stable nations. That reputation was shattered when al-Qaeda's allies joined with Tuareg separatists to take advantage of the chaos following last year's coup to seize power in the desert north of Mali. In a nation that cannot deliver safe elections for its citizens, military aid must come before developmental assistance. The real threat of terrorism must be combated before assistance can be properly distributed. French soldiers assisted by British logistics troops and with support from African armies eventually forced the Islamists from all of the towns they controlled, but they remain a threat.

foundationbriefs.com Page 62 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military African forces cannot account for Sudan on their own, DAT “Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.” United States Government Accountability Office. November 2006. Web. AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For example, according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops were deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against IDPs when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of civilians by the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a Sudanese military advance on the town that could have resulted in the substantial displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the town of Labado in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS troops in January 2005 deterred further attacks and led to the return of many town residents, who began to repair their homes and rebuild their lives. However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent violence. For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did not maintain a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in South Darfur despite concerns about security in the area and repeated requests from the international community for a continuous AMIS presence. Ultimately, armed militia attacks resulted in the death of several IDPs and subsequent displacement in early 2006. In addition, an NGO official told us that AMIS was slow in responding to requests for assistance from NGOs caught in a battle between SLM/A and Sudanese government forces in the Jebel Marra area; however, AMIS did help evacuate NGO staff from the area 24 hours after the conflict began. According to an AMIS commander, although AMIS has taken preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes, the territory is too large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall. AMIS is the African Union Mission in Sudan, a coalition peacekeeping force. This card illustrates that while AMIS is working toward its goals, the problem is fundamentally too large for an internal African military solution. When the crisis at hand demands immediate and swift attention, it is unacceptable to have an inadequate military force in place.

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foundationbriefs.com Page 64 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military In Mali, the government is unprecedentedly overmatched, DAT “A Perfect Desert Storm.” The Economist. 17 March 2012. Web. http://www.economist.com/node/21550324 The Libyan arms bazaar particularly affects Mali, a country the size of California and Texas combined and with a history of unrest. Nomadic Tuareg tribesmen, carrying Kalashnikov rifles, once criss-crossed the barren north on camels. Since Mali's independence from France in 1960 and the establishment of a state run from the leafy southern capital of Bamako, the Tuareg have rebelled frequently. Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya gave sanctuary to Tuareg leaders after the most recent revolt in 2008, and brought many into his armed forces. When his regime fell apart last year they headed home in four-wheel-drive vehicles mounted with heavy machineguns and multiple rocket-launchers. … Tuareg spokesmen say this rebellion, unlike those in the past, will not run out of steam. Their 1,000 or so fighters are, for the first time, both well armed and politically unified. The Malian army has a mere 7,500 men. Outsiders fear the Tuareg will make common cause with Islamist extremists. They face many of the same foes, and share tribal ties and commercial opportunities in smuggling, the Sahara's biggest business. The diversion of government resources to fight the Tuareg will ease pressure on extremists, as will the need to care for 120,000 refugees fleeing into neighbouring countries to escape the fighting—which comes on top of the drought. For one thing, this card disputes the notion that extremism arises from poverty and a lack of development; in Mali’s case, it was political instability and a long-running will for independence. Additionally, this card establishes the precedent at this point, Mali is really only held together by virtue of French military intervention, given the current strength of rebel forces and the capacity for future escalation which the government is no condition to handle, particularly given the massive swath of area that must be patrolled.

foundationbriefs.com Page 65 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military Mali requires prolonged outside military presence to maintain stability, DAT Dreazen, Yochi. “The New Terrorist Training Ground.” The Atlantic. 18 September 2013. Web. Mali’s central government now runs Gao, but many locals believe that the jihadists who controlled the city last year have melted away into the surrounding countryside, where they are waiting out the French. France launched its military campaign on January 11 with a series of air strikes on insurgent targets. Thousands of French ground troops poured into the country later that month and began pushing north. At the peak of the campaign, more than 4,000 French soldiers were in Mali, but the French military has announced plans to withdraw about 3,000 of them by the end of the year. Paris will pull out the remaining troops next year, leaving behind an unspecified number of special forces and trainers to mentor the Malian security forces, and will also support a new United Nations peacekeeping force of 12,600 troops drawn from other African countries. But many ordinary Malians still fear that their country’s armed forces won’t be able to fill the void. If not addressed, the insurgent issues in Nigeria will become international. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Some analysts suggest that Boko Haram may be susceptible to fracturing, with a segment of the leadership working to build ties with the international Al Qaeda franchise, while others remain focused exclusively on a domestic agenda. The emergence of a purported splinter faction known as Ansaru in early 2012 has led some to contend that there are divisions among the hardliners.32 Ansaru appears intent to focus attacks on foreigners, and has been critical of casualties among Nigerian Muslims in its public statements. The effects of the expansion of Nigerian insurgent groups are already being felt internationally. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. While Boko Haram currently appears primarily to pose a threat to local stability, its expansion and purported splintering has amplified concerns that Nigerians may be susceptible to recruitment by Muslim extremist groups aiming to use violence against government or civilian targets elsewhere in the region or abroad. The increasing lethality and sophistication of Boko Haram’s attacks has further raised the group’s profile among U.S. national security officials, as have reports of Nigerians training in camps in northern Mali. The rise in kidnappings of Western citizens in northern Nigeria, several of whom have been killed in captivity, is another source of concern as policymakers seek to determine the extent to which Boko Haram, Ansaru, and other

foundationbriefs.com Page 66 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military violent extremist groups in the region may pose an increasingly international threat.

Al-Qaeda is backing the Nigerian terrorist groups. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Potential ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a regional criminal and terrorist network that is designated by the United States as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), appear to be of particular concern. U.S. Africa Command officials have identified Boko Haram as a “threat to Western interests,” referencing indications that the two groups “are likely sharing funds, training, and explosive materials,” and suggesting that “there are elements of Boko Haram that aspire to a broader regional level of attacks, to include not just in Africa, but Europe and aspirationally to the United States.” If Al-Qaeda continues to assist these groups while the global community fails to provide military aid, the problem will get worse and only spiral out of control.

Global oil prices are affected by militant groups in Nigeria. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Militant groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) have used the kidnapping of oil workers and attacks on oil facilities to bring international attention to the Delta’s plight. These attacks have periodically cut Nigeria’s oil production by as much as 25%, and have been blamed for spikes in the world price of oil.

Security forces in Nigeria have a history of human rights abuses. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, but also the military, have been accused of serious human rights abuses, and activists suggest that the government has done little to address issues of impunity and corruption within the Nigerian Police Force. In 2007, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the country,” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice. Military assistance is needed to reform current practices. foundationbriefs.com Page 67 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military

foundationbriefs.com Page 68 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military Military aid includes increased reform of the Nigerian security forces. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Security cooperation has increased since the mid-2000s, and State Department has focused security assistance requests in recent years on military professionalization, peacekeeping support and training, and land and maritime border security. U.S. officials reportedly stress the importance of civilian oversight of the military, and respect for human rights and the rule of law, in their engagements with Nigerian military officials.

The security of oil trade in Nigeria is at stake. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Gulf of Guinea crude is prized on the world market for its low sulphur content, and Nigeria’s proximity to the United States relative to that of Middle East countries has made its oil particularly attractive to U.S. interests. The United States has coordinated with Nigeria through various regional forums and maritime security initiatives.55 Nigeria’s waters have been named among the most dangerous in the world; the country ranked first in global pirate attacks until it was overtaken by Somalia in 2008, according to the International Maritime Bureau.

Violence in South Sudan requires immediate action. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. South Sudan faces a range of persistent and emergent security threats that will pose challenges for years to come. The potential for localized insecurity in some areas is high. South Sudan is awash in small arms, and armed cattle raids and violent disputes over land and water rights are common. Inter- and intra-ethnic fighting claims thousands of lives annually

foundationbriefs.com Page 69 of 128 January 2014 Con: Situation demands military The internal police force in South Sudan is not equipped to deal with the increased violence alone. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The police service in South Sudan lacks the capacity to address many of these threats, leaving the SPLA to play a significant internal security role. The State Department reports that some SPLA stabilization and civilian disarmament activities have caused tensions with communities who claim that the SPLA is neither politically neutral nor well disciplined; some of these operations have reportedly resulted in displacement and deaths. The State Department has also documented various human rights violations by SPLA troops. Some, but not all, of those accused of serious abuses have faced military justice. Some analysts suggest that the continued presence of senior SPLA officers at all levels of the South Sudanese government obscures the concept of democratic civilian control. Given the many years of war from which South Sudan is emerging, the development of truly civilian leadership may take time. Donors are pursuing programs to promote governance skills along with a broader understanding of democratic concepts.

foundationbriefs.com Page 70 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq Military Aid is a Necessary Precursor to Developmental Assistance The Grave Refugee situation in the Sahel Region AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. Although the MNLA says it simply seeks to gain greater political autonomy in the Tamashek-speaking parts of Northern Mali, the fall-out is already having a broader impact on the region. As of February 2012, some 22,000 people have fled from Mali to Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania in the wake of the violence. Concerned that AQIM and the Tuaregs are now much better armed as a result of the Libyan crisis, Niger is reported to have increased its defence budget by 65%. Given the seriousness of poverty and food insecurity in Niger, the government’s decision to dramatically increase expenditure on hard security measures rather than poverty alleviation is concerning. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies reports that many areas of the Sahel region have become so dangerous that tens of thousands of refugees have been forced from their homelands. Developmental assistance can only be administered to a trustworthy government able to disperse it effectively. With corrupt governments and widespread emigration, the region is too unsettled for developmental assistance to be distributed without military aid. The Region is too Corrupt for Developmental Assisstance AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. The risk of kidnapping by Tuaregs is not only restricted to the borders of Sub-Saharan Sahelian states, but also at the intersection of the Tunisian, Algerian and Libyan borders in the hydro-carbon rich area known as the ‘Ghadamis Basin’. In September 2011, a British journalist was kidnapped by Tuaregs leaving Libya near the border town of Ghadames, located within the Ghadamis Basin. Most recently, in January 2012, a high ranking Algerian official was abducted and subsequently freed in Debdeb – a settlement near the Algerian / Libyan border – whilst mediating a local dispute. Although, there was insufficient evidence to implicate Tuaregs or AQIM in the kidnapping. Whilst it is unlikely AQIM or Tuaregs were solely responsible for all of the above-mentioned incidents, they nevertheless underscore the scale of the risk. Algerian officials claim that since 2003, AQIM has kidnapped and ransomed more than 50 Europeans and Canadians. Because the Sahel Region is so dangerous, it is unwise to send in unequipped developmental assistance foundationbriefs.com Page 71 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq distributors. Instead the world has a duty to supply military aid and make the region sufficiently stable before sending in assistance.

Development aid is rendered far less effective in areas needing military assistance, DAT “Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.” United States Government Accountability Office. November 2006. The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, USAID and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. It is difficult for the con to argue that development aid is ineffective outright. Rather, a more nuanced argument as accounted for here is that while development aid is effective, it drastically underperforms due to limitations imposed on conditions that can be improved by military aid.

