ISSN 2576-1021 ISSN 2576-1153 Online: Print: VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 2 • SPRING 2020 3 • ISSUE VOLUME

Texas National Security Review THE USE AND ABUSE OF STRATEGY Volume 3 • Issue 2 • Spring 2020

MASTHEAD TABLE OF CONTENTS

Staff: The Foundation Publisher: Executive Editor: Associate Editors: Ryan Evans Doyle Hodges, PhD Galen Jackson, PhD 04 The Best of the Brightest? Ideas and Their Consequences Van Jackson, PhD Francis J. Gavin Editor-in-Chief: Managing Editor: Stephen Tankel, PhD William Inboden, PhD Megan G. Oprea, PhD

Editorial Board: Chair, Editorial Board: Editor-in-Chief: The Scholar Francis J. Gavin, PhD William Inboden, PhD 12 Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers Robert J. Art, PhD Kelly M. Greenhill, PhD John Owen, PhD Erik Sand Richard Betts, PhD Beatrice Heuser, PhD Patrick Porter, PhD John Bew, PhD Michael C. Horowitz, PhD Thomas Rid, PhD 38 Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations Nigel Biggar, PhD Richard H. Immerman, PhD Joshua Rovner, PhD Daniel Bessner and Fredrik Logevall Philip Bobbitt, JD, PhD Robert Jervis, PhD Brent E. Sasley, PhD 56 Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making Hal Brands, PhD Colin Kahl, PhD Elizabeth N. Saunders, PhD Erik Lin-Greenberg Joshua W. Busby, PhD Jonathan Kirshner, PhD Kori Schake, PhD Robert Chesney, JD James Kraska, SJD Michael N. Schmitt, DLitt Eliot Cohen, PhD Stephen D. Krasner, PhD Jacob N. Shapiro, PhD Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD Sarah Kreps, PhD Sandesh Sivakumaran, PhD Theo Farrell, PhD Melvyn P. Leffler, PhD Sarah Snyder, PhD Peter D. Feaver, PhD Fredrik Logevall, PhD Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD Rosemary Foot, PhD, FBA Margaret MacMillan, CC, PhD Monica Duffy Toft, PhD Taylor Fravel, PhD Thomas G. Mahnken, PhD Marc Trachtenberg, PhD Sir Lawrence Freedman, PhD Rose McDermott, PhD René Värk, JD The Strategist James Goldgeier, PhD Paul D. Miller, PhD Steven Weber, PhD 80 One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition Michael J. Green, PhD Vipin Narang, PhD Amy Zegart, PhD Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery 94 Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners Policy and Strategy Advisory Board: Tami Davis Biddle

Chair: Adm. William McRaven, Ret.

Hon. Elliott Abrams, JD Hon. James Jeffrey David Shedd Hon. Brad Carson Paul Lettow, JD, PhD Hon. Kristen Silverberg, JD Hon. Derek Chollet Hon. Michael Lumpkin Michael Singh, MBA Amb. Ryan Crocker Hon. William J. Lynn, JD Adm. James G. Stavridis, Ret., PhD The Roundtable Feature Hon. Eric Edelman, PhD Kelly Magsamen Hon. Christine E. Wormuth Hon. John Hamre, PhD Gen. David Petraeus, Ret. 112 Captain Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard Hon. Kathleen Hicks, PhD Dan Runde Beatrice Heuser

Designed by Cast From Clay, printed by Linemark The Foundation The Best of the Brightest? Ideas and Their Consequences

