Table of Context

Development and International Relations Aalborg University 2008 Beyond Free and Fair

Aalborg, June 2008-06-30

Master Program Development and International Relations 10th Semester June 2008 Supervisor: Vibeke Andersson Beyond Free and Fair

-A change in standards. The European Observer Mission at the 2004 Malawi election

Thesis made by:

Michael Bjørn Poulsen (DK) ------

1 Abstract The world today, is a world filled with democracies dotting the landscapes on the planet. It was not always so, despite the fact that the ancient Greeks have monopolized the origins of democracy, the employment of democracy as a form of government is a rather new invention. Today democracy has become a well used phrase that covers all matters of sin, and is vigorously promoted. However, all democracies have one common trait: elections. This present thesis attempts to scrutinize the international election observers resent change in electoral standards, by devoting itself to answering the research question of: Why did the EU EOM abandon the term “free and fair” in the 2004 Malawi election, instead of a broader “will of the people and democracy progress” standard. The research question is attempted answered by focusing on one election in Malawi where to the European Union dispatched an election observer mission in 2004. The analysis of the case is divided into two separate parts, one descriptive and another exploratory. The two parts of the analysis is perceived each to provide a separate understanding of the change in standards, by applying Robert Dahl’s conceptual framework for democracy, to both standards, the thesis will illustrates which kind of democracy each standard is promoting. The descriptive part of the analysis describes the free and fair standard and the exploratory investigates the new standard. In order to bring nuances to the analysis a postcolonial perspective is applied together with theories of Soft power and Neo-liberalism.

Abbreviations/ Acronyms

 IR: International relations: a branch of the science, it deals with the study of foreign affairs of and relations among states within an international system  OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  DAC: Development Assistance Committee  UN: United Nations  CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  DEVE: European Parliament Committee on Development and cooperation  G8: "Group of Eight" or “Group of Seven + Russia” is an international forum for the governments of Italy, Japan, Canada, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.  WB: The World Bank  IMF: The International Monetary Fund  WTO: World Trade Organization  MCP: Malawi Congress Party  UDF: United Democratic Front  NCD: National Congress for Democracy  DPP: Democratic Progressive Party  MBC: Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation  ACP: African, Caribbean and Pacific states that are signatories of the Lomè convention, a trade for Aid agreement.  EU EOM: European Union Election Observation Mission  RP: Republican Party  NRP: New Republican Party  CotRoM: Constitution of the Republic of Malawi  ODIHR: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights  UDHR: Universal Declaration of Human Rights  RotCOG: Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group  UNDP: United Nations Development Program  TI: Transparency International, a global civil society organisation that monitors corruption  MEJN: Malawi Economic Justice Network  IPU: Inter-Parliamentary Council  EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement

Table of context

Title page 1

Abstract 2

Abbreviations/ Acronyms 3

Table of context 4

Why Elections? 6

Methodology 10 Aim of the thesis 10 Holistic case study 10 The choice of case 10 Reliability and Validity 12 The argument for choice of theories 12 Casual diagram of the thesis 15 Explanation of thesis causal figure 15 Structure of the thesis 15 Delimitations 16 Definition of central concepts 17 Good governance concept 17 The Free and fair concept 18 The terminology of “will of the people and democracy progress” in elections 20

Theoretical framework 21 Neo-liberalism and Soft power 21 Soft Power is attractive 24 A note on absolute and relative gains 26 Postcolonialism 26 A note on eurocentricity 29 Postcolonialism and good governance 30 Critique of Postcolonialism 31 Robert Dahl’s conceptual framework for Democracy 32

The contextual and Historical Background of Elections in Malawi 37 The gloomy history of Malawi 37 Autocracy clad in democracy 37 A way in through the ACP states 38 Democracy in the making the 1994 and 1999 Malawi elections 39 The 2004 Elections 41 The election observed 42 Development in Malawi 46 Manoeuvring for rent seeking in Malawi Politics 47 Malawi’s electorally roundabout 48

Analysis 49 Readers guide to the analysis 49 Descriptive part of the analysis 49 Into a world of free and fair 49 Free and fair applied in the 2004 election 51

Summary of the findings 53 Exploratory part of the analysis 53 Robert Dahl and the EU EOM assessment 53 The new rhetoric in commenting on elections by the EU EOM 54 New standards assessed 56 The attraction of elections 57 Post colonial? Or post independence? 57 The burden of the white man 58 A Neo–liberalist perspective 59 Summary of the exploratory part 60 Comparing the descriptive and the exploratory parts 61

Conclusion 62

Bibliography 63 Printed literature 63 Online databases 65

Appendix 68 Appendix 1 68 Appendix 2 69 Appendix 3 70

Figure 1 Causal correlation of the thesis 15

Table 1 Why institutions are necessary in states that are aspiring to become polyarchies. 35 Table 2 Regional votes in the Malawi general election 1994. 40 Table 3 regional votes in the Malawi general election 1999 40 Table 4 regional votes in the Malawi general election 2004 41

Why Elections?

“ The world must be made safe for democracy” was the words of the American President Woodrow Wilson just before he committed America to the Allied side of World war one. And the focus on democracy from the Western world has newer since diminished. Much speaks in favor of the democratic form of government, it is an open forum wherein disputes can be resolved without the desperate grasping for violent solutions and despots have a harder time avoiding being held accountable.

Democracy has long been viewed as the most acceptable form of government for both the international community and for the citizens of the Western nations. The promotion of democracy has been a keystone in many Western nations’ agenda for the last couple of decades.

As stated above much hope is pinned on the notion of democracy, and it has been aggressively promoted for almost two decades on the non democratic states of the world. To the extent, that today 62% of the world governments are considered democracies. Furthermore older institutions, such as monarchies, are considered antique, and institutions of communism and fascism have been utterly discredited (Zakaria 2003: 13). Democracies are founded on elections they are an inescapable part of the institution and cannot survive without it. To the extend today, that if nations fail to hold a competitive multiparty election we call them undemocratic (Zakaria 2003: 19). The growth of the acceptance of democracies worldwide has meant a growing focus on elections, in fact it has become acceptable that intergovernmental organizations routinely monitor elections under the clause of promoting democracies (Bjornlund 2004: 31). This suggests a strange condition of cross-boundary involvement in a clearly domestic affair (Santa.Cruz 2005: xi). Part of the reason for that is the international legitimacy that elections can create. That is based on international contracts, most notably The Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that the “will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government” as “expressed in periodic and genuine elections” (UDHR Article 21. 3). Other intergovernmental organizations have adopted the standard and thereby granting even more legitimacy to the act of elections. Furthermore elections can contribute to respect and compliance with other international rights. In addition competitive elections can create significant changes to a struggling democratic regime without violence. And elections can for developing nations be a catalyst in generating citizen involvement in public

affairs, including citizen groups that have previously been excluded. And lastly Elections create the framework for political competiveness that would often have been more violent without elections. In short elections generate international and internal legitimacy and domestic stability (Bjorndlund 2004: 34). Nonetheless, elections have not, by default, been successful in creating democracies. There are unfortunate examples where elections have not contributed to the promotion of democracy, even when taken into consideration that there have been a tendency for a deliberate transition from authoritarianism towards a democratic governing system. This is due to the inherit nature of elections, which are conflict-ridden, given that election provide the battlefield for state control, it can work as a valve letting the people fight with arguments within rules and procedures that otherwise would not be possible in an autocratic regime. However, elections are also an instigator of strife especially in developing democracies. There are good examples of where elections have been accused of exacerbate conflicts and undermining the democratic process they try to promote. This can be argued, was the case in Rwanda where the very prospect of an election has been a factor in the genocide there (Reilly 2008: 164) Additionally post conflict elections have had the unfortunate effect that they have resulted in the states elite being cemented in power (Zakaria 2003: 19), effectually precluding a rule by the people. Another critique of elections is that it has not yielded a clear success in all cases. It is true that consolidated democracies has been less prone to large scale wars, but states, that are going through the process of becoming democracies, are more prone to war both internally and externally (Reilly 2008: 163). Elections in new democracies have had an unfortunately tendency to entrench a political landscape in the favour an “us against them” atmosphere, leading to a political zero-sum game, which can initiate a long term political exclusion of minorities. This happens when elections create a hegemonic control over the political apparatus including the monopoly of force (Ibid).

However, regular elections can still become a measure stone for approval of a government or a president’s policy and thereby giving legitimacy for the continual of old policies or the legitimacy of new policies (Geisler 1993: 613). This is deemed especially important in developing democracies that have undergone a time of turbulence. Furthermore elections, which lead to democracy, are increasingly seen as the silver bullet for international terrorism (Zakaria 2003: 13). What's more, elections are increasingly used as a gate keeper for aid organizations, since elections can grant a regime a clean bill of health, which makes it legitimate for donor

organizations to begin funding development initiatives. As an example the EU has promised the state of Malawi € 451 millions in the period 2008-13 in donor aid (EC 2008), provided that Malawi continue it is dedication to development (Country Strategy Paper 2008. 1-2).

Elections have become more and more important for both the furthering of the democratic idea and the bettering of the lives of people in developing countries. Developing nations often vowed themselves to the idea of democracy, yet some governments have often been implicated in making use of the state machinery in their own favor, which makes the idea of democracy seems hollow. In that case election monitors assume the role, in elections, of a democracy police (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 76 & Geisler 1993: 613).

Election monitors have, in the past, come from different organizations ranging from supranational sponsors in the form of election monitors from the UN OSCE, Commonwealth nations, to local monitors from native civil rights groups. All international observers monitor the conduct of both state and voters at elections. Where after they pass judgment on the proceedings of the election, based on standards and practices that they assume is strengthening the democratic institutions by granting legitimacy to the elected government. But, most importantly, observes and monitors register if the actions of the voters correspond with the idea of democracy.

It was with this in mind that the European Union dispatched an election monitoring mission (EOM) to the state of Malawi in Southern Africa. The EU have through its ACP partners committed itself to monitor elections for building capacity and legitimacy as part of an overall EU agenda on promoting good governance in developing states (EU EOM 2004: 5-6 & EC 2008).

One of the guidelines, that was used in promoting democracy, is the notion of a free and fair election. As Huntington proclaims: “Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non1” (Huntington Quoted in Zakaria 2003: 7). Free and fair elections have been seen as the standard norm to enter into the society of democracies. Free and fair elections were seen as the standard election criterion for an election result granting legitimacy towards the new government. However, the term “free and fair” has been exposed to criticism to the extent that the notion is now not always used by election observers. -So is the meaning of

1 Sine qua non: is a Latin legal term that translates as: "(a condition) without which it could not be" or "but for..." Huntington here refers to democracy cannot be without elections.

elections diminished or is it democracy, or has something else happened that have made the notion obsolete? Or has there simply been created a better alternative?

Election monitors and elections observers from international organizations have increasingly been abandoning the free and fair notion, for the benefit of more vague standards that have made statements that relate more to an intention of the voters or statements of whether an election have been conducted along the lines in the spirit of democracy or according to the will the voters.

The European Union election observer mission to the 2004 Malawi election is an example of this, they did not apply the free and fair standard, and in fact very strongly objected to the former president Muluzi statement that the EU EOM had proclaimed the elections for free and fair (EU EOM 2004: 46).

On the above puzzlement, I will, for this project operate with this research question: Why did the EU EOM abandon the term “free and fair” in the 2004 Malawi election, instead of a broader “will of the people and democracy progress” standard.

Methodology This methodology chapter will look at the overall structure of the thesis and pays especial attention to some definitions of some of the major terms and concepts that are used in the thesis. I will furthermore describe the clarification and justification of each chapter and their application in the thesis. Thereafter the thesis’ delimitations will be assessed.

Aim of the thesis Following a deduction from the previous chapter, the aim of the thesis is to analyze the impact on democracy in developing states, from the change from the free and fair standard to a broader spectrum of progress towards democracy by election monitors. Essentially what impact does the change in standards of evaluation elections have on the developing democracies? To cover the field of research the thesis’s analysis is divided into two parts: a descriptive and an exploratory. The descriptive part will try to map out the developing democracies elections and the use of the free and fair standard, but also to situate the practice of the free and fair standard within the context that it was/is applied. The explanatory part is the main focus of the analysis where the focus will be placed on the case where the different standard is applied. Then a comparing of the two standards is made. Both the descriptive and the explanatory are considered equally important in regards to the research question.

Holistic case study The thesis makes use of a case study design based on empirical data in order to try to generalize the findings of the project into a wider debate on elections and democracy. The thesis makes use of mutually supplementing theories which are used instrumentally to explore a greater understanding and explanation of the descriptive background and the empirical case.

The choice of case In the processes of choosing a case several considerations have been taken into consideration. It was important to choose a case that did not have special conditions, that did not allow it to use to be generalized into a larger debate but on the other hand it were not to be a case, that falls into the “goodness of fit category” where the case is chosen on the basis of its applicability. The choice of Malawi as a case was made due to its history which has followed the general history of

developing democracies that have undergone a political liberalization and economic liberalization in tandem. Prior to that, Malawi has felt the currents from the ending of the cold war which created a sudden demand for multi party democracy and an open market economic. Furthermore by the fact that the regional superpower of South Africa abolished apartheid the expectations were high for the stability and peace in the region that would generate democratic governance and economic development (Matlosa 2008: 119). Furthermore the choice of Malawi as a representative of good governance through elections has been made on the basis of the stats inconspicuous nature, meaning it is neither a failed state, meaning a state, which state apparatus has collapsed and are unable to the further its own development, nor a state which shows a significant progress towards democracy. Malawi falls in between those two categories, as many of the states in Africa do. Furthermore Malawi shares much of the common history of most developing states, especially those found in Africa. In additions Malawi is blessed with few ethnic and religious clashes2, although they most likely provide a variable, but it is estimated that the impact of religion and Malawi’s ethnic diversity is not significant enough to influence the analysis3.