Prolonged conflict exacerbates the need for agricultural aid in neighboring countries, DAT Coleman, Isobel. “Africa’s Looming Food Crisis Could Affect 18 Million People.” The Atlantic. 5 July 2012. Web. Indeed, since a March 22 coup, Mali has been in chaos. Recently, an al-Qaeda-linked Islamist group declared its full control of the northern part of the country. This weekend, the group--aping the Taliban-- destroyed several sites and part of a particular mosque it considered idolatrous in the historic city of Timbuktu. Mali's political instability magnifies the effects of food insecurity. The WFP's work there faces disruption, as does the work of other NGOs and international organizations. Many clinics and schools have been destroyed, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) fears that children will be forced to participate in armed conflict. The influx of Malian refugees to other countries has exacerbated regional food insecurity, not only because of the extra people to feed but also because some Malian refugees bring their livestock (a critical part of their economic livelihoods) with them. As the ICRC notes, 60,000 Malian

foundationbriefs.com Page 72 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq refugees have settled in northern Burkina Faso, where "the available pastureland does not provide enough food for the approximately 150,000 head of livestock" they brought with them. In a potentially grave turn of events, the political situation also threatens to exacerbate the spread of crop-eating locusts in Mali. Experts are unable to evaluate the country's locust situation and to apply pesticide because of dangerous conditions and because rebels destroyed or displaced the necessary equipment and pesticides. Development assistance already scaled back because of violence. JCD Campbell, John. "How Does Nigeria's Boko Haram Affect U.S. Foreign Policy in the Region?" Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 25 Nov. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The tiny U.S. presence in northern Nigeria has primarily been in the form of development assistance. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) works to improve the quality of education, strengthen government capacity, and provide adequate health conditions for poverty-stricken northern communities. However, all international assistance programs, including that of USAID, have been scaled back because of the security issues caused by the jihadist revolt and the Abuja government's crackdown in response.

Military assistance is needed to help protect humanitarian interests in Chad. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The shortage of troops and equipment over the course of MINURCAT’s deployment has impeded its ability to protect IDPs, refugees, and humanitarian staff, although human rights groups argue that the force has played a critical role in security and human rights protection.20 In January 2010, the Chadian government issued a formal request to the United Nations not to renew the mandate of MINURCAT’s military component, which was due to expire in March 2010. Chadian officials based their request on the slow pace of MINURCAT’s troop deployment and planned infrastructure projects, the allegedly improved security situation in the east, and a decision by the government to take primary responsibility for the protection of civilians. During ensuing consultations between the government and the U.N. Secretariat, the Chadian government revised its request, and in March the Security Council extended the force’s mandate until May 15, 2010, under Security Council Resolution 1913. In May, the Security Council further extended the mandate through the end of May with Resolution 1922.

US military assistance in Chad promotes democratic ideals/human rights protections. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional foundationbriefs.com Page 73 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The United States also provides bilateral security assistance to Chad to professionalize and modernize its security forces, although annual appropriations legislation in recent years has limited some of this training to that which promotes “democratic values” and respect for human rights. The State Department’s FY2011 budget request includes $380,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) and $400,000 in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), part of which would be used to continue training for the Chadian police force. The protection of civil liberties in Chad highly depends upon US military assistance. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The State Department argues that its emphasis on such assistance to Chadian forces “is crucial because of their historic involvement in unconstitutional regime change, suppression of dissent, and lack of adherence to standards of good governance.”35 The U.S. government discontinued demining assistance in 2007 due to “institutional weakness and a lack of political will to address the problem.”

Military instability in Mali reduces government legitimacy and thus undermines the efficacy of humanitarian efforts. JCD Arieff, Alexis. "Crisis in Mali." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013 The prohibition in Section 7008 refers to assistance implemented in coordination with the Malian government. U.S. security assistance programs have therefore been suspended. Mali’s $461 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact—which focused on improving agricultural development along the Niger River and constructing a new international airport in Bamako—has been terminated, months before its slated completion. The Administration has also suspended some potentially legally permissible programs, including security cooperation activities administered by the Defense Department, due to policy concerns.57 Still, about $70.4 million in bilateral foreign assistance, in addition to the emergency humanitarian aid cited above, has either continued under existing legal authorities, or has been approved to resume.

foundationbriefs.com Page 74 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq Region is too Corrupt for Developmental Assistance AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. UN Secretary General. “Report of the Secretary- General on the Situation in the Sahel Region .”June 2013. http://africacenter.org/2013/06/report-of-the-secretary-general-on-the-situation-in- the-sahel-region/ Countries in the Sahel have been dealing with successive political and humanitarian crises for years. Weak governance and its impact on State institutions including insufficient border management have dramatically diminished the capacity of the Sahelian States to effectively deliver basic services, promote broad-based political participation and protect human rights. Widespread corruption, coupled with the inability of States to deliver basic services such as effective policing, justice, access to water, affordable health care and education, has resulted in a widening gap in State-society relations. At the same time chronic political instability, evident in recurrent unconstitutional changes of government, violent electoral processes and social conflicts, is a direct result of the lack of institutionalized political dialogue, weak parliaments and contested judicial systems.

The situation has left the Sahelian countries increasingly vulnerable to insecurity resulting from armed conflict, terrorist activities, illicit trafficking and related organized crime. I am particularly concerned by the apparent links between criminal syndicates involved in drug trafficking and related organized crime, as well as non-State armed groups active in the region. I am also alarmed by the activities of terrorist organizations and other militant groups, such as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram and the Mouvement pour l’unicite et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, as well as other transnational criminal organizations. They have committed acts of terrorism and abuses of human rights, increased the widespread flow of arms and engaged in human trafficking, drug trafficking and other illicit practices, while eroding Stateauthority in many of the most vulnerable sections of society in the countries of the Sahel. In doing so, they have restricted opportunities for development. Because Sahelian governments for the most part suffer from acute corruption, developmental assistance is generally unwise and ineffective. Military aid is the necessary predecessor to developmental assistance to ensure that only governments able and transparent enough to distribute assistance receive it.

foundationbriefs.com Page 75 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq

foundationbriefs.com Page 76 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq Food and development aid cannot reach conflict areas, DAT “Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.” United States Government Accountability Office. November 2006. Web. In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity, according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN officials confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian aid. However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has mainly resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash, rather than the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program official estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur was lost to banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the theft of petty cash, fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food Program supplies. Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has been curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural areas. USAID, NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of security has forced humanitarian organizations to limit access to insecure areas. For example, in response to continued attacks and insecurity in West Darfur, in January 2006, the UN Department of Security and Safety announced the withdrawal of UN staff from most of West Darfur for 2 months, and USAID also removed its staff from West Darfur. (Although UN access was restricted, some NGOs did not evacuate the area and were able to continue operations.) According to USAID, the situation dramatically curtailed the ability of organizations to access the affected residents and IDP population in the area and to implement life-saving programs in West Darfur. Additionally, the UN reported that, as a result of significant insecurity in North Darfur, approximately 460,000 Darfurians were cut off from emergency food aid in July 2006, and in August 2006, 355,000 Darfurians remained blocked from receiving food aid. According to the UN, as of August 2006, humanitarian aid organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and areas of inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 people were displaced between June and August 2006. There’s a clear link between internal conflict and an inability for NGOs and government organizations to deliver aid. In heavily militarized regions like northern Mali, Libya, or Darfur, the imperative is already military assistance. However, it’s important to note that drastic, quick improvements are necessary (e.g. by an overwhelming emphasis on military aid) for necessary humanitarian aid to be effective.

foundationbriefs.com Page 77 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq Unstable environments drive our investment and create cycles of economic damage, DAT Rosenau, William et al. “Corporations and Counterinsurgency.” National Security Research Division. RAND Corporation. 2009. Web.

For most MNCs, a highly violent operating environment, and with it, the prospect of the death or injury of employees and the destruction of corporate infrastructure, is a powerful incentive to depart—or indeed, not to enter in the first place. Advocacy groups and the broader international community frequently demand that MNCs in conflict zones halt their operations and remove themselves from the affected country, arguing that the continued presence of these firms helps maintain a “war economy” that sustains combatants. Service firms and manufacturers with comparatively light investments either do not face these obstacles and issues or have assets that are mobile; relocation in the face of political instability is, thus, the usual reaction. For some MNCs, however, financial and other considerations create strong incentives to remain. Firms that decide to do so are most often those involved in the extraction and processing of natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, and minerals, and of commodities, such as natural rubber. For firms operating in the extractive sectors, relocation is rarely an option. Not only are they compelled to remain where resources are to be found, long production cycles and expected returns on extensive capital investment frequently outweigh the costs of continuing to operate in zones of acute conflict. Equally, the terms of concession agreements with host governments typically carry time frames measured in decades, which necessarily precludes the option of early divestment. Many firms in the extractive sector, therefore, must learn to adapt to conditions of violent instability Aside from MNCs (multinational corporations) in extracting industries (prevalent mostly in Chad and Nigeria), any flaring up of violence means a withdrawal from a region, or staying and essentially funding a “war economy”. This means that for sustained development naturally funded by corporations doing business in Africa to occur, military aid must be allocated first to ensure that corporations can do business there. The fact that extractive companies stay is relatively negligible since their business is don’t in essentially two Sahelian countries, one of which (Nigeria) has only a small section in the geographical Sahel.

foundationbriefs.com Page 78 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military aid prereq The safety of humanitarian workers in Chad still remains as a concern. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s Mission in Chad closed in 1995 due to declining funding and security concerns; USAID assistance, much of which consists of monetized food aid to support health and agriculture initiatives, is overseen by its West Africa regional office in Ghana, and USAID Food for Peace (FFP) assistance is managed by the regional FFP Office in Senegal. As a result of the USAID mission’s departure, the U.S. Embassy in N’Djamena operates a Democracy and Development section to monitor and administer foreign aid programs and identify alternative sources of U.S. government funding to meet humanitarian and development needs. The country’s Peace Corps program closed in 2006. The State Department has issued a travel warning to U.S. citizens advising extreme caution for those traveling in the country and recommending that they avoid all travel to eastern Chad and the area bordering the CAR due to an escalated level of violent crime, including carjacking, kidnapping, and murder. USAID has expressed concern that the withdrawal of MINURCAT may jeopardize relief efforts and the safety of aid workers in the east.

foundationbriefs.com Page 79 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Sahel Governments Need Military Aid to Fight Terrorism The Very Real Risk of Terrorism in the Sahel AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. http://africacenter.org/security/country/sahel/ The risk posed by terrorist networks operating in North Africa should not be downplayed, however. According to a January 2012 report by the International Centre for Terrorism Studies, there have been ‘1,288 terrorist bombings, murders, kidnappings, and ambushes- against international and domestic targets in the past decade. These claimed more than 2,000 lives and 6,000 victims in Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia.’ Furthermore, since the uprisings in the MENA region, at least two new terrorist groups have been formed, namely Ansar Eddin and the Mouvement Unicité et Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest(MUJAO). Ansar Eddin was established in Azawad, Northern Mali, and MUJAO is a dissident group loosely affiliated with AQIM that claims to have carried out kidnappings of foreigners near Tindouf Algeria but also has clear links to Mali and its leader, Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou (aka Abu Qumqum), is Mauritanian. Although the creation of MUJAO is a worrying development in itself, this development adds credence to the view that AQIM is itself struggling to retain organisational coherence in North Africa.