In his introductory essay to Volume 3 Issue 2 of TNSR, chair of the editorial board Francis J. Gavin considers how we should think about the role of ideas, expertise, and influence in the THE BEST OF making of American foreign policy. orld politics is complicated, ever nized that the bomb made intentional great-power changing, and uncertain. Boiled war between superpowers possessing thermonu- THE BRIGHTEST? down to its simplest elements, clear weapons an absurdity.1 These strategists were however, the basic goal of each not unconcerned about conflict, however. The very actorW within the international system — once em- nature of nuclear weapons meant that an accident, IDEAS AND pires and kingdoms, now largely nation-states — misperception, or perverse incentives — such as the often centers upon getting others to do what you’d powerful logic of launching an attack first during a THEIR CONSEQUENCES like and preventing those same actors from forcing crisis — could generate a war nobody wanted. In you to do things you don’t want to do. This excel- 1961, Schelling and his co-author Mort Halperin, lent issue examines and assesses the tools availa- participating in a Harvard-MIT Faculty Seminar, laid ble to leaders to try to achieve these goals, with a out the intellectual origins of modern arms control Francis J. Gavin focus on strategies of coercion. in their classic, Strategy and Arms Control.2 Strate- Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery ex- gic stability and mutual vulnerability enshrined by plore the traditional tool of strategy — military nuclear arms control negotiated between the great force — and ask whether the new national defense powers would guarantee the peace. strategy and its emphasis on fighting one large war This new world of mutual vulnerability, how- doesn’t leave the United States vulnerable to a sec- ever, confronted statesmen with a dilemma. If ond, concurrent conflict. Erik Sand — in a paper launching a fully mobilized, great-power war was I am proud to say first appeared in a class taught no longer a meaningful instrument of strategy, and by Jim Steinberg and me at MIT — lays out a pow- if even threatening to intentionally unleash such erful case that economic warfare, and especially a war was not credible, what tools were left to a blockades, is more effective than we often think by state to achieve its ambitions in the world? Inter- driving the target state into riskier and ultimately estingly, Schelling provided his answer in another losing strategies. Erik Lin-Greenberg examines per- book written around the same time as Strategy haps the newest, most uncertain tool of strategy and Arms Control, The Strategy of Conflict, and — artificial intelligence — and asks how this tech- expanded upon these ideas in his 1966 book Arms nology affects alliance behavior and interoperabil- and Influence.3 Policymakers had to embrace new ity. Tami Davis Biddle provides a fascinating deep kinds of strategies to achieve political ambitions dive into the intellectual origins of coercion theory, in the world. In a nuclear environment, “military with the goal of helping policymakers and military power is not so much exercised as threatened” to officials better understand and apply the lessons of generate “bargaining power” or what he also called Thomas Schelling. “the diplomacy of violence.” Concepts such as “the This thoughtful issue provokes three questions. threat that leaves something to chance,” “the art of What are the best instruments and strategies for commitment,” and “the manipulation of risk” pro- achieving state interests in the world? What are vided policymakers with a different way of thinking those interests? And what role do ideas play in about employing both the threat and use of force.4 both framing and answering these questions? The purpose of military power thus shifted from As Biddle demonstrates, Schelling transformed defeating an enemy’s armies and navies, to convey- the way we engage the first question. From the ing signals by imposing or withholding pain. middle of the 20th century onward, scholars from These were not simply theoretical considera- Bernard Brodie to Robert Jervis and beyond recog- tions: At the same time that Schelling’s ideas were

1 See the TNSR book review roundtable, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution Thirty Years Later,” April 30, 2020, https://tnsr.org/roundtable/ book-review-roundtable-the-meaning-of-the-nuclear-revolution-30-years-later/. 2 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961). 3 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). 4 These are chapter headings and well-known concepts developed in Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.

