Global Environment
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Chapter 2
Deconstructing “Global Environment”
Thinking Green
What does it mean to deconstruct “global environment?” Chapter 1 of- fered a particular normative perspective on the general issue of global environmental degradation. That perspective included a number of foun- dational assumptions regarding the social worlds that humans have orga- nized. For example, we saw that production of the material base and re- production of the social structure are fundamental to all societies. We also saw that the power to create meanings is central to the institutional organization, and activities, of any society. Such assumptions are both ontological and epistemological in character (terms defined below). Every analytical or philosophical approach to the global environment includes a similar set of foundational assumptions, many of which are not always evident. In this chapter, we shall examine competing and con- trasting concepts of global environment in order to illustrate how each leads to a different way of addressing environmental damage and engag- ing in global environmental politics. What will become evident in this tour through environmental beliefs and practices is that none of them is explicitly scientific or technological. Remember that, in the discussion of social institutions in chapter 1, sci- ence and technology are best seen as tools or methods for achieving insti- tutional objectives. Science and technology, understood in this sense, have both politics and social meanings, but these are embedded in specif- 27 Chapter 2 ic institutions, and not in the tools themselves (Winner, 1977; Latour 1987).
Ontology and Epistemology
Who are we? Why are we here? What is our purpose and the purpose of the world? Was the Earth created by a god, or is it merely the result of chance? Is there such a thing as “human nature?” Do living things have inherent value? The arena of philosophy that examines questions such as these is ontology. How do we know what we know? Where does knowledge come from? What is knowledge? Why do some types of knowledge have the status of “conventional wisdom” while others are regarded as threats to the status quo? The arena of philosophy that examines such questions is epistemology. Finally, what do we believe? Why do we believe it? What is the rela- tionship between humans and nature? What do our beliefs impel us to do, and why? And how does what we do affect what we believe? These com- plexes of belief and practice constitute philosophies. As we shall see, ontology and epistemology have a great deal to do with understanding various perspectives on the environment and human- nature relationships. In particular, the way in which a particular problem or issue is conceived has a great deal to do with the way in which it is understood and addressed. Indeed, framing an issue in a particular way of- ten points to particular types of solutions, some of which might result in unintended or even catastrophic outcomes (Stone, 1997). Environmental ontologies, for example, can regard human beings ei- ther as the protectors of nature, put here on Earth to ensure its continuity, or the beneficiaries of nature, put here on Earth to utilize its resources (Pe- terson, 2001). While these two views are not necessarily exclusive, they posit a different purpose for both humans and the environment around them, and lead to different practices with respect to nature. Human nature is another ontological matter central to our understand- ing of global environment. To some, human beings are inherently self-in- terested, violent, fearful of injury and death, and in need of discipline. This is a position sometimes associated with Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651/1962). To others, human beings are inherently altruistic, peaceful, cooperative, and self-organizing. This is a position sometimes associated with John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1689-90/1960). While it might be difficult to see how these conceptions have anything to do with nature, a simple reading of Hobbes suggests that nature is hos- Deconstructing Global Environment 28 tile and chaotic, on the one hand, and that the riches found in nature are a focus of conflict, on the other. Only the intervention of a sovereign can eliminate the “state of nature” among men and oversee a fair division of resources (Meyer, 2001). By contrast, Locke is more concerned with the development of civi- lization than with the origins of government. He assumes that nature exists for the benefit of man but that it must be exploited in particular ways in or- der to foster both wealth and the social good. When humans put labor into land, they turn it into property which is inherently productive. Both Hobbes and Locke are believers in the social contract as fundamental to human (and environmental) politics, but they see it as serving very differ- ent functions. Assumptions such as these represent foundational principles of envi- ronmental ontologies, as we shall see, below. Other foundational assump- tions might address whether or not the world possesses an inherent pur- pose, whether nature is orderly or chaotic, and whether humans are ani- mals or different from them. These ontological assumptions, in turn, are used to explain and predict human behavior and humans’ relationship to nature. For the purposes of further exploration of environmental philosophies, we can cross two foundational assumptions about human nature with two foundational assumptions about the “state of nature.” This generates four categories of environmental ontologies: competitive, cooperative, develop- mental, and dominating, as shown in Table 2.1, below. Note that there is no box for what might be called “environmental existentialism,” that is, the notion that there is no fixed or given purpose to the world, and that we must create our own meanings and objectives.
Table 2.1: Environmental ontologies
Human nature More Individualistic More Social State of Nature Tends toward Competitive: Actors Dominating: Some ac- violence struggle with each other tors control others in or- for a share of nature’s der to accumulate na- goods ture’s goods Tends toward Developmental: Actors Cooperative: Actors harmony engage in production to work together, and with acquire a share of na- nature, to fairly share ture’s goods nature’s goods 29 Chapter 2
Competitive ontologies are organized around the proposition that ma- terial resources are the foundation of human institutions and activities. These resources are assumed to be scarce and the object of struggle and competition. Humans require adequate resources in order to survive and, whether they are acting individually or in groups, they will compete with one another, and even fight, to acquire the needed resources. Developmental ontologies include a major economic component, but generally give priority of explanation to institutions, ideologies, and be- liefs. The material necessities of life remain important, indeed vital, but can be provided through appropriate systems of production and exchange. Because institutions require some degree of collective action in order to accomplish their goals, humans must work together. Dominating ontologies are critiques of domination and, especially, capitalism, in which various forms of power are used to perpetuate accu- mulation, injustice, and what Johan Galtung (1969) calls “structural vio- lence.” Capitalism, according to these views, is based on surplus value, which comes from unjust control of labor, women, nature, minorities, and the weak. Private property and capital, owned mostly by white men, per- mits one increasingly globalized class to exercise its power over all those who have less of everything. Cooperative ontologies propose that political institutions, governed by rules, norms, and laws, can foster collective protection of nature and en- able humans to come to consensual understandings. Human beings are so- cial by nature and seek to cooperate, and nature is similarly characterized by symbiosis and organicism. The appropriate social arrangements can, therefore, eliminate or avoid struggle, competition, and domination. We can also identify four approaches to epistemology, each of which is based in a different source of knowing and knowledge. The best known of these, which is also the basis for science and technology, is empiricism (also known as induction). This involves understanding through observa- tion. Empiricism is based on an ontology of the world as a material system governed by regular and knowable laws that can be derived from observa- tion. A second well-known type is deduction, which involves discovery through logical reasoning (Sherlock Holmes used deduction, but always began with empirical evidence; deduction here means reasoning from foundational principles). Hobbes proposed the necessity for Leviathan as a result of deduction from certain assumptions about human nature, based on observations of the society in which he lived. Deconstructing Global Environment 30 A third approach to epistemology is revelation. This is associated with religious belief. In this instance, knowledge is revealed directly to humans by a divine source. The Bible and Koran constitute such revelatory knowl- edge and stand as sources of authority to define and govern human behav- ior. Nature and natural law can also, under some circumstances, be treated as revelatory. The fourth, and final, type is inspiration which, in this instance, is akin to a recognition from within, a sudden insight arrived at without intention- al or deliberate reasoning. Although science is normally depicted as induc- tive, scientists sometimes arrive at their “ah-ha!” moments through inspira- tion. These four approaches to epistemology are shown in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Approaches to epistemology
Nature of the world Mundane Transcendental Source of knowledge External Deduction Revelation Internal Induction Inspiration
Why do epistemologies matter? They matter because, among other things, the four epistemologies do not have comparable legitimacy in polit- ical and social terms. Because we have such regard for the authority of sci- ence, for example, induction is regarded as the most reliable way to come to conclusions regarding data and experience. One might arrive at equally solid conclusions through deduction or inspiration, for example, about the ethical standing of nature or the oppression of women, but these would not be regarded as having equal standing. Consequently, those philosophies that are claimed to be based on empirical data are give more credence than those that are not (Redclift and Benton, 1994). Notwithstanding their empirical basis, all four categories of ontology listed in Table 2.1 are normative, that is, they are motivated by certain be- liefs and values, whether inherent or expressed. To illustrate the distinction between ontology and epistemology more clearly, let us return to the ex- ample from chapter 1, in which industries at one end of a valley are send- ing pollution to the other end. Consider, in particular, the second case, in which an international border divides the valley. A competition-based view of this scenario would most likely see the problem in terms of power, sovereignty, and anarchy, based on knowledge of the world. In this world, there is no global government and, so, states 31 Chapter 2 pose a threat to each other. Protection can be achieved only through accu- mulation of power. The pollution from the country upwind (A) would be seen as a threat to the well-being of the country downwind (B) and a viola- tion of the latter’s sovereignty. Country B could use threats of force to make Country A cease the offending activity. If B were more powerful than A, the latter, it is assumed, would yield. Those familiar with Interna- tional Relations theory will readily recognize Realism at work. A cooperative-based view of this situation would most likely see the problem in terms of interests and exchange, based on knowledge of mar- kets. States are selfish entities who seek to protect their individual inter- ests. In this case, pollution would make clean air scarce in the lower end of the valley, but a mutually-beneficial exchange, perhaps involving sale of property rights, could induce the factories in Country A to reduce their pollution or close down entirely. This solution looks much like neo-liberal institutionalism. These two philosophical approaches are not the only ones on offer, of course, although they tend to dominate the literature on Global Environ- mental Politics. Table 2.3 summarizes a number of environmental philoso- phies within each ontological category and, in the remainder of this chap- ter, I discuss them in greater detail.