In regards to the Malawi elections, its election history shows that Malawi has held elections in 1994 and 1999 where the free and fair standard has been applied, and in the 2004 election the free and fair standard was changed to a broader terminology by some of the international observers. The 2004 observer delegations were dispatch from the EU, the AU, EISA and the Commonwealth of Nations. The delegations from the AU and EISA’s significance is somewhat diminish in the thesis due to the size of their delegations and their influence on the donor community in regards to continual good governance funding, furthermore the EU is a donor of both agencies (EISA 2008 c & EU 2005: 9). Furthermore the EU delegation assessments is emphasise due to the large amount of donor aid that Malawi is dependent on receiving from the EU (EU 2006: 31 & Appendix No. 1). It is here important to note that the EU EOM mission, makes use of the same methodology and principles that is employed by the OSCE’s ODIHR (Appendix No.2), and therefore the use of

2The worse religious fear noted was that the Christian majority would find itself in a Muslim state during Bakili Muluzi presidency however, his chosen successor Bingu wa Mutharika is a Catholic Christian. In regard to the Ethnic diversity of Malawi, one must assess that Malawi is a homogenous nation despite the fact the there a different ethnic groupings hold majority in separate regions then the recent success for political parties to broaden their voter base into other ethnic groups speak of a growing Malawi national identity (Kaspin 1995: 602) 3 Kalipeni’s article from 1997 stipulated that ethnic affiliation did not become a variable in the 1994 Malawi election (Kalipeni 1997: 154).

OSCE handbook for elections is applied, as well as material gathered from both the OSCE and the ODIHR online databases used, despite the fact the they normally only operate within OSCE states. On the basis of the above reflections Malawi would be an ideal case, as a representative for southern Africa’s development progress through elections.

Reliability and Validity Although the case that I make use of are, of cause, in no way representatives of the entire developing world that make use of elections monitors, however, the case will be able to highlight areas that need further consideration in regard to democracy promotion. As the analysis will show there are large cultural, economic and historical differences to be taken into consideration; however, the developing discourse that lays the foundation for the use of observers and monitors at elections to influence the establishment of democracies is in this thesis an area of interest. Some arguments or speculations might have more or less relevance for specific states, but in general terms the thesis should be able to be generalized into any democratic progress considerations. The generalization of the paper is specifically made possible through the underlying ideology of democracy exercise by the monitoring organizations. And likewise with the practices that they, to a large extend, make use of in promoting democracy. The projects main focus on the role of election monitors and elections can distort the greater picture of democracy development; however, the focus on election observers and monitors in the thesis is there, in order to explore the research field thoroughly.

The argument for choice of theories There are many different concepts of democratic theory and how to apply it. Even within the Western hemisphere there exists different notion’s of what democracy is and how one is to analyze democracy. Democracy has become progressively more important since the increase of democracy is rising after the cold war, where democratic rule have been increasingly imposed by the Western world on the developing world. Generally the exported version of democracy has been the European liberal model, which has been mostly unsuccessfully applied to Africa in particular (Carew 2006:22). The debate on democracies is a key concept in the thesis and is held up to Robert Dahl’s ideal democracy. An ideal democracy framework is used in order to avoid grounding the thesis’

ontological perspective in a Western concept of what democracy is, in this I am working on the assumption that the concept of democracy is dominated by a Western approach and an Western kind of thinking (Hede 2004: 185 & Keane 2005: 4-5), something that could be an obstacle for the development of the South. The Western concept of democracy is very much linked to the liberal democracy where the focus areas are the individual’s rights, and there is much emphasis on the competitive political system of different parties, universal suffrage and elections, the Western concept of democracy consider any deviant from the focus areas abnormal (Rothchield 2000: 11). By evaluating which elements are sought out by elections monitors in promoting election I will be able to identify which elements of democracy they are foremost promoting. Therefore the concept of democracy is not defined beforehand, but becomes conceptualized through the guidelines that the election monitors evaluate elections. The definition will then aimed at becoming as non- positivistic ontological as possible.

In regard to democratic theory the conceptualized framework made by Robert Dahl is used as an ideal democracy, through his seven assumptions and minimum of institutions (Hede 2004: 186). It is with Dahl’s assumptions and institutions in mind that we look upon the recommendations and remarks of the monitor organizations, in order to see which assumptions and which institutions they emphasis and if it can promote democracy and good governance. However, in the concept of the ideal democracy lies the notion that there is an end-game evolutionary goal but it is non achievable, how close or how far then becomes a somewhat normative judgement. Using Dahl’s concepts on democracies helps the descriptive and the explanatory parts in trying to decipher what, if any, kind of democracy election monitors are trying to promote.

Neo-liberalism theory is applied in the thesis to provide an understanding of how states act within the realm of international politics. It helps to describe and understand the actions or demands of governments and large institutions such as election observer’s organizations. It also aid’s in describing why states cooperate and why the cooperation sometimes does not work. Neo- liberalism is applied in the exploratory part of the analysis. Soft power as a branch off the neo-liberal theory, applied to illustrate the actions of the monitor organisations that generally are used by Western democracies in promoting democracy in developing states. The choice of theory demonstrates a belief there are actors besides states as active entities in world politics. The soft power concepts explanatory power makes it applicable to

the exploratory part the analysis. It is, however, important to note that it is an IR theory that is based on a state–centric approach and thereafter has expanded into the field of non-state actors, they are, however, still secondary to states (Keohane 1989: 8). Focuses tent to be prone to analyzing IR from a top down perspective neglecting a bottom up perspectives (Dunne 2001: 170).

Postcolonialism theory helps providing an alternative to the state-centric and top down perspective of soft power and neo-liberalism (Dirlik 2005: 561-563), which has been dominated by Western scholars and thereby Western thinking. Postcolonialism is useful when we in the descriptive and the exploratory part of the thesis challenge some of the core concepts in development, such as democracy, good governance and free and fair. Postcolonialism will be applied alongside Soft power Neo-liberalism in both the exploratory and descriptive part of the analysis. Postcolonialism helps to provide a more elaborate or alternative answer to IR then state diplomacy and threats by focusing on people, identities and resistance in connection between the North and the South in both colonial past and present (Abrahamsen 2007:111). Postcolonial theory is also a theory that works well with Soft Power and partly Neo-liberalism, since they all recognize that states and their people are increasingly interconnected on several levels of culture and economics (Abrahamsen 2003: 204). It is here important to notice that even if postcolonialism relies on the use of feminist, poststructuralist and postmodernist theories and perspectives, it is not the intention of this thesis to make use of those theories.

It is important to be aware that not any one theory are perceived to be able to provide an answer in regards to what is a right and what is a wrong assessment of democracy promotion. The theories that are applied to election monitoring are supposed to compliment each other in exploring the research field. It is furthermore not perceived as possible to provide one final answer to the research question as this is seen as non-existing, due to the fact that the thesis subscribe to an anti- foundational or post-positivistic epistemology in connection to the writer’s ontological perception (Baylis and Smith, 2001: 227), since the research in this thesis is made with the understanding that there is no value free research and that the writer cannot escape a eurocentric perception of the world; only attempt to be aware of it.

Casual diagram of the thesis Figure 1 Causal correlation of the thesis

Box 1 Box 2 Box. 3 The Free and Elections Democracy Fair Standard

Box. 4 A Broader Spectrum of Democracy Rhetoric

Explanation of thesis causal figure The above figure is meant as an illustration of the thoughts behind the analysis. Respectively box. 2 and 4 represent the descriptive and explanatory parts of the analysis. Elections are held, box 2 is the independent variable and democracy is the dependent variable. The effect of the free and fair standard is then assed in regard to democracy. In the explanatory part of the analysis Elections are held and box 4 is applied as an independent variable and then assessed on the dependent variable of democracy. The figure above represents the causal connection within the project, where the descriptive part is the top tree boxes. The descriptive part looks at elections (box. 1), where the free and fair standard has been used (box. 2) and then look at how that affected democracy in the state which held the election (box. 3). The explanatory part is the case study where box.2 is omitted so the causal connection becomes the boxes 1-4-3 where the change is that election monitors make use of at will of the people rhetoric. Then if there is a different outcome it ought to be able to provide a deeper understanding of the research field.

Structure of the thesis In the following a structure will outlined, through presenting each following chapter and what they contain. This is done in order to provide the reader with some overview of the different chapters in order to enhance the implied correlation between each chapter in accordance with the causal figure.

Chapter 1, the introduction, presents the research field of election observer’s promotion of democracy through the use of the free and fair standard and a more cautioned rhetoric of “will of the people”. Chapter 2 contains methodology and concepts that are deemed important to the thesis including the concepts of free and fair, will of the people and the concept of good governance. Chapter 3 present the theoretical framework applied in the thesis. There is a walkthrough of the elements of Neo-liberalism, Soft power and Postcolonialism that will be applied later in the thesis furthermore the good governance concept is viewed through the perspectives of postcolonialism and Neo-liberalism, then Robert Dahl’s apparatus of democracy identification is presented. Chapter 4 deals with the history of Malawian and a special emphasis will be placed on the Malawi elections and the observations made by the elections monitors present in addition Malawi’ s relationship with the EU through the ACP is briefly touched upon. Chapter 5 will present the descriptive part of the analysis which includes an operation of democracy based on how the election monitors perceive an election as a tool for the good governance concept as a modernisation concept. Then the free and fair standard on elections is applied in the Malawi context, for the promotion of democracy. This chapter will also present the critical aspects of the applicability of the free and fair notion. Chapter 6 will constitutes the exploratory part of the analysis where a judgment on the will of the people is applied by monitors in elections instead of a standard, and how, if any, change is made in how the election monitors perceive democracy through what they demand of an election? Chapter 7 contains the conclusion where the conclusion on both the exploratory and the descriptive part findings is generalized unto a wider debate on democracies in the developing world and the significance of elections.

Delimitations The thesis does unfortunately have some delimitation. These are mainly do to volume and time restriction but also due to focusing the thesis on a few variables that, of cause, do not exist independently of the reality surrounding them, but are deemed essential enough to allocate both reader and researcher attention towards.

One of the major delimitations is the disregard of the wider economic and politics behind the spreading of the idea of democracy. The incorporation of democracies into the developing world

and the linkage of democracies into the Western world economic marked has been a heated debate which is important for all developing stats. The debate, however essential, will not be analysed in this thesis. One could argue that the spreading of democracies is essential an instrument of a liberal thought that is projected by Westerns states, where one of the tools are election monitors. However as important this discussion is, the scope of the thesis does not allow for it to be included in its full scope. Also there are international elections monitors from states not affiliated with the Western hemisphere, such as observers from the African Union (AU), election monitors that seem closer linked to the notion of democracy then that of a liberal approach to economics accomplish through the creation of an open marked, introduced via the implementation of democracies.

Some discussion on democracy will not be given too much weight and so will only be mentioned in the passing; this is due to a desire to focus the project on the role of elections. Furthermore, there will be a specific focus on the European election monitoring organisation; this is mostly due to availability of accessible material, but also based on the fact that the EU is the largest trading partner of Malawi and that they are the larges observer mission by far at the latest 2004 Malawi election.

Definition of central concepts In the following I will try to create a common understanding of some key concepts that are use in the thesis

Good governance concept The concept of good governance is used to situate the discussion of monitors and observers at elections within the greater debate of democracies in the third world, and the developing of struggling democracies, through the good governance concept. Good governance is not, in this thesis, viewed as an –ism but more as an applicable tool for democracy promotion that can be influenced by how elections are conducted. Good governance will be viewed as a strategy of development wherein the conduct in elections plays a significant role. There are no universal agreements on what the concept of good governance entails. However, the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) came up with one of the first assumptions that paved the way for the concept of good development to be introduced into development literature as: “…a vital connection between open, democratic and accountable political systems, individual

rights and the effective and equitable operation of economic systems” (Hede 2006: 212). Good governance is, in this early stage, closely tied up with economic standards of dividing a nation’s resource between its citizens. However, DAC also links the concept with four dimensions: The Rule of Law: This demand a government to restrict its power to the limits of the law. A law that is managed by an independent judicial system, which has the right to investigate and pass judgement on the authorities and that all, are equal in the eyes of the law. Public sector management: This directs the public sector to serve and protect the people and be open to scrutiny. Controlling corruption: This dimension is included because it is seen as diametrically opposed to good governance and by including it, it grants credence to the cause of fighting corruption. Reducing excessive military expenditure: This dimension is, as with the previous, included due to the fact that it is an indicator on the other dimensions. Furthermore excessive military expenditure is seen as an instigator of conflicts, an unwise distribution of resources and a sign that the civil sector is not in full power (Hede 2006:213-215) It is important to notice that the OECD’s definition of the good governance concept is somewhat general and that makes them difficult to operational into concrete guidelines for the role of the state. This has a tendency to create an interpretation of the concept that mirrors the states own views on the role of the state functions. (Hede 2006: 217)

The Free and fair concept

Free and fair elections have become a cornerstone in elections rhetoric on assessments of transitional regimes through elections. Most people believe that observer’s sole task is to determine wheatear an election have been free and fair (Bjornlund 2004: 96). Likewise, has the press and media have focused very much on the free and fair concept. Yet, practices from different elections have shown that the term is not applied universally. The danger in the free and fair concept is that it suggests a dichotomy. An election can only pass or fail in meeting the terms of a free and fair election. This focus on free and fair has lead to international monitoring organizations creating bottom line judgements.

