Europeanisation and Regional Governance in Southern Italy

Europeanisation and Regional Governance in Southern Italy: local development policies in Calabria and Apulia Relazione presentata al Congresso annuale della Società Italiana di Scienza Politica Sessione “Europeizzazione: l’impatto dell’Unione Europea su istituzioni, processi, politiche degli stati membri” Napoli, 28-29 settembre – Facoltà di Sociologia, Università Federico II

Paolo Graziano Dipartimento di Scienza della Politica e Sociologia Università di Firenze e-mail: [email protected] Second Draft – please do not quote without permission

2 Introduction1

In the political science literature on transformation of centre-periphery relations and European integration quite often both processes are strictly linked (Keating and Jones, 1985; Keating, 1988; Keating and Jones, 1995). Nevertheless, the mechanisms of such linkage are often weekly explored and understood. One preliminary positive point of departure could be the analysis of European cohesion policy and its impact on regional governance (Hooghe, 1996; Le Galès and Lesquesne, 1997; Piattoni and Smyrl, 1998; Smyrl, 1996).

What is suggested in the paper is to focus on one of the most relevant policy areas (cohesion policy) where decision making powers have been or are in the process of being delegated to the regions by the national level, and explore the role played by EU policies and institutions. The paper will consider Italy and, in particular, two Southern regions: Calabria and Apulia2.

Why the Southern regions and why these two Southern regions? For three main reasons: the first one deals with the end of the Intervento Straordinario in 1992. Such circumstance offered even more policy windows for new political actors and institutions to get into the game and made the case of the Mezzogiorno even more interesting as a case study for policy and institutional change; secondly, the two regions have not been sufficiently covered by recent literature; finally because the two regions are characterised by different degrees of institutional performance (Putnam, 1993) and therefore offer a sufficient degree of variation enabling the research not to be biased by specific features which could be found only in one region. Therefore, the regions selected seem to be sufficiently representative of the Italian Mezzogiorno offering the opportunity of preliminary generalisations which could be verified with further empirical research3.

The paper is organised in the following way. In the first paragraph the concept of Europeanisation and its euristic validity is discussed and a general framework for the

1 A first draft of this paper was presented at the Conference Group on Italian Politics and Society "New Developments in Italian Politics and Society", APSA Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., Aug. 31 – Sept. 4, 2000. 2 For findings regarding other Northern regions, see Ferrera, Gualmini, Graziano, Alti, 2000. 3 The research project mentioned above will probably take into consideration all twenty Italian regions, offering the possibity to test the general hypothesis provided by the first preliminary findings regarding three Southern Italian Regions (Campania, Apulia and Calabria) and two Italian Northern ones (Lombardia and Emilia Romagna).

3 analysis of regional governance transformation as induced by Europeanisation is provided; in the following paragraphs the transformations of national and regional governance during the 1990s are discussed; finally some conclusive reflections on the “impact of Europe” on national and (in particular) regional governance are suggested.

1. Europeanisation: the use of a concept

The debate on Europeanisation is quite recent (mid-1990s). Until the early 1990s scholars focused more on the process of European integration, which differs substantially from Europeanisation of domestic institutions (Radaelli, 2000)4. Even if Anderssen and Eliassen have already talked about “europeification” in 1993, it is only in more recent years that the national dimension of European integration and the differences in national5 and regional6 responses to this integration have been given greater analytical importance. In this literature, the units of analysis are not European institutions and the “European political space”, but rather European domestic policy and the relationship between EU policies and national institutions and policies.

The first definition presenting some empirical orientation has been provided by Caporaso, Green-Cowles and Risse. These authors consider Europeanisation as “the emergence and development at the European level of a distinct political system, a set of political institutions that formalizes and routinizes interactions among the actors, and the growth of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative rules” (Cowles et al., 2000 forthcoming). Such a complex definition is not completely satisfactory. As Radaelli rightly pointed out “policy networks are taken as a matter of faith. [Instead] their existence and influence is a matter of empirical (not definitional!) analysis” (Radaelli, 2000: 3). Furthermore, there are non European political institutions which "formalize and routinize the interactions among actors"; for example, national institutions play a role (for the Italian case, see Ferrera and Gualmini, 1999). Following the suggestions provided by Morlino (1999) and Radaelli

4 Radaelli rightly points out that “Europeanisation would not exist without European integration” (Radaelli, 2000: 6), implying, therefore, that such integration is a prerequisite of Europeanisation. 5 Bulmer, 1983; Anderssen and Eliassen, 1993; Ladrech, 1994; Olsen, 1995; Mény, Muller and Quermonne, 1996; W. Wallace, 1996; Radaelli, 1997; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 1999; Schmidt , 1999. 6 Keating and Jones, 1995; Rhodes, 1995; Hooghe, 1996; Keating and Hooghe, 1996; Jeffery, 1997; Le Galès and Lequesne, 1997; Conzelmann, 1998.

4 (2000), it is argued that in order to “unpack” the concept and making it even more useful, the political dimensions of Europeanisation need to be stated clearly.

Europeanisation, therefore, can be broadly defined as a process involving two distinct dimensions : the first one is a bottom up process through which national political, social and economic forces give birth to a new European supranational political and institutional setting; the second one is a top down process through which EU political, social and economic dynamics become an increasingly important part of domestic political discourse, identities, representation structures, public institutions and public policies.

Looking more closely at public policies, Europeanisation can be even more precisely defined as a more or less accentuated process of supranationalisation of the decision-making process at the EU level which manifests itself in: the emergence of new institutions of supranational government, the redefinition of the competencies of national and subnational government institutions, and the diffusion of policies derived from principles and values which are to some extent innovative with regard to national policies. I will try to illustrate the adequateness of such a definition by analysing cohesion policy in Italy focusing in particular on its impact on Regional governance in Southern Italy.