Competition
In thinking about competitive philosophies, we can begin by examining maps. What do maps show us? Lines, among other things. What do these lines denote? It depends, of course, on what the map purports to show. But consider, for a moment, maps of the world. One map might show terrain and topography, another, landscapes and ecosystems, a third and fourth, climate zones and weather, population densities and birth rates. Most world maps also show the boundaries of countries, or states. These states are, in one sense, mental constructs: they exist only to the degree that the people living within the specified borders believe in them and actively support them (a phenomenon called nationalism; see chapter 5). In another sense, states are quite real. Many control enormous material resources, large economies, and tremendous military power. When their institutions act, consequences follow. Even though one can often point to particular rivers, mountain ranges, plains or coastlines to explain why a border is here and not there, the parti- cular territorial parameters of any given state are, to a large degree, an Deconstructing Global Environment 32 accident of history and political economy. But it is the case that states occupy virtually the entire land surface of the planet, that they are the sites Table 2.3: A selection of environmental philosophies
Competitive Realism Resources are scarce; states are fearful and violent; they struggle to control nature; war is the result Malthusianism Resources are scarce; population growth places excess demands on nature; conflict and struggle are the result Liberalism Resources are scarce; competition in the market and privatization foster efficiency and conservation of nature Developmental Sustainable growth Resources can be made more plentiful through high rates of growth and market opportunities for the poor Sustainable Poverty and over-consumption both cause degradation; Development environment and development are intimately related. Ecomarxism Capitalists control resources; expansion of production with redistribution can provide resources for everyone (Anti) Domination Ecocentrism The dominant position of humans in ecological hierarchy destroys nature Ecofeminism The dominant position of men in social hierarchies weakens and destroys both women and nature Ecosocialism The dominant position of humans in social and ecological hierarchies destroys both people and nature. Cooperative Neo-liberal States can find mutually-agreeable compromises institutionalism through negotiations in international regimes Social naturalism Humans can live in harmony with each other and with nature is in small, self-governing communities organically embedded in ecosystems Ecoanarchism Humans can protect nature and live cooperatively through local ecologically-sensitive and democratic practices Note: This table is not comprehensive; there are other epistemologies that are not included here, but those tend mostly to be variations on a theme. 33 Chapter 2
of the human activities that damage the environment, and that they are close to, if not at, the top of the hierarchy of social institutions. It would appear, therefore, that states must play some role in environmental degradation (as well as its prevention or amelioration). According to the conventional wisdom of international relations theory, countries exist in a condition of anarchy, and comprise a crude international society called the state system (Bull, 1977). There is no global sovereign or government to rule over these countries, to command them to do one thing and not another, to punish them if they fail to behave as ordered. At least two consequences are generally assumed to follow from these conditions. First, each state must look out for its own security and interests, since no one else will; the state system is a self-help one. Second, although states can make agreements with each other, there is nothing except fear of punishment by another and, perhaps, reputation to make them keep such agreements. States cannot really be trusted. Nonetheless, although states find themselves in a condition of inter- national anarchy, they are not in a condition of chaos or in isolation from one another. The fact that they occupy physical space on the surface of the Earth and watch each other’s actions also means that they must interact with each other and take each other into account. This interaction means that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts (Jervis, 1979). What we see here is a system, and not just simply states relating to each another. In theory, at least, each state is sovereign within its own juridically specified territory (but see Shaw, 2000). This means that the government of each state constitutes the ultimate authority and possesses a monopoly of legitimate violence within that territory (although there are important caveats to this idealization; many governments do not exercise such a monopoly of violence). Taken together, the state of anarchy and the condition of sovereignty mean that a state cannot be forced to do anything within its own territory that it does not want to do, and that no one can keep it from doing within its own territory what it chooses to do (again, this must be recognized as an idealized condition that does not always hold true; see Jackson, 1990). What does this have to do with the environment? One of the general assumptions underlying many political theories about interactions between people and states is that all desirable resources are scarce. That is, whether deposits are limited or supplies are constrained, there are absolute limits to the quantities of resources and goods available in the world. Deconstructing Global Environment 34 States and their populations require resources and goods to survive. Therefore, competition for access to those resources and goods is seen as a perennial problem (Sprout and Sprout, 1965; Lipschutz, 1989; Klare, 2001). These principles provide the foundation for the competitive ontologi- cal framework and compel certain questions: What can states do by them- selves, and what can they do together to alleviate scarcity? These two questions in turn lead us to, on the one hand, a liberal approach to the global environment and, on the other, a realist one. A Malthusian philosophy combines the two, regarding resources and food supplies as inherently limited and therefore the focus of economic and political competition and conflict.
Liberalism
Most accounts of international relations begin with states and realism, that is, as Hans Morgenthau (1948) put it, “the struggle for power and peace.” We begin here, rather, with states and liberalism, or “the struggle for survival and wealth.” Although the idea that these two theories might have something in common might seem odd to many students of inter- national politics, in fact they are not that different. Indeed, both are based on accumulation, one of wealth, the other of power. Liberalism is a political theory of individuals acting competitively in anarchic markets; realism is a political theory of states acting competi- tively in anarchic politics (although neither realm is truly anarchic). Both are theories of action under circumstances in which there appears to be no governing authority and few rules. Thomas Hobbes’ “State of Nature” depicts, exactly, an imagined condition of people in the absence of a governing authority. The international system comprised of states and the market comprised of individuals are structurally similar (Waltz, 1979). Realism, in other words, can be understood as the projection of a domestic liberal framework, in which individuals compete in markets for goods and wealth, to an international system, in which states compete for resources and power. Although the international system is taken to be without rules, and therefore prone to violence, in practice neither markets nor the international system are without rules or without some kind of rule- making procedure or authority. A liberal perspective on global environmental politics tends to treat states as participating in markets established among them, under the assumption that states possess or control “things” that can be exchanged or traded in a market setting. Such exchange is relatively easy to understand 35 Chapter 2 when we are speaking of an international division of labor; it is more difficult to explain when applied to the environment (Leonard, 1988). After all, how can states exchange or trade in nature? In order to analyze such exchange, we need to address three points. The first has already been made earlier: the borders of states, which are as- sumed to be fixed, do not generally correspond to boundaries manifest in nature. Hence, all kinds of geographical, topographical, and ecological settings may be shared by two or more states (a phenomenon sometimes called ecological interdependence; see Lipschutz and Conca, 1993). The second principle is that the borders of states do not provide effec- tive protection against the damage that can be done to them by activities taking place within other states (a phenomenon that, in terms of international law, constitutes a violation of sovereignty). In the case of a military threat, the answer seems straightforward, if not always simple: Arm to keep the peace, and undertake war to restore the status quo ante or eliminate an injustice (Mearsheimer, 2001; in practice, of course, one can also negotiate). Not all problems are so simple or lend themselves to such apparently straightforward solutions. The elimination of environmental insults moving across national borders is, for the most part, a circumstance that is not amenable to applied violence. Third, in the international arena, such laws as do exist are weak and there is no effective power to enforce them (but, see Goldstein, et al., 2001). In the event of environmental damage inflicted upon a state by activities originating from outside its borders, these deficiencies may be further complicated by uncertainty about the sources of the insult. Under the principles and laws of international trade, we assume that states engage in the direct exchange of goods and resources, although such trade normally occurs between private parties or public agencies, rather than states themselves. What does not take place in an organized market is the buying and selling of bads, that is, damages or negative impacts on the environment. These are called “externalities,” and treated as cases of market “failure” (see below and chapter 3). As we saw in our valley scenario, in a domestic (or municipal) setting, there are ways to deal with damage inflicted upon one’s person or property by another person, agency, or corporation. Laws usually exist, or can be passed, that prohibit such damage or require the payment of fines and costs in the event that damage occurs (see the section on “Cooperation,” below). Enforcement of the law and collection of damages can be problematic but the mechanics for addressing the bad are in place. Deconstructing Global Environment 36 Evidently, this does not follow in an international context. For exam- ple, although scientists and authorities in Sweden are reasonably sure about the origins of the acid precipitation that wafts into their country from abroad, there is at least some uncertainty as to how much comes from each specific foreign source. Depending on wind direction, moreover, the pollution may blow in from the United Kingdom on one day, or from Poland on another. With respect to greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide, the uncertainties are even greater. These are complicated by the fact that such specific insults as might arise will take time to appear and, even then, might not be attributable to specific sources. But even if one country is able to identify an environmental insult originating from the territory of another, there is nothing that the first can do, acting by itself, to remedy the problem. States are enjoined by the Stockholm Declaration of 1972 from inflicting environmental damage on each other, because this is a violation of sovereignty. For the very same reason, one state cannot intervene in another—at least in theory, since we know of many examples to the contrary—to eliminate the source of the pollution What is left? In essence, efforts to influence the offending state through the wielding of power in ways other than violent ones. These include negotiation and bargaining, that is, seeking exchanges between the two states that will motivate the offender to change its ways. For example, states can find ways to “internalize” environmental insults. This involves changing the cost structure of the polluting activity so as to make it economically attractive to put a stop to it. The “Coase theorem” (1960) in economics proposes that if a polluter is unwilling or unable to pay the costs of eliminating pollution (“polluter pays”), it is economically efficient for those being affected to pay the costs (“polluted pays”). While this might sound unfair to those on the receiving end of the pollution, it has happened that some offended countries have paid offending ones to reduce or eliminate such environmental damage. This point is discussed in further detail in chapter 3. A second, more competitive approach to internalizing an environ- mental insult is to create property rights and markets in the bad. According to the liberal framework, one reason that environmental damage is not controlled is that pollution “space” is free. There is no cost to polluting water and air, which means water and air have no market value. By creating property rights in pollution and putting them up for sale, the true value of pollution space can be determined. Exchange will take place between those who have a surplus of such space and those who need more than they have. 37 Chapter 2
This idea might seem a little bizarre—after all, who would want to buy pollution? And, yet, this is the basis for control of sulfur dioxide emissions in the United States, under the terms of the Clean Air Act of 1990 (Altman, 2002). This approach is also likely to be applied to greenhouse gases, as stipulated under the Kyoto Protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. In the market envisioned for greenhouse gas emission permits, states will be able to buy and sell a scarce resource: unpolluted atmosphere. They might also compete with one another to build projects intended to generate such emission permits. The market of classical liberalism is usually considered the exemplar of cooperative behavior although it is better seen as an arena of fierce and potentially antagonistic competition among buyers and sellers. What are presumed to be missing in the anarchy of international relations are rules. That is, for exchange to occur in a market, those doing business must accept certain constraints on their activities. Outright violence, for example, is not acceptable behavior in a market setting, although certain forms of coercion are often present. But markets are also premised on the assumption that everything has a price or, all else being equal, that demand for some good will be supplied at a price that “clears the market.” Whether a price can be put on political objectives is not obvious, but the claim is made that states can satisfy their demands to protect the environment through appropriate market mecha- nisms. We shall return to this point in chapter 3. And, although markets appear to be a function of mutual and unfettered exchange between partners, they are not devoid of either ethical structure or power. Exchange under duress does not constitute a market; partners enter into a deal with the expectation that things of equal value will be ex- changed, with each partner in full possession of relevant information (a condition not always met in practice). Markets also tend to privilege those who have more money and information, which tends to place those who are poorer and less informed at a decided disadvantage.