The term free and fair has been in use since 1978 when the United Nations Security Council created a process that would lead Namibia to independence through resolution 435 “The early independence of Namibia through free and fair elections under the supervisor and control of the United Nations” (UN Resolution 435).

However, it was first after the end of the cold war throughout the 1990s that the term became a household item among election observers. The Copenhagen document was one of the first to define the terms of free and fair elections. It tried to put forward standards and practices for determining if an election was free and fair (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 7 & Bjornlund 2004: 97). Although, the Copenhagen Document was aimed at the participating members of OSCE the document cleared the way for an assumption that elections should be conducted in a free and fair atmosphere, which the document linked together with the UN Human Rights Charter. The document’s international standards for free and fair were in essence that states should hold regular elections that would guarantee universal and equal suffrage and secure that votes were cast anonymously. Further standards were that at least the seats in one ruling chamber must be contested by an elections, that votes are counted and reported honesty, that anyone could run for office, that the executive power ensured all political campaigns including access to media and that those that did get elected also received office (CSCE 1990). Other papers and statements from various sources elaborated on the topic and monitors conducted during elections most notably Jørgen Elklit and Palle Svendsson but essentially the Copenhagen document conduct became a blueprint (ODIHR 2003: 7). The criteria for free and fair elections are separately defined by each organisation that dispatches the observers; however, the free and fair have generally been defined as where “freedom refers to voters’ opportunity to participate in the election without coercion or restrictions” (Elklit & Svensson 1996:35). Where on the other hand fairness in elections is defined as impartiality in the sense both of regularity (that rules apply equally to all parties) and reasonableness refers to a roughly even distribution of resources among participant in an election. This free and fairness has by observer missions been translated into requirements that an election must have in order to qualify as a free and fair election. Often this has been in the form of criteria’s that must be full filled in each different phase of elections, for example the requirement of freedom of movement (that voter are not restricted from the act of voting) has certain criteria’s that are evaluated such as is it possible for the people of the constituency to arrive at the polling booth free access without any obstacles (IPU 1994 & Bjornlund 2004: 118 -119). It mush here be mentioned that although is roughly the same overall criteria’s that most election observers have used then there are no universal standard for applying judgments on elections using the free and fair concept, however, for the sake of conformity, the term “free and fair standard” is applied in the thesis.

The terminology of “will of the people and democracy progress” in elections Today most monitoring organisations have omitted the phrase Free and Fair. The discontinue use of the Free and Fair standard was due to the fact that it seems definitive in its judgment, there where no room for leverage, it is either a free and fair election or it isn’t. Likewise The European Parliament Committee on Development and Cooperation (DEVE) concluded as early as 2001 that: “there are inherent difficulties with the use of the words Free and Fair as a verdict on an election” (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 14). Furthermore there was found to be linguistic traps within the free and fair standard. Instead the observers and monitors started using a different terminology in order to express a result of their monitoring efforts; often this takes the form of a concept of “will of the people”:

“We have deliberately chosen not to use or refer to the term “free and fair” for these elections because in a climate of intimidation and violence that occurred in the months prior to polling we don’t think it is an appropriate use of the term at any stage: rather, the question that we’ve asked ourselves is “does the result of the election have the legitimacy of reflecting the democratic will of the people of Zimbabwe?” (Alan Ferguson 2000)

The statement from Ferguson is by no means a single case; the EU mission to Nigeria in 1999 omitted the free and fair phrase and reflected instead on the will of the Nigerian people (Bjornlund 2004: 118) and the European handbook for election observers asks its members to focus on genuine elections (ODIHR 2003: 11). This is a result of abandoning the free and fair standard which the EU considers too narrow to assess an election process, the use of a genuine election concept the EU considers their chances better at accessing the will of the electorate process (ODIHR 2003: 3-4). The tendency is that the election observers have made use of various different semantic compromises in trying to omit the free and fair standard, often focusing of a larger picture i.e. focusing on the state of democracy after the election, or whether the election was the will of the people (Bjornlund 2004: 121). The EU election handbook for example makes a case for a standard of evaluation an election in accordance a standard of whether the election was a genuine electoral process (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 11). To makes maters further complicated the EU observer mission in Malawi do not make use of the wording but assesses the election in regard to whether the election made genuine democratic progress.

Theoretical framework

Neo-liberalism and Soft power Neo-liberalism is included due to the fact that it one of the theories that can provide an explanation for the driving force of democracy promotion in the third world by the West. Additionally, it provides an understanding of what motivates Western states to promote democracy through elections, where the individual’s choice are implement into concrete wishes. Neo-liberalism will be situated within the context of world politics and the promotion of the liberal democracies, but it also can provide a view on why cooperation, such as why “aid for democracy” cooperation, between states not always works. Neo-liberalism can present a proud pedigree within IR theory, it has branched out from the Liberalist theory, although it has changed significantly since then, it still share some notions on international politics. Mainly that states cannot achieve peace alone, there is need for some sort of cooperation between other states, and in deed desired for the possibility for peace and prosperity (Dunne, 2001: 163). Soft power derives partly from Neo-liberalism which is one of the contemporary mainstream approaches within IR. Neo–liberalism often focuses on foreign policies in promoting free trade or open markets and Western democratic values and institutions that mirrors the ones found in the West (Lamy 2001:183).

Neo-liberalism holds true to the liberal idea that states are actors in international politics which will act in order to maximize their interests in areas of international politics which is in a state of anarchy. However, neo-liberalism also maintains that there are more actors, then just states on the international scene (Lamy 2001: 190 & Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 106). These are often institutions that states delegate responsibility, states do this according to neo-liberalists, because they maintain the liberal notion that to improve a state influence and power, within the anarchy that all states exist in, co-operation is needed. Neo-liberalist also recognizes that other states might cheat in international politics. Therefore Neo-liberalists are not afraid to delegate loyalties and resources to institutions which are seen as beneficial to all participating states (ibid). Institutions that states see as mutually beneficial, in the Neo-liberalists sense, are those where participating states see advantages if they cooperate through participating. This has been the argument for the

success or compliance with international institutions that deals in economics and environment (Ibid) such as the WTO and the Kyoto Agreement. Neo-liberalism has furthermore, claimed responsibility for the democratic peace theory which states that democratic states are much more inclined to uphold human right for their citizens and that two democracies are less likely to go to war with each others (Lamy 2001: 188). This assumption is based on the idea that democracies promote free societies. A notion that is entertained by the European Union (EU) in promoting democracies: “Inevitable because the EU was formed partly to protect liberal values, so it is hardly surprising that we should think it appropriate to speak out. But it is also sensible for strategic reasons. Free societies tend not to fight one another or to be bad neighbors” (Patten 1999). The alignment between elections and democracy promotion from the Western world can credit its origin in the “democratic peace” thesis that laid the ground work for much of Bill Clinton’s policy and lately George Bush Jr.’s foreign policy. Essentially it stated that if you spread democracy there would be less interstate wars since two democracies were very unlikely to go to war against each other and that democracies where internally peaceful due to democratic institutions kept conflicts non-violent (Reilly 2008: 162). This argument has been adopted into a wider US policy comprising of liberalism, security and democracy (di Zerega 2001: 755). It is thought that if democracy is introduced then democratic governance will inevitably lead to a non-violent internal status and a lessen divide along religious, ethnic and cultural lines within the nation. And, most importantly democratic elections are the best way to generate governments, which does not pose a threat to others (Reilly 2008: 163).

Neo-liberalistic thoughts on both economic institutions and democratic promotion has been the applied policy of much of the Western world especially in regards to international trade, donor aid and Western world security policies (Ibid). One of the branches of neo-liberalist theories, that call themselves Neo-liberal institutionalism, concerns itself with a term they call Complex interdependence, where they argue that the world has many more actors then just large institutions and states. All actors, both large and small, have become more dependent on each others. The complex interdependence concept picture an international world with four characteristics:

1. Increasing linkage among states and non states actors.

2. A new agenda of international issues with no distinction between low and high politics4. 3. Recognition of multiple channels for interaction among actors across national boundaries. 4. The decline of the efficacy of military force as a tool of statecraft.” (Lamy 2001: 189).

For instance the increased focus on environment, which has grassroots supporters in many different states, has forced the issue to such a degree that it seem to surpassed in urgency over matters that fall into the high politics category. Essentially complex interdependence implies more cooperation between states and a friendlier attitude the states in-between (Jackson & Sørensen 2007: 106). Complex interdependence however, does cost states autonomy and the relations between two states are both beneficial but not necessarily symmetric in both gains and costs (Andersen 1991: 78). In total the neo-liberalists institutionalisms assumptions can be summed up as: States are important actors in international politics but not the only ones, but all actors seek to better their interests. States will always seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation and states are less concerned with the gains of other states when states work together. The biggest problem when states work together on different issues is the cheating of other states or non-compliance of some of the other states. And, finally, when states work together they will shift resources and loyalties to institutions if the states see a benefit in doing so in regards to increase their international position and to secure their international interests (Lamy 2001: 190), these include organizations that tries to minimize the cheating of other states in the international sphere, for instance argue that election monitoring organizations in fact monitor the state compliance with the democracy, so that the state do not cheat itself into a status that it did not attain through free and fair elections. Neo-liberalism has in the last couple of years been exposed to an increasing amount of criticism, mainly due to its merger of democracy and economics and the inadequacy of the combination of the two in producing a viable governance solutions and viable growth in the third world (De Angelis 2003: 16).

4 High and low politics is a term invented by Thomas Hobbs to describe a separations of issues in international politics, all that matters, in which the survival of the stat is at stake, is called High politics and all others is called low politics.

Soft Power is attractive Soft Power is in this thesis applied in order to understand the organizations that are trying to promote democracies, but also as a tool to explain why democracy is desired in states without. Soft Power will also be use in order to explain if the strategy of democracy promotion is working. Soft Power was a term that was coined in the late 1980s by Joseph Nye in his attempt to describe what was happening in the last period of the cold war. His general argument was that USA in its conflict with the USSR was doing better because it was superior at convincing other to want the same as the USA (Smith 2003: 181). Nye’s argument was that the USA was in a dominant position due to its capability in Soft Power and the more traditional Hard Power (the measure of ones military against another). The Soft and Hard power meant that the USA would keep its dominant position in international politics (Ibid).

“The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to do what you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten them with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be attracted to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks” (Nye 2004: 16)

The third way is the essence of Soft Power a concept created by Joseph Nye, one of the most influential authors within the neo-liberalist theory. Like neo-liberalist theory was an answer to Realism and Neo-Realism then Soft Power is an answer to the Realists Hard Power which concerns itself with IR in the measures of military might, population, absolute and relative gains (Lamy 2001:186). Joseph Nye dictated that a state’ Soft Power can derive from three sources: the first is the state’ culture (in regards to having a culture that others want to emulate). Secondly, soft power can come from the state’s political values. However, this is only a factor when the state liver up its own proclaimed values at home and aboard. A good example of this is in human rights, where the USA promotes human rights, but is increasingly seen as having less impact on human rights after the issues concerning the Guantanamo prison camp. However much of democracy promotion have rested on the fact that the American democracy have been seen as a form of government that other states desire. Thirdly, Soft Power can be accumulated from a state’ foreign policies. However, this can only happen if the policies are seen by others as legitimate and having moral authority (Nye 2006: 51). For instance, the American plan to spend 10 billion in Africa fighting

aids is a policy that generates Soft Power as well as being the right thing to do in regards to humanitarian reasons (Nye 2003: 75). It is important to notice that state’s strong economy, in it self, are not to be seen as Soft Power, but more as a generator of both Hard and Soft Power (Nye: 2006: 51).

Soft power works on the belief that power in IR is the ability to make other states do what you want them to do (Nye 2003: 74). The distinction between Hard and Soft Power is that where Hard Power makes entities do what they want, they do it through the use of military forces or the threat thereof. Soft Power concerns itself with getting other to do what you want through attraction rather then coercion. Or being able to dictate what other entities do through influencing what they want to do themselves (Nye 2003: 74). The Soft Power notion is centred on being able to push ones ideologies and culture onto other states5, but Soft Power also rests on the states policies and political ideas such as democracy and human rights (Smith 2002: 183 & Nye 2003: 75). However, it is important to note that Soft Power cannot be accumulated if ones policies culture and ideals are an attractive alternative to the opposing states culture, policies and ideals. Furthermore in the case of USA it has been noticed that a certain amount of attention and dialog with other states has historically been the most successful approach and that if the exports of ideals and culture do not happen under a somewhat benign way and where cooperation is perceived to be beneficial to all parties then, Soft Power can backfire and diminish the absolute gains of the state (Smith 2002: 179). Hard and soft power are not exclusive they are often found working together in union, however Soft Power is viewed, when working alone, as the not only the more creditable solution but also by far the cheapest solution (Nye 2004: 16). Soft power have often been critiqued that it is in fact not at power a government can fully control. Furthermore Soft Power often only helps to create an environment for policy chance, without having control of any details and often Soft Power can take years to produce a desired result (Nye 2004).

