1 COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK
2 Military Participation
3 in the
4 Interagency Management System
5 for
6 Reconstruction and Stabilization
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9 Distribution Statement C Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their Contractors for USJFCOM Unified Action use, 17 April 2009 Other requests for this document shall be referred to: Unified Action Joint Futures Lab; U.S. Joint Forces Command 115 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697 Attn: Lt.Col. Erin Coady, Phone: 757-203-3356
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42 Why this handbook is important 2 Military Participation In The IMS As of 17 April 2009
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43 44 Since the close of the Cold War the United States military has been 45 involved in a series of regional conflicts. These engagements have covered the full 46 spectrum of operations from providing support to steady-state, conflict prevention 47 and shaping operations to major combat operations and supporting post conflict, 48 stabilization and reconstruction operations. The importance of interagency 49 coordination, planning, and execution within these operations has become 50 increasingly clear as the success of these engagements is determined by a whole-of- 51 government approach utilizing the full set of capabilities resident within the 52 interagency community which includes the U.S. military. In response to fulfilling the 53 need for better interagency coordination in conflict prevention and stabilization and 54 reconstruction operations the Department of State created the Office of the 55 Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in June 2004. S/CRS 56 created the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and 57 Stabilization, which the National Security Council subsequently approved applicable 58 to all components of the U.S. government. 59 This system is designed to organize and support Washington D.C., Military 60 Operational Headquarters, and field-level implementation during a stabilization 61 operation to integrate planning and coordinate operations, ensuring harmonization of 62 US Government planning and operations within the context of a whole of government 63 response. 64 Most other nations involved in a stabilization operation will also operate within 65 the context of a whole of government approach individually as well as a whole of 66 coalition/alliance approach collectively. Several nations have developed compatible 67 whole of government approaches in parallel with U.S. efforts and embrace the mutual 68 benefits to engaging cooperatively across national and organizational boundaries. 69 70 The intended audience 71 72 The primary audience for this book is members of the military 73 participating in a civilian led U.S. Government response to an overseas stabilization 74 crisis and reconstruction operation utilizing the IMS. In recent years military 75 operations have increasingly supported interagency planning and implementation 76 efforts. As a result military personnel have integrated into the interagency 77 community to participate in these efforts. Military personnel participating in an 78 interagency organization bring with them a wealth of resources, reach-back 79 capabilities to parent organizations, varying backgrounds, specialties, and areas of 80 expertise. These additional resources and capabilities are valuable and have been 81 widely recognized by the interagency community. Future military engagements will 82 likely involve supporting an interagency plan, implementation effort, or participating 83 within an interagency organization. This book will help to define the roles and 84 responsibilities for military forces and individual service members participating 85 within the IMS. 86
1 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 3 87 Intent and how this handbook should be used 88 89 This handbook is intended to be used as a guide to help explain the roles and 90 responsibilities of military participation within the IMS. It is not directive in nature 91 and should be used for informational purposes only. It is also designed as a 92 companion document to the IMS Guide and the Practitioner’s Guide of the USG 93 Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation. 94 Both of these documents will be produced by the Department of State Coordinator for 95 Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). In conjunction with existing doctrine, 96 military personnel participating in support of a USG response to a stabilization crisis 97 or a reconstruction effort should utilize this book as a guide to assist them with 98 planning, coordination, and implementation in coordination with their interagency 99 counterparts. This book should be utilize by planners and implementers to assist in 100 de-conflicting efforts and to empower better and more effective communication 101 between interagency actors as it relates to roles and responsibilities for military 102 participation within the IMS. 103 104 Relationships between military and non-military participants 105 within stabilization and reconstruction operations 106 107 This handbook will identify relationships between military and non-military 108 actors within a stabilization and reconstruction operation framed by the IMS. This 109 will occur through the clarification of roles and responsibilities between interagency 110 planners and implementers utilizing the IMS. Relationships between military and 111 non-military actors will also be identified by describing how the military interacts and 112 coordinates with the different levels of the IMS, specifically the Country 113 Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) – and its Secretariat, the Integration 114 Planning Cell (IPC), the Advance Civilian Team (ACT), and if applicable the Field 115 Advance Civilian Team (FACT). A goal for this book will be to better prepare 116 military planners and implementers for interaction, coordination, and communication 117 between military and non-military participants through the identification of key 118 interagency relationships and standardization of basic processes within the IMS. 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132
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133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 Intentionally Blank 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 PAGE 170 171 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.………………………………………………………………x 172 173 CHAPTER I 174 UNIFIED ACTION 175 176 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………x
2 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 5 177 Summary of USG Policy for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations………x 178 Evolving State and Defense Department Policy...... x 179 Essentials for effective military participation in interagency management……….x 180 Purpose…………………………………………………………………………… 181 …...x 182 Key Participants and 183 Proponents……………………………………………………...x 184 Other Partners and 185 Contributors………………………………………………………x 186 187 CHAPTER II 188 INTERAGENCY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (R&S) 189 190 Introduction………………………………………………………………………… 191 …x 192 Description of 193 IMS……………………………………………………………………x 194 Organization……………………………………………………………………….x 195 Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG)………………………..x 196 Integration Planning Cell (IPC)…………………………………………………...x 197 Advance Civilian Team (ACT)……………………………………………………x 198 Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACT)…………………………………………...x 199 Key Interagency Proponents and 200 Participants………………………………………...x 201 Civilian Response Corp (CRC)……………………………………………………x 202 203 CHAPTER III 204 MILITARY PARTICIPATION IN THE IMS (R&S) 205 206 Introduction………………………………………………………………………… 207 …x 208 Military Participation 209 Authorities……………………………………………………..x 210 Control Authorities………………………………………………………………..x 211 Responsibilities and Coordination Processes……………………………………...x 212 Supported and Supporting Relationships………………………………………….x 213 Manpower Requirements and Resource 214 Planning…………………………………….x 215 Coordination and Integration with Existing Interagency 216 Structures…………………..x 217 Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)..…………………………………x 218 Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF).…………………………………………....x 219 Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF)...... x 220 Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)...... x 221 Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)...... x
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222 Integration with Non-USG 223 Structures...... x 224 UN Coalition Force...... x 225 NATO Force...... x 226 African Union Coalition...... x 227 Regional Military Coalitions...... x 228 229 CHAPTER IV 230 MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO THE ORGANZIATION OF THE IMS (R&S) 231 232 DOD Participation within the Core 233 Staff...... x 234 Support Requirements...... x 235 DOD Specific 236 Components...... x 237 Manning Requirements...... x 238 Resource Requirements...... x 239 DOD Functional 240 Elements...... x 241 Manning Requirements...... x 242 Resource Requirements...... x 243 JFC Communications within the 244 IMS...... x 245 246 CHAPTER V 247 DOD PARTICIPATION WITH THE COUNTRY RECONSTRUCTION AND 248 STABILIZATION GROUP (CRSG) AND SECRETARIAT 249 250 Introduction...... 251 ....x 252 Purpose...... x 253 DOD Participation...... x 254 DOD Role...... x 255 Structure...... 256 ....x 257 CRSG Leadership...... x 258 Secretariat...... x 259 Functions...... x 260 Operations Support...... x 261 GCC Relationship to the 262 CRSG...... x 263 GCC Relationship to other Departments and Agencies through 264 CRSG...... x
3 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 7 265 266 CHAPTER VI 267 MILITARY PARTICIPATION WITH THE INTEGRATION PLANNING CELL 268 (IPC) 269 270 Introduction...... 271 ....x 272 Capabilities...... x 273 Leadership and Structure...... x 274 GCC Relationship to the 275 IPC...... x 276 Roles and Responsibilities...... x 277 Relationship to GCC Staff...... x 278 GCC Planning in Conjunction with the IPC...... x 279 GCC Logistics and Admin Support to the 280 IPC...... x 281 GCC Communications Support to the 282 IPC...... x 283 GCC Security Support to the 284 IPC...... x 285 286 CHAPTER VII 287 MILITARY PARTICIPATION WITH THE ADVANCE CIVILIAN TEAM (ACT) 288 289 Introduction...... 290 ....x 291 Structure...... 292 ....x 293 Leadership...... x 294 Implementation Planning Team (IPT)...... x 295 Integration Structure...... x 296 MME Teams...... x 297 MME Sub-Objective Teams...... x 298 Functional Offices...... x 299 JTF Relationship to the 300 ACT...... x 301 Roles and Responsibilities...... x 302 JTF Planning in Conjunction with the ACT...... x 303 JTF Logistics and Admin Support to the 304 ACT...... x 305 JTF Communications Support to the 306 ACT...... x 307 JTF Security Support to the 308 ACT...... x 309 310 CHAPTER VIII
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311 MILITARY PARTICIPATION WITH THE FIELD ADVANCE CIVILIAN TEAM 312 (FACT) 313 314 Introduction...... 315 ....x 316 Structure...... x 317 Leadership...... x 318 Functional Areas...... x 319 Integration and Implementation Element...... x 320 JFC Relationship to the 321 FACT...... x 322 Roles and Responsibilities...... x 323 JTF/MSC Planning in Conjunction with FACT(s)...... x 324 Logistics and Admin Support...... x 325 Communication Support...... x 326 Security Support...... x 327 328 CHAPTER IX 329 PRE-IMS R&S OPERATIONS PREPARATIONS AND PLANNING 330 331 Introduction...... 332 ....x 333 Pre-IMS 334 Preparations...... x 335 Support and Assistance to Interagency Partners...... x 336 Training and Readiness to Support R&S Operations...... x 337 Exercises...... x 338 Triggers for the Application of Whole-of-Government Planning and the 339 IMS...... x 340 JFC Planning for 341 IMS...... x 342 Context for JFC Participation...... x 343 Approaches to US Government R&S Planning...... x 344 Levels of Planning...... x 345 Planning Process Structure and Focus...... x 346 IMS Planning and Implementation for Essential Tasks...... x 347 Organizational 348 Linkages...... x 349 350 CHAPTER X 351 JFC R&S PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION UTILIZING THE IMS (R&S) 352 353 Transition to the IMS in R&S 354 Operations...... x
4 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 9 355 Planning 356 Considerations...... x 357 IMS (R&S) 358 Actions...... x 359 General Actions...... x 360 Forming the Strategic Planning Team of the CRSG...... x 361 Development of the Situational Analysis...... x 362 Policy Formulation...... x 363 Strategy Development...... x 364 Interagency Implementation Planning...... x 365 Coordination at Strategic Level...... x 366 Coordination at Operational and Tactical/Implementation 367 Levels...... x 368 IPC...... x 369 ACT...... x 370 Embassy Team...... x 371 FACT...... x 372 Coordination with Host Country Public and Private 373 Sectors...... x 374 Coordinating and Managing Resources Supporting Civilian 375 Components...... x 376 Resource and Manpower Requirements...... x 377 Deploying Resources...... x 378 Employing Resources...... x 379 Sustaining Resources...... x 380 Redeploying Resources...... x 381 382 Appendices (to be completed) 383 384 AP1. Legal Authorities and Contracting 385 386 AP2. Examples of Planning Products 387 388 AP3. Resources/Manpower Guidance 389 390 AP4. IMS R&S References 391 392 AP5. Sample IMS R&S Mobilization/Operations Plan 393 394 AP6. Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform Executive 395 Summary 396 397 AP7. Military Support to Governance, Elections and Media Executive 398 Summary 399
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400 AP8. Military Support to Economic Normalization and Restoration Executive 401 Summary 402 403 AP9. Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure Executive 404 Summary 405 406 AP 10. Logistics, transportation and other life support requirements 407 408 AP 11. Security requirements 409 410 AP 12. Communications requirements 411 412 AP 13. Example MOU/MOA(s) 413 414 Glossary (to be completed) 415 o Part I – Abbreviations and Acronyms 416 o Part II – Definitions 417 418 Figures (to be completed) 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443
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472 Executive Summary 473 474 475 476 On October 14, 2008 Public Law 110-417 was signed by the President. This is 477 the National Defense Authorization Act for 2009 and Title XVI addresses 478 Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management. The law codifies the 479 existence of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 480 Stabilization, S/CRS, and defines the roles, responsibilities and functions of the office 481 and the interagency process defined as the Interagency Management System, IMS. 482 As stated in the beginning of PL 110-417 or NDAA 2009, as it is referred to 483 throughout this Handbook, “If the President determines that it is in the national 484 security interests of the United States for United States civilian agencies or non- 485 Federal employees to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing a country or region that 486 is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife, the President 487 may….furnish assistance to such country or region for reconstruction or 488 stabilization…….” NDAA 2009 does not negate or replace National Security Policy 489 Directive (NSPD)-44, which was promulgated by the Bush Administration in
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490 December 2005, rather it codifies the institutions, policies, procedures and 491 responsibilities originally set up in NSPD-44. 492 NSPD-44 recognized the need for improvement in coordination, planning, and 493 implementation for reconstruction and stabilization efforts for foreign states and 494 regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. This directive 495 established the Secretary of State as the lead to coordinate and integrate US 496 Government efforts involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant 497 capabilities to plan, prepare, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. It 498 also directed Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to integrate stability and 499 reconstruction contingency plans and activities and harmonize efforts with US 500 Military plans and operations when relevant and appropriate. 501 Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 entitled “Military Support for Stability, 502 Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) signed by Deputy Secretary of 503 Defense on November 28, 2005 states “Many stability operations tasks are best 504 performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals”. However, many US 505 Government civilian agencies lack the capability and capacity to respond to the level 506 that is necessary for these types of operations. Building partnership capacity within 507 the civilian agencies and integrating military activities with civilian activities is 508 critical to ensure unity of effort in such operations. 509 NDAA 2009 reaffirms NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05 and establishes in law the 510 guidance that directs the civilian side of the US Government to develop the capacity 511 to plan, prepare and conduct civilian aspects of stability operations. The Department 512 of State is the lead agency to coordinate and integrate US Government efforts under 513 this process. The Department of Defense has provided its expertise and taken a 514 significant role in assisting the Department of State with the development of 515 mechanisms to implement NDAA 2009. The key elements that emerge can be 516 summarized as follows: 517 NDAA 2009 notes that the USG has significant stake in reconstructing and 518 stabilizing countries or regions to help establish a sustainable path toward peaceful 519 societies, democracies, and market economies. The USG goal is to enable 520 governments abroad to exercise sovereignty over their territories to prevent them 521 from being used as a base of operations for extremists, terrorists, organized crime, or 522 other groups that pose a threat to US foreign policy, security or economic interests. 523 Towards this end, State and Defense will integrate R&S contingency plans and R&S 524 activities and military operations when relevant and appropriate and endeavor to 525 harmonize efforts with US Military plans and operations. 526 The law also takes from DODD 3000.05 and recognizes stability operations are a 527 core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to 528 conduct and support and shall be given priority comparable to combat operations. 529 Stability operations are conducted to help establish order that advances U.S. interests 530 and values with goals of providing security, restoring essential services, meeting 531 humanitarian needs, developing capacity for securing essential services, a viable 532 market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. DoD 533 shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when
6 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 13 534 civilians cannot do so, and integrated civilian and military efforts are key to 535 successful stability operations. DODD 3000.05 recognizes that civilian-military 536 teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool, development of which 537 the Department will continue to support. Assistance and advice shall be provided to 538 and sought from the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies, 539 as appropriate, in the development of DoD stability operations capabilities. Stability 540 operations dimensions of military plans shall be integrated with U.S. Government 541 plans for stabilization and reconstruction in accordance with the Secretary of 542 Defense’s guidance. 543 While NDAA 2009 and DoDD 3000.05 focus primarily on coordinating efforts 544 within the USG, the U.S. will likely participate in these types of operations within a 545 coalition or alliance context. USG guidance is not intended to limit U.S. involvement 546 in coordinating coalition and alliance strategy, policy or actions; nor will it ever 547 suggest relinquishing U.S. sovereignty to a coalition or alliance. Rather, it suggests 548 the importance of developing a consistent approach within the USG while 549 coordinating with multinational/interagency counterparts, to the greatest extent 550 practical, in order to accomplish the overall mission. 551 As a part of the implementation process of NDAA 2009, an Interagency 552 Management System (IMS) has been developed to coordinate policy, planning, and 553 implementation of stability and reconstruction operations. The purpose of this 554 handbook is to better define the roles and responsibilities for military participation 555 within the IMS. The handbook is informed by the USG Planning Framework for 556 Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation as well as the IMS Guide; 557 higher level USG documents developed by the State Department’s Office of the 558 Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in consultation with many 559 U.S. Government agencies to include the Department of Defense. 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579
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7 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 15 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 Chapter 1 646 Unified Action 647 648 649 1. Introduction 650 651 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War gave way to more numerous, 652 complex and unpredictable sources of instability and danger to the international 653 community. In particular, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been 654 involved in or contributed significant resources, both in terms of financial and human 655 treasure, to more than 17 reconstruction and stabilization efforts, yet has had no 656 effective or sustained mechanism to ensure a comprehensive, coordinated USG 657 response. 658 US operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have highlighted the lack of effective 659 mechanisms and the need for them. Additionally, the USG National Security 660 Strategy recognizes that failing states can become breeding grounds for transnational 661 terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking in humans and 662 narcotics, organized crime and other threats. From that strategic guidance USG 663 Departments and Agencies determine how they will support the USG as a whole to 664 achieve national security. 665 This shift in strategy and the need to respond rapidly and flexibly to dynamic 666 environments requires adaptation of our national security architecture to create and 667 implement a new approach to the organization and use of all elements of national 668 power to achieve strategic success. Central to this new approach is the need for
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669 unified action to ensure the activities and resources of diverse actors across the USG 670 are coordinated and integrated and work in cooperation with a variety of critical non- 671 USG actors to achieve the desired strategic affect. 672 Unified Action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the 673 activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to 674 achieve unity of effort. In this context military commanders can conduct either single 675 Service or joint operations to support the overall operation and achieve unity of effort 676 with USG civilian agencies, Allies, coalition partners, multinational organizations, 677 IO(s), NGO(s), IGO(s), and when applicable and specifically authorized, the private 678 sector. 679 An important element of Unified Action is the recognition that unity of command 680 within the military instrument of national power is vitally important and supports the 681 national strategic direction through the close coordination with the other instruments 682 of our national power. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 683 states unity of command in the Armed Forces of the United States starts with national 684 strategic direction. For US military operations, unity of command is accomplished by 685 establishing a joint force and Joint Force Commander (JFC), assigning a mission, or 686 objective(s) to the designated JFC, establishing command relationships, assigning 687 and/or attaching appropriate forces to the joint force, and empowering the JFC with 688 sufficient authority over the forces to accomplish the assigned mission. 689 Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation 690 may not be politically feasible, but it should be the goal. This can be accomplished 691 by establishing a Multinational Force (MNF) under the guidance of a Multinational 692 Force Commander (MNFC). Though each case is unique, rarely, if ever, will nations 693 relinquish command of their forces directly to an MNFC. At least two distinct chains 694 of command will result: a national chain of command for each participating nation 695 and a multinational chain of command. Organizational structures created below the 696 MNFC level (e.g. CJTF or CFLCC) are better suited to meet objectives, political 697 realities and constraints of each participating nation. Whenever operating in a 698 multinational environment, U.S. Commanders and their staffs should strive to achieve 699 unity of effort with partners to the maximum extent possible while keeping those 700 partner’s policies and authorities in view. 701 702 a. Summary of USG Policy Regarding Reconstruction and Stabilization 703 On October 14, 2008 Public Law 110-417 was signed by the President. This is 704 the National Defense Authorization Act for 2009 and Title XVI addresses 705 Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management. The law codifies the 706 existence of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 707 Stabilization, S/CRS, and defines the roles, responsibilities and functions of the office 708 and the interagency process defined as the IMS. Stated in the beginning of PL 110- 709 417 or NDAA 2009 - hereafter called in this Handbook, “If the President determines 710 that it is in the national security interests of the United States for United States 711 civilian agencies or non-Federal employees to assist in reconstructing and stabilizing 712 a country or region that is at risk of, in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife,
8 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 17 713 the President may….furnish assistance to such country or region for reconstruction or 714 stabilization…….” NDAA 2009 does not negate or replace National Security Policy 715 Directive (NSPD)-44, which was promulgated by the Bush Administration in 716 December 2005, rather it codifies the institutions, policies, procedures and 717 responsibilities originally set up in NSPD-44. 718 In 2005 the Department of Defense promulgated DOD Directive 3000.05. This 719 directive recognized that increasing stability operations capabilities within DOD are 720 essential to conducting major combat operations, winning the War on Terror, and 721 advancing U.S. national security interests in the 21st century. To address these 722 challenges, DOD Directive 3000.05 directed DOD to ensure that stability operations 723 are “given priority comparable to [major] combat operations.” It also directed 724 military commanders to plan for and execute stability operations in coordination and 725 cooperation with non-military components of national power. DOD Directive 726 3000.05 was designed to complement and support the President’s objectives by 727 making DOD a better partner in responding to reconstruction and stabilization 728 operations within the interagency process. NDAA 2009 takes the intent of DOD Dir 729 3000.05 and codifies it into law. 730 The Department of State has developed the Interagency Management System 731 (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization from the guidance established within the 732 NSPD, and reaffirmed in NDAA 2009, which will guide whole-of-government 733 response efforts in the future. Success will rest upon many sets of unified actions 734 (e.g., unity of effort and unity of purpose without unity of command), within the 735 context of the IMS. In this venue single Service, Joint Task Force Commanders, 736 Combatant Commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary 737 of Defense are all in important and influential positions to ensure unified action, in 738 relation to the IMS, is conducted and planned according to the guidance received 739 from their chain of command in coordination with other authorities. 740 741 b. Evolving State and Defense Department Policy 742 The policies associated with addressing fragile states: stability operations, 743 peacekeeping, reconstruction and stabilization, in both the Department of Defense 744 and the civilian agencies, particularly the Department of State and the US Agency for 745 International Development have been undergoing a process of change since the late 746 1990s. Indeed, these policies have never been in a state of evolution as they are 747 currently undergoing. Nevertheless, the US military and the civilian agencies, 748 especially the Department of State, have a long history of policies designed to address 749 fragile states. Playing a key role in reconstruction and stabilization, (R&S), for the 750 Defense Department is not a new phenomenon. As far back as 1815 the military was 751 engaged in operations intended to stabilize diplomatic relations between the US 752 government and governments along the Barbary Coast in the Mediterranean Sea. 753 From 1889 to 1914 the military, especially the US Marine Corps, stepped in to 754 influence and, in some cases, run governments in the Caribbean nations of Cuba, 755 Panama, Nicaragua, Mexico and Haiti. Indeed many historians credit the Marines for 756 giving Nicaragua it most historically stable government when it successfully 757 administered the country for 13 years from 1900 to 1913. The most significant 758 foreign interventions by far that involved both the military and the civilian agencies
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759 was the post World War II rebuilding of Europe, especially Germany and Japan. The 760 military played significant roles in both theaters. Military officers served as 761 governors of cities and municipalities in Germany and US general Douglas McArthur 762 wrote the post war Japanese constitution that is still in place today. 763 After the end of the Second World War and onset of the Cold War, the period 764 encompassing 1945-1990, the US allowed its capabilities to engage in R&S 765 operations to atrophy. The military was focused on maintaining its readiness to fight 766 the Soviet threat and any mission that did not complement that war objective was 767 seen as contrary to the overall readiness of the force and was thereby discouraged. 768 Accelerated by the experience in Korea (which demonstrated to many that 769 constabulary and occupation functions weakened the military) and Vietnam (which 770 deepened the perceived division of responsibilities for war and peace between 771 military and civilian agencies), this atrophy in government capabilities was 772 accompanied by an increase in International Governmental Organization (IGO), 773 International Organization (IO), and Nongovernmental Organization (NGO) 774 capabilities, which enlarged to fill the vacuum. The remarkable successes of the 775 Japanese and German reconstruction efforts, and the Marshall Plan were not 776 institutionalized or repeated in the 45 years between the fall of Berlin and the fall of 777 the Berlin Wall. 778 The 1990s ushered in an era of change and a clear recognition that the old way of 779 doing business did not work. U.S. interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, 780 Afghanistan and Iraq were not the successes expected. In each of these interventions 781 the military was able to successfully achieve its desired military objectives and 782 quickly defeat their enemies’ military capabilities within days or weeks. However, 783 the subsequent post-conflict period was another story altogether. Armed violence, 784 political squabbling and criminal economic predations quickly reversed the initial 785 successes achieved by the military in each case. It has become readily apparent that 786 the comparative advantage the U.S. enjoys in traditional military capabilities are not 787 matched by capabilities to provide economic, social, justice and good governance 788 systems where they do not exist in a failed state. Also, it has become apparent that 789 defense policy and planning capabilities, along with military operational capabilities 790 will have to integrate to a much greater degree with civilian capabilities in order to 791 successfully turn failed states around and create viable and sustainable national 792 entities. 793 Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency 794 Operations, was promulgated by the Clinton Administration in the late 1990s, was the 795 first clear and significant step taken to address the need for bringing all the 796 instruments of national power together to address a failing state situation. This 797 Directive for the first time specifically addressed the need for both the military and 798 the civilian agencies to collaborate in planning and executing whole of government, 799 (WOG) operations. The PDD was applied only a few times with limited success. It 800 acknowledged the post-Cold War environment where the security environment was 801 no longer balanced by two super powers, but was instead based on the potential for 802 frequent and wide ranging smaller conflicts involving states and trans/sub-national
9 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 19 803 actors. This included non-traditional actors such as war lords, religious leaders and 804 even transnational non-state leaders. PDD-56 made the U.S. national authority aware 805 of the limitations that faced the government. The lessons learned from applying 806 PDD-56 and from military-only excursions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to strong 807 internal reassessments throughout the government from which emerged both National 808 Strategic Policy Directive-44, (NSPD-44), Management of Interagency Efforts 809 Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Department of Defense Directive 810 (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support For Stability, Security, Transition, And 811 Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, and most recently, NDAA 2009.. 812 The decade of the 1990’s ushered in an era where regional security concerns in 813 the US national interest will continue to emanate from failed or failing states. Made 814 readily apparent is the comparative advantage the U.S. possesses in conventional 815 combat operations has not been matched by capacities to provide governance, 816 economic, social well-being and justice systems in the vacuums created by the 817 collapse or defeat of governments. Military forces must broaden their knowledge 818 base and actions beyond Cold War core competencies to encompass abilities to 819 conduct operations across the full spectrum of conflict in increasingly complex and 820 dynamic operational environments that also require relevant, multi-source civilian 821 capabilities. This is the lesson the military and civilian agencies are now beginning to 822 fully appreciate. 823 It is apparent that defense policy and planning capability and military operational 824 capabilities have to be integrated to a much greater degree with civilian capabilities in 825 order to achieve national goals. For the military in particular, modern capabilities of 826 precision fires and information flows across the battle space both compress the 827 physical dimensions of the battle space and give tactical actions strategic importance. 828 It is possible to experience pre-conflict, close-combat, and post-conflict conditions 829 within a very small area in a very short time where simultaneous actions are required 830 across this spectrum and across the civil-military organizational divide. This “three- 831 block war” compression demands unprecedented mental and physical agility and the 832 ability to apply all elements of national power in very discrete packages to achieve 833 tactical, operational, and strategic goals. Today, actions by soldiers and civilians can 834 cover all these sequences and categories in the space of a single day. 835 The evolution, some would say revolution, of whole-of-government operations to 836 address the challenges to the world today and into tomorrow continues. Civilian 837 agencies are making the hard changes necessary to establish planning and integration 838 capabilities. They are also establishing deployable capabilities never before 839 considered. A Civilian Response Corps comprising a stand-by reserve “force” of 840 competent civilians is being developed and trained for future operations they will be 841 called upon to conduct. 842 The military is also evolving in light of the interconnected political, military, 843 economic, social, information and infrastructure (PMESII) challenges that lay ahead. 844 Today stability operations have the same level of priority as more traditional war- 845 fighting objectives and more than ever the military is training with civilians, 846 deploying with civilians and learning the culture of civilian agencies. The military is 847 also evolving its capability to understand and implement non-traditional missions 848 including Rule-of-Law, governance, infrastructure rebuilding and economic
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849 normalization. Today you are just as likely to find a “diplomat” in a Kevlar vest 850 alongside his/her military counterparts offering guidance and advice and a military 851 officer sitting down with a group of village elders offering suggestions on rebuilding 852 the capacities of the local government to provide essential services. 853 854 c. Essentials for effective military participation in interagency management 855 start with the national strategic direction as well as the factors that contribute to the 856 decision establishing the IMS in response to a triggering event or emerging crisis. 857 From this unity of command within the military can be established enabling unified 858 actions that support the IMS and the overall objectives it seeks to achieve through 859 unity of effort. 860 Important essential elements for effective participation within the IMS include 861 authorities, roles, responsibilities, knowledge of the system, its participants, existing 862 DoD interface and participation within interagency structures, and manpower and 863 resource requirements. Most essential to this is a clearly defined national strategic 864 direction with measureable objectives and attainable outcomes which enable the 865 establishment of a unified military chain of command supporting unity of effort 866 through the IMS among the various actors involved in the response effort. 867 In multinational operations, an overarching strategy will be developed that will set 868 the strategic direction. The European Union, NATO and France have developed 869 processes for creating a multinational strategy which have included substantial US 870 State Department and Defense Department input. These processes and the lexicon 871 used in them are compatible with the IMS. Furthermore, setting measurable 872 objectives and attainable outcomes has also been the focus of the international 873 development community. Commonality in developing strategy and evaluation 874 criteria within the multinational diplomatic, defense and development communities 875 will help establish a clear direction and unity of effort in future operations. 876 877 (1) Requirements 878 879 A military requirement is an established need justifying the timely allocation of 880 resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, 881 missions, or tasks. Military requirements for effective participation in interagency 882 management will be defined through the objectives and outcomes indicated in 883 development of national strategic direction, to include: 884 885 A realistic plan that provides for sufficient manpower and resources 886 capable of enabling effective participation within an agreed timeframe. 887 Maintaining adequate knowledge of interagency mechanisms and 888 processes, participants, existing structures, capacity and capabilities, and 889 limitations. 890 Establishment of clearly defined authorities, roles and 891 responsibilities enabling unity of effort amongst the participants. 892
10 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 21 893 (2) Principles 894 895 Key principles for effective military participation within interagency management 896 include: 897 898 Unity of command, starts with a national strategic direction, and is an 899 important piece of the military instrument of national power. 900 Integration, the IMS is designed to successfully integrate all of our 901 instruments of national power – diplomatic, economic, informational, and 902 military – to achieve our national strategic objectives. 903 Unity of effort, defined as coordination and cooperation toward 904 common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the 905 same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 906 1) 907 908 2. Purpose 909 As defined earlier, the purpose of unified action is to synchronize, coordinate and 910 integrate activities to achieve unity of effort. A key theme of unified action in 911 stability operations is military planners and operators should not approach 912 stabilization as being a solely military responsibility, and recognize that the most 913 effective way to meet their goals is to partner with non-military actors that most likely 914 are already engaged in such functions. In situations where civilian operations may 915 have been suspended or are not present, the military has developed doctrine or pre- 916 doctrinal informational handbooks to help guide military efforts to establish the 917 conditions needed to enable civilian efforts, and foster an effective transfer of 918 responsibilities.
919 a. IMS Purpose and Common Themes 920 The Interagency Management System is designed for highly complex crises and 921 operations, which are national or security priorities, involve widespread instability, 922 are likely to require military operations, and where multiple U.S. agencies will be 923 engaged in the policy and programmatic response. It is not intended to respond to the 924 political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled through 925 the current Washington D.C. and Embassy based systems. The IMS, therefore, is 926 likely to be activated when a crisis in a foreign nation or region is of sufficient 927 importance that it directly impacts on US national interests or is likely to do so. 928 Analyses of likely scenarios have identified a range of causes of crisis, and while not 929 all can be identified, some common themes have emerged. States that fail or fall into 930 crisis usually do so for reasons of weak governance, failing economies or economic 931 plans, a collapse of the rule of law, internal social, cultural or religious strife or a 932 military that is either corrupt, inept, abusive or a combination of all of these things. 933 Collectively these represent “root causes of crisis”. These sectors are addressed by 934 various government and non-government sources. These source documents are likely 935 to be used by planners and implementers participating in the system. Thus they may 936 inform or even complement the overarching USG Planning Framework for
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937 Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation and its response 938 mechanisms through the IMS. 939
940 3. Key Participants and Proponents
941 Key participants and proponents in unified action within the context of complex 942 operations conducted since the close of the Cold War have included the majority of 943 the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. Participants have included 944 multi-national and coalition contingents, international and regional organizations, and 945 non-governmental entities such as private sector companies and non-government 946 organizations. Increasingly individual States have provided manpower and resources 947 through their National Guard Bureaus.
948 949 4. Other Partners and Contributors (e.g. IOs, NGOs) 950 We have talked about the role of the military in R&S operations, who is 951 participating in the IMS, etc. The military will find other non-military and non- 952 governmental actors very much involved in a range of activities that relate to unified 953 action. In many, if not most, cases, these actors will be essential partners, yet once 954 again they are not the “normal” or expected partners of the past. In any crisis state or 955 region there are international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations 956 (NGOs) that were present before the crisis loomed, are present during the crisis, and 957 will be present long after the US military has left. These IO(s) and NGOs bring 958 resources, skills and experience that can benefit the whole-of-government efforts. 959 The willingness of these organizations to work with the military will vary depending 960 on their mission. Those in humanitarian assistance will likely refuse to talk with the 961 military for fear of compromising their neutrality, a prerequisite for their mission. 962 Some organizations cannot be co-opted and, in fact, attempts to do so can be counter- 963 productive. The military must develop the processes and procedures to work with all 964 these organizations or at least de-conflict geographically with those who need to 965 maintain neutrality. Working or collaborating with those willing to do so can serve 966 the commander well since these organizations usually understand the local situation 967 very well and can help recognize what the root causes of crisis are and how to address 968 them. 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977
11 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 23 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 Intentionally Blank 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023
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1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 Chapter 2: 1038 Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and 1039 Stabilization (R&S) 1040 1041 1. Introduction 1042 The purpose for this chapter is to inform military personnel involved in a 1043 Reconstruction and Stabilization operation about the IMS. While much of this 1044 chapter is covered in other publications, it is worth presentation in the Commander’s 1045 Handbook to ensure that military personnel have a context from which to develop 1046 their understanding of the essential role they play in the broader IMS effort. 1047 1048 2. Description of IMS 1049 A major element of the effort to coordinate USG reconstruction and stabilization 1050 missions has been the creation of the Interagency Management System (IMS), which 1051 was approved by the Deputies’ Committee in March 2007. Responding to the 1052 direction of the National Security Strategy, NSPD-44, and most recently NDAA 1053 2009, the IMS establishes a means to successfully integrate the instruments of 1054 national power and leverage the capabilities of all participants to achieve national 1055 strategic objectives. The IMS is designed for highly complex crises and operations, 1056 which are national security priorities, involve widespread instability, may require 1057 military operations, and where multiple U.S. agencies will be engaged in the policy 1058 and programmatic response. When a significant crisis occurs or begins to emerge, the 1059 Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and/or the appropriate NSC director may 1060 decide to establish the IMS based on a decision by the Principals’ or Deputies’ 1061 Committees and implemented at the direction of the NSC. It is not intended to 1062 respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively 1063 handled through the current Washington and Embassy systems. 1064 The Interagency Management System for R&S is designed to assist 1065 Washington, D.C. policymakers, Chiefs of Mission (COMs), and military 1066 commanders to manage complex R&S engagements by ensuring coordination among
12 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 25 1067 all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels. The 1068 lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo demonstrate that the U.S. 1069 must employ an approach in these types of engagements that draws upon the full 1070 range of diplomatic, development, defense, intelligence, and economic resources 1071 available to the USG. This mechanism, through three-levels of planning and 1072 operations, creates a framework to unify effort among all USG stakeholders. Many 1073 of our multinational partners and the EU have similar mechanisms, which should help 1074 unify overall coalition/alliance R&S efforts as well. The IMS includes all civilian 1075 and military agencies and offices of the USG relevant to R&S operations. The 1076 system is intended to facilitate and support: 1077 1078 Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and implementation 1079 plans, including funding requests; 1080 Joint interagency field deployments; and, 1081 A joint civilian operations capability such as shared communications and 1082 information management. 1083 1084 The IMS is a response mechanism. It does not preclude interagency scenario- 1085 based, prevention or contingency planning, which may occur independently. The 1086 system will draw upon such plans when they exist. 1087 Military participation within the IMS will come in many forms and at all levels. 1088 Participation within the IMS will depend largely upon the nature and scale of the 1089 operation, as dictated by policy and strategic objectives. The scale of participation 1090 could range from a determination that no military forces will be required to a robust 1091 involvement of many elements of the DoD to include the Office of the Secretary of 1092 Defense (OSD), Joint Staff (JS), Services, Geographic Combatant Commands 1093 (GCCs), functional commands, and Joint Task Forces (JTFs), their Major Subordinate 1094 Commands (MSCs), and other forces. Each element will have direct interface or 1095 membership in a corresponding structural element within the IMS. For example: 1096 1097 OSD and JS will represent DoD on the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization 1098 Group (CRSG). 1099 The Integration Planning Cell (IPC) will reside at and integrate into a GCC to 1100 assist in harmonizing civilian and military planning. 1101 The JTF and Advance Civilian Team (ACT) will, at a minimum, have direct 1102 interface and communication and perhaps co-locate certain elements as the ACT 1103 plans for and coordinates R&S related tasks. The JTF may provide further 1104 logistics, transportation, and security to support the activities of the ACT and may 1105 be requested to provide personnel and units that have high value capabilities such 1106 as Engineers, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. If FACT(s) are 1107 established, they will be located in provinces or outlying areas and are expected to 1108 operate relatively autonomously or be dependant on MSC(s) for support and 1109 sustainment. Either way, MSC(s) are likely to be called upon to coordinate and 1110 collaborate with FACT(s). 1111 1112 a. Organization
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1113 The IMS functions at three levels: 1114 o A Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group (CRSG) at the 1115 strategic/policy level with a dedicated support staff or Secretariat located 1116 principally in Washington D.C., 1117 o An Integration Planning Cell (IPC) that supports the GCC, and 1118 o An Advance Civilian Team (ACT), which may if appropriate, is 1119 augmented by Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs) at the tactical field 1120 level. 1121 1122 These structures are flexible in size and composition to meet the particular 1123 requirements of the situation and to integrate personnel from all relevant agencies. 1124 Each team is designed to support and augment, not replace, existing structures in 1125 Washington, at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), and in the field. 1126 International or coalition partners may also be represented. 1127 1128 b. Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) 1129 The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) is the central 1130 Washington, D.C. coordinating body for the USG effort. The CRSG is comprised of 1131 two components: an augmented Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) established 1132 for the specific country response, and an interagency planning, operations, and 1133 coordination staff (CRSG Secretariat). The Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) is 1134 jointly chaired by a regional Assistant Secretary of State, the Coordinator for 1135 Reconstruction and Stabilization and the regional National Security Council Director. 1136 It will be supported by an interagency Secretariat complete with planning and 1137 operations staff that is drawn from all relevant USG agencies. Representatives from 1138 the OSD, JS, and when necessary the affected GCC will be involved with policy 1139 development and strategic level planning as members of the CRSG as well as 1140 providing input into the decision to establish the IMS based on the triggering 1141 guidance. 1142 With the decision to activate the IMS, a new situation-specific PCC will usually 1143 be established as the CRSG. However, it may be appropriate to designate an existing 1144 PCC to take on these expanded functions. This designation signals a change in status 1145 for the country and requires an assessment of current USG activities and plans, and 1146 additional staff to support an increased workload. Establishing a CRSG must take 1147 into account any international or political sensitivity surrounding prospective 1148 interventions and steps must be taken to minimize any potential negative implications 1149 of public knowledge of the effort. In exceptional cases, the planning and resource 1150 mobilization procedures envisioned in this handbook may be conducted under a PCC 1151 in order to avoid the higher profile that might result from establishing a formal 1152 CRSG. 1153 The CRSG prepares the whole-of-government strategic plan, including a common 1154 USG strategic goal, a concept of operations, the major essential tasks, including the 1155 Major Mission Elements (MMEs) the USG must undertake (including with 1156 international and host nation partners), and resource requirements to achieve stability.