Nevertheless, terrorist attacks continue to pose a major risk to civilians and foreign workers and businesses in the Sahel/ Sahara region. Although Algeria has received significant support from Western intelligence agencies and has taken a tough stance against AQIM, the sustained level of violence against security forces reflects the longevity and resilience of the group and its affiliates. The continued escalation of violence in the north around the provinces of Bouira, Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes is a concern. On-going operations by Algerian security forces against AQIM cells has also meant that some elements of the organisation have been pushed southwards into Mali, Chad and Niger -- countries which are comparatively less well equipped to deal with the terrorist network.

foundationbriefs.com Page 80 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism The Region Needs Military Aid to Fight Terrorism AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. http://africacenter.org/security/country/sahel/ The extent to which the governments of the North African region and the Sahel/ Sahara are genuinely committed and able to tackle terrorism is also subject to question. The governments of Algeria, Mali and Niger (and historically the former Gaddafi regime in Libya) have benefitted both financially and in terms of acquiring substantial amounts of military hardware by cooperating with the United States and European Union in combatting terrorism. To continue to attract this support, the risk posed by AQIM is frequently artificially inflated by these governments. Crackdowns on ‘terrorists’ are quite often used to remove political opponents and quash dissent and recalcitrant elements of their populations. Emphasis of the terrorism threat has decimated the tourism industry in countries such as Mali and pushed communities further into poverty and therefore increased the supply of arms, tobacco and drugs and perpetuated trafficking as well as kidnapping-for-ransom.

foundationbriefs.com Page 81 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Crippled governments are often more focused on social and economic problems, DAT “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region.” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Government Printing Office. 17 November 2009. Web. Terrorism in the Sahel has become an issue of increasing concern. Over the past 5 years, AQIM and its predecessor organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC, have stepped up their activities across the Sahel. In the past 6 months alone, AQIM has been implicated in the killing of an American nongovernmental organization—NGO—worker in Nouakchott, Mauritania; the execution of a British hostage in Mali; the assassination of a senior Malian military officer; and an attempted suicide bombing against the French Embassy in Nouakchott. The countries in the region have recognized the problem and have intensified their efforts against AQIM. Algeria recently hosted regional chiefs of defense to promote improved cooperation, and we understand that Mali will organize a heads-of-state meeting in Bamako to address the situation soon. However, all the countries in the Sahel face daunting challenges. They are among the poorest countries in the world and lack the resources to develop effective antiterrorism programs on their own. They are also vast countries, stretching over thousands of miles, where government services and authority are weak or nonexistent. They are preoccupied with critical humanitarian and development issues, and, in some cases, terrorism is not their most pressing challenge. It’s important to remember throughout this debate that even in countries where the most pressing need may be stabilization and military objectives, they still have pressing socioeconomic troubles to take care of as well.

foundationbriefs.com Page 82 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Sahel governments are too disorganized to fight a growing threat alone, DAT Goita, Modibo. “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting the AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy.” Africa Security Brief, No. 11. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. February 2011. Web. Whereas Mali’s counterterror efforts have been inconsistent, Mauritania typically resorts to overly blunt security responses. Operational blunders and civilian casualties have resulted, playing precisely to AQIM’s advantage. In July 2010, a joint Mauritanian-French special forces operation into northern Mali to rescue a kidnapped French citizen incorrectly identified the camp in which he was being held. Though six AQIM members were killed, the operation was largely viewed as a failure. AQIM later announced in a televised address that it had executed the hostage in retaliation for the attack. Mauritania’s heavy-handed security responses have also exposed it to other aspects of AQIM’s strategy. During a Mauritanian operation in September 2010, as many as four civilians, including a young girl, were killed when Mauritanian aircraft attacked a convoy of AQIM militants in northern Mali. Nearby fighting also killed and dispersed livestock owned by local 5 communities. This prompted angry condemnations from local Malian leaders. AQIM released a statement denouncing Mauritania for targeting “innocent and defenseless Muslims.” It also offered “condolences to the families of the dead . . . and all the Berebeche tribes and the proud Tuareg of Azouad” and vowed to “shield our nation.” AQIM’s rhetoric leveraged the civilian causalities resulting from Mauritania’s attacks to further drive a wedge between local Sahelian communities and their national governments. The Malian government has in the past permitted Mauritania to conduct operations in Mali’s border areas, but the “right of pursuit” remains unclear and is not uniform among Sahelian states. Algeria opposes the right of cross-border pursuit. Mauritania has exercised it without informing neighboring states. Mali has maintained an ambiguous position. AQIM exploits this lack of clarity by operating in border regions to conduct or plan attacks in one state before fleeing into a separate jurisdiction. This card is useful in linking together broad policy arguments with anecdotal arguments, which will be increasingly important given the glut of available statistics and methodologies otherwise available for this topic.

foundationbriefs.com Page 83 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Africa is becoming the new global terror center, DAT Dreazen, Yochi. “The New Terrorist Training Ground.” The Atlantic. 18 September 2013. Web. The foreign militants battling Malian and French troops across northern Mali are part of a little-noticed but hugely important shift. American policy makers have long treated the Middle East and South Asia as the main battlegrounds of the war on terror, but those regions are quickly being joined by Africa, which is now home to some of the largest and most active Islamist militias in the world. The Islamist extremist group Boko Haram used a massive car bomb to demolish a UN compound in Nigeria in 2011, leaving at least 23 people dead, and has killed hundreds of other Nigerian citizens and security personnel over the past two years as it has fought to impose Sharia law in the oil-rich state. The Somali militia known as al-Shabaab has carried out suicide bombings throughout the beleaguered capital of Mogadishu and in neighboring countries like Uganda. Radicalized Africans have been involved in terror plots in the continental United States, taking advantage of the fact that they typically attract less scrutiny than Arabs or Pakistanis. The militant who tried to down a packed Northwest Airlines flight bound for Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, for instance, was a Nigerian named Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. The Islamist groups fighting in Mali pose a particularly dangerous threat. AQIM has already accomplished something no other al-Qaeda franchise has ever been able to pull off: conquering and governing a broad swath of a sovereign country, then using it as a base to plot sophisticated attacks outside its borders. Libyan fighters trained by AQIM took part in last September’s attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which killed Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, according to another U.S. official familiar with the region, who spoke on condition of anonymity. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, at the time the top al-Qaeda commander in northern Mali, also helped the alQaeda affiliate in Algeria organize the conquest of a sprawling natural-gas facility there earlier this year; at least 37 hostages, including three Americans, were killed when Algerian special forces retook the compound. In late May, Islamist fighters loyal to Belmokhtar attacked a French-owned uranium mine in northern Niger and a nearby army outpost, killing nearly two dozen Nigerian soldiers. Belmokhtar, who is still at large, and AQIM have publicly promised to carry out attacks in France in retaliation for the country’s intervention in northern Mali. Amidst all the examples provided in this card underlies a policy advocacy: the global communities general security prerogative since 9/11 has been combatting terrorism. Given the increasing role of Sahel countries as both regional and global terror hubs, it follows that the international imperative ought to be to combat this trend, hence legitimizing an emphasis on military intervention centered around anti- terror initiatives.

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foundationbriefs.com Page 85 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Sahel governments lack the diplomatic or military power to combat AQIM, DAT Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “Could Al-Qaeda Turn African in the Sahel?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. June 2010. Web. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/al_qaeda_sahel.pdf Any measurement of the threat AQIM poses to the countries of the Sahel must weigh its capacity to use force, appeal to the population, and ability to establish deep political roots. By and large, AQIM poses more of a security threat than a political one. Although AQIM has only few hundred members scattered across the Sahara (reasonable estimates put both Belmokhtar’s katîba and that of Abu Zeid at 200 to 300 men), that low number is misleading. These forces are taking advantage of a relative security vacuum in the Sahel. As the table below indicates, the military budgets of Mali, Niger, and Mauritania are a fraction of those of Algeria and Libya. In 2009 Mali’s military budget was the largest in the Sahel at $180 million; Algeria’s military budget was $5.3 billion. Countries north of the Sahara also yield soft power, with Algeria and Libya sponsoring peace processes with local insurgencies in Mali and Niger, respectively. But in the Sahel countries the security forces, no matter how strongly motivated, are ill-equipped to chase and fight AQIM commandos in vast and scarcely populated areas. The priority should be to enable the armed forces in Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to regain control over the large parts of their territory now off-limits for foreigners, because of the risk of AQIM kidnappings and attacks.

foundationbriefs.com Page 86 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism The Mali upheaval risks spreading to neighboring countries without containment, DAT Alexander, Yonah. “Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications.” Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. February 2013. Web. Two specific threats are particularly significant. First, there is a potential for the rebellion to spill over and galvanize Tuareg populations in neighboring countries to mount their own insurgency campaigns. Second, it is likely that terrorist groups inspired by Al-Qaida’s vision and supported by regional affiliates will expand their operations across Africa and beyond. These dangers have become even more alarming in view of the fact that by summer 2012, northern Mali had fallen under the control of various Salafi jihadist organizations including AQIM, MUJAO, Ansar Dine, Al-Qaida’s El Moulethemine Brigade, and most recently the Libyan extremists of Ansar al-Sharia. It has been reported that AQIM has provided training, financial assistance, and weapons to its affiliates and has attracted an influx of recruits from the region as well as from Western countries. In the short term, terrorism “from above,” that is, harshly applying Sharia law in the jihadist-controlled north, was expanding prior to the French intervention. Civilians have been publicly punished for their “crimes,” such as smoking or playing music. Also, thieves’ hands and feet have been amputated and extrajudicial executions have been undertaken. By early 2013, seven of Timbuktu’s 16 ancient cultural mausoleums had been smashed and destroyed, following the Taliban tradition in Afghanistan. A dearth of military aid means violence; the people of the Sahel suffer. A dearth of development aid means economic and social stasis; the people of the Sahel. Clearly, teams on the Con need something to differentiate the impacts of lackluster military aid. Showing that a failure to address a problem leads to a tangible metastasis of the issue is the kind of impact Con teams to differentiate their arguments.

foundationbriefs.com Page 87 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Chadian armed forces rely on US military assistance for counter-terrorist operations. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Despite concerns regarding poor governance, the U.S. government has considered the Déby government an ally in the effort to counter violent extremism. In 2004, elements of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) (now known as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM) entered Chadian territory and met resistance from Chadian forces. Today, reports suggest that AQIM may be associated with smuggling in Chad, but it has yet to conduct attacks in the country. Chad is a part of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that aims to increase regional government’s border protection and regional counter-terrorism capabilities, as well as “to promote democratic governance as a means to discredit terrorist ideology.”34 The country has received over $8 million in military-to-military assistance since FY2005 through the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS), the military support component of TSCTP, and in FY2007 Chad received $1.7 million in DOD global train and equip, or “Section 1206”, assistance to Improved its tactical airlift capacity. Other TSCTP-related security assistance has been funded through the State Department’s Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) accounts.

There are several terrorist groups operating in Mali that are cause for international concern. JCD Arieff, Alexis. "Crisis in Mali." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013 There are three main armed Islamist groups in northern Mali: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or AQIM; Ansar al Deen (alt: Ansar al Dine, “Defenders of the Faith”), and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA, a.k.a. MUJAO after its French acronym). AQIM grew out of Algeria’s civil conflict of the 1990s, and has been present in northern Mali for at least a decade. It has kidnapped Westerners, primarily Europeans and mostly for ransom, in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Algeria. AQIM has also carried out a number of bombings within Algeria, including against a U.N. office in Algiers in 2007. AQIM’s leader, Abdelmalek Droukdel, is reportedly based in northeastern Algeria, although his whereabouts are uncertain; a news reporter claimed to have seen him in Timbuktu in mid-2012. The group has been a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization for a decade.

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foundationbriefs.com Page 89 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Failing to deal with this terrorist threat will lead to its expansion. JCD Arieff, Alexis. "Crisis in Mali." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013 Since early 2012, U.S. officials have been concerned that AQIM and affiliated groups could leverage their expanded presence in northern Mali to carry out training, expand recruitment, and advance transnational terrorist plots. Officials have pointed to links between AQIM and extremist groups in Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Amanda Dory have also suggested that those who carried out the September 11, 2012, attacks in Benghazi, Libya, had ties to AQIM. These reports are difficult to verify, as is the operational significance of potential contacts between AQIM and other extremist actors. Factions and allies of AQIM may nonetheless leverage the broader regional political and security situation created by ongoing upheaval and transitions in North Africa, as fragile transitional governments confront myriad security threats without the capacity or will to exercise their predecessors’ style of authoritarian control.