Realism and Malthusianism
What happens when the market doesn’t clear and a price for a good or bad cannot be established? That is, for whatever reason, there is no possibility of exchange between parties and, yet, the parties cannot walk away from a situation. Sometimes, as at auctions, bidding can become quite fierce and create bad feelings. At times, violence can break out even in market settings. In that case, we may find ourselves back on realist turf. Deconstructing Global Environment 38 It might be difficult to visualize realism applied to emission permits, but many have had no trouble applying it to material resources (Lipschutz, 1989). In the situation posited above, a state wishing to acquire something from another state might decide to use more overt forms of power, such as economic leverage or political influence. One result could be growing mutual antagonism between the two, inasmuch as the first state will be using its power to force the second state to do something it might not wish to do. Economic sanctions, for example, seek to restrict international trade in particular goods (or the “exchange” of bads) in those situations in which the application of force is deemed impossible or unreasonable. But the line between sanctions and violence is often a blurry one, as seen in their application to Iraq and Serbia. More frequently, these kinds of competitive, conflict-prone situations are described in terms of states going to war over scarce resources, such as petroleum (Klare, 2001). More extreme versions of realism derive from older geopolitical the- ories about the security implications of strategic raw materials (Spykman, 1942; Lipschutz, 1989). Minerals are unevenly distributed around the world, and not necessarily to be found within the borders of the states most in want of them. Therefore, it might become necessary for a state to take by force what it can not acquire by market or guile. The “have” state pos- sessing the strategic material can, for any number of reasons, refuse to supply it to the “have-not” state needing, but not possessing, the substance. The “have-not” state can then claim that the material in question is essential to national security and that the maintenance of sovereignty justi- fies an attack on the “have” state. This is one common interpretation for the origins of the War in the Pacific between Japan and the United States (Marshall, 1995) as well as the 1991 Gulf War. The same kind of logic has been applied to other resources. For example:
Fresh water is a fundamental resource, integral to all ecological and societal activities, including food and energy production, transportation, waste disposal, industrial development, and human health. Yet fresh water resources are unevenly and irregularly distributed, and some regions of the world are extremely water-short. As we approach the twenty-first century, water and water-supply systems are increasingly likely to be both objectives of military action and instruments of war as human populations grow, as improving standards of living increase the demand for fresh water, and as global climatic changes make water supply and demand more problematic and uncertain (Gleick, 1993:79). 39 Chapter 2
Arguments of this sort are widely-made and, some claim, form the basis for both analysis and action by states. After all, if states go to war over oil, why shouldn’t they do the same over water? And if political leaders believe in such ideas, aren’t they likely to initiate war in the event that national water sources appear to be threatened (Starr, 1991; Lowi, 1995; Lipschutz, 1998b)? Water would not be a military objective that one would destroy in order to save, although there have been attempts to use water to destroy those who some did not want to save. Images of terrorists or saboteurs bombing dams (or threatening to do so as a means of extortion) is a compelling one, but such incidents are as likely to arise from internal political instability and conflict as the malign intentions of state leaderships bent on revenge against neighbors. Water may figure into the strategic calculations of generals and prime ministers, as some writers have suggested, but war is an awfully blunt instrument with which to accomplish objectives having to do with control of this particular resource (Beaumont, 1997; Lonergan, 1997). What about renewable resources, such as forests? Here, the scarcity involved is of a somewhat different character, involving the erosion of physical, biological or life support systems, but a similar logic could be applied. By permitting its destruction, a state whose territory encompassed a tropical rain forest might be contributing to conditions that would negatively affect other states (through global warming or flooding). The affected states could argue that they were within their sovereign rights to prevent further destruction of the rain forest, including a right to intervene physically to prevent further damage.1 A more probable competitive scenario, and one that has probably been played out by war gamers in the Pentagon and elsewhere, is the destabili- zation of a country as a result of environmental degradation and scarcity within it (Homer-Dixon & Blitt, 1998). It is fairly easy to imagine the inhabitants of a small, poor country ruining the soil to such an extent as to make subsistence farming extremely difficult, if not impossible. This, in turn, could lead to famine, social instability, the fall of the government and internal chaos. This is a version of Malthusianism, which links population to resource scarcity. Thomas Malthus (1798/1998), an 18th century English cleric and contemporary of Adam Smith, was concerned about the number of
1 The Bush Administration has pronounced its “right” to intervene with force in cases where governments are abusing the human rights of their citizens. Why not, then, a simi- lar right with respect to the abuse of nature? Deconstructing Global Environment 40 destitute people he saw in the cities and towns of his time. He believed that the poor had many children, and were so numerous, because English law provided for a certain amount of subsistence to them. Malthus argued that, inevitably, population growth would outstrip food production, exposing both rich and poor to starvation. There would then follow violent struggle over remaining supplies and the inevitable destruction of English society. Malthus’s solution was to let the poor starve. He believed that only hunger would discipline them into having fewer children. While Malthus’s analysis is flawed in a number of ways (Ross, 1998), Malthusianism nonetheless remains a staple of environmental philosophy, a form of realism applied to the individual level (Hardin, 1974). If there were fewer people in those countries with many poor, goes the argument, struggles over food and resources would not occur. As there are too many people in such places, war and death are inevitable. Competitive philosophies seek to explain human and state behavior as arising from an almost genetic propensity for struggle. Because goods are scarce, there are never enough of anything to satisfy everyone. What is possessed by one will be jealously sought by another. In the state of nature, without government, the result is competition, struggle, and conflict. Within the regulated conditions of the market, the result is competition and accumulation. Ontologically, both philosophies regard humans and states as selfish and only minimally inclined to cooperate, unless forced to do so. More to the point, viewing global environmental politics through the lens of competition results in a very narrow view of both means and ends. Everything comes to have a price, and anything whose price does not generate market activity is not worth owning or saving. Those who have the wherewithal to set prices in markets for environmental goods or bads, through either supply or demand, can simply decide the game is not worth the candle, and the benefits are not worth the costs. In that case, those without will suffer. We will return to markets and the environment in chapter 3.
Cooperation
Neo-liberal institutionalism
From a realist perspective, interstate cooperation appears to be infrequent and from the microeconomic perspective, it is difficult to explain such “collective action” as does occur (see below). Given this somewhat pessimistic outlook, then, it comes as something of a surprise to see how much interstate cooperation actually takes place. Bilateral, multilateral, 41 Chapter 2 and international agreements are quite common—by some counts, in the ten thousands or more—and the number of these having something to do with the environment are by now estimated to number more than one thousand (Porter, Brown and Chasek, 2000:147). The arrangements established to deal with these collective issues—international regimes— are addressed through neo-liberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1989: ch. 1). An important ontological dividing point between competitive and cooperative epistemologies is to be found in the two notions of “self- interest” and “public good.” The former assumes the desires and pref- erences of the individual or state to have primacy; the latter acknowledges that some interests are shared and that some group action is required to provide goods that will not be provided through private or market-based action. In real life, in other words, actors are hardly as antagonistic toward each other as the examples in the preceding section might suggest, and not all interactions take place directly through pure market exchange. States, corporations, and individuals often share common interests and similar desires, and are willing to collaborate on solving joint problems. At times, actors will even accept personal losses if their values place a public good above self-interest. But why is such cooperation thought to be problematic? The collective action problem is deemed to be the reason (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1981). This “problem” is based on the ontological assumption that actors are capable of reason and motivated primarily by self-interest. For a group project to be successful, each participant must have an individual stake in the outcome, and each must be prepared to contribute part of the cost—in time, money, or whatever—toward the project’s completion. Yet, in large groups, each individual’s contribution to the whole is likely to be small, and the absence of one contribution will not generally affect the outcome (this is less the case with small groups, in which reputation and trust play a major role). Because each participant recognizes this “fact,” each will be inclined to either “free ride” and get the benefit of the project without paying anything, or “defect” and not be bound to the project at all. Therefore, continues the argument, collective action is difficult to explain because self-interested individuals ought to be loathe to cooperate on anything. In the international realm, moreover, there is no authority to compel states to contribute to the costs of a joint project. Any such action that does succeed must do so because one or a few parties are willing to pay the costs of group action (Olson, 1965). Deconstructing Global Environment 42 How, then do we account for all of the cooperation observed in real life? Cooperation arises from the combination of two, somewhat con- trasting incentives. Exchange through markets can result in clear economic benefits for each of the parties involved (and costs, as well). But the parties can also act on the basis of a conception of the public good, drawing on ethical principles and broadly-held values. An agreement to act jointly through markets may thus draw on both competition and cooperation. Again, the example of global warming provides a useful illustration of this point. On the one hand, it is generally argued that interstate cooperation is required to control and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Such cooperation is most likely to take place through international regimes. While the long- term distribution of the costs of global warming remain uncertain, they are likely to be quite uneven. Hence, there is potential benefit from sharing the costs of control. But each participant could also suffer losses. Yet, there is a general consensus among most of the world’s countries that, whatever the costs or balance of interests, collective action is necessary for the common good. On the other hand, there is considerable reluctance on the part of some countries to impose present costs on their economies so as to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases with benefits only to be realized in the distant future. The second Bush Administration, for example, believes the actions required by the Kyoto Protocol are likely to affect America’s global economic competitiveness. Thus, although the United States has signed and ratified the Framework Convention on Climate Change—a manifestly cooperative step—it has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In this instance, Washington’s competitive impulses have trumped its com- mitments to neo-liberal institutionalism. Cooperation, however it is conceived, is not devoid of power conside- rations. In any joint project, some participants are likely to be wealthier or more powerful than others, and this can affect both process and outcomes. It will be difficult for the Kyoto Protocol to be implemented without the participation of the United States, simply because it is the largest economy in the world. At the same time, however, the determination of the rest of the world to act in spite of the United States may well lead to the passage of the Protocol into international law. Power is manifest in other, more subtle forms, as well. As we have already seen, the entire discourse of climate change is premised around the privatization of the right to pollute, an action that effectively turns the atmosphere into private property. Left off the climate agenda are alterna- tive approaches, among which is one that would treat the atmosphere as a 43 Chapter 2