13 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 27 1157 It can build on earlier interagency contingency planning. The CRSG prepares and 1158 forwards recommendations for decision by the Deputies’ and/or Principals’ 1159 Committee to ensure guidance and direction to U.S. civilians in Washington and the 1160 field. 1161 Once the USG integrated strategic plan is approved, the CRSG facilitates 1162 preparation and integration of interagency implementation planning, operations 1163 support, information management, international/coalition partnership development, 1164 and resource mobilization, as well as reach-back, monitoring and reporting functions. 1165 1166 c. Integration Planning Cell (IPC) 1167 An Integration Planning Cell (IPC) is a team of interagency planners and regional 1168 and sectoral experts who will be deployed to a Geographic Combatant Command 1169 (GCC) Headquarters or to the equivalent multinational HQ. The team leader for the 1170 IPC is considered to be at the peer level and will have direct access with the 1171 Commander of the GCC. Its purpose is to support civilian-military communication 1172 and integration of civilian and military planning in order to achieve unity of effort 1173 between civilian and military R&S implementation teams. This mechanism is not 1174 designed to create a USG civilian R&S operations/tactical plan. 1175 The CRSG will establish and deploy an IPC in response to an emerging crisis 1176 potentially requiring military intervention or support, a DOD request for assistance 1177 with R&S planning or a request from an equivalent multinational HQ. The IPC will 1178 be established in conjunction with the development of a U.S. strategic plan. It 1179 supports the Commander in integrating the evolving civilian components of the U.S. 1180 strategic and implementation plans with the military plan for operations. 1181 The affected GCC will have a key role in advising strategy and plans 1182 development – specifically those with possible military tasks. It will be responsible 1183 for providing the right force, manpower and equipment, to structure a JTF, to achieve 1184 its assigned tasks under an overarching strategy within the IMS. The GCC will also 1185 host and help align the IPC with its relevant staff elements, to facilitate effective 1186 integration of civilian and military R&S efforts designated by the CRSG. 1187 Integration of interagency planning is not limited to the establishment of an IPC, and 1188 working relationships between civilian and military planners should be developed 1189 before crises. 1190 1191 d. Advance Civilian Team (ACT) 1192 The CRSG may recommend (with the Chief of Mission’s concurrence) that the 1193 Secretary of State deploy an Advance Civilian Team (ACT). The ACT is a 1194 combination of processes, structures, and authorities that together provide the COM 1195 with the capacity to integrate the activities of the allocated assets in time, space and 1196 purpose in order to achieve unity of effort in the development and execution of the 1197 USG R&S Implementation Plan. Though it is called a “Team” it is a capacity. 1198 Furthermore, though it has “civilian” in its title, it seeks to integrate all elements of 1199 the USG to include the military. 1200 The ACT HQ is both strategic and operational in nature, assisting the COM to 1201 direct R&S planning and operations, and provides reach-back to parent, Washington, 1202 D.C. agencies for support. ACT(s) provide core R&S implementation planning and
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1203 operations expertise to the COM and military commanders. The ACT serves as the 1204 COM’s general R&S staff, supporting the COM, as they deem appropriate, in 1205 executing the USG Interagency R&S Implementation Plan. 1206 The ACT operates under Chief of Mission authority. The ACT can operate with 1207 or without U.S. military involvement. In instances where the military is involved, the 1208 ACT will assist in integrating Joint Task Force (JTF) and Embassy R&S operations in 1209 support of both the COM and the Joint Force Commander. In all circumstances, U.S. 1210 civilian field operations are conducted under COM authority, and the COM bears 1211 ultimate responsibility for the execution of the R&S implementation plan. In the 1212 absence of an existing USG diplomatic presence, the ACT leader may be designated 1213 as the President’s Special Representative or Special Envoy, act as the COM, and will 1214 oversee the establishment of a more permanent USG presence. 1215 If a decision is made to establish and deploy a JTF in response to the triggering of 1216 the IMS, the JTF’s participation within the IMS may require it to interface with many 1217 different components such as the Advance Civilian Team (ACT), Field Advance 1218 Civilian Team (FACT) Chief of Mission (COM), and country team members of a US 1219 Embassy. For unity of effort, ACT(s) integrate and coordinate the execution of the 1220 U.S. R&S Implementation Plan with existing USG civilian and military operations. 1221 Success or failure of a U.S. R&S operation in the field largely will depend on 1222 ensuring the COM and the JTF Commander having a shared operational picture, an 1223 agreed plan and vision for its execution, and a shared process for raising and making 1224 decisions. 1225 1226 e. Field Advanced Civilian Teams (FACTs) 1227 If necessary, the ACT can deploy a number of Field Advance Civilian Teams 1228 (FACTs). FACT(s) are usually deployed outside of the ACT HQ to establish a U.S. 1229 presence, provide direct information about conditions on the ground and support 1230 those R&S operations conducted at a provincial and local level. They are flexible, 1231 scalable teams responsible for a range of operations in governance, security, rule of 1232 law, infrastructure and economic stabilization to provide the COM with maximum 1233 capacity to implement R&S programs. As required, they may coordinate the field 1234 execution of projects that involve not only USG resources, but also foreign 1235 governments, UN, other international organizations, non-governmental organizations 1236 (NGO), or host nation activities. While remaining under COM authority, FACT(s) 1237 may integrate with U.S. or foreign military forces when appropriate to maintain 1238 maximum U.S./coalition unity of effort. In this regard, FACT(s) build upon the 1239 lessons learned from Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), currently established 1240 for both Afghanistan and Iraq. 1241 An MSC or elements thereof such as Brigade Combat Teams/Regimental Combat 1242 Teams (BCT/RCT), within a JTF, will interact with many of the ACT/FACT 1243 implementers, who plan, coordinate and execute projects while participating in the 1244 IMS. The primary interface at this level, within the construct of the IMS, will be the 1245 Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT). FACT(s) must be equipped and trained to 1246 perform in non-permissive/hostile environments, in coordination with the U.S.
14 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 29 1247 military or multinational forces. Functional units, elements or selected personnel 1248 within a MSC with inherent civil-military capabilities such as Civil Affairs, 1249 Engineers, Military Police, and Contracting Officers (or their designated 1250 representative) when appropriate may be tasked to support, attached or detailed (in 1251 the case of individuals) to a FACT to provide assistance and expertise. Arrangements 1252 concerning direction, guidance, and sustainment should be established through an 1253 MOU prior to any unit taskings or personnel moves between military and civilian 1254 elements. 1255 1256 3. Key interagency proponents and participants 1257 As approved by Deputies Committee, the IMS is the approved process for how 1258 the US Government will organize itself when responding to a Reconstruction and 1259 Stabilization intervention. The key interagency proponents for the IMS are derived 1260 from NDAA 2009, which specifies that the Department of State will lead USG 1261 reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The Department of Defense and the National 1262 Security Council serve as two other key proponents for the IMS. Participants in the 1263 process are all agencies and departments of the USG that will have a role in an 1264 approved R&S operation. These include, but are not limited to: the Departments of 1265 Justice, Commerce, Homeland Security, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, 1266 and the US Agency for international Development. 1267 All agencies contributing personnel to elements of an IMS should place them 1268 under the administrative control (ADCON) of a single designated Senior Agency 1269 Representative (SAR). SAR(s) enjoy direct access to the IMS leadership at their 1270 level, to include the DCM and COM at an ACT/Embassy. Where USG agencies have 1271 multiple organizations under them (OFDA/DART and OTI in USAID, INL and PRM 1272 in State, ICITAP and OPDAT in DOJ, etc.), the agency may opt to designate a SAR 1273 for each of them. That said, because SAR(s) enjoy direct access to the DCM and 1274 COM, they may not “stack”, for example, DART and OTI “SAR(s)” reporting to an 1275 overall USAID SAR. 1276 1277 a. Civilian Response Corps (CRC) 1278 The civilian agencies, despite their roles and responsibilities in the IMS, will not 1279 have the manpower capacity necessary to support pre-crisis training or extra 1280 personnel available to be dedicated to IMS specific duties. Civilian agencies in many 1281 cases are staffed “one deep”, meaning an individual with particular expertise needed 1282 during an R&S operation will be holding down responsibilities in his or her agency 1283 on a daily basis that will be left unfilled if that individual is “deployed” to fulfill 1284 duties specific to the R&S operation. In recognition of this reality, the Department of 1285 State has been authorized to establish and sustain a pool of professionals intended to 1286 serve when an IMS is authorized for an R&S operation. The Civilian Response Corp 1287 (CRC) is the civilian agency’s equivalent of military reserves for crisis response. 1288 This section is not intended to offer a detailed description of the CRC. It is designed 1289 to provide military personnel involved in an R&S operation an understanding and 1290 appreciation of the civilian counterparts they will encounter at the different levels: 1291 strategic, operational and tactical, of the IMS.
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1292 The Civilian Response Corps is a group of civilian federal employees and, 1293 eventually, volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments, who 1294 will be trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from 1295 conflict, in order to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. The CRC is 1296 the core of how the civilian components of U.S. national power will respond to a 1297 country in crisis that has been designated by the President for an R&S response 1298 employing the IMS. The CRC is comprised of diplomats, development specialists, 1299 public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, 1300 economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists and others – offering the full 1301 range of skills needed to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law, and 1302 achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth as quickly as possible. 1303 The President has empowered the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead 1304 integrated U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and 1305 reconstruction activities, and to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense to 1306 harmonize civilian and military activities. Because no single government entity has 1307 all of the relevant expertise, the Civilian Response Corps is a partnership of eight 1308 departments and agencies: the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International 1309 Development (USAID), Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, 1310 Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, 1311 Department of Justice, and Department of the Treasury. 1312 The CRC consists of three components, an Active Component, a Standby 1313 Component and a Reserve Component. The Department of State and the US Agency 1314 for International Development are currently the only civilian organizations that have 1315 dedicated personnel, whose daily work is centered on IMS planning and preparation, 1316 including training. These staffs are small and while military personnel may encounter 1317 these personnel during R&S operations they will be the exception rather than the rule. 1318 Most civilians involved in R&S operations under an established IMS will come from 1319 one of the three components of the CRC. 1320 Active component officers are full-time employees of their departments/agencies 1321 whose specific job is to train for, prepare, and staff reconstruction and stabilization 1322 (R&S) operations for conflict prevention and response. They may spend 50-60% of 1323 the year in overseas conflict areas, deployed on average for 90 days at a time. Active 1324 component members will attend up to eight weeks of formal training and exercises 1325 per year. They provide “first responder” expeditionary capabilities in civil-military 1326 environments and operate in whole-of-government structures such as the formal 1327 Interagency Management System (IMS) or ad hoc response teams. They focus on 1328 critical initial interagency functions such as assessment, planning, management; and 1329 administrative, logistical, and resource mobilization in order to stand-up or increase 1330 the capabilities of U.S. Government (USG) systems and structures for response and 1331 implementation of R&S operations during a specific country engagement. When not 1332 deployed these personnel participate in exercises, train for R&S operations, conduct 1333 training and contribute to lessons learned, best practices, development of standards 1334 and SOP(s).
15 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 31 1335 The Standby Component is comprised of officers that are full-time employees of 1336 their departments/ agencies who may or may not have current positions related to 1337 R&S sector areas. However, they have specialized subject matter expertise useful in 1338 R&S operations, and have committed and secured permission from their office to be 1339 available for call-up in the event of an R&S operation, have been pre-screened and 1340 trained, and have committed to be available to leave their home office within 30 days 1341 of call-up (if approved by supervisor and department/agency). 1342 The initial period of operational support for Standby officers will be for 90 days. 1343 Standby officers can be asked to extend for an additional 90 days and most should 1344 expect to do so. Standby Component members attend orientation training in the first 1345 year and additional training in following years. When activated, they serve as 1346 employees of their home departments/agencies assigned to U.S.-based planning, 1347 assessment, exercises or overseas deployment, under the supervision of a designated 1348 individual within the whole-of-government response structure. They provide critical 1349 reinforcement and follow-up for the Active Component, as well as pertinent skills and 1350 expertise. Deployments will be on average for a 90 day period. 1351 The final component of the CRC is the Reserve Component. Officers designated 1352 to the Reserve Component are U.S. citizens who have committed to be available 1353 within 45-60 days of call-up to serve as U.S. Government temporary employees in 1354 support of inherent governmental work during an overseas R&S operation. They 1355 provide a pool of qualified, pre-trained, and ready civilian professionals with 1356 specialized expertise and skills not readily found within the U.S. Government—such 1357 as municipal administration, policing, and local governance—that are critical for 1358 R&S operations. 1359 The Reserve Component will draw upon civilians outside the United States 1360 Government with critical skills either absent in the federal workforce, or present in 1361 insufficient numbers. Reserve officers are vital to efforts to bring “normalcy” to 1362 countries going through R&S engagement by filling capabilities career U.S. 1363 Government employees simply cannot match in expertise or in number. Reserve 1364 Component officers are expected to serve a minimum of three months when deployed 1365 but are likely to be asked to extend for up to one year. Although Reserve Component 1366 officers can be utilized at all levels of the IMS, they will mostly be assigned to 1367 positions in the ACT or FACT(s), and for this reason these Reserve Component 1368 officers are the civilians most likely to interact with military personnel on a daily 1369 basis during an R&S operation under the established IMS. 1370 Reservists will most likely conduct field based, sector specific activities, such as: 1371 development of a range of short, medium, and long term programs in highly technical 1372 areas; conduct technical assistance in host nation ministries, regional, and local 1373 offices; coordinate with other donor nations, multilateral organizations, NGOs, and 1374 the private sector to develop a comprehensive approach to technical assistance; reach 1375 back to technical experts in state-side headquarters to enhance value of forward 1376 deployed team. CRC officers of the Reserve component are force enhancers to 1377 complement the conventional operations of departments/agencies. They will apply 1378 their sectoral expertise to provide effective and informed R&S assistance. Reserve 1379 Component officers should ideally also have experience in a range of countries and 1380 environments and a range of civilian, military, and international structures.
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1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 Intentionally Blank 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424
16 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 33 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 Chapter 3 1434 Military Participation in the IMS (R&S) 1435 1436 1437 1438 1. Introduction 1439 The complex nature of reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations, 1440 characterized by a rapidly changing environment, multiple simultaneous responses 1441 and activities, and a variety of actors, requires unity of effort for the coordinated 1442 interagency response to succeed.1 Skilled personnel are best able to accomplish USG 1443 and agency specific R&S goals within an interagency environment when: 1444 1445 operating according to a common set of principles; and 1446 organized and supported according to clearly defined authorities, roles, 1447 and relationships with other personnel (peers, superiors and subordinates) and 1448 their respective agencies2 1449 1450 A significant way to improve interagency coordination is to develop a common 1451 understanding for agency authorities participating in the IMS, and the existing 1452 controls that will guide R&S activities in the affected country or region.3 It is 1453 essential that clear-cut, mutually understood principles, authorities and control 1454 relationships are established during the course of any planning process, prior to the 1455 deployment of any implementing personnel into an operational area.4 This chapter 1456 describes a series of principles, authorities, and control and coordination measures by 1457 which the IMS is established to ensure successful interagency cooperation.5 These 1458 mechanisms will be refined by planners, implementers and leaders during the 1459 establishment and operation of the IMS to ensure unity of effort during R&S 1460 operations.6 1461 Effective execution of interagency R&S operations begins by establishing unity of 1462 effort through the designation of a leader with the requisite authority to accomplish 1463 assigned tasks using an uncomplicated chain of leadership.7 The COM is the primary
17 1 Draft IMS Guide, chapter 2 Interagency Management: Principles, Authorities, and Controls, Department of State, Office of the 18 Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), April 2008 19 2 Id 20 3 Id 21 4 Id 22 5 Id 23 6 Id 24 7 Id 34 Military Participation In The IMS As of 17 April 2009
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1464 USG official tasked with implementing the USG Strategic Plan for R&S.8 However, 1465 the President may designate a special envoy or senior official for such purposes.9 The 1466 authorities granted to the COM and the JFC are statutory and must be taken into 1467 account during the establishment and operation of the IMS. The IMS does not 1468 obviate these authorities. It is essential for the COM and JFC to ensure that 1469 subordinate leaders and staff understand their authority to act as well as their role in 1470 decision making and relationships with others.10 The assignment of responsibilities 1471 and the delegation of authorities both foster initiative and ensure unified action.11 The 1472 authorities and control mechanisms contained in the IMS are summarized in this 1473 chapter. Appendix A: Authorities for Military Participation in Stabilization and 1474 Reconstruction Operations, provides further detail of authorities governing command 1475 and control relationships, acquisitions, and interagency coordination involving 1476 military participation in the IMS. 1477 Interagency staff in the CRSG, IPC/GCC, and ACT/JTF must understand that 1478 their primary roles are to provide sufficient, relevant information to enhance their 1479 leadership’s situational awareness critical to decision-making and to execute the 1480 decisions of their leaders by focusing the appropriate capabilities within their 1481 organizations to achieve the leader’s intent.12 Therefore, leaders must give staff the 1482 authority to make routine decisions while conducting operations consistent with the 1483 objectives in the USG Strategic Plan for R&S.13 1484 1485 2. Military Participation Authorities for the IMS 1486 Military participation authorities for the IMS can be explained by examining 1487 statutes in U.S. Code, Acts of Congress, Directives – both Presidential and DoD, DoD 1488 Instructions, and Doctrine. The US Government Planning Framework for 1489 Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation (RS & CT), further 1490 describes the IMS, its participants and authorities, and how the system enables the 1491 planning framework. 1492 Authority over U.S. personnel in foreign countries is fundamentally a statutory 1493 issue divided primarily between the Chief of Mission (COM) and the applicable 1494 senior U.S. Military commander with geographic responsibilities. This clear division 1495 of authority states that the COM has “full responsibility” for the direction, 1496 coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in the 1497 country except for … employees under the command of United States area military 1498 commander.14 1499 The U.S. area military commander is understood to be the commander of a 1500 Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). The GCC is responsible to the Secretary 1501 of Defense and the President for the performance of missions assigned by them,
25 8 Id 26 9 Id 27 10 Id 28 11 Id 29 12 Id 30 13 Id 31 14 22 USC 3927
32 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 35 1502 which includes “sufficient authority, direction, and control over commands and forces 1503 assigned to exercise effective command ….”15 1504 The nature of this command authority is further delineated in Joint Publication 1 1505 (JP1). It cites unity of command as one of the primary general principles for 1506 command relationships. Specifically, unity of command requires that two 1507 commanders may not exercise the same command relationship over the same force at 1508 the same time. Therefore, the authorities of the COM and the GCC are separate and 1509 distinct, but sufficient within their own realms. This is not meant to breed 1510 disharmony. Military doctrine and the concept of unity of command are never 1511 exercised in isolation, but is part of the broader goal of unified action. 1512 The principles of unity of effort are essential to R&S operations. For example, in 1513 the IMS, a deployed Advance Civilian Team (ACT) serves under COM authority. 1514 All ACT members, including detailed military members, are under COM control.16 1515 Another example of an established relationship between the COM and DoD is the 1516 Defense Attaché. The Defense Attaché and all the military personnel detailed to that 1517 office, “belongs” to the COM. If the COM decides to make his or her senior military 1518 attaché the principal liaison with the JTF commander, that attaché continues to work 1519 for the COM, in effect serving as their “camel in the JTF tent”. 1520 If military forces, such as a Joint Task Force (JTF), are simultaneously present 1521 in-country, the Commander of a GCC or his designated subordinate military 1522 commander exercises their statutory command and control authority.17 Although 1523 these command and leadership chains are separate and distinct, the military concept 1524 of unified action requires close coordination between the JTF commander and the 1525 COM-directed ACT to accomplish the objectives in the USG Strategic Plan for 1526 R&S.18 1527 1528 a. Control Authorities 1529 In general the military refers to control in the context of an authority that may be 1530 less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of 1531 subordinate or other organizations.19 Examples of control are Operational Control 1532 (OPCON), Tactical Control (TACON) and Administrative Control (ADCON). 1533 Current military definitions for OPCON, TACON, and ADCON do not account for or 1534 incorporate the addition of the interagency perspective, which will be brought to the 1535 forefront if the IMS is established resulting in military participation under the system. 1536 When necessary, the Department of State, in coordination with the Department of 1537 Defense will develop MOU(s) with a GCC to ensure effective and timely attachment 1538 of an IPC to its headquarters. The IPC reports to the CRSG and maintains a 1539 coordinating relationship with the COM.20 When deployed, members of the IPC will 1540 fall under the security rules of the host GCC HQ based on the terms stipulated in a
33 15 10 USC 164 34 16 Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, (DC Approved, March 29, 2007) 35 17 Robert Wedan, “Authority Issues for Stability Ops” paper, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, Pentagon, 2008 36 18 Id 37 19 JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended 17 OCT 2008 38 20 Draft IMS Guide, chapter 5 Integration Planning Cell, Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 39 Stabilization (S/CRS), June 2008 40 36 Military Participation In The IMS As of 17 April 2009
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1541 MOU, but will otherwise fall under the authority of the COM. Implied in this is the 1542 close coordination and de-confliction of security rules established by the Regional 1543 Security Officer (RSO), COM, and the GCC inside the country of deployment. These 1544 should be clearly stated and understood by all parties who operate under an 1545 arrangement utilizing an MOU. 1546 An underlying principle of the IMS is that the COM retains authority and control 1547 over all USG activities in country not under the GCC.21 The COM may be accredited 1548 to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS strategic-level planners 1549 and decision makers and provides recommendations and considerations for crisis 1550 action planning directly to the GCC Commander and/or JTF Commander. While 1551 forces in the field under a GCC Commander are exempt from the COM’s statutory 1552 authority, the COM confers with the combatant commander regularly to coordinate 1553 US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG 1554 toward the host country. The COM’s political role is important to the success of 1555 military operations. Each COM has a formal agreement with the geographic 1556 combatant commander as to which DOD personnel fall under the force protection 1557 responsibility of each. 1558 The USG Planning Framework reinforces the importance of the COM in the early 1559 development of a policy and strategic planning for the USG response to an IMS 1560 triggering event. While bodies of the IMS may deploy to the location of the military 1561 to maximize unity of effort and assist with planning and implementation of tasks, this 1562 does not mean they fall under the control of a military commander. Instead they will 1563 either report to a higher element in the IMS or, when deployed, the COM. This is 1564 also true when US civilian and military headquarters are co-located. The IPC, for 1565 example, will report to the CRSG and has a coordinating relationship with the 1566 relevant COM. If deployed to a foreign country with the GCC, the IPC will fall under 1567 COM authority. 1568 Similar to the IPC, the ACT when deployed serves under the COM authority. 1569 They will also have the capability to operate in country with or without a US Military 1570 presence. If FACT(s) are established, they too will remain under the COM authority. 1571 FACT(s) may integrate with US military forces when appropriate to maintain unity of 1572 effort. This implies previous planning and close coordination with the military and 1573 the development of MOU(s) outlining the requirements, responsibilities, duties and 1574 authorities of each party to the signed document. At a minimum the JFC (and 1575 relevant MSC), COM, ACT/FACT leaders, and RSO plus the appropriate legal 1576 advisors should be consulted when constructing these documents. 1577 ACT/FACT personnel may be drawn from members of the US military in 1578 accordance with the Economy Act, which, in DoD is implemented by DoD 1579 Instruction 1000.17 (DoDI 1000.17). Under that Instruction, a “detail” is a temporary 1580 assignment of a military member or DoD civilian employee to perform duties in an 1581 agency outside the Department of Defense with the intent of returning to the 1582 Department upon completion of those duties. The Economy Act and DoDI 1000.17 1583 do not apply to military forces. A military force cannot be assigned, attached, or
41 21 22 USC 3927
42 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 37 1584 controlled by a COM. A military force is assigned to a GCC and cannot be 1585 transferred to another except by order of the Secretary of Defense. The COCOM 1586 must be a military officer. Although the COCOM can delegate operational control 1587 over forces assigned to subordinate commanders, they too must be military officers. 1588 Personnel drawn from the US military should be fully trained and qualified to 1589 perform the functions necessary to support an ACT or FACT. Members of the US 1590 Military may find themselves in the unique position of being part of an IMS body 1591 under the control of the COM while being a member of a military force deployed into 1592 theater under the control of a GCC. In these instances careful consideration should be 1593 made to determine what functions will be performed by these personnel. 1594 Issues of control and responsibility for military detailees can be resolved in an 1595 MOU. However, ultimate control remains with the sending agency, which can 1596 revoke the MOU at any time. Similarly, the receiving agency, if dissatisfied with the 1597 military detailee’s performance, may return the military detailee at any time. In light 1598 this; the COM’s authority over a military detailee is not equivalent to military 1599 command. The GCC retains this authority at all times. However, for as long as the 1600 detailing arrangement is in effect; the COM exercises direction, coordination, and 1601 supervision authorities. 1602 According to the IMS (R&S) paper approved by the Deputies Committee in 1603 March 2007, “ACT HQ and FACT members are under the operational control of the 1604 ACT/FACT leader, though they remain in contact with their parent agencies and may 1605 still be rated or evaluated by their parent agencies, with input from the ACT/FACT 1606 Leader. Alternately, if agreed in advance, ACT/FACT members may be rated 1607 directly by the ACT/FACT leadership and reviewed by their parent agency.” 1608 Furthermore, “the ACT, as directed by the COM, exercises operational control over 1609 interagency personnel assigned or attached to it. Operational control in no way 1610 denies or alters any officer’s right and duty to remain in communication with his/her 1611 parent agency, to exchange information and recommendations with that agency, and 1612 to appeal to more senior parent agency representatives when necessary.” These 1613 guidelines coupled with COM authority for all USG activities in country not under 1614 the control of the GCC exemplify the need for clearly articulated arrangements 1615 utilizing MOUs between the GCC and COM before military personnel are detailed to 1616 an ACT or FACT. 1617 It is important to note that there may be US military forces and USG civilian 1618 agency organizations already deployed and operating in the affected country prior to 1619 the establishment of the IMS. If these elements are conducting operations related to 1620 the implementation of stabilization and reconstruction plans, the COM may authorize 1621 the ACT or FACT(s) upon arrival to synchronize the operations of these elements in 1622 support of the Interagency Implementation Plan, sometimes called the Country Plan. 1623 For the military this will require additional coordination measures to be implemented 1624 between the ACT/FACT(s) and military units (for example civil affairs, 1625 psychological operations, engineers, advisors for indigenous security forces, and 1626 military police) during on-going operations through the use of fragmentary orders. 1627 These units will likely already be engaged providing stabilization and reconstruction 1628 activity support to military commanders from the JTF level down to battalion and 1629 below level. Because of this it will be important to incorporate the input of military
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1630 commanders to provide advice for the synchronization of operations concerning 1631 military units who impact the implementation of stabilization and reconstruction 1632 plans. 1633 1634 b. Resource Authorities 1635 Under the IMS, USG executive agencies and their programs will retain their 1636 established legal authorities and responsibilities concerning the use of appropriated 1637 funds and implementation of programs. DOD funds and programs that are existing or 1638 created to execute the Interagency Implementation Plan (or Country Plan) will be 1639 managed by DoD appointed officers or designated representatives assigned to support 1640 or detailed to the ACT HQ or FACT(s), as determined by the DOD or by a designated 1641 subordinate agency with established authority over the funds and programs. 1642 Within the ACT/FACT area of responsibility, control of DOD resources and 1643 programs will be maintained by the DOD or by one of its designated subordinate 1644 agencies. Designated DOD (or subordinate agency) program officers or 1645 representatives may conduct their activities centrally from the JTF/MSC or can 1646 choose to decentralize and delegate program implementation and funding authorities 1647 to their designated representatives on the ACT/FACT(s) while maintaining the 1648 necessary level of oversight as required. 1649 Employees of executive agencies, who are specifically authorized by the head of 1650 his or her agency to certify vouchers for payment, are responsible to ensure the 1651 legality of a voucher and the correctness of the facts supporting it. This responsibility 1652 cannot be transferred to another agency. Once the voucher is certified, disbursing 1653 officers from various agencies may disburse funds as appropriate if they determine 1654 the voucher is in proper form and computed correctly on the facts certified. 1655 The options surrounding the use of DoD resources choices will be dependant 1656 upon R&S program requirements and an overall assessment of the situation on the 1657 ground. It will also be influenced by contracting and funding authorities that program 1658 and contracting officers and their appointed representatives can assume through 1659 delegation. Responsibility for implementing programs will be maintained by the 1660 agency that funds the program. For example, a FACT team leader could not tell a 1661 FACT member with certifying authority to certify a voucher for payment that is not 1662 legally proper under the appropriation or funds involved. Similarly, the FACT team 1663 leader could not have authority to direct a fund certifier to authorize the obligation of 1664 funds. However, FACT team leaders may participate in determinations of spending 1665 priorities, to include approval or coordination of requirements in accordance with the 1666 Interagency Implementation Plan (or Country Plan). 1667 1668 c. Responsibilities and Coordination Processes 1669 NSPD 44 stipulated that the Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate 1670 stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans 1671 when relevant and appropriate and develop a general framework for fully 1672 coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all 1673 levels where appropriate. These responsibilities were reaffirmed in NDAA 2009
43 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 39 1674 which stated, “The Secretary of State and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 1675 Stabilization are also charged with coordination with the Department of Defense on 1676 reconstruction and stabilization responses, and integrating planning and implementing 1677 procedures.” In June 2008, the Deputies Committee of the NSC approved the United 1678 States Principles for Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict 1679 Transformation. This framework provides a whole of government process for 1680 planning for stabilization, reconstruction and conflict transformation. The IMS 1681 provides a vehicle to implement a planning framework for stabilization and 1682 reconstruction activities. Each level of the IMS will require coordination points to be 1683 established with the relevant USG interagency actors operating within the system. 1684 In order to maximize coordination and effectiveness, the IMS paper approved by 1685 the Deputies Committee, recommended that when appropriate, at each level of the 1686 IMS military and civilian headquarters be co-located. This will be influenced by the 1687 level of military involvement, the phase and timing of operations, and the security 1688 situation. The feasibility of co-locating headquarters for planning and conducting 1689 stabilization and reconstruction activities will also be influenced by other factors such 1690 as the need for USG civilian professionals to be in close proximity to host nation 1691 government officials and their offices and the location allocated for a military 1692 headquarters. 1693 In some instances other factors will intervene making it necessary for the military 1694 and civilian headquarters to be separate. Decisions should be made concerning 1695 liaison capabilities needed and what interagency “slice” elements of both civilian and 1696 military headquarters should co-locate within each other’s headquarters. Separate 1697 headquarters will also require careful planning and implementation for 1698 communications, transportation, security, and sustainment capabilities that could 1699 otherwise be leveraged when both headquarters are co-located. 1700 The CRSG, on behalf of NSC Principals’ and Deputies’ Committees, will 1701 coordinate interagency crisis response and provide recommendations on strategic 1702 guidance to Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees on all policy and resource issues 1703 related to the specific country or crisis. This includes recommendations on lead roles 1704 between all elements of the interagency. 1705 The IPC leadership will keep the host GCC HQ leadership apprised of 1706 communications with the CRSG. The IPC and DOD representatives on the CRSG 1707 will keep the CRSG informed of military planning and operations so that the planning 1708 process can take into account the military operations and their potential effects. The 1709 IPC will also coordinate with the ACT through the COM. Coordination between the 1710 IPC and CRSG does not obviate the defense policy guidance and plan approval 1711 process codified in law and implementing through internal DOD procedures. 1712 The IPC may require frequent coordination with and guidance from key 1713 implementing agencies. Ideally, such communication should be channeled through 1714 the CRSG to implementing agencies in order to facilitate the development of timely, 1715 field-informed recommendations for program development, and supplemental budget 1716 requests. Recommendations should be based on an understanding of the host GCC 1717 HQ plans and field-identified R&S conditions and requirements. If necessary, 1718 disputes among interagency partners within the IPC or between the IPC and the host 1719 GCC HQ can be referred to the CRSG for resolution.
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1720 ACT(s) will coordinate and integrate the execution of 1721 the Interagency Implementation Plan (or Country Plan) 1722 with existing USG civilian and military operations. 1723 Where gaps in existing civilian operations are identified, 1724 ACT(s) initiate or manage a response. ACT(s) provide 1725 core R&S implementation planning and operations 1726 expertise to COM(s) and military commanders. They 1727 also may extend the USG’s civilian presence via 1728 FACT(s) reporting to the ACT HQ. ACT(s) will work to 1729 ensure that U.S. efforts focus on supporting both USG 1730 and host country goals and interests. As required, 1731 FACT(s) may coordinate the field execution of projects 1732 that involve USG resources. They may also coordinate 1733 with UN, other international organizations, non- 1734 governmental organizations (NGO) or host country 1735 entities to execute projects. 1736 The ACT/FACT areas of responsibility should mirror 1737 those of the military forces deployed, so that each area of 1738 responsibility has a dual US civilian and military 1739 leadership structure, starting at the COM-JFC level and 1740 working to the lowest tactical level feasible/necessary. 1741 However, having common areas of responsibilities (or 1742 areas of operations as defined by the military) may not 1743 be possible. In the earlier phases of military 1744 involvement, especially in armed conflict, the priority 1745 may be to capture and hold key terrain such as 1746 geographic features, transportation nodes, ports, towns 1747 (with transit points), etc. In these cases the geographic 1748 objectives and key terrain that form the boundaries of a
44 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 41 1749 military area of operation may not align with political 1750 boundaries utilized by civilian professionals operating 1751 within the IMS. 1752 As the situation dictates and stabilization and 1753 reconstruction activities are transitioned to civilian 1754 professionals then a realignment of military areas of 1755 operations to civilian areas of responsibility should be 1756 considered to unify the actions of and maximize the 1757 capabilities resident in both civilian and military 1758 organizations to achieve unity of effort. 1759 ACT/FACT and military coordination with the host country is of great importance 1760 to stabilization and reconstruction activities. The primary objective in any R&S 1761 operation is to identify and work to reduce drivers of conflict and instability and build 1762 host country government capacity sufficient to put the country on a path towards 1763 sustainable peace. Although specific ACT and FACT operations could range from 1764 direct governance to advisory missions to reporting and program-implementation 1765 functions, all civil military operations should be conducted with a view towards 1766 creating local host government capabilities to sustain stable and functional 1767 governance. 1768 1769 i) GCC and JTF coordination requirements 1770 Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to successful stability operations 1771 and civil military teams are a critical U.S. Government stability operations tool. 1772 Participation in such teams will be open to representatives from other U.S. 1773 Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International 1774 Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector with relevant skills and 1775 expertise. Relevant to the IMS is the responsibility for the Under Secretary of 1776 Defense for Policy, USD(P), to “develop a process to facilitate information sharing 1777 for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments 1778 and Agencies…”, which is a core function of the IMS. The Chairman of the Joint 1779 Chiefs of Staff supports the USD(P) and appropriate U.S. Departments and Agencies 1780 through participation in US Government and multinational stability operations 1781 planning processes. Commander’s of GCC(s) will engage relevant U.S. Departments 1782 and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, 1783 NGOs, and members of the Private Sector in stability operations planning, training, 1784 and exercising, as appropriate, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 1785 of Staff and the USD(P). 1786 The term and definition of the IMS is absent in DoDD 3000.05. However, it is 1787 clear that this document mandates the participation of the military in stability 1788 operations as one of its core mission areas. This establishes a clear point of
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1789 intersection between the Directive and the IMS which if established will direct and 1790 coordinate R&S response activities across the US Government. 1791 The JTF Commander participating in the IMS will coordinate with many different 1792 actors and entities – some of whom may not be operating under the system. These 1793 other elements may include the host country (public and private sector) and its 1794 military, coalition militaries, and NGOs. Within the IMS, the Joint Force 1795 Commander will have reoccurring coordination and interaction with members 1796 representing the IPC, ACT, and if deployed the FACT. Coordination with the CRSG 1797 will likely occur through guidance and direction received from OSD, Joint Staff, and 1798 the GCC utilizing existing procedures. It will be important for the JTF Commander 1799 and staff to know and understand the mission and purpose of each IMS body so 1800 coordination requirements can be better supported. 1801 GCC coordination with the IPC will initially focus on reception and integration of 1802 the team into the appropriate elements of the GCC planning staff. The IPC will 1803 require space in which to conduct their activities and access to communication 1804 networks to maintain contact and information sharing with their home agencies, the 1805 CRSG, the COM (and Country Team), while allowing for the sharing of information 1806 between them and the GCC. It is likely that procedures for clearance and access to 1807 GCC staff and for facilities and plans stored at the GCC will have to be developed so 1808 that the IPC can provide the maximum benefit to the GCC to facilitate integration into 1809 the IMS. 1810 JTF coordination with the ACT/FACT implementing bodies in the IMS will come 1811 in many forms and increase or decrease depending on the scale of the operation, the 1812 level of military involvement, phase and timing, and if civilian and military 1813 headquarters are co-located or in separate locations. It will also be dependant upon 1814 the level of civilian involvement due to restrictions such as Department or Agency 1815 capacity shortfalls or a determination by the COM, RSO or military commander that 1816 security is inadequate for USG civilians to perform the tasks necessary to accomplish 1817 R&S objectives. At a minimum, coordination requirements the military should 1818 consider are security and clearance requirements, force protection, transportation, 1819 communications, and other requirements that enable life sustainment, such as 1820 housing, workspace facilities, fuel, power generation, food, water, medical, etc. 1821 An important coordination requirement for the JTF Commander to prepare for is 1822 the Interagency Implementation Plan (Country Plan) coordinated through the ACT 1823 and the field execution of (R&S) projects that involve USG resources, which are 1824 coordinated through FACTs. If the JTF Commander has contingency funds available 1825 to apply to stabilization and reconstruction activities the project nomination and 1826 approval process should incorporate the recommendations of the ACT and/or FACT 1827 leadership to established processes where extent. This process should, in most cases, 1828 incorporate the viewpoint and recommendations of the relevant and legitimate host 1829 country officials. Coordination with the ACT, FACT, and host country should be a 1830 reoccurring step within the R&S project life cycle processes. The goal of the whole- 1831 of-government approach utilizing the IMS is to create a common operating picture 1832 enabling coordinated planning and implementation for programs and projects.
45 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 43 1833 1834 d. Supported/Supporting Relationships 1835 Generally, the US military serves in a supporting role during whole-of- 1836 government planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction activities 1837 within the construct of the USG Planning Framework. While the primary effort for 1838 planning and conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities are best suited for 1839 civilian professionals, the interagency community has recognized that in some 1840 instances it may not be possible for these professionals to engage in these tasks, 1841 especially when the security situation in the affected country remains tenuous and 1842 order has yet to be established. In these situations the military may be called upon to 1843 perform stabilization tasks necessary to establish and maintain order allowing for 1844 transition to the civilian professionals. These supported and supporting relationships 1845 are codified in NDAA 2009. 1846 At each level of the IMS the military generally serves in a supporting role and 1847 may detail personnel with the requisite experience upon request or when determined 1848 by DoD to the organizational structures resident within the system. However, there 1849 may be some instances where the military may find itself in the supported role. An 1850 example could be the DOD being designated to lead a Major Mission Element 1851 (MME) – one that is predominately security related utilizing a preponderance of 1852 military resources. In this instance the DOD would be responsible for coordinating 1853 the development of sub-objectives as well as executing the majority of tasks to 1854 achieve the overall objectives in the MME. Likewise, the DOD may be called upon 1855 to provide its expertise and support to another Department or Agency leading another 1856 MME. Supporting and supported relationships do not affect legal authorities 1857 concerning Department or Agency specific programs and funding. 1858 1859 3. Resource Planning 1860 Planning resource requirements for military participation within the IMS should 1861 start as early as possible after the USG policy guidance and a decision to involve 1862 military forces have been established. Representatives from OSD and Joint Staff 1863 serving on the CRSG Strategic Planning Team (SPT) will assist in the planning and 1864 development of the USG policy guidance, strategy and MME development to 1865 determine the need for military participation. The OSD and Joint Staff 1866 representatives will utilize established DOD procedures, when communicating with 1867 elements inside DOD, for policy guidance and approval of plans. They will assist in 1868 the development of a PLANORD that will be distributed to the affected GCC 1869 participating in the response effort. 1870 The PLANORD will serve as the initial notification to the GCC of the forces 1871 available for utilization under the response. The affected GCC will then be able 1872 conduct planning for manpower requirements utilizing the policy guidance, strategy, 1873 and objectives it receives from the Joint Staff. The affected GCC should incorporate 1874 the views and recommendations of the IPC, if deployed to its location, into its 1875 planning processes. IPC members should integrate into staff structures such as the 1876 Operations Planning Team (OPT), the Joint Planning Group (JPG) and or relevant 1877 Boards Centers and Cells (BCC).
