Changing Course:

A Reaction to the Baker-Hamilton Report

Policy Brief Draft

By Dr. Mohamed Nimer, CAIR National

Any American exit strategy from Iraq will fail unless it is conceived as part of restructuring a policy whose failure led America to Iraq in the first place. Any change of policy cannot escape the fact that the U.S. government looks at the whole Muslim world as a unit of analysis. Any sound review of U.S. policy must begin with a factual assessment of the complexity of problems facing the U.S. vis-a-vis Muslims.

State of Affairs

Outside America, there is a perception that America is at war with the Muslim world. This view may be exaggerated, but it is not baseless. Immediately after 9/11, FBI agents fanned throughout the country arresting nearly 1,200 Muslims who technically violated immigration law. Worse yet, although none of these detainees were suspected of any association with terror, they were kept in secret, denied legal representation or the right to hear charges against them. Many were roughed up and beaten in prison, where they languished for extended periods of time before they were deported. Another 5,000 Muslim immigrants with perfectly legal status were asked to go through a special registration procedure.

To legalize these and other abuses, the PATRIOT Act was rushed through Congress. Provisions of this law allowed the secret search of people's homes and businesses, the confiscation of property without deadline, and the collection without notice of personal information on American citizens, including their medical histories, books checked out of libraries or goods they purchased.

Moreover, President Bush signed several executive orders designating charity groups as supporters of terror, allowing the freezing of their assets and the detention of their leaders. Some of these organizations had received U.S. government grants to distribute aid to the needy overseas.

The anti-Muslim hysteria also expressed itself in what became known as "extraordinary rendition" policy, whereby Muslim suspects are turned over to foreign countries to be tortured. In one example that became public, Maher Arrar, a Canadian citizen, was flown by U.S. agents to Syria, where he was tortured for the purpose of extracting information. It only turned out that there was nothing unusual about his situation and there was no justification for his arrest.

And now Muslim travelers and bank customers face profiling in their daily life, because security procedures allow the selective enforcement of law and do not punish abuse in law enforcement. Muslims are routinely subject to denial of airline travel. Muslim bank account holders often receive notices that their bank accounts have been closed in compliance with government rules.

And abroad the U.S. has been involved directly or indirectly in fighting Muslims in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon. These nations are governed by various competing social forces and have faced various struggles and security issues, but have been seen by the U.S. as pieces in a singular confrontational strategy. Afghanistan was attacked because its Taliban rulers refused to join the U.S. in the fight against al- Qaidah. The Taliban refused because the U.S. never gave them incentive to change their position from a beneficiary of al-Qaidah to its enemy. Pakistan was bullied into switching from a Taliban ally to its arch enemy. Iraq was falsely accused to links to al-Qaidah and 9/11. Lebanon and Palestine were severely punished after some of their militias attacked the soldiers of their Israeli enemy.

Thousands of suspects have been captured in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and were subjected to torture and degrading treatment. More than 500 of these detainees, including some boys, were transferred to an American prison camp in Guantanamo, Cuba. They have been held without charge and subjected to physical and psychological abuse.

Still, one has to warn against perceptions of a looming world war between the U.S. and Muslims. American Muslims have managed to turn their experience of discrimination into a cause for political mobilization. Last month they celebrated the first Muslim elected to Congress. This development, however, does little to fixing America's troubled relations with Muslim nations.

Policy Failures

Since the war on terror and the war in Iraq began,

 Terrorism and radicalism in the Muslim world have risen.

o The most recent National Intelligence Estimate illustrates this fact.

 Iraq has become another source of instability and a recruitment ground for extremists.

 The U.S. lost credibility in the world, particularly among Muslims.

o While President Bush talked about a Palestinian state, he approved the Israeli illegal grab of the envisioned state's lands.

o While the U.S. has made the targeting of civilians a major world problem after 9/11, the Bush Administration supported Israeli bombing of civilian infrastructure and residential sectors of Southern Lebanon and Gaza.

o While the U.S. spoke highly of democratization in the Muslim world, the U.S. punished people for choosing candidates it did not like.

o The widespread use of torture in American-controlled prisons in the pursuit of the war on terror and the war in Iraq has made the U.S. the target of repeated criticism by international human rights organizations.

Three main lessons have been learned:

1. America's involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq exposed the fragility of political structures in Muslim-majority countries. Yet, America's involvement in the political mess of these nations has only made things worse for both both sides. Clearly, democracy cannot be imposed on people by war. 2. Militarism is not the right answer to terrorism. Only a sensible political reform process coupled with conflict resolution can reduce the appeal of extremism and violent tendencies.

3. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains the mother of all problems in the Middle East, feeding anti-Americanism and radicalism in the region.

