Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff

#5-239 Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff [September 26, 1945] [Washington, D.C.] Restricted

1. I am not in agreement with the reasons advanced by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, against acceptance of the recommendations of the majority report of the Special Committee on Reorganization of National Defense that the system of a single department be adopted. In so far as his reasons are expressed by adherence to the minority report by Admiral Richardson, I consider that in general the majority report of the Special Committee covers the points raised by Admiral Richardson. 2. On the matter of the three points in paragraph 3 of Admiral King’s paper (JCS 749/22) cited as objections additional to those raised by Admiral Richardson, these have already been covered in substance in both the majority and the minority reports of the Special Committee. In comment thereon, however, I do not agree that it is inadvisable for the President to depend on one man, who, in accordance with the American way of government, would be a civilian secretary with associated civilian under secretaries and assistants, to exercise authority over all the armed forces. I do not agree that the report of the Special Committee implies creation of any organization having the position and powers of that referred to by Admiral King as the Ober Kommando Wehrmacht.1 Obviously, any necessary departmental staff would be the servant of the civilians exercising authority over the department, subject to the President and Congress. This, however, is a matter of detail which can be worked out later. It does not appear to be an important factor in the consideration of the principle of one department. 3. To the point that results of centralized control of the armed forces compare unfavorably to better all-round results to be expected from “friendly and intelligent coordination . . . thus providing for balanced consideration of military matters,” in my opinion and experience this coordination has been difficult and incomplete even in war, and will be infinitely more difficult in peace. As a current evidence of the inefficacy of this system and as a strong argument for a single department of national defense is the fact that under the present system, which is similar to the minority proposal, there has been presented to budgetary agencies of the government a plan for a post-war Navy without consideration or coordination with the War Department. Such procedure does not appear to be in the national interest. 4. The basic disagreement within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization on the most effective form of organization is now apparent and there remains no valid reason for further delay in transmitting to the President the differing views of the Chiefs of Staff and the study of the Special Committee containing the majority and the minority reports on Reorganization of National Defense. 5. It is recommended that the attached memorandum, together with the study of the Special Committee, the differing views of the Chiefs of Staff contained in JCS 749/21 and JCS 749/22, and this paper be presented to the President.2

Document Copy Text Source: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165), Records of the Operations Division (OPD), 320, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. Document Format: Typed memorandum.

1. The German armed forces high command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) was created by Hitler in 1938 as the means through which he would direct the war. The OKW failed to coordinate military views and policies, however, since the individual service commanders had direct access to the Führer, who had great confidence in his own skill as a warlord, and who generally pursued a divide-and-rule managerial philosophy. The OKW was thus left as primarily Hitler’s military mouthpiece.

2. For further developments on this issue, see Marshall Memorandum for General Hull, October 2, 1945, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-245 [5: 321–22], and Marshall Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 10, 1945, Papers of George Catlett Marshall, #5-251 [5: 327–30].

Recommended Citation: The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, ed. Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens (Lexington, Va.: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981– ). Electronic version based on The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, vol. 5, “The Finest Soldier,” January 1, 1945–January 7, 1947 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), pp. 314–315.