Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations

FM 34-130/MCRP 2-12A

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO IPB

If I always appear prepared, it is because before entering on an undertaking, I have meditated for long and foreseen what may occur.

- Napoleon Bonaparte, 1821

Historically, throughout the spectrum of operations IPB has been a process interwoven into all levels of military decision making and planning (Figure 1-1). The process itself involves thought, knowledge of the enemy, and a certain amount of visual techniques to create and communicate the necessary information to the commander regarding the battlefield and the unit’s mission within the integrated battlespace.

STABILITY OPERATIONS 1990-1 Saudi Desert Shield/Storm - Peace Operations 1991-? Kuwait Southern Watch 1991-? Iraq Provide Comfort - Show of Force 1992-4 Somalia Restore Hope - Arms Control Panama 1989-90 1992 Hurricane Andrew 1993 U.S. Midwest Floods - Noncombatant Operation Lebanon 1983 Grenada 1983 1994 Western U.S. Fires - Nation Assistance 1994 Rwanda Support Hope Sinai MFO 1982 - ? 1994-? Haiti - Support to Counterinsurgencies Detroit/Chicago 1994-5 Panama Safe Haven - Combating Terrorism 1967 Dominican Republic 1997 Bosnia - Civil Disturbance 1966 1998-9 Desert Fox Vietnam War - Counterdrug Operations 1965-75 1999 Kosovo Joint Guardian Korean War Future - Support to Insurgencies 1950-53 Future OperationsOperations World War II 1941-45 Range of Military Operations FF OO RR CC EE SUPPORT OPERATIONS World War I - Humanitarian Operations XXI - Environmental Operations Army 2010 and beyond

Figure 1-1. Range of military operations. WHAT IS IPB?

IPBIPB isPROCESS a systematic continuous process to analyzing the weather, terrain, and threat in a specific geographic area for all types of operations. IPB integrates threat doctrine with the Theweather IPB processand terrain consists as they of relatefour steps: to the mission within a specific battlefield environment. This is done to determine and evaluate threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action (COAs). This analytical process builds an extensive database for each  STEP 1: Define the battlefield environment. potential area in which a unit may be required to operate to determine the impact of the threat,STEP environment, 2: Describe and the terrain battlefield’s on operations effects. and ultimately presents it in a graphic format.STEP 3: Evaluate the threat.

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 STEP 4: Determine threat COAs.

A particular battlefield may have unique boundaries but regardless of the operation the analysis process is the same. The commander’s initial input into the IPB process is directly proportional to success on the battlefield (Figure 1-2). By providing the commander’s intent and guidance early on into the process, the G2/S2 directs the intelligence cycle allowing the staff to focus on what’s important to the mission. Each staff element and each echelon conducts IPB for its specific functional area. The IPB process helps the commander maximize the unit’s combat power at critical points in time, space, and resources to shape the battlefield by –

 Determining the threat’s likely COA.

 Describing the environment your unit is operating within and the effects of the environment on your unit.

IPB MDMP Cdr’s initial guidance Warning order 1 Initial IPB RECEIPT OF MISSION

Completed Initial IPB products Restated mission Cdr’s Intent & Guidance Mission MISSION ANALYSIS Warning order 2 Brief to Staff products Commander Battlefield framework Preliminary movement Update IPB Products Completed COA DEVELOPMENT COA stmts and sketches

IPB Wargame results Products COA ANALYSIS Task organization Brought to the (WARGAME) Mission to subordinate units CCIR Wargame Decision matrix COA COMPARISON

Refined IPB Approved COA Refined Cdr’s Intent Completed COA APPROVAL Specified type of order Specified type of rehearsal HPTL

Continuous IPB OPLAN/OPORD ORDERS PRODUCTION DENOTES: CDR’s Input

Figure 1-2. IPB embedded into the Mititary Decision Making Process (MDMP). The IPB process is continuous. IPB is conducted prior to and during the command’s initial planning for an operation. The analyst continues to perform and refine the IPB products throughout the MDMP. This ensures that –

 The products of IPB remain complete and valid and create the correct vision for the commander. IPB is the primary means by which the commander develops that vision in mind of how an operation will unfold and how the threat will be depicted

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throughout the operation.