2. Europeanisation of Cohesion Policy in Italy: the national dimension

2.1. Patterns of adaptation: moving from path dependency…

In order to assess the impact of Eu cohesion policies on Italian regions, one must briefly describe the transformations occurred at national level induced by EU policies. In fact, cohesion policy is the most important market correcting policy (i.e. redistributive) implemented at the EU level. First, because it explicitly targets regions that are lagging behind and are in need of financial resources in order to catch up with more advanced regions in Europe, and, second, because it redistributes resources to peripheral territories that are struggling with the liberalisation and deregulation process (which means building an increasingly free market) taking place in Europe (Marks, 1993).

5 The objective of social and economic cohesion has already been addressed in the Preamble to the EEC Treaty of Rome, even if the propositions that it spelt out were not immediately met with the adoption of a comprehensive cohesion policy framework7. It was in the 1970s (and more markedly in the 1990s) that the territorial dimension and the weight of European institutions gained relevance. In regulation 2088/85 – mainly inspired by the Greek and French governments – the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP) were brought to life. These programmes represented a clear and decisive attempt to correct and rationalise European cohesion policy.

In 1988 this policy was reinforced by the approval of the first reform of the financial instruments of cohesion policy which witnessed a substantial increase in funds allocation. Essentially, throughout the course of the 1990s, the resources made available by the EU have increased significantly, accounting for 35.2% of the EU budget, and absorbing just under 0.5% of the average GDP of the member states8.

The IMP introduced principles – consolidated by successive structural fund reforms (1988, 1992-93, 1998-99) – that promoted the emergence of a multilevel pattern of governance. These principles are: concentration, partnership, programming and additionality. To these four fundamental principles must be added two important additional functions introduced with the IMP that concern guaranteeing the efficiency of policy implementation: monitoring and evaluation.

In Italy, cohesion policy has been faced primarily with the persistent territorial differences of economic development and has been used mainly as a tool of strong intervention in the Mezzogiorno. Up to L. 64 (1986) and L. 488 (1992), which ended the Intervento Straordinario for the Mezzogiorno, Italian national cohesion policies had common features that made them substantially different from EU policies.

First, the additionality feature simply did not exist. There was only one actor, the national actor, who provided funds for socio-economic development. Thus, shared responsibility did not occur since the supranational actor did not have any competencies under Italian legislation.

7 For more detailed accounts see Armstrong (1995); Pollack (1995); Staeck (1996). 8 For the data see European Commission (1998: 34).

6 Second, the programming of the interventions provided for by the regulations never became a reality; in the 1950s and in the 1960s, despite the powerful impetus given to the programming principle, real interventions remained fragmentary.

Third, the practices of horizontal partnership both at a national and a subnational level were very weak. In the past, only a few strong social actors (mainly industrial associations and trade unions) were active in the occasional negotiations. Other social actors were excluded. Instead, after the end of the Intervento straordinario (and more consistently during the negotiation of the new CSF 2000-2006) new actors, such as non profit organisations, SME associations and co-operatives entered into the negotiation arena. Considerable changes are also emerging at a regional level.

Furthermore, even vertical negotiation struggled to gain acceptance. The decentralisation features expressed by Law 64/86 were, by their nature, merely executive. Moreover, a perspective so favourable to regional governments appears notably altered if one also considers the rather limited role reserved for the regions both in the ascendant and descendent phases of EU policy. In short, considering the alliance between the regions and an outside powerful institutional actor (the Commission) and contrasting it with a situation in which the only negotiation possible was between a strong national actor and other weaker actors (i.e. the regions) or actors with few competencies (i.e. provinces and communal institutions), the differences between national and supranational principles becomes even more clear. Even from a strictly formal point of view, the regions previously had only minor opportunities to intervene in the formulation of national policies at the national level when compared with the EU policy formulation environment9.

Finally, until EU policy came into action, the concentration principle was not considered to be relevant to national regulations. One could object that such a principle was implicit in the choice to distribute special subsidies to southern regions. However, this objection does not hit the mark. Of the three types of concentration provided by EU regulations (priority, sectorial, and financial and geographic concentration), only the latter was partially included by national legislation. Furthermore, Italian cohesion policy did not provide adequate monitoring and 9 Several pieces of research have shown that in the past 10-15 years the European Commission has constantly tried to increase regional powers and limit national competencies. See Hooghe (1996b); Tömmel (1998).

7 evaluation devices for the implementation of development programmes, being characterised rather by a high degree of party interference in the allocation of resources10.

2.2. …to domestic institutional and policy change.

Since 1975 Italy has been confronted with a new and important actor in the administration of socio-economic disparities: the EU institutions. At a European level, Italy was particularly weak in making her voice heard in international bargaining 11. In this new European arena national interests were not well defended. In fact, Italy has benefited from EU subsidies in large part due to the pressure of other member states (Greece and France first, then Spain and Portugal respectively) interested in the adoption of measures favouring areas considered to be underdeveloped.

Italian indifference influenced the two Structural Funds negotiation rounds at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s which demonstrated the scarce attention paid by Italian decision makers to vital European financial matters. In contrast, the new round for the period 2000-2006 has shown a strong potential prompted by Treasury Ministery (Ministero del Tesoro, del Bilancio e della Programmazione economica) already during the policy formulation phase.