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1878 GCC planners will begin planning as soon as a GCC receives a PLANORD – in 1879 some instances before. The IPC may not be established and deployed to the GCC to 1880 inform initial planning, therefore the GCC should be prepared to make adjustments 1881 and/or modifications to its planning when the IPC arrives and is integrated into the 1882 GCC. Insights and recommendations gained from the IPC members may help inform 1883 the development of resource requirements to accomplish the objectives assigned to 1884 the military. GCC request for forces should incorporate whole-of-government 1885 planning objectives while utilizing established processes and mechanisms for 1886 submission through established channels. 1887 Resource requirements should align to assigned tasks to accomplish designated 1888 objectives as illustrated in the USG Strategic Plan Overview Template utilized by the 1889 IMS. Resource requirements need to consider possible support requirements for USG 1890 civilian professionals such as ground/air transport, security (including contracted 1891 security), and life support. Structures within the IMS may require selected military 1892 personnel based on specialty (MOS), level of experience, and subject matter expertise 1893 (e.g. a military reservist’s civilian employment) to be detailed. In these instances 1894 Economy Act Orders and written agreements such as MOUs need to be constructed 1895 between the affected military command and the receiving organization gaining these 1896 personnel. Requests for support may extend to certain types of military units whose 1897 core mission generally involves civil military operations (CMO). Security, logistic, 1898 sustainment, and support to other implementing missions may be accomplished by 1899 DoD upon reimbursement by the State Department under an Economy Act order. 1900 Planning resource requirements supporting military participation within the IMS 1901 needs to start early. This will already be underway in the affected GCC and will have 1902 to be aligned to the objectives and tasks assigned to the military under in the strategic 1903 plan devised by the CRSG. It will be important for the military, including the 1904 affected GCC, to understand what other resources implementation partners within the 1905 IMS are bringing with them to achieve objectives. By doing so the military can 1906 leverage resources, reduce duplication, and increase unity of effort to achieve shared 1907 objectives. 1908 Resource planners, on behalf of the GCC, should plan for and be prepared to 1909 support requests for contingency funding related to the implementation of R&S 1910 related programs and projects. An example of this is the current use of Commander’s 1911 Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds in Iraq and Afghanistan. This type of 1912 resource planning should be coordinated with the ACT/FACT elements of the IMS as 1913 well as the COM, relevant country team members and appropriate host country 1914 officials. It is important to note that this type of expanded and coordinated resource 1915 planning should not interfere with established legal authorities concerning 1916 Department or Agency programs and their allocated funds. The military may be 1917 requested to resource training and equipping programs of a host nation’s security 1918 forces. These activities need to be planned and coordinated with the implementing 1919 bodies of the IMS as well as the COM, and other executive and legislative bodies as 1920 dictated by laws and regulations. The goal of the training and equipping programs is
46 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 45 1921 to build host country capacity to hasten transition to the appropriate host country 1922 officials. 1923 As with any military deployment information on resources available within the 1924 affected country will be of value to military planners. How the military employs the 1925 use of another country’s resources will be dependant upon how the military enters a 1926 country, whether by invitation or through the application of force. Deployed military 1927 forces must obey all laws and agreements the USG is a party to concerning the 1928 employment of its military and depending on the situation, the use of force. Some 1929 resource considerations for the military will be land or facility use and their 1930 restrictions as well as life support related resources such as water, and power 1931 generation. Additionally, the military may require the use of ports, rail, and roads to 1932 deliver critical sustainment resources. 1933 1934 4. Coordination and Integration with existing Interagency Structures 1935 Although elements of the recently established Civilian Response Corps are 1936 permanently standing bodies (i.e., the Active and Standby Corps), there is no 1937 permanently established IMS. This will require the CRSG, IPC, and ACT/FACT(s) 1938 to coordinate or integrate with existing interagency structures resident within GCCs, 1939 JTFs or falling under COM authority. These existing interagency structures bring 1940 with them regional knowledge and subject matter expertise of the affected country or 1941 countries. They will likely have pre-existing regional and country level contacts with 1942 IOs, NGOs, COMs, Country Teams, and host nation officials. It will be important for 1943 military participants in the IMS to leverage this knowledge and apply it to their 1944 planning processes. The following are examples of existing interagency 1945 organizations. 1946 1947 a. Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) 1948 The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and 1949 collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational 1950 planners, it is composed of US Government civilian and military experts detailed to 1951 the combatant commander. The JIACG is tailored to meet the requirements of a 1952 supported joint force commander, and provides the capability to coordinate with US 1953 Government civilian agencies and departments. The JIACG has been refined and in 1954 many cases renamed at the COCOM(s) where they were established. This standing 1955 interagency staff element will likely have direct interface with an IPC in the event the 1956 IMS is established. Due to their expertise, members of the JIACG will be consulted 1957 and expected to offer advice to the IPC and some members may participate on the 1958 IPC. However, they remain members of the JIACG and detailed to the GCC with 1959 steady-state consultative and advisory responsibilities that will continue during the 1960 crisis. 1961 1962 b. Joint Inter-agency Task Force (JIATF) 1963 The JIATF is an interagency organization under a single military director that 1964 coordinates specific operations (i.e., counterdrug, counter terrorism, IW, etc.) at the 1965 operational and tactical level. The JIATF concept has been expanded at COCOMs 1966 that previously established JIACGs as well as exporting the concept down to a JTF
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1967 operating within the AOR of a GCC. Further development of this concept will 1968 increase the need for coordination or integration of its activities with implementing 1969 bodies of the IMS. 1970 1971 c. Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) 1972 The JCMOTF is a joint task force composed of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) 1973 units from more than one Service. It provides support to the joint force commander 1974 in humanitarian or nation assistance operations, theater campaigns, or civil military 1975 operations concurrent with or subsequent to regional conflict. It can organize military 1976 interaction among many governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian agencies 1977 within the theater. 1978 The JCMOTF is not a standing interagency organization instead it can coordinate 1979 or facilitate interaction between various actors within USG civilian agencies. It 1980 focuses on providing the JFC with certain CMO capabilities subsequent to, during, 1981 and after a regional conflict. This organization may find itself coordinating and 1982 interfacing with the IPC, ACT and FACTs while planning for or conducting 1983 stabilization and reconstruction related activities. 1984 1985 d. Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC) 1986 A CMOC is an ad hoc organization, normally established by the GCC or 1987 subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of 1988 engaged military forces, and United States Government civilian agencies, 1989 nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. 1990 There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation 1991 dependent. 1992 CMOC(s) may include representatives from the USG interagency community. 1993 They are normally established to assist military commanders in the coordination of 1994 CMO related activities. The CMOC is not a standing organization. Due to its role, 1995 facilitating implementation of stability and reconstruction related tasks, may find 1996 itself interacting with ACT or FACT field elements and in some cases the COM or 1997 designated country team members. Because CMOC(s) have been used in the past to 1998 manage the interaction of military organizations in the field with NGO(s), and local 1999 host country entities, a JTF may establish a CMOC from the outset and prior to USG 2000 civilian agency presence on the ground. Once the ACT is established and 2001 operational, the JTF commander and ACT leader should determine whether to 2002 maintain the CMOCs or subsume there role in the ACT. 2003 2004 e. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) 2005 The PRT is a relatively new organization that builds on the foundations of the 2006 Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (JCMOTF) and Joint Interagency Task 2007 Force (JIATF), providing a unique interagency approach to stability operations. 2008 A PRT is an interim Civil-Military Operations (CMO) organization that is able to 2009 help stabilize the operational environment in an unstable or insecure province or 2010 locality through its combined diplomatic, military, informational, and economic
47 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 47 2011 capabilities. Generally, PRT(s) help create conditions for development and 2012 improvements in governance capacity in areas where traditional development 2013 organizations (intergovernmental and nongovernmental) are inhibited from full 2014 operation, whether the area is considered stable or unstable. It combines 2015 representatives from DOD, DOS, United States Agency for International 2016 Development (USAID) and other interagency partners into a cohesive unit capable of 2017 independently conducting operations to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness 2018 of a host country government. 2019 PRT(s) are not permanent standing interagency organizations and are currently 2020 operating only in Iraq and Afghanistan. The FACT structure within the IMS closely 2021 resembles the mission and purpose of a PRT. In future operations, which require the 2022 activation of the IMS, it is expected that the PRT will be replaced by the FACT to 2023 avoid duplication of effort and ensure the implementation of stabilization and 2024 reconstruction activities remain coordinated within the established structures of the 2025 IMS. 2026 2027 5. Integration with non-USG structures 2028 Stabilization and reconstruction operations are conducted in the context of larger 2029 multinational operations where the primary or secondary locus of planning is in a 2030 multinational headquarters. A multinational operation can be a coalition formed for 2031 that particular purpose, an alliance based on a treaty (e.g. NATO), or under the 2032 umbrella of an international or regional organization such as the United Nations, or 2033 African Union, or a combination of all three. Many non-US militaries operate under 2034 regimental systems and do not have structures analogous to the GCC. They perform 2035 operational level planning at the HQ level. 2036 Each multinational operation is different. Differences can be highlighted due to 2037 doctrine, language and culture, organizational structures and planning processes. 2038 Despite these differences, NATO doctrine has become the military standard for many 2039 operations. In Afghanistan NATO has cleared its doctrine for use by NATO and non- 2040 NATO members alike. Another key consideration is that the multinational bodies 2041 will either develop a collective strategic plan or adopt the plan of the predominant 2042 nation, which is often the United States. Most nations will not have likely approved 2043 nor participated in the development of the USG Strategic Plan for R&S and are under 2044 no obligation to implement it. Therefore, diplomacy will play a vital role ensuring 2045 smooth coordination and cooperation. Understanding the potential political 2046 sensitivities of working in the multilateral context will be a challenge at both the 2047 strategic and operational levels. 2048 Another area that will pose a challenge is information sharing. Certain 2049 organizations, particularly ones in which we have longstanding relationships, such as 2050 NATO, will make information sharing easier. Others, such as the UN, have no way 2051 of securing classified material. Those organizations, who we do not have formal 2052 sharing arrangements with, will arguably be the most difficult. Coalition information 2053 sharing will be determined largely by bilateral agreements already negotiated between 2054 individual countries, which can easily become difficult to manage in a multinational 2055 environment. Coalition staffs must also be aware of how to handle controlled 2056 unclassified information, which can result in legal pitfalls when not executed
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2057 properly. Some countries are required by their national laws to release ALL 2058 unclassified information into the public domain, regardless of its “FOUO” markings. 2059 The result will usually be to either over-classify information or not share at all. Both 2060 of these options make collaborating with other nations in R&S operations more 2061 difficult. 2062 Fortunately many partner countries and organizations are currently in the process 2063 of developing their own approaches to “whole of government” or integrated mission 2064 planning. Most appear to be compatible with our own. 2065 2066 a. UN coalition force 2067 The UN does its military planning within the Department of Peacekeeping 2068 Operations, Office of Military Affairs, Military Planning Service. The UN does not 2069 accept gratis personnel, which means the UN does not allow member countries to 2070 detail personnel “at no charge to the UN” to work, even temporarily, in UN offices. 2071 Should the USG or CRSG decide that personnel are necessary to work with 2072 counterparts in the UN on plans or other aspects of an operation, these personnel 2073 would be assigned to the US Mission to the UN, receive UN badges, and then could 2074 spend time working with their UN counterparts. This requires close coordination and 2075 assistance from the IO bureau of the State Department and the US Mission to the UN, 2076 particularly the military advisor. Traditionally, military planners have worked with 2077 UN military planners in this way. Inserting civilian planners is untested. The UN has 2078 developed new teams, called integrated operational teams (IOT), which takes subject 2079 matter experts from various disciplines to plan from a “whole-of-UN” perspective. It 2080 will take further consideration to determine the most appropriate relationship. 2081 2082 b. NATO force 2083 To integrate into NATO planning efforts would require close coordination with 2084 the US Ambassador to NATO. At NATO, initial planning is conducted in the Allied 2085 Command Europe Headquarters, and initially approved by nations through their 2086 Military Representatives in the NATO Military Committee prior to engagements with 2087 the North Atlantic Council, and is where integration would be most appropriate. 2088 2089 c. African Union (AU) coalition 2090 Personnel can be assigned to work in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, although there it can 2091 also be difficult to provide personnel gratis to the AU. The AU conducts its military 2092 planning within its conflict management division. This planning is conducted in 2093 either the early warning and post–conflict reconstruction section or the operations 2094 section within the conflict management division. The nature of the intervention 2095 would determine the best place for cooperation. Similarly, close cooperation would 2096 be established with USAU. 2097 2098 d. Regional military coalitions (i.e. ECOWAS) 2099 Regional military coalitions are recent innovations and there are no precedents for 2100 how the USG will engage and coordinate with them. ECOWAS, the Economic
48 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 49 2101 Community of West African States, is a leading contender for a future cooperative 2102 effort. It is still developing its planning and execution capabilities so diplomacy and 2103 flexibility will be necessary if and when the USG decides to cooperate with 2104 ECOWAS or another regional coalition. It is unlikely, in the near term, that prior 2105 exercising or training will occur to establish familiarity with these organizations. 2106 2107 2108 2109 2110 2111 2112 2113 2114 2115 2116 2117 2118 2119 2120 2121 2122 2123 2124 2125 2126 2127 2128 2129 2130 2131 2132 2133 2134 2135 2136 2137 2138 2139 2140 2141 2142 2143 2144 2145 Intentionally Blank 2146
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2147 2148 2149 2150 2151 2152 2153 2154 2155 2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166 2167 2168 2169 2170 Chapter 4 2171 Military Contribution to Organization of the Interagency 2172 Management System 2173 2174 2175 2176 1. DOD Participation within the Core Staff 2177 2178 The standing up of the IMS will occur at the Washington DC strategic level once 2179 a decision is made to establish the system based on input from the necessary actors as 2180 laid out in the triggering guidance. The organization will be dependant upon many 2181 factors to include the nature of the crisis the USG is facing, the USG policy and 2182 strategy objectives for a response, determination of the scale of effort required, the 2183 actors involved, the affected region and country or countries, manpower and 2184 resources available as well as the level of commitment from coalition partners and the 2185 international community to the response effort. The greater the commitment from our 2186 coalition partners and the international community may, in fact, decrease the resource 2187 requirements to be provided by the USG. 2188 The DOD contribution to the organization of the IMS will, for the most part, 2189 come from the OSD and Joint Staff up to and including the Secretary of Defense. 2190 Input from the affected GCC, when necessary, may be requested to inform the DOD
49 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 51 2191 contribution to the organization process and in some cases strategy planning and 2192 development occurring within OSD/JS participation on the CRSG. Requested inputs 2193 from the GCC will utilize the appropriate and established DOD communications 2194 channels to the JS and the OSD. It is important to note that the IMS may not require 2195 the participation of the military. In this case the DOD contribution to organization of 2196 the IMS may not extend beyond the initial phase of planning and preparation in the 2197 decision making process to establish the system. 2198 According to the IMS triggering guidance in the case of imminent crises with 2199 R&S or conflict implications, senior officials (DC, PC, direct request from the 2200 Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense) can trigger whole-of-government 2201 planning. A decision of the R&S PCC can also trigger whole-of-government 2202 planning, with the concurrence of the State Regional Assistant Secretary and COM. 2203 Recommendations could also come from any member of the R&S PCC, State or 2204 USAID regional or functional bureaus, a country or regional PCC, or other PCC 2205 member. 2206 The decision to trigger whole-of-government planning is not the same as 2207 triggering the establishment of the IMS. The threshold for triggering the 2208 establishment of the IMS is much higher than what triggers whole-of-government 2209 planning, although many of the actors participating in both processes may be the 2210 same and some of the initial steps may be similar. 2211 Some examples of criteria for triggering any level of whole-of-government 2212 planning for a crisis in countries/regions of policy importance could include, but is 2213 not limited to: 2214 2215 Significant actual or potential (near-term) U.S. military involvement; 2216 Events with significant potential to undermine regional stability and 2217 development progress, e.g., a coup, economic collapse, severe environmental 2218 damage or degradation; 2219 Actual or imminent state failure, particularly where the host government is 2220 unwilling or unable to respond; 2221 Excessive mortality rates; 2222 Large-scale displacement of people; 2223 Recommendation of Chief (s) of Mission in affected country(ies) or the 2224 appropriate Regional Assistant Secretary; 2225 Rapid increase in USG-funded civilian programs operating in an R&S 2226 environment; 2227 Activation of USG agencies’ crisis assessment, planning, or response 2228 teams (such as a Disaster Assistance Response Team); 2229 Embassy drawdown or evacuation in an R&S environment and/or 2230 significant threat to U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities; 2231 International or allies’ crisis response, such as the formation of a U.N. 2232 peacekeeping operation; and/or, 2233 Determination of an impending or actual genocide, ethnic cleansing, or 2234 massive and grave violations of human rights. 2235
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2236 It is the Secretary of State who may decide to establish the IMS based on the 2237 decision by the Principals’ or Deputies’ Committees and implemented at the direction 2238 of the NSC. The DOD will have representation on the DC, PC and/or PCCs to 2239 provide its input and position with regards to a decision to establish the IMS or 2240 whole-of-government planning. If the IMS is established these same representatives 2241 may be involved in the initial policy planning and strategy development within an 2242 R&S PCC that is crisis specific, which forms the basis or core of the structure for the 2243 CRSG element of the IMS. 2244 The staffing of the CRSG will include Co-chairs at the appropriate State 2245 Department Regional A/S and/or Special Envoy, S/CRS Coordinator, and NSC 2246 Director. All agencies with involvement in programs or policy relating to the crisis 2247 should be represented on the CRSG at the Assistant Secretary-level including DOD, 2248 USAID, the Department of State, Department of Justice, and other agencies as 2249 appropriate. Agency representatives to the CRSG must be able to speak 2250 authoritatively on behalf of their agencies or bring issues for decision to their 2251 leadership. The representatives from the DOD essentially become members of the 2252 CRSG core staff and may occupy positions on the CRSG itself, its Secretariat, and/or 2253 the Strategic Planning Team (SPT). 2254 The Secretariat is jointly managed by a Policy Director (State Department 2255 Regional Bureau) and a Chief Operations Officer (S/CRS). Interagency staff for the 2256 Secretariat should include agency planners, sectoral and resource experts including 2257 the Department of State’s F and DS staff, DOD, USAID, Department of Justice and 2258 other agencies as necessary given the situation. 2259 The SPT, within the CRSG Secretariat, will become the center of gravity for 2260 policy planning and strategy development. It will develop policy options and 2261 recommendations for approval at the CRSG, DC, PC, or NSC levels depending on the 2262 political and strategic importance as well as the complexity of the situation. After 2263 approved policy guidance is established further strategy planning, development and 2264 refinement will proceed and inform established DOD planning processes from the 2265 strategic to operational levels and ultimately the execution of plans at the tactical 2266 levels while ensuring alignment to guidance as a participating member of the IMS. 2267 Strategy development at the multinational level will be challenging and will 2268 require a very deliberate effort to coordinate efforts and de-conflict. Multinational 2269 partners, particularly the UN, the EU and the AU, have no requirement to consider 2270 USG planning and, indeed, when the US is not the lead country, US planners will be 2271 pressed to adapt their planning to that of the multination organization with the lead. 2272 Even when the USG is the lead nation it must always recognize that other entities 2273 plan differently and may not understand US processes, especially military planning 2274 processes. There are efforts ongoing to find more common ground between partners 2275 in crisis response collaboration. The EU and France developed a multinational 2276 interagency strategic planning guide very similar to the S/CRS strategic planning 2277 process. The UK and Canada have both created and stood-up crisis response 2278 organizations very similar to the US State Department’s S/CRS organization. But all 2279 of these efforts are intended to specifically facilitate a collaborative effort among the
50 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 53 2280 multinational community while respecting national sovereignty. Gaining buy-in and 2281 perspective by working with the international community and sharing the risk usually 2282 make this dual-track endeavor well worth the effort. 2283 For the U.S. Military this means recognizing that by the time the USG has joined 2284 or entered a multinational response to a regional or state crisis a significant amount of 2285 US and international policy planning and strategy development has likely been 2286 accomplished. The U.S. Military will normally not lead the USG engagement 2287 concerning high level policy and strategy development with the international 2288 community. Instead it will inform this process and present recommendations through 2289 its participation and representation on the CRSG, DC, PC, or NSC levels depending 2290 on the importance and complexity of the situation. Military planners, as well as 2291 civilian ones, will need to be flexible and innovative in efforts to align USG planning 2292 efforts with those of the other multinational players. It is very likely, for example, to 2293 find the USG, the UK and Germany to each have robust levels of planning completed 2294 that must now be adjusted to accommodate UN plans that are neither as well along 2295 nor as detailed. 2296 2297 a. Support Requirements 2298 The support requirements for DOD participation within the core staff will be 2299 dependant on the situation, level of involvement, and scale of the anticipated response 2300 effort. These requirements will generally support the activities taking place at the 2301 strategic level in Washington DC and will focus on the military component of 2302 participation within the IMS. If the establishment of the IMS requires a large 2303 commitment of DOD manpower and resources the effort to support these activities 2304 will be much more intensive. 2305 Support requirements could include, but are not limited to; facilities and 2306 workspace specifically set-aside and capable of supporting interagency planning and 2307 collaboration efforts, lodging and transportation, temporary hire (under contract) of 2308 subject matter experts and temporary transfer of government civilian and military 2309 personnel with skill sets and requisite experience to contribute to interagency 2310 planning efforts under the IMS. An updated roster or a listing of occupational 2311 specialties relevant to interagency planning under the IMS (R&S) should be 2312 maintained to quickly identify these individuals. It is recommended that DOD 2313 personnel identified to support whole-of-government planning and the establishment 2314 of the IMS be “fenced off” from other activities to fully focus on their contribution to 2315 the organization of the IMS and the specific crisis that led to the establishment of the 2316 IMS. 2317 Interagency personnel will need to be cleared with the appropriate access to 2318 facilities and information systems in order to conduct planning and collaborative 2319 efforts as required under the IMS. Information systems supporting the planning and 2320 collaborative efforts of interagency personnel must be capable of reaching back to the 2321 sending or home agency for these personnel so they can provide an immediate and 2322 effective contribution to the planning effort. Knowledge management is another area 2323 where capacity will need to be available to interagency personnel. GCC(s) will likely 2324 be asked to provide dedicated knowledge management personnel, when appropriate, 2325 to assist interagency teams.
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2326 2327 2. DOD Specific Elements 2328 2329 Relevant offices and staff elements designated to respond to the crisis from the 2330 Joint Staff and the OSD will make up the bulk of the contribution from the DOD in 2331 the decision to establish the IMS as well as the initial organization of the IMS. 2332 Representatives from these elements will participate in the initial policy planning and 2333 strategy development contributing to whole-of-government planning and the decision 2334 to establish the IMS. 2335 Under the IMS, additional planning capabilities may be required from the DoD at 2336 the OSD/Joint Staff level than their current capacity may be able to handle due to 2337 their current force structure and manning. Specifically, the JS will need to be 2338 prepared to absorb additional planners from the affected GCC and/or other sources to 2339 assist in the whole of government planning efforts to support an R&S mission. 2340 2341 a. Manning Requirements 2342 The manning requirements should remain flexible and scalable to address the 2343 needs of the situation or crisis confronting the USG that initiated whole-of- 2344 government planning and the decision to establish the IMS. These requirements 2345 could utilize existing structures, like PCC(s), requiring no additional personnel or in 2346 the case of a major event bring together many of the relevant staff elements in the 2347 OSD/JS to support whole-of-government strategic planning and policy development 2348 and the initial establishment and organization of the IMS. 2349 Due to current planning capacities at the OSD/JS levels a decision may be 2350 necessary to involve planners from the affected GCC to cover the capacity gap and 2351 inform DoD contribution to the strategy development of Major Mission Elements 2352 (MMEs). These planners may be geographically dispersed from the OSD/JS in 2353 Washington DC and is recommended that they utilize established channels of 2354 communication to the JS and the OSD within this process. The OSD/JS should 2355 officially represent concerns raised by the affected GCC to the other interagency 2356 elements participating in the IMS. 2357 2358 b. Resource Requirements 2359 Additional resource requirements for DoD contributing to the organization of the 2360 IMS are expected to be minimal at the beginning stages of whole-of-government 2361 planning leading to the decision to establish the IMS. In many of these cases the 2362 personnel contributing to the organization of the IMS will utilize resources already 2363 resident within their own organizations. There may be additional resources required 2364 for these personnel to effectively communicate and collaborate with other interagency 2365 actors involved in the organization of the IMS. This could come in the form of 2366 additional facility requirements for planning and collaboration purposes or the need 2367 for information and knowledge management systems to be interoperable and interface 2368 with other agency systems to enable whole-of-government planning.
51 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 55 2369 Additional resources may be required for personnel in the way of travel, 2370 transportation, lodging, and other life support requirements if they are not assigned to 2371 the OSD/JS and/or reside in the Washington DC area. This could be the case if GCC 2372 personnel are required to be present to assist the planning effort on-going at the 2373 OSD/JS. This could also be the case in the instance where an advance party to 2374 include a planning element from the DoD is sent forward to assist in the base-line 2375 assessment of an affected country or region to support the whole-of-government 2376 planning effort – in some cases prior to the establishment of the IMS. It is also likely 2377 that additional resources may be required when the USG R&S effort is part of a larger 2378 international effort and DoD resources are to be located at an international or 2379 multinational headquarters such as NATO, the AU, or the UN. 2380 2381 3. DOD Functional Elements 2382 2383 In addition to relevant staff and personnel from the OSD and the Joint Staff, 2384 certain DOD personnel with functional skill sets and background experience useful 2385 for the DOD contribution to whole-of-government planning or for contributing to the 2386 planning for the response to the crisis at hand may be called upon to assist. These 2387 personnel may be drawn from COCOM(s) (both functional and geographic) and the 2388 Services. Examples of personnel or staff elements with functional areas relevant to 2389 possible activities surrounding the establishment of the IMS may include engineers, 2390 military police, medical, civil affairs, psychological operations, information 2391 operations, public affairs, staff judge advocate, finance/comptroller, contracting, and 2392 subject matter experts who may be under contract. The amount of personnel drawn 2393 from these various functional backgrounds will vary based upon the requirements 2394 facing the OSD and the Joint Staff as it pertains to their participation on the CRSG 2395 and its Strategic Planning Team (SPT). 2396 2397 a. Manning Requirements 2398 Manning requirements for functional elements are likely to be dependant on the 2399 situation confronting the USG and the contribution of the DOD to whole-of- 2400 government planning and the establishment of the IMS. These requirements could 2401 supplement existing structures, such as DOD participation on established PCC(s), or 2402 could supplement staff elements of the OSD and Joint Staff brought together to 2403 contribute to whole-of-government planning and the establishment of the IMS. 2404 Planning capacity at the OSD and the Joint Staff level may also drive or increase the 2405 need for additional functional elements or personnel to contribute to the DOD 2406 participation to the CRSG and its SPT upon establishment of the IMS. It is important 2407 that the relevant functional capabilities, useful to the whole-of-government planning 2408 effort, are identified early and that the DOD contribution to the IMS elements such as 2409 the SPT have the right personnel present to contribute to the effort. 2410 2411 b. Resource Requirements 2412 Resource requirements for DOD functional elements are likely to be similar to 2413 those described in the DOD specific elements. As many of the identified functional 2414 personnel may not be from the OSD or the Joint Staff it is likely that additional
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2415 resources may be required in the way of travel, transportation, lodging, and other life 2416 support requirements. This could also be the case in the instance where an advance 2417 party to include functional elements or personnel from the DoD is sent forward to 2418 assist in the base-line assessment of an affected country or region to support the 2419 whole-of-government planning effort – in some cases prior to the establishment of the 2420 IMS. 2421 2422 4. JFC Communications within the IMS (to be completed) 2423 2424 2425 2426 2427 2428 2429 2430 2431 2432 2433 2434 2435 2436 2437 2438 2439 2440 2441 2442 2443 2444 2445 2446 2447 2448 2449 2450 2451 2452 2453 2454 Intentionally Blank 2455 2456 2457 2458
52 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 57 2459 2460 2461 2462 2463 2464 2465 2466 2467 2468 2469 2470 2471 2472 2473 2474 2475 2476 2477 Chapter 5 2478 DOD Participation with the Country Reconstruction and 2479 Stabilization Group (CRSG) and Secretariat 2480 2481 2482 2483 1. Introduction 2484 2485 a. Purpose 2486 The CRSG is made up of two components: an augmented Policy Coordinating 2487 Committee (PCC) -level entity established for a specific crisis response, and a 2488 dedicated interagency planning, operations, and coordination staff called the CRSG 2489 Secretariat. The CRSG’s purpose, on behalf of Principals’ Committee (PC) and 2490 Deputies’ Committee (DC) of the National Security Council (NSC), is to unify the 2491 U.S. Government’s response to a reconstruction and stabilization crisis. The CRSG 2492 achieves this through whole-of-government strategic-level planning and operations 2493 utilizing the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 2494 (IMS R&S). This system enables effective decision-making through the 2495 standardization of processes resulting in improved knowledge management, 2496 mobilization of resources, and interagency coordination. 2497 2498 b. DOD Participation 2499 Department of Defense (DOD) participation within the CRSG and its Secretariat 2500 will occur at the strategic level involving designated representatives from the Office 2501 of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff (JS). CRSG representation will 2502 be at the Assistant Secretary-level. Those who serve on the Secretariat and act in a 2503 capacity representing their Assistant Secretary will be sufficiently senior and both
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2504 knowledgeable about the area and/or situation and capable of reaching back into the 2505 Defense Department for expertise and advice as needed. Representatives of the 2506 Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) will also participate. The level of GCC 2507 participation will be determined by both OSD and JS based on the requirements of the 2508 CRSG for the planned USG response and recommendations from the GCC. 2509 2510 c. DOD Role 2511 The role of DOD representatives from both OSD and the JS are critical to ensure 2512 the military understands the non-military objectives and informs the non-military 2513 components of the CRSG about military capabilities and limitations. Regardless of 2514 actual representation on the CRSG or its Secretariat, the affected GCC will have an 2515 important role in advising the OSD and JS representatives about possible operational 2516 level courses of action and planning options that relate to and affect their contribution 2517 to the development of policy options, strategic plans, and Major Mission Elements 2518 (MME) – specifically those with possible military tasks. 2519 2520 2. Structure 2521 2522 a. CRSG Leadership 2523 The CRSG is co-chaired by the Regional Assistant Secretary of State, a Director 2524 from the National Security Council, and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and 2525 Stabilization, with representation, at the Assistant Secretary-level, by all Agencies 2526 and Departments of the USG who will contribute resources or expertise to the crisis, 2527 including DOD. 2528 DOD A/S level representatives to the CRSG may find it necessary to delegate 2529 their authority to a lower level representative who can focus solely on the affected 2530 country where the R&S response utilizing the USG Planning Framework and the IMS 2531 will be implemented. However, DOD representatives on the CRSG must be able to 2532 speak with authority on behalf of the department or bring issues for decision to their 2533 leadership. 2534 2535 b. Secretariat 2536 The CRSG Secretariat members will be drawn from across the interagency 2537 representing departments and agencies participating within the IMS (R&S). The 2538 Secretariat is managed by a Policy Director from the relevant State Department 2539 Regional Bureau and a Chief Operations Officer from the Office of the Coordinator 2540 for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Secretariat will have a “Core 2541 Staff” dedicated full time to the work of the CRSG as well as “Agency Staff” who 2542 fulfill certain CRSG functions as part of their overall Department or Agency 2543 responsibilities. 2544 Core Staff bring the expertise, context and contacts of their specific agencies 2545 but fill whole-of-government functions, report to and are reviewed by the 2546 CRSG Secretariat Leadership, and have no authority or responsibility to 2547 represent their specific Department or Agency’s viewpoint.
53 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 59 2548 Agency Staff represent their agencies, providing specific expertise, ability to 2549 reach-back to other agency personnel and offices, and the ability to represent 2550 and influence efforts of their sending agency. Such personnel can be full or 2551 part-time. 2552 DOD contributions to the Secretariat will include both Core Staff as well as 2553 Agency Staff. DOD personnel assigned to the Secretariat will include regional 2554 experts, strategic and operational planners, as well as sectoral and resource 2555 management experts. It will also include DOD and military personnel who have been 2556 identified to be detailed to the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) or Field Advance 2557 Civilian Team (FACT) prior to their deployment. 2558 The CRSG Secretariat includes individual cells focused on planning, operations, 2559 partnership, strategic communications, and resource mobilization to carry out its 2560 functions. The Secretariat includes the strategic planning team, which is responsible 2561 for completing the USG Strategic Plan for R&S, and the planning integration team, 2562 which is responsible for supporting interagency implementation planning led by the 2563 ACT. Secretariat members from the DOD will participate in all or some of these cells 2564 or teams depending on the subject matter as it relates to the DOD portfolio in the 2565 R&S plan. The strategic planning team and the larger CRSG Secretariat also have the 2566 following planning responsibilities: 2567 1 2568 Communicating the USG Strategic Plan to users in Washington, 2569 Combatant Commands, and the Field and ensuring clarity on the goals and 2570 objectives that guide all activities; 2571 2572 Ensuring that agency implementation plans and the Interagency 2573 Implementation Plan support (and are necessary and sufficient to achieve) the 2574 USG Strategic Plan for R&S; 2575 2576 Revising the USG Strategic Plan for R&S, as necessary, to respond to 2577 changing conditions, policy guidance, and new knowledge about assumptions; 2578 2579 Providing necessary guidance and requirements to logistical planning and 2580 deployment management cell of the CRSG; 2581 2582 Establishing Major Mission Element (MME) Teams; 2583 2584 Maintaining feedback loops between Washington and the field across the 2585 interagency; 2586 2587 Ensuring Washington-level coordination between agencies, including 2588 keeping agencies informed about the activities of other actors; 2589 2590 Identifying gaps in information, programs, and resources and requirements 2591 for decisions or corresponding actions by the CRSG; and 2592
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2593 Establishing and tracking strategic-level metrics, assumptions and other 2594 trend indicators. 2595 2596 c. Functions 2597 Functions performed by the CRSG (PCC) include policy and planning guidance 2598 preparation, coordination to achieve unity of effort across the interagency, monitoring 2599 the common operating picture, mobilizing resources, and proposing further 2600 implementation of elements of the IMS structure (e.g., IPC, ACT, and FACTs). 2601 The CRSG’s core function is to enable effective decision-making at the lowest 2602 possible level, to channel any disputes with agreed options for higher decision, and to 2603 provide policy and planning guidance to the U.S. Government. The CRSG decides 2604 upon, and will rise to the Deputies’ and Principals’ Committees for decision as 2605 necessary, all policy and resource issues related to the specific crisis. This includes 2606 recommendations on changes to pre-existing policies and resources in response to the 2607 emerging crisis, and critical decisions for planning and executing the response 2608 including lead roles among the departments and agencies of the USG. The CRSG is 2609 responsible for developing, mobilizing resources for, monitoring, and revising a 2610 crisis-specific USG Strategic Plan for Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S). 2611 Functions performed by the CRSG Secretariat which support the CRSG (PCC) 2612 include leading whole-of-government planning at the strategic level and supporting 2613 implementation planning, maintaining the common operating picture, developing and 2614 maintaining partnerships, coordinating and informing strategic communications, 2615 mobilizing resources, and performing reach-back for the Integration Planning Cell 2616 (IPC) and the ACT. Secretariat members from the DOD can be expected to 2617 contribute to or support all or some of these functions depending on the subject matter 2618 area of interest as it relates to the DOD portfolio within the R&S plan. 2619 The Secretariat functions as the CRSG staff and provides day to day, strategic, 2620 and operational guidance for U.S. whole-of-government planning and implementation 2621 activities within an affected country or region. The Secretariat is drawn from the 2622 USG interagency community as necessary to provide expertise in strategic assessment 2623 and planning, operations support, knowledge management, resource mobilization, and 2624 strategic monitoring, as well as field team support and partner coordination. It will 2625 funnel requests for guidance, assistance, and support to the appropriate source and 2626 manage the process to get timely results. This central node works in the other 2627 direction as well: through standardized requests for information and reporting, the 2628 Secretariat manages the “Washington process” to avoid duplication or undue 2629 reporting burdens on implementers in the field. It works as a team to pull together the 2630 best possible whole-of-government response, within the context of, but not 2631 constrained by individual agency prerogatives. 2632 Most importantly, the CRSG has overall responsibility for the development of 2633 the USG Strategic Plan for Reconstruction and Stabilization. To develop this plan, 2634 the CRSG executes an integrated planning process which ensures that the range of 2635 diplomatic, development, security, economic, trade, public affairs and strategic
54 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 61 2636 communications strategies, congressional consultations, and resource decisions are 2637 integrated and managed as part of overall engagement efforts. 2638 The CRSG does not direct field operations. The Chief of Mission (COM) retains 2639 control of all USG activities in country that are not under the authority of the GCC. 2640 The CRSG does not have a direct role in military operational planning conducted at 2641 the GCC(s). However, DOD representatives on the CRSG will provide relevant input 2642 from GCC planning into the development of the USG Strategic Plans. In addition, JS 2643 representatives on the CRSG will translate relevant portions of USG strategic 2644 planning into military operational planning through the existing Joint Operational 2645 Planning Process (JOPP). At the GCC, the IPC will work with JOPP and represent 2646 civilian implementation plans, resources, and expertise. 2647 The JS is the appropriate US military organization to be an MME process lead 2648 and to ensure that MME(s) are supported by GCC planning and execution as 2649 necessary. Furthermore, the Principles Document of the USG Planning Framework 2650 for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation describes the 2651 triggering of the IMS for both crisis action planning as well as contingency planning. 2652 The JS J3, J5, and J7 each need to be prepared to lead and support integrated strategic 2653 planning as described in the Practitioner’s Guide of the USG Planning Framework 2654 for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation due to the different 2655 types of military plans over which they have cognizance. Other JS directorates are 2656 likely to be involved in the intelligence fusion that contributes to the Situation 2657 Analysis or in providing estimates for requested logistical support, such as the JS J2 2658 and J4 respectively. 2659 DOD representatives at this level will forward department concerns to the CRSG 2660 (PCC) for dispute resolution regarding proposed recommendations for R&S policy 2661 and planning – especially those that affect DOD authorities, policies, and resources. 2662 It is important that a unified position, concerning the dispute, be established internally 2663 to the Defense Department to allow DOD representatives on the CRSG to speak for 2664 the entire department. The CRSG should make every effort to resolve interagency 2665 disputes before raising them to the National Security Council (NSC) Deputies 2666 Committee (DC) for decision. The NSC co-chair of the CRSG plays an important 2667 role ensuring the CRSG anticipates the needs of higher-level decision makers, thus 2668 allowing policy recommendations to flow up instead of down. 2669 2670 d. Operations Support 2671 At the Washington D.C. -level there will be a need for the mobilization of 2672 logistics and capabilities to support the functions of the CRSG, IPC, and the ACT. 2673 This support includes the following: 2674 2675 Security 2676 Infrastructure (Room, board, water, sanitation, etc.) 2677 Transportation (Armored vehicles, transport systems) 2678 Administrative support (including Washington-based interpreter 2679 contracts?) 2680 Communications 2681
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2682 The military role in operations support will be vital and essential more than in any 2683 other area of planning and execution. Most of the support provided to an R&S 2684 operation at the beginning will come from the GCC or designated military assets, and 2685 the military will likely continue to provide operations support throughout the 2686 operation. It will be critical that the military contribution to the CRSG have the 2687 authority and capacity to plan and coordinate this support. It is essential that these 2688 personnel understand the IMS and have a good familiarity with the functions and 2689 responsibilities of civilian agencies, particularly the Department of State and U.S. 2690 Agency for International Development (USAID). It is also essential that the military 2691 representatives include personnel who fully understand the authorities and procedures 2692 for applying DOD funding and how to apportion funds. 2693 There are three main phases of Washington D.C. -based Operations support: 2694 2695 Phase I – Planning Engagement. The U.S. strategic plan and its 2696 implementation plan will include a logistics and security plan which will be 2697 developed with expertise from the Resource Mobilization team in the 2698 Secretariat with significant reach-back into all relevant agencies, particularly 2699 DOD. The logistics and security (force protection) plan will lay out the 2700 requirements, constraints, assumptions, timelines, current capacity in country, 2701 and current logistical footprint of the U.S. Government in country. 2702 2703 Phase 2 – Mobilization and Negotiation. If the U.S. already has 2704 representation and resources in country, the Secretariat and CRSG (PCC) will 2705 work closely with the COM to support re-allocation for the new mission. This 2706 may include changes to SOPs, notifications to Congress, and a range of 2707 contractual and management shifts to be performed by agencies possessing 2708 those resources or assets, but coordinated by the Secretariat. Mobilization of 2709 resources and assets located elsewhere for “new” use in the country in crisis 2710 will require identification of current supply-chain expected delivery timelines, 2711 decisions to re-divert assets to the crisis area, negotiations of warehousing 2712 space, air/sea/land transport, MOA(s) for sharing assets, etc. which are 2713 supported, coordinated, and monitored by the Secretariat but performed by the 2714 relevant agencies. The Secretariat, in coordinating this process, must be able 2715 to quickly push up to the CRSG information on critical bottlenecks or disputes 2716 so that they can be resolved with expediency. Most U.S. embassies in 2717 countries where an R&S operation is likely to occur are not large and have 2718 very limited resources and assets. The assumption going in is that these 2719 resources, especially personnel, will require significant augmentation in all 2720 respects. Military planners should assume that all mission assets and logistics 2721 would have to be delivered to the U.S. Mission AOR. 2722 2723 Phase 3 – Support and Sustainment. The Secretariat will provide backstop 2724 to the “supported” management units outside of Washington. As the 2725 Secretariat works to design the scope and composition of the IPC and ACT in
55 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 63 2726 collaboration with the GCC and COM respectively, it will also obtain 2727 approval from the DC or PC to support these deployed elements with 2728 resources, mobilizing personnel, financial, logistical, and contractor resources 2729 in support of the plan, identifying legal constraints, and proposing legislative 2730 and budget recommendations to overcome limitations. The Secretariat will 2731 provide operations support by managing information and collection and 2732 implementation of best practices. 2733 2734 3. Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) Relationship to the CRSG 2735 and Secretariat 2736 2737 The GCC does not have a direct or subordinate military chain of command 2738 relationship to the CRSG or its Secretariat. GCC relationships to the CRSG are 2739 established through the Joint Staff and the OSD representatives on the CRSG. 2740 According to 10 USC 164 and JP-1, a military chain of command is an uninterrupted 2741 flow of authority that extends from the President of the United States, to the Secretary 2742 of Defense, to the GCC, to subordinate military commanders, and finally to assigned 2743 or attached military forces. As such, channels of communication, direction, and other 2744 requests to and from the GCC will utilize existing channels and structures as 2745 established in U.S. Code and military doctrine. 2746 2747 If the circumstances warrant, a GCC (or a subordinate JFC) may be tasked to 2748 take guidance and direction from a COM. While not assigned to a COM for 2749 the reasons stated above, a GCC or subordinate JFC may take guidance and 2750 direction from a COM (through Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) or other 2751 official document delineating the directive relationship between the COM and 2752 JFC). 2753 2754 Under the IMS, OSD and JS participants on the CRSG Secretariat’s Strategic 2755 Planning Team (SPT) will assume roles and perform planning functions that are not 2756 part of the JOPP and not defined in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution 2757 System (JOPES). It is imperative that the JS participants on the CRSG Secretariat’s 2758 SPT have the capability to conduct rapid operational mission analysis to determine 2759 scope, scale and duration of the military’s role in supporting a proposed USG course 2760 of action and development of Major Mission Elements (MME), including the role of 2761 leading an MME. To do this the GCC may be tasked to provide an operation 2762 planning team (OPT) to support the JS planning contribution. 2763 In addition to coordination with civilian agency elements assigned to the GCC 2764 (e.g., JIACG, CIEG, etc.), IPC members deployed to the GCC will perform liaison 2765 functions with the CRSG Secretariat’s SPT to assist in harmonizing the civilian and 2766 military planning processes and operations. This creates a potential new channel of 2767 communication between the GCC and the CRSG. Careful consideration must be 2768 taken into account to not interrupt the authorities that extend from the President of the 2769 United States to the GCC through the Secretary of Defense. The leadership of the 2770 IPC must keep the GCC leadership apprised of communications with the CRSG. 2771 Coordination between the IPC and CRSG does not obviate the defense policy
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2772 guidance and plan approval process as established by law and through DOD 2773 procedures. The IPC leadership will have frequent communications with and seek 2774 guidance from both the COM and CRSG regarding: the strategic plan and its 2775 integration with the military operational plan; identifying and addressing gaps and 2776 deficiencies between the civilian and military plans; identifying impacts of planned 2777 military operations on future R&S efforts; and recommending processes and criteria 2778 to ensure smooth transition from military to civilian lead, when appropriate, by 2779 function and region as the environment is stabilized. 2780 2781 4. GCC Relationships to other Departments and Agencies through CRSG 2782 2783 The GCC relationship to the CRSG will be established through representatives 2784 from the OSD and the Joint Staff while reinforcing the integrity of authorities 2785 established between the JFC and the Secretary of Defense. Its relationship to other 2786 agencies and departments represented on the CRSG will be indirect and established 2787 through and coordinated with DOD representatives on the CRSG, preferably 2788 formalized at the CRSG (PCC) level – although, informal, working-level action 2789 officer relationships may be established through its Secretariat. In addition, the IPC 2790 may facilitate the GCC relationship to other departments and agencies represented on 2791 the CRSG through proper coordination involving the DOD representatives on the 2792 CRSG. 2793 2794 2795 2796 2797 2798 2799 2800 2801 2802 2803 2804 2805 2806 2807 2808 2809 2810 2811 2812 2813 2814 2815
56 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 65 2816 2817 2818 2819 2820 2821 2822 2823 2824 2825 2826 2827 2828 2829 2830 2831 2832 2833 2834 2835 2836 2837 2838 2839 2840 2841 2842 2843 2844 2845 2846 2847 2848 Intentionally Blank 2849 2850 2851 2852 2853 2854 2855 2856 2857 2858 2859 2860 2861
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2862 2863 2864 2865 2866 2867 2868 2869 2870 2871 2872 2873 Chapter 6 2874 Military Participation with the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) 2875 2876 2877 2878 1. Introduction 2879 2880 The IPC is an interagency team that brings operation-specific capabilities to a 2881 regional military command, either a GCC or an equivalent multinational 2882 headquarters. It is activated by the CRSG through the Washington-based whole-of- 2883 government planning process. Its purpose is to support civilian-military 2884 communication and integration of civilian and military planning in order to achieve 2885 unity of effort. The size and composition of the IPC will change over the course of 2886 the planning for and execution of the R&S operation. The IPC is not designed to 2887 create a USG civilian R&S operations/tactical plan; that responsibility resides in the 2888 ACT or COM. 2889 An IPC may be established in response to 1) an emerging crisis potentially 2890 requiring military intervention or support, 2) a DOD request for assistance with 2891 operational-level R&S planning, or 3) a request from an equivalent multinational 2892 military headquarters (i.e., UN Peacekeeping force, EU, AU or NATO). R&S 2893 operations that do not involve significant military engagement normally do not 2894 require the establishment of an IPC. Integration of interagency civilian-military 2895 planning is not limited to the establishment of an IPC or to crises. Working 2896 relationships between civilian and military planners should be developed on an on- 2897 going basis. 2898 The IPC reports to the CRSG, it does not “work” for the GCC commander. This 2899 is an important distinction. For a specified mission, IPC members serve as a bridge 2900 between civilian agency staff in Washington and the field to the GCC by filling the 2901 civilian agency gap at the military operational level and ensuring planning and 2902 decisions by civilian agency actors in Washington and the field are represented in and 2903 informed by planning and decision-making at the military operational headquarters. 2904 However, unlike the GCC in the military chain of command, the IPC has neither 2905 oversight nor control over USG field operations.
