Lezioni 3, 4

Radical Realism and Radical Antirealism I. Samuel Clarke’s Radical Realism A moral-realist view like the one I have just sketched may not have been an exception, or even a minority position, in the history of ethics. Rather, it might be suggested that doubt about, and rejection of, moral realism, is an essentially modern and contemporary philosophical phenomenon. Some pages from Samuel Clarke’s Discourse of Natural religion (1705, 1728) (from: D.D.Raphael, ed., British Moralists, 1650-1800, Oxford, 1969, vol. I, pp. 191-225; number into brackets refer to pages of the text) can help us to give substance to the outline of moral realism I have sketched. The main themes of moral realism are put forward, and very aptly intertwined, in Clarke’s text. (a) Moral Reality Structure: The ultimate grounds of moral (or practical) authority consist in: “necessary and eternal different relations, that different things bear one to another” (192); “eternal and necessary differences of things” (192); “differences of things; and different relations, respects or proportions, of some things towards others” (192); “eternal and unalterable relations, respects, or proportions of things” that “absolutely and necessarily are in themselves” what they are, “natural and necessary relations” (198); “proportions...of things” (199); “abstract and absolute reason and nature of things” (201); “necessary relations and dependencies of things” (202); and, to sum up, “differences, relations, and proportions of things [that] are certain, unalterable, and real in the things themselves; and do not at all depend on the variable opinions, fancies, or imaginations of men” (203). A few comments: Such grounds contribute to the reality, to the structure and substance of the world. They are to be identifies with essential properties and necessary relations of and among things and events, on the model of geometrical properties and relations (understood as having an absolute application to reality) and of physical laws. There is a structure of reality that governs all natural processes; this constitutes the ultimate, real ground of morality. (b) Fittingness. The crucial move, for the metaphysics of morals, takes place at this point. The structure that forms, or at least contributes to, the reality of things, events, and their relations, also discriminates them in normative terms, makes them correct or incorrect. Clarke advances this view in terms of entities being fitting or agreeing to each other. After introducing the different relations things stand into, he writes of “the same consequent fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another”, of the “agreement or disagreement of some things with others” that “necessarily arises” (192), of “their consequent agreements or disagreements, fitnesses or unfitnesses” (198), so as to exclude that “there be naturally and absolutely in things themselves, no difference between good and evil, just and unjust” (195). This is moral realism in its core. There is reality (structure, substance, independence) to things, events, and their relations; they have normative properties and discriminations (fittingness or un-fittingness, agreement or disagreement), even moral ones (good or evil, just or unjust), just because of what they are. Of course, Clarke makes very strong assumptions about the significance of the essential connections among things and events - very strong because unrestricted (all kinds of things and events contribute to the order of the world) and highly specific in its normative content (a certain set of moral duties is grounded on that order). But we should read Clarke charitably. It is interesting that he says that fittingness and un- fittingness, the fundamental normative discrimination, are said by Clarke to be “consequent” on the nature of things, to “arise” from it. Thus, the reality of things and their normative properties are not identical, since the latter depend on, and thus are not the same as, the others. This dependence is strict, or essential (it is of necessity), but, still, being one thing or another, and having fittingness or un-fittingness, are distinct. One thing cannot fail to be the thing it is, while it can fail to fit or agree. What this distinction consists in, whether it is purely conceptual or involves a deeper metaphysical difference, is still hotly debated among realists and between supporters and enemies of realism. A realist might want to minimize the distinction between natural and normative properties, holding that it is only conceptual, or to maximize it, holding that it allows normative properties to be of their own kind. Those who oppose realism will insist that the distinction being only conceptual, there are no other properties than the natural ones. The debate will be shaped, of course, by the way the relevant concepts are understood. Clarke seems to suggest that fittingness, while distinct from the structure and substance of things, is as close as possible to it. He thus seems to holds something like a strong supervenience thesis of the normative on the natural: (i) fittingness has covariation with, and dependence on, the nature of things, (ii) there is no possible situation in which such covariation and dependence fail (fittingness or un-fittingness arise necessarily). The distinction thus is not purely conceptual, but it does not go to the point of having self- standing, floating normative properties. Such properties are real and distinct, but they are somehow well grounded in unquestionable, uncontroversial ones. This is the kind of metaphysical accommodation of normative properties that has been prevalent in moral realism, and it is interesting that we see an early-modern moral realist hinting to it. (c) Authority. Actions and agents are of course included in the natural structure of things and events (they are real, after all) and in their normative relations of fittingness and agreement. It is manifest that “there is a fitness or suitableness of certain circumstances to certain persons, and an unsuitableness of others; founded on the nature of things and the qualifications of persons”, and “that from the different relations of different persons one to another, there necessarily arises a fitness or unfitness of certain manners of behaviour of some persons towards others” (192). This kind of fittingness has (inherently grounded, fully justified) authority in regard of action, practical authority: “Originally and in reality, it is as natural and (morally speaking) necessary that the will should be determined in every action by the reason of the thing, and the right of the case; as it is natural and (absolutely speaking) necessary, that the undersanding should submit to a demonstrated truth” (200); “to act according to the plain right and reason of things” is what an agent “ought to do” and “his plain and indispensable duty” (200); “the original obligation of all...is the eternal reason of things”, which cannot but be discharged, if only in conscience, in self-condemnation (202). Clarke is so keen at vindicating the real grounds of practical authority to border extravagance: “By this understanding or knowledge of the natural and necessary relations, fitnesses, and proportions of things, the wills...of all intelligent beings are constantly directed, and must needs be determined to act accordingly; excepting those only, who will things to be what they are not and cannot be” (198-9). It may strike us as preposterous to object to willing that, or to acting with the effect that, things be not what they are (which we must assume not to be the same with what they cannot be, on pain of an excess of essentialism). Why should otherwise one will to act? Action is essentially connected with change. (And willing things to be what they cannot be is at most a factual mistake.) But Clarke’s implicit thought is clear: Practical authority, what one can be correctly and justifiedly required to do, what one properly ought to do, can only be grounded on reality, on ways things in effect are that make a inherent normative difference to action.