Until 1995 the management of EU affairs concerning cohesion policy was characterised by a great “disorganisation”12. It was only with the founding in June 1995 of the Cohesion Policy Service (Servizio per le politiche di coesione) within the Budget Ministry that the formulation of cohesion policy over the period 1994-1999 availed of a tool of co-ordination and stimulus which contributed to speeding up the implementation of the CSF 1994-1999. Over the course of the last two years, the Treasury Ministry, which centralised all of the competencies for the “new programming” and also fulfilled an incisive co-ordination role with regard to social and regional institutional actors, followed the principles of concentration, programming, additionality and partnership more closely.

10 On this point see also Trigilia (1992:13). 11 See Ferrera (1991); Giuliani (1992). 12 Commissione speciale per le politiche comunitarie, 1996, p.4.

8 Throughout 1998, the creation of a governmental department within the Treasury Ministry explicitly dedicated to development and cohesion policies (Dipartimento per le politiche di sviluppo e coesione) led until recently (Dec. 1999) by an expert from the Bank of Italy, the launching of the process of negotiation nearly a year before the beginning of the 2000-2006 programme, the detailed diffusion of information relating to EU initiatives, the continued activity of co-ordination, and the definition of precise timing and procedures (generally respected by all of the institutional actors involved), all confirm the idea that the adaptation of the formulation of cohesion policy to EU tools has increased notably over the last few years.

First, from a top-down perspective, the Treasury Ministry has underlined the centrality of the regions, insisting on one of the cardinal principles of the structural funds – programming – and founding, alongside national horizontal negotiations, a board for regional horizontal negotiations. With the adoption of the new CSF there is a consistent move towards a “regionalisation” of the management of Structural Funds. During the period 2000-2006 more than 70% of the total resources available will be managed by the region compared to less than 50% in the previous CSF.

Second, also a bottom-up dynamic has developed. The intense concertation at both national and regional levels contributed to increasing the number of social actors involved in the decision-making process, facilitating the formation and promotion of a “regional interest” during the programming of EU cohesion policy. Calabria, for example, formed a regional Co-ordination Committee for Structural Funds 2000-2006 composed of representatives of local institutions, social actors and trade associations, who actively contributed to the draft of the regional programming document that was then presented to Rome and Brussels. In Apulia also, albeit with less promptness, a similar process of negotiation and programming between the regional government, social actors and representatives from the trade association world was initiated, contributing to the elaboration of the region’s programming document.

3. Europeanisation of Cohesion Policy in Italy: the regional dimension

9 Europeanisation has occurred not only at the national level but also at the regional one13. According to the local élites, the main changes perceived concern: the strengthening of the regional executive vis-à-vis both the regional legislative body and the national executive; the opening up of the network of interests and actors to some extent involved in both policy formulation and implementation; an initial adaptation process on behalf of the bureaucracy (although quite different across regions); the limitation of party influence on regional decision making. It is hard to say what part of such changes are to be explained by Europeanisation, but first of all it is necessary to: 1) provide some basic socioeconomic information on the two regions14; 2) fully describe the changes that have occurred in the past decade and 3) try to answer the question concerning the relative importance of exogenous (i.e. Europe) or endogenous (i.e. domestic autonomous transformations) sources of change.

Calabria

4.1. Socioeconomic background Calabria is the region with the lowest GDP per capita in Italy and with the highest unemployment rates. As far as export performance is concerned, Calabria traditionally had a very marginal role in national exports. In 1997, the region covered only 0.1% of the national export share (exports in Calabria were worth about 200 Million Euros and about 200 Billion Euros in Italy). Since World War II, Calabria has always been one of the poorest regions in Italy, and has not benefited very much from the so-called 'economic miracle' witnessed in Italy between the 1950s and the 1960s. Over the past 50 years, low GDP growth rates have been one of the main features of the development model of the region and economic growth has been nourished basically by public subsidies.

Calabria is also characterised by a very high structural unemployment rate and by a consistent mismatch between very high labour supply and few job opportunities. Youth unemployment (especially among young females) is very high (table 1), whereas among the 40-50 year age bracket the situation is slightly different (table 2). It is not infrequent that entire sectors of the population of Calabria have not seen a 13 This part of the research is based on 30 semi-structured interviews (15 per region) submitted to regional political and social élites performed during the period march-june 1999.

14 Regions in Italy were formally established by the Constitution (1948), but only in the 70s (with the D. Lvo 616/77) they became effective and strarted to be responsible for various public policies including vocational training and local development.

10 regular job ever. The 1993-1999 trend highlights that unemployment among young people has grown by almost 30% (from 44.5% to 57.7%), and so has the total unemployment (from 20.3% to 28.3%). Disaggregating the data, female youth unemployment emerges as even higher (65.8% in 1998), while the figure for males is slightly less dramatic (50.5%). Also particularly low are both the employment rate (39.4%) and the participation rate (54.9%). The sectorial analysis of employment shows, in the period 1993-1999, a decline of both the agricultural (high for Italian standards) and industry (low for Italian standards) sectors, somewhat compensated by an increase in the service sector.

If we look at a more broad and less 'formal' picture, we find that an informal economy is flourishing and offering some kind of employment to a consistent number of people. According to the President of the local artisan organisation, in the construction sector more than 70% of the market is in the black economy, and also in other economic sectors (retail services and agriculture) about 50% of the workers are employed on an informal basis.