4 5 The Foundation The Best of the Brightest? Ideas and Their Consequences

laying the groundwork for strategic nuclear arms and cultural polarization, and a loss of faith in gov- either the United States or the world. Or consider the officials of the Johnson adminis- control between the superpowers, his other con- ernance within the United States? How far do these arguments get us? As Richard tration who crafted America’s disastrous military cepts were helping to shape the Johnson adminis- The journalist David Halberstam thought he Hofstadter brilliantly pointed out in his seminal es- policies in 1964 and 1965, as laid out in Logevall’s tration’s strategy of coercive warfare against North had an answer. In his 1972 classic, The Best and say, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” blam- masterful study Choosing War.12 Concurrent to Vietnam. Through the plans of Schelling’s friend the Brightest, he argued that, in addition to do- ing a cabal of cosmopolitan, unaccountable elites — their deliberations over Vietnam, many of these and protégé, John McNaughton, the Johnson ad- mestic political expediency and an obsession with who are overly influenced by events abroad — for same officials confronted the aftermath of China’s ministration employed his belief that measured, credibility, the hubris and lack of accountability of America’s woes is a populist trope that goes back to detonation of a nuclear device. Intelligence ana- graduated bombing of the North Vietnamese could American policymakers and their advisers blinded the country’s founding.9 Debates over America’s for- lysts expected the emergence of a dangerous world coerce them into changing their behavior — in this them to their own mistakes and the limitations of eign policy are often marked by the extremes of rev- with dozens of nuclear weapons states in the near case, ending their support for the Viet Cong insur- American power.6 The Best and the Brightest be- olutionary, evangelical fervor to remake the world future if nothing was done. The same administra- gency. The goal was not to defeat North Vietnam’s came a classic, joining other explanations of the Vi- and an equally intense desire to withdraw from tion, even many of the same officials who blun- armies, but rather to send signals and alter incen- etnam War that dismissed the idea that the United its corrupting influences. The historical sources of dered into war in Vietnam, crafted a nuclear non- tives.5 Schelling, it should be noted, imagined such States was a force for good in the world or that its both impulses are closer to each other than adher- proliferation policy that was a great success. Their compellence might eventually be needed against a decision-makers could overcome their own myopia ents from either camp are willing to acknowledge. policies, which included negotiating the Nuclear larger enemy, China, though with targeted tactical or self-importance.7 Blaming the blob for America’s misadventures in the Nonproliferation Treaty, are largely responsible for nuclear weapons instead of conventional ordnance A version of Halberstam’s argument has made a world is as old as the Republic, as the bitter debates the fact that the number of nuclear weapons states used to convey the message. It is chilling, to say comeback, as analysts try to make sense of Ameri- over the 1795 Jay Treaty between the United States is in the single digits, the overall number of nuclear the least, to go back and read these passages in ca’s grand strategy in recent years, only now “best and Great Britain make clear.10 weapons is far lower than in 1965, and the danger Arms and Influence. and the brightest” has been replaced by “the blob.” How then should we think about the role of ex- of nuclear war has receded further into the back- An odd coalition from the political left and right, pertise and influence in the making of American ground than anyone in the Johnson administra- including libertarians, paleo-conservatives, Bernie foreign policy? Consider again Schelling, a card-car- tion could ever have hoped for or imagined.13 Were The Best and the Brightest, Bros, and defensive realists, has come together to rying member of the best and the brightest, or the these members of the blob, the so-called best and the “Blob,” and the Restaurant School skewer U.S. policy in the world since the end of so-called blob, if ever there was one.11 There is a re- the brightest, arrogant, unaccountable, and myopic the Cold War. This group goes by various names markable but rarely commented upon tension be- about America’s power and purpose when meeting This leads to the insightful and timely histori- — they often refer to themselves as offshore bal- tween Strategy and Arms Control — which sought about Vietnam, only to become enlightened and vi- ographical essay by Daniel Bessner and Fredrik ancers, whereas their critics label them neo-isola- to minimize the danger of nuclear war by enshrin- sionary a few hours later when the deliberations Logevall. That their piece generated an enormous tionists. I call them “the restaurant school.” Why? ing mutual vulnerability and arms control — and turned to nuclear proliferation? Twitter controversy over a point that, for most in- Years ago, when my friend Barry Posen kindly gave Schelling’s other two works, which suggested em- One can imagine similar considerations in more telligent observers, is common sense — that to un- me an autographed copy of his newest book, Re- ploying strategies to exploit uncertainty, manipu- recent times. How does one balance, for example, derstand international relations since 1945, it might straint, a member of my family misread the title late risk, and use targeted, graduated violence to between the