Military assistance is needed for logistical support. JCD Arieff, Alexis. "Crisis in Mali." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013 AFISMA is not conceived as a full U.N. “blue helmet” operation. Instead, pending further Security Council deliberations, it is expected to be funded either through voluntary bilateral donor contributions, or potentially through a U.N.-funded logistics support package. News reports have cited estimates that the operation would cost $200-500 million in its first year.37 Given the extremely limited ability of West African states to project military force, donors would presumably provide air lift, surveillance, equipment, and training to regional troop contributors. (France has reportedly transported some regional troops to Mali since the start of French military operations.) U.S. officials have expressed a qualified willingness to provide logistical support to AFISMA, for which France has provided the most vocal diplomatic support. This is to help show that military assistance doesn’t necessarily have to be boots on the ground fighting.

foundationbriefs.com Page 90 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Weapons Loose in Sahel Region AMS Kaci Recelma. AL Monitor. April 8, 2013. “Terrorism Still Threatens Sahel Region.” http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/terrorism-threatens-sahel- region.html# Harouna Abdouramane, a political analyst in Niger who closely follows the security situation in the Sahel, told Al-Monitor: “I do not think the destructive capacity of the jihadists has been completely eliminated. Do not forget that the Malian situation is a consequence of the Libyan crisis. Weapons are scattered across the Sahara and it would be wrong to believe that the French military action has solved the problem. This war is here to stay. The French are preparing to leave and the UN is trying to ensure continuity. Nature abhors a vacuum. In addition, the Malians have proved incapable of cohesion. Anyway, I am not very optimistic.”

Governments too Ineffective to Combat Growing Terrorist Networks AMS Dr. Claire Spencer. Chatham House. January 22, 2013. “Combatting Terror Across the Sahel.” http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/188675 Despite their recent military ventures, AQIM and other Al-Qaeda-inspired groups, such as the Malian Tuareg Ansar Eddine or the recently-formed Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), are better seen as the instigators of the past decade's upsurge in regional criminality rather than as a united 'franchise' in pursuit of Islamist goals. As demonstrated by the internecine quarrels that provoked the formation of breakaway militias by the now notorious Mokhtar Belmokhtar, these groups appear to be far from united. They may now close ranks under concerted international pressure and the attendant publicity attracted to their cause. What they will still compete over, however, is control over the trans-regional networks of crime they have collectively established. The accumulation of wealth - rather than al-Qaeda's jihadist appeal - is what has succeeded in tipping the regional balance away from the Sahel’s weak and ineffective governments towards a wider array of light-footed and well-funded non-state actors.

foundationbriefs.com Page 91 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism Mali Lacks the Resources to Fight Terrorists AMS Morgan Lorraine Roach and Caitlin Poling. “Misadventures in Mali: Implications for Trans-Sahel Region.” February 5, 2013. Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/morgan-roach/misadventures-in- mali_b_2624018.html Yet, holding this territory and securing it against the threat of terrorism will be the long-term challenge. Militants have left town or are hiding amongst civilians, but they haven't left the country. Regional governments have pledged troops to assist in stabilization, and a few have already trickled in. But, the extent to which regional militaries will make a difference is questionable. Nigeria, for example, has pledged 900 troops -- only 200 of which have made it to Bamako, far from the front lines.

Neither the Malian Army nor the eventual 7,700 regional troops planned for have the capacity to lead such a mission without sustained training and assistance. This lack of capacity will eventually devolve into an issue of will: Do African governments care enough about Mali to dedicate more resources? And will these African forces be sufficiently trained or equipped?

foundationbriefs.com Page 92 of 128 January 2014 Con: Terrorism The proliferation of insurgent and terrorist groups has global security implications, DAT Alexander, Yonah. “Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012: Global Reach & Implications.” Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. February 2013. Web. Undoubtedly the emerging vulnerable “underbelly” of the vast territories ultimately threatens the security interests of the greater Middle East as well as the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. More specifically, this evolving and worrisome strategic map is nourished by Al-Qaida’s radical theology of jihad seeking local, regional, and global objectives and sustained by loose and at times more structured networks, based on organizational and operational collaboration. The latest sober minded reminder of this “Grand Design” was communicated by a spokesman of an Australian branch of the extremist movement Hizb-ut-Tahrir, in a comment posted on the Internet on December 24, 2012: “…the duty of the caliphate- [is] to implement Islam internally and carry the light of Islam to the rest of the world. How? Not with flowers. It was the army of the Muslims, which started from Al-Madina, and they went to China, India, and Al-Maghreb. That is Jihad.” The most significant strategic phase in advancing the foregoing vision in 2012 is the disturbing and evolving reality that AQIM and its affiliates have already carved out in northern Mali a new brand of “Afghanistan in the Sahara” by providing a safe-haven and establishing a breeding ground for jihadists in Africa, intensifying operations from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. Thus, the terrorist challenge assumes even greater regional and inter-regional implications. While the upheaval in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel undoubtedly takes its greatest toll on those living in the region, teams need to remember that the implications of security failure do not concern just African nations or their people.

foundationbriefs.com Page 93 of 128 January 2014 Con: Military success examples Military Aid Successes An ongoing, adaptable military aid effort through the U.S.’s TSCTP, DAT “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region.” U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Government Printing Office. 17 November 2009. Web. The focal point of our effort has been the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. Created in 2005, TSCTP allocates between$120 and $150 million per year for programs in 10 countries. TSCTP originally included Algeria, Chad, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. Burkina Faso was added in 2009. The TSCTP program reflects our recognition that sporadic engagements without adequate followup or sustainment would fail to achieve the meaningful, long-lasting results that we seek in the region. The emphasis, therefore, has been placed on addressing key capacity shortfalls that could be addressed over a period of years in these countries. The program draws resources and expertise from multiple agencies in the U.S. Government, including the State Department, the Department of Defense, and USAID. TSCTP does not provide a one-size-fits-all assistance package. As the current threat levels prevail in the region, we look at the states on a case-by-case basis and adjust the program to meet the needs of the countries. The size and scope of the TSCTP is requisite evidence attesting to the need for military aid at all times and across all countries virtually independent of whether an overwhelming crisis is incipient.

foundationbriefs.com Page 94 of 128 January 2014 Con: Diplomatically favorable Providing Military Aid is Diplomatically Favorable The United States has an opportunity to expand military capability in now-friendly states, DAT Dreazen, Yochi. “The New Terrorist Training Ground.” The Atlantic. 18 September 2013. Web. The United States is racing to expand its military and intelligence capabilities in Africa, taking advantage of the fact that some governments that were once reluctant to house American military facilities on their soil are so rattled by the unrest in Mali, Somalia, and other African nations that they now welcome U.S. personnel with open arms. In March, The Washington Post reported that the United States opened a new drone base in Niamey, the capital of Niger, to complement existing facilities in Ethiopia and Djibouti. (The U.S. government denies that such a base exists.) According to the article, the Predator drones flying out of Niger are currently being used to feed surveillance footage to French and African troops on the ground in Mali, but the aircraft could easily be outfitted with missiles if the administration chose to adopt a more muscular approach to the conflict. Niger’s president, Issoufou Mahamadou, told The Post that his country needed the drones because its military was too weak to defend its borders on its own. “We welcome the drones,” he said. A question both teams need to answer is, who is the aid (development or military) supposed to primarily help? Of course, the default answer is the Sahel but if an ancillary benefit is provided to whatever entity is giving the aid, this is a positive impact in favor of that policy course as well.

foundationbriefs.com Page 95 of 128 January 2014 Con: Dev aid corruption Development Aid Drives Corruption and Inequality Selective partnership weakens ties in West Africa, DAT de Verdiere, Michel Colin. “West African Perspectives: Resources for Development.” Sahel and West Africa Club and OECD. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2009. Web. Joining forces in international negotiations is, in theory, away to achieve greater collective gains and also has the advantage of moving towards a convergence of national policies. West African countries have not yet succeeded in jointly negotiating the EPA with the European Union. The lack of actors’ strategic vision and sometimes capacity vis-à-vis their partners remains a major issue. It is also the result of an imbalance of power. Even united through the C4 (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), West Africa was not able to obtain from the WTO the elimination of agricultural subsidies on cotton, even though it exports 15% of the cotton traded on the international market. For emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India, entering into dialogue and economic co-operation withWest African countries is definitely a positive, albeit risky, trend. It opens up and strengthens West African countries’ position in international negotiations. Nevertheless, dialogue at only the bilateral level still limits the balance of power between states to the detriment of West Africa, except perhaps for Nigeria. It is important to note who the actors and recipients are with respect to international aid. Development aid from China can be going to different ends than that from the USAID. Aid going to one country in a broader alliance can undermine the positions of its allies, as seen here.

foundationbriefs.com Page 96 of 128 January 2014 Con: Dev aid corruption The root of Niger Delta violence and turmoil is the revenue-generating oil industry, DAT Rosenau, William et al. “Corporations and Counterinsurgency.” National Security Research Division. RAND Corporation. 2009. Web. The region is also one of widespread armed militancy, fueled by gross economic and political inequality, conflicts between and among communities for land and other resources, and chronic neglect by Nigeria’s federal and state governments, which, as the U.S. Department of State has noted, have failed to use oil revenues to promote regional development Indeed, with the exception of the security forces, the government has no presence in the delta. In the words of one oil company executive, “[y]ou won’t find police stations, court houses or primary schools for vast stretches. There are no post offices. There is no presence of the government for miles. No electricity is provided. There is no water supply.” Oil lies at the heart of the region’s turbulence. The discovery of oil in the delta in 1956 brought with it popular expectations that life for the indigenes would improve dramatically. But despite the fact that oil has generated an estimated $500 billion for Nigeria, the Niger Delta remains the country’s least developed region. Unemployment is high, and ethnic groups, 70 percent of the population subsisting on less than $1 dollar a day. The region’s youth population serves as what one author characterizes as a “‘reserve army’ of discontent.” For many young men, violent criminality, aided by the ready availability of small arms and light weapons (including AK-47 rifles, rocket launchers, and rocket-propelled grenades) and the absence of effective policing, remains an attractive (and perhaps the only) promising career prospect. Oil exploration and production has ushered in what one scholar has termed excruciating environmental conditions . . . often aggravated by oil spills, gas flaring, the discharge of waste into communal lands and waters, and other fallout of poor oilfield management by the multinational oil companies. Delays in compensation from oil companies for environmental damage have sparked further conflict. Ownership of land marked for oil exploration remains bitterly contested across the region, and oil has heightened communal tensions. In and around the city of Warri, for example, the Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo ethnic groups have clashed over the distribution of oil revenues, jobs, and contracts and over such other issues as the control of local government. Finally, the oil companies and their employees are magnets for violent criminal predators. The illegal acquisition of oil (known as bunkering) and the kidnapping of oil workers for ransom serve as significant illicit revenue streams. These criminal activities help foster a climate of insecurity, with oil-related violence estimated to kill 1,000 people a year. While the generation of money and the development of industry is, in a vacuum, a heavily positive impact, the overall impact of resource extract as a means of development is negative. This also underscores the idea that the type of impact development makes is highly dependent on who is providing the assistance and to what end. Development is wasted on inefficient governments with little incentive to foundationbriefs.com Page 97 of 128 January 2014 Con: Dev aid corruption act for the benefit of their people.

Poor allocation of development aid in Mali has fostered corruption and militarism, DAT Pezard, Stephanie and Michael Shurkin. “Toward a Secure and Stable Northern Mali.” RAND Corporation. 2013. Web. The north’s precarious economic circumstances have been compounded by the Malian government, which has repeatedly broken promises to share a large portion of resources with the north and to bring more development to the region. Much of the aid that has been earmarked for the north has, in fact, never reached its destination because of corruption or plain bad faith. International aid from foreign governments or nongovernmental organizations has become not only a major source of income for the region but also a vehicle for individuals and groups to elevate their political and social status relative to others. It has given rise to a new class of political entrepreneurs reminiscent of the intermediaries between local communities and colonial administrations, referred to as “aid brokers.” Individuals strive to monopolize their access to aid by winning the loyalty of aid providers, in many cases altering the political landscape as a result. The region’s extreme poverty and its reliance, particularly in recent years, on external infusions of cash and resources explains why economic opportunism has driven many individuals to join whatever armed group offered a decent living or to switch sides when potential benefits seemed larger in another group. Ansar Dine and MUJAO, for example, appear to have—at least initially—derived much of their strength from their wealth, which enabled them to provide young men with precious opportunities for gain and social advancement. MUJAO reportedly provided extensive financial support to its recruits’ families, which probably acted as a strong incentive for individuals to join the group. In contrast, the smaller resources of the secular Tuareg rebel group National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (known under its French acronym, MNLA) explain in part the decline of the group in the months that followed its takeover of northern towns in 2012.