TABLE 1. Participation, employment and unemployment rates for males in Calabria*, 1993-1999 Employment rate Unemployment rate Participation rate Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 1990 56.8 24.5 40.5 18.2 36.1 24.6 69.4 38.3 53.8 1991 56.7 23.8 40.1 17.0 34.6 23.1 68.4 36.4 52.3 1992 57.0 26.0 41.3 16.8 30.3 21.6 68.5 37.3 52.8 1993 55.4 25.2 39.9 15.6 28.9 20.3 65.7 34.7 50.0 1994 53.4 24.0 38.6 16.9 29.9 21.5 64.3 34.3 49.1 1995 51.7 23.5 37.4 18.3 32.3 23.3 63.2 34.8 48.9 1996 50.5 22.3 36.3 20.0 34.7 25.2 63.1 34.1 54.0 1997 50.7 21.4 35.9 19.3 33.8 24.3 62.8 32.4 47.4 1998 50.3 21.1 35.6 20.4 38.5 26.8 63.2 34.3 48.6 1999 56.1 22.5 39.4 20.8 42.0 28.3 70.8 38.9 54.9 * For the years 1990-1992 rates are calculated on the population over 15 years of age; for the years 1993-1999 rates are calculated on the population 15-70. Source: Istat, Forze di lavoro, 1990-1999.

TABLE 2. Youth unemployment rate (15-29) in Calabria and in Italy, 1990-1999 Calabria% Italy % 1990 53.6 24.8 1991 49.6 24.1 1992 42.6 20.6

11 1993 44.7 22.9 1994 45.4 24.6 1995 50.0 25.8 1996 54.0 25.8 1997 52.8 26.1 1998 57.1 26.1 1999 57.7 25.6 Source: Istat, Forze di lavoro, 1990-1999.

4.2. The relevance of Europe for regional political economy: EU Structural Funds Calabria has benefited from the EU Objective 1 funds for more than 10 years. Nevertheless, until recently the capacity to actually spend these funds has been – like in many other Southern regions - quite weak on the part of both the national (POM programmes) and the regional government (CSF programmes). By the end of 1997 the ratio payments/commitments summed only 24.6% of the total, while in 1998 – mainly due to the reorganisation of the offices dealing with local development matters within the national government – the ratio reached a considerable 50.9% mark. Furthermore, at the regional level there have been some important organisational changes in the implementation and management of EU funds which have proved to be quite relevant, while in other policy sectors (such as the new employment services) the lack of institutional capacity has been dramatic. After the end of the Intervento Straordinario (1992) the Structural Funds and the implementation style required by EU law became the most important financial and organisational feature of cohesion policy in Southern Italy. Such policy change had a important (although limited with comparison to Apulia) impact on the patterns of regional governance in Calabria.

4.3. Calabria: from a closed to a (slightly more) open system of regional governance The co-operation network among institutional and social actors has traditionally been very weak in Calabria. Recently, such co-operation has greatly increased, especially among municipal institutions and social actors. The change has mostly an exogenous origin: EU programmes (Structural Funds and Urban programme for the cities) had a strong impact on the actors which however have not yet constituted a consolidated network. During the policy formulation phase, EU funded programmes

12 (Agenda 2000) have forced the regional institution to foster a wide co-operation among various social actors, including Third Sector actors. Before this very recent policy inclination - it is too early to jump to conclusive remarks on the nature of this phenomenon considering it a fully fledged change -, social actors in Calabria were very poorly institutionalised (i.e the Confindustria - national employers association - had a very small regional office which was permanently understaffed and therefore never had a strong institutional impact on local policy-making) while the main social (and institutional) ties were family-based or familistic.

The 1980s: (few) atoms without a constellation – a weak, closed policy network

Since their foundation, regional institutions were very weak and characterised by a very low degree of policy innovation, and horizontal societal co-operation was rare. Furthermore, vertical co-operation was particularly fragile. The region was very closed to innovation and co-operation, even with regards to other institutional actors (such as the Province and the Comuni). Conflictual patterns of relations were frequent and communication often lacking.

Also among the municipal institutions within the region, the relations were conflictual and competitive, while societal actors were simply interested in cultivating their short-term interests (increasing the number of affiliates). In the words of the regional artisan association's (CNA) President: "Calabria always had a great weakness: it is composed of ‘atoms’ and has never constituted a true system". Also the regional Agenzia del Lavoro has been considered suspiciously by local institutions which saw in this central institution a sort of control on what they wanted to be decentralised activities.

The main institutions responsible for policy formulation were the national government (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Industry, etc.) and the Parliament, which were also responsible for a very formal evaluation. The region had only implementative tasks. As in other regions, the top-down pattern of implementation was state-guided and, to a certain extent, controlled. Nevertheless, regional and local policy-makers had some freedom of action and choice, but their action and choices were always residual if confronted to the national ones. In particular, the most important local actors were party leaders or politicians who often were able to

13 implement national policies following particolaristic and clientelistic lines (i.e. providing job opportunities in the public sector or in publicly owned firms to a large number of ‘clients’).

Also the horizontal relations with trade unions and especially with employers’ associations were scarce and conflictual, in particular due to the extreme weakness of such institutions. At the regional level, as in the other regions, the Regional Commission for Employment (Commissione regionale per l’impiego), established in 1987 – consisting of six representatives of the employers’ associations, six representatives of the most relevant trade unions (Cgil-Cisl-Uil), three representatives of the region and three representatives of the national Ministry -, had the task of keeping conflicts regarding labour policy and development issues under control and of promoting negotiation among the various actors. Notwithstanding its limited powers - mainly consultative - the commission was the only institutionalised setting for bargaining, confrontation and conflict avoidance, although according to the actors interviewed its performance has always been inadequate and not efficiently organised.

Furthermore, the commission had a very closed nature: only institutional actors were represented, while non-conventional actors (non-profit organisations, social co- operatives, Catholic associations, etc.) were excluded. As in other Southern regions, sub-regional associations (i.e. associations organised on a municipal and provincial basis) were also penalised compared to the regional level, since on the one hand they had very limited voice at the regional level, and on the other hand sub-regional institutions, more accessible, had very scarce competencies in the field of labour and local development policies. Figure 1 sums up the main relevant actors in Calabria during the 1980s15.