5 Culture as an ideology is in the case of the USA, something they exported through popcultuel institutions such as Hollywood, American music, CNN and the Internet to other states (Smith 2002: 181).

A note on absolute and relative gains It is important to know the concepts of absolute and relative gains in order to understand what matters to states when they interact with each other. Absolute and relative gains are a term that is well used in IR theory. It describes what states want from of international dealings. The term is often used by both Realist and Liberalist theorists. Absolute gains are the advantages a nation gains through power and influence through interstate cooperation. This is why states decide to cooperate with actors in the international system in order to increase their absolute gains. However, states will continuously keep an eye on other states to make sure that they do not gain too much influence and power (the relative gains) (Lamy 2001: 186). However, both the realist and liberalist branches of theorists acknowledge that states can (and will) cheat if cheating will generate them greater gains, this creates a situation of mistrust that international agencies and institutes moderate in order to minimize mistrust between nations. In regards to elections one can see that there is an advantage for states to become democracies6, their absolute gains would increase, but for the international society to recognise the state as democratic they make sure that the states do not cheat through the use of election monitors from international organisations. Neo-liberalist believes that if cheating does occur and “fail to follow the rules… to secure their national interests” (Lamy 2001: 186), then cooperation becomes impossible.

Postcolonialism Postcolonialism is employed in the thesis in order to create a more nuanced picture of elections, election monitors, democracy and good governance. Postcolonialism will enable the exploratory part of the analysis to challenge core concepts within the development paradigm. This is done to create a more nuance picture of democracy promotion and the standards they are judged by. The theory is an alternative to the top down perspective that Soft Power and Neo-liberalism represent. In addition, it provides an alternative perspective to the more Western orientated theories that dominate the IR theories and have grounded the discipline’s interpretation in “Western experiences and discursive practices” (Abrahamsen 2007: 111). The Postcolonialism take as opposed to Neo-liberalism not a state-centric view on IR, but attempts to focus on the: interconnectedness of the North and the South (Abrahamsen 2007: 122), thereby introducing new elements into IR.

6 An advantage for new democracies could be the access to foreign donor aid if elections are held.

Essentially Postcolonialism can be seen as: “…a critique of the spatial metaphors deployed by western institutions as well as a concern for the ‘experiences of speaking and writing by which dominant discourses come into being” (McEvan 2001: 95). One of the main focuses of postcolonialism is that it provides an opportunity to shift the IR focus towards resistance, people and identity away from the state-centric areas of foreign policy and military (Ibid). The historical background of postcolonialism theory is found in colonial literature analysis and stretches across as diverse fields as: cultural studies, development studies, anthropology, geography, history and politics (Abrahamsen 2007:112). The various different study areas included make the theory very flexible and present a new approach to IR (ibid.) One of the big benefits of applying postcolonialism is the fact that it often suggests a link between identity, culture, race or gender with the relationship of Western powers, most notably those that have had a history of colonialism (ibid.). Often the main intend of theorist of the discipline is to challenge or expose the Western perception created by the mainstream theories in IR or as Rita Abrahamsen frames it:

“ A key aim of much postcolonial writhing is to expose the extent to which mainstream scholarship and also frequently our `common sense´ understandings of the social world are firmly grounded in a particularly Western perspective, and thus to draw attention to the epistemological bases of Western power” (Abrahamsen 2007: 112).

Postcolonial theory have often centred itself on power, but whereas mainstream IR theory, including neo-liberalism, have placed power as deriving from the state, then Postcolonial theory makes use the concept of power of a much wider definition then the mainstream IR theories (Abrahamsen 2007: 115). The theory draws mainly on the Foucauldian understanding of discourses, where truth is produced through various discourses that: …establish dominant or hegemonic ways of understanding and representing social reality (Abrahamsen 2007: 115). In this approach discourses then become something that is not only describes the reality in which they function, they “shape the manner in which it is perceived and understood” (Ibid). Using these insights the theory then tries to explain how a certain way of comprehension has become dominant in IR7 (Ibid). For instance a postcolonialist approach to the idea of good governance, one would forego the intent of good governance, but instead postcolonialism would focus on the effects of good 7 An example of this is found in the Edward Said’ book Orientalism, when he attempts to explain how the east is represented in western literature, where after the epistemological perception is reproduced in eastern literature.

governance and explore the key concepts that are assumed to be implied as something we all take for granted (Abrahamsen 2007: 116). Furthermore the concepts that Postcolonialism often work with is scrutinize in their capability as uneven tools of power between the former colonies and the former colonizers (ibid.)

One of the key interest areas of Postcolonial theory is identity. Postcolonialism often works with identity from a power perspective, where the former colonized has to a large extend been influenced and their own imaged of themselves have shaped by the white man in his quest for colonization (Abrahamsen 2007: 117). This makes the search for the authentic identity of the colonized a mode of resistance. This identity that former colonized has acquired have had such an impact that it to some degree is still reproduced today: “in a multiplicity of practices, philosophies, and cultures imparted to and adopted by the colonized in more or less hybrid, or mixed, forms” (Ibid.)8. Here shines through the postcolonialism theorist because, the hybrid identity is not vied as a failure but as an example of the colonised in resistance since they managed to maintain some of their own identity and thereby showed the ability to defy foreign control (Ibid.). In the postcolonialism focus on identity lays also a critique since it seems one-sided in its critique of the West, where in fact an argument is that the colonized were not passive victims, and have become stronger actors in the face of oppression by the West (Abrahamsen 2003: 205). Furthermore it has been argued that the search for a strengthening of the self-identity in the pursuit of authenticity can be dangerous, since therein lies a danger of justifying ethnic violence or as Salman Rushdie phrase it: “Doesn’t the idea of pure cultures, in urgent need of being kept free from alien contamination lead us to inexorably towards apartheid, towards ethnic cleansing, towards the gas chamber?” (Abrahamsen 2007: 118).

Another focus area of postcononialism theory is resistance. In the above we deduced that the hybrid identity is linked to resistance. Postcolonialism theory often tries to turn hegemony9 upside down and look at how resistance is voiced out against the dominant power(s) (Abrahamsen 2007:119). However, where hybrid identity could be seen as resistance, postcolonial theorist also looks upon power and resistance within the system from a new perspective: “…postcolonial

8 When Abrahamsen speaks of “hybrid” she refers to the identity of the colonized as being mixed up with the cultures that have been imposed on them. 9 In IR studies Hegemony most often refers to one group is able to dictate policies upon other groups; hegemony is the description of how a dominant group can maintain domination.

theory illustrates the inadequacy of conventional binary oppositions between domination and resistance… but operates instead inside a structure of power that it both challenges and helps sustain” (Abrahamsen 2007: 120). This approach blurs the lines between the power ratio between the colonizer and the colonized and black vs. white (ibid.). The fact that power is blurred within a system or institution creates a new understanding of the system or institution since it is both enforced and challenged at the same time (Ibid.). Achille Mbembe makes use of the African states struggle for independence as an example:

While the demand for national struggles for independence effectively utilized Western discourses against Empire, the endorsement of the nation-state simultaneously ensured the survival of the colonial redrawing of the world map and enshrined the importance of the nation-state in the international system. (Mbembe 2001 Quoted in Abrahamsen 2007: 120).

The example illustrates that resistance helps bring down empires, but also helped maintain a artificial colonial divide of the developing world.

A note on eurocentricity Ziauddin Sarda, a London based professor of postcolonialism, describe the power of the West in its ability or power to define the world: “The real power of the West is not located in its economic muscle and technological might. Rather it resides in its power to define” (Sardar 1999: 44). Sarda believes that the West promotes a eurocentric “…dominant outlook of the planet” (Ibid.), that in turn dictates the use of the Western yardstick for measuring all social and political advances or lack thereof in all societies around the world, all10 the involved in the non-West sphere then actually reproduces the eurocentrism creating an inferior picture of themselves. That aids in maintaining a distort picture of the world or as Sardar phrases it: The non-West thus promotes Eurocentrism, …, and colludes in its own victimization as well as in maintaining the global system of inequality” (Sadar 1999: 44). This is done on because the West is dominating knowledge and thereby dominating the past, present and future of the non-West (Sadar 1999: 45, 47 & McEvan 2001: 95).

10 Sadar includes all those involved in the shaping of social and political progress in the non-west, that being: Intellectuals, academics, writers, thinkers, novelists, politicians and general decision makers (Sadar 1999: 44).

Eurocentricity is as an important concept to postcolonialism due to the fact that the epistemological perception continues eurocentrict practices that are viewed as oppressive to the people of the south. Postcolonial theorist identifies five different forms of eurocentricity (Harding 1998: 13), which can serve to distinguish the where the postcolonial writer can direct his analysis. The first two forms of eurocentricity are: “…overt and covet eurocentric beliefs and practices, are intentionally enacted by individuals” (Hastings 1998: 13), moral where the West argue from what they perceive to be a moral high ground. The third is institutional eurocentrism which even intentionally reproduces an eurocentric practices (Ibid.). The fourth form societal eurocentrism, is when institutional eurocentrism is held by a larger culture, that helps maintain the practices (ibid.). The fifth eurocentristic form is the civilizational or philosophic eurocentricism, it happens when societal eurocentrism becomes the norm for an entire civilization over a prolonged period of time (Hastings 1998: 14). The fifth form of eurocentricity is also the hardest to escape because one is trapped within ones own cultures understanding that has existence long enough to shape the meaning and understanding of concepts, of everyday life and common sense (Ibid.).

Postcolonialism and good governance Good governance is viewed by postcolonialist theorists as the continuation of the development discourse that the West has tried implemented in the third world since the 1950s. By articulating the third world as underdeveloped it managed to chance social reality so that the third world became framed as underdeveloped, illiterate and poorly managed (Abrahamsen 2003: 202 & McEvan 2001: 95). The discourse then justified the intervention of the West in the third world on the basis of trying to reshape and restructure practices in third world states; based on a moral superiority (red. the West had a duty to develop the third world). The West then began developing the third world according to Western practices, that then became emulated by the (re)colonized. However, after then end of the cold war a new intervention reason was needed, because underdevelopment had been too much associated with the payoffs to despots and authoritarian for support during the cold war. Western organizations began promoting good governance; however, a prerequisite for good governance’ aid was the introduction of the democracy requirement (Abrahamsen 2000: 43). The argument for democracy being a prerequisite for good governance was: “history suggests that political legitimacy and consensus are a precondition for sustainable development” (Abrahamsen 2003: 202). However, democracy

promotion and good governance have the same task at the development discourse, in the sense that it calls for intervention by the West to come to the rescue of the third world through restructure and reshape the third world. This is seen by postcolonial theorists’ writer as a continual of Western practices so that the West can maintain their present in the third world and the West can: Retain the moral high ground, the right to administer development to the south (Abrahamsen 2003: 203 & McEvean 2001: 95).

The way that good governance is viewed as an integrated part of democracy discourse has meant that the democracy that is being promoted is coupled to liberal economics policies of Western institutions. This has meant that: “…alternative conceptions of democracy are marginalized and silenced (Abrahamsen 2003: 203). Furthermore the West’ moral basis for intervening in developing states has effectuality protected the West from democratic scrutiny, in such a way that the Western states have been able to monopolize the concept of democracy only to include the liberal version (ibid.), the lace of focus on the Western states democracy have created an approach to good governance and democracy promotion as something that only takes place in developing states, in addition to the West being seen as democratic the institutions that have been created by the West11 have been overlooked in terms of democratic norms (Ibid.). This essentially means that the West is advocating domestic democracy but not international democracy. In this scenario the good governance discourse grants the West a right to intervene in developing states internal affairs, just as it was the case during the cold war, the good governance discourse can be seen as a way for the West to maintain and reproduce the international power balance in their favour (Abrahamsen 2003: 203). In this way then democracy can be viewed as a development tool that is everything but democratic, basically the “good governance agenda works materially to produce processes and forms of political subjugation that help maintain Western hegemony” (Abrahamsen 2003: 203).

Critique of Postcolonialism Postcolonialism has been severely critiqued as a theory; even to the point where it is debated whether it is can call itself a theory. The root of the dispute is that postcolonialism leaves out important issues within poverty and development. The understanding postcolonialist writers

11 Examples of international institutions that the West has created includes: the G8, WTO, IMF, WB and the Commonwealth.

generate are not providing a deeper understanding of how inequality fits into the equation (Abrahamsen 2003: 190). Postcolonialism is very applicable in illustrating an alternative perception of both power and history, but as a concept it has yet to change or suggest significant change in former colonials policies regarding resource distribution both on state level and at global level (Abrahamsen 2007: 120-121). Additionally, postcolonialism has been critiqued on the basis that it through the use of discourses which enables it to say something about general tendencies and overall policies but the theory has difficulties in addressing specific project and events: “…if it [Postcolonial studies] can overcome a tendency to lock into intellectual rather than practical projects” (Sylvester 1999: 703). Furthermore it has been critique that in the attempt to escape the Western stereotypes they often themselves fall into that category, since most of them are Western educated and works in the West. They have a poor claim of speaking for those who have no voice since they have little in common with, the uneducated, poor rural population of the non-West (Harding 1998: 191-192). In essences Postcolonial theory has had difficulties in coming up with alternative solutions to development issues and one can question if it really speaks for the non-West.