II. David Hume’s Radical Antirealism Commitments to: Moral reality, Moral truth, and Moral knowledge, form the core of moral realism. The adversaries of moral realism can refuse any of these commitments. They can deny that there is moral knowledge, and qualify as moral sceptics. They can deny that there is moral reference and truth, and qualify as moral non cognitivists or non descriptivists. They can deny that there is moral reality, and qualify as moral non-factualists or antirealists. These positions are asymmetrically dependent: you cannot have moral knowledge if you don’t have moral truth-conditional thought and you cannot have moral truth-conditional thought if you don’t have moral reality. But you can have moral reality without moral truth-conditional thought, and moral truth-conditional thought without moral knowledge. Therefore, moral antirealists are committed to deny that moral thought is truth-conditional and that there is moral knowledge. However, this would be too quick. Moral antirealism may be radical or moderate. Radical antirealism is committed to an utter and complete rejection of moral truth-conditions and moral knowledge. There cannot and there need not be any such thing. Moderate antirealism is committed to reject, in a literal, absolute, and fundamental sense, moral truth conditions and moral knowledge. But it holds, quite sensibly, that something like moral truth and moral knowledge is needed, if morality is to be a rational discourse and practice. Therefore it looks for a substitute for moral reality and for some counterpart to moral truth and to moral knowledge (without moral reality). A very radical and enormously influential form of antirealism is that of David Hume. (At least, it is interesting to read Hume in this way.)We will discuss Hume’s moral antirealism following the reverse order than the one we followed in the case of Clarke: no moral knowledge, no moral truth, and no moral facts. This is actually the order Hume follows in the text we will be considering. It is quite clear that Hume has Clarke in mind as his main polemical target. When he writes: “Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every rational being that considers them; that the immutable measures of right and wrong impose an obligation, not only on human creatures, but also on the Deity himself”, he can only be referring to Clarke.