 The initial IPB process must be completed before the mission analysis brief to the commander in the MDMP, prior to developing the friendly COA and the development of the staff estimate. This ensures the effective visualization and communication tools necessary to inform the commander.

A brief overview of each step of the IPB process follows:

STEP 1: DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

 Establishes the limits of the area of operation (AO).

 Establishes the limits of the area of interest (AOI).

 Identifies those characteristics of the battlefield that will influence friendly and threat operations.

 Identifies gaps in current intelligence holdings and information.

To focus the remainder of the IPB process, the G2/S2 identifies those battlefield characteristics requiring in-depth evaluation. This may include terrain, weather, logistical infrastructure, demographics, and visualizing the operation in the integrated battlespace of an operation (See Figure 1-3). Generally, the command’s AO is a geographical area assigned to the commander’s responsibility whereas the AOI is usually larger. The AOI includes any threat or characteristics of the battlefield environment that significantly influences the mission of the command. This enables the G2/S2 to focus the IPB effort on a specific area within the operation.

Maneuver & Fires

Traditional Intel

Logistics

National

Nontraditional

Battlespace encompasses the surface, subsurface, endoatmospheric, and exatmospheric spheres of a particular geographic area. It also includes the electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, and human psychological aspects of military operations. The dimension of the command’s battlespace is dictated by the mission and the capabilities of any potential threat throughout the operation. Defining the significant characteristics of the battlefield environment also aids in identifying gaps in current intelligence holdings and the specific intelligence required to fill them. Similarly, the G2/S2 identifies gaps in the command's

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knowledge of the threat and analyzed current threat situation.

Once approved by the commander, the specific intelligence required to fill gaps in the command's knowledge of the battlefield environment and threat situation becomes the command's initial intelligence requirements (Figure 1-4).

CCIR Information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful execution of operational or tactical operations.

EEFI PIR Critical aspects of a friendly FFIR Intelligence requirements that operation that, if know n by Information the commander a commander has anticipated the enemy, w ould and staff need about the and stated priority in the task subsequently friendly forces available planning and decision making. compromise, lead to failure, for the operation. or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be INFORMATIONINFORMATION REQUIREDREQUIREDprotected TOTO ANSWERANSWER CCIRCCIR from enemy detection. DATA IR Information collected Information regarding the enemy and compiled by the staff and the environment that needs to provide the commander to be collected and processed Priority for EEFI w ith current readiness status regarding the friendly force in order to meet the intelligence INFORMATION operational data. requirements of the commander. Information regarding the threat’s detection collection COLLECTIONCOLLECTION efforts in order to protect Unit Status Readiness REQUIREMENTSREQUIREMENTS the friendly forces critical Information the commander aspects of the operation. needs to know to protect ISR Plan /Collection Plan the friendly force. Tasked for EEFI - Equipment Status Gathering of threat information tasked by: - Personnel Status - Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR) - Logistical Status - Specific Orders and Requests (SOR) - Experience and Leadership - Weapon Systems Status Gathering of Information regarding threat collection capabilities/ assets to include: - Threat’s IMINT, ELINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT capabilities and locations. - Threat’s Force Protection & Information Operations Capabilities

Figure 1-4. Commander’s critical information requirements.

As the commander visualizes the operations, one develops the commander's critical intelligence requirements (CCIR) by considering the following questions:

 What decisions do I need to make?  What information about the enemy, terrain, and friendly situation do I need to know

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to make those decisions?  What friendly information must I conceal from the enemy?  When, during the operation, do I need this information to support my anticipated decisions?

This series of questions then generates the sub-elements of the CCIR: PIR, EEFI and FFRI with related information requirements (IR). Eventually being combined into the information collection requirements tasked out to assets available within the command.