57 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 67 2906 The size and composition of the IPC will be determined by the CRSG based upon 2907 operation-specific requirements from the GCC. While the final decision regarding 2908 where best to embed an incoming IPC rests with the GCC, this relationship will be 2909 discussed within the CRSG and is expected to facilitate direct involvement with the 2910 J3, J5 and existing interagency coordination or advising entities. Any combatant 2911 command to which an IPC is deployed will be responsible to provide necessary 2912 resources to include: work space, communications, and computers that are compatible 2913 to their operating systems. Deploying and operating an IPC at a multinational 2914 headquarters will require special considerations for information sharing, staff skill- 2915 set, political sensitivities, and organizational structure and culture. 2916 2917 a. Capabilities 2918 The IPC is a scalable, tailored, civilian-led interagency stability and 2919 reconstruction planning advisory and consultative team that embeds into the GCC 2920 planning staff to advise them on planning considerations from the perspective of 2921 civilian agencies. Each IPC will vary in structure based on the mission and available 2922 civilian resources. The IPC brings relevant capabilities of other U.S. Government 2923 agencies to the GCC both directly in the form of the expertise of its staff and 2924 indirectly through its reach back capability to home Departments/Agencies 2925 headquarters and their field staff, the CRSG, and the ACT. It is this operation- 2926 specific set of capabilities that distinguishes the IPC from other pre-existing 2927 interagency elements of the Combatant Command, such as a Joint Interagency 2928 Coordination Group (JIACG) or Interagency Staff Element (ISE). It is important to 2929 recognize the IPC is unique and distinct from these entities which will continue to 2930 execute their essential functions in support of the GCC(s) overall regional and steady- 2931 state missions, in coordination with the IPC. 2932 The direct expertise of the IPC staff normally includes R&S functional expertise, 2933 regional/country expertise, sectoral expertise, legal expertise, expertise in the 2934 capabilities, policies, processes and operation-specific plans of their home 2935 Department/Agency, and functional expertise in the metrics, conflict assessment, and 2936 planning processes of civilian agencies and knowledge of the whole-of-government 2937 process laid out in the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, 2938 and Conflict Transformation. IPC members also have the capability to reach back 2939 into the broader and deeper expertise of the sending Departments/Agencies and to 2940 obtain real-time information on corresponding civilian Department/Agency planning, 2941 which normally occurs both at civilian headquarters and field locations. This enables 2942 the IPC to support the GCC in integrating the evolving civilian components of the 2943 USG R&S Strategic Plan, Interagency Implementation Plan, and Department/Agency 2944 implementation plans with the military plan for operations. 2945 Whenever possible, IPC members should participate in the CRSG strategic 2946 planning process and deploy with a full understanding of the approved USG R&S 2947 Strategic Plan and resources available to implement it. This allows the IPC to provide 2948 insight on policy guidance and assumptions. In cases where the strategic planning 2949 process is still underway, the deployed IPC will consult with the GCC to identify 2950 potential policy issues and, as appropriate, make recommendations to the CRSG. 2951
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2952 b. Leadership and Structure 2953 The IPC will be led by an ambassador-level civilian who is a peer of the GCC 2954 commander with direct access to him/her. The team leader is responsible for setting 2955 priorities and communicating with the CRSG and COM. If a deputy is required based 2956 on the size of the mission, he/she will also be a senior civilian, though not necessarily 2957 an ambassador ranked officer. Although not required, it is likely that the team leader 2958 and the deputy will come from different agencies. For example, the team leader 2959 might come from the Department of State and the deputy will come from the US 2960 Agency for International Development, AID. Below the leadership there will be 2961 section leads for sections including, but not limited to: Plans, Operations / 2962 Information Management; Support / Admin; Sectoral and Regional experts. 2963 2964 2. GCC Relationship to the IPC 2965 2966 The IPC will work closely with many bodies within the GCC staff to ensure 2967 coordination and unity of purpose including the Combatant Commander, the J-Codes, 2968 the numerous non-standing boards, centers, and cells established for crisis planning, 2969 the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or its equivalent, and the Political 2970 Advisor (POLAD). The IPC will also want to have relationships with relevant 2971 functional elements at the GCC which may or may not be located in ‘J-Codes.’ These 2972 may include: intelligence, logistics, policy/strategy, plans, resourcing (especially 2973 contracting), effects, engineering, medical, and civil affairs. Since not every GCC is 2974 the same, the entry points for the IPC may vary. The JIACG, the POLAD or another 2975 section with interagency responsibilities (such as the J-5 or J-9), may facilitate the 2976 integration of the IPC into the GCC. 2977 The POLAD and the JIACG, or its equivalent, are steady-state actors within the 2978 GCC. They do not necessarily have R&S expertise. However, the IPC will probably 2979 consider inviting both the POLAD, Senior Development Advisor, and JIACG 2980 representation to participate in its meetings to facilitate planning collaboration. These 2981 individuals, having been part of the GCC staff prior to the emergence of any crisis, 2982 know the staff and can serve a bridging role to the IPC, speeding the integration 2983 process and helping it along. 2984 2985 a. Roles and Responsibilities 2986 Each IPC has a combination of roles or functions and responsibilities. Core 2987 functions include: IPC leadership; operations and information management; planning; 2988 support for administrative needs; and, provision of Sectoral and Regional expertise. 2989 2990 The IPC Operations and IPC Information Management will prioritize, 2991 facilitate, and synchronize the workflow and coordination of the IPC with the 2992 GCC staff and ensure IPC integration with host networks, databases and 2993 systems to maximize information flow. 2994 The Plans element will comprise the USG planners that have a thorough 2995 understanding of the USG planning framework and DOD (as well as other
58 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 69 2996 agency) planning tools. IPC members supporting ongoing GCC planning and 2997 operations may include personnel skilled in current operations and others 2998 skilled in transition or future operations. 2999 Support for Administrative Needs is provided by staff member(s) who manage 3000 administrative functions for the team to include coordination of travel, 3001 billeting, meals, transportation, office space, supplies, and communications. 3002 Sectoral and Regional Expert(s) are part of the IPC to provide expert 3003 functional knowledge and skills based on requirements for the operation as 3004 determined by the CRSG. These skills may include but are not limited to: 3005 Country, Economic, IDP/Migration, Infrastructure, Legal/Rule of Law, 3006 Policy, Strategic Communications, and or Security advisor. 3007 3008 b. Relationship to GCC Staff 3009 The IPC has a hierarchical/subordinate relationship with the CRSG. This means 3010 that the IPC receives its guidance directly from and reports back to the CRSG. The 3011 IPC leadership will keep the GCC leadership apprised of communications with the 3012 CRSG. Coordination between the IPC and CRSG does not supersede the defense 3013 policy guidance and plan approval process as established by DOD procedures. The 3014 IPC and OSD/Joint Staff representatives on the CRSG will keep the CRSG informed 3015 of military planning and operations so that the planning process can take into account 3016 the military operations and their potential effects. The IPC may complement the 3017 GCC commander’s intentions and/or concerns to the CRSG as they are brought to the 3018 CRSG via military channels (the JCS or OSD reps). Additionally, IPC leadership in 3019 consultation with the GCC will determine which information and policy guidance 3020 requests to or from the GCC have sufficient importance or interagency implications 3021 (to include consideration of consistency with the existing plan) needing referral to the 3022 CRSG for decision. Finally, if necessary, disputes among interagency partners within 3023 the IPC or between the IPC and the GCC will be referred to the CRSG if unresolved 3024 at lower levels. 3025 The JIACG, the Political Advisor (POLAD) or other sections with interagency 3026 responsibilities, may facilitate the integration of the IPC into the GCC. The POLAD 3027 is normally an ambassador assigned as the GCC commander’s senior political 3028 advisor. The JIACG (or its equivalent) is an advisory group at the GCC, which will 3029 normally have one or two State Department officers, as well as an AID officer, 3030 among others. The POLAD and the JIACG are steady-state actors within the GCC. 3031 They do not necessarily have R&S expertise. However, the IPC should consider 3032 inviting both the POLAD, Senior Development Advisor, and JIACG representation to 3033 participate in its meetings to facilitate planning collaboration. The POLAD will have 3034 a role in the mission of the IPC however; their primary role remains the same - 3035 advising and helping the GCC commander to remain focused on regional issues. 3036 Much like the POLAD, the JIACG members are regional generalists in nature and 3037 have as their primary mission the responsibility of assisting the GCC commander and 3038 his staff and maintain a more regional focus. Not all COCOM(s) will have JIACG(s), 3039 but they should have some form of an interagency staff element. Another primary 3040 GCC staff contact is the J-5. Their duties may vary from GCC to GCC; however, 3041 they normally will include long-term planning and military-to-military
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3042 contacts/relationships. Regular contact among the IPC, POLAD, JIACG and J-5 is 3043 necessary to de-conflict efforts and ensure that no process or task is overlooked. The 3044 division of labor should be addressed early on once an IPC arrives at the GCC. 3045 3046 c. GCC Planning in Conjunction with the IPC 3047 The IPC is not a planning body. Nevertheless, it has a planning role advising and 3048 ensuring that military plans and the R&S plan are de-conflicted. It is highly likely that 3049 by the time the IPC arrives at a GCC to assist in harmonizing the USG R&S plan with 3050 the military planning effort, the GCC and staff have already begun the planning 3051 process in response to the GCC Commander’s or Secretary of Defense’s direction, 3052 perhaps initially independent of a decision to undertake whole-of-government 3053 planning or response. Ideally, the relevant GCC staff has participated in the 3054 development of the Situation Analysis Overview and can use this information to 3055 inform its planning efforts. 3056 While the IPC is deployed to the GCC they may develop many products that 3057 should be informative to the GCC staff. These products may include: 3058 3059 Briefing slides capturing issues for COM and/or CRSG PCC decision and 3060 provide a situation update, including proposed changes to the USG Strategic 3061 Plan. 3062 Information to COCOM planners on represented Agency’s 3063 implementation plans, and Major Mission Element deliberations. 3064 Generated slides for COCOM on ACT activities and assessments, 3065 including from FACT(s) and DART(s) 3066 3067 3. GCC Logistics and Admin Support to the IPC 3068 3069 The IPC cannot deploy to a GCC with all the necessary logistics and 3070 administrative support it will require to be effective. The GCC will have to provide 3071 some measure of both. As a minimum, the GCC should be prepared to provide the 3072 following: 3073 Reserve Hotel/lodging for IPC members near COCOM location 3074 Provide/coordinate for transportation to receive IPC members (as 3075 required) 3076 Provide welcome packet that includes list of local restaurants, medical 3077 facilities, and other area amenities to IPC members 3078 Provide desk / work stations for each IPC member 3079 Provide conference room where IPC can meet as required 3080 Provide admin supplies (paper/envelopes/pens/pencils/etc.) while at 3081 COCOM 3082 3083 4. GCC Communications Support to the IPC: 3084
59 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 71 3085 Provide computers and monitors for both NIPR and SIPR Net for IPC 3086 members. 3087 Provide printers (both color and black and white) sufficient for IPC 3088 members. 3089 Provide FAX capability 3090 Provide sufficient telephones 3091 Provide sufficient secure telephones 3092 Provide photocopier access 3093 Provide VTC capability 3094 Provide server storage space for NIPR and SIPR to IPC members 3095 Provide NIPR and SIPR (with appropriate clearance) Net email accounts 3096 for all IPC members 3097 Provide training to IPC members on COCOM specific Information 3098 Management and Information Technology tools 3099 Certify IPC members for use on COCOM NIPR/SIPR nets 3100 Provide system maintenance/trouble-shooting capability (as needed) 3101 3102 5. GCC Security Support to the IPC: 3103 3104 Provide DOS S/CRS and/or IPC members information on passing of 3105 security clearances to the COCOM Security Officer (normally Secret – Level 3106 3 clearance is required) 3107 Verify receipt of clearances prior to IPC deployment to COCOM 3108 Provide security access badges to members of the IPC and access to areas 3109 within COCOM appropriate for the individual security level 3110 Provide secure storage of any classified materials 3111 Provide classified material destruction capability 3112 Provide storage of firearms as required for IPC law enforcement members 3113 Provide shipping capability of classified and bulk materials (as required) 3114 3115 3116 3117 3118 3119 3120 3121 3122 3123 3124 3125 3126 3127 3128 3129
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3130 3131 3132 3133 3134 3135 3136 3137 3138 3139 3140 3141 3142 3143 3144 3145 3146 3147 3148 3149 3150 3151 3152 3153 3154 3155 3156 3157 Intentionally Blank 3158 3159 3160 3161 3162 3163 3164 3165 3166 3167 3168 3169 3170 3171 3172 3173
60 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 73 3174 3175 3176 3177 3178 3179 3180 3181 3182 Chapter 7 3183 Military Participation with the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) 3184 3185 3186 3187 1. Introduction 3188 3189 The Advance Civilian Team (ACT) is the integrating, and in certain roles, the 3190 implementing civilian component of an R&S operation. When the demands of 3191 planning and executing an R&S mission are unable to be met by the existing civilian 3192 capacity in-country, the CRSG, in consultation with the Chief of Mission (COM), 3193 may activate the ACT. The ACT works under the authority to the COM but will have 3194 working-level relationships when deployed with the CRSG, IPC, and the JTF. The 3195 ACT serves as the COM’s general R&S staff, supporting the COM, as he/she deems 3196 appropriate, in executing the USG Interagency R&S Implementation Plan. In the 3197 absence of a COM the ACT leader may be designated as the COM. All ACT 3198 elements, except the FACT, are referred to as the ACT headquarters or ACT HQ. 3199 The ACT is designed to be flexible and scalable; as such an ACT deployed to one 3200 R&S crises may not have the same composition or size as another ACT. However, 3201 core aspects of the ACT such as mission, structure, processes, and authorities will 3202 remain consistent. 3203 There are two scenarios that are most likely for the deployment and location of 3204 the ACT. In the first a US embassy exists and a Chief of Mission, COM, is present. 3205 In this scenario the ACT will deploy to the US embassy and establish itself with the 3206 embassy. In the second scenario the US embassy either does not exist or, due to the 3207 circumstances on the ground, is vacant and untenable. In this case the ACT will 3208 deploy and co-locate with the JTF. In this scenario the director of the ACT is 3209 appointed as COM or a designated COM is identified and the director of the ACT is 3210 answerable to the COM. 3211 For planning purposes when the USG decides to establish a Country 3212 Reconstruction and Stabilization Group, CRSG, to address a crisis in a foreign 3213 country the following assumptions can be made: 3214 The crisis requires a reconstruction and/or stabilization response that is in 3215 the national interest to pursue. 3216 There is a security vacuum that requires the USG and the DOD 3217 specifically, to plan for the execution of a security stabilization operation.
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3218 The Combatant Commander responsible for the country in crisis will task 3219 organize a Joint Task force, JTF, to assume lead for the military components 3220 of the R&S Operations Plan. 3221 The CRSG will develop and execute a whole-of-government R&S 3222 operations plan. 3223 The CRSG consists of representatives of all the participating agencies and 3224 departments involved in the R&S effort. The Defense Department 3225 representation includes voices that speak for the Combatant Commander. 3226 ACT HQ personnel, when formed, may be drawn from members of the US 3227 military. Personnel drawn from the US military should be fully trained and qualified 3228 to perform the functions necessary to support the ACT HQ. Members of the US 3229 Military may find themselves in the unique position of being part of an element of the 3230 IMS under the ultimate operational control of the COM, but being a member of a 3231 military unit deployed into theater under the ultimate operational control of a GCC. 3232 In these instances careful consideration should be made to determine what functions 3233 will be performed by these personnel. If the function is primarily liaison then the 3234 lines of authority remain with the sending organization. If however, military 3235 personnel are assigned or attached then an early determination should be made as to 3236 whose operational control they should fall under; the COM or the GCC or their 3237 designated representatives? This should be clearly laid out and put into writing 3238 utilizing a MOU or MOA between the GCC and COM or their designated 3239 representatives. 3240 DOD personnel may be detailed to other agencies, including an ACT, in 3241 accordance with the Economy Act, which, in DOD, is further implemented by DoD 3242 Instruction 1000.17 (DoDI 1000.17). The Economy Act and DoDI 1000.17 are silent 3243 with respect to issues of command and authoritative direction. However, since the 3244 detail of personnel through the Economy Act must be written, issues of control and 3245 responsibility can be resolved in a memorandum of understanding (MOU). The 3246 detailee can be directed to follow the orders of the receiving agency, and the 3247 performance evaluation can be written to reflect his/her performance in this regard. 3248 However, ultimate control remains with the sending agency (e.g., the GCC), which 3249 can revoke the MOU at any time. Similarly, the receiving agency (e.g., the COM), if 3250 dissatisfied with the detailee’s performance, may return the detailee at any time. 3251 3252 2. Structure 3253 3254 The structure of the ACT HQ and the processes it utilizes are derived from the 3255 functions it must perform to fulfill its mission. Though the scale and scope of the 3256 structure of the ACT will change depending on the R&S effort, the elements of the 3257 structure and their relationship to each other will not. The ACT HQ structure 3258 includes the ACT leadership office, functional offices, an integration structure (the 3259 term used to refer to all the MME teams) and agency representation positions. The 3260 functional offices are where the R&S-specific functional expertise of the ACT HQ is 3261 housed. The functional offices include: Planning, Resources, Operations, Force
61 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 75 3262 Protection, Strategic Communication, Situational Assessment and Analysis, ACT 3263 Support, and ACT Reach-back. The size of each functional office will be based on 3264 the R&S scenario. 3265 Military participation within the ACT HQ structure will most likely occur within 3266 the functional offices, the integration structure, and agency representation positions 3267 depending on the scope and nature of the mission. This participation may go beyond 3268 the traditional security and logistics duties (commonly associated with military 3269 capabilities and applications) to include, but not limited to, participation within the 3270 integration structure and functional offices such as planning, operations, and 3271 situational assessment and analysis. In certain instances the military may be asked to 3272 lead a MME team, where multiple agencies are involved, within the Integration 3273 Structure. In these cases the military must be prepared to integrate its planning 3274 processes into whole-of-government (WOG) planning processes as envisioned in the 3275 US Government Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict 3276 Transformation. 3277 Certain capabilities and functions the military possesses may be of use and 3278 contribute greatly to various structures of the ACT HQ. Military personnel such as 3279 civil affairs, psychological operations, engineers, military police and contracting 3280 officers, to name a few, offer a number of capabilities that could contribute to, and 3281 benefit multiple structures within the ACT HQ beyond security and logistical 3282 applications. DoD civilians and contractors may also offer certain capabilities with 3283 applications across multiple ACT HQ structures depending on scope, nature of the 3284 mission, and the objectives. These capabilities may include specific subject matter 3285 expertise – both sectoral and functional, as well as reach-back to agency and CRSG 3286 counterparts to assist in informing strategic planning and transitioning strategic plans 3287 to implementation level planning and execution. 3288 3289 a. Leadership 3290 Just as the composition and make-up of the ACT is situation dependant, similarly 3291 the ACT Leader positions could also vary. It may be possible for ACT leadership to 3292 range from a position subordinate to the DCM, to having the ACT Leader also 3293 serving as COM. In this final scenario, it is important to stress that COM/DCM are 3294 distinct and broader functions from that of ACT Leader, although one person could 3295 perform both functions. The ACT Leadership Office consists of the ACT Leader, 3296 ACT Deputy Leader (at a minimum) and other necessary staff such as a Chief of Staff 3297 and aides. The various functions of the Leadership Office may be assigned in totality 3298 to the ACT Leader and Deputy Leader or apportioned amongst a larger staff. The 3299 ACT Leader is in charge of this office, though the daily operations of the office are 3300 managed by an assigned Chief of Staff. The ACT Leadership Office is subordinate to 3301 the COM. It has a peer relationship with the JTF senior leadership (typically a 3302 Colonel or Brigadier General if the JTF is based on a brigade task force structure or 3303 an independent brigade structure) as well as the implementing agencies. It has a 3304 coordinating relationship with the CRSG secretariat and IPC. 3305 The JTF, its commander and senior staff, will interface with various IMS field 3306 implementing structures and leaders while participating within the IMS. Critical from 3307 the earliest stages will be the need for close communications and coordination
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3308 between the COM/ACT Leader and the JTF commander. The COM has overall 3309 responsibility for implementing the R&S operation; and the JTF commander often 3310 has the preponderance of resources and capabilities. It is essential that these two 3311 principals communicate at all times. Success or failure of a U.S. R&S operation in 3312 the field largely will depend on the COM/ACT Leader and the JTF Commander 3313 having a shared operational picture, an agreed plan, and vision for its execution, and a 3314 shared process for raising and making decisions.
3315 b. Implementation Planning Team (IPT) 3316 The IPT acts as the “executive/steering committee” for the ACT. Its mission is to 3317 assist the ACT team leader in the management of the USG R&S response by 3318 integrating across agencies, functional offices, MME teams, and between the USG 3319 civilian and military response in order to ensure unity of effort in the development 3320 and execution of the USG R&S Implementation Plan. The IPT is subordinate to the 3321 ACT Leader and the COM. It is superior to MME teams and functional offices. It is 3322 also superior to those assets of the participating agencies that are allocated to the R&S 3323 mission inside the affected country. In military parlance the IPT serves as the ACT 3324 team leader's 'senior staff'. The JTF will coordinate and integrate primarily with the 3325 IPT and the ACT leader as the two entities cooperate to achieve the common R&S 3326 goals. The IPT is the senior point of substantive integration of the JTF. It is the 3327 only structure in which agency interests are represented to the R&S implementation 3328 planning and execution effort. 3329 The IPT is chaired by the ACT Deputy Leader. Its membership includes MME 3330 team leaders, ACT HQ Functional Office Directors, senior representatives of USG 3331 agencies engaged in the R&S mission, FACT Directors, and representatives 3332 designated by the JTF. Membership is decided by the COM in consultation with the 3333 JTF Commander and approved by the CRSG. 3334 Responsibilities include: 3335 Serves as the executive steering committee for the ACT – the primary 3336 senior consultative body for the US R&S mission in-country and in this role 3337 provide recommendations to the ACT leader 3338 Direct the MME teams and FACT(s) on behalf of the ACT Leader 3339 Makes decisions regarding the prioritization and de-confliction of 3340 resources among MME teams 3341 Responsible for managing cross-MME issues 3342 Compile and de-conflict MME Team plans in the drafting of the R&S 3343 Implementation Plan 3344 Provides non-binding guidance to agencies, which may then proceed to 3345 COM to make binding as needed in consultation with the JTF Commander 3346 Create MME Teams and Sub-Objective Teams as instructed by the ACT 3347 Leader 3348 Create task forces and other cross-MME working level groups as needed 3349 De-conflict and approve R&S Synch Matrix compiled by OPS
62 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 77 3350 Integrate JTF plans and activities into the overall US Government 3351 response as stipulated in the Interagency Implementation Plan
3352 c. Integration Structure 3353 The Integration Structure is the term used to refer to all the MME Teams as a 3354 collective whole. The IPT provides oversight of this structure by managing the MME 3355 teams. This structure is where whole-of-government (WOG) processes take place to 3356 include WOG planning, implementation, and operations. It represents a 3357 transformational way in which the USG organizes for an R&S mission. Instead of 3358 being organized by how the USG independently implements individual agency 3359 activities, the Integration Structure organizes the USG response by why, through 3360 focused synchronization of activities in time, space, and purpose by organizing 3361 MME(s) around outcomes to achieve a stated strategic objective. The number and 3362 focus the MME Teams is determined by the US Strategic Plan for R&S as issued by 3363 the CRSG. 3364 3365 d. MME Teams 3366 MME(s) are initially developed by the CRSG and defined in the R&S Strategic 3367 Plan. MME teams conduct planning and implementation management ensuring 3368 integration of its activities and resources allocated to achieve the condition described 3369 in its stated strategic objective. MME Teams are subordinate to the ACT Leader and 3370 they are subject to direction from the IPT and ACT Deputy Leader through the 3371 authority of the ACT Leader. They serve as the primary integration points of 3372 implementing activities with other USG (e.g., JTF), host country, or IC elements. 3373 MME Teams are the “unit of integration” within the ACT HQ. It is where agency 3374 representatives serve as WOG agents. The teams serve as venues for agencies to 3375 provide their input at every level and iteration of planning and execution. 3376 It is likely that the agency with the preponderance of resources allocated to the 3377 MME and for whom the stated objective of the MME is the core competency will be 3378 asked to provide the MME Team Leader. However, the MME Team Leader position 3379 is a WOG position and is not an agency position. In most cases Team Leader is 3380 assigned to the ACT with no additional duties or obligations to their home agency. 3381 The Team Leader is the most qualified person for the position regardless of their 3382 employing agency and is a director-level position. MME Leaders are appointed by 3383 the COM in consultation with the leadership of the IPT, ACT, CRSG and JTF. The 3384 Team Leader serves as the primary representative of the MME Team on the 3385 Implementation Planning Team (IPT). 3386 The MME team consists of personnel from participating agencies, ACT 3387 functional offices and JTF. These personnel are normally organized into Sub- 3388 Objective Teams (SO Teams). In some cases, the MME Team may create Sub-Sub- 3389 Objective or Task Teams as called for by the complexity of the issue and the scale of 3390 the R&S operation. The MME Team Leader may chose to allot one team for each SO 3391 or may assign more than one SO to the same group of people. The MME Team 3392 Leader, in consultation with the relevant SO Team Leader, may also set up sub-sub- 3393 objective teams. Staff from the ACT functional offices may assist the MME Team 3394 Leader in the management of the MME.
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3395 The following responsibilities are carried out by the MME Team or SO Teams as 3396 determined by the MME Team Leader: 3397 Develop the portion of the R&S Interagency Implementation Plan 3398 pertaining to the MME 3399 Assess the USG Strategic Plan for R&S pertaining to the MME and 3400 provide feedback to the CRSG through the IPT and ACT Leader 3401 Task organize the MME to best accomplish its stated strategic objective 3402 Manage all subordinate teams 3403 Develop implementation Synch Matrix 3404 Analyze, monitor and evaluate performance and other reports pertinent to 3405 the MME 3406 Manage implementation through field reports from implementers (e.g., 3407 FACT(s) and implementing agencies) assisted by Operations Office 3408 Interact, coordinate, and plan with international or host-country partners 3409 3410 MME teams may convene jointly with JTF, host country, or IC structures for 3411 planning and implementation management to maximize integration. The Team 3412 Leader has the authority to provide team members the direction required to 3413 accomplish the MME strategic objective. This authority extends to sub-objective 3414 team leaders but not members of a JTF whose organization constitutes a military 3415 force under Title X definitions. Any direction deemed in contradiction to DOD 3416 fiduciary or other obligations can be appealed to the IPT for arbitration. 3417 The ACT’s Planning Office and Resource Office will facilitate and support the 3418 MME Teams during development of the R&S Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP). 3419 The ACT Operations Office facilitates, supports, and monitors the integrated 3420 execution of the IIP. This includes conveying tasks to FACT(s) and other ACT 3421 implementation bodies. The ACT Situational Analysis and Assessment Office 3422 provide MME Teams with an understanding of the environment throughout 3423 implementation of R&S activities. Other ACT HQ functional offices participate and 3424 provide services to the MME Teams as needed. 3425 3426 e. MME Sub-Objective Teams 3427 The Sub-Objective (SO) Team conducts planning and implementation 3428 management to ensure integration of activities concerning the resources allocated to 3429 the SO effort to achieve the condition described by the SO stated objective. SO 3430 Teams are the working, task level “units of integration” in the ACT HQ. The teams 3431 are led by an SO Team Leader. In most cases, the SO Team Leader will have 3432 responsibilities to their home agency. However, in the role of the SO Team Leader 3433 they will serve as a WOG agent and not that of any agency, perspective, or agenda. 3434 The SO Team is subordinate to the MME Team Leader and a peer to other SO 3435 Teams within its MME and all other MME(s). Integration and coordination with SO 3436 Teams within the MME are done under the direction of the MME Team Leader. 3437 Coordination with SO Teams outside of the MME is directed by the ACT Deputy 3438 Leader or the IPT. The SO Team is the normal point of daily substantive working-
63 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 79 3439 level integration with other SO Teams, host country ministries and departments, JTF 3440 planning cells, or UN organizations. 3441 SO Teams are created and task organized by the MME Team Leader. Program 3442 managers serve at the heart of the team and are essential to bring about the condition 3443 stated in the SO objective. ACT functional offices provide additional capacity to the 3444 SO Team by providing planning, operations, and other functions. WOG integration 3445 necessitates the JTF planning and execution of tasks assigned to the SO should be 3446 coordinated within the confines of the MME and SO structure to ensure unity of 3447 effort between civilian and military implementation activities. SO Teams may 3448 require additional subject related expertise. In such cases, the ACT will deploy 3449 Subject Matter Experts to advise and assist the team. 3450 3451 f. Functional Offices 3452 The ACT HQ includes offices related to the following functional areas: Planning, 3453 Resources, Operations, Force Protection, Strategic Communication, Situational 3454 Assessment and Analysis, ACT Support, and ACT Reach-back. The size of each 3455 functional office will be dependant upon the R&S scenario. The military possesses 3456 certain capabilities that may be of use and contribute greatly to various functional 3457 area structures and offices of the ACT HQ. The military contribution to these various 3458 functions can come in the form of liaison officers and military detailees from the JTF 3459 assigned to the ACT HQ or from military units under operational control of the JTF 3460 tasked to support the activities of the ACT HQ. 3461 i.) The Planning Office consists of WOG planners. One position within the 3462 office may serve multiple functions to different MME or Sub-objective (SO) Teams. 3463 The office is divided into a Planning and an Assessment and Effects Section. The 3464 Planning Office is the first point of integration for related functional offices of the 3465 JTF, UN, IC, HN or other entities. The mission of the Planning Office is to provide 3466 planning expertise and capacity to the ACT leader, IPT, and Integration Structure 3467 (MME and SO Teams) in order to enable these elements to carry out their mission. 3468 The military possesses significant planning capabilities which can contribute to 3469 this office. This will be especially critical when the military is involved in the 3470 response effort utilizing whole-of-government planning or operating under an 3471 established IMS. Ensuring overall planning integration with the JTF of activities that 3472 affect the R&S planning and implementation will be a vital function military planners 3473 perform supporting the Planning Section of this office. Providing planning assistance 3474 and support to MME teams, Implementation Planning Team (IPT) and their 3475 development of the R&S Implementation Plan are examples of requirements where 3476 military planners from the JTF or GCC may apply their planning expertise to support 3477 the activities of the Planning Section. 3478 Individual military detailees assigned to the ACT as well as military units 3479 operationally controlled by the JFC may be requested to assist and support the 3480 development and collection of outcome metrics to monitor the execution of the R&S 3481 Implementation Plan. The proximity of military units, and their ability to maneuver 3482 and conduct patrols in hostile environments, make them a valuable resource to collect 3483 the data that is necessary to inform the outcome metrics. The Assessment and Effects 3484 Section of the Planning Office will devise and manage overall assessment and effects
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3485 collection, analysis, and reporting to ensure relevant MME teams of provided 3486 information in a timely manner enabling better decision-making. 3487 ii.) The Resource Office consists of WOG resource expertise and capacity. One 3488 position within the office may serve multiple functions to different MME or SO 3489 Teams. The office consists of Resource Management, Contracting, and Legal 3490 Sections. The size and composition of this office will depend greatly on the 3491 mechanisms used by Congress and the CRSG to implement the US R&S Strategic 3492 Plan. For example, if interagency contingency funds are provided, the Resource 3493 Office would need the ability to administer this fund in accordance with all 3494 regulations. The mission of the Resource Office is to provide resource planning, 3495 acquisition, and application expertise and capacity to the ACT leader, IPT, and 3496 Integration Structure (MME and SO Teams) in order to enable these elements to carry 3497 out their mission. 3498 Military detailees to the ACT or military personnel operationally controlled by the 3499 JFC may be assigned or requested to provide support to the ACT HQ Resource 3500 Office. This would be the case in the event Congress appropriates contingency funds 3501 from DOD for use in R&S related activities. The resource office would perform the 3502 mission of integrating the use of these funds to best support MME teams and 3503 accomplish the objectives stated in the R&S Implementation Plan. Ultimately, the 3504 agency that received the appropriated funds is responsible and accountable for their 3505 use per existing laws and regulations governing the funds. It is for this reason that it 3506 is critical the military establish a relationship with this office either through the 3507 assignment of a detailee or by tasking the appropriate JTF personnel to support the 3508 mission of this office. 3509 Military comptrollers or a designated fund manager, either assigned to or tasked 3510 to support the ACT HQ, should assist the Resource Management Section or the 3511 Resource Office with budget planning and reporting functions pertaining to their 3512 agency fund, providing fiscal accountability, and tracking DOD resources applied to 3513 the R&S operation. 3514 Contracting officers or their designated representative, representing DOD or one 3515 of its Service components, will be needed to support the Contracting Section of the 3516 Resource Office if DOD funds are used - through the execution of a contract relating 3517 to R&S activities. These contracting officers or their representatives will provide 3518 needed contracting capabilities, under DOD authority, by providing contract 3519 management to support the execution of R&S activities by ACT elements. 3520 Representatives from the JTF Staff Judge Advocates (SJA) office may be 3521 requested to assist the Legal Section of the Resource Office by providing legal 3522 expertise as needed to all elements of the ACT concerning matters related to JTF 3523 activities and authorities pertaining to department/agency contracting and fund uses 3524 applied to R&S operations. 3525 The military may detail personnel to the ACT HQ Resource Office to support its 3526 activities depending on the size and scope of the R&S operation and the level of 3527 military involvement. However, as these types of personnel (comptrollers, 3528 contracting officers, and military lawyers) are in “low-density” military occupation
64 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 81 3529 specialty career fields it may be more feasible for the JTF to detail designated 3530 representatives (e.g. CORs, fund managers, etc.) from the existing military detailees 3531 assigned to the ACT HQ. The JTF should then task the appropriate offices 3532 (Comptroller, Contracting, and SJA) of the JTF to support the ACT HQ Resource 3533 Office and provide reach-back for the designated military representatives detailed to 3534 the ACT HQ. 3535 iii.) The Operations Office consists of WOG operations officers. One position 3536 within the office may serve multiple functions to different MME or SO Teams. The 3537 Operations office also houses the USG Operations Center. The Operations Office 3538 consists of an Operations Section and a Knowledge Management FACT and MME 3539 Support Section. The mission of the Operations Office is to provide operations 3540 management expertise and capacity to the ACT leader, IPT, and Integration Structure 3541 (MME and SO Teams) in order to enable these elements to carry out their mission. 3542 The JTF will primarily have a coordinating relationship with this office, its 3543 Operations Section, and Knowledge Management Section. The primary tasks of the 3544 Operations Office is to: maintain visibility over all activities and processes of the 3545 USG R&S mission; provide a current, comprehensive common operating picture 3546 (COP) of the R&S mission; provide decision support to the COM and ACT decision- 3547 makers; facilitate agency and deployed element compliance with COM and ACT 3548 decisions; and facilitate support/enablement to deployed elements. In order to 3549 support these tasks, the JTF may exchange liaison officers with the ACT HQ 3550 Operations Office or at a minimum establish direct communications between the JTF 3551 Operations Center and the Operations Office of the ACT HQ. 3552 Depending on the scope and scale of military participation in the R&S operation 3553 and the requirements of the Operations Office, the ACT HQ may request the JTF to 3554 provide communications equipment (computers, network infrastructure, AV 3555 equipment, etc.), to enable an integrated R&S common operating picture, and the 3556 necessary personnel to set-up and maintain this equipment – either by detail or liaison 3557 assignment. This equipment and personnel will assist the Operations Office ensure 3558 communications connectivity with the JTF and in tracking the movement of military 3559 assets affecting the R&S operation, in time, space, and purpose. Military detailees or 3560 JTF liaison officers assigned to support this office may also assist in the development 3561 and management of systems for collecting, integrating, and disseminating information 3562 and reports between the JTF and the ACT HQ. 3563 iv.) The Force Protection Office consists of Department of State Diplomatic 3564 Security Personnel working in service of the ACT. It is comprised of a Physical 3565 Security Section, Protection Program Section, Investigations and Intelligence Section, 3566 and an Operations Section. The mission of the Force Protection Office is to provide 3567 the ACT with the ability to physically operate in permissive, semi-permissive, and 3568 (sometimes) non-permissive environments. The Force Protection Office is 3569 responsible for the security of all USG personnel under COM authority. 3570 The military defines semi-permissive and non-permissive environments as 3571 uncertain and hostile environments respectively. In these environments the ACT HQ 3572 Force Protection Office may require additional force protection assistance, both static 3573 and mobile, from the JTF. Uncertain and hostile security environments may require 3574 the ACT – the HQ and its associated FACTs – to co-locate with elements of the JTF
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3575 inside the confines of their operating bases. In these circumstances the ACT Force 3576 Protection Offices will need to closely coordinate with JTF base commanders and 3577 their force protection representatives to ensure proper alignment of security and force 3578 protection procedures. It should be noted that the COM still maintains control over 3579 members of the ACT regardless of their location on or off of a JTF operating base. 3580 The COM can direct members of the ACT to follow the established force protection 3581 and security procedures of the JTF operating base at which they may be co-located. 3582 In permissive environments, where a US Mission has already been established, it 3583 is likely that the ACT (and its elements) may not be co-located with the JTF. Force 3584 protection and security coordination between the ACT and JTF, under these 3585 circumstances, become more complicated. As these two elements are separated, the 3586 reporting chain, communications, and authorities become more distinct. Elements of 3587 the JTF adhere to the guidance of their commanders largely informed by military risk 3588 and threat assessments. Elements of the ACT adhere to the guidance of the COM and 3589 the directives and procedures issued by the Force Protection Office and the 3590 Department of State. These are largely informed by their own risk and threat 3591 assessments, which incorporate a different set of criteria than the military’s threat and 3592 risk assessments. As in any environment communication and coordination 3593 procedures between the JTF and ACT security and force protection elements take on 3594 significant importance enabling secure movement and safe housing and workspace in 3595 support of those performing R&S operation related activities. 3596 v.) The Strategic Communications Office consists of a Public Information 3597 Section, and Information Operations and PSYOPS Section, and a Joint Visitors 3598 Bureau Section. The mission of the Strategic Communications Office is to integrate 3599 all communications between the USG presence in-country and any other non-US 3600 entity regarding the US R&S mission. The Strategic Communications Office 3601 provides the MME Teams and IPT with the ability to identify specific messages and 3602 information, deciding to whom it will be conveyed, select how the conveyance will 3603 take place, then measure the results of the effort. Public Affairs Offices (PAO), 3604 Information Operations (IO) Cells, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units, and 3605 other specially designated strategic communications elements of the JTF will have 3606 significant interaction with the Strategic Communications Office of the ACT HQ. 3607 The Public Information Section of the Strategic Communication Office will 3608 develop country-level messages. It will facilitate and support the development and 3609 implementation of a unified vision and voice for the operation. This section will 3610 liaison and partner with the aforementioned strategic communication elements of the 3611 JTF to enable and integrate national and sub-national messages with various USG 3612 actors in the R&S operation, as well as those of non-USG entities. Another function 3613 of this section is to track strategic communication activities and messages of all the 3614 USG actors and non-USG entities involved in the R&S operation. 3615 The Information Operations and PSYOP Section of the Strategic Communication 3616 Office will enable and manage R&S implementing bodies of the JTF in formulation 3617 and execution of strategic communications. This will be done in close coordination 3618 with the strategic communication elements of the JTF. This section will provide
65 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 83 3619 national level coordination such that R&S implementing bodies of the JTF are able to 3620 deliver informational stimuli intended to compel a specific audience to act or not act 3621 in a certain way to achieve goals as stipulated in the R&S Implementation Plan. This 3622 section will monitor and counter the IO efforts of spoilers opposed to the USG R&S 3623 operation while partnering with JTF strategic communications elements to 3624 proactively identify and execute PA/IO opportunities. 3625 vi.) The Situational Assessment and Analysis Office consists of WOG officers 3626 working along with Liaisons from other agencies (if they are present). The Office 3627 consists of a Conflict Analysis Section, Intelligence Fusion Section, Common 3628 Operating Picture Section, and a Red Cell Section. The mission of the Situational 3629 Assessment and Analysis Office is to provide ACT decision-makers with an accurate 3630 understanding of the environment and the situation to include real-time information 3631 and long-term trends. Facilitate and support the situational analysis development and 3632 adaptation process – creating unity of understanding. 3633 The JTF, GCC, or other elements of the DoD may detail personnel through 3634 temporary assignment or send liaison officers to support the activities of this office. 3635 These detailed personnel or liaison officers may provide support to the Conflict 3636 Analysis, Intelligence Fusion, Common Operating Picture, and Red Cell sections by 3637 providing assessment and analysis perspectives of the JTF, GCC, and DoD to the 3638 office. These perspectives will assist the office in developing a WOG assessment and 3639 analysis of the situation. 3640 These personnel will assist the Conflict Analysis Section in conducting conflict 3641 and instability assessments and develop its understanding of all relevant aspects of the 3642 ACT AOR. These assessments will provide accurate information to key decision- 3643 makers in the ACT Leadership Office. These personnel will also perform a reach- 3644 back function to adjacent JTF units operating in or around the ACT AOR to gather 3645 necessary information for conflict and instability assessments. 3646 Military personnel temporarily detailed to or performing liaison function with the 3647 Intelligence Fusion Section may be used as a conduit for reach-back and partnering 3648 with adjacent information/intelligence units from the JTF. This section will focus on 3649 collection, analysis and distribution issues amongst all USG agencies participating in 3650 the IMS as well as coalition partners, IOs, NGOs, and host-country entities. This 3651 section will, if needed, support the JTF in its development of information collection, 3652 analysis, and reporting plans to ensure relevance of information transmitted to 3653 decision-makers in the ACT Executive Office. 3654 The Common Operating Picture Section will provide each MME team with a 3655 current comprehensive picture of all USG, HN, IC, and other activities related to each 3656 MME. Military personnel detailed to or performing liaison functions with the 3657 Situational Assessment and Analysis Office may be requested to provide the JTF’s 3658 perspective and assist this section with the gathering of data and other relevant 3659 information to populate the common operating picture. 3660 The Red Cell Section will provide a “devil’s advocate” perspective during critical 3661 aspects and decision points of the WOG planning process. This section will attempt 3662 to provide planners and key decision-makers in the ACT Executive Office with 3663 possible enemy courses of action versus the WOG R&S Implementation Plan to 3664 better inform critical decisions. Military personnel detailed to or providing liaison