Robert Dahl’s conceptual framework for Democracy Robert Dahl’s framework of institutions and requirements is presented in order to have an apparatus to hold up the recommendations and comments that the election monitors organization describe, in order to determine whether an election has been free and fair or whether an election has been conducted so the result is the will of the people. The arguments the election observes make is held up against the standards of Dahl’s institutions and requirements to see if there are any correlation or lack there off. That should in turn enable us to understand, which kind of democracy is being promoted and if the change in standard (from free and fair to will of the people) has made a difference. Democracy as a concept is continual being defined today and have been defined very broadly in the past12. There is no set definition on democracy, however, democracy can be seen as a set of practices and principles that has become institutionalize and thereby protect the individual’s freedom (Economist 2006).

12 Most states wherein “democratic” is part of the state’ name would not be deemed democratic by Western states (die Deutsche Demokratische Republik, The Democratic Republic of the Congo and The Democratic People's Republic of Korea).

The word democracy derives from the Greek words of “demos” and “kratos” meaning people and rule (Hede 2006: 170). Together the words would mean rule by the people (Dahl 2006: 8). Democracy refers to a form of government where the people rule either through direct control or through their elected representatives (Hede 2006: 176). Robert Dahl a noted theorist of democracy which conceptual framework, of what the modern democracy is. Dahl’s democracy framework is very closely related to the liberal democracy (Hede 2006: 182) that election monitor organizations might be are promoting. Dahl believes that if the equality is desired then democracy is the only form of government. In trying to conceptualise the modern democracy Dahl has advanced six requirements that a state and its people should strive to live up to, in order to achieve a democratic state (Dahl 2006: 8).

The first requirement is the assumption that there must be effective participation where Dahl stipulates that before a policy is effectuated then all members of the demos must have had the chance to make their opinion known. The second requirement is equality in voting this is a condition that is required when a decision must be made, then every member of the demos must have equal opportunity to vote and all votes must be of equal value (one man one vote). The third requirement is gaining enlightened understanding where members of the demos must have equal opportunity to learning of alternatives to policies that are proposed for being debated for implementation. The fourth requirement is control of the agenda where the demos holding absolute control over which items are to be decides and which isn’t. This effectively means that items that have already been voted on can be reassessed if so the demos desires. The fifth requirement is inclusion which stipulates that all members of the demos would participate in the above requirements. The sixth requirement is fundamental rights which are an understanding that there are present fundamental rights installed, so the demos can participate in the above requirements. That all the people have undenialable rights to participate (Dahl 2006: 9-10).

Dahl is aware that this is an ideal constellation that he proposes through his requirements, since no system or society can fulfil all these requirements. However, the process that state goes through in order to try and fulfil these is what Dahl calls polyarchies’ (Hede 2006: 185).

The Polyarchy are essentially states that pay attention to their citizens and have institutional practices in place for the demos to participate in the democratic process (Hede 2006: 186). Dahl has put forward seven institutions which all need to be functional and in place before a nation can qualify to be a polyarchy (Dahl 1998: 84). The first institution need for a polyarchy to work is elected officials. Elected officials become necessary when the affairs become to large for direct demos rule, they (demos) then transfer their mandate to a elected official, in that way the demos can still maintain their “effective participation” and still, after having delegated power into an elected official, have their say on “control of the agenda”. The second institution needed is free, fair and frequent elections. The need for free, fair and frequent elections is based on the premises of equality which is stipulate in the second requirement where there is “equality in voting” this means that every member of the demos has equal opportunity to vote and that their vote carries the same value. This implies that the election must be free and fair. Dahl defines a free and fair election as: “To be free means that citizens can go to the polls without fear or reprisals; if they are to be fair, then all votes must be counted as equal” (Dahl 1998: 95). Dahl furthermore adds the concept of frequent elections due to the fact that it otherwise might be difficult for the demos to maintain control of the agenda through their representatives. The third institution is inclusive suffrage which stipulates that all members of the demos are allowed to participate in the voting process, this is mainly based on Dahl’s equality principle among humans, Dahl includes all people in his demos demographics. The exceptions being those that are deemed mentally unfit and those that are not residents but passing through the area where the decisions are makes by the demos, also there is included a minimum age of participation (Hede 2006: 185). The fourth institution Dahl proposes is that all citizens are entitled to run for and serve in elective office. Dahl’s all citizens are his demos although Dahl does make concessions in regard to age, where some office might require a higher age, then the one allowed in “inclusive suffrage”. Dahl justifies this institution because The fifth institution is the freedom of expression Dahl includes this institution on the basis that it would be impossible to participate in the political life if one did not have the opportunity to address issues without the fear of reprisals. Furthermore Dahl’ concept of freeness not only

include the right to speak out but also the right to hear which is essential to “gaining enlightened understanding”. The sixth institution is alternative information which is deemed necessary for “gaining enlightened understanding” the institution relies on the fact that the demos have a need for more then one source of information especially if the one source present is controlled by one fraction. The seventh institution is independent associations which become important for members of the demos in order to pursue their special interest in between elections they become the source of gaining enlightened understanding through debating policies. These demos must then have the right to form interest groups (political parties, interest groups and organizations) (Dahl 1998: 98 & Dahl 2006: 10-14 & Hede 2006: 185).

Table 1 Why institutions are necessary in states that are aspiring to become polyarchies.

In a unit as large as a country, these political institutions of are necessary to satisfy the following polyarchal democracy… democratic criteria: 1. Elected representatives … Effective participation Control of the agenda 2. Free, fair, and frequent elections … Voting equality Control of the agenda 3. Freedom of expression … Effective participation Enlightened understanding Control of the agenda 4. Alternative information … Effective participation Enlightened understanding Control of the agenda 5. Associational autonomy … Effective participation Enlightened understanding Control of the agenda

6. Inclusive citizenship … Full inclusion

(Adapted from Nye, 1998 p. 92)

The above table shows the correlation between Dahl’s six assumptions and his seven institutions that are necessary for a polyarchy.

Dahl’s conceptual framework of assumptions or standards and those institutions that he deems necessary for a polyarchy to thrive are very much connected to the act of elections. However, Dahl emphasis that institutions alone are not what make a democracy there has to be a continual democratic process, not only in time of elections (Dahl 1998: 105).

The contextual and Historical Background of Elections in Malawi This chapter seeks to situate Malawi as a developing state that have first been exposed to the process of democratization through several elections, first in the name of development then according to the concept of good governance. We begin with an outline of Malawi’s challenging path towards a democratic statehood, with special emphasise on Malawi’s elections. Then the international observer’s assessment on the Malawi elections of 1994 1999 and the 2004 elections is presented. Then we chart some of the progress, or lack thereof, of development in Malawi.

The gloomy history of Malawi Malawi has a gloomy entrance into the international society. The area where present day Malawi is located was discovered and opened up by the Europeans through David Livingstone, and soon thereafter the area draw attention through the large scale slave trade. Through fear of increasingly Portuguese annexation, the British proclaimed the Shire Highlands Protectorate in 1889 and in 1891 created the British Central African Protectorate known as Nyasaland until 1964 when it became known as Malawi, the Nyasaland protectorate formed the boarders of present-day Malawi (EU EOM 2004: 7). British rule was somewhat trouble free (seen from point of view of the Europeans) until a small rebellion in 1915 took place. The rebellion was easily suppressed, but it did ignite a liberation aspiration among the native Malawians (Ibid.). The British proclaim Nyasaland a state within the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 195313 under strong protests, which would eventually lead to the independence from British rule 1964.

Autocracy clad in democracy Malawi created its first political party, the Nyasaland African Congress, in 1944. The party became active in the liberation movement and with Kamuzu Banda taking over the party leadership in 1958 the party took on a more radical approach in their demands. Banda pushed the British to declare a state of emergency in 1960 where he was arrested until independences (EU EOM 2004: 7).

13 The Federation split up in 1964 and became tree separate states, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Banda quickly gained power through, the renamed Nyasaland African Congress, Malawi Congress Party (MCP). And subsequently won Malawi’s first national elections in 1961, and although the election was held as multi party elections only the MCP was elected into parliament and Banda became president. Banda soon began to consolidate his power –first by chancing the Malawi constitution, making him President for life, then by prohibiting the multi party elections, making Malawi into a de facto one party state until the election in 1994, until then the MCP dominated the political scene (EU EOM 2004: 7).

A way in through the ACP states Malawi is a member of the ACP states and through beneficial trade agreement with the EU. Malawi receives aid in form of good governance advocacy aid, and the EU is the single most important trading partner that Maalwi has, in 2007 it was estimated that the EU absorbs 40% of Malawi’s export, and the Director of Trade in the Minister of Industry H. Maindindi said that:

“ … European countries through the European Union and bilaterally had been central to the country’s progress on a number of fronts. But worth mentioning for this meeting [Meeting on the re-negotiating of Malawi trade relationship within the ACP] is the development and technical assistance, not withstanding that they are the number one destination for Malawi exports.”(MEJN 2007: 4)

The EU focuses on capacity building in its ACP partner states, this very much includes political legitimacy through free elections (EU COM 2006: 8 & EC 2008), therefore is it naturally to find EU representatives to an election in Malawi. The EU creates criteria’s for each stat to be made by the state, as a condition for ACP trade (EU COM 2006: 5) however, the EU do point out that: “the process of democratic governance … cannot be imposed from outside. In relations between the partner countries and donors it is vital that the ownership of the reform [such as elections] processes be respected”. The EU however, does point out that: “The donors do however have an important role to play by developing incentives-based approaches” (Ibid). The EU and representatives from the Commonwealth Nations were invited, by the MEC, to the last tree elections in Malawi in order to provide monitors and observers (AfriMAP 2005: 3). The European Union send off a European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) in response to the MEC request for the 2004 election, its mission was to assess the election process according to international standards, to do so the EU EOM fielded both a long and short term observer teams to observe the 2004 election (EU EOM). Within both the long and the short term

observers groups were there members from other ACP states as a part of the EU delegation (EU EOM 2004: 45). The EU has been sending EOM’s to elections all over the world under their good neighbours program they has since 2000 deployed over 60 EOM’s to all continents. In order to:

“Election observation is a vital component of European Union activities to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law worldwide. Election observation can contribute to strengthening democratic institutions, build public confidence in electoral processes and help deter fraud, intimidation and violence. Election observation also serves to reinforce other key European Union foreign policy objectives, notably peacebuilding.” (EC 2008 a)

Furthermore it is customary to present a rapport of a observer missions findings after the election, where recommendations and a assessment is made on the observed election (Bjornlund 2004: 131 & Carothers 2004: 83).

Democracy in the making the 1994 and 1999 Malawi elections Banda was eventually forced to hold a referendum on introducing multiparty elections again,14 by pressure from donor states, the church and two revival political parties, the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), such a referendum was held in 1993 which fell out in favour of UDF and the AFORD. In 1994 elections were held, it is important to notice the international community actively advocated a change towards a more democratic rule through the use of withholding aid: “The democratic process was encourage by the international donor community which demanded democratic reforms in return for aid” (EU EOM 2004: 7). This was an abrupt turn in attitude from the donor community, since it had been a stout supporter of Banda during the cold war (Van Donge 1995: 231). The 1994 elections were essentially an election between UDF, MCP and the AFORD. The tree parties were completely dominant in the election, leaving no room for other candidates or alternative political parties. It was quickly realized that the different parties had each their own power bastions UDF controlled the south, MCP the centre and the AFORD controlled totally the northern part of Malawi.

Table 2 Regional votes in the Malawi general election 1994. 14 Elections were held in 1983, 1987 and again in 1992. However, these elections were not multiparty elections, and all candidates had to be a member of the MCP in order to run for office.

(Copied from EU OEM 2004: 8)

As seen in figure 3. There is a strong consistency between regions and the different political parties would indicate that each political party holds its own heartland. The UDF won both the presidential post for Bakili Muluzi and became the biggest party in the Malawi congress. Muluzi created a coalition government with the other former opposition party AFORD. However, AFORD was forced out of the government in 1996 by Muluzi who managed to persuade several individuals, through the offers of patronage, into backing his government so that he could maintain his majority rule in the parliament (Wiseman 2000: 638). The AFORD and the MCP hoped to win the election in 1999. Nevertheless, Muluzi was re-elected, and the AFORD joined forces with the MCP party in an unsuccessful attempt to have the election judged invalid (CEE 2007). After the election it came out that the UDF had made extensive use of government finance and property during the election –this ranged from using ministerial cars, to dominating the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) by ignoring the AFORD and MCP’ messages throughout the campaign. Furthermore the UDF was able to present local dignitaries with cash and community projects (Wiseman 2000: 642).

Table 3 regional votes in the Malawi general election 1999

(Copied from EU OEM 2004: 9)

The time between the first multi-party election in 1994 and in 1999 the ruling party worked hard at changing the electorate laws in their favour. The attempts were mostly resisted in parliament by

the opposition parties or by local NGO or the donor community which was paid a significant part of the election budget (Wiseman 2000: 638). However the UDF succeeded in appointing its supporters in the election committee and most successfully they managed to create more electoral districts in the UDF heartland (Wiseman 2000: 639).

The 2004 Elections Prior to the 2004 elections there were several irregularities, for example the then presiding president Muluzi tried in vain to sway public opinion towards a referendum on extending his term of office that proved unsuccessful, the UDF then tried to pass a bill in the Malawi parliament that would allow Muluzi to run for a third term, the motion was turned down with only a tree vote majority (EU EOM 2004: 7). Even before Election Day the leader of a seven party coalition Gwanda Chakuamba petitioned the MEC to postpone the election since they questioned the reason for printing 1,3 more ballots’ then there was registered voters (Maroleng 2004: 77), the election was thereafter postponed a week and the extra ballots were confiscated (ibid.). President Muluzi chose the 70-year old wa Mutharika as the UDF presidential candidate, since he was unable to run himself hawing lost the referendum of extending the presidential term to tree. In stead he continued as head of UDF and it is widely believed that Muluzi thought that he could, through wa Mutharika, rule from behind the throne and at the same time avoid corruption charges (Maroleng 2004: 79).