“global common property resource” (sometimes called the “common heritage of mankind”) governed under rules severely limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
Ecoanarchism
Philosophies of cooperation do not begin and end with neo-liberalism. Ecoanarchism and social naturalism are also based on cooperation, but among individuals in small communities. Both philosophies are concerned about relationships within society, and between humans and nature. Both are also opposed to power exercised through the state and through unregulated markets. But these two philosophies lead to rather different conclusions about how to deal with global environmental problems and politics. Ecoanarchism is a form of leftist anarchism often associated with Murray Bookchin (1991). He calls his approach “social ecology,” but in this book we use that term with a somewhat different philosophy in mind. Ecoanarchism is attentive to society as rooted in ecological praxis (practice). It is humanistic and leftist, and rejects much of the idealism and romanticism found in anarchist theorizing. Its proponents tend to view nature in its present form as a product of human action and transformation. Ecoanarchists believe that both the state and “big” capital are inimi- cal to the autonomy of humans and nature. The preservation of nature therefore depends on the reorganization of society into small, relatively self-sufficient units. In an anarchist society, therefore, politics is to take place through these self-governing, egalitarian, voluntary communes. There is no central government—at most, a kind of confederal system. Altruism and mutual aid are practices of central importance. Left anarchism, which includes most ecoanarchists, thereby stands in a curious relationship to realism, inasmuch as both hold certain forms of political community to be central. Right anarchism, or libertarianism, is closer to liberalism, in that both are centered on the individual. Finally, despite their shared cooperative elements, ecoanarchism is, in many ways, the diametric opposite of social naturalism (see below). Bookchin argues that contemporary environmental problems are rooted in an irrational, anti-ecological society, and that piecemeal reforms cannot address them. These problems originate in a hierarchical, class-ridden, competitive capitalist system that nourishes a view of the natural world as a mere agglomeration of "resources" for human produc- tion and consumption in which man is bound to dominate nature. Deconstructing Global Environment 44 Class is tied to ownership of the means of production under capi- talism (property, in this case), while hierarchy, which is much more sub- tle and elusive, is nonetheless pervasive. As a result, capitalism is not an economy in some traditional sense but constitutes a “society” (Polanyi, 2001). Both people and nature are commodified, and hierarchy helps to naturalize and maintain the system. Bookchin has no truck with spiritualistic ecologies or organic ver- sions of deep ecology, and regards both as mystical, misanthropic, and quasi-religious biocentrism. He attacks them at every opportunity as anti- materialistic, atavistic, and completely unrealistic (although in recent years, he has reconciled with a few deep ecologists). Instead, Bookchin argues for a rational, technically-based culture, refined, but not determined, by spiritual and intellectual insights, one that is more sensitive to and concerned with non-human nature. As he puts it,
Nature...is a cumulative evolutionary process from the inanimate to the animate and ultimately the social, however differentiated this process may be…. Both nonhuman nature and human nature are the product of natural evolution as a whole—not of a Supernature.… Neither religion nor a spiritualistic vision of experience has any place in an ecological lexicon…. Society is the exclusive province of humans, for what distin- guishes a human society from an animal community is the existence of social institutions (1991: xx-xxii).
For Bookchin, the only environmentally-viable future lies in careful hu- man intervention into nature, in which a localized politics (“libertarian mu- nicipalism”) is combined with science-based understanding and all efforts to avoid domination of both people and nature. Concludes Bookchin
The private ownership of the planet by elite strata must be brought to an end if we are to survive the afflictions it has imposed on the biotic world, particularly as a result of a society structured around limitless growth. Free nature...can only begin to emerge when we live in a fully participatory society literally free of privilege and domination. Only then will we be able to rid ourselves of the idea of dominating nature and fulfill our promise for acting as a moral, rational, and creative force in natural as well as social evolution (1991: lv).
For some, Bookchin’s ecoanarchism is too humanistic and political. Its links to both Enlightenment rationality and socialism are clearly evident in his prioritizing of both science-based understanding and the struggle to achieve human freedom through what appears to be a form of class 45 Chapter 2 struggle. And, while Bookchin is very conscious of the role of power in fostering domination, his ecoanarchism seems to treat power as something that will, like Marx’s fabled state, wither away in the fullness of time. This seems unlikely.
Social naturalism
In contrast to ecoanarchism, social naturalism views culture and nature as bound together in a kind of social community in which cooperation among humans, and between humans and nature, should be organic and harmonious. This philosophy is rooted in 19th century romantic and organic views, and its proponents adopt Prince Kropotkin’s notion of mutual aid and cooperation between species as the basis for community. According to John Clark (1998), who also uses the term “social ecology” to describe this philosophy, social naturalism seeks to relate all phenomena to the larger direction of evolution and emergence in the universe as a whole. It also examines the course of planetary evolution as a movement toward increasing complexity and diversity and the pro- gressive emergence of value. Social naturalism interprets planetary evo- lution and the realization of social and ecological possibilities as a holistic process, rather than merely as a mechanism of adaptation. This evolution can only be understood adequately, argues Clark, by examining the interaction and mutual determination between species and species; between species and ecosystems; among species, ecosystem, and the earth as a whole; and by studying particular communities and ecosystems as complex and developing wholes. Such an examination, writes Clark, reveals that the progressive unfolding of the potentiality for freedom depends on the existence of symbiotic cooperation among beings at all levels. The goal of social naturalism is, therefore, the cooperative ecological society found to be rooted in the most basic levels of being. Clark uses the concept of “community” here in a very expansive sense, to include not only people, but also animals, plants, ideas, language, history, ecosystems and other elements of the world. In this respect, social naturalism strongly resembles the worldviews and beliefs of indigenous groups, such as the Navaho (briefly summarized in chapter 1). More problematically, however, advocates of social naturalism also believe that human practices and institutions must be depoliticized. Clark argues that legislative assemblies Deconstructing Global Environment 46
must be purged of the competitive, agonistic, masculinist aspects that have often corrupted them…. [T]hey can fulfill their democratic promise only if they are an integral expression of a cooperative com- munity that embodies in its institutions the love of humanity and nature (1998:XX).
In Clark’s view, capitalism could still comprise the economic base of such a community: “The dogmatic assertion that in an ecological society only one form of economic organization can exist...is incompatible with the affirmation of historical openness and social creativity and imagin- ation that is basic to a social ecology [sic].” Clark’s vision is, therefore, one of pre-lapsarian Edenic harmony and, in this respect, is strongly linked to more romantic versions of deep ecology (1998:XX). The roots of social naturalism are also found in the work of G.W.F. Hegel and his claims for the organic nature and teleological destiny of the nation-state (1837/1956). Hegel believed that the state represented the highest and best form of human social and political organization, and that human potential could only be realized through the state. For Clark, the “natural” community replaces the “natural” state, and biological potential replaces human potential. All else is the same. We might doubt, however, that Clark’s teleology is any more likely to come to fruition than has Hegel’s. The synthesis of the two can be found in bioregionalism, which posits the “natural” political community to be found in ecological units, such as the watershed. Inside that unit, a high degree of self-sufficiency, within limits imposed by nature, is re- quired (Lipschutz, 1998a). Presumably, one is also organically rooted in and restricted to one’s bioregion. While the inhabitants of bioregions might share normative perspectives on preservation of nature, will each staying within her or his own natural borders breed harmony or distrust?
Development
A third ontological approach to global environment rests on development. The three philosophies discussed in this section are all derived from the cooperative aspects of classical economic liberalism. Sustainable growth posits a constantly expanding world economy as the savior of the global environment. Sustainable development requires major modifications in modes of production and consumption, although it can hardly be said to eschew capitalism as the means through which environment and development can be reconciled. Finally, ecomarxism must emerge out of 47 Chapter 2 capitalism. Therefore, environmentally-protective production of goods is central. All three depend on political intervention in the growth process, in order to direct resources toward the environment. Philosophies of development are organized around the idea that econo- mic and social improvements in the condition of everyday life will result in greater public concern for and attention to the environment. To put the argument another way, if people are sufficiently well-off, they will be less exploitative of nature and more willing to pay to protect it. They will also be happier and less likely to commit violence against each other or against nature. Again, there are certain assumptions about human nature and production and reproduction embedded in developmental philosophies, and a certain dismissal of power. Whether these assumptions stand up under inspection is not entirely clear, although the frequent failure of developmental projects and practices suggests that they do not (Sen, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002).