STEP 2: DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD’S EFFECTS

Step 2 evaluates the effects of weather and terrain for both the friendly and threat environmental conditions. The G2/S2 identifies the limitations and opportunities the environment offers to mission planning, equipment Weather Data - Forecasts, Visibility, Illumination, TDAs, IWEDA products…etc. capabilities, and maneuver potential Terrain Topographic Products - Terrabase II, DTED, Elevation, Slope, Soils Data. for ground assets. This evaluation Lines of Communication Overlay - Roads, Railroads, Airfields, Related Infrastructures. focuses on the general capabilities Specialty Products - Population Overlays, Urban City Plans, Imagery & Spectral Products. for each force until COAs are developed in later steps of the IPB process.

This assessment of the environment always includes an analysis of the weather and terrain but can include discussions of the characteristics of detailed geography, demographics, urban city plans, or computer information infrastructure and their effects on friendly and threat operations.

Characteristics of geography include general characteristics of the terrain and weather, as well as such factors as politics, civilian press, local population, and demographics. An area's infrastructure consists of the facilities, equipment, and framework needed for the functioning of systems, cities, or regions. Products developed in this step might include, but are not limited to—

 Population status overlays.

 Overlays that depict the military aspects and effects of terrain.

 Weather analysis matrices.

 Integrated products such as modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOOs).

 Information Infrastructure templates.

Regardless of the subject or means of presentation, the G2/S2 ensures the product’s focus on the effects of the battlefield environment.

STEP 3: EVALUATE THE THREAT

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In step 3, the G2/S2 must identify the threat by evaluating the command's intelligence holdings (i.e., country studies, contingency plans, intelligence readiness files) to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar circumstances. Identifying the intelligence gaps in the available threat holdings allows the time to develop requests for information (RFI) from higher headquarters to include the national agencies.

Identification of the threat’s capabilities becomes apparent and the analysis of the broad COAs are discerned by understanding the environment, terrain, and then the patterns of behavior the threat may use as possible COAs to achieve their objectives and intent on the battlefield. The G2/S2's evaluation is portrayed in the creation of threat models which are graphic depictions and narratives that include doctrinal templates, the threat’s preferred tactics, options and peculiarities, and identification of HVTs as shown in Figure

Description: • Movement begins as early as 1.5 hours after order. EXAMPLE (DEFENSE): • Movement along previously rehearsed routes. Description of Preferred DESCRIPTION PREFERRED • Defense in two echelons with a reserve. TACTICS, OPTIONS, Tactics, • Local counterattacks to restore defensive Failu Options, and positions. AND PECULIARITIES • Tank Battalion counterattacks if defense is • Fix friendly forces for counterattack by reserve of Peculiarities. compromised. higher HQ. • Detailed and coordinated fire support plan Peculiarities: supporting defense and counterattack. • Limited to 24 hour sustained operations due to • They prefer obstacle systems (usually DOCTRINAL lack of fuel. minefields) that turn enemy forces into their TEMPLATES engagement areas. They seldom employ fixing, blocking, or disrupting obstacles. De sc r iptio n : • M ov e m e nt b eg ins as e arl y as 1. 5 h ou rs a fter o r d er. • M ov e m e nt a lo n g p re vio us ly XXXXXXXX re he ars ed rou t e s. • L ea d e lem en t s an d su pp o rt ing FAILURE OPTIONS XXXX d efe ns es f ix fr ie nd ly fo rc es w it h fire s. • M ain bo d y se ek s fla nk s o f frien d ly fo rce s. • Local counterattacks. F ai lu re O pt io n s: • F ix frie nd ly fo r c es fo r co u nt e ratt a ck b y re se rve of h i g he r H Q. • Counterattack by division reserve. IDENTIFICATION P ec u lia rit ies : • L i mi te d t o 2 4 ho u r su stai n ed OF TYPE HVT’S o pe ratio n s du e to l ac k o f fu el . • Withdraw.