Therefore, Hume has present moral realism in the strong, but well crafted version, which Clarke gives of it. He begins to address it from the epistemological and meaning-theoretical end. But Hume tries to keep clear of the obvious question-begging risks that this starting point involves, since he complements it with an independent discussion, and rejection, of the ontology of moral realism. Hume’s moral antirealism, just as Clarke’s moral realism, is a comprehensive, well-rounded theoretical position. Therefore, their confrontation brings in touch with the living issues in this area.

(a) Against Moral Knowledge and Moral Truth The moral-realist view that is advanced by Clarke involves a certain kind of moral epistemology. We know from Clarke what it is: It is possible to gain moral knowledge. This must be by means of the understanding or reason, because of the general and necessary character of moral truths. That such knowledge is possible (in effect, that any sort of moral knowledge is possible) implies, in its turn, that there is referential and truth-conditional moral thought. Hume calls in question these assumptions, both the epistemological and the meaning- theoretical one: Morality does not amount to knowledge and, a fortiori, to knowledge by reason. Morality cannot consist in any cognitive attitude because its content does not consist in representations, and thus is not of the right sort to individuate truth-conditions and truth-values. Hume makes this point by saying that morality does not consist in ideas, that are the only representational contents and states. Therefore, moral subject matters not only cannot be known by reason. They cannot be known at all. Hume’s problem with, and objection to, moral knowledge, therefore, is not that it exceeds our cognitive capacities. The problem, and the objection, is that there are no moral representations or objects of cognition The epistemological objection is, in effect, also (and principally) an objection against the referential and truth-conditional character of moral thought. This comes out clearly from the distinctive nature of Hume’s arguments against morality being known by reason. In effect, while the arguments are explicitly levelled against the idea that reason as a specific faculty can give knowledge of moral subject matters, they variously invest the very idea that the content of morality can be representational or cognitive. We can distinguish at least three different arguments in Hume’s text, but the second, seemingly, is inconsistent with the first and the third one and quite clearly unsound. So I will concentrate of the other two. The first argument gravitates around the idea that morality is practically authoritative. The third, around the idea that morality implies distinctive normative discriminations and sources of error.

First Argument: The Practical Influence of Morality “If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions, `twere in vain to take such pains to inculcate it; and nothing wou'd be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts, with which all moralists abound. Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and practical; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, `tis supposed to influence our passions and actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of the understanding. And this is confirm'd by common experience, which informs us, that men are often govern'd by their duties, and are deter'd from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell'd to others by that of obligation. Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality. therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.”

To summarize: Morality essentially has influence on action; The conclusions of reason alone have no such influence; Morality cannot be identified with any conclusion of reason alone. Reason gives only knowledge in its conclusions; Morality then is not object of knowledge

Hume argues (in Book II of the Treatise) for the second step of the argument in terms of the basic difference of role or direction of fit between motivational and cognitive states. If we accept this argument for this lemma, it holds not only of the conclusions of reason, but of any cognitive state. While the Humean theory of motivation, in its own combination of rational and emotive may be called in question, the general idea of a distinction between the contents and norms of epistemic and practical states seems sound. To this extent, not only the whole argument is valid and sound, but it generalizes easily to all cognitive capacities and attitudes.

Third Argument: Moral Mistakes “It has been observ'd, that reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us of the existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion. These are the only kinds of judgment, which can accompany our actions, or can be said to produce them in any manner; and it must be allow'd, that these judgments may often be false and erroneous […] But tho' this be acknowledg'd, `tis easy to observe, that these errors are so far from being the source of all immorality, that they are commonly very innocent, and draw no manner of guilt upon the person who is so unfortunate as to fail into them. They extend not beyond a mistake of fact, which moralists have not generally suppos'd criminal, as being perfectly involuntary. I am more to be lamented than blam'd, if I am mistaken with regard to the influence of objects in producing pain or pleasure, or if I know not the proper means of satisfying my desires. No one can ever regard such errors as a defect in my moral character” To summarize: Moral and epistemic correctness and incorrectness are essentially different; Conclusions of reason can be only epistemically correct or incorrect; Morality essentially consists of distinctions of moral correctness; Therefore morality cannot consist of cognitive distinctions.