The roots of sustainability
Historically, the most common form of production and reproduction was subsistence. People and societies produced what they needed to survive and reproduce, and there was little, if anything, left for exchange (there was, of course, barter between groups, but not for the purposes of profit). The primary inputs into the subsistence mode were earth, water, air, seeds, and labor, and it was a mode that was, for the most part, a closed cycle. Inputs of materials and human and natural energy roughly equaled outputs in food energy, non-edible products, and waste, with the last being returned to the soil. A subsistence mode is, absent a constant increase in inputs, a steady- state system (with some seasonal and annual variation). Presumably, sub- sistence can be maintained over the long term, so long as there are no disasters or inappropriate uses of nature.2 At some point in human history, social organization became more so- phisticated, and divisions of labor began to develop within societies. This began to happen some 7,000 to 10,000 years ago, when the great Middle and Far Eastern civilizations emerged and agriculture became widespread. Food surpluses beyond the subsistence needs of farmers were produced,
2 In truth, there have been few subsistence modes that were closed or steady-state over the longer term. Transactions across societal boundaries were common, and sometimes subsistence-based communities unintentionally destroyed the eco- systems on which they were dependent. Deconstructing Global Environment 48 and food and other goods could be transported from places of production to the places of consumption, such as cities. The rulers of these first cities were able to extract food from surround- ing villages and, eventually, to establish large-scale irrigation systems that expanded agricultural productivity far beyond what had been previously feasible. Once a large food surplus was possible, long-distance trade in valuable commodities began to develop, too. While these arrangements had local and regional environmental impacts, which might have led to the col- lapse of these societies, large-scale effects were limited. In global terms, human civilizations remained in the steady-state (see, e.g., Goudie, 2000: ch. 1). Not until the 17th and 18th centuries, when a second major social transi- tion to industrialism began in Europe, was the steady-state breached. Industrialism, combined with capitalism, was based on fossil fuels and long-distance transport of raw materials, commodities and finished goods. The ability to easily and cheaply move inputs and outputs (and labor) around the world meant that some societies were no longer reliant on local resources for production and survival. It also meant that resources could be turned into capital, and profits could be extracted systematically from the combination of labor, technology, and materials. Such accumulation provided the financial basis for further industrialization, and what came to be called modernization and development (Black, 1991). The critical point in this sequence is that, for all practical purposes, the initial conversion of nature into capital focused primarily on those resources that could be exploited for the cost of extraction alone (mostly through labor). Thousand year-old trees, which were essentially free for the taking—land being cheap and royalties minimal—could be turned into lumber by those who could organize the skills, tools, and transportation ne- cessary to produce and market the product. That lumber was sold at considerable profit, which was then used to pay for further extraction and conversion. In this scheme of things, the environment had no value, either monetary or normative—one cut down and moved on, as necessary—and there were no incentives to limit exploitation of or damage to nature. In the longer run, the initial economic “kick” derived from the conversion of low-cost resources was, in combination with the factory system, turned into a self-reproducing system. Fewer and fewer people were tied directly to the land and more and more were tied into the market. Most had only their labor to sell, owning nothing else of value (Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (2001) is extremely eloquent on this point.) 49 Chapter 2
But capitalist expansion—for this is what we are speaking of—depends on continuous growth and profit, and this requires more resources, expand- ing markets, and new technologies and products. During the 19th century, the profit incentive motivated a further search for those factors unavailable or very costly in home countries. The result was imperialism, as the more powerful European countries moved overseas to occupy territories that became colonies, and to integrate then into their home economies. Capital was accumulated from colonial territories by the industrialized countries (ICs) largely in the form of resources, and it was only returned when there was an opportunity to extract additional capital through investment in infrastructure, plantations or factories. Most of the people in what are today called “developing countries” (DCs) were only weakly- linked into the IC’s imperial market systems, possessing neither the cash nor the skills to become full-fledged participants in them. These individuals found themselves relying for their subsistence on those increasingly-mar- ginal resources that had not been appropriated and converted into private or state property (Guha, 2000). And it is this marginalization that has, and continues, to be the basis for the poverty that afflicts so many billions around the world. If we examine the ICs today, we find very few people engaged in subsistence production and most people deeply engaged with markets. We also find high levels of environmental protection, low rates of population growth and, where technically feasible and economically rational, substitution of capital for natural resources in the form of new materials and technology. To reduce pressure on the environment in LDCs, then, it would appear that we need to make the developing world richer, as quickly as possible. This is the basic argument in favor of development.
Defining development
In its simplest form, development has to do with growth in incomes, in the widely-held utilitarian view that the well-off are most able not only to acquire basic needs but also to fulfill their preferences. Not only does this make people happy, as noted earlier, it also contributes to social stability. Not by coincidence, growth in incomes ties people into markets and networks of exchange through which the true price of the environment can be established and nature can be protected (see chapter 3). And those who are well-off, it is argued, are more willing to pay to protect nature. The poor are very dependent for their survival on access to the natural resources around them, and they are in no position to use them carefully, or Deconstructing Global Environment 50 so it is sometimes argued (WCED, 1987). Even though the poor indi- vidually consume very small quantities of nature’s goods, their aggregate demand is so great that the total far exceeds supply. The result is damage to forests, soil, water, and species. If the poor could acquire the funds to participate in markets, continues the argument, they could purchase their basic needs from places where environmental impacts are more subject to control. For example, house- holds dependent on local wood or charcoal could instead purchase kerosene and burn it in more energy-efficient stoves (Foley and Moss, 1985; Maniates, 1990). Pressure on local wood resources would diminish, and so would pollutants from fires. Everyone would benefit. Not coincidentally, such changes in resource use would also offer new market opportunities to producers and suppliers. At the same time, changing preferences and purchases have their own impacts on the environment. Growing consumption of imported goods is likely to mean growing volumes of non-recyclable and non-biodegradable wastes as well as the relocation of environmental damage from one country to another. There are alternative conceptions of development, that depend more on improvements in the quality of life: nutrition, access to clean water, ade- quate health care, education, rights for women, and other, similar goods, but there has been only limited success in achieving development without growth (Sen, 1999; Franke and Chasin, 1994). Such improvements require either greater commitment to social services by governments or wealthier people able to purchase those services from private providers. These days, there is only limited support for the direct state provision of such services. Whatever development might be, the market cannot generate on its own either growth or sustainability. What is required is some degree of regulation of markets and social policy and, for this to be society- or world- wide, governments and other political actors must become involved. It might be that such intervention is limited only to the setting of conditions under which growth can be encouraged—through, for example, foreign investment. Or, intervention can be as extensive as state management of specific projects and policies, as we would expect to find under ecomarxism. Such centralized control tends, these days, to be frowned on, for reasons having to do with both ideology and efficiency.
Sustainable growth
Development requires economic growth, according to the advocates of sustainable growth, so that poor countries will become richer than they are 51 Chapter 2 now. Then, the poor will be able to buy goods in markets and reduce their impacts on nature. But how are they to acquire the funds to purchase these goods in the market? Aye, there’s the rub! In order to import, it is necessary to export, and the more, the better. And what to export? The answer rests on what is produced most cheaply. The global economy is characterized by an international division of labor, in which countries, based on their comparative advantage, specialize in the production of raw materials, goods, technology, and information. These are then exported to other countries, which earns the foreign currency that can, in turn, be used to purchase goods from abroad. Ideally, the added value from such export and trade accrues to the producer of the goods, who uses the funds to finance further production to the benefit of the country in which the activity takes place. People then become wealthier, according to this calculus, rely less on local resources and, eventually, become more concerned about quality of life issues, such as environmental protection. When people have moved beyond subsistence levels, it is claimed, they pay more attention to their surroundings and are more able to pay the costs of clean air and water (Bailey, 1993; we return to this argument in chapter 3). Whether or not these results follow from economic growth is an empir- ical question—and a rather controversial one (Ekins, 1997; Harbaugh, Levinson & Wilson, 2000). In any event, emphasis on economic growth and the market has become the conventional orthodoxy regarding the envi- ronment-development dilemma (Bernstein, 2001). As Barber Conable, then-president of the World Bank put it at the beginning of the 1990s: “If I were to characterize the past decade, the most remarkable thing was the generation of a global consensus that market forces and economic efficiency were the best way to achieve the kind of growth which is the best antidote to poverty” (quoted in Broad, Cavanaugh and Bello, 1990:144). More than a decade later, Conable’s optimism seems less warranted, for a number of reasons. First, notwithstanding the arrival of the World Trade Organization and the commitment to free trade it is thought to imply, rich countries have been notably reluctant to open their markets to those developing country goods—mostly agricultural products—that would most help the latter toward greater economic growth. Second, and linked to the first point, even a decade of relatively high economic growth during the 1990s did not lead to the commitment of large amounts of new resources to protecting the environment nor major reductions in poverty. While the overall global level of poverty appears to have been reduced, as a result of growth in China and India (Dollar and Kraay, 2002; but see also Galbraith, 2002), there also are more than one Deconstructing Global Environment 52 billion people living below the UN’s poverty line (one dollar a day of income; an estimated three billion live on less than two dollars a day), a number higher than ever before (Chen and Ravallion, 2000). Third, even though the wealthier countries are cleaner than they used to be, industrialization is not a clean process. The novels of Charles Dickens provide ample illustration of the dismal state of the English environment during the Industrial Revolution of the 19th century, and many of these conditions existed in parts of Eastern Europe and Russia well into the 1990s. They are being reproduced today in many developing countries. The notion of “ecological modernization,” which seeks to avoid creat- ing pollutants, is an increasingly popular one (Mol, 2001). Clean industry looks, however, to be a “positional good,” one demanded only when consumers in the host country are sufficiently well-off to have met their other needs. Countries might have to get much dirtier before they can get cleaner (Bailey, 1993). But this argument ignores the fact that health and welfare are closely tied to a clean environment, as the governments of the emerging welfare states of the 19th century well knew when they put public health systems into place. Fourth, it is often assumed that developing countries will be able to skip, or leapfrog, over the “dirtier” phases of industrialization, acquiring clean, environmentally-friendly technologies either directly or via foreign investment. Taiwan, which has undergone successful capitalist indus- trialization and modernization, is now considered among the most-polluted countries in the world. The regions around Bangkok, Thailand and the rapidly growing coastal provinces of China are not very clean, either. (To be entirely fair, Taiwan has embarked on an ambitious effort to clean up its environment, but this is not proving to be an easy task.) Moreover, it is not evident that those who hold the patents and property rights to advanced “clean” technologies will be that ready to provide it to those who want it, without sizeable royalties. In any case, such technologies are sure to be costly, and there may be more to be gained by relying on dir- tier industrial systems, if this is a draw to foreign investors who want to reduce their production costs. Fifth, it is generally believed that the accumulation of wealth through industrialization and markets will benefit all the people of a country, as the neo-classical economist’s dictum tells us “A rising tide lifts all ships” (this might not hold true, however, for those boats with holes in their hulls). While some money will trickle down, as factory workers spend their wages in the local economy, those at the bottom of the feeding chain will, in all likelihood, still remain too poor to move out of the slums or to invest in cleaning up their surroundings. 53 Chapter 2