Nigeria is prone to mismanage humanitarian aid. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Decades of economic mismanagement, instability, and corruption have hindered investment in Nigeria’s education and social services systems and stymied industrial growth. The economy depends heavily on the oil and gas sector, which accounts for the majority of government revenues and export earnings. This makes the country particularly vulnerable to swings in global oil prices, and to conflict and criminality in the Niger Delta.

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foundationbriefs.com Page 99 of 128 January 2014 Con: Dev aid corruption The pervasive corruption will hinder all humanitarian efforts. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Corruption in Nigeria is “massive, widespread, and pervasive,” according to the U.S. State Department, and by many accounts, the country’s development will be hampered until it can address the perception of impunity for corruption and fraud.10 Human Rights Watch suggests that Nigeria’s political system rewards rather than punishes corruption, which has been fueled by oil revenues for decades.

The fungible nature of money makes future effective humanitarian aid impossible. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. According to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a Nigerian law enforcement agency created in 2003 to combat corruption and fraud, billions of dollars have been expropriated by political and military leaders since oil sales began in the 1970s. The country’s central bank governor has estimated that Nigeria may lose more than 10% of its annual GDP through fraud, and a task force appointed by President Jonathan found in late 2012 than billions of dollars have been lost since 2002 through oil theft and the mispricing of gas exports. This shows how the money put in the hands of the government is siphoned away from public services at an alarming rate. Simply putting more money in their hands will not solve the problem by any means.

Nigeria still remains vulnerable to corruption despite anti-corruption efforts. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Nevertheless, critics contend that executive interference with the EFCC continued during Yar’Adua’s tenure, undermining the entity’s investigations and derailing prosecutions. Donors were highly critical of the transfer and eventual dismissal of the EFCC’s first chairman, Nuhu Ribadu, in late 2007.15 President Jonathan fired Ribadu’s successor, who was implicated in corrupt practices, in late 2011, replacing her with Ribadu’s former deputy, Ibrahim Lamorde. Advocacy groups welcomed Lamorde’s appointment, but have called on Jonathan to increase the EFCC’s independence, suggesting that the chairman “remains deeply vulnerable to the whims of the president and lacks security of tenure.”

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Insurgent groups in Nigeria have prevented any adequate reforms from occurring. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Boko Haram’s attacks have since increased substantially in frequency, reach, and lethality, now occurring almost daily in northeast Nigeria, and periodically beyond.31 Attacks attributed to the group since 2010 have increasingly featured improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and suicide attacks. Boko Haram has primarily focused on state and federal targets, such as police stations, but has also targeted civilians in schools, churches, markets, and bars. Cell phone towers and media houses have also been targets. The group has conducted assassinations of local political leaders and moderate Muslim clerics. Bank robberies attributed to the group may contribute to its financing, although authorities warn that criminal groups may also be opportunistically posing as Boko Haram militants. Efforts by various interlocutors to facilitate government negotiations with Boko Haram have, to date, been unsuccessful.

The healthcare structure in Nigeria is fundamentally prone to corruption. JCD Su, Yanfang. "An Inverted Pyramid: Three-tier Public Financing for Health in Nigeria." Harvard College Global Health Review (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Nigeria consists of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, as well as 774 local government areas (LGAs). Though healthcare delivery was decentralized to local governments in 1999, the main contributor of public financing for health continues to be the federal government, followed by state governments (see diagram below). In 2005, the federal government, state governments, and LGAs contributed 50%, 31%, and 19% of government expenditure on health, respectively. This inverted pyramid structure of public financing presents critical challenges to delivering primary healthcare, especially because it enables leakage and corruption. This proves that regardless of outside efforts, only the Nigerian government can deal with internal issues such as corruption.

Foreign private investors refuse to invest because of corruption. JCD "Dragon-slayers Wanted." The Economist. N.p., 3 Dec. 2011. Web. 2 Dec. 2013 Corruption is a huge brake on Nigeria's growth. One official reckons the country has lost more than $380 billion to graft since independence in 1960. Foreign investors cite it as the main reason to avoid the country. It

foundationbriefs.com Page 101 of 128 January 2014 Con: Dev aid corruption remains to be seen whether Mr Jonathan really wants to fight graft or will merely switch people around to keep his critics guessing.

Corruption stops humanitarian aid in South Sudan. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. High-level corruption is a major challenge. In May 2012, President Salva Kiir sent a letter to 75 senior officials who are reportedly suspected in the disappearance of several billion dollars in government revenues. The exact amount missing is subject to debate, but South Sudan’s Auditor General has confirmed that the government cannot account for at least $1 billion in revenues. A sizeable portion of the missing funds is linked to a three- year old scandal involving grain imports that were ordered to address food shortages but never received (this prompted a leadership change at the Finance Ministry, but no officials have been prosecuted). President Kiir, who reportedly stated in the letter that “the credibility of our government is on the line,” offered amnesty to those who returned missing funds.61 Senior officials are required by law to report their income, assets, and liabilities to a new anti-corruption commission, but it has little capacity to verify submissions.

Limited access to humanitarian efforts in South Sudan show flaws in the current system. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The U.N.’s refugee agency reports that mortality and malnutrition rates at the camps are above emergency thresholds. Aid groups are currently working to improve water, sanitation, and hygiene conditions. Yida camp in Unity state is the largest refugee settlement, with more than 60,000 people who have fled Southern Kordofan. Aid agencies can currently only access the camp by air, and its proximity to the Sudan border is a serious security concern for aid officials. Refugees have resisted calls to move. The SAF bombed Yida in November 2011; no casualties were reported. Insecurity in parts of the country periodically impedes access to other populations that have been internally displaced. Aid agencies report that isolated incidents of harassment of relief workers have become an increasing problem; donors have registered complaints with Juba

foundationbriefs.com Page 102 of 128 January 2014 Con: Dev aid corruption Internal political issues make outside efforts to deal with corruption nearly impossible. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Within the NCP, reports of large-scale state corruption, including allegations directed at Bashir himself, have led to calls for internal party reform. Pragmatists within the party have stressed the need to draft a new permanent constitution, although many observers suggest such efforts are unlikely to lead to serious reforms in the way the NCP governs. The government appears increasingly sensitive to criticism, particularly of its austerity measures and subsidy cuts, as evidenced by multiple incidents of harassment of newspapers in 2012. Whether the SRF, the opposition parties, or the protest movement may pose a serious threat remains to be seen —some view the greatest potential threat to Bashir’s rule as coming from rival party members or segments of the security forces. Bashir’s position among Sudanese Islamists also continues to be challenged by his former ally turned political rival Hassan al Turabi, a member of the NCF.

Internal affairs in South Sudan are conflicting with current US humanitarian assistance Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013.stance. JCD The State Department has referred to the consolidation and strengthening of the new nation of South Sudan as the biggest governance challenge in Africa in FY2013. U.S. assistance to the country is guided by a USAID transition strategy to increase internal stability. The bulk of proposed development assistance to the country aims to build government and civil society capacity and economic infrastructure, and to mitigate local conflict. According to the State Department’s budget request, U.S. assistance to South Sudan in FY2013 would “accelerate progress in the critical areas of governance, rule of law, conflict mitigation, economic development, delivery of basic services, and security sector reform.” Efforts to build the country’s agricultural capacity and reduce its dependency on food aid are a central component of economic growth objectives. USAID reports that its existing development strategy relied on a level of government ownership by South Sudan that may be unrealistic in view of Juba’s current austerity budget, and some programs in the health and education sectors have been revised with the aim of preserving and protecting basic service delivery until oil revenues begin to accrue again.

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foundationbriefs.com Page 104 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Dev aid prereq Developmental Assistance must Precede Military Aid Regions Lack Resources to Fight Terrorism AMS United Nations Security Council. “Spiking Arms Proliferation, Organized Crime, Terrorism as Part of Fallout from Libyan Crisis Affecting Sahel, Security Council Told.” January 26, 2013. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10533.doc.htm Governments in the region are faced with the return of millions of economic migrants, the smuggling of weapons from Libyan stockpiles, terrorist activities, youth unemployment, trafficking in drugs and human beings, and a surge in criminality. Added to this backdrop is an impending food and nutrition crisis, the report says, noting the determination of those Governments to address the challenges.

A particular focus of national efforts, the report continues, is the transnational threat posed by Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, as well as the menace of Boko Haram and other groups, and the proliferation of weapons. However, it is clear that there are only limited national and regional capacities to confront those threats, which cannot be addressed in isolation. Despite the establishment of regional mechanisms, they lack adequate means to implement their tasks. Leaders in all the countries visited stressed the need for home-grown solutions, supported by the international community. Although government leaders seek to fight international terrorism, they often lack the infrastructure to do so effectively. Thus, developmental assistance is the necessary predecessor of military aid.

foundationbriefs.com Page 105 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Dev aid prereq United Nations Report Recommends Developmental Assistance AMS United Nations Security Council. “Spiking Arms Proliferation, Organized Crime, Terrorism as Part of Fallout from Libyan Crisis Affecting Sahel, Security Council Told.” January 26, 2013. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10533.doc.htm LYNN PASCOE, Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, said that the Secretary-General had dispatched the interagency assessment mission to look into the impact of the Libyan crisis on the Sahel, and it had found “a remarkable openness to engage on the nature and enormity of the challenges” confronting the Sahel among the region’s civil and political leaders. While most of those challenges pre-dated the crisis, a top priority for the countries visited was the question of feeding and reintegrating vulnerable returnees arriving from Libya, and helping affected communities cope with the loss of remittances.

The region also faced underlying structural problems and a looming food crisis, he said, describing strong appeals for the United Nations and the African Union, among others, to find a mutually satisfactory framework for rebuilding relationships in the region. The mission had found that greater efforts were needed to identify the criminal and militia elements that were “reigniting embers of past rebellions”, using weapons smuggled from Muammar al-Qadhafi’s arsenal during the fighting in Libya.