Figure 1. Members of the cohesion policy network in Calabria during the 1980s.

15 The relevant actors are those cited most frequently by the interviewees.

14 - National government and Parliament - Parties and local party leaders - Trade unions (CGIL-CISL-UIL) - Business associations (Confindustria, API) - Agricultural associations - Artisan associations

The 1990s: the slow making of a regional governance system

Recently, major initiatives in local development have been taken by municipal institutional and social actors. In several parts of the territory, these programmes have led to policy network coalitions which were able not only to ‘get together’ and apply for national or EU funds, but also to discuss and find agreements on communal development strategies within the territory of Calabria. For instance, for the territorial pact of Cosenza the mayor was the first one to move towards a co-operative approach, and the Urban programme has helped very much to set the framework for new development and labour policies at a sub-regional level. In particular, national and EU financial resources have helped to institutionalise and formalise co-operation networks among Comuni, Province and social actors. Absent (partially so still) and less open to innovation was the region. Social actors are undertaking a process of profound innovation, since they have understood the importance of an horizontal network at a sub-national level in order to profit not only from the inexploited territorial resources, but also from national and EU funds.

As in Campania, co-operation and policy networks were very scarcely spread out before the new national and EU policy initiatives of the 1990s. A policy learning process is currently occuring at all institutional levels, although at the regional level things seem to move slower than at the municipal and, to a certain extent, the intermediary level (Provincia).

New social actors have been inserted in the forming system. Actors such as Caritas and Forum del Terzo Settore, until now quite important informally but never really recognised by public institutions, have contributed to give birth to a new multilevel network (figure 2). - Municipal governments Figure 2. Members of the- cohesionRegional policy government network in Calabria during the ‘90s. - Provincial governments - Local party leaders - Agricultural associations - Trade unions (CGIL-CISL-UIL) - Artisan associations - Business associations (Confindustria) 15 - Co-operative associations - Third Sector Associations Among regional offices the main unit member of the co-operation network is the Industry and not Social Affairs office, although social integration remains the main goal of local labour and cohesion policies. This indicates, however, the potential impact of local development programmes which have been at the centre of several territorial pacts and area contracts. Creation of employment is considered to be a direct effect of local development policies and this is the reason why offices of the Assessorato all'Industria are more active and involved in the co-operation network.

The new policy zeitgeist in favour of co-operation methods was introduced after the end of the Intervento Straordinario (1992)16, which until then was the main policy instrument (rather inefficient according to those interviewed) for development policies. The new co-operation approach has the great advantage of introducing a new method to elaborate solutions to public problems (such as unemployment).

Nevertheless, critical points still remain. In the first place, the new problem- solving approach often is hampered by the low cultural level of the bureaucratic staff which makes it difficult to gather fast and reliable information concerning the territory. The regional authority often does not seem to be responsible not only before the regional assembly, but also before the citizens. Accountability is still very hard to accomplish, and this factor often makes co-operation more difficult and time- consuming.

Another factor which hampers co-operation is the difficulty and slowness of funding allocation. Often it takes too much time simply to have the necessary money to start negotiated programmes. This has relevant consequences on building confidence in the workability of the procedure and on the well-functioning of central

16 Intervento staordinario is the set of policies which were aimed, during the period 1950-1992, to reduce territorial disparities and promote economic development in the Southern italian regions.

16 institutions. “If the central government does not set a good example, what should we do?” - stated a regional top officer in one of the interviews.

The final negative factor linked with the co-operation approach is that often concertation is not real and effective but virtual, and thus not considered important by local social actors. Until now concertation has “meant meetings, meetings and even more meetings” aimed at putting social and political actors together and making them interact. Furthermore, there are no examples of autonomous programmes initiated by local social actors - such as in Apulia. Co-operation stems mainly from the national public institution, and until now not all the other public institutions have understood the importance of this new policy paradigm: in fact, communal dynamism often contrasts with regional immobility.

Apulia

5.1. Socio-economic background conditions

Apulia is considered to be a ‘system of systems’, as stated in a regional official document. Within the regional territory there are consistent disparities which show how certain areas of the region are almost in line with the national standards (table 5), while others are characterised by a profound economic and employment crisis. Especially over the past three years, Apulia has experienced a severe negative employment and economic performance trend (table 1). The unemployment rate has increased from 13.9% (1993) to 20% (1999) – i.e. almost 300,000 jobs have been lost in six years – and the annual GDP growth has fallen to an average of 0.6% for the period 1993-1997 (the 1987-1992 average was 2.2%). Nevertheless, Eurostat data show that in 1996 the GDP per capita was 71% of the European average, while the national average was 103%, positioning Apulia among the most developed regions of the Mezzogiorno (together with Abruzzi, Molise and Sardinia). Export figures have improved in the past 15 years as well, performing a constant 12% yearly growth. However, the regional export share still represents only 2% of the national figure.

Particularly impressive is the number of people in search of a first job, which covers almost 50% of the total unemployed. Among them, young people and women seem to be the most weak figures in the picture. In 1999, employment rates show the

17 gender bifurcation among the employed in Apulia: while the employment rate among females is 23.7%, the same rate for the male workforce is 61.7%. The 1993-1999 trend highlights that youth unemployment has grown by almost 35% (from 29.8% to almost 41%), and even more severe has been the increase in the number of the total unemployed (see tables 3 and 4). A more detailed data disaggregation makes the picture even more dramatic. Female youth unemployment emerges as even higher (51.8% in 1998), while the male figure is slightly less dramatic (34.5%). Also particularly low are both the total employment rate (42.5%) and the total participation one (53.1%) although they have increased since 1998.