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3665 functions with the Situational Assessment and Analysis Office, depending on their 3666 background, may be requested to provide assistance or subject matter expertise to this 3667 section. In the event military personnel with specific subject matter expertise are not 3668 resident within this office or the ACT the ACT may request, through the ACT Reach- 3669 Back Office to the CRSG for military subject matter experts with the necessary 3670 qualifications. 3671 vii.) Depending on the scenario and the size of ACT HQ and existing support 3672 capabilities, the ACT Support Office or (S) is likely to be the largest ACT HQ office 3673 and provides all the support services necessary for the ACT HQ to perform its 3674 mission. This office is composed of: Administrative, Logistics, Procurement, HR, IT, 3675 Finance, Motor Pool, and Well-being sections. The mission of the Support Office is 3676 to provide the provide logistical and administrative support to the ACT (including 3677 ACT HQ, the FACT(s), and all related ACT activities and programs) in order to 3678 accomplish the ACT mission. 3679 In the event military personnel are assigned to the ACT as detailees or in a liaison 3680 capacity the need for support requirements for these personnel will arise. If the JTF 3681 and ACT occupy disparate locations, the ACT Support Office will likely serve a 3682 coordinating function with the support elements of the JTF for these personnel. 3683 Depending on the nature and level of military participation within the ACT, elements 3684 of the JTF support structures may choose to co-locate their own representatives 3685 within the ACT Support Office to ensure an adequate level of service is attained for 3686 the military personnel assigned to support the activities of the ACT. 3687 viii.) Though located outside of the country; the ACT Reach-Back Office 3688 answers to the ACT leader NOT the CRSG or any other Washington-based entity. 3689 The Reach-Back office will likely be staffed primarily by contractors and supervised 3690 by USG direct hires. Functions placed in the Reach-Back office will mostly consist 3691 of “back office” functions such as voucher processing, human resources paperwork, 3692 open-source media analysis, etc. The mission of the ACT Reach-Back Office to 3693 provide any function that can be more effectively and more inexpensively be 3694 provided out of country. Personnel are extremely expensive to transport, compensate, 3695 and maintain overseas especially in semi- and non-permissive environments. 3696 Military personnel detailed or performing liaison functions to the ACT will 3697 utilize, as their primary source, reach-back provided by a deployed JTF such as 3698 human resources (personnel), finance and other related administrative and support 3699 capabilities. The secondary source for reach-back for these personnel will be their 3700 sending units or home agencies within their respective branch of Service. In the 3701 event a JTF is not deployed, this secondary source for reach-back will become the 3702 primary source in coordination with the ACT Reach-Back Office as deemed to be 3703 appropriate. 3704 If military personnel coordinate reach-back through this office, it is likely that it 3705 will interact with the same JTF support elements that the ACT Support Office 3706 coordinates with. Due to this, the Reach-Back Office and Support Office of the ACT 3707 should internally coordinate their request prior to coordinating with the JTF support 3708 elements. This should reduce the potential of duplicative requests originating from
66 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 85 3709 multiple offices within the ACT HQ. Substantive reach-back functions contributed 3710 by DOD, such as sectoral and specific subject matter expertise, will be retained by the 3711 CRSG and its DOD representatives, in coordination with the JTF and GCC. 3712 3713 3. JTF Relationship to the ACT 3714 3715 The GCC will have a pre-existing relationship with the COM(s) inside the country 3716 or region where the R&S response effort is focused. Their relationship is formalized 3717 in 22 USC 3927, which states that the COM has “full responsibility” for the direction, 3718 coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in the 3719 country (except for … employees under the command of United States area military 3720 commander). This pre-existing, “steady state” relationship with the COM and 3721 country team will greatly inform the deploying JTF initial planning to support the 3722 R&S operation while participating within the IMS. 3723 As previously stated in this chapter, the ACT serves as the COM’s general R&S 3724 staff, supporting the COM, as he/she deems appropriate, in executing the USG 3725 Interagency R&S Implementation Plan. This body is not a standing structure on a 3726 country team and its lifecycle will coincide with the activities surrounding the R&S 3727 effort. Similarly, the JTF, deployed by the GCC, to support the R&S effort will have 3728 a lifecycle that coincides with the planning and implementation activities related to 3729 the R&S operation. Both the ACT and JTF will focus its efforts on executing the 3730 R&S Implementation Plan with the ACT taking a lead role while the JTF will 3731 primarily serve in a supporting role. 3732 3733 a. Roles and Responsibilities 3734 There are two likely scenarios, mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, 3735 relating to the roles and responsibilities of the JTF and ACT relationship. In the first 3736 scenario the ACT will be deployed into the crisis country and will take up residence 3737 either in the US embassy compound or in a securable location close by. The JTF will 3738 be located either at an APOD/SPOD nearest the national capitol (All capitols with 3739 almost no exceptions have APOD(s)/SPOD(s) in close proximity to the city limits; 3740 securing them is critical to the follow-on needs of the R&S mission) or at a site 3741 nearby that allows the JTF to create a secure operating environment and lines of 3742 communication between the APOD/SPOD and the US Embassy compound. In 3743 coordination with the Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Diplomatic Security (DS), 3744 the JTF will create a secure operating environment in and around the US embassy. 3745 Both, securing APOD(s)/SPOD(s) and the embassy will be initial tasks for the JTF. 3746 Associated with those security tasks will be the task of establishing lines of 3747 communications between the JTF headquarters and the embassy. These lines of 3748 communications will evolve. They may begin as satellite phone communications, 3749 evolve towards rotary-wing shuttles and then to road links between the two 3750 headquarters as the security situation evolves. Or, dependant on the nature of the 3751 threat, they may evolve from satellite phone and radio communications, to ground 3752 transport, and then the development of air transport through secure corridors. A third 3753 critical security task the JTF will assume as soon as diplomatic conditions warrant 3754 will be the protection and movement of diplomatic missions to the government
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3755 entities of the host country. As conditions warrant, this function may be assumed by 3756 armed diplomatic security or by private contractor under the direction and 3757 management of DS and the RSO. 3758 In the second scenario, where a US embassy is either not present or vacated, the 3759 situation is changed. The JTF will still have responsibility for securing the 3760 APOD/SPOD and establishing the JTF presence at and around it. There will not be 3761 the responsibility for securing the non-existent embassy until such time as one is 3762 established or re-established. The ACT and the COM, in this scenario, will co-locate 3763 with the JTF headquarters and operate out of its operating base. The task of 3764 providing for the security of diplomatic missions to and from the functioning 3765 government entities will be more challenging since APOD(s)/SPOD(s) are usually 3766 more distant from government facilities than embassies are. Also in this scenario it is 3767 up to the COM and the JTF commander to decide how they wish to be included in 3768 each other’s daily meetings and briefings. They can either choose to attend 3769 themselves or rely on deputies to do so for them. Coordination between the COM 3770 and JTF commander are much facilitated by proximity in this scenario. In this 3771 scenario, it is likely that when security conditions improve, the COM and ACT will 3772 chose to locate at a facility closer to the host country’s national seat of power. 3773 Preparations should be made to enable this transition from the situation described in 3774 scenario two to the situation described in scenario one. 3775 It is important to remember that under both scenarios the JTF will have units 3776 whose specialties offer a capability to perform implementing tasks in support of the 3777 R&S Implementation Plan, above and beyond traditional security and logistics roles, 3778 while participating within the IMS. These units should be identified early in the 3779 planning process to help determine their roles and responsibilities in direct support of 3780 the R&S Implementation Plan. Determinations should also be made with regard to 3781 authorities and command and control relationships to avoid unnecessary confusion 3782 and delays in executing the implementation plan. In some cases, where authorities 3783 have not been codified, MOUs may need to be drafted and approved to determine 3784 specific relationships between these specialized units, their JTF HQ, the ACT, and the 3785 COM. These MOUs become the basis of identifying and assigning supported and 3786 supporting tasks as well as clarifying supported and supporting relationships, roles 3787 and responsibilities while executing the implementation plan. Some of these units 3788 may be assigned missions from their JTF HQ to directly support field implementing 3789 structures of the IMS, such as the ACT HQ or an FACT. As previously stated, the 3790 JTF, or higher echelon level command or element (such as the GCC or DoD), may 3791 request or be requested to assign detailees or liaison officers to an ACT HQ or a 3792 FACT. The statuses of relationships for these individuals are further specified in 3793 appendix 1: Legal Authorities. 3794 3795 b. JTF Planning in Conjunction with the ACT 3796 The draft USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and 3797 Conflict Transformation does not seek to replace the methodologies and processes by 3798 which a JTF will plan. Rather, it establishes the methodology and process for
67 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 87 3799 developing an Interagency Implementation Plan and provides guidance on what 3800 aspects of JTF implementation plans must be shared with other USG actors and the 3801 implementation planning team. 3802 A JTF will utilize the planning processes outlined in JP 5-0, Joint Operation 3803 Planning, to devise a plan or order. The Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) 3804 consists of seven steps: Initiation; Mission Analysis; Course of Action Development; 3805 Course of Action Analysis and War-gaming; COA Comparison; COA Approval; and 3806 Plan or Order Development. This planning process has served the military well in 3807 operations involving the use of conventional warfare. However, recent experiences in 3808 stabilization and reconstruction operations in post-conflict environments have 3809 exposed limitations in this process. JOPP is mainly centered on the achievement of 3810 military objectives. This process does not sufficiently address the whole-of- 3811 government (WOG) approach to planning for stabilization and reconstruction 3812 operations in environments that are highly complex, confusing, and ill-structured, 3813 which more accurately depicts the reality of the interconnectedness between the 3814 drivers of conflict in societies embroiled in a conflict. This process was not designed 3815 to produce a plan that is implemented through an integrated whole-of-government 3816 effort, which is necessary to achieve the desired objectives in a highly complex post- 3817 conflict environment. 3818 The ACT’s overall responsibility is to implement the USG Strategic Plan for R&S 3819 through development and management of the Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP), 3820 under the leadership of the Chief of Mission. Interagency implementation planning is 3821 an iterative process to synchronize diplomatic, development, economic and defense 3822 implementation planning and tasks through a comprehensive approach to achieve the 3823 USG R&S Strategic Plan. This whole-of-government process identifies additional 3824 planning requirements, potential impediments, and assumptions regarding the 3825 environment. It establishes a timeline for implementation, priority tasks, lead and 3826 supporting USG agencies, authorities and cross-sector linkages and sequencing. This 3827 continuous planning process is the mechanism to communicate feedback, raise 3828 resource and logistics requirements, and conduct monitoring and evaluation while 3829 ensuring the flexibility of USG operations. 3830 JFC programs or activities in or relating to the country where the operation is 3831 occurring will be responsible for participating in whole-of-government planning for 3832 R&S at the strategic and implementation planning levels. Under the IMS, the JFC 3833 will retain responsibility for tasks or sub-tasks assigned to them through the 3834 implementation planning process. This includes the planning, management, 3835 implementation and monitoring of the activities necessary to complete the task. In 3836 non-IMS situations, the JFC will retain normal responsibilities for program 3837 management and monitoring. 3838 DOD responsibilities for whole-of-government planning as an implementation 3839 agency includes: 3840 3841 Providing information on the JTF’s implementation plan, the country and 3842 operational environment, prior and ongoing assessments, and ensuring that such 3843 information is revised once implementation begins;
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3844 Ensuring that to the greatest extent possible, JTF implementation planning 3845 systems interface with an eventual interagency planning system; 3846 Providing staff, as appropriate, to the IMS for R&S or to an S/CRS-led strategic 3847 planning team; and 3848 Carrying out additional implementation planning as required by the CRSG PCC. 3849 3850 Military units subordinate to the JTF and assigned the mission to directly support 3851 ACT implementation activities (e.g., civil affairs) will likely participate in the 3852 planning processes of the JTF as well as the interagency implementation planning 3853 occurring at the ACT. These units will have to develop internal mechanisms and 3854 reporting procedures to maximize their contributions to both distinct processes 3855 without adversely affecting their vital implementation roles and activities and 3856 undermining their ability to achieve their assigned objectives under the IIP. It is these 3857 units that will perform the actual function of linking the planning processes between 3858 the JTF and ACT through their information gathering, implementation activities, and 3859 associated reporting to both elements. In the absence of an assigned military unit in 3860 direct support of ACT implementation activities then JTF liaison officers or military 3861 personnel detailed to the ACT could serve some of the functions in linking the 3862 planning processes. 3863 3864 4. JTF Logistics and Administrative Support to the ACT 3865 3866 The ACT HQ will have an organic logistics and administrative support structure 3867 that will contain a robust capability to support it and its subordinate elements. The 3868 ACT Support Office or (S) is likely to be the largest single office, personnel wise. Its 3869 mission will be providing logistical and administrative support to the ACT (including 3870 ACT HQ, the FACT(s), and all related ACT activities and programs) in order to 3871 accomplish the ACT mission. The office is composed of: Administrative, Logistics, 3872 Procurement, HR, IT, Finance, Motor Pool, and Well-being sections. The structure of 3873 this package (personnel and equipment) will allow it to be deployable into almost any 3874 environment to provide relevant support to the ACT and its field implementing 3875 bodies. 3876 In certain security environments, such as those classified to be uncertain or hostile 3877 by the military and/or the RSO and Force Protection Office, it may be necessary for 3878 the JFC to provide additional logistics and administrative support to the ACT and its 3879 implementing bodies in the field. The JFC should coordinate ACT requests for 3880 additional support, under the direction and guidance of its commander, through its 3881 plans, operations and logistics elements back to the ACT leadership and appropriate 3882 staff elements. It is likely that the JFC will receive guidance from the COM and/or 3883 the ACT Leader for supporting requirements and that the ACT Support Office (S) 3884 will coordinate directly with their counterparts inside the JFC (most likely the 3885 deployed JTF) to properly assign JTF support capabilities to tasks in support of the 3886 ACT and its mission.
68 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 89 3887 Although not all inclusive, additional support could be requested by the ACT 3888 leadership in the following areas: Airlift/Sealift of required sustainment materials and 3889 supplies, Intra-theater Air/Ground transport of personnel and supplies, access to 3890 military medical facilities for personnel assigned under COM authority, and 3891 providing necessary customer service (HR, finance, etc.) for military service 3892 members detailed to or performing liaison duties with the ACT. Military units 3893 assigned the mission to directly support the activities of the ACT will still fall under 3894 the operational control of the GCC or one of the GCC subordinate commanders. 3895 Regardless of their mission, these units will follow established service and support 3896 regulations pertaining to their own unit’s sustainment requirements. In certain 3897 scenarios, these units may likely locate in disparate positions from the deployed JTF 3898 to better support the ACT and its field implementing activities. Detailed logistics and 3899 sustainment plans must be developed and established between the JTF and these units 3900 ensuring that they are supplied, equipped, armed, and manned to levels necessary to 3901 support the mission of the ACT and execution of the R&S Implementation Plan. 3902 Appendix 10: Logistics, Transportation, and Other Life Support Requirements further 3903 details logistics and administrative support the ACT may request of the JFC to assist 3904 with or provide. 3905 3906 5. JTF Communications Support to the ACT 3907 3908 The ACT will have an organic communications support capability located within 3909 the ACT Support Office – (S). In some circumstances and in some environments the 3910 ACT may need additional support from the JFC, more specifically from a deployed 3911 JTF if present in the area of operations (AO). The ACT communications structure 3912 will need to have a robust capacity and provide the necessary capabilities for the ACT 3913 HQ and outlying FACT(s) to support the execution of the R&S Implementation Plan. 3914 However, as previously mentioned, some countries may have a small or even non- 3915 existing US Missions. This will affect the ACT/FACT(s) communication 3916 infrastructure requirements and may result in the need to deploy with a large 3917 communications package. 3918 JFC – particularly from a deploying JTF – communications support may be 3919 requested under these circumstances. Because the ACT is a new organizational 3920 structure it is not yet known what type of communications equipment it will be 3921 authorized and have on-hand to supplement a degraded communications 3922 infrastructure at a US Mission or temporary US Mission inside the country where the 3923 R&S response effort is focused. Due to this the JTF may be asked to provide 3924 personnel and equipment to supplement and add capacity to the ACT 3925 communications infrastructure. In a scenario where the JTF HQ and ACT HQ 3926 initially co-locate, the JTF communications could be leveraged without significant 3927 changes to their internal structures. However, if or when these two elements locate in 3928 different positions the support requested by the ACT and COM may require a more 3929 robust support package and result in re-organization in some internal JTF 3930 communications structures to fulfill the request if and when it is approved. This is 3931 also likely to result in personnel and equipment physically re-locating to the site of 3932 the US Mission (ACT) or one of its regional offices (FACT[s]). This detailed support
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3933 package would most likely interface and/or co-locate with the ACT Support Office – 3934 (S). It is likely and suggested that a unit, rather than individual personnel, be 3935 assigned this type of support task. This would allow for a more complete support 3936 package and ensure that personnel are familiar with the equipment as it is organically 3937 assigned to their unit. This would also allow for ease of accountability for a 3938 commander over personnel and equipment tasked to support the activities of the 3939 ACT, rather than individually detailing personnel and hand-receipting individual 3940 pieces of equipment over to the ACT. Another benefit of assigning a unit is that it 3941 can bring with it its own life support equipment (i.e. shelter). This aspect would 3942 greatly benefit the COM and ACT in the circumstance when it locates at a small US 3943 Mission site where space is limited. The status of these personnel and equipment will 3944 need to be addressed in an MOU between the JTF and COM or their designated 3945 representatives and subject to approval of the JTF Commander or an appropriate 3946 subordinate commander. Appendix 12: Communications; further details possible 3947 support requirements to be requested of a JFC. 3948 3949 6. JTF Security Support to the ACT 3950 3951 The ACT will deploy with an organic security and force protection structure. 3952 This structure will be managed within the Force Protection Office and will consist of 3953 personnel from Department of State Diplomatic Security (DS) organization. DS may 3954 contract services through a private company to supplement their security 3955 requirements depending on the needs of the ACT and COM and influenced by the 3956 complexities of the security environment. As previously stated, the military defines 3957 semi-permissive and non-permissive environments as uncertain and hostile 3958 environments respectively. It is in these environments in which the ACT HQ Force 3959 Protection Office may require additional force protection assistance, both static and 3960 mobile, from the JTF. 3961 Specific requests for mobile security from the JTF may include both tactical 3962 convoy ground transport and intra-theater air transport - rotary and fixed-wing. In 3963 uncertain or hostile environments additional requests for static security will probably 3964 occur, due to the limited resources available to DS in such environments. These 3965 requests must be weighed against other requirements placed on the JTF and any 3966 security restrictions related to COM personnel emplaced by the COM and enforced 3967 by the RSO and/or DS. Utilizing military forces of the JTF to perform static security 3968 at US Mission sites will provide the benefit of increased security for the ACT and 3969 COM personnel, but the cost will be the diversion of troops from performing security 3970 tasks outside the US Mission in support of the R&S operation. Determinations must 3971 be made by the COM and JTF Commander with respect to involvement of private 3972 security to supplement DS and the JTF security tasks - both mobile and static. In the 3973 circumstance where the ACT/COM is co-located on a JTF operating base static 3974 security duties can be leveraged with the pre-existing security apparatus of the base. 3975 Another aspect of security support to the ACT and COM from a JFC (and the 3976 deployed JTF) would involve communications security. As in any degraded security
69 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 91 3977 environment the need for protecting communications and information is of paramount 3978 significance. An inability to do so may result in compromises leading to situations 3979 where the physical security to JTF and ACT/COM personnel is threatened beyond 3980 established force protection levels. A deployed JTF would be able to provide 3981 advanced countermeasures to various threats presented to ACT/COM information and 3982 communication systems. Appendix 11: Security Requirements; further details 3983 possible support requirements to be requested of a JFC. 3984 3985 3986 3987 3988 3989 3990 3991 3992 3993 3994 3995 3996 3997 3998 3999 4000 4001 4002 4003 4004 4005 4006 4007 4008 4009 4010 4011 4012 4013 4014 4015 4016 4017 4018 4019 4020 4021 4022
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4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 Intentionally Blank 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4033 4034 4035 4036 4037 4038 4039 4040 4041 4042 4043 4044 4045 4046 4047 4048 4049 4050 4051 4052 Chapter 8 4053 Military Participation with the Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT) 4054 4055 4056 4057 1. Introduction 4058 4059 Field Advance Civilian Teams or FACT(s) are field elements of the Advance 4060 Civilian Team (ACT). Their missions are to conduct and integrate USG activities, 4061 and coordinate with actors from the international community and local population, to 4062 achieve unity of effort in the execution of the USG R&S Interagency Implementation 4063 Plan (IIP) in their assigned area and level of responsibility. The other major element 4064 of the ACT is the ACT HQ, which is described in Chapter 7 of this handbook. The 4065 ACT HQ, acting as the headquarters element, provides overall direction and support
70 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 93 4066 to the FACT(s) based on guidance from the COM. In turn, FACT(s) provide the 4067 ACT HQ local level implementation capabilities, understanding of unique local 4068 environments within an affected country or region, interaction with the populace, and 4069 inform critical aspects and pieces of information that make up the common operating 4070 picture. The common operating picture is utilized by the ACT HQ and ultimately 4071 informs the information requirements requested by the Country Reconstruction and 4072 Stabilization Group (CRSG) to assist in crafting and refining policies and supporting 4073 strategies and plans. 4074 FACT(s) are usually deployed outside of the ACT HQ to establish a U.S. 4075 presence, provide direct information about conditions on the ground and support R&S 4076 operations conducted at provincial and local levels. In this regard, FACT(s) build 4077 upon the lessons learned from Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and provide 4078 assessments, first-response, and management to the full range of R&S operations. 4079 While remaining under COM authority, FACT(s) may integrate with U.S. or foreign 4080 military forces when appropriate to maintain maximum U.S./coalition unity of effort. 4081 As required, they may coordinate the field execution of projects that involve not only 4082 USG resources, but also UN, other international organizations, non-governmental 4083 organizations (NGO) or host nation activities. 4084 Selected units, elements, or personnel in a JTF with inherent civil-military 4085 capabilities (e.g., Civil Affairs, Engineers, Military Police, and Contracting Officers) 4086 may be assigned to provide support to the FACT in their area of expertise. Reporting 4087 and control arrangements such as OPCON and TACON must be established prior to 4088 personnel or unit moves between civilian and military elements. Whenever possible, 4089 for ease of management and accountability, JTF(s) should consider detailing a unit 4090 (e.g. an engineer platoon) to support a FACT rather than individual soldiers. 4091 4092 a. Structure 4093 FACT(s) are task-organized structures. Each FACT must be designed for the 4094 context in which it is placed, and for the mission with which it is tasked. FACT(s) 4095 are designed to provide FACT Leaders with great flexibility in staffing, tasks, and 4096 organization, while providing the necessary structure and processes to facilitate 4097 whole-of-government integration. The FACT can be divided into four basic 4098 structural alignments: leadership, integration/implementation, functional, and 4099 support. FACT(s) may contain, or be divided into, subordinate forward-deployed 4100 elements. These could take a variety of forms, but should generally respect the FACT 4101 AOR concept of following political boundaries. These sub-elements could range in 4102 scope and scale from a single individual (working with a military unit) to full-scale 4103 teams. Many of the key decisions about FACT structure and organization will be 4104 made by the ACT HQ, and when US military forces are present, are dependent on the 4105 agreements and understanding between the COM and the JTF Commander, as well as 4106 decisions made by the CRSG. 4107 4108 b. Leadership 4109 FACT leadership provides guidance and direction to the team, serves as the 4110 source of authority to knit together a whole of government team, and is responsible 4111 and accountable for the overall planning and implementation of R&S activities within
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4112 their AOR, to the extent authorized by the CRSG, COM and JTF Commander. FACT 4113 leadership includes the FACT Leader and Deputy Leader, and may include a Chief of 4114 Staff. The FACT Leader provides vision, strategic direction and policy guidance to 4115 the FACT. 4116 The FACT Leader is the senior civilian USG representative in AOR and may be 4117 tasked with providing policy and strategic guidance to US military or civilian agency 4118 elements operating within their AOR (during combat operations, a FACT may be in a 4119 supporting relationship to a military unit). FACT leaders are field directors for R&S 4120 operations within their geographic area, reporting to the COM through the ACT 4121 leader and DCM. FACT Leaders are given operational control over the individual 4122 personnel assigned to their FACT, and are able to give guidance and direction to their 4123 team members. A COM may delegate, in writing, additional specific authorities as 4124 appropriate to FACT leaders within their geographic areas. 4125 The FACT Deputy Leader may serve several different functions, and the Deputy 4126 may often be dual-hatted with another role (either within the FACT or in another 4127 organization operating within the FACT’s geographic area). If there is a significant 4128 military presence within the FACT or operating within its geographic area, having the 4129 senior military person responsible for R&S activities serving as FACT Deputy will 4130 simplify the coordination and integration of R&S activities. An example of this could 4131 be a BCT XO or a battalion XO. A military deputy preserves the military chain of 4132 command and personnel rating schemes for any military personnel assigned to the 4133 FACT, and could be appointed from within the FACT if there are no military units 4134 operating in the FACT AOR. If there are no military units, it is likely that the senior 4135 officer representing the largest single military element or organization within the 4136 FACT may be appointed as the Deputy. An example of this is a civil affairs 4137 commander having a dual responsibility of both commanding a unit assigned to 4138 support the R&S implementation activities of the FACT and acting as the rater of 4139 individual military personnel detailed to the FACT. This role would require an extra 4140 challenge of reporting through two different and distinct lines of authority to stay 4141 aligned with US Code. The details of this responsibility should be further stipulated 4142 in the form of an MOU between the officer’s sending organization and the COM. 4143 The FACT may also require a Chief of Staff function (not necessarily a specific 4144 position); someone to oversee FACT internal operations. This function oversees all 4145 FACT support activities, as well as assisting the FACT Leader and Deputy in 4146 managing internal mission-oriented processes. When there is a stand-alone FACT 4147 that must provide for all of its own support, this role will grow significantly in scope 4148 and importance. In cases where the FACT is small in size the function may be an 4149 additional responsibility assumed by the FACT deputy or another suitable FACT 4150 member. 4151 4152 c. Integration and Implementation Element 4153 A parallel structure to the MME Integration Teams in the ACT HQ is the FACT 4154 Integration and Implementation Element which, like the MME Integration Teams, 4155 is comprised of Objective Teams determined by the FACT transformation plan.
71 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 95 4156 This element is focused on implementing programs and plans at the sub-national level 4157 within the FACT AOR. These plans and programs will align with the national level 4158 Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) managed by the ACT HQ. 4159 The Integration and Implementation Element Objective Teams are the focal point 4160 for FACT planning and implementation activities. The Integration and 4161 Implementation Element is where the true task organizing of the FACT happens and 4162 is likely to have the greatest interaction with the local populace and leadership of the 4163 host country; all other FACT elements serve in supporting roles to its 4164 implementation activities. 4165 The FACT Integration Group (FIG) integrates and de-conflicts plans and 4166 activities between FACT-level Objective Teams and if necessary the Objective 4167 Teams of the ACT HQ MME Integration Teams. It will serve as the larger FACT 4168 steering group under the FACT Leader. It coordinates with USG elements inside its 4169 AOR, such as the military, and other R&S elements from the host country and 4170 international community to achieve unity of effort executing the FACT 4171 transformation plan. The FIG will constitute the structure in which leadership from 4172 the military and FACT can meet and make decisions relevant to the conduct of R&S 4173 implementation activities within the AOR. Leadership from both the FACT and 4174 military inside the FACT AOR will require integrated plans and information 4175 concerning the employment of resources, manpower, and equipment supporting the 4176 Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) prior to the conduct of coordinated or 4177 integrated civil-military R&S implementation activities. 4178 The exact make-up of the FIG will depend on decisions made by the CRSG, 4179 GCC/JTF, COM/ACT HQ and the FACT Leader. Normally, the FIG will include all 4180 FACT structural element leaders. It advises and assists the development of 4181 recommendations for guidance to integrating, implementation, and leadership 4182 functions. The FIG is headed by the FACT Leader, with the Deputy providing day- 4183 to-day management. Within the FACT, the FIG is comprised of Objective Leads, 4184 functional section coordinators, Support and Security coordinators, and others as 4185 determined by the FACT Leader. The FIG is also a natural connection point for 4186 coordination and consensus-building with military, other USG agencies, and 4187 international or host-country actors operating within the FACT AOR. 4188 The FACT level Objective Teams plan and conduct R&S activities in the FACT 4189 AOR with all USG elements, to achieve unity of effort and accomplish the FACT 4190 transformation plan objectives. There are likely to be Sub-Objective Teams, with 4191 Sub-Objective Leads within each Objective Team. These Objective and Sub- 4192 Objective Teams contain the actual FACT R&S implementers from each contributing 4193 USG agency – including detailed military personnel or units tasked to support FACT 4194 R&S implementation activities. Each team has a leader and members from USG 4195 agencies implementing tasks necessary to achieve the objective. FACT Objective 4196 Teams are not sector-based (i.e. governance, economics, rule of law, etc.), but 4197 organized around objectives or outcomes specifically targeting the drivers of conflict 4198 and instability dynamics. This discourages organization around agency stovepipes 4199 and brings together individuals with the relevant skills to accomplish a common 4200 objective. Given the matrix structured nature of the FACT organization, Objective
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4201 Team members may perform more than one function, or the same function in more 4202 than one Objective Team. 4203 Coordination or integration of activities with military units possessing civil- 4204 military capabilities operating in the FACT AOR will need to be generated through 4205 the commander and staff of the maneuver unit they are tasked to support and possess 4206 operational or tactical control (OPCON/TACON) over their activities. In some 4207 circumstances these units may be tasked to directly support an ACT or FACT, 4208 however, per US Code, the area commander (or COCOM) will maintain operational 4209 control (OPCON) over the forces assigned to their AOR. Military units tasked to 4210 support ACT(s) and FACT(s) will require special planning considerations concerning 4211 their sustainment – most likely to be arranged with and fulfilled by the nearest MSC 4212 in relation to the location of the ACT or FACT. It is likely that units assigned to 4213 support the FACT could provide a source of mobility in uncertain or hostile 4214 environments for civilian agency personnel (with approval of the CofS or RSO). Due 4215 to their mobility capabilities, these units may be requested to gather pertinent 4216 information related to FACT implementation activities. 4217 Each FACT level Objective Team will have an Objective Lead, tasked with 4218 organizing the processes and managing the activities of the team, as well as their own 4219 implementation activities. The Objective Lead will be chosen based on who can best 4220 fulfill the role, not on which agency has contributed the preponderance of resources to 4221 accomplish the objective. The Objective Lead will have the responsibility to 4222 maintain a relationship with USG elements outside of the FACT with relevant 4223 expertise and involvement in their objective area. This role will put them in contact 4224 with military units subordinate to a JTF or MSC that have civil-military capabilities 4225 or maneuver units conducting security related tasks supporting the R&S operation 4226 objectives. Objective Leads are responsible for reach-back and coordinating with 4227 personnel in the ACT HQ in their objective area (such as MME Integration Objective 4228 Team) to ensure the activities and outcomes of the objective team remain integrated 4229 into the USG R&S Interagency Implementation Plan. In addition to the Objective 4230 Lead, Objective Teams will be composed of Subject Matter Experts, Advisors, 4231 Implementers, Agency Program Officers, and Policy and Reporting Officers. 4232 SME/Advisor/Implementers provide specific knowledge, capacity building, or 4233 direct application capabilities to the objective team. They may be provided by 4234 individual agency details including military personnel, Civilian Response Corps 4235 (CRC) call-ups and contractors. They receive direction from the Objective Lead (or 4236 Leads) they serve under, while exercising the option to maintain reach-back to their 4237 sending organization or agency for resource, programmatic and technical matters or 4238 for administrative and human resource reasons as stipulated in MOU(s), regulations, 4239 applicable laws and code that governing their relationship to the FACT. Examples 4240 include a public finance expert assisting in local budget development, or a military 4241 civil affairs team leader assisting in an infrastructure related assessment alongside 4242 military engineers and development officers from USAID. 4243 Agency Program Officers represent agency programs and funds. These officers 4244 follow their agency regulations and authorities to manage and implement agency
72 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 97 4245 programs supporting the FACT transformation plan and Objective Team 4246 implementation activities. Program Officers representing DoD work closely with the 4247 FACT and ACT HQ Resource Management offices and any DoD counterparts within 4248 those offices such as contracting officers and comptrollers. 4249 Policy and Reporting Officers provide awareness of policy decisions in the 4250 FACT level Objective Team’s area of interest being made at the ACT HQ, Embassy 4251 or CRSG. They also report on host-country conditions and activities related to the 4252 R&S implementation activities. Policy and Reporting Officers will work on one or 4253 more objective teams. They will coordinate with Strategic Communications section 4254 concerning current policy, perceptions, and implications and the KM&R section 4255 concerning their participation in the FACT reporting plan. 4256 4257 d. Functional Areas 4258 The functional areas of the FACT are not a single structural element, but a cluster 4259 of individual sections that report to the FACT leadership. Functional sections provide 4260 support in the form of mission-necessary capabilities to the Integration and 4261 Implementation Element. The function sections include, but are not limited to: 4262 situational analysis/common operating picture, planning, operations, reporting 4263 and knowledge management, strategic communications, and resource 4264 management. The functional sections are highly scalable in nature. They may 4265 consist of one or two people, or may be enlarged as needed. The composition of each 4266 section will be described in terms of functional roles to be performed. 4267 These functional sections may request assistance of the JTF for technical matters 4268 associated with communications and information systems and related capabilities. 4269 This is likely to happen in the case of a significant military presence in support of 4270 R&S activities in order to better facilitate communication and information sharing 4271 between the military and the FACT. Other technical support may be requested of the 4272 military, especially concerning resource management and the use of agency funds and 4273 related contracts. Comptrollers, fund managers, authorized pay agents, and 4274 contracting officers (or their representatives) representing DoD or one of its 4275 subordinate elements (including the deployed military forces of the JTF) will be 4276 required to monitor the use and disbursement of DoD funds and maintain oversight of 4277 contracts awarded utilizing DoD funds. Lastly, as with the other elements of the 4278 FACT, these functional elements may request further support of deployed military 4279 forces in the form of logistics, transportation and additional security concerning 4280 movement and travel. This is especially true if or when the environment in which 4281 they operate is evaluated to be uncertain or even hostile. Additional logistic and 4282 security requests should be coordinated with the FACT leadership to ensure proper 4283 coverage to the FACT organization as a whole. 4284 The following is a description of the functional elements and how they may 4285 interact with the military. This may take the form of military units operating inside a 4286 FACT AOR or military personnel detailed to a FACT. 4287 The Situational Analysis/Common Operating Picture Section (SA/COP) 4288 mission facilitates regular whole-of-government situational analysis of the FACT’s 4289 AOR to develop and maintain a common operating picture and understanding of the
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4290 context, dynamics, activities and trends in the AOR among all USG actors. There are 4291 four functional roles that this section needs to provide. 4292 The COP Coordinator facilitates the whole-of-government situational analysis 4293 process within the FACT AOR. This coordinator must possess knowledge of 4294 methods and tools for situational analysis and COP development. The Intel Officer 4295 provides intelligence analysis for COP and integration/implementation efforts, liaison 4296 and coordination with other intelligence units in their AOR and reach-back to the 4297 intelligence community. The Conflict Analyst provides conflict-specific expertise to 4298 COP and integration/ implementation efforts, including use of conflict assessment 4299 tools and methodologies such as the ICAF. The Area Specialist provides regional 4300 and national cultural and historical expertise to COP and integration and 4301 implementation efforts. 4302 The SA/COP section may coordinate or integrate planning and execution with 4303 various military forces either detailed to provide personnel to a FACT, or that a 4304 FACT may work closely with. These include, but are not limited to Human Terrain 4305 Teams and Tactical HUMINT Teams, military intelligence fusion cells or “2” shops, 4306 Civil Affairs teams conducting assessment activities, and information collected by 4307 maneuver units conducting presence and security patrols. 4308 The Planning Section (PLN) facilitates whole-of-government R&S planning for 4309 the FACT and other USG actors in its AOR, based on the situational analysis and 4310 COP to create unity of effort among R&S activities. There are two functional roles in 4311 the planning section. 4312 The first position is the Planning Coordinator who facilitates whole-of- 4313 government R&S planning within the FACT and with other USG actors inside the 4314 FACT AOR. The planning coordinator links the FACT’s planning activities to the 4315 host country national level Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) at the ACT HQ. 4316 The second position is the Metrics Advisor who develops useful measurements of 4317 inputs, outputs and outcomes for measuring progress and reassessing conditions. 4318 Planning Assistants provide a functional role which serves to reinforce that the 4319 planning process is complex enough that it would be useful if a few of the people 4320 filling other primary functions in the integration/implementation unit had additional 4321 experience in R&S planning to support the process. Assisting R&S implementation 4322 planning is another area in which the military can coordinate or integrate activities 4323 with the FACT. In addition to military detailees assigned to the FACT, planners from 4324 Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) in the JTF, conducting civil-military 4325 operations (CMO) within the FACT AOR should contribute to and align their 4326 planning to FACT R&S implementation plans. 4327 The Operations Section (OPS) provides support to day-to-day FACT operations 4328 and develops the FACT 90-day operations plan to translate whole-of-government 4329 planning into whole-of-government action. The Operations Section’s size will be 4330 affected by the scale of the R&S operation and dependant on the FACT providing for 4331 its own support, or relying on other actors such as the military when co-located or 4332 embedded.
73 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 99 4333 There are a handful of functional roles in the Operations Section. The 4334 Operations Coordinator oversees FACT operational planning (90-day plans), and 4335 manages the FACT day-to-day administrative activities. The Synch Matrix 4336 Manager manages the 90-day operational planning cycle, and the development of the 4337 FACT Synch Matrix that integrates and coordinates all FACT activities around the 4338 larger FACT transformation plan informing the national level IIP. Additional 4339 Operations Coordinators may be needed when the FACT is working with US 4340 military or other USG actors, or international partners. The additional coordinators 4341 provide a liaison and coordination function with those actors. A JTF should 4342 reciprocate this by designating an individual from an MSC operating within the 4343 FACT AOR to liaison and coordinate with the FACT Operations Section. This 4344 individual will work with multiple sections of the FACT in the course of their liaison 4345 duties and must be able to speak on behalf of his or her commander. 4346 Like the Planning Section, military forces conducting CMO in the FACT AOR 4347 must coordinate their activities with the FACT Operations Section. Military units or 4348 individuals detailed to the FACT with mission sets that are inherently civil-military 4349 may be tasked to directly support this section; specifically the 90-day operations plan 4350 development and refinement. 4351 The Reporting & Knowledge Management (R&KM) section will manage the 4352 flow of information within the FACT, between the FACT and other USG elements, 4353 between the FACT and ACT HQ, and between the FACT and other R&S actors 4354 (international organizations and host country) to ensure that the COP remains 4355 “common” and that information and reporting requirements are met while also 4356 minimizing duplication of effort. 4357 There are three primary functional roles for this section and depending on the 4358 circumstances an MSC in a JTF may be tasked to provide support and technical 4359 assistance to them. The Reporting & Knowledge Coordinator is responsible for the 4360 management of technical details of the COP including FACT KM processes, 4361 reporting plans and external reports, liaison with other USG elements operating in the 4362 FACT AOR concerning their reporting activities, tie-in with the KM activities and 4363 processes at the ACT HQ, and serve as the central node for information moving to, 4364 from and within the FACT. Technical Specialties will be needed in order to ensure 4365 the knowledge management activities of the FACT. Various technical informational 4366 specialization areas must be present; these include GIS operations and other mapping 4367 specialties, portal management, and any other specialized information skills sets as 4368 required. The IT & Communications staff addresses the provision of IT and 4369 communications support within R&KM ensuring connectivity and communication 4370 between FACT and ACT HQ, as well as between the FACT and other organizations - 4371 including other FACT(s). 4372 If the information and communications infrastructure is significantly degraded, 4373 MSCs may be requested to provide support to the FACT R&KM section. The level 4374 of support requested will depend on the package of personnel and equipment that is 4375 organic to the R&KM section and gaps in capacity and capabilities which will need to 4376 be addressed given the supporting infrastructure in the affected country or region. 4377 These requests should be weighed against operating constraints that the military is 4378 facing, current capability to provide the requested support, and prioritized in
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4379 coordination with both JTF and ACT headquarters. Maintaining communications 4380 necessary to support command and control systems within the MSC will be a major 4381 planning consideration when evaluating requests for communications support for a 4382 FACT. 4383 The Strategic Communications Section (SC) facilitates whole-of-government 4384 strategic communication assessment and strategy development for the USG in the 4385 FACT AOR and supports the SC assessment and activity requirements of the 4386 integration/implementation section. This includes information operations as well as 4387 public affairs and public diplomacy issues – paying special attention to public 4388 perception at the local level, in order to achieve an integrated approach to managing 4389 the perceptions of the FACT target audiences (host-country, international, domestic). 4390 There are three functional roles contained within this section. These functions are 4391 likely to work with and be informed by activities performed by certain units within a 4392 JTF such as Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams, military IO cells, and Public 4393 Affairs Officers (PAO). These military elements are likely to inform and work with 4394 the SC section and receive input from it when crafting messages and planning 4395 activities to better advise their commander(s) of the overall USG SC strategies and 4396 objectives within their area of operation that is inside the FACT AOR. 4397 The Strategic Communication Coordinator develops and manages a SC 4398 strategy for the FACT and among the USG elements conducting R&S activities inside 4399 the FACT AOR. The Coordinator also provides SC/IO assessments, advice, and 4400 options to the integration/ implementation element. The Public Affairs Officer 4401 provides management of press relations, media events and statements, and other 4402 public affairs activities. The FACT PAO will work with and request support from 4403 military PAO(s) to ensure all messages, concerning USG activities, broadcasted to the 4404 public within the FACT AOR and to larger audiences is coordinated, provide accurate 4405 information, and enhance public perception of the operation. The Public Diplomacy 4406 Officer manages PD programs and activities, including: exchanges, building 4407 connections with host country groups and communities, and representational 4408 activities. Military commanders, their primary staff, CMO sections, and other units 4409 which provide specialized civil-military capabilities (e.g., CA, PSYOP, PAO) 4410 supporting a maneuver commander whose AO is in the FACT AOR, are likely to 4411 work with the PD Officer and assist in building connections with groups and 4412 communities residing inside the FACT AOR. 4413 The Resource Management Section (RM) will coordinate and plan the use of 4414 USG resources in the FACT AOR to ensure that resources are tied to the COP and 4415 support the transformation plan. This section provides management and execution of 4416 any “contingency funds” allocated to the FACT. The RM section will be highly 4417 scalable and flexible dependent upon specific circumstances concerning funds 4418 allocated to the FACT. If the FACT is allocated significant funds, then it will need a 4419 highly capable RM section. If not, then a RM section may not be required – making 4420 the assumption that the Planning section can take on the resource planning function 4421 for any funds that are made available.