He said the mission’s report made recommendations in three areas: support and capacity-building in respect of ongoing national initiatives to address the region’s immediate humanitarian, socio-economic and security challenges, as well as enhanced efforts by United Nations country teams; support for existing regional mechanisms and enhanced coordination agreements on border control and the growing activities of terrorist organizations building networks throughout the region; and the mobilization of international support for the Sahel by the United Nations and the African Union.

foundationbriefs.com Page 106 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Dev aid prereq Anti-corruption efforts in Nigeria have been pushed alongside humanitarian aid. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The U.S. government also signaled its support for Lamorde, and has welcomed other anti-corruption initiatives by the Jonathan government, including the passage of a Freedom of Information law in 2011, a parliamentary inquiry into fraud associated with the country’s fuel subsidy program (see below), and the appointment of Ribadu to lead an independent audit of the oil and gas sector. The Jonathan Administration has also pledged to expand budget transparency by requiring legislators and other senior officials to publicly declare their assets

Humanitarian interests in Chad don’t need additional military protection. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. On May 25, the Security Council approved Resolution 1923, which extended MINURCAT’s mandate until December 31, 2010, but ordered the gradual reduction of its military component and transfer of civilian protection responsibilities to the Chadian security forces. Specifically outlined in the resolution is the Chadian government’s commitment to assuming full responsibility for (1) ensuring the security and protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and IDPs; (2) facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by improving security in eastern Chad; and (3) ensuring the security and freedom of movement of MINURCAT staff and United Nations and associated personnel. A joint Chad-U.N. Working Group is expected to monitor the situation on the ground and assess progress by the government of Chad on several additional benchmarks related to civilian protection, including voluntary return and resettlement of IDPs, demilitarization of the camps, and improved domestic law enforcement capacity

foundationbriefs.com Page 107 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob Military Assistance Makes Problems Worse Military Attention Corroborates Problems AMS United Nations Security Council. “Spiking Arms Proliferation, Organized Crime, Terrorism as Part of Fallout from Libyan Crisis Affecting Sahel, Security Council Told.” January 26, 2013. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10533.doc.htm HARDEEP SINGH PURI (India) said that military operations carried out ostensibly to protect civilians had led to adverse consequences for millions in the Sahel. In a relatively short time, its countries had had to contend with the impact of half a million returnees and an influx of large numbers of weapons. Noting that some 3 million people had lost their sources of livelihood, exacerbating food insecurity and the nutrition crisis in the region, he said terrorist groups were increasingly filling that vacuum. Most of those countries had few resources to deal with such challenges, he said, adding that structural challenges had a regional dimension and must therefore be tackled through regional cooperation.

Police System Requires Developmental Assistance AMS Sahel Working Group. “Global Counter Terrorism Forum.” 25 June 2013.http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/55810/Final+EN+SWG+Oran+June+ 2013.PDF NEEDS AND CHALLENGES FOR POLICE SERVICES IN THE SAHEL Presenter · Mr. Mohamed Esseissah, Mauritania; · Mr. Dieter Korhummel, Chief of Programs for Counter Terrorism Capacity Building, Police are often the first point of contact for criminals, victims of crime, and evidence. They also fulfill other security sector roles, such as border security, including document fraud and illegal immigration (ex: in Mauritania, 29 of 45 border crossings are staffed with police). Given that intelligence is frequently inadmissible as evidence in court, there is a need for training and equipment on crime scene management to ensure the proper collection of reliable evidence. Shared international databases have proven useful for regional cooperation. However, information from national databases should be more broadly shared to enhance cooperation on cases of mutual interests across borders.

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Solving problems with local solutions mitigates side effects of outside assistance, DAT Rabasa, Angel et al. “From Insurgency to Stability, Vol. II: Insights from Selected Case Studies.” National Defense Research Institute. RAND Corporation. 2011. After its successful counterinsurgency effort, the Malian government has continued to rely on local actors for security and the maintenance of order in the north. In a way, the Malian government is currently re- applying the method that proved successful in chasing and ultimately defeating Bahanga: co-opting members of the local population who know the terrain and guerrilla tactics much better than the Malian regular army. The development of Special Units composed mainly of Tuaregs has had three main benefits: providing former combatants with a legitimate occupation, reducing the army’s footprint in an area where it was not welcomed, and reducing the army desertion rates, which were due, in part, to the reluctance of integrated northerners to be deployed in the south of the country. Northern Mali is an archetypal region where the geographic expanse and foreignness of the territory precludes outside aid from being even close to as effective as locally-dependent solutions. For the emphasis to be on outside military help would be a drastic underutilization of resources.

Private Military Firms in Africa have a history of corruption. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Several international firms have been implicated in Nigerian bribery scandals, including German telecom giant Siemens and the U.S. firm Halliburton and its subsidiary Kellogg, Brown, and Root, Inc. (KBR). If the integrity of KBR has already been called into question, corruption would only be reinforced by providing more military assistance.

Military aid is poorly received by local Nigerians. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. By many accounts, Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization. According to U.S. officials, its core militants foundationbriefs.com Page 109 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob may number in the hundreds, but the group also appears to draw support from a broader following of several thousand Nigerians, primarily young men from the northeast, who have expressed frustration with the lack of development, jobs, and investment in the north, and with the heavy-handed response of security forces

The prison system is also plagued with corruption. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The State Department’s 2012 human rights report documents allegations by multiple sources of “arbitrary or unlawful killings” by security forces, including “summary executions … torture, rape and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of prisoners, detainees, and criminal suspects,” and a variety of other offenses, such as the use of “excessive force to stem civil unrest and interethnic violence.” The prison system has also drawn criticism; human rights groups report that many of the country’s inmates are incarcerated for years without being convicted of a crime. Simply adding more military aid will put more people in a broken prison system which causes far more harm than good.

Security forces in Nigeria are responsible for dozens of civilian deaths. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Forces deployed under the JTF to counter Islamist militants in the northeast—JTF-Operation Restore Order— have been implicated in extrajudicial killings of suspected militants and in civilian deaths. In April 2013, for example, more than 180 people were killed in fighting between security forces and suspected Boko Haram militants in the village of Baga, according to the Red Cross and local officials; among the dead were reportedly innocent bystanders, including children. Nigerian security forces disputed the number of casualties.

The Nigerian government is resistant to military aid. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service(n.d.): n. pag. 24 Apr. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Nigeria is a participant in the State Department’s Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a U.S. interagency effort that aims to increase regional counter-terrorism capabilities and coordination. Some Nigerian

foundationbriefs.com Page 110 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob officials reportedly remain sensitive to perceived U.S. interference in internal affairs and dismissive of certain training offers, however, and, conversely, U.S. officials remain concerned about reported abuses by Nigerian security services. These factors appear to have constrained U.S.-Nigerian security cooperation, despite shared concerns over terrorism and other regional security threats in recent years.

US Security assistance in Africa lacks adequate oversight. JCD Shank, Michael. "Aid Gone Awry in Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 19 June 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. As the U.S. government gears up to militarize more of the Middle East by arming rebels in Syria, we are witnessing a similar mission creep toward the African continent. Not merely in the more obvious military interventions into Libya, Mali or Somalia, or military bases in Niger or Djibouti, but through growing security partnerships in places including Kenya, Nigeria and even Mauritania. The ramp up of military and counterterror assistance to these countries – and the human rights abuses committed by these same actors – is seriously troubling. […] We need vigilant, ongoing accountability around U.S. military training and equipment – especially as the House Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities included some alarming language on U.S. security assistance in its latest markup of the National Defense Authorization Act. The subcommittee raised concerns that current U.S. standards – known as the Leahy laws – would be interpreted "more broadly" than intended, causing combatant commands to be significantly "restricted" in "a number of countries across the globe." Those restrictions, however, which the House subcommittee felt might be too limiting, are one of few mechanisms currently in place to ensure accountability and respect for human rights. Yet these restrictions are not strong enough. While they sometimes serve to cut off aid from specific units or individuals, they ultimately do not prevent ongoing partnerships with chronically abusive governments

Current military efforts are too short-sighted. JCD Shank, Michael. "Aid Gone Awry in Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 19 June 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013.

foundationbriefs.com Page 111 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob This "Western money" and "African boots" approach to security assistance programs is increasingly seen by Washington as an innovative alternative to large-scale wars – one that allows for "sharing" the burden of security and empowering foreign forces to address their own problems. But without careful accountability and rigorous evaluation, its implementation looks a lot more like short-sighted Cold War policies in Latin America than local empowerment.

Drones are especially dangerous to civil liberties in the hands of corrupt governments. JCD Shank, Michael. "Aid Gone Awry in Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 19 June 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The U.S. has taken some small steps to acknowledge the problematic nature of human rights violations, with Kerry admitting that they can "escalate the violence and fuel extremism." But as the U.S. continues to profess support for reform in each of the countries in question, it also continues to provide aid like surveillance drones to governments that imprison activists and further marginalize oppressed communities.

Using military forces to stamp out an ideology in Africa is counter-productive. JCD McDermott, Jim. "America's Creeping Militarization of Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 9 July 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. First, Congress must acknowledge that the AUMF has served its purpose. While military force cannot eliminate ideological extremism, it is clear that, nearly thirteen years after this war started, al-Qaida no longer poses an existential threat to the United States. Military force is certainly not solely responsible for this truth, as it has allowed many costly mistakes along the way. To perpetuate these policies is to force the AUMF to live far beyond its appropriate duration. Attempting to track down elements of al-Qaida linked only by ideology, not capabilities, would be costly and counterproductive. This is especially important when addressing arguments about AL-Qaeda’s influence. Just because there are sympathizers in the Sahel region, military force will not necessarily fix this issue.

foundationbriefs.com Page 112 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob Military intervention will lead to more civilian deaths in the Sahel region. JCD McDermott, Jim. "America's Creeping Militarization of Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 9 July 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Second, the global war on terror, too, must end. Since 9/11, bad decisions and mission creep have pushed the U.S. into more, not fewer, conflicts. The U.S. invaded Iraq on the premise that Saddam Hussein had al-Qaida ties. The U.S. has used drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia to kill alleged affiliates of al-Qaida. Thousands of people have been killed, but fewer than 2 percent have been the key leaders the U.S. has said it is targeting. According to recent reports and congressional hearings, the U.S. is expanding operations all over the African continent under the AUMF law, using an undisclosed list of "associated forces" the administration claims are tied in some way to al-Qaida.

Diplomatic relations will be undermined with increased military intervention in Africa. JCD McDermott, Jim. "America's Creeping Militarization of Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 9 July 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. This militarization of U.S. policy toward Africa is likely to undermine legitimate diplomatic relations and cause untold harm to ordinary Africans. The U.S. cannot afford, financially or ethically, another decade of war fought by U.S. troops or proxies. Rather than expand these polices, let's dial them back and end the longest era of war in our history.

foundationbriefs.com Page 113 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob Oversight in Africa continues to degrade. JCD McDermott, Jim. "America's Creeping Militarization of Africa." US News World Report. N.p., 9 July 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Finally, perhaps most importantly, Congress must reclaim its oversight responsibilities. The AUMF has been characterized by very weak oversight and accountability. According to data from Special Operation Command, U.S. Special Forces were operating in 92 countries, most likely including a number of African counties, as of this past March. The U.S. drone program is reportedly expanding throughout the African continent. When Obama negotiates military agreements with other countries, most recently with Niger, Congress is rarely consulted. The AUMF is not confined by geographical boundaries; military operations and assistance missions also have taken place in Mali, Niger, Kenya, Uganda and Somalia without a declaration of war. Strikingly, in the face of this absence of oversight, Congress only recently has begun to hold hearings on transparency and accountability. During the recent debate on the military authorization bill, the House had a timely opportunity to debate the AUMF, but failed to do so. Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., offered an amendment to the bill (identical to his legislation, HR 2324) to repeal the use of force law, but debate on the amendment was denied.

The lack of basic human rights protections make military assistance dangerous. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. In short, the challenges facing the government are great, and its capacity is limited. Among its many tasks are adopting a permanent constitution and transitioning to fully elected national and local governments, as required by the current transitional constitution. The State Department views support for South Sudan’s development of democratic governance and its ability to deliver services and ensure the rule of law as critical. South Sudan is under pressure from human rights groups and donors to hold security forces and officials responsible for reported abuses. The development of legal and regulatory frameworks to protect basic rights and freedoms, such as freedom of speech, and to address issues of property ownership and labor rights, may serve as important benchmarks for donors and investors alike.

foundationbriefs.com Page 114 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob Military assistance runs contrary to the principle of peacekeeping in Sudan. JCD Frazer, Jendayi. "How to Defuse Sudan Conflict." Council on Foreign Relations. N.p., 26 Apr. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. The UN is involved from the point of view of having peacekeepers on the ground. The UN's role is very important. But it was a mistake for Ban Ki-moon, the United States, and the AU to come out so hard against South Sudan for just an incursion into Heglig. It just created the context in which the Sudanese are now bombing Unity state. The UN role is primarily to protect the civilian population--from the point of view of keeping their peacekeepers there, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to those people that are now displaced and fleeing from these bombing attacks from the north. The international community should be united against northern aggression.