The argument crucially depends on whether there are independent grounds for differentiating in the required way epistemic and moral normativity. Hume’s suggestion that this can be made in terms of different reactive attitudes (complaining versus blaming) seems to be on the right track. Hume here accepts that it makes sense to talk of moral mistakes, and thus, that morality consists of contentful attitudes and states. But he contends that the normative discriminations that underlie morality are not the same that underlie representation. Again, the problem is not so much with epistemological limitations, than with conditions of cognitive meaning.

My overall assessment of Hume’s case against moral knowledge is that it raises in effect very serious difficulties against the idea of identifying the practically authoritative with the epistemically authoritative, both in regard of the content of states and of the normative concepts that are involved. That is, the idea of identifying practically authoritative states or actions (those we are under a justified, forceful moral demand to be in) with some sort of privileged cognitions. Notice, however, that the point is not whether we can in general know what is right and what is wrong. Of course we can, as Hume explicitly recognizes: once certain moral norms or distinctions are set, we can know what they are and whether they apply or not in certain cases. The point is whether it is this knowing that makes what is so known morally right. And this Hume rightly denies: How could knowing that so and so is right be what makes so and so right? What there would be to know? But clearly the debate now has shifted to the ontological level. If moral realism is to be seriously addressed, the question must be raised whether there can be moral realities. For, if there were such realities, if moral rightness and wrongness were part of the furniture of the world, then, since we undoubtedly we can know what is right and what is wrong, there would not be obstacles to say that morality consists in conclusions of reason (or in the contents of other epistemic attitudes). There would be something moral for us to know, and since the practicality of morality now is not taken into consideration, morality could well be made to consist in knowledge.

(b) Against Moral Reality Hume’s take on moral ontology is quite complex. But essentially it consists in drawing from the concept of morality, that is rightly held to be non-controversial, two constraints that every supposed moral reality should satisfy, and then to challenge the moral realist to produce any example of a reality that satisfies such constraints. This does not amount to a proof of non-existence. Hume does not attempt to establish that the notion of moral reality is inconsistent. This would involve making assumptions about meaning that the moral realist might find controversial. But he shifts the burden on the moral realist. Unless an instance satisfying the two constraints is produced, it is not rational to believe that there are moral realities. Hume proceeds by making two assumptions, one concerning the concept of morality and the other of a general, ontological character. Assumption 1 The concept of morality is that of a form of practical force, of a demand of action which is not easily overridden and which is grounded on views and attitudes amounting to approving in a certain way of certain actions. Assumption 2 All realities are either relations or matters of fact. There is no other kind of reality but individual things or events and the structures they figure in.

Then Hume introduces two constraints on moral realities, on the ground of the concept of morality. First: “As moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind, and are deriv'd from our situation with regard to external objects, the relations, from which these moral distinctions arise, must lie only betwixt internal actions, and external objects, and must not be applicable either to internal actions, compared among themselves, or to external objects, when placed in opposition to other external objects. For as morality is supposed to attend certain relations, if these relations cou'd belong to internal actions consider'd singly, it wou'd follow, that we might be guilty of crimes in ourselves, and independent of our situation, with respect to the universe: And in like manner, if these moral relations cou'd be apply'd to external objects, it wou'd follow, that even inanimate beings wou'd be susceptible of moral beauty and deformity” Second: “According to the principles of those who maintain an abstract rational difference betwixt moral good and evil, and a natural fitness and unfitness of things, `tis not only suppos'd, that these relations, being eternal and immutable, are the same, when consider'd by every rational creature, but their effects are also suppos'd to be necessarily the same; and `tis concluded they have no less, or rather a greater, influence in directing the will of the deity, than in governing the rational and virtuous of our own species”

Hume challenges the moral realist to produce any relation or matter of fact that satisfies either constraint. Until the challenge is met, it is not rational to believe in moral realities. The force of the argument depends, obviously, on the soundness of the two constraints and on the grounds of the challenge. We will consider the two points in order.