74 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 101 4422 There a several functional roles within this section. The Resource Planner will 4423 develop a FACT AOR-wide resource strategy, ensuring the FACT and other USG 4424 R&S related funds are used in accordance with the FACT plan supporting the larger 4425 Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP). The Resource Planner will coordinate with 4426 agency representatives who are appointed to manage their individual agency- 4427 allocated funds and maintain communications with ACT HQ resource planners to 4428 align with the ACT HQ resource strategy. Also, they will make planning decisions 4429 for any FACT “interagency” contingency funds that may be allocated. The 4430 Contracting Operations element of this section will require at least one contracting 4431 officer - especially if the FACT is allocated “interagency” contingency funds for the 4432 purpose of executing contracts related to R&S activities. If “interagency” 4433 contingency funds are allocated then a Fund Manager to fulfill a funds 4434 management/comptroller function separate from the contracting function will be 4435 required. This position represents the comptroller (or budget office) that allocated the 4436 contingency funds for use in R&S related activities. The Project Manager Support 4437 function will perform needed technical assistance for projects conducted by the 4438 FACT Integration and Implementation Element Objective and Sub-Objective Teams. 4439 These teams will appoint Project Leads (aka Project Managers) for each project. 4440 The use of contingency funds allocated to DoD must be coordinated with the 4441 FACT RM Section when it relates to R&S activities conducted in the FACT AOR. 4442 Fund managers, comptrollers, and contracting officers who represent DoD will 4443 continue to provide stewardship, expert advice, and management of resource related 4444 processes and activities concerning the uses of their agency funds. The appointed 4445 Project Leads representing Objective and Sub-Objective Teams will provide 4446 recommendations for project prioritization and funding in consultation with the 4447 FACT RM Section, representatives of agency-allocated funds, and host country 4448 government officials to determine which fund source is best aligned to meet their 4449 objectives. Ultimately, in the case of DoD contingency funds, the approval authority 4450 – usually a military commander - will retain the right to approve or disapprove the 4451 use of appropriated contingency funds authorized to their command. This decision 4452 will be based largely on the objectives laid out in the Interagency Implementation 4453 Plan (IIP), availability of funds, and project prioritization developed in conjunction 4454 with the ACT/FACT, and when appropriate government representatives of the host 4455 country. 4456 4457 2. JFC Relationship to the FACT 4458 4459 Pre-existing relationships with the COM(s) inside the country or region where the 4460 R&S response effort is focused are formalized between GCC(s) and COM(s) within 4461 their AOR with 22 USC 3927. This states that the COM has “full responsibility” for 4462 the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch 4463 employees in the country (except for … employees under the command of United 4464 States area military commander). This pre-existing, “steady state” relationship with 4465 the COM and country team will greatly inform and assist the deploying JTF 4466 conducting initial planning to support the R&S operation while participating within 4467 the IMS.
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4468 This section describes two types of generic FACT structures that have different 4469 implications as they relate to a JTF and its subordinate units mainly concerning 4470 support and security requirements. Similar to the deployment and location scenarios 4471 of the ACT, there are two scenarios that are likely for the deployment and location of 4472 the FACT. In the first a US mission, consulates, and regional offices exist, and a 4473 Chief of Mission (COM) is present. In this scenario the security environment allows 4474 the FACT to deploy to the existing facilities established at the US mission and stand- 4475 up per established procedures. In the second scenario the US mission and associated 4476 facilities in country either do not exist or, due to the circumstances (including security 4477 threats) on the ground, are vacant and untenable. In this case the FACT will deploy 4478 and co-locate, or even embed, with MSC(s) of the JTF on operating bases located 4479 inside the FACT AOR. 4480 MSC(s) of a JTF, such as BCT(s), are most likely to interact, coordinate or 4481 integrate R&S implementation activities with a FACT. Staff elements of the JTF 4482 higher headquarters will likely contact individual FACT(s) concerning varying topic 4483 areas of concern to the larger effort the JTF is supporting. However, these activities 4484 should be coordinated through the ACT HQ and include the subordinate military units 4485 operating within the FACT AOR. Military units, elements or selected personnel 4486 within a JTF possessing civil-military capabilities (e.g., Civil Affairs, Engineers, 4487 Military Police, and Contracting Officers) may be tasked to support, or in some cases 4488 selected personnel may be detailed to a FACT to provide assistance and expertise. 4489 Arrangements governing these relationships concerning control and reporting 4490 authorities must be established and clarified through a detailed MOU. 4491 4492 a. Roles and Responsibilities 4493 The roles and responsibilities between subordinate units of a JTF and embedded 4494 FACT(s), co-located FACT(s), and stand-alone FACT(s) will vary due to their 4495 purpose, mission, and organizational design. The structure of an embedded FACT is 4496 likely to be much smaller than that of a co-located FACT. In some circumstances, 4497 personnel comprising the make-up of an embedded FACT will act in advisory roles to 4498 a commander of a MSC while implementing programs with the support of the 4499 command. FACT personnel will remain under COM control, but their roles will be 4500 infused into and supported by the mission and activities of the MSC. Embedded 4501 FACT(s) may collaborate or integrate their activities with larger stand-alone FACT(s) 4502 in neighboring FACT AOR(s). Co-located FACT(s) are likely to be larger and more 4503 autonomous than embedded FACT(s) and have a larger and more capable support 4504 apparatus reducing the support requirements tasked to a MSC through the JTF. A 4505 decline in the security environment or deployment of the FACT to a hostile area may 4506 lead to a decision to co-locate. The task of providing security to diplomatic missions 4507 traveling to and from host nation government entities may be more challenging when 4508 co-located since JTF operating bases are likely to be more distant from host 4509 government facilities than embassies and other US mission facilities. Also the FACT 4510 Leader and the MSC Commander need to be included in each other’s daily meetings 4511 and briefings. They can either choose to attend themselves or rely on deputies to do
75 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 103 4512 so for them. Coordination between these two individuals and their organizations is 4513 facilitated by proximity in this scenario. As security conditions improve a co-located 4514 FACT may choose to depart a JTF operating base and stand-alone to work more 4515 closely with their counterparts in the host country. 4516 The stand-alone FACT will deploy to an existing US mission compound or 4517 securable position preferably located near their counterparts in the host country 4518 government. It is likely to be significantly larger than an embedded or co-located 4519 FACT. This type of FACT will contain a support apparatus, to include security that 4520 will likely surpass the number of actual implementers conducting R&S activities. 4521 This stand-alone FACT will require less assistance from MSC(s) within the FACT 4522 AOR regarding its sustainment due to increased internal support capabilities. In 4523 coordination with the Regional Security Officer (RSO) and Diplomatic Security (DS), 4524 the JTF through its MSC(s) will create a secure operating environment in and around 4525 the FACT location. Initial R&S support related tasks for MSC(s) are likely to include 4526 the creation of and securing lines of communication between the locations of JTF 4527 subordinate units and the location of the FACT enabling implementation of R&S 4528 activities. Another critical security task MSC(s) may assume as diplomatic 4529 conditions warrant, and manpower and resources allow will be the protection and 4530 movement of diplomatic missions to and from the government entities of the host 4531 country. When conditions allow, this function may be assumed by armed diplomatic 4532 security or by armed private security contractors under the direction of the COM and 4533 management of DS and the RSO. 4534 No matter the type of FACT, a JTF will likely have subordinate units operating in 4535 its AOR whose specialization offer a capability to perform implementing tasks in 4536 support of the Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP), above and beyond traditional 4537 security and logistics roles. First and foremost these units support the mission of a 4538 military commander; therefore special considerations should be made when tasking 4539 these units, or individuals within these units, to directly support the implementation 4540 activities of a FACT. Considerations should include the resulting reduced support 4541 capabilities available to a commander versus the benefit to accomplishing the 4542 objectives in the Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) by directly supporting the 4543 implementation activities of a FACT. These military units or personnel should be 4544 identified early in the planning process to help determine their roles and 4545 responsibilities in direct support of the implementation plan. Determinations should 4546 also be made with regard to authorities and command and control relationships to 4547 avoid unnecessary confusion and delays in executing the implementation plan. In 4548 some cases, where authorities have not been codified, MOUs will be needed and 4549 approved to determine specific relationships between these specialized units or 4550 individual personnel, their JTF HQ, the FACT, and the COM/ACT HQ. These 4551 MOUs become the basis of identifying and assigning supported and supporting tasks 4552 as well as clarifying supported and supporting relationships, roles and responsibilities 4553 while executing the implementation plan. The JTF, or higher level echelon or 4554 command (such as the GCC or DoD), may request or be requested to assign detailees 4555 or liaison officers to FACT(s). The statuses of relationships for these individuals are 4556 further specified in appendix 1: Legal Authorities. 4557
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4558 b. JTF/MSC Planning in Conjunction with FACT(s) 4559 FACT(s) are responsible for coordinating planning with all U.S. military forces 4560 operating in their geographic area to achieve interagency implementation planning 4561 objectives. Likewise, MSC(s) of a JTF should coordinate their R&S activities and 4562 integrate their planning for these activities with all FACT(s) operating in their AO. 4563 The primary focus of a FACT is local, on-the-ground tactical level implementation 4564 activities, however, their assessments, plan revisions, and sub-national field level 4565 planning and execution is important and may have implications that affect plans at the 4566 operational and strategic levels. FACT(s) contribute to the planning and revisions of 4567 the Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) and play an important role informing and 4568 achieving the objectives in the USG Strategic Plan for R&S. Due to their role at the 4569 tactical implementation levels in support of the IIP it is likely that the FACT and 4570 MSC(s) of a JTF will be implementing programs and projects in the same geographic 4571 sector that are interconnected and therefore should be coordinated through an 4572 integrated planning process as envisioned in the IIP under the USG Planning 4573 Framework. 4574 The land component MSC(s) of a JTF will utilize their Service doctrine planning 4575 processes to devise a plan or order. For the Army this process is outlined in FM 5-0, 4576 Army Planning and Orders Production, and for the Marine Corps this process is 4577 outlined in MCDP 5, Planning. The IIP does not replace the processes by which a 4578 MSC will plan. Rather, it establishes the process for developing an integrated civil- 4579 military plan and provides guidance on what aspects of MSC R&S implementation 4580 plans must be shared with the FACT. Military units subordinate to a MSC and 4581 assigned the mission to directly support FACT implementation activities (e.g., civil 4582 affairs, PSYOP, engineers) will participate in the planning processes under the MSC 4583 as well as the interagency implementation planning occurring at the FACT. These 4584 units will have to develop internal mechanisms and reporting procedures to maximize 4585 their contributions to both distinct processes without adversely affecting their vital 4586 implementation roles undermining their ability to achieve their assigned military tasks 4587 and interagency objectives in the IIP. These units will perform the actual function of 4588 linking the planning processes between the MSC and FACT through their information 4589 gathering, implementation activities, and associated reporting to both elements. In 4590 the absence of an assigned military unit in direct support of FACT implementation 4591 activities then MSC liaison officers or military personnel detailed to the FACT may 4592 serve some of the functions in linking the military and interagency planning 4593 processes. 4594 For more information pertaining to MSC Planning in Conjunction with FACT(s) 4595 refer to Chapter 7, Section 3b – JTF Planning in Conjunction with the ACT. 4596 4597 c. Logistics and Admin Support 4598 Support requirements for FACT(s) will vary depending on a number of factors to 4599 include its mission, objectives, size, locations and the security environment. Current 4600 designs of FACT(s) contain a Support and Security Element to manage the 4601 requirements to successfully operate. The size of this office is highly dependant on
76 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 105 4602 the type of FACT it will support. When appropriate and available this element may 4603 receive additional support from the ACT HQ Support Office or (S) to enhance its 4604 capabilities. A FACT advance party will plan FACT support requirements prior to its 4605 deployment and determine responsibilities for providing that support. This may 4606 translate into the development of MOUs with the military and the establishment of 4607 contracts to provide support that is otherwise unavailable. 4608 In uncertain or hostile security environments MSC(s) may be tasked to provide 4609 additional logistics and administrative support to a stand-alone FACT. These units 4610 should coordinate FACT requests for additional support using established staffing 4611 processes to generate a command decision and then relay the request response back to 4612 the FACT staff and leadership. It is likely that the JTF will receive requests from the 4613 COM and/or the ACT Leader for FACT support requirements and that the ACT 4614 Support Office (S), or FACT Support and Security element, will coordinate directly 4615 with their counterparts inside the JTF to properly assign JTF support capabilities to 4616 tasks in support of stand-alone FACT(s). Co-located or embedded FACT(s) will 4617 leverage, to the maximum extent possible, the support and sustainment capabilities 4618 and capacities of the JTF operating base where they are located. 4619 Additional support could be requested by the FACT leadership in the following 4620 areas: Intra-theater Air/Ground transport of personnel and supplies, access to military 4621 medical facilities for personnel assigned under COM authority, and providing 4622 necessary customer service (HR, finance, etc.) for military service members detailed 4623 to or performing liaison duties with a FACT. Military units assigned to directly 4624 support the activities of the FACT will remain under the operational control of the 4625 GCC, the JTF or one of the JTF subordinate commanders. Regardless of their 4626 mission, these units will follow established service and support regulations pertaining 4627 to their unit’s sustainment requirements. In certain cases these units could locate to 4628 satellite positions away from JTF operating bases to better support the FACT(s). 4629 Detailed logistics and sustainment plans must be established between the JTF and 4630 these units ensuring that they are supplied, equipped, armed, and manned to levels 4631 necessary to support themselves and the activities of the FACT. Appendix 10: 4632 Logistics, Transportation, and Other Life Support Requirements further details 4633 logistics and administrative support the FACT may request of the JTF. 4634 4635 d. Communication Support 4636 FACT(s) will have a small communications support capability to manage 4637 communication requirements located in its Support and Security element. Due to the 4638 security environment, the FACT may need additional support from the JTF, 4639 specifically from communications units of a MSC that are present in the FACT AOR. 4640 The FACT communications structure will need a robust capacity and provide the 4641 necessary capabilities to support the execution of the Interagency Implementation 4642 Plan (IIP). Some countries may have small or even non-existing US Missions. This 4643 will affect the FACT(s) communication infrastructure requirements and result in the 4644 need to deploy with or request a large communications package. Examples of 4645 communications support requirements a FACT may have include non-secure internet, 4646 voice, mobile; secure internet and secure voice; IT support; and interoperability 4647 capabilities with the military.
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4648 The FACT is a new organizational structure. It is not yet known the type of 4649 communications equipment it will be authorized and have on-hand to supplement a 4650 degraded communications infrastructure inside the country where the R&S response 4651 effort is focused. Due to this the JTF may be tasked to provide personnel and 4652 equipment to supplement and add capacity to the FACT communications 4653 infrastructure. In situations where MSC(s) and FACT(s) co-locate, communications 4654 could be leveraged without significant changes to their internal structures. However, 4655 if or when these two elements locate in different positions the support requested by 4656 the FACT may require a more robust support package and result in re-organization of 4657 some internal JTF communications structures to fulfill the request to include 4658 personnel and equipment physically re-locating to the site of the FACT. In these 4659 circumstances communications units or sections, rather than individual personnel, 4660 should be assigned to support the task. This allows a complete support package to be 4661 sent and ensures personnel are familiar with the equipment since it is organic to the 4662 unit’s MTOE. This also enhances the accountability for a commander over personnel 4663 and equipment tasked supporting the activities of the FACT, rather than individually 4664 detailing personnel and hand-receipting individual pieces of equipment over to the 4665 FACT. Another benefit of assigning a unit is that it will bring its own life support 4666 equipment (i.e. shelter). This aspect would greatly benefit the FACT when it locates 4667 at a small US Mission or other secured site where space is limited. The status of 4668 these personnel and equipment will need to be addressed in an MOU between the JTF 4669 and COM or their designated representatives and subject to approval of the JTF 4670 Commander or an appropriate subordinate commander. Appendix 12: 4671 Communications; further details possible support requirements to be requested of a 4672 JFC. 4673 4674 e. Security Support 4675 The FACT may deploy with an organic security and force protection capability, 4676 depending on security environment, location, its mission, and design. This capability 4677 will be managed within the Support and Security element in consultation with the 4678 Force Protection Office of the ACT. It will consist of personnel from Department of 4679 State Diplomatic Security (DS). DS may contract services through a private company 4680 to supplement their security requirements depending on the needs articulated by the 4681 COM, ACT and FACT leadership. In uncertain or hostile environments the FACT 4682 leadership in coordination with the ACT HQ Force Protection Office may require 4683 additional force protection assistance, both static and mobile, from the JTF. 4684 Specific requests for mobile security from MSC(s) operating in the FACT AOR 4685 may include both tactical convoy ground transport and intra-theater air transport - 4686 rotary and fixed-wing. In uncertain or hostile environments additional requests for 4687 static security will probably occur, due to the limited resources available to DS in 4688 such environments. These requests must be weighed against other requirements and 4689 constraints placed on these units. Utilizing military forces to perform static security 4690 at US Mission sites will increase security for the FACT, but the cost will be the 4691 diversion of troops from performing security tasks outside the FACT location in
77 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 107 4692 support of the R&S operation. Determinations must be made by the COM and JTF 4693 Commander regarding the use of private security to supplement DS force protection 4694 and security responsibilities. When the FACT is co-located on a JTF operating base 4695 static security duties can be leveraged with the pre-existing security apparatus of the 4696 base. 4697 Another aspect of security support to the FACT, ACT and COM from a JTF 4698 would involve communications security. Degraded security environments require the 4699 need for protecting communications and information. This is of paramount 4700 significance. An inability to do so may result in compromises leading to situations 4701 where the security of JTF and FACT/ACT/COM personnel is threatened beyond 4702 established force protection levels. A JTF can provide advanced countermeasures to 4703 various threats presented to FACT/ACT/COM information and communication 4704 systems. Appendix 11: Security Requirements; further details possible support 4705 requirements to be requested of a JFC. 4706 4707 4708 4709 4710 4711 4712 4713 4714 4715 4716 4717 4718 4719 4720 4721 4722 4723 4724 4725 4726 4727 4728 4729 Intentionally Blank 4730 4731 4732 4733 4734 4735 4736 4737
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4738 4739 4740 4741 4742 4743 4744 4745 4746 4747 4748 4749 4750 4751 4752 4753 4754 Chapter 9 4755 Pre-IMS R&S Operations Preparation and Planning 4756 4757 4758 4759 1. Introduction 4760 4761 Joint Force commanders can be expected to engage in Reconstruction and 4762 Stabilization, R&S, operations for the foreseeable future. The Defense Department 4763 recognizes the importance of readiness for these operations and has placed them on 4764 par with the core military priority of war-fighting. For years the military has been 4765 reluctant to engage in these forms of operations as a drain on resources supporting 4766 missions that were not military core competencies. The attacks on U.S. targets on 4767 September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed perceptions and made it clear the 4768 government needed to change the way it addresses crisis in far off places. The result, 4769 as has been discussed earlier in previous chapters, is the Interagency Management 4770 System (IMS) for R&S. 4771 When a significant crisis occurs or begins to emerge and the Secretary of State 4772 decides to establish the Interagency Management System (R&S) based on a 4773 decision by the Principals’ or Deputies’ Committees and implemented at the 4774 direction of the NSC, several components will be stood up, not necessarily in a 4775 simultaneous manner, but in a fashion that addresses the specific requirements of the 4776 response. 4777 4778 CRSG (Country Reconstruction & Stabilization Group): A Washington- 4779 based decision-making body (Policy Coordinating Committee—PCC) with a 4780 planning and operations staff;
78 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 109 4781 IPC (Integration Planning Cell): A civilian planning cell integrated with 4782 relevant Geographic Combatant Command(s) (GCC) or with equivalent 4783 multinational headquarters; and, 4784 ACT (Advance Civilian Team): One or more, in the case of regional 4785 crises, interagency field management and coordination teams to support 4786 Chiefs of Mission (COM[s]) in the field. 4787 4788 The IMS is established to assist Washington policymakers, (COM[s]), and 4789 military commanders manage complex R&S engagements by ensuring coordination 4790 among all USG stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical/field levels. It 4791 is designed for highly complex crises and operations, which are national or security 4792 priorities, involve widespread instability, may require military operations, and where 4793 multiple U.S. agencies will be engaged in the policy and programmatic response. 4794 This system is a response mechanism. It does not preclude interagency prevention or 4795 contingency planning, which may occur independently. The system will draw upon 4796 such plans when they exist. The IMS is not a substitute for agency planning. DOD 4797 entities will plan for military operations and contingences in usual and prescribed 4798 manners. The system is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian 4799 crises that are regularly and effectively handled through the current Washington D.C. 4800 and U.S. Embassy based systems. 4801 The lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, 4802 and Kosovo demonstrate that the U.S. must employ an 4803 approach in these types of engagements that draws upon 4804 the full range of diplomatic, development, defense, 4805 intelligence, and economic resources available to the 4806 USG. The system provides flexible tools to ensure unity 4807 of effort as laid out through whole-of-government 4808 strategic and implementation planning for R&S. It is 4809 intended to facilitate and support: 4810 Integrated planning processes for unified USG strategic and 4811 implementation plans, including programmatic and contingency operation 4812 funding requests; 4813 Joint and interagency field deployments; and, 4814 A joint civilian operations capability including sustainment and shared 4815 communications and information management. 4816 4817 On a multinational level, nations need to collectively share their analysis of the 4818 conflict which will drive identification of the coalition/alliance goal, subsequent 4819 strategy and central priorities to achieve the goal – similar to USG processes. It is 4820 more beneficial to share conflict assessments and keep differing perspectives in view 4821 rather than develop one single multinational assessment which would reflect the 4822 lowest common denominator among partners. Since many U.S. partners developed
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4823 compatible national whole-of-government processes in parallel with S/CRS, efforts to 4824 develop a multinational strategy and priorities should be more coherent than in past 4825 R&S operations. 4826 4827 2. Pre-IMS Preparations: 4828 4829 The GCC, through the JTF and subordinate commands of the JTF, will provide a 4830 range of services and assistance to the COM and the ACT or FACT(s). GCC(s), and 4831 the Services that provide the forces to them, will need to institutionalize training, 4832 concerning the IMS, and identify what the likely forms of assistance and support will 4833 be. In many countries where an R&S operation is likely to unfold, the diplomatic 4834 footprint is either small or non-existent. 4835 The JFC needs to consider two focus areas as forces are prepared for potential 4836 R&S operations employing the IMS. One area is planning and preparations to 4837 support and assist interagency partners with military resources and manpower, which 4838 may go beyond the traditional roles of providing transport and security. The other is 4839 the training and readiness necessary to ensure military forces, especially staffs and 4840 commanders, have the knowledge and understanding to effectively execute R&S 4841 operations, either in a lead or subordinate role. This training and readiness, of 4842 necessity, needs to include basic understanding of how civilian agencies operate and 4843 their “operational tempo” in field situations, which are very different from the 4844 military’s OPTEMPO. 4845 Of utmost importance is training and education. GCC(s) must develop 4846 contingency plans and bring the IMS into every day planning and operations 4847 considerations. When the crisis is unfolding and the NCA has directed a GCC to 4848 respond, then it is too late to try to get these procedures and understandings into 4849 place. 4850 4851 a. Support and assistance to interagency partners 4852 Civilian agencies do not have the resources, either the manpower or materiel, 4853 which the Department of Defense can apply to military operations in support of R&S 4854 activities. These agencies will possibly need a wide range of assistance, including 4855 personnel and units that provide specialized civil military functions. However, the 4856 bulk of the assistance will be in the form of logistics, communications, transportation, 4857 security and associated manpower needed to address these requirements. Agencies 4858 like State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 4859 are aggressively building civilian capacity to address this problem. 4860 Where embassies exist, they will consist of a handful of U.S. citizens, often fewer 4861 than 12, the rest will be host nation nationals employed to work in the embassy. 4862 When an embassy does not exist; the U.S. Ambassador of a nearby country will 4863 represent U.S. interests. There may be U.S. diplomatic personnel in the capitol, but 4864 they will be very small in number. In all of these cases, the COM staff will lack 4865 almost everything, from experience dealing with a complex operation to vehicles,
79 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 111 4866 communications equipment/capabilities and housing for in-coming R&S operations 4867 personnel. 4868 These embassies will also lack the necessary force protection assets, even when a 4869 small marine detachment and/or diplomatic security staff are available. These are 4870 places where resources, such as 4-wheel drive vehicles, are scarce to non-existent. 4871 The ACT(s), and any of their subordinate FACT(s), will probably not be able to 4872 deploy with the equipment and assets they need to fully operate and cannot expect to 4873 obtain them once the teams arrive in-country. The only available source for vehicles, 4874 communications equipment, shelter, initial food and water, and adequate force 4875 protection, especially in the first few weeks of a deployment to support an R&S 4876 operation, will be the JTF. Therefore out of necessity, it must plan to provide support 4877 and assistance when it is anticipated or requested. 4878 In cooperation with S/CRS, GCC(s) will need to develop logistics and admin 4879 plans for supporting an IPC when activated and deployed to the GCC. GCC(s) will 4880 need to develop logistics and admin plans in conjunction with commanders of JTF(s) 4881 when deployed and working with ACT(s), FACT(s) and COM(s). Plans should be 4882 based on capacity and capability of civilian agencies in a given moment in time, as it 4883 is constantly changing (thus plans need to be reviewed cyclically). Logistics plans 4884 should address all classes of supply and functions (man, fuel, fix, move, sustain). 4885 Logistics preparation should include staff responsibilities for supporting the IPC and 4886 the ACT/FACT. Assuming that ACT/FACT(s) and COM(s) will request and require 4887 assistance from deployed JTF(s), planning for them in peacetime will ensure the 4888 GCC(s) are prepared to provide the support with minimal impact on military 4889 operations in support of the R&S operation. 4890 Planning should include considerations for detailing military personnel to, and 4891 tasking military units to support, the ACT/FACT or COM. For command and control 4892 reasons, for example, it might make more sense to task a communications platoon to 4893 directly support an ACT rather than individual communications personnel. 4894 Individuals would require either an MOU or MOA, but a direct supporting unit would 4895 remain operational controlled (OPCON) by the JTF and the JTF would continue to 4896 support that unit. 4897 4898 b. Training and readiness to support R&S operations 4899 GCC(s) and the Services will be expected to integrate 4900 IMS training, professional development and planning 4901 into all aspects of their readiness programs. Individual 4902 planners should be sent to attend the Department of State 4903 Foreign Service Institute, FSI, R&S courses. FSI 4904 currently runs a suite of courses for interagency planners. 4905 Command and staff from the GCC(s) and Services must 4906 be trained in the IMS concept and periodically receive 4907 refresher training.
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4908 It will be essential that GCC(s) and Services have staff officers educated and 4909 trained on the IMS. GCC(s) and Services need to institute regular and publicized 4910 initiatives to have planners attend the Department of State Foreign Service Institute, 4911 FSI, R&S courses on an annual or recurring basis. FSI has courses established and 4912 are developing new programs of training with the goal of eventually having two 4913 levels for interagency planners, a basic level and advanced level. 4914 The GCC and Service staffs must be trained in the IMS and periodically receive 4915 refresher training. Refresher training does not necessarily need to be conducted at 4916 FSI. Once the basics are understood Commander's should ensure their staffs are 4917 familiar with the concepts and the internal supporting SOPs established to deal with 4918 the various bodies of the IMS as it is established. They should be able to do this 4919 internally once the individual training mechanisms are institutionalized and working. 4920 GCC(s) should determine how IPC requirements are addressed in their continuity of 4921 operations, (COOP) plans. This will also apply to the approach GCC(s) need to take 4922 as JTF(s) are established and designated to work with COM(s) and ACT/FACT(s). 4923 4924 c. Exercises 4925 Every GCC conducts a wide range of exercises on an annual basis. Recent DOD 4926 guidance states that major exercises include interagency aspects in order that 4927 command personnel become inculcated with both understanding and familiarity with 4928 the non-military components of national power. GCC(s) are strongly encouraged to 4929 conduct at least one major exercise annually where the scenario places the GCC in a 4930 subordinate role to a civilian-led R&S operation. GCC(s) should conduct exercises in 4931 coordination with S/CRS (this MUST BE coordinated through the JS, J7; commands 4932 are not to go directly to S/CRS). Exercises can include full-up staff exercises 4933 (STAFFEX) or table tops. GCC(s) should look at these exercises in two different 4934 roles; one as the supporting organization to a whole of government plan developed by 4935 the CRSG or similar PCC; or initially as the supported command where DOD is the 4936 lead (e.g., a major combat operation) and the IMS is supporting parallel planning for 4937 phase IV and eventual transition from DOD lead to Inter agency lead after cessation 4938 of combat operations. 4939 The GCC staff should exercise and understand that they will not always be the 4940 lead planner, and may well be a supporting element to a broader plan; as a result, 4941 great effort is required to modify how the GCC normally plans operations through 4942 JOPES processes and incorporate core civilian agency considerations throughout all 4943 operations. This must be practiced in exercises; it is not status quo where some 4944 interagency representatives show up and the GCC can check the block that they had 4945 interagency participation in a DoD-centric exercise. The GCC must practice being in 4946 a supporting role or preparing to transition in phase IV from DoD lead to a USG 4947 interagency lead. This is easier said than done; thus must be exercised - and can be 4948 captured in Commander's annual and quarterly training guidance. 4949 Effective exercises with a significant R&S component will be a particular 4950 challenge for all GCC(s) and Services for the foreseeable future. Ideally, every such 4951 exercise should be developed well in advance with the involvement of a robust
80 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 113 4952 civilian component. However, civilian agencies lack experience in planning for 4953 exercises, they lack staff that can be released for TDY to a GCC, or one of its 4954 subordinate commands, to plan for, develop and participate in exercises. Like the 4955 military, they lack full appreciation in how civilian and military planning must 4956 integrate. GCC(s), and their components, will need to be innovative and creative, 4957 finding ways to compensate for these challenges. Ensuring that GCC and Service 4958 staff planners have attended FSI training course will be a significant benefit. GCC(s) 4959 should identify one key exercise every year where significant aspects of the IMS are 4960 tested and coordinated through the JCS J-7 to invite the key civilian partners to 4961 participate. By providing a clear training benefit to the civilian partners participation 4962 by civilian planners and exercisers can be realized. 4963 4964 3. Triggers for application of the USG Planning Framework and the IMS 4965 4966 It is appropriate to offer an explanation of the triggering mechanisms for 4967 determining when whole-of-government planning for reconstruction, stabilization, 4968 and conflict transformation is necessary for crisis response prior to the execution and 4969 transitioning of activities in an R&S operation. Triggers for the application of the 4970 USG planning framework do not apply to normal or “steady-state” planning or for 4971 more traditional crisis response to natural disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, 4972 and tsunamis. The USG has well established procedures and methodologies in place 4973 for these types of responses that work and will continue to be relied upon. The 4974 USAID Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance, for example, has well established and 4975 highly effective procedures to respond to a natural disaster anywhere in the world. 4976 The Department of Defense is equally well prepared for any national disaster 4977 contingency. 4978 An unfolding potential or actual crisis in a region or individual country can be 4979 identified and raised for consideration by the Principals Committee, the Deputies 4980 Committee, a Chief of Mission, or a regional Assistant Secretary. The R&S Policy 4981 Coordinating Committee (PCC) can be asked by any of these individuals or 4982 committees to consider initiating whole-of-government crisis response planning for 4983 any crisis that has already begun or is expected to emerge within the next six months. 4984 Any decision to leverage USG resources towards dealing with a crisis in a foreign 4985 country will ultimately be decided by the President in consultation with Congress. 4986 Two types of planning are impacted by triggers and unique sets of criteria. One is 4987 Contingency Planning (CP) and the other is Crisis Response Planning (CRP). 4988 CP planning has a lower threshold. Proposals for initiating planning are based on 4989 a set of established criteria, which include: 4990 Importance: Impact on U.S. national security and foreign policy 4991 objectives; 4992 Magnitude: Regional impact; potential scale of humanitarian needs; 4993 Potential for significant U.S. military involvement: As indicated in DOD’s 4994 Contingency Planning Guidance; 4995 Likelihood: Probability of a crisis occurring, as indicated by information 4996 and risk assessments such as the Intelligence Community Watch-lists, USAID
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4997 Conflict/Fragility Alert, and/or assessments by the UN or other international 4998 organizations; and/or, 4999 Capacity: Ability of affected country and neighbors to respond effectively 5000 to crisis. 5001 The R&S PCC, in consultation with the appropriate Department of State Regional 5002 Bureau, will consider proposals and make recommendations on how many and which 5003 specific countries or regions require whole-of-government planning to prevent, 5004 mitigate, or prepare to respond to potential conflict. The R&S PCC will hold semi- 5005 annual “Planning Guidance” meetings to determine USG objectives for the year and 5006 to develop the list of countries that will be the subject of CP planning, and a second 5007 meeting to review the planning efforts after six months. Participation in the “Planning 5008 Guidance” meetings will include the normal R&S PCC representatives and others as 5009 appropriate. The PCC will forward recommendations to the Deputies Committee 5010 (DC) or Principals Committee (PC) for final decisions on the list of countries, noting 5011 concurrence or non-concurrence of the Regional Assistant Secretary and/or the COM. 5012 These recommendations will be coordinated with the Director of Foreign Assistance 5013 (F) Operational Plan cycle and the F core country team. To the extent practicable, 5014 contingency planning will link to agency planning cycles. S/CRS will maintain a 5015 database of the participants in the interagency planning teams for each country to 5016 facilitate the formation of crisis response planning teams, should they become 5017 necessary. 5018 The Department of Defense will be represented by both OSD and the Joint Staff 5019 and, in turn, through either of these agents, Combatant Commanders can have a voice 5020 and inform planning decision-making conducted by this PCC. 10 USC Section 163 5021 designates the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (C/JCS) as the spokesman for the 5022 commanders of the combatant commands, especially on the operational requirements 5023 of their commands - subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of 5024 Defense. In performing such function, the Chairman shall: 5025 confer with and obtain information from the commanders of the combatant 5026 commands with respect to the requirements of their commands; 5027 evaluate and integrate such information; 5028 advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the 5029 requirements of the combatant commands, individually and collectively; 5030 and communicate, as appropriate, the requirements of the combatant commands to 5031 other elements of the Department of Defense. 5032 NSPD – 1 describes the structure of the NSC. It defines PCC(s) as the day to day 5033 fora for interagency coordination. The R&S PCC is part of this interagency NSC 5034 structure. Its membership is stipulated in NSPD 1 which states that each NSC PCC 5035 includes representatives from each Department, Office, and Agency represented on 5036 the NSC Deputies Committee (DC). For the Department of Defense representation 5037 on the DC includes the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Under Secretary of
81 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 115 5038 Defense for Policy, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This 5039 translates into both OSD and JS as the DOD representation on the R&S PCC. If the 5040 IMS is established and a country specific R&S PCC is formed (called the CRSG), it 5041 too will have OSD and JS representation. These DOD representatives may invite the 5042 affected GCC into the associated strategy development and policy planning. If this 5043 occurs special considerations must be outlined and the roles of GCC participants 5044 clearly defined so as not to interfere with the statutory command relationship between 5045 the President of the United States and the COCOM Commander through the Secretary 5046 of Defense defined in 10 USC Section 162. GCC representation on a CRSG or R&S 5047 PCC will be at the invitation of either the OSD or the Joint Staff and will be to advise 5048 and inform the OSD and/or Joint Staff representatives on the CRSG/R&S PCC, not as 5049 a participating representative in their own right. Only OSD and the Joint Staff have 5050 statutory authority to represent DOD in interagency fora. 5051 Crisis response planning (CRP) is for a crisis that has already begun or is 5052 expected to emerge within the next six months. Triggering CRP does not necessarily 5053 imply activating the IMS at the same moment or even at all. The threshold for 5054 activating the IMS is higher than the threshold for triggering CRP. However, if a 5055 major crisis is unfolding and the USG is planning a robust response, activation of the 5056 IMS is probable. Like CP planning, CRP planning can be triggered by the PC or DC 5057 or by direct request from the Secretary of State or Defense. Unlike the CP, a CRP 5058 effort does not require deliberations in the R&S PCC. However, a decision of the 5059 R&S PCC can also trigger whole-of-government planning. Triggering CRP does not 5060 necessarily imply activating the IMS at the same moment or even at all. The 5061 threshold for activating the IMS is higher than the threshold for triggering CRP. 5062 However, if a major crisis is unfolding and the USG is planning a robust response, 5063 activation of the IMS is probable. 5064 Given the need for urgent action in a crisis S/CRS will undertake initial crisis 5065 analysis and following a decision by the Coordinator for Reconstruction & 5066 Stabilization, form an initial strategic planning team (SPT) by calling together a 5067 group of interagency planners who have been pre-identified by their agencies to be 5068 available for participation in crisis response planning. If the IMS were activated, this 5069 initial strategic planning team (SPT) would be joined by more interagency personnel 5070 and evolve into the CRSG Secretariat. Likewise, the initial crisis analysis would 5071 serve as a starting point for the Situation Analysis. 5072 In addition to the criteria listed above for triggering CP planning, additional 5073 criteria for CRP may include, but are not limited to: 5074 Significant actual or potential (near-term) U.S. military involvement; 5075 Events with significant potential to undermine regional stability and 5076 development progress, e.g., a coup, economic collapse, severe environmental 5077 damage or degradation; 5078 Actual or imminent state failure, particularly where the host government is 5079 unwilling or unable to respond; 5080 Excessive mortality rates; 5081 Large-scale displacement of people; 5082 Rapid increase in USG-funded civilian programs operating in an R&S 5083 environment;
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5084 Activation of USG agencies’ crisis assessment, planning, or response 5085 teams (such as a Disaster Assistance Response Team); 5086 Embassy drawdown or evacuation in an R&S environment and/or 5087 significant threat to U.S. citizens and U.S. facilities; 5088 International or allies’ crisis response, such as the formation of a U.N. 5089 peacekeeping operation; and/or, 5090 Determination of an impending or actual genocide, ethnic cleansing, or 5091 massive and grave violations of human rights. 5092 5093 For military planners it is important to know that military contingency planning 5094 can, and often will, commence before whole-of-government crisis response planning 5095 begins. GCC(s) will often recognize the initial signs of an unfolding crisis and 5096 anticipate orders to take action with preliminary planning efforts of their own. Take, 5097 for instance, the historical example of Kuwait. The same day Kuwait was invaded by 5098 Iraq in 1990 the CENTCOM commander, Gen. Norman Swartzkopf ordered his 5099 planning staff to expand already on-going contingency planning to free the country 5100 with force. Months earlier Gen. Swartzkopf recognized signs in the region that led 5101 him to order his staffs to start looking at how the US military, and CENTCOM in 5102 particular, might need to respond to military aggression on the part of Iraq even 5103 though at the time there were no overt indications that Iraq was planning on invading 5104 Kuwait. 5105 5106 4. JFC Planning for IMS 5107 5108 a. Context for JFC Participation 5109 R&S operations will be more likely to occur in such places as Sierra Leone, 5110 Sudan, and Somalia and not in places like Rumania, Kazakhstan or Estonia. These 5111 are examples only, but represent countries that are now or could be at risk in the 5112 future. The first countries noted represent places with very weak central 5113 governments, with strong potential or actual religious, cultural or social conflict, 5114 victims of drought, economic mismanagement or places with high corruption and 5115 potentially lucrative natural resources. These are considered high risk candidates for 5116 the kinds of crisis that could lead to the need for an R&S response. The second 5117 group of countries is listed to distinguish between poor countries or countries with 5118 weak economies that are, nevertheless, not likely crisis candidates because of 5119 relatively stable central governments, no strong latent domestic social, cultural or 5120 religious conflict and places with potential economic resources not being squandered 5121 through mismanagement and/or corruption. 5122 Due to the nature of R&S operations a Joint Task Force (JTF) will likely be 5123 established by the relevant GCC. In some circumstances the JTF may already be 5124 present in the affected country. This JTF will work closely with the COM, the ACT 5125 and any Forward Advance Civilian Teams (FACT[s]) that are established. In some 5126 circumstances, particularly when a U.S. embassy is not present in country or 5127 conditions on the ground warrant, the ACT will co-locate with the JTF and draw
82 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 117 5128 substantially on military resources, but even when the ACT is not co-located, the JTF 5129 will likely still be asked to provide assistance and support. In other circumstances a 5130 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) can be signed placing the JTF under 5131 direction of the COM, while still retaining Title X command relationship authorities. 5132 Military planners need to be prepared to respond to these circumstances and all 5133 contingency possibilities in between. 5134 In non-permissive or hostile security environments, U.S. and multinational 5135 military forces often possess the only readily available capability to meet many of the 5136 local populace’s fundamental needs. Human decency and the law of war require land 5137 forces to assist the populace in their areas. The U.S. military has a long tradition of 5138 extending help and assistance to impacted populations in crisis areas. Leaders at all 5139 levels should prepare to address civilian needs, including identifying people in their 5140 units with regional and interagency expertise, civil-military competence, and other 5141 critical skills needed to support a local populace and host country government. In 5142 some cases, to identify these individuals, commanders and their staffs may need to 5143 canvas the entire force, not just personnel organic to their headquarters, the active 5144 component, or in specialized units already conducting civil military operations to 5145 make determinations as to critical skills resident within the force that can provide 5146 additional support. The joint force must strive to support the population and other 5147 partners that are supporting the population. 5148 Military forces must defeat enemies and simultaneously help shape the civil 5149 situation through stability operations. Shaping the civil situation in concert with 5150 civilian U.S. government agencies, international organizations, civil authorities, and 5151 multinational forces is important to campaign success. Stability operations may 5152 complement and reinforce offensive and defensive operations, or they may be the 5153 main effort of an operation. These operations may take place before, during, and after 5154 major combat operations and seek to secure the support of civil populations in 5155 unstable areas. Forces engaged in an operation dominated by stability tasks may have 5156 to conduct offensive and defensive operations to defend themselves or destroy forces 5157 seeking to challenge the stability mission. Following hostilities, forces conduct 5158 stability operations to provide a secure environment for U.S., coalition, multinational, 5159 and local civil authorities as they work to achieve reconciliation, rebuild lost 5160 infrastructure, and resume vital services. 5161 The focus of these combined military and civil efforts is to diminish the means 5162 and motivations for conflict, while developing local institutions so they can take the 5163 lead role in national and local governance (provide basic services, foster economic 5164 development, and enforce the rule of law). Success depends ultimately on the host 5165 country and on the interrelationship and interdependence of the ensuing dynamics: 5166 • The legitimacy of the government and its effectiveness as perceived by the 5167 local population and the international community. 5168 • The perceived legitimacy of the freedoms and constraints placed on the forces, 5169 both host country and/or coalition, supporting the government. 5170 • The degree to which factions, the local population, and other actors accede to 5171 the authority of the government and those forces supporting the government. 5172 5173 There are times when hostilities continue to exist in many forms during stability-
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5174 focused operations because of warlords, tribal competition, ethnic rivalries, outlaws, 5175 terrorists, or insurgents. This can leave areas of a country caught in the middle of the 5176 transition between major combat and relative stability. Combat operations may be 5177 very much “on again/off again” across parts of the country, and there may be areas 5178 that have not stabilized significantly and are at risk of “slipping back” if security 5179 forces are removed. However, moving these areas further along is beyond the 5180 expertise and capabilities of any one department or agency. The military can operate 5181 in these unstable areas but lacks development skills. Diplomatic and development 5182 agencies have these skills but are unable to operate in these areas using their 5183 traditional delivery mechanisms because of the instability threatening their security. 5184 Therefore, this complex environment requires an integrated civilian-military 5185 operation focused on achieving sufficient stability to allow reconstruction and 5186 development to begin. 5187 5188 b. Approaches to US Government R&S Planning 5189 Approaches to R&S Planning within the context of the USG Planning 5190 Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation include the 5191 conflict transformation and whole-of-government approaches. The conflict 5192 transformation approach to R&S operations is two pronged in nature. It focuses on 5193 building both local institutional capacity and reducing the sources of conflict and 5194 instability. The USG has many years of experience in building institutional capacity 5195 – to include the military’s train and equip programs; however it has limited 5196 experience and even more limited success at targeting drivers of conflict. To be 5197 successful at transforming conflict, the USG must do more than build institutional 5198 capacity; it must also identify and address the sources or roots of conflict and 5199 instability through the use of targeted transformational policies and programs to 5200 reduce and/or mitigate these sources. R&S planning should serve to develop policies, 5201 design programs and measure success in the context of the interplay between these 5202 two endeavors. 5203 A whole-of-government (WoG) approach to R&S recognizes that success requires 5204 unity of effort across all civilian and military components of the USG. Integrating the 5205 efforts of the USG is necessary first step towards effective coordination with host nation 5206 authorities, bi-lateral partners, non-governmental actors and multilateral organizations. 5207 This approach is driven by the search for those combinations of USG resources and 5208 activities that reinforce progress made in one sector or enable success in another. 5209 To do this, the interagency community must resist seeing USG resources (funds, 5210 personnel, programs, expertise, equipment, etc) and instruments of power (diplomatic, 5211 military, development, intelligence, economic, strategic communications, etc) as 5212 belonging to any one agency, military service or entity. All are parts of a USG whole. 5213 Moreover, in complex R&S operations no single sectoral solution is sufficient. 5214 It is imperative that all of the USG actors involved in an R&S operation, at the 5215 appropriate level as deemed by their agency, participate in the policy-making and 5216 planning process. This will ultimately determine how the various resources and 5217 instruments are arrayed as a whole in partnership with the host nation and, if present, our 5218 international partners. This approach requires “early and high” (i.e., early in the process
83 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 119 5219 and at a high level of policy and strategy) level collaboration within the USG as well as 5220 with stakeholders from the host nation and international community. 5221 5222 c. Levels of Planning 5223 The military has detailed and comprehensive planning tools, approaches and 5224 methodologies to cover all possible contingencies and circumstances. Civilian 5225 agencies do not have a culture of deliberate planning similar to that of the military, 5226 but the civilian agencies do conduct a range of planning efforts and address a wide 5227 scope of contingencies. This section is intended to offer a basic understanding of the 5228 planning process developed by the civilian agencies. It is not JOPES and differs from 5229 the way the military plans, but then, the civilian agencies are different from DOD and 5230 civilians plan to accomplish different goals. Military planners typically plan for 5231 operations in a finite period of time measured in hours or days. Civilian planners do 5232 not plan force-on-force engagements and their planning scope typically spans weeks, 5233 months and even years. 5234 As has been discussed elsewhere in this Handbook, planning will likely 5235 commence before the IMS is officially established and can occur when there are no 5236 plans to establish the IMS. Any time a crisis is identified that is in the US national 5237 interest both the Defense Department, particularly the regional Combatant 5238 Commander, and the Department of State will stand-up crisis response or task force 5239 cells that will immediately begin preliminary planning. These planning efforts will 5240 continue to function and evolve as interest in the crisis matures and USG policy 5241 towards the crisis determines the appropriate level of response. The whole-of- 5242 government approach to planning involves three levels. At each level, planning 5243 teams produce products that drive the process. 5244 The first level of planning is policy formation, followed by strategic development, 5245 which is in turn followed by implementation planning. The process begins with an 5246 analysis of the conflict, which drives the identification of the USG policy goal. The 5247 policy goal informs the development of a strategy around central objectives to 5248 achieve the goal, or Major Mission Elements (MME). MME teams then determine 5249 the sub-objectives that are necessary to achieve the MME. Development of MME(s) 5250 flows from a careful and comprehensive assessment of the drivers of conflict or 5251 instability as well as the local capacity to address those destabilizing factors. 5252 MME(s) therefore must be a narrowly-tailored set of outcome statements that are 5253 together necessary and sufficient to achieve the overarching policy goal within the 5254 stated timeframe. Stating MME(s) as outcomes will help planners avoid stove-piped 5255 responses based on current capacities. 5256 Collectively, the policy formulation and strategy development levels of planning 5257 lead to a USG Strategic Plan for R&S. This strategic plan informs individual agency 5258 implementation planning at the field level, requiring revisions to agency 5259 implementation plans where they already exist, and the integration of those plans into 5260 a USG Interagency Implementation Plan. For military planners the challenge is to 5261 take military plans at the tactical level that are often either fully developed or well 5262 into the process and align them with IMS implementation plans that will be playing 5263 “catch-up” to the military planning efforts. 5264 The methodologies for the three levels of planning are: 5265
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5266 Level One: Policy Formulation 5267 Assess the operational environment to define policy-level assumptions and 5268 interests, analyze risk, and determine drivers of conflict or instability; 5269 Determine clear and measurable goals of the intervention based on US 5270 national interests and transforming the drivers of conflict and instability; 5271 5272 Level Two: Strategy Development 5273 Harmonize policy goals with available resources and focus policymakers 5274 on resource implications that may limit goal achievement; 5275 Identify Major Mission Elements and assign agency responsibility for sub- 5276 objectives and tasks; 5277 Create a meaningful evaluation system to measure progress in achieving 5278 goals and MME(s). 5279 5280 Level Three: Implementation Planning 5281 Orchestrate the application and integration of all elements of national 5282 power to accomplish policy goals; 5283 Integrate US national efforts with those of other international partners and 5284 organizations; and 5285 Create a meaningful evaluation system to measure achievement of sub- 5286 objective and the completion of tasks. 5287 5288 Together, policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation 5289 planning form the backbone of the whole-of-government planning process. While 5290 these levels are sequential—each providing essential outputs for the next—they 5291 should not be seen as completely discrete and linear. The intent of this overview is 5292 not to get into levels of detail that are comprehensively provided in the U.S. Government 5293 Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation. 5294 5295 d. Planning Process Structure and Focus 5296 The first step in putting together policy options is determining which assumptions 5297 are critical to the direction of a USG plan and the ultimate success of USG R&S 5298 operations. There are three main categories of contextual assumptions about the 5299 strategic environment to consider: 5300 1. Conditions within the country (e.g., electrical infrastructure in major cities 5301 will be sufficient and functioning, the security environment will be 5302 permissive, etc.); 5303 2. Behavior of other regional and international actors (e.g., the European 5304 Union will provide sufficient resources to achieve objectives in the Rule of 5305 Law sector, neighboring states will not send military forces across borders, 5306 etc.); and 5307 3. Resources (forces/people, assistance, activities) available from the USG 5308 (e.g., there will be a $300 million supplemental, 100 civilians will be deployed 5309 from the civilian reserve corps, etc.).