Table 4 regional votes in the Malawi general election 2004

(Copied from EU OEM 2004: 9) The winner of the 2004 election was the chosen UDF candidate Bingu wa Mutharika, however, the UDF was forced to create a correlation government with the National Democratic Party in order to achieve majority in the parliament. President Mutharika introduced an anticorruption campaign that succeeded in alienated his own party UDF and Mutharika created his own party the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and has

since then faced numerous allegations of corruption and lack of cooperation from his vice president whom Mutharika unsuccessful tried to fire and in 2006 has accused the vice president of treason (CEE 2007).

The election observed During the 2004 elections there were some points of concern form international monitoring organizations15. Most of the observers sent the 2004 Malawi election was short term observers, only the EU OEM fielded observers for long term observation prior to the election16 (EISA 2004b & RotCOG 2004: 6 & AU 2004: 3). The largest delegations of international observers were from the EU who fielded 22 long term observers and 53 short term observers. The distinction of long and short term observer is made in recognition of the fact that to observe an election, there is more to be observed in an election then just the Election Day (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 16), it is equally important to monitor the election campaign in order to assess the election according to election standards, however, the practice of long term observers is a resent addition to international election monitoring (Carothers 1997: 21). The EU EOM makes use of eight principles that needs to be fulfilled in order to be able to declare an election as a “genuine election process” (OSCE/ODIHR 2007:15), this is judged from principles taken from both the Copenhagen document, but also from the Universal declaration on human rights, which the EU election handbook summarise in eight principles (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 82-85 & Bjornlund 2004: 118). However, the EU do acknowledge that the election that they are passing judgment on need to be judged in the context that is held (Bjornlund 2004: 98-99). The EU EOM had some reservations after the election. They found that the MEC had not handled the voter registration segment of the election acceptable. This was mainly due to insufficient resources available, for example in the form of standardise voter application forms. Furthermore the entire voter registration process was hampered by the political turmoil of the leaving president in trying to secure a tried term (EU EOM 2004: 15). In addition, there were some areas in which the EU EOM found that the training of the local MEC staff was in some cases not adequate to handle invalid ballots and flawed voter registration (ibid.), furthermore the above mentioned

15 International observers were sent from: The EU (through the agencies of ODIHR and OSCE), the electoral institute of southern Africa EISA, the African Union AU and the Commonwealth Nations. 16 Both the AU and the EISA delegation arrived few days before the election, the Commonwealth Nations delegation had an advanced team of two the came two weeks prior to the Election Day (RotCOG 2004: 5)

surplus of ballots was for the EU EOM, an indicator that the MEC was not prepared to hold an election. On Election Day, EU EOM noted that the present of the National Intelligence Bureau and the Criminal Investigation Department could bring doubt on the independence of the election officials (EU EOM 2004: 15). The EU EOM noted the trust in the police was low since very few complaints reached the local police forces. It is speculated that the police is viewed as close linked to the ruling party so that the police would act in accordance to the wishes of the UDF (EU EOM 2004: 21). In regards to the presidential candidates the EU EOM noted that all had spend many years in Malawi politics and that many of the candidates had been leaders of several different political parties: “the political diversity was questionable. There was no untainted fresh face that might bring a change of direction for the electorate to consider” (EU EOM 2004: 18). During the campaign the EU EOM noted with concern that the UDF had a tendency to provide money or material goods to dignitaries from areas where large UDF rallies were held, also it was noted that state resources were applied for the UDF in their re-election campaign: “EU observers reported widespread abuse of state resources by the ruling party during the campaign period, including the use of governmental parastatal vehicles and human resources” (EU EOM 2004: 20), the opposition parties restricted themselves to thanking their supporters verbally (Ibid.). Some candidates rallies were meet with violence from other parties’ youth groups that wanted to prevent the rallies and in other cases, candidates were refused permits to hold rallies by local officials that were under threat of loosing their job, should they grant the permission to an opposition candidate (ibid.). In regards to the media, it was found that the MBC had favoured the ruling coalition with 97.7 of its electoral range of programs. The MBC it the most widely used media; it is able to reach 80% of the population and especially in the rural areas where illiteracy makes written media ineffective, is radio the only source of information. The only TV channel, Television of Malawi (TVM), is completely owned by the state and used 79.5 of its electoral airtime reporting from the UDF campaign. Both the MBC and the TVM where thought to be under order from the minister of information, a post held by a UDF party member, to allocate attention to the ruling coalition and especially the president on the basis that. “…because he is the president of the country, the president has to be followed and all his activities broadcast in the national news” (EU EOM 2004: 23-24). EU EOM noted that this was in violation of the Presidential and Parliamentary

election act of Malawi. The private radio stations were reported to allocate an even amount of resources to the different candidates and parties, however, the two national newspapers, which are owned by opposition leaders or their family members, appeared on many accounts to be biased against the ruling party and its coalition partners (Ibid.). The EU EOM has addressed the issue of gender in the 2004 election, and noted the number of women candidates had increased in the 2004 election and in fact there were more women elected in the 2004 election, However, women seem to have great difficulties in attaining high positions within the political parties (EU EOM 2004: 27). Civil society organizations were praised for their voter educational programs and advocated an increasing in funding to create confidence in the electoral process (Ibid.) Election Day was in the EU EOM opinion a well executed election without major faults, there were irregularities observed but not any that have raised serious concern with the EU EOM, the voting process was seen as a success out of a total of 540 voting stations visited by the EU EOM 85% of the voting stations were deemed very good/good and in 15% bad or very bad (EU EOM 2004: 29). In regards to the counting of the votes the EU EOM found that: “…the counting was bureaucratic and slow in most places” (EU EOM 2004: 30). Furthermore it was noted that if a recount was to be made, then the ballots could not be traced back to their constituency since many boxes lacked the county labels (Ibid.), and that the publication of the result of the parliamentary election was not broken down into constituencies, therefore lacking transparency. The EU EOM noted that after and during Election Day there lacked knowledge in the constituencies on how to file complains –and the MEC did not a local level have sufficient knowledge in how to process them (EU EOM 2004: 34-36). The final assessment of the EU EOM was, as according with the EU handbook for election monitoring (OSCE/ODIHR 2007: 66-67), filled with both praise of what went well, and recommendations of what need to be changed. The EU EOM final statement was:

“ The May 2004 elections were the third multiparty elections in Malawi since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1994, the political environment has somewhat improved since the 1994 elections and there is reasons for optimism in the political development of the country. […] there were however, many problems with the electoral process, some of which were so serious the confidence in the accuracy in the results

were undermined. It is therefore vital that stakeholders continue developing democratic practises in Malawi. […]” (EU EOM 2004: 39)

The result of the election that elected president Mutharika, was not disputed by the EU EOM, they did, however, note that there were serious faults in the election process, and the EU EOM refrained from mentioning or applying the wording of Free and Fair anywhere in their rapport. The EU EOM did however respond to the former president Muluzi announcement, that the EU delegation had pronounced the election for free and fair: “This statement [president Muluzi’s] is factually incorrect. “I no place in our preliminary statement, … did we use either the word free or the word fair” (EU EOM 2004: 46 & Appendix 3).

The other observers delegations at the Malawi 2004 election, shared many of the observations that the EU EOM made, they however emphasised different aspects. The Commonwealth of Nations delegation17 was the second largest and the only other to field long term observers (two people). They emphasised like the EU EOM mission that the media coverage was very bias especially in regard to the state owned media (RotCOG 2004: 56). However the Commonwealth group made significant use of the standard of free and fair at all level of observers. Each observer filled out an application form answering questions relating to the campaign, the poll and the count. In addition for each ballot station they attended, they describing abnormalities, the conduct of the MEC officials and if they felt about the: “Fairness overall: Good? Acceptable? Questionable?” (RotCOG 2004: 6). In the end the Commonwealth group proclaimed the 2004 Malawi election for: “Our conclusion is that the voters were free to express their wishes on the day itself, but because of the problems with the register, the bias of the state media and the abuse of incumbency, the process prior to the election day was unfair” (RotCOG 2004: 56). The AU also determined the election in terms of free and fair, they did note several serious lack in the election process: “The conduct of the election was free and peaceful” (AU 2004: 19), however the AU delegation also stated that: “the overall performance of the Malawi Electoral Commission did not meet the expectations of the stakeholders in respect to the management of the of Voters’ roll, Media coverage, voter and civil education and the use of public resources by the ruling party” and go further to critique the election campaign: “…the campaign did not focus on the issues as such but on personalities and character assassination … the practice of handouts was a disturbing feature” (Ibid.). 17 The Commonwealth group composition was from 14 different states all but tree (Canada, Australia and the UK) was from developing states (RotCOG 2004: 62-65).

The EISA delegation also deemed the election in regard to free and fair: “[EISA mission] concludes that the elections in Malawi were substantially free. The mission notes however that the playing field was not levelled, which made it difficult for opposition parties and candidates to have equitable access to public resources including the state media” (EISA 2004 b). Generally the delegations that made use of the free and fair standard in the Malawi 2004 election saw the election as free but not fair.

Development in Malawi Both the 1994 an the 1999 election secured Muluzi the presidential post and since the Banda years there has been significant progress of human rights in Malawi, to the point where the safeguard of the freedom of speech and the right to assembly is generally protected (Fenger 2005). Nevertheless Malawi is still ranking at 163 out of 173 on United Nation Development Program (UNDP) human development index and 65% of the population was living below the poverty line 18 (UNDP 2005). By the 2004 elections Malawi was facing huge problems in regards to corruption it came to a point, where Malawi was going to face a significant drop in donor aid, due to the level of corruption in all layers of society (Fenger 2005). And especially in the latter years of president Muluzi’s term in office where Malawi fell 43 places on the Transparency International index (TI 2004). In 2002 Malawi lost 75 million dollars worth donor aid, due to overspending in the Malawi administration (24NEWS). President Mutharika introduces an ambitious anti-corruption program on the basis that the American donor aid required a increase focus on corruption, only months after his inauguration he arrested former ministers of the UDF for corruption (Fenger 2005). However, president did not gain support from his own party and instead created his own party the DPP. However he has not been able to accuse the former president for neglecting to handle the corruption, he is however facing the former president in 2009 since Muluzi has announced that he will be running for president. Furthermore Malawi has not been able to combat the spreading of HIV19 something that has brought the life expediency in Malawi down to 36. Malawi is still very much today an underdeveloped state (CEE 2007).

18 These Numbers might be slightly inaccurate in describing Malawi Development index ranking, since the numbers are from 2005 the same year that Malawi was hit by severe drought. Incidentally president wa Mutharika ignored the advice from foreign organizations, in trying to become self sufficient in agriculture products and now provides government funded fertilizer to farmers. So successful that Malawi in 2008 is exporting food (findingDulcinea 2008). 19 Malawi suffers form a staggering high Aids Infection rate, it is estimated that roughly one seventh of the population is affected with Aids. The Aids issue was high on the agenda of all the candidates of the 2004 election, where all promised the to supply all affected with medicine (RotCOG 2004: 15)

Manoeuvring for rent seeking in Malawi Politics One of the problems that affect Malawi, and large parts of Africa, is rent seeking. Rent seeking is often compared to corruption, but where corruption is: “the misuse of public power for private gain” then rent seeking is “then the effort to acquire access to or control over opportunities for earning rent” (Coolidge 1996: 2) that in itself is not illegal, however, it becomes morally questionable when politicians occupier an bureaucratic position, wherein their position grants them the legal power to award legitimacy to others for what can be viewed as rent or bribes, that is especially concerning because it can damage a third party (Coolidge 1996: 3), for example the population in general because of loss of tax revenues.

After the 2004 election it has been noted that a significant part of Malawi politics is based on the personalities of a few leaders instead of a focus on party ideology or their policies (Maroleng 2004: 80 & EU EOM b 2004: 2). In both before and after the 2004 election there have been significant leadership changes in all the main Malawi political parties. The parties have each faced internal dissension. Banda’s old party, the MCP, had for example seen their party’s vice-president and president have a bitter in-fight for the party nomination for presidential candidate, which resulted in the MCP president Gwanda Chakuamba, wining the nomination, but the subsequent High court battle left the nomination with the vice-president John Tembo. Gwanda Chakuamba then created his own political party the Republican Party (RP) (Ibid.). Gwanda Chakuamba, together with his RP, created a coalition of six other opposition parties in order to counter a UDF majority in the parliament, however, when the UDF majority was in danger, the RP joined the government in exchange for government posts, effectively killing the coalition (Ibid.). Gwanda Chakuamba then later left his own party and became the member of president Mutharika new DPP and was at that time promoted to minister of Agriculture. Gwanda Chakuamba, however, soon fell out with president Mutharika and changed horse again and created a new political party, the New Republican Party (NRP), and is now supporting the former president Muluzi for the presidential election in 2009 (Maroleng 2004: 82-83). Gwanda Chakuamba’s manoeuvring in the Malawi political sphere is extreme but not unusual. First president Muluzi and then later president Mutharika have on several occasions, managed to persuade several members of the opposition to switch sides in favour of government posts (EISA

2004a: 10 & EUOEM 2004: 17-19), and party loyalties seems mean little in regard to personal gain especially it seems when there are opportunities for rent seeking (Ibid.).