First. We may well accept the underlying concept of morality as practically authoritative or forceful – on grounds of views and attitudes amounting to approval of a certain sort. But how do we move from this concept to the two constraints? Hume’s underlying thought seems to be the following: Take the features of the concept of morality; Think of how it would be if these feature did count as real, were real or intrinsic properties of particular or relations; Any putative moral reality should be like that. This is a move to translate the conceptual or intentional content of morality into features of putatively real relations, considered simply in and for what they actually would be. The two constraints translate in realistic terms the concept of morality: the first restricts that content to relations holding place only among mental states and external things and events, the second restricts it to relations that exert, at the highest degree, influence on rational wills. This move seems legitimate in itself and non-question begging against the realist; in fact, Clarke might well approve either constraint.

What then, in the second place, about the two constraints. The second constraint seems to be easily amenable, in this way, to the practical character of morality. In effect, it is simply an extension to ontology of the argument against the influence of cognition (alone) on action, along the following lines: Grant that we have moral knowledge: It should be knowledge that influences action; Grant that we have knowledge that influences action: It should influence action because of the real particular or relation that is apprehended influences action; Grant that some real particular or relation influences action: It should necessarily influence action of all beings that apprehend it.

This is because such influence counts as an aspect of the reality of such particulars and relations. It does not depend on the way they are apprehended (given only that they are apprehended as they truly are) or on any other attitude.

The grounds in the concept of morality for this constraint are quite straightforward (even though it needs careful qualification). The first constraint, by contrast, seems more puzzling. Hume’s idea seems to be still that of looking for the implication of regarding as real, as a part or an aspect of the reality of particular and relations, a feature of the concept of morality. What is less than clear is what is that feature, and why it is translated in the specific, real feature of a relation that it only holds between mental states or acts and external objects. Thus, why is it required that the relevant relata are mental states and non-mental things and events, but neither only the former nor only the latter? Hume observes that, otherwise, morality would be instantiated also by relations among internal operations of the mind or among external objects, while neither of those kinds of relata are appropriate objects of moral blame. If these were Hume’s only grounds, this part of his argument would be flawed. This feature of putative moral reality does not seem to depend on the concept of morality alone, but on the particular content and character that Hume ascribes to morality. Kant, as it is well known, holds that the root of moral blameworthiness is that one’s internal maxim of action cannot be willed to hold as a law. And it is conceivable that certain combinations of internal attitudes, those corresponding to hypocrisy, for instance, be intrinsically morally blameworthy. However, I think that there is a different and more interesting reading of the first constraint. What is involved in the concept of morality, apart from its practical import, is authority, that is, that the practical import has the relevant grounds of correctness. Because of this, that of morality is a normative concept, one whose content can be fully specified only by mentioning certain distinctions of correctness – moral distinctions, in the present case. (Authority is grounded on normativity, on the possibility of correctness and incorrectness). Now, what could be the character and the source of such content? The primary character and the primary source, I mean? As Hume points out, such character and source both are determined by our situation with respect to the universe. That is, what determines the content of moral distinctions are actions, relations, attitudes of persons, and their contexts, to whom we take attitudes of approval and disapproval. It is only given such a content that some moral significance can be given to relations between internal actions of the mind. (And of course, no such significance can be given to relations merely between objects.) Therefore, moral authority and the moral views, attitudes of approval, on which it is grounded, involve the content or idea of certain relations exclusively between actions of the mind and external objects. Now, if we are realists, that is, if we think that morality consist of some real relation, such relation should be one which can hold only between mental actions and objects or the world, because this is conceptually mandatory of morality, on grounds of the character of its content. But then Hume can challenge the realist to point to any such real relation. Notice that while Hume is assuming that there are relations between actions of the mind and external objects and that they are exclusively between such actions and such objects – sensation and memory, primarily; but also pleasure and desire - this is consistent with his denial that they support a position of realism. The point is that such relations are, in the framework of Hume’s general philosophy, essentially subjective: they are in a metaphysical sense internal to awareness; and therefore they cannot support realism. (Ultimately, the argument relies on Hume’s generally internalist conception of mental activity and cognition. This may be a quite shaky ground.)