The sectorial analysis of employment shows that in the period 1993-1999 there has not been a consistent decline of the agricultural and industry sectors as noticed in other Southern regions (Calabria and Campania). Agriculture has declined by only two points, from 15.6% to 13.7%, while the figure for industry has remained unaltered at 26%. Instead, the service sector has shown a moderate increase.

TABLE 1. Participation, employment and unemployment rates in Apulia*, 1993-1999 Employment rate % Unemployment rate % Participation rate % Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 1990 63.6 24.5 43.5 11.0 25.2 15.7 71.6 32.8 51.6 1991 61.8 24.9 42.8 12.0 24.5 16.1 70.2 32.9 52.3 1992 62.2 24.9 43.0 11.8 25.0 16.2 70.5 33.2 51.3 1993 60.2 23.7 41.3 11.2 20.0 13.9 67.7 29.1 47.9 1994 57.8 22.5 39.7 12.6 20.8 15.1 66.1 28.4 46.8 1995 57.1 21.7 39.0 13.1 24.7 16.8 65.7 28.8 46.8 1996 56.6 21.6 38.7 13.8 26.2 17.7 65.7 29.3 47.0 1997 55.6 21.4 38.1 15.2 27.7 19.2 65.5 29.6 47.1 1998 55.7 21.6 38.3 16.5 29.8 20.9 66.7 30.9 48.4 1999 61.7 23.7 42.5 14.6 31.0 20.0 72.3 34.4 53.1 * For the years 1990-1992 rates are calculated on the population over 15 years of age; for the years 1993-1999 rates are calculated on the population 15-70. Source: Istat, Forze di lavoro, 1990-1999.

TABLE 2. Youth unemployment rate (15-29) in Apulia and Italy, 1990-1999. Apulia% Italy % 1990 35.4 24.8 1991 34.6 24.1 1992 27.5 20.6 1993 29.8 22.9 1994 32.4 24.5 1995 37.0 25.8

18 1996 37.9 25.8 1997 39.9 26.1 1998 41.3 26.1 1999 40.4 25.6 Source: Istat, Forze di lavoro, 1990-1999.

5.2. The relevance of Europe for regional political economy: EU Structural Funds

Also Apulia, as Calabria, is among the Southern Italian regions benefiting from the EU Objective 1 funds. By the end of 1997 the ratio payments/commitments summed 25% of the total, while in 1998 – mainly due to the creation of the Dipartimento per le Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione within the Ministry of Treasury which proved to be more efficient in the fund allocation – the ratio reached 47.4%. At the regional level, there have been only a few organisational changes (i.e. the strenghtening of the Assessorato Programmazione, regional governmental body encharged of the policy formulation at the regional level) which until now have not been as relevant as those introduced by the central government.

5.3. Apulia: increasing the openness of the system of regional governance

The 1980s: societal dynamism vs. institutional immobility During the 1980s, in Apulia co-operation networks have been restricted to some areas within the region, while at the regional level only in the second part of the 1990s has co-operation been put into action. There were informal and informative links which involved social actors and individual public regional officers. A clientelistic system which distributed benefits to all prevailed and therefore very few actors were against it.

The entrepreneurial culture was state-centric: only if the public funds were available, would entrepreneurs have initiated large investments. It is only with the end (1992) of the Intervento Straordinario per il Mezzogiorno (special development policies for the Southern regions) that concertation and co-operation methods were adopted by local actors.

As for the other Italian regions, the main institutions responsible for policy formulation were the national government (Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Industry,

19 etc.) and the Parliament, which were also responsible for a very formal evaluation. The regional institution in Apulia had only implementation tasks and therefore weak powers. Furthermore, the top-down pattern of implementation was state-guided and, to a certain extent, controlled.

Also the horizontal relations with trade unions and employers’ associations were scarce and for the most part formal. At the regional level, the Regional Commission for Employment (Commissione regionale per l’impiego) - which consisted of six representatives of the employers’ associations, six representatives of the most important trade unions (Cgil-Cisl-Uil), three representatives of the region and three representatives of the national Ministry -, had the task of moderating emerging conflicts and of promoting negotiation among the various actors. As in Calabria, the commission was the only institutionalised forum for bargaining, confrontation and conflict avoidance.

Finally, the commission had a very closed nature: only institutional actors were represented, while non-conventional actors (non-profit organisations, social co- operatives, Catholic associations, etc.) were excluded. Sub-regional associations (i.e. associations organised on a municipal and provincial basis) were also penalised compared to the regional level, since on the one hand they had very limited voice at the regional level, and on the other hand sub-regional institutions, more accessible, had very few competencies in the field of labour and local development policies. Figure 1 shows the main relevant actors in Apulia during the 1980s17.

17 The actors are those cited most frequently by the interviewees.

20 Figure 1. Members of the labour policy network in Apulia during the 1980s.

- National government and Parliament - Parties and local party leaders - Trade unions (CGIL-CISL-UIL) - Agricultural associations - Artisan associations - Business associations (Confindustria) - Banks - Minor business associations (API)

The 1990s: towards horizontal co-operation in a multilevel system of governance?