X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X PECULIARITIES

XXXXXXXXXX X X X X X • Critical shortages of tank ammunition. XXXX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X • Defenses weak due to lack of engineer spt. X X X X

Description: • Movement begins as early as 1.5 hours after order. D Command centers coordinate move I RELATIVE S D L and commitment of reserves. Cent ral R E I TARGET SET U L M WORTH FS centers nearby. P A I DOCTRINAL TEMPLATES T Y T C3 X LOC allow rapid move of reserves and continued resupply. • Organization X X FS X X X MANEUVER • Equipment ADA Reserve units critical to success of defense. • Battle Positions ENGINEER RISTA • Supporting Elements X X FS masses fires to assist defense and • Echelons REC commitment of reserves. • Frontages NUC/CHEMICAL BULK FUELS Acquire deep targets to disrupt X X friendly at tack. • Depths AMMO MAINT • Boundaries Stockpiles vulnerable, important for • Engagement Areas X LIFT/LOC continued anti-armor and FS fires. • Objective Depths

• Control Measures X X X XX X X X X X X X X X X XX X X X

• Any Graphic Depiction X X X XX X X X X

X X X XX X X X X X X X X X XXXX

Figure 1-5. Portions of the threat model.

When facing a well-known threat, the G2/S2 relies on databases and threat models readily available. The G2/S2 will use updated information to keep the databases current. It is also entirely possible that one may have to create new threat models by combining doctrinal templates, threat tactics, and available options within the operation. The G2/S2 must take into account the threat's many options by identifying all possible branches and sequels and peculiarities of a specific threat’s behavior into this IPB product termed the threat model. While this detailed analysis is being developed, a direct outcome of this

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process is the identification of the threat’s high value targets (HVTs). This enables the friendly to begin identifying their assets to target the threat's vulnerabilities and HVTs along with building some broad COAs to consider as threat plans of attack/defend alternatives.

There is also the realistic nature of the current threat dilemmas that the G2/S2 may know very little regarding a certain threat. The motives, intentions and agenda may be unpredictable if analyzing a new terrorist faction or key leader whose profile is immature and has no identifiable history of behavior characteristics. Another obstacle to threat determination are the technological threats that are so diverse in options and sophistication. Assuming a database will be available for all threat’s capabilities become inherently impossible when considering the asymmetric and asynchronous types of delivery means and diversification of the threat agendas.

*Asymmetric Threat: A threat that uses dissimilar weapons or force (e.g. WMD, small-scale attacks, information attack) to offset a superior military force and technological advantage.

*Asynchronous Threat: A threat that doesn’t require the orchestration of timing or simultaneous use of its capabilities to achieve a desired effect. Therefore causing haphazard attacks that result more on circumstance and personality rather then by a well designed operation. (e.g. A terrorist faction that is structured by separate cells branched off for anonymity purposes acting independently of a primary leader of the faction.)

(*The above definitions are not yet approved as official doctrine until the final draft of FM 34-130)

STEP 4: DETERMINE THREAT COAs

Step 4 integrates the IPB products of the previous steps into conclusions that formulate ID THREAT OBJECTIVES possible COAs. The G2/S2 ID FULL SET OF THREAT COAs develops threat COA models *REVERSE IPB* depicting the threat's potential ENEMY PERCEPTION OF COAs. (See Figure 1-6.) FRIENDLY SITUATION Additional IPB products during the final step involve the EVALUATE/PRIORITIZE preparation of event templates, ENEMYCOAs situation templates, and DEVELOP EACH COA specialized matrices that focus WITHIN TIME LIMITS intelligence requirements and collection requirements on ? ? ? IDENTIFY INITIAL identifying the most likely COA ? ? COLLECTION the threat will use to meet their ? REQUIREMENTS objectives on the battlefield. Figure 1-6. Sequence of determining threat.

The threat COA models developed in step 4 are the products taken into the MDMP of COA analysis and the wargame process which help develop the planning phase of an operation for the unit. Once the friendly COAs are war gamed separately against each possible threat COA, the commander is briefed on the COAs which meet the requirements

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of the commander’s guidance and intent of the operation that were successful in the wargame process. (See Figure 1-7.)