The Chadian army has a history of using child soldiers. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. According to U.N. estimates, as many as 10,000 children may have been used in combat and non-combat roles by Chadian rebel groups, paramilitary forces, and the national army in recent years. The government denied the existence of child soldiers in its army until May 2007, when it signed an agreement with UNICEF to end recruitment of persons under age 18 and begin demobilization of those already within the security forces

The Chadian military continues to recruit child soldiers even with military aid. JCD Ploch, Lauren. "Instability and Humanitarian Conditions in Chad." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 1 July 2010. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. In October 2008, however, the U.N. Secretary General noted that the government had begun an effort to sensitize military commanders and personnel on the issue of child recruitment, and in April 2010, the Secretary-General reported that the Chadian government has “shown a consistent policy position and commitment against child recruitment,” and has granted the U.N. and the International Committee for the Red Cross access to military camps to verify the presence of children and facilitate their release from the army.25 According to his 2010 report, however, the army and other armed groups continued to recruit and use children in 2009; MINURCAT documented 26 cases of child recruitment by the army during the year, and 19 children remained associated with the army as of April 2010. The United Nations continues to express concern regarding the recruitment of children by rebel groups, including armed Sudanese groups such as the Justice and foundationbriefs.com Page 115 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Military aid worsens prob Equality Movement (JEM), and local militias in and around refugee camps.

foundationbriefs.com Page 116 of 128 January 2014 Pro Counters: Alt solutions to military Alternate Solutions to Military Problems Focus should be place on making Algeria a regional leader in the Sahel. JCD Arieff, Alexis. "Crisis in Mali." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 2 Dec. 2013 Given its size, experience in counterterrorism, and military superiority in the region, Algeria’s role in responding to Mali’s security crisis has drawn intense international attention. Secretary of State Clinton traveled in October to Algeria, where bilateral discussions focused on the situation in Mali. Algeria’s constitution prohibits troop deployments beyond its national borders, and noninterference in other states’ sovereignty is a cornerstone of Algerian foreign policy. Still, Algeria could potentially provide support for a regional operation in other ways. Amid intense U.S. and French diplomatic pressure on Algeria to play a constructive role with regard to Mali, Algerian officials have oscillated between opposing and tacitly accepting the concept of regional military action. In part, Algerian objections may have stemmed from the perception that a regional deployment could serve as a front for Western intervention. Algerian leaders’ preoccupation with domestic politics and the opacity of Algeria’s decision-making apparatus have also complicated Algeria’s claims to regional leadership in the Sahel.39

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foundationbriefs.com Page 118 of 128 foundationbriefs.com Page 119 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Mali needs military aid Situation in Mali Demands Military Attention Mali Remains Entrenched in Conflict AMS Reuters Reporters. “Malian Separatist Rebels End Five-month Ceasefire.” Telegraph. November 30, 2013. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/10485593/ Malian-separatist-rebels-end-five-month-ceasefire.html Separatist Tuareg rebels said on Friday they were ending a five-month-old ceasefire with Mali's government and taking up arms following violence in the northern city of Kidal. The declaration came a day after Malian troops clashed with stone-throwing protesters who blocked a visit by the prime minister to the city, a northern rebel stronghold. Several demonstrators were wounded but there were conflicting accounts of how the incident started. "The political and military wings of the Azawad (MNLA, MAA and HCUA) declare the lifting of the ceasefire with the central government in Bamako," said a statement by Attaye Ag Mohamed, one of the founders of the MNLA groups. "All our military positions are on alert," he added Today Mali is in no condition to receive developmental assistance. The nation is wracked by terrorism and violence.

foundationbriefs.com Page 120 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Mali needs military aid Mali Government Unsuitable for Developmental Assistance AMS Reuters Reporters. “Mali Coup Leader ‘Charged with Murder.’” November 28, 2013. Telegraph. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/10479906/ Mali-coup-leader-charged-with-murder.html Mali's former junta chief, General Amadou Sanogo, has been detained after being questioned by a judge over what a senior judicial source said were accusations of post-coup violence by the army and financial crimes. (…) Mali's newly elected President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is under pressure to restore the state's authority over the army, which overthrew President Amadou Toumani Toure last year, plunging the West African country into chaos. Controlling the army, along with regaining control of the north, which was occupied by separatists and Islamists rebels until a French-led intervention in January, are widely considered Mr Keita's two biggest challenges. A spokesman for the group of soldiers involved in last year's coup declined to comment on Sanogo's detention. The judiciary source said authorities questioned Sanogo over army violence linked to a counter-coup shortly after he seized power in March 2012 and suspicions of financial crimes related to money transfers from the government. "He needs to account for the use of sums that he received from the defence department," he said, asking not to be named. It was not immediately clear if the financial probe was linked to a report released this week by Mali's auditor general which found that 49.4 billion CFA francs ($102.12 million) had been lost in 2012 to fraud and mismanagement. Financial fraud has met previous developmental assistance to Mali—a clear sign that the nation is not yet ready for similar aid.

foundationbriefs.com Page 121 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Mali needs military aid Militarily, the Mali government is either apathetic or hapless against AQIM, DAT Goita, Modibo. “West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting the AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy.” Africa Security Brief, No. 11. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. February 2011. Web. A “total struggle” against AQIM pledged by President Touré, however, has yet to be fully realized. Official reaction to setbacks is often unsettling silence, as with AQIM’s abduction, execution, and refusal to return the body of customs official Lieutenant Sidi Mohamed Ag Acherif in August 2010. The government has also released AQIM prisoners in response to demands and threats to kill hostages. The rise in AQIM kidnappings and the use of safe houses in northern Mali to guard captives has benefited not only AQIM but also many entrepreneurial Malian officials who are often negotiators and go-betweens. Such negotiators retain substantial portions of multimillion dollar ransoms. These factors have further complicated government efforts to tackle the challenge in northern Mali. Acquiescence to demands for ransoms and the release of detained AQIM operators has also strained regional ties. Mauritania recalled its ambassador in Bamako for 8 months after Mali released four Mauritanian AQIM detainees in early 2010. Another AQIM mercenary was released by Mali in August 2010 after he was extradited from Mauritania. Despite strong rhetoric, Malian government policy seems primarily aimed at avoiding direct confrontation with AQIM—even its foreign elements—within its territory. Providing basic necessities for citizens is often a cause governments are able to get behind moreso than fighting a certain group, with Mali being a clear example of the latter. With that in mind, the necessity for non-state actors to intervene is much stronger militarily than developmentally.

foundationbriefs.com Page 122 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Libya needs military aid Situation in Libya Demands Military Attention Instability of Libya AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. http://africacenter.org/security/country/sahel/ Ineffective governance, inadequate security measures and the outflow of arms from post-Qadhafi Libya are contributing to lawlessness, smuggling, kidnapping, and terrorism in the Sahel. The influx of weapons into northern Mali is fueling and will sustain the newly formed National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) rebellion, whose operations have displaced tens of thousands into neighboring countries and is having a broadly destabilizing impact in the Sahel. Meanwhile, national governments in the region have been unable to overcome complex and contradictory aims to collaborate effectively to address these new challenges. Military attention should be devoted to the Sahel, particularly, Libya before moving towards developmental assistance.

foundationbriefs.com Page 123 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Libya needs military aid Fall-out from the Libyan uprising: instability in the Sahel/ Sahara AMS Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Insurrections, kidnappings and instability: Security dynamics in the Sahara/Sahel in the wake of the Libyan uprising” February 2012. http://africacenter.org/security/country/sahel/ In the wake of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, the proliferation of weapons in the Sahel/Sahara region has become a major security risk. A report published on 18 January by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) notes that in addition to the large influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees and economic migrants returning from Libya to countries such as Mali and Mauritania, ‘large quantities’ of weapons and ammunition has been smuggled into the Sahel from Libya. There is serious concern that the light and heavy arms (such as artillery, anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air-missiles) will now be sold to terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram in Nigeria and other criminal organisations. These weapons are being smuggled by nomadic Tuareg tribesmen, many of whom fought on the side of pro- Gaddafi fighters and have since fled Libya. Whilst the risk of arms flowing to terrorist organisations and saboteurs is a concern, it is also fuelling a Tuareg rebellion in Mali, which will further destabilise the region. That the situation in Northern Mali is deteriorating fast is evinced by the fact that Algerian troops crossed into Mali on 20 December. Whilst the ostensible reason for the Algerian incursion was to ‘combat groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda’, in reality Algeria is concerned that Tuareg unrest in northern Mali led by the newly formed Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) will spread to its own southern provinces – in particular Tamanrasset and Adrar. Meanwhile, clashes between Tuareg and Malian security forces have increased in intensity since late December. The risks of arms flow and terrorist activity in Libya are too great to ignore. The world most respond quickly and firmly with military aid to restore stability to the region.

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Companies provide development aid as a part of doing business in Nigeria, DAT Rosenau, William et al. “Corporations and Counterinsurgency.” National Security Research Division. RAND Corporation. 2009. Web. The region’s chronic violence and instability has driven some MNCs out of the Niger Delta. Willbros, one of the world’s largest suppliers of services to the oil and gas industry, left the delta in 2006 after nearly 45 years in Nigeria, announcing that dangers in the region “exceed our acceptable risk levels.” But for Shell Nigeria, this turbulent operating environment is simply too lucrative to abandon. While “highly complex, threatening, and generally explosive,” according to one analyst, the delta’s petroleum resources are “too rich for Shell to walk away from, or for that matter too tempting not to further explore and commercialize.” Moreover, as with other firms in the extractive sector operating in Nigeria and elsewhere, the resources necessary for corporate survival and success are fixed geographically, so relocation to a more salubrious environment is simply not a reasonable option for Shell. … Today, Shell Nigeria’s activities include investing in the community; supporting microenterprises; and providing health care, education, and agricultural services. In 2005, the corporation began negotiating long- term agreements, which it calls “global memoranda of understanding,” with host communities. According to Shell Nigeria, such memorandums provide for “planned and integrated activities that will hopefully encourage sustainable development for communities.” Communities are encouraged to direct and manage their own long- term development “by encouraging them to identify projects and determin[ing] who implements them.” In 2008, Shell contributed $158.2 million to the NDDC and spent an additional $25.2 million directly on development projects. However, Shell Nigeria has not abandoned the “harder” aspects of security. A corps of Nigerian police, known as the Supernumerary constabulary, are deployed across the delta to provide protection for Shell Nigeria’s personnel and installations. Members of this force, according to the corporation, are trained in Shell security guidelines, which reflect international norms, including the United Nations’ Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. Although the corporation does not say so publicly, the Supernumerary police providing protection to Shell Nigeria have been paid by the oil company, according to one human rights NGO. The corporation has also been in discussion with Nigerian authorities over how the company might provide human-rights training for the security forces. Shell in Nigeria is a strong anecdotal example of the kind of symbiotic relationship companies can have

foundationbriefs.com Page 125 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Outside dev aid redundant with their host nations. Development assistance is inherent to doing business in afflicted regions, partially overriding the need for dedicated, isolated development aid from outside groups.