To be sure, as in the Horatio Alger story, there will be a few individuals who do become wealthy, and these will be pointed to as evidence of the benefits of capitalism. Most, however, will remain relatively poor. Added to this is the fact that industrialization and agricultural modernization tend to drive people off the land and into the cities (Chai and Chai, 1997)—quite deliberately, it might be added—there adding to the reserve army of low- cost labor that is so attractive to foreign investment. Again, national economic growth is not an entirely hopeless proposition, as shown by various countries in Asia prior to and since 1997, but the same degree of growth has proven difficult to duplicate in other parts of the world. Sixth, most of the countries of the world possess small domestic markets, in which consumers tend not to have a great deal of free cash or savings (liquidity). Thus, successful development usually depends on access to large, open markets elsewhere, into which commodities and manufactures can be exported. To no small degree, growth in China’s economy has been dependent on relatively easy access to the American market. But, there remain major restrictions on imports of agricultural commodities into industrialized countries, and many LDCs cannot take advantage of their comparative advantages in foods and commodities (Oxfam, 2002). Heavy dependence on rich countries for growth carries other risks, too. During the post-World War II period, recession in the United States always meant a drop in demand, a slowdown in growth, and domestic economic difficulties in much of the world. Little has changed. In Asia, this problem has diminished somewhat as domestic markets grow, but in Africa and Eastern Europe, where producers hope to export into the European Union, the problem of domestic liquidity and demand remains a serious obstacle to sustained growth. Have globalization and the “Information Revolution” made a dif- ference? Some pundits argue that an educated workforce can enable coun- tries to tap into new global commodity chains and systems knowledge pro- duction (Friedman, 1999). By providing less-costly information services to IC consumers—in the form of software, data processing, customer service centers—the benefits of development can be obtained without the environmental costs of polluting industries. Again, some regions in the LDCs, such as that around Bangalore, India, have begun to specialize in information services and export, and India has become a major player in computer programming education and software development. But most of this is oriented toward export markets, and some 800 million Indians remain largely outside of the wonders of cyberspace. While the substantial middle class of 200 million is increasingly concerned Deconstructing Global Environment 54 about both environment and development, in a country as poor as India, they are simply too few to provide the tax revenues required for environmental protection. Finally, it is not only poverty that is the problem, but also wealth. Rising rates of production and consumption in both rich and poor countries have led to growing quantities of all kinds of wastes (this is a particular problem in the European Union and the United States; see, e.g., O’Neill, 2000). This phenomenon is visible, for example, in the life-cycle of personal computers. PCs are usually assembled in poor countries, shipped to rich ones where they are used for several years, and then shipped back to poor countries for extraction of the valuable metals found in electronic circuits. At both the production and recycling ends, a variety of toxic materials finds its way into the environment and bloodstreams of the poor (Puckett, et al., 2002). And the rich have no idea where their computers are manufactured or where they go when they die. The same can be said of cars, CD players, microwave ovens, and all of the other paraphernalia of 21st century life. In summary, while sustainable growth does foster development under some conditions, the empirical evidence suggests that it is hardly a panacea for poverty. Those who are able to take advantage of opportunities in the market may succeed, although there is no guarantee of this. Those who begin with little or nothing usually find that they end up with little or nothing. If global environmental protection depends on the poor countries of world becoming much richer than they are today, the prospects for nature are none too promising.
Sustainable Development
The dilemma of growing quantities of waste, as well as the damage resulting from development in both rich and poor countries was already of considerable concern during the 1980s (Bernstein, 2001). The solution to the shortcomings discussed above was a new and more environmentally- friendly form of growth, called “sustainable development.” The origins of the concept are to be found in the 1970s, but the term first appeared in official use in 1980. It only achieved full international recognition in 1987, with the publication of Our Common Future, the report prepared by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED; also known as the Brundtland Commission). The Commission was first convened in 1983, under the auspices of the United Nations, and ordered to conduct an inquiry into the condition and prospects of the global environment and the possibilities and constraints of 55 Chapter 2 economic development. The Commission conducted hearings in a number of rich and poor countries (but not the United States, to which it was not invited). The task was an enormous one, and in the finished product were to be found many interesting observations and proposals and not a few intractable contradictions. Such results are not surprising in a report written by a committee. The fundamental charge to the WCED was to determine whether development and environmental protection involved compatible values and goals, and how the two could be reconciled. The conflict between the two objectives had been central to the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, and had remained a point of North-South disagree- ment ever since. If development rested on growth in production and con- sumption, how could the environment be preserved? Many developing country governments argued that growth must come first, and the environment could be protected later. Northern governments, under some public pressure, thought that the environment must have precedence, and that poverty could best be addressed through family planning and fewer people. According to Our Common Future, however, there was no inherent contradiction between environment and development:
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable—to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits—not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organizations on environmental resources, and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities (1987:8).
The WCED argued that the “needs” of the world’s poor required priority in any effort to devise and implement sustainable development. But to achieve this objective, wrote the Commission, growth was essential. By the end of the 21st century, a five to ten-fold increase in the size of the world’s economy would be necessary to eliminate poverty and preserve the global environment. And only by increasing Northern demand for Southern goods, reasoned the WCED, would there follow a sufficient transfer of wealth from North to South to enable the latter to deal with the problem of poverty and environmental damage. The assumption that such economic expansion could occur without ser- ious damage to nature is an heroic one. This “solution” depends on a transi- tion to post-industrial, service and information-based economies every- where, a doubtful proposition. For the Brundtland Commission, sustainable Deconstructing Global Environment 56 development is clearly sustained economic growth, and this does not seem a likely answer to global environmental damage to many who have given thought to the issue. What the concept of sustainable development does do, however, is to provide a platform from which to speak. Insofar as it suggests some sort of international regime or arrangement based on a new global distribution of resources and technology, the concept of sustainability points to some redistribution of wealth from rich to poor (however distasteful this might be to some). In other words, if developing countries are to embark on this new path of environmental friendliness and economic promise, they are going to require considerable assistance and capital from the developed ones. Much of this help will have to be provided either at no cost or under extremely favorable terms, and will have to include access to state-of-the-art design, technology and manufacturing. Such a prospect is not viewed with great favor by those corporations who would like to maximize the rents from their intellectual property rights or by the ICs, who would have to hand over large sums of public revenues that are always in short supply. There is such a transfer mechanism to be found in the Kyoto Protocol, the so-called “Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM). The CDM does not quite involve wholesale technology transfers with no strings attached, but it goes some way toward this end through the proposed financing of environmentally-friendly projects in LDCs through foreign investment by ICs and corporations. The expectation is that investors will find many attractive opportunities to deploy lower-emission systems and it is hoped, although not yet certain, that the financiers of such projects will split the resulting greenhouse gas emission credits with the host country govern- ment. But all of this is still in the future. None of this really defines “sustainable development” (Redclift, 1987; Reid, 1995). Is it, as the Brundtland Commission proposed and others hope, environmentally-friendly economic growth? Does it require a reduction in consumption in richer countries and an increase in consumption in the poorer ones? Does it mean a steady-state economy where growth, as we know it, is tightly controlled or completely abolished? No one, so far, has been able to answer the question inasmuch as no one has actually been able to resolve the conceptual and political contradictions (Sachs, 1992). The result is that, for the most part, sustainable development is a mantra; a phrase that bears repeating because it has a calming effect. It seems to imply that, given our ingenuity, we will find a way out of what appears to be an almost intractable dilemma. And, we can do so on a global scale. 57 Chapter 2
The steady-state economy
An alternative formulation to sustainable development can be found in Her- man Daly’s conceptualization of the steady state economy (1991). Daly argues that the fundamental error in our developmental philosophy is that we rank flows of materials and money more highly than accumulations, or stocks. That is, we place more value on the number of automobiles that are manufactured, bought, and discarded each year than on their longevity. The latter is a function of how long a car would operate if it were made and maintained to last, and not intended for rapid obsolescence. Clearly, in an economic system such as ours, based on flows but faced by limited consumer desire, it is necessary to find a way to increase the rate at which goods are bought and sold. Advertising and peer pressure are helpful in this regard. Thirty years ago, it was common for middle-class American families to buy a new car every three years. Today, the cycle has lengthened to something on the order of five to ten years, but the admonition to acquire a new car beckons from the newspapers every day and the TV every night. Cars can be built to last a long time, but styles are constantly changing (or being changed). Consumers are urged to base their self-image on driving and being seen in the latest model. Such commercial appeals seem to have effect: witness the impact of SUVs on the U.S. automotive market. (Witness also the problem of disposing of all those cars.) A steady-state economy, by contrast, would be oriented toward durability rather than consumer taste or commercial indoctrination. It would remain a capitalist economy but one motivated by ends different than the relentless search for profits. For example, if people drove the contemporary equivalent of a 1968 Volvo Sedan or 1970 Volkswagen Beetle, this would clearly affect the basic structure of an economy heavily dependent on the automobile. The flow of resources going into cars would be reduced (a goal that could also be accomplished, albeit less effectively, through closed- cycle recycling, as is being tried in Europe; see chapter 5) as would the emissions and wastes coming out of them. But this would also mean that many fewer cars would be manufactured each year, the actual number being a function of the extended lifespan of the vehicle. Many fewer people would be employed as auto workers than is even now the case. The demand for auto parts would be reduced. Fewer dealerships would be needed. The economy might grow more slowly. People would have less money with which to buy a new car, which would probably be more costly, but they would need to buy a new car less often. Deconstructing Global Environment 58 Even under these circumstances, there would still be major environ- mental consequences. Long-lived products would mean less-frequent innovation, and less energy-efficient items would remain in service and continue to pollute. Even were everyone to purchase long-lived, low-emis- sion hybrid or electric automobile, the environmental costs could still be severe if enough new cars took to the road. To avoid such results, the cost of owning and operating a vehicle, through high licensing, fuel taxes, and road use fees would need to be made unattractive by comparison with the cost and ease of using mass transit. None of this is impossible—it is done, to some degree, in Western Europe —it is simply politically unimaginable in those contemporary societies so dependent on the automobile. And what might a steady-state world look like? What would constitute the economic units? In a book co-authored with John Cobb, Jr., Daly proposed that the proper unit of “development” in his steady-state world would be the nation-state (Daly and Cobb, 1989: 76, ch. 11). This prescription is a sort of New Age, eco-friendly, realism—bioregionalism extended to the nation-state (McGinnis, 1999). Each country, according to Daly, ought to be prepared to live within the limits of its own natural endowments. Daly provides no real explanation for why the state, which is certainly among the most unnatural of humanity’s social institutions, should be the basis for an attempt to implement a sustainable economy. But he seems to believe that this would eliminate conflict over resources and therefore contribute to world peace. His conclusion is questionable; after all, the nationalization of the steady-state would do nothing to reduce disparities between well- and poorly-endowed countries.