During the 1990s, European programmes have played an extraordinary role in increasing the co-operation inclination of local social and political actors (local actors talk about the “cultural importance” of European programmes). Vertical networks and relationships, however, continue to be quite weak, practically non-existent in fact. In particular, between regional and sub-regional institutions relationships are often conflictual rather than co-operative. Only due to EU Agenda 2000 and to the budget redefinition at the national level, sub-national public institutions have they been forced to co-operate, primarily in order to get funding. This new situation has determined an important change in the public-private relationship also. Local social actors have realised that the most significant and useful institutional connections in the future will not be at the national level, but rather at a sub-national one. Therefore, attention and resources have been reoriented towards this institutional level.

At the provincial level the situation is even more hostile to horizontal co-operation and concertation. Until recently, competencies of this institution were very few and they did not give birth to any policy network. With a regional Law (19/99) the situation is changing, but the innovation it is still too recent to provide an adequate evaluation. According to the provincial officer responsible for the implementation of such Law, until now the few competencies on vocational training were not delegated by the Regione, which instead has always "jealously" kept programming and co-ordination tasks. The programming capabilities of the Provincia are still very weak, and concertation and co-operation may be developed also as a way of overcoming the lack of experience and knowledge of the provincial officers.

At the same time, on the communal level institutional co-operation does not seem to be very highly developed. Until recent years, relationships between social

21 actors and the municipal public institutions had not been very relevant, while among social actors there has always been activism and internal dynamism. Instead, local communal relationships among social actors have been encouraged also by the common perception of the problems linked to public institutions. In other words, institutional weakness contributed to building societal partnerships. Now things are slowly changing but in an ambivalent way: for example, the mayor of Bari (recently re-elected) has privileged a relationship with the business community, while trade union interests have been left behind.

Some horizontal relationships, however, have developed among communal institutions within the provincial territory due in particular to the strong incentives offered by EU programmes and the new local development national programmes, which provide significant funding to concerted projects submitted by local institutions and social actors. The same pattern seems to have been present in other provincial territories (such as Lecce and Brindisi) where the co-operation among public sub- regional institutions and social actors has produced negotiated projects for local development financed either by EU (territorial pacts for employment) or by the national government.

Instead, at the communal level ‘internal’ horizontal co-operative relationships have been carried on by local social actors, in particular among the business community. Until recently, regional labour market institutions have been very weak and scarcely innovative, the local business association and the local bank association have acted on their own and agreed on the creation of a permanent monitoring and evaluating of both the labour and economic market. Therefore, the circulation of information (prerequisite of any kind of co-operation network) has occurred mainly among business social actors and has not covered the whole spectrum of social actors.

Among local social actors, there is a relevant difference between those actors who have a strong tradition of interest inter-mediation at the local level (business associations, trade unions, etc.) and those actors who are relatively new (third sector associations such as Forum del Terzo Settore, Caritas, small public interest groups, etc.), which are becoming more and more significant at the regional level (figure 2). These actors are consistently helped by EU policies which in the 1990s have offered numerous job opportunities to young and socially excluded individuals who were not

22 considered an important part of the local social actors’ spectrum. Social and local development promotion have offered them a ‘voice’ in the formulation and implementation of both policies for social inclusion and local development (such as programmes for the insertion of young unemployed into the labour market, implemented by non-profit organisations which were created explicitly for this purpose – i.e the case of 'info-point offices' on employment and social integration opportunities financed by EU funds and sponsored by the municipality of Bari).

Figure 2. Members of the labour policy network in Apulia during the ‘90s.

- Regional government - Provincial governments - Municipal governments - Trade unions (CGIL-CISL-UIL) - Business associations (Confindustria) - Parties and local party leaders - Agricultural associations - Artisan associations - Banks - Co-operative associations - Minor business associations (API) - Third Sector Associations

Almost all of the social actors agree in defining bureaucracy as a true obstacle to modernisation and effectiveness of the formulation and implementation of innovative policies at the regional level. Also according to the regional officers interviewed, in recent years the region has continued to yield inadequate results with respect to policy implementation and policy design. In Apulia a significant ‘cultural’ backwardness still remains. Clearly, this does not mean that all regional officers are inadequate in performing their institutional functions, but the summation of personal initiatives does not constitute a homogeneous 'institution capacity'.

6. The Transformation of Regional Governance The previous paragraphs have illustrated the progressive making of a Europeanisation of domestic cohesion policy: the traditional Italian policy of assistance for the Mezzogiorno is now aligned with an EU policy that has therefore

23 “Europeanised” the national policy. But what are the results of the “Europeanisation” of cohesion policy in Italy? In order to provide an answer it is necessary to disentagle the exogenous factor (Europe) from the possible endogenous sources of change.

In fact, also the “earthquake” that rocked the Italian political arena in the early nineties affected the policy area under examination. The persistence of wide territorial differences has favoured the consolidation and spread of a negative evaluation of the entire forty-year span of the Intervento Straordinario. In 1991 a referendum to abrogate such set of policies was proposed and, successively, Law. 448 was adopted in December 1992. In this context of institutional uncertainty, Europe has become an increasingly important political and legislative point of reference for both national and regional governments18. Being therefore even more legitimised and legitimising, Europe has had substantial repercussions on relations between the centre and periphery, between the executive and legislative, on national and regional bureaucracies, and on patterns of interest representation.

First, with regard to executive and legislative relations, the role of national government was increased on all fronts. At this time the Treasury Ministry plays the co-ordinating role and is the driving force behind cohesion policy, while Parliament, traditionally a key figure for national cohesion policies, has a rather weak controlling function. Also at a regional level it is the government that exercises key functions. For example, responsibility for EU policies in Apulia is under the President of Regional Government (Giunta), while the regional Assembly carries out only a marginal role.