(c) Is and Ought Hume rounds up his argument against moral realism with a criticism of the idea of demonstrative morality. This criticism, while undoubtedly very influential, does not add anything substantial to what we have already seen. The target is again Clarke. Suppose that there are moral facts, and, correspondingly, moral true or false propositions. There will be relations among those propositions that are grounded only on their truth values, or on their internal structure. These are logical relations, just like those studied in propositional and in predicate logic. Logical validity is defined in term of consistency (a scheme is logically valid if its conclusion is inconsistent with the denial of its premises) and consistency is defined in terms of truth (of propositions possibly be true together). This applies also to moral truths, since the specific nature of contents are irrelevant. So, moral propositions, just because of their being true or false, can figure in logically valid schemes, like modus ponens or syllogistic inference, and can be the conclusions that follow from true premises. In this case, they can be known demonstratively. This is how Clarke expresses this ideal of moral demonstration: “And it is as absurd and blame-worthy, to mistake negligently plain right and wrong, that is, to understand the proportions of things in morality to be what they are not […] as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a man in arithmetical matters, ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal to four […] [he] is really guilty of an equal absurdity and inconsistency in practice; as he that in speculation denies the effect to owe anything to its cause, or the whole to be bigger than it part […] [he] is guilty of the very same unreasonabless and contradiction” (Clarke, 200)

Hume's rebuttal of demonstrative morality is rightly famous: “I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it”

Hume essentially indicts of invalidity any attempt to deduce moral conclusions from purely factual premises, because the conditions of identity of propositions or of predicates that underlie validity are violated. It is as if we wanted to infer by (pseudo) modus ponens in the following way: If (if p, then q) and r, then q ! Or, in pseudo-syllogistic form: All A are B' All B'' are C Thus, All A are C! were B' and B'' are not logically equivalent.

Hume, in effect, has in mind something simpler and more concrete. His view of demonstration is that of a relation among ideas, representations, that is intrinsic to their contents. If contents of ideas are changed, the demonstrative relations are changed as well. No matter what the exact way, Hume's grounds for rejecting the inference of ought from is are those that we have already considered, when discussing his rejection of moral knowledge, and, before that, of moral representations or truth-conditions. It is significant that Hume selects “ought” to give expression to the difference in content that is responsible for invalidity. This obviously points at his main reason for denying that moral thinking is representational or truth-conditional:

Morality is practical; it deals with what one ought to do, not with is true.

But it also hints at his main reason for denying that there are moral facts, moral reality:

Morality is normative; it consists of what ought to be, not of what is the case.

Now, of course, as a point about logical validity this is well taken. But one is left wondering whether this point adds anything to what we have already seen. Clarke would simply deny that there is any fallacy in moral demonstration, because he would deny that its premises are no- moral truths. It is only denial of moral truth and moral reality that gives support to Hume’s criticism. Furthermore, one wonders if logical validity is all there is to moral reasoning. We accept invalid arguments as cases of good reasoning (inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning). Thus, validity is an insufficient ground for discussion of practical and moral reasoning.

Hume, and antirealist in general, obviously do not ignore this, thus we may hold him, and the antirealists in general, to provide for a general not purely ad hominem, alternative to realistically understood moral reasoning. But what are the conceptual resources for thinking, in antirealist terms, of moral reasoning in general? The antirealist cannot in general get away so easily. He owes an explanation of how, if fundamental normative properties like those that make any mental action correct or incorrect are subjective, are expressions of mental stances or attitudes, moral thinking with a minimum of objectivity and rationality is at all possible. Therefore, we seem to have reached a standoff: Hume and moral antirealists in general are very clear minded about the distinctive, practical and normative character, of morality. But they fail to establish that it does not have to involve any real and objective aspect or ground. Furthermore, if they could establish such a result (and pending another explanation), we would be left without resources for giving an account of moral reasoning.