Motor Unit and Electromyogram (EMG ) s1

Introduction

Game theory has excisted for millenium millennia in many formss;, ranging from historical events such as

Spain’s’ rebellion onagainst Rome in 75 BCE (McCain, 2010), biological moldmodels such as natural selection, market environments (oligopoly) , politics (election bidding), and computer science to name a few. This field of applied mathematics captures behaviour in strategic situations ( games ), wherebyin the success (payoff) of the choice made by an individual (player ) is dependent on the choicees made by others’ (players) (Myerson) .

The three main mathematical models of games is are the extensive form, the strategic form, and the coalition forms. The basesbasis of difference in one each of these models is the amount of detail provided: the players, their preferences, their information, the strategic actions available to them, and how these influence the outcome?.

In this paper, we describe the strategic form and study its phenomena in a case of management - –labor negotiation at an automobile factory, we tell the strategic form and study it’s phenomenon.

The strategic form, in additionalso called the normal form of a game, has much littleless detail compared with the extensive form. For In the extensive form, the position and move of the game is closeare closely followed, and the rules define the probable outcomes in of planned or random moves (gambling ). By comparioncontrast, in the strategic form, the players player’s choice, i.e., strategy, from a set of possible strategies determines the outcome, ie.e., payoff. All players are involed in chooseing a strategy,, and select options, and once the choices are it is clearrevealed, the game ends with each players getting someroughly payoff . Each player’s payoff is influenced by each player’s choice . Payoffs can be quiete complex

All material in this document is the intellectual property of Crimson Interactive Pvt. Ltd. The use of information and content in this document in whole or in part is forbidden unless express permission has been given in writing by Crimson Interactive Pvt. Ltd. www.enago.com | www.enago.jp | www.enago.com.tr | www.enago.com.br | www.enago.de | www.enago.tw www.enago.cn | www.enago.ae entityies. For the model, we represent payoffs by numerical values. Hence, we preassume that the numerical payoffs depend on the choices of all the players.

Three3 objects define the strategic form of a game: (1) the set of players, N= = {1,2,…, n}, (ii2) the

sequence of players’ strategy sets, X1,…, Xn, and (3) the sequence of player’s’ pay -off functions, f(a1,,

an), ,,…, an),…, fn(a1, , a n ,…, an).