A radical solution? Ecomarxism
However it is conceived, what sustainable development will not do is to change basic social relations and class structures inherent in a global capitalist economy: the rich will remain rich; the poor, it is to be hoped, will become somewhat richer, but certainly not so much as to pose an effective challenge to the rich. According to neo-marxist analyses, capitalism requires such economic inequality, and cannot survive without it. Societies are composed of contending classes—capitalist, worker, bourgeoisie—who struggle for the opportunity to organize modes and relations of production in their particular interest. This is the engine of capitalism (Mann, 1993: ch. 2) Classical Marxism viewed capitalism as a necessary step on the road to an eventual workers’ revolution, under which the fruits of development and 59 Chapter 2 technology would be equitably available to all. Central to the application of Marxism was growth, albeit not driven by consumer desire but by some conception of the public good. What was largely ignored under “really- existing socialism” was environmental quality. The former was treated as a free input to production, while the latter had no standing at all (Pryde, 1991). The environmental failures of socialist states created a kind of epis- temological gap, filled by what might be called radical redistribution. From this perspective, environmental degradation is caused both by excessive wealth and poverty. The rich—most, but not all of whom are found in the ICs—comprise some 20 percent of the world’s population but consume about 80 percent of its resources, goods and services. But these statistics hardly begin to illustrate the difference: a typical American consumes 80- 100 times as much as a typical South Asian (WRI, 2000-2001: Table ERC.5). The waste stream that results spills across borders. It changes the global environment and affects even those whose poverty is so great that they can barely survive even as they produce hardly any wastes at all (Conca, 2001). Despite the general optimism that growth can address this problem, all of the consumption in the rich countries hardly seems to make a dent in the condition of the poor. The gap in wealth, between countries and within countries, continues to grow, and the existing economic system seems only to exacerbate this difference. The answer to this dilemma is clear and rests largely on two propo- sitions. First, the rich must cut back on consumption in order to reduce their unfair burden on the earth’s resources and environment. Second, the ICs must transfer massive amounts of capital and technology to the LDCs in order to enable the latter to grow economically, to be less dependent on the ICs, and to skip over the stage of reliance on heavily-polluting tech- nologies. There are other elements to this position, but the general sense is that governments must find ways of accomplishing both objectives. Not the least of the problems facing attempts to put such a program in place is the fact that, more and more, capital and technology transfers are in the hands of private corporations rather than public authorities. Such redistribution is, therefore, to be desired but quite improbable.
Against Domination
Inherent in the three ontological categories we have examined so far is a matter largely downplayed in all of them: Power. Not power in the tradi- Deconstructing Global Environment 60 tional military sense, or even as relative wealth, but structural power, that is, the power embedded in social relations and social institutions, in the way they are organized, and in the way they are reproduced. Power in all of its forms normally serves to maintain the status quo or to provide vari- ous forms of advantage to some as opposed to others. Therefore, it tends to increase inequities and injustices at the expense of others, who may have little or no ability to resist. The result is domination. As we shall see, while most people regard power in a negative sense, as a tool of manipulation and self-interest, power can also be regarded in a positive light, as some- thing that makes action possible (Arendt, 1958; Foucault, 1980). As explained in chapter 1, there are at least four conceptions of power. The first is also the most common: the ability and capacity to get people to do something they would not otherwise do. The second conception rests on authority, that is, the right to define which practices are acceptable and which are not. Those with authority have the right to set agendas in meet- ings, to limit discussions in public forums, or to forbid certain behaviors. A third dimension of power is visible in the normalization of practices and beliefs. Thus, the many ways in which men exercise power over wom- en through patriarchy have historically been considered “natural” and have hardly been questioned. Finally, a fourth aspect of power is to be found in Michel Foucault’s notion of liberal self-discipline, in which power serves to constitute both individuals and society. As a way of seeing some of the subtleties of power, consider the auto- mobile. American society is structured in such a way that car ownership becomes essential to daily life and to economic growth. Through “normal” use, the practices of owning and driving a car are variable only with re- spect to model and style; otherwise, for most people there are few, if any, alternatives. Attempts to change such practices, which benefit some inter- ests over others, are not only treated as impossible, because of the embed- dedness of power, but also as a threat to social organization and the domi- nation exercised by some over others. Or, as an advertisement might put it, “without a car, freedom is impossible.” Indeed, the very structure of language and the way in which it is used can be understood as a form of power, albeit one that can be challenged in productive ways. Reflect on the term resource, as I have used it in this chapter. A “resource” is something that is deemed to have value for human beings, in that it can be converted from some initial form into a final prod- uct (De Gregori, 1987). When we speak of “natural resources,” we treat all of nature as either having value or being valueless. The latter will, conse- quently, become invisible, like air, and ignored (unless, of course, air pol- lution begins to threaten our survival). 61 Chapter 2
Through this same discourse of resources, only when something can be turned into a marketable product does it acquire value. Then, it is no- ticed but, by then, the resource can also be appropriated and turned into private property (think of oxygen bars in Los Angeles). Hence, a forest that is used as a common property resource by a specific group is regarded under some legal systems as having no “owner.” Unless it is privatized, the forest has no market value and is therefore regarded as “waste” (chapter 5). Denying the legitimacy of common use thereby makes it vanish and per- mits authority to confiscate what is, after all, essential to the user group. Power and domination, in other words, may be exercised in very subtle ways. A number of environmental philosophies—ecocentrism, ecosocialism, ecofeminism, and environmental governmentality—are organized around the notion of power and domination, and in opposition to it. Generally speaking, these approaches have their origins in Marxist theory, although they arrive, for the most part, at radically different conclusions. All of these philosophies posit relations of inequality between two or more groups of people or beings. They view this inequality not as a simple mat- ter of differences in individual wealth or other attributes, but as structural and normalized. In these philosophies, therefore, the exploitation and degradation of Nature and the environment is understood to occur because those in power legitimate and reproduce their dominant position, and the accompanying social organization, through normalized and naturalized actions and be- liefs. Moreover, these actions and beliefs are broadly accepted as both le- gitimate and necessary to the survival of the social order. Domination can- not be eliminated by reform, political participation, or even redistribution; what is required is wholesale social change. That is a tall order for any po- litical philosophy.
Ecocentrism
Observe what I label ecocentrism, a philosophy often called “deep ecolo- gy” (ecocentrism should not be confused with “biocentrism,” which is a position based in particular moral philosophies). Most deep ecologists es- chew any philosophical relationship to Marxism. Indeed, many lean to- ward forms of Darwinian ecologism or Malthusianism, on the one hand, or some kind of theologically-based spirituality, on the other. Nonetheless, inherent in their beliefs is the need to overcome the “class difference” be- tween humans and nature. Deconstructing Global Environment 62 Without nature, humans could not survive; by exploiting nature, hu- mans may destroy it. A revolution is, therefore, necessary to alter this or- der of things, a revolution that establishes harmony between people and the natural world, in which humans get no more than their fair share. If one were to replace “humans” with “capitalists” and “nature” with “labor” in this schema, it would become evident that deep ecology is not entirely dis- connected from certain Marxist propositions, even though such leftist ten- dencies tend to be strongly disavowed by proponents of deep ecology (Sessions, 2001; see also Fox, 1989). But ecocentrism is also a form of romanticism. It seeks to overturn the domination exercised by humans over nature, even as it searches for tran- scendental sources of authority to legitimate such a change. Often, such authority is found in either science or spirituality. In the former case, ecol- ogy is called upon not only to describe what might happen should human practices remain the same but also as the basis for imposing order on those changes that take place (Keulartz, 1998). In the latter instance, a sort of spiritual essence of Nature plays the same role. In both, what should be done must be done, or humanity will inevitably suffer the consequences. Humanity and nature might suffer from our actions, or they might not, but what we see here is an attempt to institute one form of domination to counter another: domination by an external authority. Moreover, there is a certain deterministic quality to such warnings: sin and die; repent and flourish. The Marxist conception of history has a similar teleological quali- ty to it, as do all Western religions and liberalism, too. All demand certain kinds of prescribed behaviors as the price of salvation, and all prophesy doom should those prescriptions be violated. In other words, ecocentrism proposes replacing human domination by natural domination (whatever that might mean in practice), in order to overturn the existing class system. In this instance, a class coalition be- tween nature and bourgeois humans can overturn what is, in effect, capital- ist domination, replacing it with human-nature harmony in which the full potential of both can be realized.