STEP 1 PRODUCTS DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT GEOGRAPHY - Significant characteristics of the environment POPULATION REQUIRED - Establish the limits of the AO and AOI SOCIECONOMIC FACTORS MAPS TRANSPORTATION - Evaluate existing databases and identify ROE intelligence gaps TELECOMMUNICATIONS - Collect required materials

STEP 2 OBSERVATION & FIELDS OF FIRE DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD EFFECTS COVER & CONCEALMENT OBSTACLES MCOO - Analyze the battlefield environment KEY TERRAIN TERRAIN - Terrain analysis (OCOKA) AVENUES OF APPROACH PRODUCTS - Weather Analysis (5 aspects) - Describe the battlefield effects on the threat VISIBILITY, WINDS and friendly capabilities PRECIPITATION - Demographics, politics, legal issues …etc. CLOUD COVER, HUMIDITY TEMPERATURE STEP 3 MANEUVER RECON EVALUATE THE THREAT FIRES SECURITY DOCTRINAL - Convert threat doctrine into doctrinal template NBC (WMD) LEADERSHIP TEMPLATES - Describe the threat’s tactics, options M/S MORALE ADA AIR ASSAULT and peculiarities AIR THREAT INFILTRATION - Identify threat capabilities C2 REINFORCEMENT - Identify high-value targets LOGISTICS UNCONVENTIONAL EW TACTICS STEP 4 DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION ENEMY COA CONSISTS OF: SITEMPs - Identify the threat’s likely objective SITEMP which portrays all enemy EVENT - Identify a full set of COAs available capabilities TEMPLATE - Evaluate and prioritize each COA DESCRIPTION OF TACTICS INTEL - Develop each COA in detail AND OPTIONS REQMTS - Identify collection requirements HIGH-VALUE TARGET LIST HVT LIST

Figure 1-7. Key components of IPB.

The entire staff depends on the G2/S2 to use all the IPB products and analysis tools acquired to portray the threat in the decision making and targeting processes. COAs are compared until the commander approves the friendly COA to meet objectives versus the most likely threat COA. The G2/S2 cannot produce these models, effectively predicting the threat COAs, unless he has—

 Adequately analyzed the friendly mission throughout the time duration of the operation; identified the physical limits of the AO and AOI; and identified every characteristic of the battlefield environment that might affect the operation (step 1).  Identified the opportunities and constraints the battlefield environment offers to threat and friendly forces (step 2).

 Thoroughly considered the threat capabilities and preferred COA in like situations if

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all conditions best suited the threat in an unconstrained battlefield environment, using “reverse IPB” to best understand the threat (step 3).

In short, the G2/S2 provides the commander with the best visualization of the threat’s capabilities by developing threat COA models that drive the MDMP. These models are valid only if the G2/S2 establishes a good foundation of analysis during the first three steps of the IPB process.

HOW IPB INTERELATES TO THE SIX INTELLIGENCE TASKS

There are six intelligence tasks that generate products that ultimately synchronize the intelligence efforts in assisting the commander to visualize the battlefield and aid in the MDMP. These six tasks are thought of as the mission-essential task list (METL) for intelligence: provide indications and warning (I&W), perform IPB, perform situation development, perform target development, support force protection, and perform battle damage assessment (BDA). Figure 1-8 illustrates how the G2/S2 tailors intelligence to the commander’s needs and how IPB is interrelated to the other five tasks.

INTELLIGENCE COMMANDER’s COMMANDER’ s DECISIONS TASKS FOCUS I&W Orient on Increase intelligence contingencies Implement OPLAN? readiness? IPB Which COA will I implement? Plan a mission Where is my main effort?

Situation Execute and Are these threat actions expected? Development Manage a Plan Is a FRAGO required now?

Target Destroy/Suppress/ Does destruction of this target Development Neutralize Targets accomplish the objective? When to execute this fire mission?

Force Secure the Force Is the intent obvious to the Protection Enemy? accomplishment of the mission?

BDA Reallocate Is the fire/maneuver plan effective? Intelligence Reprioritze the HVTL.