84 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 121 5310 5311 Drawing on the interagency situation assessment, the strategic planning team 5312 should determine which assumptions are critical, and by varying those assumptions, 5313 identify 2-3 alternative plausible contextual scenarios for the plan. Given that a 5314 mismatch between goals and resources always spells mission failure, each scenario 5315 should make explicit the USG resources assumed, and the time envisioned to meet 5316 those goals. These “scenarios” form the basis for the determination of policy options. 5317 The identification of achievable and realistic goals is the next stage in the 5318 formulation of policy options. The strategic planning team, which is established at 5319 the CRSG, should identify a goal for each contextual scenario. 5320 Following the Conflict Transformation approach, planners should consider the 5321 longer-term objectives for the country when trying to determine shorter-term goals 5322 that focus on capitalizing on the 2-3 year period where political and financial 5323 resources are often at their highest levels. The 2-3 year goal should be to reach the 5324 Conflict Transformation “tipping point” of locally-led nascent peace, where the 5325 country is on a sustainable positive trajectory out of conflict, regardless of 5326 international assistance. Stated otherwise, the goal would be that the country is 5327 beyond major conflict and beyond major security, political, and economic reliance on 5328 foreign interveners so that future transformation of the country or region is largely 5329 and increasingly in the hands of benign, credible, and legitimate local authorities, 5330 with international assistance shifting to a supporting role. 5331 When presenting a goal, the strategic planning team should describe, as clearly as 5332 possible, what “success” would look like if the goal was reached. Proposing that 5333 country X will be “at peace with itself and on the path to economic growth” is a 5334 standard goal that could apply to any R&S country. The strategic planning process 5335 should, however, provide senior policy-makers with a more detailed explanation of 5336 the goal in order to faithfully convey the challenges that lay ahead. This discussion 5337 will also prove valuable when planners begin to outline the necessary benchmarks to 5338 be reached and the measures of progress to be observed. 5339 Limiting the scope of the plan helps focus a response strategy on a realizable set 5340 of goals and within a manageable timeframe. This helps mission leadership, domestic 5341 constituencies, and implementing staff come to a common understanding of the 5342 threshold for intervention success, and in turn, down-sizing, transition, or exit. The 5343 plan should not be based on long-term developmental goals that may require decades 5344 of sustained assistance or support, but should nonetheless be informed by and 5345 consistent with that perspective. After determining an Overarching R&S/Conflict 5346 Transformation Goal for each contextual scenario, the strategic planning team must 5347 then determine the course of action or strategy that the USG will follow to achieve 5348 the goal – the MME(s). 5349 At this stage in the development of policy options, planners should explicitly 5350 recognize any critical causal assumptions for each strategy. Causal assumptions are 5351 hypotheses about the relationship between action and effect: that by doing X, you will 5352 achieve Y. (e.g., giving someone a job will prevent him/her from participating in 5353 insurgency, holding an election will give you a more effective local government, or 5354 reducing poverty will eliminate conflict). These types of assumptions can also be 5355 termed “theories of change.” Theories of change are often implicit and
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5356 unacknowledged in the crafting of plan. The planning process presented here seeks to 5357 draw attention to the theories of change that drive planning at each level.
5358 5359 i.) Fleshing out the Policy Options 5360 The strategic planning team should then flesh out each policy option into a 2-3 5361 paragraph narrative that outlines: 5362 5363 The contextual scenario (assumptions about the environment in the 5364 country and anticipated roles and resource commitments of other actors) and 5365 how the assumptions will be verified over time; 5366 Overarching policy goal; 5367 What success would “look like”; 5368 Major Mission Elements, and any causal assumptions and how they will 5369 be verified over time; 5370 USG resource availability, rough orders of magnitude of USG resource 5371 needs expressed in a common, agreed lexicon; and 5372 Associated risks. 5373 5374 While all resource issues may not be fully identified at this stage in the planning 5375 process, it is crucial to put potential resource gaps squarely before policymakers as 5376 early as possible, so they understand the hurdles in achieving desired policy 5377 objectives. 5378 In addition to the narrative paragraphs on each policy option, the strategic 5379 planning team should explain the broader context and reasoning associated with the 5380 set of options (e.g., one option assumes significantly greater USG resources than the 5381 others or one option posits the crisis to pose a greater threat to U.S. national security 5382 interests than the other options). The narrative should also underscore any issues of 5383 policy incoherence, gaps in capability, or longstanding legislative and policy issues. 5384 Together, these overarching and policy option paragraphs form a Policy Guidance 5385 Memo. 5386 5387 ii.) Preparation of MME(s) 5388 Once the Deputies Committee has approved a policy option, the strategic planning 5389 team identifies MME planning teams from key actors in the interagency community 5390 to develop a strategy for each MME. MME teams function as interagency sub- 5391 working groups (sub-PCC level) charged with developing the USG strategy to 5392 achieve each MME, and report to the interagency body under which they are 5393 convened (PCC, CRSG, etc.). Generally, an MME planning team is formed for each 5394 MME, but in some cases it may be more efficient for a planning team to develop the 5395 strategies for multiple MME(s). 5396 A MME planning team should bring together each agency relevant to the MME, 5397 including regional experts and sectoral and functional experts in R&S and conflict 5398 transformation. In addition, the team should include those who understand the
85 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 123 5399 processes and requirements involved in employing, prioritizing and sequencing the 5400 various elements of national power that may be useful in the MME strategy 5401 (budgeting, logistics, legal, etc.) taking into account the resources that other nations, 5402 IO(s), NGO(s), PVO(s), and host country may apply to the problem. This 5403 composition ensures an integrated USG strategy toward the MME outcome. MME 5404 teams may be Washington, D.C., or field-based, and ultimately could be civilian- 5405 military, international, or coordinated with host country structures. It is advisable that 5406 a regional or sectoral expert and a strategic planner co-chair MME planning teams. 5407 The participation of a strategic planner as a co-chair of each MME planning team 5408 ensures strong vertical integration between goals and tasks, as well as interagency 5409 integration of the expertise, tools, and resources within and external to the USG that 5410 can be brought to bear on MME strategy development. MME planning teams should 5411 be designed to facilitate the maximum gain from coordination among actors, and 5412 between regional and functional experts, while minimizing the inefficiencies that 5413 could arise from that inclusiveness. 5414 5415 iii.) Responsibilities for MME(s) 5416 In some cases, there will be an obvious agency or office to lead an MME and 5417 undertake the bulk of the strategy development for the MME. Even in such a case, 5418 however, planners should be careful to ensure that all equities, capabilities, and 5419 capacities, particularly those from agencies with which they are not familiar, are 5420 represented and can be brought to bear on the MME. MME teams will consist of 5421 members representing all agencies and departments that have equities in the particular 5422 MME. For the military there is a traditional recognition amongst the USG 5423 interagency community that security MME(s) will be in large part initially led by 5424 DOD. Following the comprehensive approach, the security sector MME(s) will need 5425 include representatives from civilian agencies who can offer their insight and 5426 expertise into security sector reform, which encompasses more than just military 5427 related security objectives and tasks. Agencies such as the Department of State, 5428 Department of Justice, USAID, and their respective bureaus will figure prominently 5429 in their representation on security sector focused MME (s) – even one that is led by 5430 DOD. Just as in other MME(s), particularly at the beginning of R&S operations, 5431 military representation and participation will be crucial to support a successful 5432 outcome, especially during critical transitions between the military and civilian 5433 authorities. For example, a MME focused on restoring basic civil services such as 5434 sanitation, power and water may be led by USAID. Because the military will be 5435 integrally involved initially in the restoration of these services, DOD will want to 5436 have relevant expertise represented on this MME team. 5437 5438 e. IMS (R&S) planning and implementation for Essential Tasks 5439 Once MME(s) are identified, planners rely on the Essential Task Matrix and their 5440 functional expertise to develop a comprehensive list of the Essential Task Areas 5441 necessary and sufficient to achieve the MME outcome. To ensure shared 5442 understanding of Essential Task Areas, the MME team may want to generate a list of 5443 illustrative Sub-Tasks for each ETA. Like the MME, Essential Task Areas should be 5444 stated as outcomes with suitable indicators for measuring achievement.
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5445 5446 Essential Task Areas (ETAs): The elements of the plan, written as outcomes 5447 and achieved by the completion of a functionally integrated set/series of activities, 5448 that is both necessary and sufficient to achieve a Major Mission Element. 5449 5450 Sub-Task: A specific process or activity, stated as an outcome when possible, 5451 that is one part of an Essential Task Area. 5452 5453 MME planning teams are responsible for completing an MME Strategy Memo and 5454 MME Overview PowerPoint Presentation that include the following elements: 5455 linkage to the overarching policy/conflict transformation goal; linkage to other 5456 MME(s); measures of success; assumptions; impediments to success; ETA(s) 5457 necessary and sufficient to achieve the MME; and a resource strategy. Throughout 5458 the period of plan execution, MME planning teams are responsible for assessing 5459 progress, sequencing, and cross-MME linkages. 5460 The MME Strategy Memos become part of the overall USG Strategic Plan for 5461 R&S or Conflict Transformation, and serve as the foundation for the USG Strategic 5462 Plan for R&S Narrative drafted by the strategic planning team. 5463 5464 5. Organizational linkages 5465 5466 GCC(s) have three linkages that need to be planned for. At the strategic level the 5467 CRSG will include representatives from OSD and the Joint Staff. The CRSG will be 5468 formed when there is a crisis in a country or region of the world and the President of 5469 the United States made a determination that the national interest dictates the USG will 5470 respond with a whole-of-government R&S operation. All departments and agencies 5471 of the U.S. Government participating in the operation are represented in the CRSG. 5472 In some circumstances OSD and the Joint Staff will invite the GCC to send 5473 representatives to inform and participate in CRSG planning and deliberations. 5474 GCC(s) will need to be prepared to send representation of sufficient stature 5475 commensurate with the level of participation on the CRSG, but remain cognizant that 5476 the Joint Staff and OSD representatives will retain their overall roles of being the 5477 primary DOD participants. It is essential that the GCC work closely with the Joint 5478 Staff to ensure it knows what is emerging from the CRSG and the CRSG knows 5479 clearly what information the GCC is gathering pertaining to the subject crisis and 5480 what it can and cannot do or provide. 5481 At the operational level the GCC must plan to host the IPC. The IPC is an 5482 essential component of the IMS and improper utilization of the IPC will be a major 5483 detriment to the overall execution of the R&S strategic and implementation plans and 5484 will inhibit the effectiveness of military participation in the IMS. GCC(s) must plan 5485 on how best to integrate an IPC into their planning staffs. This should be exercised 5486 and rehearsed during peacetime and it needs to be internalized as well as 5487 institutionalized. At the time of a crisis, this effort will be too late. Since each
86 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 125 5488 command is organized differently, each commander must determine what the best 5489 method is for them. 5490 Consider the following for reception and integration: 5491 What staff element is responsible for initially receiving and integrating the 5492 IPC---J3, J5, JIACG (sometimes called the Interagency Staff Element)? 5493 How will they do it? 5494 How will they build IPC capability/SME into their staff processes? 5495 Does the GCC LNO in the Pentagon possess all this information and 5496 understand what the command will do and how it will integrate with the 5497 IMS? 5498 5499 GCC(s) should determine how IPC requirements are addressed in their continuity 5500 of operations (COOP) plans. They should consider developing an internal handbook, 5501 SOP, or similar document that establishes how the command will handle an IPC with 5502 reference to, but not limited to, organizational links, communications, and logistics. 5503 At the tactical level the GCC will likely form and deploy a JTF to execute 5504 military operations. What is new or different is the high probability that the JTF will 5505 have to not only work closely with an ACT, it might be operating in a supporting role 5506 to the ACT. Similarly, subordinate units of the JTF will have to work closely with 5507 field elements of the ACT also known as FACT(s), if the determination is made that 5508 they are needed. Like the JTF, its subordinate units may be operating in a supporting 5509 role to the FACT. Additionally, the GCC must take into account the likelihood that 5510 the ACT or the COM or both will need military assets and support in order to carry 5511 out their functions. 5512 5513 5514 5515 5516 5517 5518 5519 5520 5521 5522 5523 5524 5525 5526 5527 5528 5529 5530 5531 5532 5533
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5534 5535 5536 5537 5538 5539 5540 5541 5542 5543 5544 5545 5546 5547 5548 5549 5550 5551 5552 5553 5554 5555 5556 5557 5558 5559 5560 5561 5562 5563 5564 Intentionally Blank 5565 5566 5567 5568 5569 5570 5571 5572 5573 5574 5575 5576 5577
87 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 127 5578 5579 5580 5581 5582 5583 5584 5585 5586 5587 5588 5589 Chapter 10 5590 JFC R&S Planning and Implementation Utilizing the IMS 5591 5592 5593 5594 1. Transition to the IMS in R&S Operations 5595 5596 This chapter will address the very challenging issue of executing activities and 5597 transitioning them within an R&S operation from military to civilian lead once the 5598 IMS has been established. Relationships between military commanders and civilian 5599 leaders will be critical to ensuring smooth transitions. The more civilian leaders and 5600 military commanders understand each other, each other’s missions or objectives, and 5601 each other’s capabilities, the easier it will be to coordinate and plan to hand 5602 leadership and responsibility from one to the other. These leaders must do everything 5603 possible to establish and foster good relationships between themselves and their 5604 supporting staffs and, ideally, should endeavor to meet with each other at every 5605 opportunity. 5606 The military may be the first USG entity to arrive or return to an affected country 5607 or region in crisis in many R&S operations. It will have the initial responsibility and 5608 leadership for many of the immediate tasks identified in the strategic planning process 5609 under the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict 5610 Transformation. The most important task will be establishing or re-establishing 5611 security and creating conditions that will allow civilian organizations to become fully 5612 engaged. While some civilians are likely to be with the military as it deploys into the 5613 crisis country or region, their roles will be limited until the situation becomes more 5614 stable. As a result, the military can expect to initiate a number of R&S activities. 5615 While the US military may be the first USG representative to arrive or return to 5616 an affected country, it is likely that international or non-governmental organizations 5617 and USG civilian agencies under a COM will have been present prior to US military 5618 involvement and will likely remain afterwards. They and the local populace will 5619 inherit the consequences of any US military actions – good and bad. Being aware of, 5620 and when appropriate, collaborating with those organizations and agencies still in 5621 country as well as the local populace is essential for long-term mission success. 5622 Until interagency CRP is initiated or IMS is established, the military will need to 5623 lead the planning and implementation process of administering, maintaining, or re-
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5624 establishing the host country’s essential government services - getting power, water, 5625 sanitation and emergency service functions operational and begin the process of 5626 managing the activities associated with refugees and displaced persons. All of these 5627 tasks will transition to US Government, international, multinational or host 5628 government civilian control and responsibility. The better the military understands 5629 both the fundamentals of addressing these activities and the expectations of the 5630 civilian organizations they will transition their activities to, the easier and more 5631 effective the transition will be. Transitioning is not a linear or country-wide event. It 5632 will occur at different times in different places within the affected country or region 5633 based on the situation and measures of progress achieved. It will involve many 5634 different organizations (both government and non-government) that will require 5635 different levels of planning – theater strategic to tactical implementation. 5636 Transitioning to civilian led R&S operations after the IMS is established will be 5637 among the most challenging and time sensitive activities the military and civilian 5638 component will accomplish during complex operations. Transition can be related to 5639 the military’s own “Relief in Place or RIP” operations conducted between military 5640 units. Among the most complex of military operations, a RIP requires leadership, 5641 timing and absolute sound planning, training and readiness among commanders, 5642 staffs and individual service members. These same qualities are a necessity in the 5643 much more complex transitions that occur between military and civilian led 5644 operations. 5645 Transition to a civilian led R&S operation utilizing the IMS occurs when a 5646 military commander hands the leadership and major operating responsibilities and 5647 associated structures of a complex interagency operation over to a civilian leader 5648 (e.g., ACT Leader or COM) and assumes a supporting role. In most circumstances a 5649 transition may be incremental, both geographically and at different times, involving 5650 many subordinate commanders of a JTF and FACT Leaders of an ACT. It is possible 5651 for a transition to reoccur from civilian led to military led. However, this would 5652 mean the situation on the ground deteriorated to the point where security re-emerged 5653 as the most significant challenge and civilians could no longer safely execute their 5654 responsibilities. 5655 The complexity of a transition from military to civilian leadership stems from two 5656 factors. First, in a crisis response utilizing the IMS, the leadership is coming from 5657 very dissimilar organizations with different cultures, planning horizons and objectives 5658 with differing timeframes. Second, while the command or leadership of the overall 5659 R&S operation will change from military to civilian authority, component elements of 5660 the R&S operation could remain military-led or civilian-led for timeframes that are 5661 not linked to the overall transition from military to civilian. For instance, the JTF 5662 Commander may transition responsibility for R&S operations over to the ACT 5663 Leader at a time when most of the sub-objectives of the Major Mission Elements 5664 (MMEs) are still being led and conducted by subordinate military units. However, 5665 this in no way will interfere with the command and control authorities the JTF 5666 Commander exercises over his military forces.
88 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 129 5667 For example, Information Operations (IO) may initially be managed and led by 5668 military psychological operations leaders early in an R&S operation. Once the ACT 5669 has been deployed and established, the IO campaign may be assumed by the ACT 5670 leader or a designated representative and military IO activities will become a 5671 supporting effort. In relative terms this transition will occur early after the IMS is 5672 established. Conversely, the transportation responsibilities for the implementing 5673 bodies envisioned in the IMS (ACT and FACT) will likely be assigned to the military 5674 at the outset and may remain a responsibility throughout the duration of the operation. 5675 Depending on the situation, the civilian organizations participating in the IMS may 5676 not be able to provide their own transportation to effectively support operational 5677 needs. 5678 An important recurring theme in R&S operations employing the IMS is 5679 transitioning responsibility and participation in MME(s) - regardless of the division of 5680 labor. During a military to civilian led transition military leaders must ensure 5681 continuity of the USG contribution to the initial supporting tasks of the crisis 5682 response while meeting the needs of the host country government, and its local 5683 populace. The same general guidelines governing battle handovers apply to concepts 5684 guiding transitions under the established IMS. Whether the transition is between 5685 military units or from a military unit to a civilian agency, all involved must clearly 5686 understand the tasks and responsibilities being passed. 5687 Maintaining unity of effort is particularly important during transitions, especially 5688 between organizations with different capabilities and capacities. Relationships 5689 between organizations tend to become strained during transitions – especially 5690 between organizations with vastly different cultures and background. Transitions are 5691 not a single event happening all at once; instead they are rolling processes of little 5692 handoffs between different actors along several streams of activities. There are 5693 usually multiple transitions for any one stream of activity over time. Using 5694 coordination mechanisms as stipulated in the IMS will create and sustain the links 5695 that support effective transitions without compromising unity of effort. Training can 5696 significantly facilitate transition activities; however, it is likely that transition training 5697 will not be resourced among the civilian components participating in the IMS. Even 5698 if the military has trained for these activities, they will probably have not trained with 5699 the civilian counterparts they will interact with when deployed. 5700 It is imperative that planning for transitions begins early and communications 5701 between the organizations that transition is vibrant and two-way. The need for the 5702 civilian leaders to understand the military and for the military to understand the 5703 civilians is critical to successful unified actions enabling unity of effort. The 5704 understanding needs to be focused on what responsibilities will transition and the 5705 specific organizations involved. Numbers of personnel, where are they located, 5706 current communications, logistics, and transportation capabilities and anticipated 5707 needs of each organization involved in the transition need to be taken into account. 5708 Minimizing the impact of the transition on the host country and on NGO(s), IO(s) and 5709 international partners that are engaged with one or both of the transitioning parties 5710 should be taken into consideration. 5711
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5712 2.) JFC Planning and Implementation Considerations during Multinational 5713 and USG Interagency R&S Operations 5714 5715 Focus on the host government: The primary focus of a military and civilian 5716 coalition intervention in an R&S operation should be on developing, supporting 5717 and sustaining a legitimate host government through the use of all available 5718 instruments of power. This is accomplished in great part by supporting and 5719 facilitating the establishment of rule of law and social well being capacities. 5720 5721 Shared Assessments: The process of developing USG situational assessments and 5722 then sharing them with partners is useful to improve communication and facilitate 5723 a common understanding of the problem. It is more beneficial to share our 5724 national assessments and keep differing perspectives in view rather than develop a 5725 single common coalition assessment which would reflect the lowest common 5726 denominator among partners and be time and resource intensive. 5727 5728 Strategic Guidance: Shared strategic guidance is needed early to clearly convey 5729 the coalition’s focus and intent. It also is necessary to establish coherence and 5730 align the appropriate resources and authorities to delegated leaders in theater 5731 enabling unity of effort. 5732 5733 Comprehensive Approach: Comprehensive approaches to analysis, planning, 5734 programming and evaluation across organizations are needed for unity of effort. 5735 Pursuit of a singular approach is not desired as it will alienate key partners 5736 external and internal to a coalition and likely generate a process that seeks the 5737 lowest common denominator and marginalizes the unique strengths of the 5738 participating organizations in the R&S operation. 5739 5740 Campaign Design and Planning: Campaign design and planning must focus on 5741 the unique situation presented in a particular country or region embroiled in 5742 conflict and account for achieving the strategic objectives envisioned in the 5743 formulation of a strategy utilizing a whole of government approach to planning 5744 nested within a coalition’s comprehensive strategy. The design of a campaign 5745 plan should include the military’s role in transitions; transitions from military to 5746 civilian control, transitions from civilian to international control, and handover to 5747 host government control. It should also include analyses of influential indigenous 5748 actors who may support or oppose the society’s transformation to a locally led 5749 nascent peace. 5750 5751 Measuring Progress and Employing Metrics: Civilian agencies and the military 5752 face a common challenge in measuring results on the ground and evaluating 5753 progress toward achieving objectives. Many organizations are able to measure 5754 their own programs and project-level activities; however adequate methods have 5755 not been implemented to evaluate USG interagency and coalition wide impact of
89 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 131 5756 collective efforts. Ultimately, determinations must be made regarding coalition 5757 efforts contributing to achieving the strategic objectives. 5758 5759 Maintain a Dialogue: Active dialogue among civilian and military organizations 5760 within and external to the coalition, and at all levels of activity, is important to 5761 sharing perspectives. This expands the coalition’s scope of awareness, sharpens 5762 its situational discernment, and facilitates cooperation among the actors. 5763 5764 Understanding Differences: Differences in motives, objectives, perspectives and 5765 cultures between the varieties of actors involved must be understood and 5766 accounted for. This understanding contributes to flexibility in thinking, 5767 adaptability in planning and compromise in developing objectives. 5768 5769 Fostering Cooperative Relationships: Command relationships will not be 5770 established among all actors participating in the R&S operation. Collaboration 5771 conducted among the voluntary civilian and military participants, both internal 5772 and external to a coalition, should be based on cooperative relationships rather 5773 than restrictive command relationships. However, the importance of centralized 5774 decision making control in cooperative relationships should be understood. 5775 5776 3. IMS (R&S) Actions 5777 5778 a. General Actions 5779 The goal of R&S operations utilizing the IMS is to return “normalcy” in the host 5780 country. The response effort needs to be viewed in terms of a long timeframe. The 5781 military normally views operations based on specific timeframes; a “from start date 5782 to” or “D+”, or in terms of deployment rotation schedules, 6 months, a year, eighteen 5783 months. However, the USG approach is to view events in terms of years or even 5784 decades. Whole-of-government planners from agencies participating in the IMS will 5785 look at a crisis state in terms of how circumstances were ten or twenty years prior to 5786 the crisis and what circumstances should be ten years after the crisis. The crisis itself, 5787 if placed on a timeline, will be viewed as a “blip”, an anomaly in the timeline’s 5788 continuum. 5789 Planning prior to a crisis is steady-state planning. The USG has an engagement 5790 plan with every country in the world, even those the USG has no official relationship 5791 with. The US ambassador to a country has a strategic plan that defines what the 5792 steady-state engagement with that country will be. The normal or “steady-state” 5793 planning, programmatic, and budgeting processes of U.S. government agencies will 5794 serve as a start point for the whole-of-government R&S planning process. The 5795 Strategic Planning Team (SPT) of the CRSG Secretariat must become familiar with 5796 current plans, programs, and their supporting budgets both for Crisis Response 5797 Planning (CRP) and Contingency Planning (CP). Each SPT member, drawing from 5798 their own agency-specific expertise and reach-back capability, will brief the team on 5799 the objectives, assumptions, timeframes, and implementation status of their agency’s 5800 existing plans, programs and supporting budget processes. Next, the team must
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5801 consider the implications of the new or potential crisis and identify where existing 5802 planning, programs and budgeting does not adequately address the new R&S needs. 5803 5804 Listed below are examples of steady-state planning, programs, and budgeting 5805 processes that planning teams must take into account: 5806 5807 ...... Depart 5808 ment of Defense contingency planning and campaign planning; 5809 ...... Depart 5810 ment of State mission strategic planning and bureau strategic planning; 5811 ...... Depart 5812 ments of State and USAID foreign assistance planning and programs; and 5813 ...... The 5814 President’s budget request and Congressional budget cycle. 5815 5816 The initiation of CRP or contingency planning does not stop individual agencies’ 5817 internal planning and budgeting processes. CRP shifts the responsibility for whole- 5818 of-government R&S planning for a given country to the strategic planning team. 5819 Individual agencies will continue to plan independently to be able to fulfill both their 5820 specific R&S responsibilities within the USG R&S plan and their non-R&S functions. 5821 Contingency planning occurs in parallel with steady-state planning. 5822 During a crisis the planning teams will actively plan to return to steady state 5823 planning. Because of the complexity of transition, military commanders and civilian 5824 leaders will need to work very closely and should treat the transition planning as a 5825 distinct effort informing and improving the overall crisis response planning effort. 5826 R&S planning and operations are, by their nature, transitional efforts to confront a 5827 crisis whose resolution is in our national interest. As the drivers of conflict are 5828 addressed and the host country institutional capacity increases, the USG will move to 5829 long-term steady-state planning, as represented by Mission Strategic Plans (MSP), 5830 military campaign plans, and traditional foreign assistance programs such as Country 5831 Assistance Strategies (CAS) and Operational Plans. 5832 When the R&S PCC of the NSC, in consultation with the appropriate Department 5833 of State Regional Bureau, decides to discontinue contingency planning for a country, 5834 the whole-of-government planning process described in the Planning Framework will 5835 cease. Contingency planning is a parallel process and does not replace steady-state 5836 planning, so the “transition” is just a matter of stopping the contingency planning. 5837 Individual agencies should consider the results of the contingency planning and any 5838 new guidance from senior officials as they continue steady-state planning in support 5839 of USG policy goals for the region. 5840 The main difference between a transition from contingency planning and CRP is 5841 that the scale will be larger, particularly if the CRP coincided with a robust USG 5842 response effort implemented through the IMS. If the USG deployed additional R&S 5843 capacity (civilian and/or military) to the field, key planning and implementing 5844 personnel as well as technical experts may be in-country, rather than in Washington.