Furthermore, a reorientation of centre-periphery has taken place, the most substantial effect being the increased resources available to regional government institutions. With the new programming for the period 2000-2006 in particular -- in which centre-periphery negotiation was quite intense -- the regions, as stated previously, will have the exclusive management of 70% of the total resources allocated to Italy at their disposal, whereas, for the other two CSF periods, they had managed less than 50% of the available budget. Moreover, the tools of the negotiated programming anticipate an increase in territorial centralisation and in the power of regional (and to a certain extent sub-regional) governments.

18 See also Giuliani (1996: 132).

24 The effects of Europeanisation have also been significant on bureaucracy. It is necessary to pause, above all, on the bureaucratic machinery in order to understand the amount of change triggered by the implementation of EU cohesion policy. Over the past years, to meet the challenge of the new procedures introduced by the Community bureaucracy19, a process of rationalisation and modernisation has been put in motion that continues to affect a deep change on the nature of administration in national and regional bureaucracies. Such a process implies a progressive independence of the bureaucratic machine from political parties and an adherence to the regulatory principles that limit the discretionary powers and steer administrative behaviour towards a problem-solving approach. Such modernisation occurred (and still occurs) at the national level while it is often determined by an incentive derived from the supranational or national level when it occurs in the regions.

Finally, interest representation is strongly influenced by the Europeanisation process. In particular at the regional level, the aims provided by EU programmes have widened the circle of the interests taken into account during the preparatory phases, including actors who were not previously on the scene at a regional level (e.g. minor business associations and representatives of Third Sector associations). According to interviewed actors, it is the first time that such involvement was not only effective but also quite inclusive. Such involvement is contributing to the decline of party control of decision making at a regional level, which was so relevant in the past, and was already weakened by the national “earthquake” of the early nineties. In this new context, regional government institutions take on a central role as co-ordinators and as a driving force mainly controlled by social actors and, in a much diluted role with respect to the past, political parties.

One question still remains: why was there discontinuity in the Europeanisation process? A response to this question needs to take into account two factors. The first factor, apart from the logic of public policies, is to be found in the “earthquake” which shook the Italian political scene in the early 1990s20. Such instability influenced the development of a more favourable view of Europe which came to be seen as a reference model or a necessary vincolo esterno21. In Italy traditional pro-Europe

19 See Franchini (1993) and Dente (1999: 123-124). 20 See Cotta (1996); Giuliani (1996). 21 See Dyson and Featherstone (1996).

25 rhetoric has given way to an effective Europeanisation of cohesion policy ratified and filtered by the national government in such a way that sought to remove, by means of a series of organisational and institutional innovations, those elements that were blocking its advance. In other words the existing disparities between EU and national policies were partially removed thanks to the adoption of a more active and resolute policy style in the ascendant phase (formulation) and more efficient in the descendent one (implementation).

The second factor to be taken into account is within the logic of public policy and deals with a concept that is familiar to policy analysts: policy learning. The IMP and the first reform of Structural Funds (1988) introduced elements of discontinuity in relation to principles, policy objectives, and Italian administrative procedures which required time to be “learned” and accepted by domestic policy-makers and bureaucrats. Only now, ten years later, the new European policy style is starting to be fully understood by national actors.

The interconnections between the two factors should not be overlooked. Empirical analyses provided on cohesion policy show how the initiative of the national government, while encompassing an efficient and decentralised “pro- Europe” approach, has contributed to the acceleration of the adoption of EU legislative standards and of EU cohesion policy formulation and implementation.

7. The Implications of the Empirical Findings: towards convergence patterns of regional governance in Southern Italy?

In the first place, along with a consolidated legislative Europeanisation, the Europeanisation of national policies has recently, over and beyond cohesion policy, reached other policy domains (for example, monetary and labour policies). After 1992 this process accelerated along with the consolidation of policy learning processes derived from the innovation of EU policies. Such an acceleration confirms that the intensity of Europeanisation varies on the basis of the previous “paths” followed by its member countries: the greater the discrepancy between EU and consolidated national policies (the so called “goodness of fit”: see Cowles, Caporaso, Risse, 2000

26 forthcoming), the greater the necessary time span in order to adapt the national policy setting to EU requirements.

Furthermore, at the regional level, during the two preceding rounds of programming, regional governments exercised a minimal influence. Apart from a few particularly noteworthy exceptions22, the majority of regions limited themselves to accepting policies that they had not actively participated in formulating. Analysing more closely the role of the regions in the ascendant phase of the new round of programming and negotiating, the regions individually and collectively (thanks to a special national committee of regions, the Comitato delle Regioni) have succeeded in exerting a greater influence when compared with the past.

Finally, Europeanisation seems to lead to a restructuring of centre-periphery relations more favourable to the regions vis a vis the national government than before. This however does not imply that such central government institutions are “obsolete” and excessively weakened by the strengthening of regional governments. Rather, it seems that there is an induced redefinition of the role of national government led by the government itself, which takes place in a context where processes are occurring on which the national government exercises an almost irrelevant (globalisation) or reduced (Europeanisation) influence. Such processes reduce the traditional sovereignty of national governments entailing a greater distribution of power among the various government institutions and a widening of the number of actors that have access to the decision-making process, thus giving birth to what has been defined as “multilevel” or “network” pattern of governance. Nevertheless, since national governments have the most difficulty in controlling the economy for exogenous reasons, the sharing of its weakness is a demonstration of its strength: the government decides to decentralise responsibility and authority knowing very well that in the new world economy the traditional Keynesian methods of intervention would prove of little use. Europeanisation therefore is not in itself automatically effective; it is the behaviour of national and regional government which makes Europeanisation display, or not display, its effects.

22 For example, Abruzzo, Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in Italy. See Smyrl (1996); Gramise (1995); Piattoni and Smyrl (1998).

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