Figure 1-8. Illustrates how the six intelligence tasks aid the commander in decision making. WHO CONDUCTS IPB?

IPB enables all the services to leverage information about the threat’s capabilities and potential centers of gravity, and determine possible COAs across all dimensions of the battlespace. IPB is a proven flexible technique used across the range of conventional

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operations out to unknown battle environments into the future. On a global scale the IPB process is continuously used in analyzing the ongoing multifaceted conflicts in stability actions and support actions handled daily.

As shown in Figure 1-9, the transition of IPB through the history of military operations remains a proven, effective process.

A DYNAMIC NEW ERA

21st Century - CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS The Information Age - OVERPOPULATION 1990 - 2010 - ECONOMIC STRAINS Decades of Transition - POLITICAL REORDERING 20th Century - WEAPONS PROLIFERATION The Industrial Age - NEW TECHNOLOGIES - NEW USES FOR OLD TECH

• Turmoil • Crisis • Conflict • War IPB REMAINS A PROVEN AND EFFECTIVE PROCESS WHILE DYNAMIC FORCES ARE RAPIDLY REORDERING THE WORLD. CREATING NEW CHALLENGES IN TECHNOLOGY AND INFORMATION WARFARE ISSUES TO SOLDIERS AND THEIR LEADERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE

Figure 1-9. IPB transition.

Applications for this predictive analytical approach are employed to handle the new realms of threat encompassing information warfare, worldwide terrorism, and the enormous potential in space operations. The IPB four-step process remains consistent varying only on the focus within the type of operation and the environmental effects.

DOCTRINE VERSUS TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

The doctrinal principles of IPB are sound and can be applied to all situations at all levels. The TTP of the applications of IPB may vary according to the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, time and civilians available (METT-TC) in a given situation. (See Figure 1-10.) The doctrinal principles of IPB call for –

 Evaluating the battlefield’s effects on friendly and threat operations.

 Determining the threat’s possible COAs and arranging them in order of probability of adoption.

 Identifying the activities, or lack of, and the locations where they will occur that will identify which COA the threat has adopted.

 Identifying assets the threat needs to make each COA successful HVTs and where they can be expected to appear on the battlefield target areas of interest (TAIs).

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MISSION Higher commander’s mission and intent two levels up. METT-TC Higher commander’s concept of operations. Tasks (implied, specified, and essential). Brigade’s mission. Risk. TROOPS AVAILABLE CCIR. Task organization. Potential for exploiting success. Friendly strength, composition, and disposition. Readiness and condition of subordinate units. ENEMY Morale. Composition, strength and disposition. Training, experience, and leadership. Capabilities. Status of logistics. Likely objective and intentions. Doctrine and known tactics. TIME Likely COAs . Planning and preparation time. Potential vulnerabilities. Critical timing aspects of the mission.

TERRAIN AND WEATHER CIVILIAN CONSIDERATIONS OCOKA (terrain); five aspects (weather). Attitudes and activities. Effects on friendly and enemy forces. Anticipated refugee movements. Advantages and disadvantages. Interagency operations in the AO.

Figure 1-10. METT-TC factors.

The decision to use a sketch instead of an overlay to depict the battlefield’s effects or the threat’s available COAs is a matter of TTP. Such a decision can be made only within the context of a given situation. Similarly, the amount of detail that goes into each step of the IPB process, the techniques for depicting areas of RESTRICTED terrain, and other such decisions are also driven by factors of METT-TC and local policies and procedures.

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PLANNING IN A TIME-CONSTRAINED ENVIRONMENT

Although the task is difficult, the commander and staff must be able to produce simple, flexible, and tactically sound plans under severe time constraints. They must develop and issue a plan within one-third of the available preparation time (one-fourth is preferred). The commander only hurts his subordinates and jeopardizes mission success by issuing a late order. Having a well-trained staff and standing operating procedures (SOPs) with clear divisions of labor in the staff are essential.