Malawi’s electorally roundabout Malawi is a republic, with an electoral system modelled on the British Westminster electoral system, with elections every five years. One election determines the president which is elected by a majority vote. The other election is for seats in the parliament thought single member, first past the pole concept, the election is a multiparty election. Both these elections take place at the same time and work on the principle of plurality (CotRoM 1994 & EISA 2006). Furthermore Malawi has an election commission (MEC). The leader of the election committee is appointed by the president in cooperation with the parliament (EISA 2006).

Analysis

Readers guide to the analysis In this first section of the analysis the descriptive part is found. It outlines some of the difficulties the free and fair standard has had previously. The use of the free and fair standard is then displayed within the context of the 1994, 1999, and most importantly, the 2004 Malawi elections in order to situate the standard and to enable the theoretical tools of the thesis to provide us with a theoretical outlook on the context wherein the free and fair standard is applied. The section also includes an operation of democracy, based on how the election monitors perceive an election as a tool for the good governance concept as a modernisation concept, through the free and fair standard. The descriptive part of the analysis ends with concluding observations on what kind of democracy the free and fair standard is promoting. In the exploratory section of the analysis we take a look at what happened when the free and fair standard is omitted in favour of a progress of democracy and will of the people standard, when concluding on an election by the EU EOM. Then we apply a theoretical approach on the proceedings in order to see if there is a different kind of promotion or focus on different aspects of democracy, which can explain the change in rhetoric applied to the 2004 Malawi election overall assessments from the EU EOM. Furthermore the section also includes an operation of democracy based on how the election monitors perceive an election as a tool for the good governance concept as a modernisation concept, through the progress for democracy standard. The exploratory part of the analysis will present a summary of its findings, which will then be compared to the concluding observations from the descriptive part.

Descriptive part of the analysis

Into a world of free and fair “While democracy must be more than free elections it is also true… that it cannot be less” -UN secretary general Kofi Annam.

The free and fair standard has been accused of having some shortcomings, as described in the method chapter, that will be elaborated further on here. Essentially free and fair elections are those elections, where the balloting and the counting of the votes are conducted in a fair manner, in addition the there must have been a fair competition the

political parties in between, prior to the election. A fair competition includes reasonable access to media, fair rules that uphold a political environment free of intimidation and lastly an impartial and quick authority for handling election disputes (Bjornlund 2004: 94). Elections requirements based on the free and fair standard that have been set into criteria’s have been questioned. One of the main issues with the free and fair standard is that there are no universal criteria’s for defining what is free and fair and the methodical approach to determining an free and fair elections has been questioned (Elklit & Svensson 1997: 33). For example should one have criteria’s that you would grade according to fulfillment of free and fair and then combine the overall score to reach a passable lever to be judge a free and fair election? Generally, the idea is that observers should judge or evaluate imperfections in a process that is meant to reflect the UN’s charter on human rights: “will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government” (UDHR Article 21. 3). But for example how can the observers assess where the cut-off point is in regards to voter registration if there do not exist any reliable demographics. This is a special problem in Malawi, where they employ the Westminster of “first past the post” election model, modelled after the British electoral system, where the population in a given area reflects on how many votes are needed to get elected into parliament and the majority are the only ones that achieve representation (EISA 2006). This was the reason that there was an outcry against the Malawi UDF government in 1998 when the UDF managed to bargain their way into extra electoral seats where the UDF had the strongest supporters, thereby gaining more UDF elected into parliament in the 1999 election. Another issue with the free and fair standards is that in a state as Malawi where the illiteracy rate is very high20 how, can one fault an election for not complying with the criteria for anonymous voting if voters: “have to ask for assistance to mark their ballot papers?” (Geisler 1993: 618). It has been an issue that has not been solved for the free and fair standard; it remains a concept that has faces serious problems as an assessment tool for real life situations during elections (Bjornlund 2004: 98). The general problem with the free and fair standard is that it is a subjective judgment. The observers will have to decide if a flawed part of an election is sufficient reason for determining if the election is not free or fair? As Gisela Geisler, a noted electoral debater, have noted “…Who decides what cumulation of flaws is still permissible for free and fair elections, and what is not?”

20 Illiteracy rate is a significant part of the UNDP’s human development index, where Malawi ranks 163 out of 177.

(Geisler 1993: 618). However, the standard is still used by election observer teams when they assess the overall results of an election.

Free and fair applied in the 2004 election It is here that the applicability of both Robert Dahl’s requirements and functioning institutions is useful. Both the Institutions and the requirements can be evaluated according to the assessments the international observer missions are making in regards to the 2004 election. In order to scrutinize the termination of the appliance of the free and fair standard by the EU OEM in the 2004 Malawi election, it is necessary to describe what the standard means for the election in Malawi, in respect to what kind of democracy it is trying to promote. Even with the troublesome issues with the free and fair standard, the standard has to some degree been institutionalized so that the population, aid donors and politicians and especially the media still use the standard (Carothers 2004: 90). In the 2004 elections tree delegations made use of the standard in assessing the election. The Commonwealth of Nations concluded the election as: “Our conclusion is that the voters were free to express their wishes on the day itself, but because of the problems with the register, the bias of the state media and the abuse of incumbency, the process prior to the election day was unfair” (RotCOG 2004: 56). In a Robert Dahl terminology what they actually is saying is the first two requirements (effective participation and equality in voting) is fulfilled but that gaining enlightened understanding is not, due to the delegations notice that the media is bias, thereby the is Dahl’s requirements of the control of the agenda, inclusion and fundamental rights not fulfilled. The AU’s evaluation on the election was: “The conduct of the election was free and peaceful” (AU 2004: 19), however the AU delegation also stated that: “the overall performance of the Malawi Electoral Commission did not meet the expectations of the stakeholders in respect to the management of the of Voters’ roll, Media coverage, voter and civil education and the use of public resources by the ruling party” and go’s further to critique the election campaign: “…the campaign did not focus on the issues as such but on personalities and character assassination … the practice of handouts was a disturbing feature” (Ibid.). Like the Commonwealth of Nations team the AU delegation also deemed the election fulfilling in respect to the effective participation but in fact the AU delegation also critiqued the second requirement of equality in voting, because they emphasise the UDF practice of handouts which violates the equality in voting requirement, because by bribing some and not all, it disrupts Dahl’s equality principle. Like the

Commonwealth of Nations delegation the AU delegation do not in Dahl terminology see control of the agenda, inclusion and fundamental rights fulfilled. The EISA electoral mission “concludes that the elections in Malawi were substantially free. The mission notes however that the playing field was not levelled, which made it difficult for opposition parties and candidates to have equitable access to public resources including the state media” (EISA 2004 b). EISA thereby concludes that there have been an effective participating and equality in voting, but the requirement of gaining an enlightened understanding is not fulfilled because of an uneven playing field, control of the agenda and the inclusion requirements suffers likewise because Dahl’s demos do not have a full understanding of the elections candidates and their policies to make an informed decision. Likewise with the inclusion and fundamental rights were not fulfilled since they relies on the control of the agenda and gaining enlightened understanding requirements, to be fulfilled. Generally the delegations that made use of the free and fair standard in the Malawi 2004 election saw the election as free but not fair.

Interesting many of the institutions that Robert Dahl suggests for at state to become a Polyarchy are actually deemed in place in Malawi. Most notably is the free and fair election that are held at regular intervals fulfilled because the general consent from all observer missions is that all voters could go freely to the pooling booths without fear or reprisals, and all votes count the same. Besides the fact the secret police was reported to be present near pooling stations then the Malawi state shows that it has created a functional free and fair election institution. Furthermore, Dahl’s institution of inclusive suffrage is also effectuated, since all have been allowed to participate in the actually process of voting, furthermore, the election was made to determine which candidate would win the election thereby fulfilling the needs for both the institution of elected officials, and the fact that so many independent candidates ran for parliament and got voted into parliament signifies that all citizens, including the ones without party affiliations, were entitled to run for office. Likewise the disintegration of the AFORD party and the creation of multiple smaller parties illustrates that it is possible to pursue ones own interests and thereby effectuating the institution of independent associations. However, the election lacked proper institutions of freedom of expressions, due to restriction to the media and the restrictions on public rallies, which also hindered the institution of alternative information.

Summary of the findings The AU, EISA and the Commonwealth of Nations election delegations generally shared the same notion on the 2004 election. The tree delegations deployed by the AU, EISA and the Commonwealth of Nations acquit the “free” part of the election effectually thereby, in a Dahl terminology, saying that the election had equality in voting and in Dahl’s terminology an institute of free and fair elections. However, there was a lack in almost all other areas raging from control of the agenda to gaining an enlighten understanding –and besides the free and fair elections most of the institutions needed for a polyarchy was not functional in the Malawi elections. But the general understanding is that the election was free but not fair –it is still a 50 % success rate and only the Commonwealth mission actually makes use of the word unfair. Therefore it must be assumed that the observers is lending credibility the election, despite its shortcomings. Most serious is the AU and EISA comments regarding the media bias and an uneven playing field, effectuating that the voters did not have the possibility to make an informed decision, because they did not have access to freedom of expression and an alternative source of information. Essentially the delegations comments Malawi on a good Election Day but severely critique the methods used in the electoral campaign and the role of the media.

Exploratory part of the analysis "Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard." - H.L. Mencken,

Robert Dahl and the EU EOM assessment In this part of the exploratory the EU EOMs assessments will assessed using Robert Dahl’s concept framework. In the assessment and recommendation the EU EOM mission noted that there was an undesired presents of both police and secret service, however, in regards to the presents of police at pooling stations if must be assumed that is acceptable for police to be present at lager gatherings. But in essence the EU EOM questions the effective participation since some might be afraid to vote, or afraid to vote for the opposition party. The EU EOM also noted that there were handouts during the election campaign which suggest that there is not equality in voting, because some votes are more worth then others i.e. some votes are important enough to pay bribes for. In addition the act

prevents inclusion since not all are bribed, thereby making some want to participate more in the election more then others. The EU EOM also noted during the campaign process that some were not allowed to hold election rallies, thus preventing both the possibility for gaining an enlightened understanding and deceiving the voters control over the agenda because voters are not allowed near their candidates for influencing them and being influenced by them. In regards to the media the EU EOM found that the state and two privately owned newspapers (by the opposition) were very bias in their reporting of the election, thus the EU EOM critique the election for preventing the people from gaining an enlightened understanding. Furthermore the EU EOM found the MEC ´s handling of complains concerning. Thereby critiquing the control of the agenda because it questioned whether the people can reassess former actions. However, the EU EOM also praised the election for its inclusion of civil society thereby saying the voters had some control of the agenda. In addition the EU EOM praised the conduct of all during Election Day and noted only small irregularities connected with the counting process suggesting some equality in voting. More praises commends the Malawi institution of free and fair elections, and the institution that all citizens are entitled to run for and serve in elective offices, likewise was the independent associations institution praised due to the fact that many independent ran for office. Interestingly the EU EOM has no mentions of the fact that many independent parliament members became party members in the new government, in exchange for positions in the government as it was the case with Gwanda Chakuamba, it suggest that the EU EOM did not consider it a part of the election process or ignored it. Generally the EU EOM considered the campaign progress, and the complain process flawed, but the actions on the Election Day was considered acceptable. However, if the people do not have control of the Agenda then there is no democracy, as the last tree elections have granted a victory to the UDF a party that the majority of the population has not voted for in the last two elections. It then can be argued that democracy conflicted with the Universal declaration of human rights wherein the government is suppose to be in office by the will of the people, and furthermore the election day might be in order but the people do not have the opportunity to a gain alternative information’s then the will of the people is not present.

The new rhetoric in commenting on elections by the EU EOM The EU EOM elided using the free and fair wording, they did however, make concluding remarks on the 2004 Malawi election:

“ The May 2004 elections were the third multiparty elections in Malawi since the introduction of multiparty elections in 1994, the political environment has somewhat improved since the 1994 elections and there is reasons for optimism in the political development of the country. […] there were however, many problems with the electoral process, some of which were so serious the confidence in the accuracy in the results were undermined. It is therefore vital that stakeholders continue developing democratic practises in Malawi. […]” (EU EOM 2004: 39)

The omitting of the free and fair wording was supposed to make the judgement of an election less subjective. However, when the EU EOM makes use of sentences like “the political environment has somewhat improved since the 1994 elections” and “there is reasons for optimism in the political development of the country” and most notably “the electoral process” then there is a lack of a positivistic approach, which suggest that the assessment has traits of subjectivity. In addition when the EU EOM mention the for elections of 1994 and 1999, and further make an assessment on the fact the democracy has improved, “the political environment has somewhat improved since the 1994 elections and there is reasons for optimism” it is in essence an judgment on the same level as the free and fair, furthermore, by evaluating the election on the basis of an (genuine) “electoral process”, as a new standard, they are in fact just replacing one subjective standard with another. One would however, see on the different aspects of evaluating by the observes, but when one evaluate the assessment sheets of the EU EOM and the assessment sheet from the Commonwealth delegation in regards to polling stations assessments, then we can see we can see that the wording of the two sheets are different but they essentially assess the same: conditions at the station?, the voting procedures?, political party members presents? And many of the points on the checklist are very subjective. For example if there is a “general agitation” (RotCOG 2004: 52) or “Atmosphere at the station” (EU EOM: 71). It is, however, important to notice that the phases “process” is better at describing the 2004 election in the context of previous elections. In regards to good governance and the DAC standards there are especially two areas where the new standard could have a new effect. In regards to the rule of law it can be questioned whether the new standard provides a better argument for governance, when it appears as a weaker version in it approval or especially in it disapproval, in regards to if any had broken the electoral law, then the free and fair standard that determined either a right or a wrong seems better. Furthermore one can debate whether introducing a standard that do not take into account the blatant rent-seeking done by politicians post elections is not mentioned, which not only creates uncertainty for voters in the future but also, makes the democratic institution loose legitimacy. Furthermore it goes

against EU EOM principles for election monitoring: “Election observation can contribute to strengthening democratic institutions, build public confidence in electoral processes and help deter fraud” (EC 2008). Elections are supposed grant legitimacy to its government, but when the principles and ideologies the votes vote for are sat aside for personal gain then elections lose their legitimacy.