Ecosocialism
Both ecosocialism and ecofeminism are more explicit about their Marxist roots, although there are versions of the latter that eschew these connec- tions. Essentially, ecosocialists (and eco-marxists) argue that the domina- tion of nature by the capitalist class is parallel to its domination of labor. Both forms of domination emerge out of the material base of society. As 63 Chapter 2
David Pepper puts it, “Material production and the exchange of products constitute the basis of all society” (1993:67). The way in which production is organized—the mode of production— matters because producing things is one way in which human beings inter- act with nature. More to the point, in making things, we change the sub- stance of nature into socially-useful forms, via the forces of production (la- bor), the instruments of production (technology), and the means of produc- tion (raw materials). The relations of production—that is, the social organization through which things are produced—are the most critical part of the mode of pro- duction. These relations include those political and legal arrangements that sustain social organization, particular forms of social consciousness (what Robert Cox calls “historical structures”; 1987:395-96), and specific forms of domination and control. Social change is possible, therefore, only if the material base of society is changed. The implications of this analysis for capitalist societies goes rather against the grain of both cooperative and developmental philosophies. Whereas the proponents of the latter see the existing global political econ- omy as capable of being reformed—although the specifics of such a pro- gram remain somewhat cloudy—ecosocialists regard capitalism as funda- mentally unredeemable. Because capitalists constantly seek cheaper raw materials and externalize waste onto nature, capitalism is an inherently an- ti-ecological and anti-nature system. It encourages greater consumption to maintain profit rates and facilitates the "creative destruction" of old capital and nature. Capitalism alienates humans from their selves, the things they pro- duce, and nature. It commodifies everything (“commodity fetishism”) and drains social meaning from all things. Finally, capitalism creates a “false consciousness” in that things as they are perceived to be is how things must be, now and always. This last process is often called “naturalization.” Treatment of the market as a “natural” institution is an example of this last phenomenon. What is to be done? The ecosocialist program, as the Marxist program, relies heavily on revolutionary action. At the global level, and without a world government, this becomes an awesomely difficult proposition. It is a pretty forbidding one at the national level, too. As David Pepper has put it, “Trying to smash capitalism violently will probably not work while capi- talists control the state, so the state must be taken and liberated in some way for the service of all (1993:234). Consequently, Pepper tends to favor more localized, less complex and ambitious collective efforts, to wit, Deconstructing Global Environment 64
It follows that the most potentially fruitful kinds of action are those which emphasise people’s collective power as producers, which directly involve local communities (particularly urban) and increase democracy, which enlist the labour movement and which are aimed particularly at economic life…. But to be more positive and dialectical, perhaps they [“new” approaches to development] represent part of that order whom the existing economic and social arrangements do not satisfy and which will eventually, by struggle with the existing order, produce a new socialist synthesis (1993:235-36).
The paradox here, as with all Marxist and socialist theories, is that the state, which is part of the problem, also becomes central to the eventual extension of the new system. But can small-scale localized changes in pro- duction modes generate the transformation in relations of production nec- essary to give rise to this “new socialist synthesis?” This is a question we will return to in Chapter 4.
Ecofeminism
There is no single version of ecofeminism; if asked, probably all feminists, whatever their political or philosophical position, would admit to being ecologists (Warren, 2001; Seager, 1993). Paradoxically, perhaps, this posi- tioning arises out of the ways in which patriarchy and the common di- chotomies inherent in modernism juxtapose those with power as against those who are without it. Women are often characterized essentially in terms of their “links” or “likeness” to nature—these having to do with bi- ology, temperament, patterns of thought and reasoning, and so on—with the result that they are treated by men with as little regard as men treat na- ture. Whether abuse of women or nature came first is unclear, and probably unimportant; as Ariel Salleh, a neo-marxist ecofeminist puts the point: “Feminine suffering is universal because wrong done to women and its on- going denial fuel the psychosexual abuse of all Others—races, children, animals plants, rocks, water, and air” (1997:14). For ecofeminists, in other words, the domination of women and nature are inextricably linked. There are a number of ways in which this linkage is explained, ranging from es- sentialist to ethical to symbolic to structural (Warren, 2001:255-66), al- though it is the last with which I am concerned here. 65 Chapter 2
From the structural perspective, the women-nature linkage is not only characteristic of patriarchy and rationalism which, together, have generat- ed capitalism. It is also central to the maintenance of contemporary social organization in which men and capital hold power. In other words, reform is not enough; as with ecosocialism, change must be foundational—al- though not all ecofeminists would necessarily agree with this point—and must begin with the overturning of patriarchy. Salleh offers one intriguing version of this structuralist perspective, although she tends, perhaps, to essentialize women’s suffering under patriarchy as identical to the suffering of nature under the same arrange- ments. Thus, while she argues that women’s relationship to nature is not an ontological one—which is an essentialist position adopted by some ecofeminists—she does claim that “women North and South tend to arrive quite readily at ecofeminist insights as a result of the conditions they live in and the physical work they do.” (1997: 13). Women’s labor is designed to protect life, unlike the work of men, and “Women's ecological commitment is fed by an intimate biocentric understanding of how people's survival links to the future of the planet at large” (1997:17). How did such a state of affairs come about? According to Salleh’s analysis, the contemporary ecological crisis can be ascribed directly to a “Eurocentric capitalist patriarchal culture built on the domination of nature and the domination of Women ‘as nature’” (1997:12-13). This grows out of the Enlightenment project of applying rationalism to the management of nature (a theme prefigured in Hobbes’ Leviathan). “ In the West, feminine and other abject bodies are split off and positioned as dirt, Nature, resource, colonised by masculine energies and sublimated through Economics, Science and the Law” (1997:54). Therefore, Salleh continues, “An ecofeminist response to ecological breakdown means finding ways of meeting human needs that do not further the domination of instrumental rationality....” (1997:53). For Salleh, therefore, ecofeminism offers a comprehensive progressive approach to the ecological crisis.
Ecofeminist politics is a feminism in as much as it offers an uncompro- mising critique of capitalist patriarchal culture from a womanist perspec- tive; it is a socialism because it honors the wretched of the earth; it is an ecology because it reintegrates humanity with nature; it is a postcolonial discourse because it focuses on deconstructing Eurocentric domination” (1997:192). Deconstructing Global Environment 66 Given the overwhelming dominance of and domination by structure in her analysis, what is not entirely clear is how Salleh might propose to attack those structures. This is a problem we find with many critiques of domina- tion; they advocate some kind of change in consciousness, hoping that this will lead to collective action (in this, they are not so different from liberal ecologists). But what kind? As we saw earlier, if revolution is not a possibility, and reform has no impact on structure, can small but cumulative changes in the material base eventually result in wholesale structural change? And what are the impli- cations of this analysis for global environmental politics?
Biopower and Governmentality
As is the case with all politics, environmental philosophies of domination are linked to power relations among humans, and between humans and nature. As we saw above, as well as in chapter 1, there is more than one dimension of power, which is not something that can be simply accumulated, as are money or artifacts or weapons. Nevertheless, all of the “anti-domination” philosophies discussed so far take a stance of resisting and opposing power, with the view that the ideal society is one in which power is evenly distributed or from which it has been banished. If the unjust exercise of power could be eliminated, goes the implicit claim, not only would intra-specific domination cease (among people), so would inter-specific domination (between people and nature). There is, however, a problem with this argument: it denatures or dismisses politics, so to speak. If politics is fundamentally about power, rather than the distribution of resources, equalizing or eliminating power would have the effect of doing away with politics. It helps, therefore, to examine one final approach to the problem of power, domination, and the environment (Paterson, 2000), based on the work of Michel Foucault. While Foucault said many relevant things about both power and nature, he never wrote explicitly about the environment. He did, however, write about power and domination and, in particular, the propensity of some men to manage both other men and things, calling this practice “governmentality” (Dean, 1999). In his essay on “Governmentality” (1991), Foucault asks what it means to “govern things?” Government is not the same as politics; it is better understood as a kind of sovereignty (but not sovereignty as it is commonly understood), as the practices that constitute governing of “a sort of complex of men [sic] and things” within a state. 67 Chapter 2
The things with which in this sense government is to be concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with those other things which are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate irrigation, fertility, etc.; lastly, men in their relations to that other kind of things, accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, death, etc. (1991:93).
In Foucault’s analysis, power—and the domination that results—is embedded in the discipline of men and things inherent in the act and process of government. Elsewhere, Foucault speaks of power not as a stock but as a flow, and not as a prohibition or constraint so much as something much more positive:
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse (1980:119).
If power is understood relationally—as something that flows between and connects people and things to each other—domination can be seen as a result of the discipline of governmentality. For the global environment, and its politics, governmentality becomes a way of managing those things that are seen to threaten the welfare of that which is governed. This is accomplished through what Foucault called bio- politics. According to Mitchell Dean (1999:99), biopolitics “is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and illness, both physical and mental, and with the processes that sustain or retard the optimization of the life of a population.”
Bio-politics must then also concern the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective bio-politics is concerned with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call “lifestyle,” with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living. It is concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell (Dean, 1999:99). Deconstructing Global Environment 68 International environmental regimes are an expression of such biopolitics, as are all environmental agencies and regulations, inasmuch as their goal is the management of human behavior so as to maintain the material base of life, that is, the global environment. Governmentality and biopolitics are not, however, simply intellectual phenomena, inasmuch as their discipline is backed by material goods and forces. Those who are being dominated usually have some material interest in the structure within which power is being exercised. What this means is that resistance is not enough, consciousness-raising is not enough, and libertarian municipalism is not enough to protect the environment. Most of all, these arguments suggest that “global environ- mental politics” must be “global” in a way other than how they are commonly understood. The practice of global environmental politics must be centered elsewhere than the state system, the international conferences, and the centers of corporate capital, all of which are part of the processing of governmentality. What replaces them may be simply another form of governmentality, to be sure, but perhaps it need not serve the interests of quite so few, as we shall see in chapters to come. 69 Chapter 2
For further reading
Steven Bernstein, The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
Mary E. Clark, Ariadne’s Thread—The Search for New Modes of Think- ing (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989).
Herman E. Daly, Steady-State Economics (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 1991, 2nd ed. with new essays).
John S. Dryzek, The Politics of the Earth—Environmental Discourses (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1997).
David Harvey, Justice, Nature & the Geography of Difference (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
Michael Klare, Resource Wars—The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001).
Timothy W. Luke, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology—Departing from Marx (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
John Meyer, Political Nature—Environmentalism and the Interpretation of Western Thought (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001).
Lester Millbrath, Envisioning a Sustainable Society—Learning Our Way Out (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1989).
David Pepper, Eco-socialism—from Deep Ecology to Social Justice (London: Routledge, 1993).
Michael Redclift and Ted Benton (eds.), Social Theory and the Global Environment (London: Routledge, 1994).
Eric B. Ross, The Malthus Factor—Poverty, Politics and Population in Capitalist Development (London: Zed Books, 1998).
Wolfgang Sachs (ed.), The Development Dictionary (London: Zed Books, 1992). Deconstructing Global Environment 70 Ariel Salleh, Ecofeminism as Politics—Nature, Marx and the Postmodern (London: Zed Books, 1997).
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).