The MDMP is adjusted any time there is too little time for its thorough and comprehensive application. The commander decides what techniques to use to save time. The five primary techniques to save time are—

 The commander increases involvement. Get involved directly to save time. Ranging from participating in the steps of the MDMP with the staff to keep personally available. The staff may need additional guidance and intent without wasting time to get affirmation.

 The commander issues more directive guidance, limiting the staff’s options. This saves time by focusing the staff on those things of importance.

 The commander limits the number of COAs developed and analyzed. In extreme cases, direct that only one COA be developed. This option carries great risk especially in military operations on urban operations where there can be up to four potential avenues of approach against a single target. The goal is an acceptable COA that meets mission requirements in the available time. However, the COA must still be flexible enough to succeed against all feasible threat COAs.

 Maximize parallel planning. Although parallel planning is the norm, maximizing its use in a time-constrained environment is critical.

 Functional area integration of IPB. Functional areas responsible for specific TTPs regarding the battlefield must forward their critical informational and IPB products to the next echelon for integration into the big picture and MDMP. (For example, air avenues of approach from air assets, engineer obstacle updates, LOC issues from signal and MP support, HUMINT updates on IO issues all should be updated and forwarded to higher on a regular 24-Hour basis to form a collaborative tool to pull information). This saves an enormous amount of time allowing the experts in their functional area to supply up-to-date IPB products into an integrated database.

END RESULT OF A STRONG IPB ANALYSIS

Once the G2/S2 has provided the initial IPB analysis and continued the process during the MDMP to the point of briefing the commander, the desired outcome should address

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Place the most critical information regarding the threat up front and early on in the MDMP. Upon receipt of the mission, the higher echelon should identify the threat’s desired intent, possible centers of gravity, and threat’s culmination point.

IPB identifies the facts and assumptions about the battlefield and the threat’s capabilities. It provides the basis for intelligence direction and synchronization. Once developed, the collection plan supporting the commander's chosen COA will follow. Wargaming the possible COAs effectively isolates and develops the operations plans (OPPLANs) or operations orders (OPORDs). IPB continues with the execution of the OPORD/OPLAN with actual situational development and updated information from the battlefield.

The ultimate goal is to identify the threat’s COA and obtain information superiority (IS) against the adversary. Analyzing the ranges of threats poses an interesting dilemma for the G2/S2. Options range from conventional warfare versus asymmetrical or asynchronous threat with the possible integration within one operation. This can create a diverse spectrum in COA development. Remaining informed of the threat’s actions can be elusive. If the threat is currently unknown (i.e., such as terrorist bombings, computer network attacks, or a biological agent released without ownership), the role of the G2/S2 in developing initial IPB can be frustrating and leads to creative deductive reasoning. Predicting who, what, when, where, and the next move of the adversary becomes the ultimate challenge.

Even with the knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities and location, perhaps the terrain is the wildcard. As an example, urban warfare is the modern day “jungle” in which most soldiers are untrained and unprepared to fight. The increased number of mobility corridors (i.e., air, building, intra-building, street, and subterranean levels) available to the threat commander and avenues of approach tend to have an exponential effect on the number of possibilities. Consider the other added dimension, the G2/S2 cannot easily identify the difference between the adversary versus the civilian population.

No matter the adversary, environment, nor operation the G2/S2 will provide the best initial IPB assessment. Once the commander receives the mission, the immediate step is extracting all the critical information from higher to be as exact and detailed as possible for analysis. Highlight who, what, when, where, how and why associated to the operation and the threat? If the threat’s intent is clearly defined, it should include possible culmination point and center of gravity issues that will allow the commander’s staff to focus their efforts on specific and tangible threat capabilities. Depending on the type of mission, the culmination point is usually phased. Each phase of an operation will address a friendly and a threat's culmination points.

More effort should be made to create an OPORD that depicts as much detail and information to direct the staff and IPB process. The entire unit should then be informed of the mission and execution expectations. The individual soldier then knows his personal impact for mission success, which leads to ownership of the “team of teams” concept. This lends itself to a higher morale of the unit’s effectiveness and ultimate success in battle.