90 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 133 5845 When the CRSG (PCC) determines that the R&S goal has been met it will stop CRP 5846 and individuals who had been part of the CRP teams will gradually rejoin their 5847 agencies. Planning for transition from the R&S operation will be a critical 5848 component of the planning. This will include the resumption of steady state planning 5849 processes such as MSP, CAS, and military campaign planning. 5850 5851 b. Forming the Strategic Planning Team (SPT) of the CRSG Secretariat 5852 One of the first tasks of the CRSG is to form a Strategic Planning Team (SPT), if 5853 not already assembled by S/CRS prior to a formal decision to trigger the planning 5854 process or establish the IMS. This team fulfills the planning and budgeting functions 5855 of the CRSG Secretariat, including conducting an initial assessment and developing 5856 policy goals and a strategy to achieve them. This process requires identifying 5857 assumptions and priorities, as well as developing a broad resource strategy. 5858 The SPT will consist of the members of the appropriate regional Assistance 5859 Working Group (AWG), augmented by S/CRS planners and additional 5860 representatives from across the Executive Branch of the USG interagency community 5861 as appropriate. The team must include at least two persons designated to deploy as 5862 part of the IPC and two persons designated to deploy as part of the ACT R&S 5863 interagency implementation planning team. The SPT should also include 5864 representatives from those USG agencies responsible for interfacing with the relevant 5865 multilateral bodies and as many representatives of implementing organizations as 5866 possible, such as the JTF and USAID. While the exact composition of the SPT will 5867 vary depending on a number of factors, the success of the team depends upon the 5868 convergence of functional, regional and country context, resource, and planning 5869 experts. 5870 The SPT will form the core of MME planning teams. The planning process will 5871 initially constitute a full-time commitment for the members of the SPT; contracted 5872 experts may augment the team to supplement planning capacity. In the event of 5873 large-scale multilateral involvement, the SPT will coordinate the USG Strategic Plan 5874 for R&S with international counterparts, ideally accommodating international 5875 participation from close allies or coalition partners. The combination of CRP and the 5876 IMS represents the most complex undertaking for R&S planners. Transition planning 5877 will be done by the planners in the field in cooperation with the planners at the 5878 CRSG. Transition planning should be treated as distinct plans that are critical to 5879 informing the overall strategic and implementation plans because of their uniqueness 5880 and complexity. Planners in the field will take the lead in developing transition plans 5881 with ACT planners and JTF planners working closely together. Command 5882 relationships will be critical to planning for transitions. Civilian representatives will 5883 likely not fully understand the military definition of command relationships, but they 5884 will understand the need for leadership, coordination and responsibilities at different 5885 levels both horizontally and vertically. Developing and fostering the relationship and 5886 understanding between the JTF commander, the ACT Leader, and COM plus their 5887 respective staff is vital to accomplishing transitions with a minimum of disruption and 5888 confusion. 5889 An R&S operation likely involving a significant U.S. military presence creates the 5890 need to integrate crisis action planning or contingency planning occurring
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5891 simultaneously at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) with the whole-of- 5892 government crisis response planning (CRP) or contingency planning in Washington 5893 and the field. A team of civilian planners called the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) 5894 will deploy to the affected GCC to ensure this integration occurs. Likewise, a similar 5895 type of team may deploy to a multinational planning headquarters to integrate USG 5896 efforts with an international response. 5897 5898 c.) Development of the Situational Analysis 5899 Civilian agencies do much, if not most, of their planning at the strategic level. 5900 The next four sections look at the development of the Situation Analysis, the 5901 formulation of Policy, Strategy development and Interagency Implementation 5902 Planning. These all take place in Washington, except for the last, which spans the 5903 levels of execution from Washington to the field. Military planners at the GCC and 5904 JTF levels will not directly participate in the strategic level activities, but their 5905 planning and deliberations will influence and inform strategic level situational 5906 analysis, strategy development and policy formulation. Both OSD and the Joint Staff 5907 will contribute significantly to all aspects of the Whole-of-Government planning 5908 process at the strategic level. 5909 The Situation Analysis describes the current environment for the R&S operation 5910 and is a prerequisite to developing policy options for senior-level review. The 5911 Situation Analysis will draw, where possible, on consultations and information 5912 exchanges with U.S. personnel and other multilateral, governmental and non- 5913 governmental partners in the field. Situation analysis for R&S planning should 5914 include conducting a comprehensive interagency assessment using, when possible, 5915 the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) that: 1) diagnoses the 5916 conflict or civil strife and 2) completes a pre-planning mapping of current efforts 5917 against drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. Information generated from prior 5918 planning and assessments, as well as existing data and intelligence from interagency 5919 partners will be used in the analysis and mapping. 5920 The military will participate in the development of the situational analysis at all 5921 stages. This process will in almost all cases begin prior to the establishment of the 5922 CRSG. The development of the situational analysis is similar in approach to the 5923 Army’s tactical operations intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) where all 5924 sources of intelligence and information are used to determine enemy strength, 5925 disposition, intentions, strength, etc. For situational analysis all of these factors are 5926 considered, as are: environmental facts, cultural, ethnic, religious, economic factors 5927 that all impact on understanding the environment where the crisis is taking place. 5928 Drawing on the results of the ICAF, the Strategic Planning Team (SPT) will 5929 develop a Situation Analysis Overview memo that provides a clear depiction of the 5930 drivers of conflict and mitigating factors that reduce civil strife or conflict, and 5931 current USG and international efforts. Also depicted are U.S. interests relating to the 5932 country and region, the expected actions of key actors (both partners and 5933 competitors), gaps in current and expected efforts to address the instability or conflict, 5934 risks associated with action and inaction, legal considerations for providing assistance
91 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 135 5935 to the country, and critical gaps in knowledge/intelligence. The SPT uses the 5936 Situation Analysis Overview memo to help develop policy options for consideration 5937 by senior officials. 5938 The Situation Analysis Overview Memo should be no longer than ten pages and 5939 include: 5940 1. A summary of key U.S. interests relating to the country and region, and the 5941 major risks associated with a continuation of current trends; 5942 2. A brief summary of recent developments and the strategic context, key 5943 Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors, and critical knowledge gaps; 5944 3. A review of international engagement in the country/region, including the 5945 impact of past, present and expected host country and international actors 5946 actions, as well as a review of the impact of past and present U.S. actions; and 5947 4. A review of possible opportunity costs and/or policy tradeoffs to U.S. action 5948 (or inaction) and possible U.S. and/or international legal or other impediments 5949 to U.S. action. 5950 A shared understanding of the situation is critical to the success of the planning 5951 process and ultimately the implementation of the USG Strategic Plan for R&S. The 5952 situation analysis serves as the foundational process to forge this shared 5953 understanding, identifying the underlying drivers of instability or conflict, the US 5954 interests at stake, existing USG and other actors’ plans and activities, key 5955 assumptions, possible contingencies, anticipated resource availability, intelligence 5956 requirements, and the dynamics of the regional and international context. It is the 5957 foundation of the consensus-building effort to formulate policy options and develop 5958 the strategic plan. This is particularly relevant as parallel military planning and 5959 situation awareness is coordinated and de-conflicted with civilian agency planning 5960 and situation awareness. The Situation Analysis Overview memo produced by the 5961 SPT will serve as a mechanism for in-briefing new planning team members and 5962 fostering a shared understanding of the situation beyond the SPT to all participating 5963 agencies. 5964 5965 d.) Policy Formulation 5966 The Situation Analysis Overview is the basis for second step of the Whole-of- 5967 Government strategic planning process: the articulation of clear policy options with 5968 associated risks and benefits in the form of a Policy Advisory Memo for 5969 Principals/Deputies Committees. The Policy Advisory Memo combines the most 5970 important elements of the Situation Analysis Overview with an explanation of how 5971 differing assumptions about critical planning considerations (conditions within the 5972 country, the behavior of other regional and international actors, and resources from 5973 the USG and other sources) lead to options for an overarching R&S policy goal and 5974 the strategic objectives required to achieve the R&S policy goal. These strategic 5975 objectives correspond to the drivers of conflict and local capacity needs and are 5976 termed Major Mission Elements (MMEs). 5977 Principals/Deputies Committees respond to the Policy Advisory Memo by either 5978 issuing a Policy Statement or requesting new policy options. OSD and the Joint Staff 5979 are deeply involved and likely to play a leading role in developing many of the 5980 options sent to the Principals and/or Deputies Committees for decision. The Policy
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5981 Statement determines the overarching R&S goal through the approval of one of the 5982 policy options. This includes stipulating the critical planning considerations that 5983 planners should use as they develop the USG R&S Strategic Plan and providing a 5984 preliminary estimate of the USG resources likely to be available for the R&S 5985 operation. The Policy Statement also designates the U.S. official responsible for 5986 implementing the plan and identifies the U.S. Agency tasked with leading the 5987 planning around each MME supporting the development of the USG R&S Strategic 5988 Plan. 5989 The first step in drafting policy options is determining which assumptions are 5990 critical to the direction of a USG plan and the ultimate success of the R&S operation. 5991 There are three main categories of contextual assumptions about the strategic 5992 environment to consider: 5993 1) Conditions within the country (e.g., electricity infrastructure in major 5994 cities will be sufficient and functioning, the security environment will be 5995 permissive); 5996 2) Actions of other regional and international actors (e.g., the European 5997 Union will provide sufficient resources to achieve objectives in the Rule of 5998 Law sector, neighboring states will not send military forces across borders); 5999 and 6000 3) Resources (funding, manpower, equipment) available from the USG (e.g., 6001 there will be a $300 million supplemental, 100 civilians will be deployed from 6002 the civilian reserve corps). 6003 The identification of achievable goals is the next stage in the formulation of 6004 policy options. The SPT should identify a goal for each contextual scenario. 6005 Planners need to consider the longer-term objectives for the country when trying to 6006 determine a shorter-term goal that capitalizes on the 2-3 year period where political 6007 and financial resources are at their highest levels. The 2-3 year goal should be to 6008 reach the Conflict Transformation “tipping point” of locally-led nascent peace, where 6009 the country is on a sustainable positive trajectory out of conflict, regardless of 6010 international assistance. Considering 2-3 year periods in planning will be a departure 6011 for many military planners that are familiar with planning timeframes measured in 6012 hours and days. 6013 When presenting a goal, the SPT will define, as clearly as possible, what 6014 “success” would look like if the goal was reached. Proposing that country X will be 6015 “at peace with itself and on the path to economic growth” is a standard goal that could 6016 apply to any R&S country and therefore not useful. The strategic planning process 6017 should provide senior policy-makers with a more detailed explanation of the desired 6018 end state to faithfully convey the challenges ahead. The defined goal will prove 6019 valuable when planners begin to outline the necessary benchmarks to be reached and 6020 the measures of progress to be observed. 6021 Next, the SPT will flesh out each policy option into a 2-3 paragraph narrative that 6022 outlines:
92 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 137 6023 The contextual scenario (assumptions about the environment in the 6024 country and anticipated roles and resource commitments of other actors) and 6025 how the assumptions will be verified over time; 6026 Overarching policy goal; 6027 What success would “look like”; 6028 Major Mission Elements, any causal assumptions and how they will be 6029 verified over time; 6030 USG resource availability, rough orders of magnitude of USG resource 6031 needs; and 6032 Associated risks. 6033 Resource issues may not be fully identified at this stage in the planning process; 6034 however, it is crucial to put potential resource gaps squarely before policymakers as 6035 early as possible so they understand the obstacles in achieving desired policy 6036 objectives. The SPT will seek input from all USG elements in the affected country 6037 throughout the development of the situation analysis, scenarios, goals, and MME(s). 6038 This input may arrive through regional bureau representatives on the team or directly 6039 from the COM (or the ACT) to the CRSG. 6040 6041 e.) Strategy Development 6042 The SPT uses the Policy Statement to begin the iterative process of developing the 6043 USG R&S Strategic Plan. This plan will determine how the R&S operation will 6044 address the prioritization, sequencing and cross-sectoral linkages of USG efforts. The 6045 CRSG or relevant PCC will initiate a budget planning process drawing on interagency 6046 members including Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of the Director 6047 of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F), and implementing agencies in coordination with the 6048 SPT and USG presence in the field (if any). 6049 DOD will play a significant role in apportioning resources to the mission due to 6050 the significant resources it brings to an R&S operation and because any USG 6051 presence in the field is likely to include military personnel. DOD has formalized a 6052 process for estimating the cost associated with contingency operations. This process 6053 is outlined in the Financial Management Regulation (FMR) Volume 12 Chapter 23 6054 entitled “Contingency Operations” and would support OSD and Joint staff 6055 representatives on the CRSG developing cost estimates for the R&S Strategic Plan. 6056 The preliminary DOD contingency cost estimate, called the pre-deployment 6057 estimate, typically is prepared by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 6058 (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) and the Joint Staff J-8. It projects a rough order of 6059 magnitude cost estimate. Typically, DOD Components need additional time to 6060 develop “ground up” estimates. As an adjunct to this model, the OUSD(C) has 6061 established a Contingency Cost Estimating Team to develop a more reliable preliminary 6062 cost estimate for contingency operations. This team is on call to OUSD(C) and consists 6063 of financial managers from OSD, the Joint Staff, and DOD Components. It is augmented 6064 by operational and logistics planners as needed, to collect information about the operation 6065 and to formulate assumptions to support the cost estimating effort. 6066 The strategic planning team is also responsible for synthesizing the constant flow 6067 of information from the field into its deliberations on the plan including, where 6068 possible, input from host country authorities. As a guiding principle, host country
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6069 authorities should be engaged, as early as possible, in strategic planning. In extreme 6070 instances, where outside actors have assumed authority, criteria for triggering a 6071 Transfer of Authority (TOA) to a responsible host country government should be 6072 established early and reviewed regularly for continuing relevance to changing 6073 situations. 6074 The locus of planning during the strategy development phase will depend on the 6075 nature of the R&S operation, as indicated in the Policy Statement. 6076 A major national security engagement requiring the establishment of the IMS 6077 dictates that the strategy development would be centered in Washington with 6078 significant participation and input from actors outside Washington, including 6079 the GCC, the US Mission, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team 6080 (DART), bi-lateral and multi-lateral partners and/or NGOs. In countries 6081 absent a USG presence, when U.S. personnel are deployed into the field, their 6082 input becomes a critical component of strategy development and may include 6083 recommendations for revisions to the overarching USG policy goal. 6084 The PCC or Deputies Committee may determine that strategy development 6085 should take place primarily in-country, under the direction of the COM in 6086 order to take full advantage of on the ground interagency regional, sectoral, 6087 and functional expertise, as well as assure buy-in from host-country leaders 6088 and stakeholders. 6089 An R&S operation involving a significant U.S. military presence creates the need 6090 to integrate crisis action planning or contingency planning occurring simultaneously 6091 at the GCC with the planning in Washington and the field. A team of civilian 6092 planners will deploy to the affected GCC called the IPC to ensure the integration of 6093 military and civilian planning occurs. Likewise, an IPC may deploy to a 6094 multinational force headquarters to integrate USG planning efforts with an 6095 international response. The strategy development level of planning is the final step 6096 towards completion of the USG Strategic Plan for R&S, which in turn begins the 6097 interagency implementation planning process. The completed USG R&S Strategic 6098 Plan will be submitted to the CRSG PCC and to Deputies Committee as necessary for 6099 approval. Once approval, the USG Strategic Plan for R&S and associated guidance 6100 can be issued to executing agencies. 6101 6102 f.) Interagency Implementation Planning 6103 Agencies and actors across the USG have existing capabilities to plan the 6104 resourcing and support to implementation of their own agencies’ activities. Agency– 6105 level implementation plans exist prior to the beginning of the whole-of-government 6106 planning process. Agencies will likely begin internal discussions on what revisions to 6107 their implementation plans are necessary in parallel with whole-of-government 6108 planning processes. In the case of DOD, contingency plans will likely be well 6109 underway by the time the USG decides to act on a crisis and establish the IMS. DOD 6110 planning will continue, however it must adjust to and incorporate the requirements 6111 developed by the whole-of-government planning process employing the IMS. The 6112 whole-of-government approach to planning utilizing the IMS does not replace the
93 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 139 6113 methodologies and processes by which DOD plans. Rather, it establishes the 6114 methodology and process for developing an Interagency Implementation Plan and 6115 provides guidance on what aspects of DOD implementation plans must be shared 6116 with other USG actors conducting interagency implementation planning. 6117 Interagency implementation planning takes place over three main phases: 6118 6119 1) Pre-deployment interagency initial planning; 6120 2) On-the-ground reassessment and revision of the R&S Strategic Plan and 6121 Interagency Implementation Plans; and 6122 3) Transition planning, this includes planning for ongoing operations and when 6123 authorities are passed from one entity to another. 6124 6125 During all phases the Chief of Mission has responsibility for the implementation 6126 of the USG R&S Strategic Plan and all other related USG efforts in the host country. 6127 Interagency implementation planning is an iterative process to synchronize 6128 diplomatic, development, economic and defense implementation planning and tasks 6129 with a goal of developing a comprehensive approach to achieve the USG R&S 6130 Strategic Plan. This whole-of-government approach to planning identifies additional 6131 requirements, potential impediments, and assumptions regarding the environment. It 6132 establishes a timeline for implementation, priority tasks, lead and supporting USG 6133 agencies, authorities and cross-sector linkages and sequencing. This continuous 6134 planning process is the mechanism to communicate feedback, identify resource and 6135 logistics requirements, and conduct monitoring and evaluation, and ensure the 6136 flexibility of USG operations. Like strategic planning, implementation planning 6137 should be coordinated with coalition partners and when possible host country 6138 authorities. 6139 The CRSG approves the formation of the interagency implementation planning 6140 team, including specifying the head of the team, who will most likely serve as the 6141 ACT deputy leader and support the Chief of Mission and ACT Leader’s 6142 implementation of the USG R&S Strategic Plan. This team will be comprised of two 6143 efforts: one located at the CRSG secretariat – in essence derived from the MME 6144 planning teams – and one located at ACT. The CRSG Secretariat implementation 6145 planning team ensures integration of planning efforts directly under the COM’s 6146 authority and those occurring in other geographic locations, such as Washington 6147 (USG), New York (UN), or Brussels (NATO). 6148 The implementation planning team uses the information provided in the MME 6149 Sub-Objective (SO) tasks to create the Interagency Implementation Plan (IIP) in 6150 support of the COM, in conjunction with the Country Team. The IIP is the 6151 compilation of information that provides an overarching picture of interagency 6152 planning (and status of plan delivery once implementation has begun) for 6153 achievement of a USG R&S Strategic Plan. 6154 Elements of an IIP include: 6155 An overview of the operating environment, indicating the critical 6156 elements of the environment anticipated to affect implementation of the 6157 plan 6158 Mission statement
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6159 Proposed revisions to the USG R&S Strategic Plan 6160 Key decision points and benchmarks 6161 Issues for decision 6162 Summary of Sub-Objective tasks 6163 Prioritization, timeline, and sequencing for all Sub-Objective tasks 6164 across geographic areas 6165 Metrics for both monitoring and evaluation, including targets for 6166 each task/activity at 3 month intervals in order to synchronize activities, 6167 the proposed system for ongoing assessment of crosscutting linkages, and 6168 benchmarks to signal when transfers of authority should occur (military to 6169 civilian, USG to host country, etc) 6170 o A polling strategy 6171 Overview of how the Knowledge Management function of the 6172 ACT will be fulfilled 6173 Congressional strategy 6174 Public relations/media strategy 6175 Implementation-level resource plan 6176 o The implementation planning team will work with the logistics 6177 planning team in the CRSG to lay out a security and logistics plan, 6178 including logistics/deployment/sustainment plan for IMS teams (IPC, 6179 ACT, FACTS) that outlines in detail information about how people 6180 will flow into theater, who will establish support systems, and where 6181 supplies will be pre-positioned. 6182 o Resource requirements, including resource constraints and 6183 limitations. 6184 o A picture of host country resources and non-financial resources 6185 that partners bring to bear which allows the USG to coordinate to 6186 maximize effectiveness. 6187 o An annex with the schedule for staff rotations and a training plan 6188 to ensure that all know the plan, their role, and associated processes 6189 o Audit/Legal/Financial Management/Contracting annexes that 6190 specify major contracts, timelines for putting them in place, potential 6191 duplication or gaps 6192 Annex on how and what components of the IIP will be shared with 6193 other actors (host country, coalition partners, international actors) 6194 6195 4. Coordination at Strategic Level 6196 6197 Coordination at the strategic level on transitions is not going to significantly vary 6198 from coordination that occurs throughout the R&S operation employing the IMS. 6199 The CRSG will have the lead for deciding when transitions will occur based on input 6200 from the field, and with the advice and consent of the COM and ACT leader, who 6201 will assume leadership roles after the transition has occurred. The overarching R&S
94 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 141 6202 goals for the operation are used by the SPT to identify and develop the strategic 6203 objectives necessary to accomplish the overarching R&S goals. These strategic 6204 objectives are termed Major Mission Elements (MMEs). All agencies and 6205 departments with a role in a MME will be involved in the planning and subsequent 6206 implementation activities surrounding the MME. 6207 A scenario example may have an MME that covers the restoration of the host 6208 country power grid initially with DOD in the lead, due to a tenuous security 6209 environment, playing a key planning role along with other agencies providing 6210 technical advice in developing the sub-tasks for the MME. Eventually, the 6211 Department of Energy (DOE) will transition to assume leadership of the subsequent 6212 planning and execution of this MME. In time the DOE will transition the 6213 responsibility for the power grid over to a host country entity. DOE representatives 6214 will participate on the MME planning team from the outset and DOE will deploy the 6215 appropriate personnel to the host country to work with the DOD counterparts as soon 6216 as possible in order to assume lead responsibility when the CRSG leadership 6217 determines based on advice received from the field regarding the security 6218 environment. 6219 6220 5. Coordination at Operational and Tactical/Implementation Level 6221 6222 a.) Integration Planning Cell (IPC) 6223 At the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) operational level the Integration 6224 Planning Cell (IPC) serves the role of synthesizing the military operations planning 6225 with interagency R&S planning. Its purpose is to support civilian-military 6226 communication and integration of civilian and military planning in order to achieve 6227 unity of effort. The goal of the IPC is to provide timely, usable information, advice, 6228 and coordination from an interagency perspective to the combatant commander. The 6229 IPC will not be directly involved in transition planning. Its role will primarily be to 6230 help the GCC staff understand the capabilities, limitations and requirements of the 6231 civilian organizations they represent and serve to liaise between the ACT and the 6232 GCC where and when appropriate. 6233 IPC members serve as a bridge between their civilian agencies’ Washington and 6234 field staffs by addressing the civilian agency gap at the operational level of the 6235 military, represented by the GCC, and ensuring plans and decisions by civilian 6236 agencies in Washington and the field are represented and informed by planning and 6237 decision-making at the military operational headquarters. The IPC members will be 6238 of sufficient stature and possess sufficient knowledge to provide insights into the 6239 R&S plans utilizing the IMS and reach-back to their respective parent agencies. The 6240 interagency representatives on the IPC are the R&S subject matter experts for their 6241 respective agencies and have expert level knowledge of the IMS. 6242 The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) or its equivalent interagency 6243 staff element exists in all GCC(s). They help combatant commanders by providing 6244 advice and linkages during normal day-to-day activities with the civilian components 6245 of our national power (e.g., Department of State, the US Agency for International 6246 Development, USAID, and other departments and agencies). The IPC is established 6247 to facilitate the conduct of the IMS by providing interagency support to plans,
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6248 operations, contingencies, and initiatives. The IPC does not replace the JIACG or its 6249 equivalent. The IPC does not subsume JIACG responsibilities, nor does the JIACG 6250 become the IPC. The two organizations will be expected to cooperate with each 6251 other. The members of the JIACG should help facilitate IPC integration into the 6252 GCC structure. The JIACG will continue to exercise its advisory function to the 6253 commander and members of the JIACG may, if appropriate, serve temporarily on the 6254 IPC; however the IPC is specifically sent to the GCC to facilitate the execution of the 6255 IMS supporting the planning and implementation of an R&S operation. 6256 6257 b.) Advance Civilian Team (ACT) 6258 The ACT is the primary interagency coordinating and implementing body for the 6259 R&S response effort with the host country national level government. The ACT is 6260 the senior in-country coordinating and supervising body focused on the R&S 6261 operation employing the IMS and executing the R&S Interagency Implementation 6262 Plan. The ACT is not to be confused with the Country Team, headed by the U.S. 6263 Chief of Mission (COM), usually the Ambassador, who may be dual-hatted as both 6264 the ambassador and head of the ACT. The Country Team retains responsibility for 6265 the day-to-day operations and functions of the embassy and is responsible for 6266 integrating U.S. efforts in traditional embassy support of the host country to the 6267 extent allowed by the situation and circumstances. 6268 The ACT, in addition to being headed by the ambassador or a designated leader, 6269 is composed of the senior member of each represented department or agency. In a 6270 foreign country, the COM is the highest U.S. civil authority. The Foreign Service Act 6271 assigns the COM to a foreign country the responsibility for the direction, 6272 coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that 6273 country except for military service members and employees under the command of a 6274 U.S. area military commander – the GCC. As the senior U.S. Government official 6275 permanently assigned in the host country, the COM is responsible to the President for 6276 policy oversight of all United States government programs. This includes a scenario 6277 involving an R&S operation using the established IMS as part of a whole-of- 6278 government response to a crisis that may unfold in their country of responsibility. 6279 The more extensive the U.S. Government participation is in an R&S operation 6280 and the more dispersed U.S. military forces are throughout a country, the greater the 6281 need for additional coordination mechanisms to extend civilian oversight and 6282 assistance. However, given the limited resources of the Department of State and the 6283 other U.S. Government agencies, especially at the outset of a crisis response, military 6284 forces often represent the U.S. Government in decentralized, diffuse, and oftentimes 6285 hostile operating environments. Operating with a clear understanding of the guiding 6286 political aims, military commanders and their subordinates at all levels must be 6287 prepared to exercise judgment and act without the benefit of immediate civilian 6288 oversight and guidance. 6289 Initially, civilian agencies will integrate into the existing implementation efforts 6290 and procedures established by the military in a supporting role due to the security 6291 environment and its affect on their abilities to carry out their normal responsibilities.
95 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 143 6292 Transitions will occur when practicable with the recommendations of the JTF 6293 commander and the ACT leader as more civilian agency personnel and resources 6294 enter the AOR and the USG Strategic Plan for R&S and the subsequent USG 6295 Interagency Implementation Plan unfold utilizing the IMS. 6296 The military should not remain the lead of any traditional civilian responsibilities 6297 for longer than is absolutely necessary. Tasks such a good governance, establishing 6298 local medical clinics, security sector reform, local infrastructure restoration, restoring 6299 schools are all tasks the military may undertake at the outset of an R&S operation 6300 using the IMS, but are all tasks that are civilian led by nature and require civilian 6301 leadership as soon as possible. The military may play a key supporting role, such as 6302 in security sector reform, but the role should be supporting, not lead. The transitions 6303 will be planned in close coordination between the ACT implementation planning 6304 team and the JTF planners. The ACT leader and the JTF commander must have a 6305 close working relationship that includes daily interface. Determinations will be made 6306 between these two leaders when the various transitions should occur and by whom. 6307 Their recommendations will be passed to the CRSG in close coordination with the 6308 GCC and COM – if the COM is a different person than the ACT Leader. 6309 6310 c.) Embassy Team 6311 The Embassy Team is led by the presidentially appointed ambassador. The 6312 makeup of the embassy team, or country team, varies widely from country to country, 6313 depending on the U.S. departments and agencies represented in the country and the 6314 desires of the ambassador and the host country government. The country team, 6315 regardless of size, has a range of responsibilities that go on daily in the diplomatic, 6316 informational, bilateral military and economic spheres. Most country teams have 6317 representation in some form from the departments of State, Defense, Justice and 6318 Treasury, as well as USAID, the CIA and the DEA. The American citizens in most 6319 embassies are outnumbered by the host country nationals that work for the embassy 6320 and perform most of the routine non-policy related work. 6321 The country team does not have the capacity and may lack the expertise to deal 6322 with the challenges of a complex crisis. However, they have the understanding of the 6323 society, government, local customs, culture, and language that will be invaluable to 6324 the incoming ACT implementation personnel. So while the country team will not all 6325 become part of the ACT or the JTF, the country team will be a valuable coordination 6326 and advisory body and some members of the country team could, based on expertise 6327 and background, be dual-hatted to the ACT. It is also possible that some country 6328 team members could serve briefly as liaisons with the JTF until more personnel have 6329 deployed in. When there is no country team in a crisis country---either one did not 6330 exist before the crisis unfolded, or the one that was present was withdrawn---the ACT 6331 may have to temporarily assume the duties of the country team, in addition to their 6332 own duties. 6333 The military, the JTF, will not have transition requirements regarding the country 6334 team. At no time will the JTF or another military entity assume the roles of the 6335 country team so a need to transition will not occur. The JTF will coordinate closely 6336 with the country team and sometimes the lines between the country team and the 6337 ACT may be briefly blurred if personnel serve on both. However, this will not affect
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6338 the overall relationship the JTF will have with either the country team and/or the 6339 ACT. The COM may insist on using his/her military advisor in a liaison role with the 6340 JTF. If the relationship between the COM and the senior military person in the 6341 embassy is good and the COM has trust in the individual, this can serve to facilitate 6342 the cooperation between the COM, ACT, country team and the JTF. This liaison 6343 function can facilitate transitions as the military advisor will have a measure of 6344 knowledge and understanding of the country situation and where US interests lie as 6345 the mission moves from crisis to steady state. 6346 The lack of a transition requirement between a country team and a JTF alludes to 6347 but does not address the extreme scenario where the U.S. military is an occupying 6348 power and the U.S. Government has imposed a military government on a foreign 6349 country. This topic goes beyond the scope of the IMS and this handbook. 6350 6351 d.) Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT) 6352 The FACT level of the IMS is where transitions from military authority to civilian 6353 leadership will be most visible. FACT(s) are stood up “away from the flagpole” in 6354 outlying areas or provinces once there is sufficient stability to allow them to establish 6355 and commence longer-term R&S activities. In most, if not all cases, FACT(s) will 6356 take over from military units - engineers and special operations forces to include civil 6357 affairs will be among those that will have started the implementation of R&S 6358 activities. A few exercises are encouraged and recommended while training for such 6359 situations. However, it is probable that no formal process will be in place prior to the 6360 transition and civilian participation in exercises is likely to be under resourced and 6361 compete with other budgetary and program requirements within their respective 6362 agencies. 6363 Military commanders and leaders should continue to plan, dispatch, and execute 6364 missions while the FACT team members become familiar with the situation. The 6365 FACT should gradually begin planning and executing more of the missions in its 6366 AOR, initially working with the military components and gradually assuming 6367 leadership with military support as appropriate according to a schedule agreed upon 6368 between the FACT leader and the military officer in charge. The military will retain 6369 responsibility for the missions initially but gradually the FACT will take over and at a 6370 point in time mutually agreed upon will assume all mission responsibility. The FACT 6371 assumption of mission responsibility in no way diminishes the authority a military 6372 commander has over forces assigned or attached to them. 6373 The military will assume a supporting role and will remain in place until mission 6374 requirements no longer necessitate the involvement of military forces and their higher 6375 headquarters make a decision to redeploy. This transition process is often referred to 6376 as “left seat, right seat” by military personnel and is traditionally executed during a 6377 relief in place (RIP) operation conducted between two or more military units. 6378 Military commanders need to be prepared to maintain a military presence with the 6379 FACT indefinitely, if the need and justification warrants it. 6380 6381 6.) Coordination with host country public and private sectors
96 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 145 6382 6383 A JTF deployed to a country or region in crisis as part of a U.S. whole-of- 6384 government response will have the primary mission of security. In most cases this 6385 will be a broad mandate, security will be a dynamic and challenging suite of 6386 operational imperatives. The JTF commander will ensure the security of the military 6387 personnel and resources placed under his command, establishing securable operating 6388 bases, a headquarters, and securing routes of movement for his elements. At the same 6389 time the JTF Commander must balance the security of the forces under his command 6390 with the security needs of the population within the host country. Maintaining a 6391 constant security presence, preferably and when appropriate utilizing the tactic of 6392 dismounted operations, will greatly contribute to the resumption of normal daily 6393 activities of the host country population and allow the deployed JTF to counter 6394 messages and actions perpetrated by extremist or insurgent groups. 6395 Maintaining a security posture that isolates the deployed JTF from the host- 6396 country population, will in the short term provide adequate security to the military 6397 forces under command of the JTF Commander. However, the security needs of the 6398 host country population may be sacrificed using this strategy. It will also become 6399 difficult for the JTF to counter the messages and actions of extremist and insurgent 6400 groups under this strategy, thus leading to an overall degraded security environment 6401 for both the host country population and the forces under the command of the JTF 6402 commander. 6403 6404 FM 3-24 (COIN) states the following: 6405 6406 “Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be 6407 1-149. Ultimate success in COIN is gained by protecting the populace, not 6408 the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose 6409 touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to 6410 the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening 6411 post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and 6412 contact maintained. The effectiveness of establishing patrol bases and 6413 operational support bases should be weighed against the effectiveness of 6414 using larger unit bases. (FM 90-8 discusses saturation patrolling and 6415 operational support bases.) These practices ensure access to the intelligence 6416 needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with 6417 the populace that help establish real legitimacy.” 6418 6419 6420 FM 3-24 (COIN) goes on to state: 6421 6422 “ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A PRESENCE 6423 A-24. The first rule of COIN operations is to establish the force’s presence 6424 in the AO. If Soldiers and Marines are not present when an incident 6425 happens, they usually cannot do much about it. The force cannot be 6426 everywhere at once. The more time Soldiers and Marines spend in the AO, 6427 the more likely they are where the action is. If the force is not large enough 6428 to establish a presence throughout the AO, then determine the most 146 Military Participation In The IMS As of 17 April 2009
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6429 important places and focus on them. This requires living in the AO close to 6430 the populace. Raiding from remote, secure bases does not work. Movement 6431 on foot, sleeping in villages, and night patrolling all seem more dangerous 6432 than they are—and they are what ground forces are trained to do. Being on 6433 the ground establishes links with the local people. They begin to see 6434 Soldiers and Marines as real people they can trust and do business with, 6435 rather than as aliens who descended from armored boxes. Driving around in 6436 an armored convoy actually degrades situational awareness. It makes 6437 Soldiers and Marines targets and is ultimately more dangerous than moving 6438 on foot and remaining close to the populace.” 6439 6440 6441 The JTF will implement the operational objectives and guidelines established by 6442 the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC). Policy guidance and the strategic 6443 objectives, referred to as MME(s), will originate in Washington D.C. through the 6444 CRSG and military specific operational level sub-objectives under each MME will 6445 get passed to the JTF commander through guidance and direction from the GCC 6446 chain of command with the appropriate input from the COM or ACT leader. The 6447 COM will occupy a special position and will advise the formation of strategic and 6448 operational objectives while keeping appraised of the tactical situation in country 6449 from information gathered at the JTF and the resident ACT and country teams. 6450 While the COM has no command authority over the JTF commander, the COM 6451 nonetheless carries substantial influence as that official with Presidential authority 6452 over US policy concerning the host country. Cooperation between the COM and the 6453 JTF commander are essential to successful execution of the broad missions of all 6454 USG elements inside the affected country. The tasks assigned to the JTF commander 6455 as a result of the GCC operational plans incorporating the MME sub-objectives will 6456 significantly broaden the security responsibilities of the military force. 6457 A JTF commander can expect to be asked to supplement existing security at the 6458 facilities of the US Embassy in the affected country or those facilities that have been 6459 designated a temporary embassy. The JTF will be asked to secure lines of 6460 communication between its headquarters and the embassy. It also may be requested 6461 to provide a measure of security to a pre-determined set of critical host country 6462 infrastructure, refugee centers, and emergency medical locations. 6463 JTF commanders must plan on the likelihood that assigned military personnel will 6464 be the only “American face” present on the street in the host country during the first 6465 critical hours and days of the USG response. What happens in those first hours and 6466 days will set the tone for how the USG presence is perceived by the local inhabitants. 6467 In an ideal circumstance, civilian experts in a range of disciplines such as power 6468 generation, sanitation, municipal governance, law and courts, police functions, and 6469 cultural awareness will all arrive in country with the military force. The reality is that 6470 these personnel are probably not going to arrive until days or even weeks later when 6471 the main body of the ACT arrives. Until that time the JTF will, out of necessity, be
97 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 147 6472 the face of the American presence and will be expected to respond to a range of 6473 demands not normally expected by military commanders. 6474 The JTF command and staff will have to establish a mechanism for dealing with 6475 local leaders and individuals representing tribes, communities, regions and 6476 themselves. They will also need to establish a two way dialog with whatever senior 6477 USG civilian leadership is present, either the embassy, the COM located in an 6478 adjacent country or the US, or through the GCC to the State Department. To deal 6479 with the host country’s private and public sector the JTF commander needs to 6480 establish a CMOC or its equivalent. 6481 The CMOC may be located near the JTF headquarters where the JTF commander 6482 or their designated representative will meet with any private or public sector 6483 representatives on a daily basis to determine what assistance the command can offer 6484 the host nation to further stabilization. The presence of the CMOC, its purpose, and 6485 who its target audience is will need to be publicized and distributed out into the host 6486 nation population by whatever mean is available to the JTF---radio, local TV, local 6487 news media and public announcements by the JTF public affairs office or through the 6488 use of subordinate military units and special operations forces conducting civil 6489 military operations. The information should identify the daily hours when the CMOC 6490 is staffed and open. When the security environment is prohibitive to establish normal 6491 operating hours the information provided should contain at a minimum who to 6492 contact and how to arrange an appointment. 6493 CMOC(s) facilitate the integration of military and political actions. Joint 6494 Publication 1-02 defines a CMOC as an ad hoc organization, normally established by 6495 the GCC or subordinate JFC, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged 6496 military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental 6497 organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no 6498 established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. 6499 Below the national level, additional CMOC(s) where military commanders and 6500 civilian leaders can meet directly with local leaders to discuss issues and coordinate 6501 implementing activities may be established. Where possible, IGO(s) and NGO(s) 6502 should be encouraged to participate in coordination meetings at CMOC(s) to ensure 6503 their actions are known, de-conflicted, and if possible integrated with U.S. 6504 Government, coalition, and host country plans. 6505 As the face of the American presence, the JTF can utilize the CMOC or its 6506 equivalent to better organize its civil military efforts and provide a venue to interface 6507 with representatives of the host country. Members of the host country from the 6508 public and private sectors will routinely approach the CMOC for a wide variety of 6509 reasons. These could be simple requests for assistance or to file a complaint to much 6510 larger and complex issues dealing with security, governance, essential services, 6511 infrastructure, economics and commerce. It will be important, in all of these factors, 6512 to assess the situation and address the issues from the standpoint of military support 6513 to stabilization activities to enable a transition to civil authorities utilizing the FACT 6514 and ACT structures as they establish and become operational. 6515 The JTF is well suited to conduct short term high impact projects that have been 6516 coordinated with its higher headquarters (the GCC), the ACT in communication with 6517 the CRSG and, when deemed to be appropriate, representatives from the host country.
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6518 Daily and regular coordination needs to be maintained to ensure projects and 6519 programs initiated by the JTF support the longer-term USG strategic objectives or 6520 MME(s). Funding sources will be essential in determining what the JTF can do. As 6521 in the past, the JTF commander is expected to receive contingency funds to initiate 6522 immediate impact projects below a pre-set ceiling. More costly projects will have to 6523 be prior approved on an individual basis. The JTF staff and the CMOC will have to 6524 act in a circumspect manner with all individuals claiming to be legitimate leaders 6525 until assistance can be obtained to verify claims. IO(s) and NGO(s) can be a very 6526 good source of advice on prioritizing quick impact projects and can even serve to 6527 promote higher cost larger scale projects, often with the approval and advice of a 6528 senior USAID representative at the US Mission and/or the ACT. These projects must 6529 conform to governing regulations concerning the use of contracting and funding 6530 mechanisms when they exceed pre-set dollar threshold amounts. 6531 A well functioning CMOC will find that its customer base will expand due to its 6532 level of performance. Oftentimes, projects will be proposed by members of the host 6533 country and sometimes in concert with representatives of the US Government. 6534 Careful consideration must be given to the accomplishment of R&S objectives when 6535 prioritizing and selecting projects with host country counterparts. The goal is to 6536 stabilize first then transition to the appropriate civilian authority for follow-on, longer 6537 term R&S and development activities. 6538 Lastly, the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) can assist in the development 6539 and execution of infrastructure related projects – both short-term and longer-term. 6540 USACE has a history of working with CMOC(s) for the development, prioritization 6541 and selection of projects. All projects to include those that go beyond short-term and 6542 into the longer-term development category most be carefully coordinated with the 6543 appropriate authorities from the host country and the US Government. The expertise 6544 of USACE, if available, can be utilized as a “bridge” for longer term projects that can 6545 be transitioned to the relevant civil authorities. 6546 The CMOC will be approached by representatives of recognized international 6547 organizations (IO(s)) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with advice and 6548 requests for assistance, especially transportation requests and security requests. JTF 6549 staffs are encouraged to establish dialogs with these representatives and take 6550 advantage of the depth of “ground-truth” knowledge these organizations have. 6551 Transportation and security requests should be considered in the context of the JTF 6552 priorities, mission requirements that resource the USG Interagency Implementation 6553 Plan, as well as advice from the ACT and any set or standing guidance from its higher 6554 headquarters. Granting these requests will require coordination with various elements 6555 of JTF operations and logistics staffs and may require a commander’s authorization. 6556 CMOC personnel may be approached by intelligence and counter-intelligence 6557 officials for information derived or produced through interactions with the 6558 representatives of the host country. It is important to remember that the main focus of 6559 a CMOC is to assist in the activities of engaged military forces as it relates to civil 6560 military operations. Intelligence collection methods are a sensitive issue that will be
98 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 149 6561 managed at higher levels at or above the JTF level and direction will be provided 6562 accordingly based on applicable policies. 6563 There will be many types of personnel working within a CMOC and many more 6564 actors who will utilize a CMOC for various purposes. Military commanders and 6565 senior US Government representatives will utilize the CMOC while meeting with 6566 senior level counterparts in the host nation for a variety of purposes ranging from 6567 security to humanitarian assistance needs. Civil Affairs forces and representatives of 6568 a commander’s civil-military staff will utilize the CMOC on a daily basis when 6569 interacting with representatives from the host country. Depending on the security 6570 environment other US agencies and departments may utilize the CMOC – most likely 6571 for program and project implementation purposes in coordination with the host 6572 country. 6573 Another scenario a JTF Commander and staff must be prepared for is the 6574 necessity to open multiple CMOC(s) from the JTF level down to subordinate 6575 command levels as determined by the commander, the requirements pertaining to the 6576 situation on the ground, the number of military forces present, and the geographic 6577 footprint of the forces inside the host country. These CMOC(s) should strive to 6578 correspond to their equivalent level ACT and FACT structures. However, this may 6579 not be possible as their focus will be toward short-term stabilization tasks to allow for 6580 the implementation of the IMS and the reception of the interagency community 6581 resident within the structures of the IMS. The USG Interagency Implementation Plan 6582 utilizing the IMS should consider the concept of “Relief in Place” (RIP) when 6583 transitioning CMOC responsibilities to corresponding structures of the IMS. 6584 However, personnel from a CMOC must be prepared to conduct a RIP (on their own) 6585 with their relevant IMS counterpart if the implementation plan does not sufficiently 6586 address the topic. 6587 Once the ACT and FACT(s) have deployed and established a significant presence 6588 inside the affected country the JTF should consider the phasing out of CMOC(s). The 6589 JTF staff members of the CMOC should be considered for duties liaising with the 6590 ACT or even being detailed to the ACT to ensure smooth transition from military 6591 CMOC(s) to the civilian led ACT and FACT(s). The transition from CMOC(s) to 6592 ACT/FACT(s) may not happen all at once due to conditions in the security 6593 environment. It is likely that during transition there will be sub-national regions of a 6594 country where CMOC(s) will remain while other more permissive environments at 6595 the sub-national level may establish FACT(s) outside of the ACT HQ. CMOC(s) and 6596 FACT(s) may even co-exist or co-locate during the actual relief in place (RIP). 6597 A JTF Commander or Subordinate Commander may opt to continue the operation 6598 of a CMOC when circumstances cause the forces of a JTF and civilian authorities to 6599 locate in disparate positions. In these circumstances the CMOC will coordinate with 6600 ACT/FACT(s) to ensure their activities remain aligned with and support the R&S 6601 objectives of the USG Interagency Implementation Plan. Overall, the JTF 6602 commander needs to strive to move forward on stabilization activities and initial 6603 reconstruction efforts consistent with USG projected goals and objectives so that a 6604 smooth transition is accomplished when civilian members of the ACT and FACT(s) 6605 arrive in the affected country. 6606
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6607 7. Military Resources Supporting Civilian Components of the IMS 6608 6609 a. Resource and Manpower Requirements 6610 Both the GCC and the JTF commanders will need to take into account resources 6611 and manpower requirements above and beyond those needed for more traditional 6612 military operations. The requirements will be different for every complex R&S 6613 operation employing the IMS, however, common threads can be found that can help 6614 prior planning and preparation. Manpower requirements supporting the established 6615 IMS will fall in several categories; liaison, tasks to military units to provide 6616 operational support, and attachment of individual service members to civilian led 6617 elements of the IMS to name a few. Transition operations should be treated as 6618 distinct operations requiring additional manpower to support its planning teams. 6619 Transition planning should be incorporated into the USG Strategic Plan for R&S, the 6620 Interagency Implementation Plan, and JOPP and resourced accordingly. 6621 Upon initial completion of the strategic plan, the scope of the operation, general 6622 numbers and types of civilians being deployed, and general logistics and 6623 transportation requirements will become increasingly clearer. Military planners can 6624 estimate and prioritize where and when military elements that are performing or 6625 assisting civilian tasks can hand over leadership responsibility for those tasks and 6626 assume a supporting role or withdraw entirely from involvement. In many cases the 6627 military components will assume supporting roles and then phase out over time, they 6628 will not execute abrupt handovers. JTF commanders should plan to retain leadership 6629 and responsibility for a number of supporting tasks; normally this will include 6630 security, logistics, transportation, and communications. The civilian components are 6631 not likely to be able to assume responsibility for these until normal steady-state 6632 operations are re-established. 6633 6634 i.) Determine Resources 6635 Resources have been covered in other parts of this Handbook. Executing 6636 transition operations will have specific demands on both manpower and resources 6637 that are somewhat unique. One of the critical objectives of transitions is to maintain a 6638 measure of equilibrium with the host country and other actors like NGOs, IO and 6639 multinational partners. It will be necessary for military planners to consider a brief 6640 surge in manpower and resources during the transition period to ensure no 6641 breakdowns occur while maintaining implementation activities. Military planners 6642 need to know what civilian personnel are involved in the transition from the civilian 6643 agencies and NGO(s) and what resources they might lack that the military could 6644 provide, temporarily, until the transition is complete and the civilian lead has 6645 accepted responsibilities. 6646 A scenario to consider is the relief in place (RIP) of a civil affairs unit that is 6647 managing the restoration and rehabilitation of a power generating station along with 6648 the involvement of technical experts from a military engineer unit to an NGO that is 6649 coming into the AO under the auspices of a contract with USAID. The NGO will not 6650 have communications equipment with which to communicate with the military units
99 Pre-Decisional Draft - Unclassified 151 6651 it is relieving or the FACT responsible for the region within which the power station 6652 resides. Military planners may be asked to plan to provide a specified number of 6653 communications equipment to the NGO and personnel to either operate them or 6654 provide some basic training in their use until the transition is complete and they have 6655 established their own communications link-up with the FACT and others. This is just 6656 one example, for the same scenario there may be a request for several days of rations, 6657 vehicles for transportation and even access to potable water. Even a relatively benign 6658 transition can present military planners and leaders with unanticipated and complex 6659 challenges. 6660 6661 ii.) Obtaining Manpower and Resources 6662 Transition operations will occur within R&S operations when conditions have 6663 been relatively stabilized and reconstruction activities have increased in tempo. 6664 Military and civilian planners and leaders will need to work in close cooperation to 6665 identify the needs of the civilian components entering the AO. The military will have 6666 in place the preponderance of the manpower and resources allocated to address the 6667 immediate needs of the crisis. In preparation for transitions to occur the civilian 6668 planners, especially at the ACT level, will need to identify manpower and resource 6669 needs the civilian agencies cannot fill that will be requested of the military to provide. 6670 The military will likely have the skills and resources in place that civilian planners on 6671 an ACT may request. Obtaining manpower and resources will need to be conducted 6672 by the ACT through formal requests passed to the CRSG and executed using Letters 6673 of Agreement (LOA) and Letters of Request (LOR). 6674 The military can respond to these requests with the manpower and resources 6675 already in the AOR, or with augmentation from the GCC. For example, a scenario 6676 could have civilian agency personnel on an ACT identifying the number of persons 6677 with the appropriate skills needed to manage a detention facility in the ACT AOR, 6678 but the contract for the right number of contractor personnel with the appropriate 6679 skills will not have them in place until several weeks following the transition. The 6680 military has been managing the detention facility since assuming control early in the 6681 stabilization phase. At the request of the ACT through the CRSG, the military may 6682 be tasked by its chain of command to provide a specified number of soldiers with the 6683 necessary skills to remain in place until the contractor group arrives. If the JTF does 6684 not have other responsibilities for the troops at the detention facility this can be 6685 accommodated with organic assets. If there is another mission for these troops, the 6686 JTF might have to request additional forces from the GCC for a short period of time. 6687 In all cases requests from the ACT to the JTF for additional resources supporting its 6688 operational requirements will need to be coordinated with and cleared by the CRSG 6689 and the GCC. 6690 6691 o Deploying Resources (TBD) 6692 o Employing Resources (TBD) 6693 o Sustaining Resources (TBD) 6694 o Redeploying Resources (TBD) 6695 6696
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6697 6698 6699 6700 6701 6702
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