foundationbriefs.com Page 126 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Military aid underfunded Military projects only face failure due to underfunding The African Union Mission in Sudan is underpowered in fighting the internal conflict, DAT “Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges.” United States Government Accountability Office. November 2006. Web. According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as vehicles and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS operations. For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has inadequate transportation equipment and communications equipment, as well as a lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials whom we interviewed expressed their concern that the lack of adequate communications equipment limited their ability to interact with different camps in the region. Further, an AMIS civilian police official noted that the civilian police often receive less equipment than the military component of AMIS, which has resulted in situations such as the need to rely on military colleagues’ equipment to communicate with their civilian police colleagues. One AMIS commander also noted that AMIS required more printers, computers, and photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that until AMIS makes the most efficient use of its current resources, such as vehicles and communications equipment, it is unclear whether more resources are needed. Further, the December 2005 African Union–led report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned, equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed. A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and the residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central problem hindering AMIS’s ability to monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the African Union’s Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200 interpreters; however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70 interpreters. The lack of interpreters has been attributed to the difficulty in finding people who speak both Arabic and English. One U.S. military observer told us that many uneducated people in Darfur speak only their tribal language, further complicating AMIS’s ability to ensure effective communication. In addition, we were told that at times, AMIS patrols used representatives of the parties to the conflict as translators, which meant that AMIS officials could not verify that translators were conducting the interview in an objective fashion, asking the required questions, or reporting responses accurately. In one example provided by an AMIS civilian police official in El Daein in South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a woman had said she was “helped” in a particular instance, when in fact she had stated that she had been violently attacked. Someone within the investigative team was able to discern that this mistake had been made and communicate it to the rest of the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over the lack of civilian police translators able to communicate with IDPs and respond to IDPs reporting violence in the camps.

foundationbriefs.com Page 127 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Military aid underfunded Given the lack of distribution pathways and both logistical and human resources, African troops cannot be expected to achieve successes in their given missions. The added benefit of this card is that con teams have a rebuttal to the idea that a lack of military successes in certain instances in the Sahel entails that military aid should not be prioritized; rather, some military goals (e.g. that mentioned in this card) are not achieved because is not prioritized enough. While this evidence is not quite recent, it supports the contention that emphasis on military aid is what can spur military competence in afflicted regions.

foundationbriefs.com Page 128 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Military aid underfunded United States involvement is constrained by a lack of resources, DAT Dreazen, Yochi. “The New Terrorist Training Ground.” The Atlantic. 18 September 2013. Web. Africom’s biggest shortcoming is that it is a command in name only: it has no troops, tanks, or aircraft of its own. The 2011 U.S. military intervention in Libya was the most important moment in Africom’s history, but General Carter Ham, then the commander of Africom, had to borrow aircraft and helicopters from European Command because he had none of his own. Africom controls the drones flying over Mali from the bases in Niger and other nearby countries. But any future U.S. intervention in Mali, Somalia, or other emerging terror sanctuaries on the continent—whether via air strikes, which are a possibility, or the deployment of American combat troops, which appears highly unlikely—would require Africom’s new commander, General David Rodriguez, to ask other parts of the military for aircraft, armaments, and troops. In Mali, the U.S. is relying on the same military that fled the north in the spring of 2012 to hold the line after the French withdraw their troops later this year. The confidence seems misplaced. The Malian armed forces have about 7,000 troops, many with little to no combat training. Malian army commanders in the north are so concerned that Islamists will use purloined uniforms to slip onto their bases to mount new attacks that they’ve given loyalist soldiers swaths of red fabric to attach to their uniforms. When I asked one officer what would prevent the Islamists from simply buying identical bits of fabric, he shrugged and told me, “The future of this place is in God’s hands.” Africom is a United States military initiative in Africa currently based in Germany. While it is simple for pro teams to rationalize an emphasis on development by pointing out military failures, the cause of those failures is important. In this instance, the high potential for the United States positively identifying a problem and effecting a positive outcome in Sahel countries like Mali is crippled by a lack of resources; emphasizing military aid is, bluntly, the simplest remedy to the problem.

Military assistance in South Sudan helps to increase accountability. JCD Blanchard, Lauren. "Sudan and South Sudan: Current Issues for Congress and U.S. Policy." Congressional Research Service. N.p., 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013. Proposed FY2013 aid funding would also continue State Department efforts to help transform the SPLA from a guerilla army to a professional military force subordinate to civilian leadership and protective of human rights, and to build the capacity of the nascent police force. Military assistance for both Sudans is subject to congressionally-mandated restrictions related to the use of child soldiers, although President Obama issued a presidential waiver in September 2012 exempting South Sudan (along with Libya and Yemen) from the foundationbriefs.com Page 129 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Military aid underfunded restrictions.

foundationbriefs.com Page 130 of 128 January 2014 Con Counters: Military aid underfunded Contentions

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Introduction:

For years the U.N., neighboring nations, and the United States have tried to calm conflict in the Sahel region by supplying troops and military aid. This approach is misguided. The Sahel region faces acute hunger crises, deep set refugee problems, and instability that can only be mitigated through developmental assistance. Relief efforts should focus on getting the Sahel region vital materials and building sustainable communities rather than supplying military aid.

Contention One: Military involvement is inappropriate.

According to an analysis piece from the New York Times published in March of 2013, “The turmoil in the Sahel is shaping up to be a long-playing conflict that will end well only with the help of African regional organizations, Western nations, nongovernmental groups, and the United Nations providing a mix of military, diplomatic and economic assistance. Collective conflict management carried out by improvised, case-specific networks operating in informal cooperation is urgently needed.” The piece goes on to explain that the region will not see large scale troop deployments from NATO countries that are “war-weary and financially tapped out from fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.” History has shown that throwing troops at the problems in the Sahel region is fruitless. Instead multilateral conflict management is necessary to solve the Sahel region’s problems.

Contention Two: Need for developmental assistance.

According to Oxfam International, “Last year, over 18 million people in the Sahel region of West Africa were affected by a severe food crisis caused by drought, a failure of several crops, and sharp rises in food prices. With the current conflict in Mali, more than 350,000 people have been forced to flee their homes, both in Mali and its neighbors in Sahel, adding more pressure on already vulnerable communities.” And “the lives of over 1 million children were at risk from severe malnutrition.” The malnutrition, famine, and refugee crises facing the Sahel region demonstrate the acute need for developmental assistance. Sahel leaders cannot achieve sustainable solutions while facing widespread hunger and refugee emergencies. The World Food Programme reported this year that the conflict in the Sahel Region has already produced 180,000 refugees in three neighbouring countries and more than 150,000 internally displaced persons inside Mali. These refugees face extreme hunger and disease which should be combatted through developmental assistance. Supplying more troops will not solve the Sahel’s problems.

foundationbriefs.com Page 133 of 128 January 2014 Pro Contentions Contention Three: Developmental assistance has had great success.

The World Food Programme is currently reaching 6 million people with food assistance across the Sahel region. In the wake of the conflict in Mali, WFP is supporting internally displaced people, refugees and their host communities in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mauritania. The WFP expects to reach 550,000 people through refugee programs. In addition to providing solutions for famine in Sahelian countries, developmental assistance programs can end militancy before it begins. According to a report from the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, USAID’s developmental program concentrates on “youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance—the four areas where we see the greatest opportunity for local partnerships and progress.” These programs are specific towards each country and “Unlike traditional development programs, [USAID efforts] target narrow populations that generally aren’t reached by other programs. We also specifically reach out to young men—the group most likely to be recruited by extremist groups. USAID programs have had success in Niger helping local leaders launch community developmental projects. In Mali, the 11 community radio stations built by USAID will reach 385,000 people with messages of peace-building, governance, and education. And in Chad, the organization is developing conflict mitigation and community stabilization projects that reach into the country’s remote north. In northern Mali, where one of the underlying drivers of extremism is the lack of educational opportunity, a USAID radio-based program has trained more than 1,400 teachers in 217 schools.

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Introduction:

So long as the Sahel continues to be arid and dry, on the fringes of what may be considered livable, aid will continue to flow in. This arid stretch of sub-Saharan Africa, stretching from Mauritania’s Atlantic coast in the west to Sudan and the Red Sea in the east, is one of the most impoverished and war-torn regions on the planet. Basic human necessities, the kinds of things being accounted for by development aid, are always important. The Con in today’s debate does not wish to argue against the disbursal of development aid in the Sahel. But let us take a look at what is truly the most necessary and most beneficial to the people of the Sahel. Given the continuing genocide in Darfur, the continued instability in the Niger Delta, and the unprecedented upheaval in Mali, it is unacceptable for development aid to have priority over the military assistance that promises to stabilize the Sahel.

Contention One: Military threats are too large to ignore

If military threats in the Sahel were localized and relatively unimportant, the international community would be justified in emphasizing development assistance. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Instability and upheaval have reached an extent that it would be unacceptable not to address it more strongly than the need for development assistance. The United States’ Government Accountability Office in November 2006 found, for instance, that African troops were incapable of monitoring and controlling the upheaval in Nigeria, a conflict that continues nearly unabated today. Meanwhile in Mali, Reuters noted that as of late November Tuareg rebels, having been in a cease fire with the Malian government for five months, were actively taking up arms yet again, making further prolonged conflict incipient, particularly given the Tuaregs’ historical aversion to the Malian government and peacekeeping efforts. Both Mali and Sudan are illustrative of a core point in the Sahel: instability is seemingly inherent to the region. In both cases, it is internal factors which cause instability. The difference today is that while the Darfur conflict simply continues, Mali’s has proceeded to escalate.

Contention Two: Development aid does not effectively help the people of the Sahel

Fundamentally, development aid is about enabling people and, as an extension, enabling progress. This is a laudable goal. Unfortunately, it fails to meet its mark, and this failure would only be perpetuated to a greater extent if development aid was prioritized. Let’s first examine agricultural aid. As noted by The Economist in July 2012, “the main requirements [for agricultural development] are long-term agricultural improvements as foundationbriefs.com Page 135 of 128 January 2014 Con Contentions well as institutions and safety-nets to respond to food crises fast.” Contrast this with the analysis of Rob Bailey of Chatham House, a London think tank, who notes that humanitarian and development aid are often separated from each other and that development aid tends to follow rigid timelines for delivery. This is not the adaptable strategy the Sahel needs, and this certainly does not come close to fulfilling the efficiency goals outlined by the Economist. So development aid is inefficiently delivered. But this would be OK if it still positively impacted the people of the Sahel. Again, this is where theory meets cold reality. “In most cases, there is food available but people cannot afford it,” says Sibiri Jean Zoundi, an agricultural economist at the Sahel and West Africa Club, as quoted in The Economist in December 2010. Food aid is undoubtedly a massive component of development assistance, and the Pro will likely offer up numerous examples of the breadth and effectiveness of food aid. But there’s the problem. It’s about economics, not availability, and development funds used on procuring food are essentially wasted.

Contention Three: Development aid detracts from political and humanitarian goals

The problem with development aid is not only that it helps in an inefficient manner; in many case, it actually has either no positive effect or a net negative effect. Take Nigeria, for instance. As noted by Lauren Ploch of the Congressional Research Service, the country manages to have 70% of its population below the poverty line and around 50% of its population living without running water despite receiving more foreign aid than any other country in the planet. Coupled with massive oil revenues in the country and it becomes clear that there is a distinct chasm between revenue and positive effect. Indeed, much of the country’s resources are squandered without actual development helping its people; despite $500 billion in oil revenue generated, according to William Rosenau of the RAND Corporation, the nation remains one of the least developed in the world. This underscores the fundamental flaw with development aid: it almost inherently entrusts the well-being of people to governments for whom the well-being of their people is not a primary priority. This seen in Mali as well, where Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin of the RAND Corporation noted that poverty coupled with a heavy reliance on outside aid has driven the kind of economic opportunism which fuels membership to insurgent groups. We are sure the Pro will agree, to some extent at least, that the Sahel is unstable. And when development cash is injected into an atmosphere of instability, it does not empower. It does not enable; rather, it crushes and creates destructive reliances.

As previously emphasized, we do not wish to argue against the need for development assistance or entirely against the merits of development assistance. But its problems are too big to ignore. When looking at what is most beneficial to those living in the Sahel, the answer is clearly not development aid, which we have shown to not only be unhelpful, but destructive in countries like Nigeria and Mali. The answer is to bring stability to a region that greatly needs it. The answer is military assistance.

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