New standards assessed One of the first things that can be questioned in the appliance of the free and fair standard, is the fact that through the new standard the EU EOM don’t really make a assessment on the 2004 election, certainly not one that the people of Malawi wants from the EU delegation; “Often the population in African states have high expectations of international observers and they most often expect a declaration on whether the election was free and fair” (Abbink & Hesseling 2000: 261). This is partly du to the fact that the EU apply a standard that is not well defined “process towards democracy” is not articulated in a way that explains if the 2004 was a democratic election or not. This could suggest that the observers are present for the sake of controlling an institution, the MEC, rather then helping the institution achieve its goal of promoting democracy. It is true that the standard is less of a dichotomy which makes it better at making an assessment not either one ting or another, but a process standard is still a very subjective and like the free and fair standard the new standard is just as flawed, cause who or what decides how many flaws it takes in an election for there not to be progress? In addition, less of a dichotomy is concerning because the process of democracy seem to suggest that the process of democracy leaves room for interpretation and further considerations, that can be seen to be a function that can only go one way: towards lowering the bar of what is acceptable in elections, where in fact one ought to set the standard as high as possible, so that leaders would have something to strive towards. Instead when the EU EOM suggests that there is a process going on, were Malawi has made steps towards democracy, the EU EOM are lending credibility to the election process, which they incidentally has found flawed.

The attraction of elections One could argue that elections often brings much more then the right to choose you own government, according to Soft Power it is a desirable institution that has a lot of attraction. Soft Power is mainly the attraction of ideology, or cooperating with other states in order to get the states to do what you want. In regards to Malawi it is clear that there has been created a norm concerning elections that is imported from the West. The participation in the Malawi 2004 election was reasonably (54.7%) suggesting an overall desire for democracy among the Malawi people (MEC 2004). On the basis of Soft Power one can see the West, represented by the EU, is using two methods to introduce democracy, the carrot and attraction. The carrot is a synonym for bribe or a payoff in order to get someone to do what you want them to do. Malawi has through their ACP membership been paid off through the EPA’s they have signed, this has granted them trade agreements but the EU have in turn, among other things, demanded that Malawi committed itself to promoting good governance. Attraction on the other hand is much more difficult to recognise, because it is difficult to measure (Nye 2004 a: 62), however, we can see the effect. Malawi has since the Banda years invited international observers to judge their elections in accordance with Western standards, this show a desire to emulate the Western world’s democracy. Soft Power is of cause a dissuasion what, if anything, the EU wants to use their attraction power to, this is mainly due to the fact that Soft Power is so difficult to use and control effectively, as the critique of the theory has commented, however, Soft Power do make it more difficult for Malawi to argue against the appliance of Western election observers, or for that matter the kind of democracy they are trying to promote.

Post colonial? Or post independence? If we look at the international observers assessments of the 2004 Malawi elections through the lens of a postcolonial perspective then we need to reassert certain definitions used by the election observers. In regards to free and fair, postcolonialism poses an explanation in regards to Malawi’s contradictory relationship to the standard. On the one hand Malawi expects the standard to be used, but on the other hand they clearly don’t live up to the full extend of the meaning of the concept. The explanation of the conflicting approach has to be found in resistance to the West.

Malawi operates within a states system that is not of their own making, but on the other hand still wants to be a part of, (Soft power’s attraction concept offers and explanation for this). The interesting issue here is that Malawi has fully accept the concept and operates with it, however, they offer resistance towards the concept while still applying it, in that way they both challenges the concept that is not their own but also helps sustain the concept by using it. Likewise postcolonialism aid in illustrating connections and relations taken for granted, like for instance the electoral system applied in Malawi, is adopted from the British Westminster system suggesting an adoption of the system without considering alternatives, yet it seems to be an unnecessary instigator of conflict because of its “first past the pole” concept, that opens up for electoral speculation of how many constituencies a party can get within its heartland. One can also argue that the fact that the Malawi people have accepted the fact that they need international observers with Western standards is an illustration of a dominant discourse that represents the social reality in Malawi as an underdeveloped state in need of Western guidance, which in turn enables the West (EU) to help structure the state through the institutions they promote, in fact democracy guided by the West can be seen as a new form of control of the South by the West to replace colonialism

The burden of the white man21 In regards to the new “progress of democracy / will of the people” standard postcolonialism would argue that it serves as continuation of a long line of concepts that serves to dominate the South, through the West’s power to define. It can be argued that the new election standards are just new fads in a long line of buzz words and focus areas, that the West employs to dazzle the developing states in order to maintain an understanding (both in the West and in the South) that the South needs intervention. And it is implied that the intervention is done by the West based on moral superiority, based on the fact that the West has claimed ownership over concepts such as democracy and freedom and fairness. Ownership of free and fair has, however, come under severe scrutiny after the Bush/Gore elections in 2000. Nonetheless the new standard becomes the West latest measuring tool based on moral superiority. This is a clear example of a eurocentric approach that exhibits at least two characteristic of clear euro centricity: the standards a based on a moral

21 Title is a reference to a Rudyard Kipling poem that was interpreted as a characterization for colonialism that justified the policy as a noble enterprise.

approach of what the West considers progress, and institutions (EISA, AU and the MEC) are reproducing that standard. Furthermore the new standard is based on the fact that the circumstances, surrounding the 2004 election, were not easy defined. This suggest that the new standard has been adapted to conditions in Malawi, which only can be described as a paternalistic or as morally superior act by the West.

A Neo–liberalist perspective

However one might see the developing world, they can still be seen to act, as states within a realm of anarchy, for instance the Malawi government received large donations of rice from Taiwan during their 2005 drought, but later switch sides and recognized mainland China (Lameck 2008), this illustrates that Malawi is a state that is trying to take action accordingly to maximise its absolute gains, in world politics, same thing can be assessed from Malawi’s handling of the 2005 drought where president Mutharika ignored the WB’s advice and introduced a government funded fertilizer program (Ibid.). Likewise one can argue that in respect to elections and donor aid then Malawi is a very rational actor. They first transcended to democratic rule after the Banda years and the one party rule period, when they lost international support and donors where treating to withhold aid. And likewise one can view the introduction of democracy and elections as institutions that were demanded by the international society. And as a rational actor Malawi has complied and have been introduced into the democratic assembly of state, however, as Neo-liberalists would argue the biggest problem to interstate cooperation is cheating, which states will do if they see a benefit in doing so. One can argue that it is exactly what Malawi has done in regards the democracy for aid agreement. Malawi has introduced democracy and free elections but not fair elections and thereby not actually introducing democracy. However, even if there is not introduced fair elections, it seems to satisfy the EU on the basis that in 2007 Malawi reconfirmed its Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) through the preliminary ACP contract (MEJN 2007). This is also an example of the fact that there is a new agenda on international issues, where there is no distinctions between high and low politics, we can observe that donor aid in the form of election Observer Missions (low politics) and economics (high politics), are connected and influence each other. However, one can also argue that Malawi has in fact played a zero sum game, because they might on the one hand have gotten away with granting the people a lesser degree of democracy and has

cheated its way into being recognized as a democracy, but on the other hand they have been forced to accept a increase in complex interdependence. The increase in interdependence can be argued has created a demand for international observers to pass judgment on Malawi elections, and as dependence works both ways, the EU has been able to created standards for trade agreements that relies on democratic improvement. However, as complex interdependence do not need to be a zero sum game, then the EU can afford to overlook standards for democratic improvement, as long as their trade agreement is upheld: “For Africa’s donors and creditors, good governance may therefore have more to do with accepting and enforcing the “right economic policies than adhering to widely recognized democratic principles. If so, this might give African Leaders the option to substitute economic adjustments for democracy” (Geisler 1993: 631). This explains why Malawi is allowed to cheat in regards to fair elections, and perhaps explains why the EU has adopted a new rhetoric that do not suggest a dichotomy, but allows room for interpretation, which then allows for continual aid and thereby trade. This suggests a flaw in the plan to have democracy operate as the silver bullet to terrorism, when the democracy that is promoted is not necessarily a fair democracy, but one that can end up as authoritarian. However, this corresponds with the critique the neo-liberalistic approach has received, and the issues the EU is faces in its promotion of democracy: a linkage between democracy and economics has had problems in producing viable governance in the third world.

Summary of the exploratory part The EU EOM recognized several flaws in the election process and provided a critical review of the process prior to and after the election, critiquing control of the agenda, equality in voting, voter’s inclusion and lack of possibility for voters to gain an enlightened understanding of the options they had to choose from. However, there was also praises for having functional institutions of free and fair elections and that all citizens were entitled to run for office, likewise was the independent associations institution praised due to the fact that many independent ran and got elected for office. The new standard the EU EOM assessed the election with, was if, there had been a genuine democratic that had moved Malawi forward? Despite the fact that the new standard can create a more nuanced image of the 2004 election it still have flaws. Most notably that the standard is just as subjective as any other and the standard do not deliver what the people of Malawi want from international observers namely a verdict –suggesting that the observers are present for the sake of

controlling an institution, rather then helping the institution achieve its goal of promoting democracy. Furthermore the new standards do not seem to provide any improvement in helping the DAC standards, in fact the opposite can be argued, because the less definitive standard creates doubt on how wrong or how right things are, furthermore the fact that new standard has not been used to address corruption and rent seeking do the standard not prevent the loss of state legitimacy. In regards to neo-liberalism the one can say the political leaders of Malawi have accepted democracy but through electoral manipulation have affected the outcome in a way they find beneficial. Something they can get away with, because they have accepted closer ties with the West, which in turn uses that to impose judgment on elections –and can perhaps change standards to suit their trade interest. Soft power has illustrated that the lure of the West can not only promote democracy but a democracy that is being judged by Western standards without being seen as intrusive. An alternative point of view on election observers has been presented by the postcolonialist perspective. It presents a social reality where the Malawi state and people sees itself as underdeveloped and in need of Western interference and that the new assessment standards that the EU EOM makes use of is just a new tool to have an excuse to intervene in the internal affairs of Malawi.

Comparing the descriptive and the exploratory parts

Essentially the difference between the observer delegations that applied the free and fair standard and the EU EOM new standard of assessing if there had been progress towards genuine elections is difficult to spot. Both of the standards did not seem to significantly affect the monitoring task of the different delegation, which arrived at roughly the same critique and praises of the 2004 election. And the new standard of progress evaluation seems no less subjective in their assessments then the free and fair standard. The new standard do seems to have more nuances being less definitive which makes it more applicable in elections where there is a demand for judging an election in the context in which it takes place. However, that is also a weakness due to the fact that average voter, aid donor, politicians and the media demands a definitive answer to the credibility of an election.

Conclusion The analysis has tried to provide an answer to the research question of “Why did the EU EOM abandon the term “free and fair” in the 2004 Malawi election, instead of a broader “will of the people and democracy progress” standard.” The respond to the research question have been based on the combined explanatory power of both the descriptive and the exploratory part of the analysis. Through the thesis it has become clear that the answer to the research question is not found in the in the applicability of the different standards; they do not provide a different measuring ability for observers in the field. Both standards do, however, suffer from being subjective in their analysis of elections. Each standard has abilities that the other lack, free and fair can provide a more definitive answer to the result of an election and the progress of democracy standard can better interpret elections within the context that they occur. It does however, become difficult in assessing which standard is better as an election judgment tool, where one is better in regards to understanding an election, another is better in making a different through being ascertain in its ability to communicate results and satisfy the people that is truly affected by an election. However, if one looks closer then there seems to be an advantage for the progress for democracy standard since it is less definitive in its statement, thereby enabling the EU to ignore the violations of good governance by the Malawi government, for the possible benefit of continued intervention. In addition, the difference in standards can perhaps also be found in the interplay between Malawi and the EU, where the EU seems to have an advantage in being able to lower the acceptable bar for elections. Furthermore, the new standard continues to enforce and reproduce a notion that Malawi needs Western intervention. The general picture is that Soft Power and Neo-liberalist theoretical approaches suggest that Malawi has an uneven relation with the EU, which in turn seems to hold an advantage in its relations with Malawi that in might very well use, for intervening in Malawi. This change in election standards is a disturbing sign, first of all is creates mixed signals of what elections should be in order to strengthen democracy worldwide, in fact it can have the opposite effect if the notion of democracy can be suited those that can benefit from a weak or stagnant democracy. If we remember the Huntington quote from the introduction, it is important to remember that there is a second line: “Elections, open, free and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine qua non. Governments produced by elections may be inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted.”

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Appendix

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

Appendix 3