Iraq Study Group (ISG) Recommendations

The report prepared by the Baker-Hamilton Commission came admits shortcomings in the current U.S. policy in the Middle East. Yet it fell short of confronting the core elements of the crisis. Instead it focused on redefining the U.S. military mission in Iraq.

There is no doubt that reducing the military presence in Iraq means fewer targets to the insurgency and may possibly reduce American casualties. This suggestion seems to respond to domestic political pressure that was felt by the November 7, 2006 vote. An opposite view holds that more U.S. troops are needed to stabilize Iraq, whose failure could mean serious long-term risks for American interests in the region. It is not quite evident, however, how any troop levels would fix the compounding of policy dilemmas that America is facing.

The Baker-Hamilton Commission calls for involving regional powers, including Iran and Syria, to stabilize Iraq. This is a prudent advice, but merely drawing Iraq's neighbors into a mess created by the United States offers no fresh perspective. The involvement of regional players could be essential to a new strategy that aims at scaling back hostilities in the region and pursing conflict resolution and serious reconstruction.

A major shortcoming in the ISG report is the lack of consideration to the paradigm shift in the U.S . conduct of foreign policy since 9/11. For the first time the American government has pursued policy with a dangerous disregard to the fundamental difference between state and non-state actors, a core principle that defines the contemporary nation-state system. In pursuing a war against a non-state actor by attacking an unrelated U.N. member state—and doing so against the expressed collective will of the international body—the U.S. government has undermined the authority of the U.N. and the very concept of International Law.

Changing Course

Due to the high level of suspicion regarding U.S. intentions, no policy changes will amount to a clean exit strategy. The current problems were compounded by post 9/11 policies, but they have festered for several decades. There is not going to be a short term solution. Only a long-term strategy aimed at reducing tensions, restructuring U.S. role in Muslim countries and rehabilitating America's damaged reputation may offer effective remedies.

De-escalate

The U.S. should pursue a holistic approach to problems in the region through de- escalation of tensions. Specifically, the U.S. should:

o Begin reviewing domestic measures that contributed to an unprecedented level of Islamophobia in U.S. and discrimination against Muslims in daily life.

o Seek the least damaging exit from Iraq and Afghanistan.

. Support the formulation of institutions representing all citizens, abandoning "selective favors" tactics that stirred up sectarian and ethnic tensions.

. Do not offer political advice on domestic politics or policy in these countries.

. Complete U.S. withdrawal based on the request of legitimate governments.

. If Iraqis and Afghanis are not ready, hand over security to the U.N., the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Conference.

o Lead a genuine peace process to end the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of international legitimacy, supporting an Israeli withdrawal to the June 4, 1967 borders and the principle of return or compensation for Palestinian refugees.

o Abandon military bases where there is substantial popular opposition to their presence, especially in states with non-elected rulers.

Restructure

As the U.S. disengages from direct and indirect hostilities, a re-craft of relations with a clear focus on its core interests in the Muslim world can proceed without stifling distortions. The core American interests are:

1. Uninterrupted access to energy sources.

2. Unimpeded access to strategic waterways.

3. Regional peace.

4. Arresting international terrorism.

In pursuing these core objectives, the U.S.:

o Should not abandon political reform in Muslim-majority countries as a policy outlook. But the U.S. should do not push it aggressively.

. The U.S. should support reform measures and oppose oppressive policies by all regimes.

. The U.S. should encourage the building of institutions of governance that are capable of managing internal disputes.

o The civil war in Iraq proves that recognizing and arbitrating societal cleavages is a necessary condition for domestic peace and political reform.

o Should craft policies toward Muslim-majority states with full respect to their sovereignty. . Muslims oppose replacing their dictators with elected rulers who operate on the basis of dictates from outside powers.

o Should seek alliance with stable governments that are friendly to the U.S.

. In pursuing relations the U.S. should assess ruling parties on the basis of their policy proposals, not the religious profile of their leaders.

. American opposition to governments with anti-American policy outlook will then be seen by people in the region as a legitimate American pursuit of well-defined interests rather than an imperialist posture designed to subjugate Muslims.

o Should pursue an international agreement on terrorism and honor it.

 This agreement should spell what each nation is required to do to combat international terrorism.  The agreement should include clear provisions regarding sanctions, including the expulsion from the U.N., against non-compliant nations.

Rehabilitate

In order to effectuate a reversal of relations between the U.S. and Muslims, the U.S. should assist Iraqis and Afghanis in reconstructing the infrastructure destroyed by U.S. bombing. The U.S. should:

o Commit substantial resources to help Iraqis and Afghanis speed up their economic recovery.

o Recommit the U.S. to respecting the U.N. and the Geneva Convention in the conduct of war.

. Develop a clear policy on torture by the various branches of the U.S. military and an effective training program to ensure compliance.

o Promote people to people contacts with Muslims. . Utilize the knowledge and expertise of American Muslims to vouch for American values and friendship.