Bush administration’s disastrous poli- be a good idea to understand how and why the most and asked, “Why is Barry writing about restau- signal credible commitment to achieving a particu- cies in the Greater Middle East and the President’s powerful player in world politics, the United States, rants? Has he become a food critic?” To his cred- lar political end. The first set of ideas — strategic Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, which has saved made its decisions — says much about the strange it, when I mentioned this to Barry, he responded, stability and superpower arms control — laid the millions of lives? Both were driven by experienced state of academic history in the United States. To “Well, the members of the blob certainly enjoy fine groundwork for the Antiballistic Missile Treaty experts who looked beyond narrow conceptions me, however, the article prompted a far more im- food and junkets.” Touché. I continue to use the (ABM) and the series of Strategic Arms Limitation of the national interest and believed America’s portant, powerful set of questions: Do we actually appellation “restaurant school,” if only to lower treaties (SALT), which may have prevented a ther- deep engagement benefited both the nation and know what the United States thought it was trying the temperature in what often seem to be heated monuclear war and, if nothing else, limited arms the world. Obviously, in an ideal world, the United to achieve during the war in Southeast Asia? Do and overly personal debates about American grand racing and made international politics more sta- States would do only those things that are good and we fully understand why the United States chose strategy.8 Similar to Halberstam’s diagnosis almost ble and predictable. The second set of ideas pro- avoid those things that are bad. This desire, howev- strategies that led to over 50,000 American combat 50 years ago, the restaurant school identifies the vided inspiration for one of the worst, most tragic er well meant, is naïve. The necessary critiques of deaths and killed approximately 3 million people in actions of a self-appointed, inner circle of arrogant strategies in American history — the “strategic” America’s blunders should be accompanied by a rec- that region? What explains a tragic set of policies officials and intellectuals, misled by their overre- bombing of North Vietnam. Would the world have ognition that it is much easier to dissect an outcome that wreaked unimaginable physical destruction liance on military instruments and their mistaken been better off if Schelling had never published his that has already unfolded than to provide guidance while generating economic malaise, deep political belief that deep American engagement is good for ideas, or if government officials had not been open about an unknowable future. Furthermore, we need to his innovative insights into strategy? To put it to imagine and evaluate the counterfactual world bluntly — would you take a world without Rolling in which the United States embraced the ideas of 5 Lawrence Freedman, “Vietnam and the Disillusioned Strategist,” International Affairs 72, no. 1 (January 1996): 133–51, https://doi. org/10.2307/2624753; Fred Kaplan, “All Pain, No Gain: Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling’s Little-known Role in the Vietnam War,” Slate, Oct. 11, Thunder if it meant no ABM and SALT treaties? the restaurant school after the end of the Cold War. 2005, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2005/10/nobel-winner-tom-schelling-s-roll-in-the-vietnam-war.html; and Richard Ned Lebow, “Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining,” International Journal 51, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 555–76, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002070209605100308. 9 Richard Hofstadter, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” Harpers (November 1964), https://harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-para- 6 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972). noid-style-in-american-politics/. 7 Halberstam’s other key argument — that Lyndon B. Johnson was intimidated by the Ivy League-educated advisers he inherited from his pre- 10 Jeffersonian republicans bitterly accused Alexander Hamilton and John Jay of being monarchists while selling out America’s interests and decessor, John F. Kennedy — was exposed as ludicrous once Johnson’s secret phone recordings were released. Listening to these tapes, there is no values for their own personal and political gain. disputing Johnson was in charge and driving policy. 11 For an outstanding analysis of the origins of Schelling’s ideas, see, Benjamin Wilson, “Keynes Goes Nuclear: Thomas Schelling and the Macro- 8 For my own, libation-aided views, listen to, Ryan Evans, Francis J. Gavin, Jim Steinberg, “In Defense of the Blob,” War on the Rocks Podcast, economic Origins of Strategic Stability,” Modern Intellectual History, forthcoming, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479244319000271. March 9, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/in-defense-of-the-blob/. The phrase “restaurant school” strikes me as about as descriptive and 12 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). nuanced as the other terms used in the debate, such as blob, swamp, isolationist, free-rider, primacy, hegemony, etc. For an outstanding critique of this concept of the blob and two of its leading proponents, see, Robert Jervis “Liberalism, the Blob, and American Foreign Policy: Evidence and 13 Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/2005): 100–135, Methodology,” Security Studies, published online May 14, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1761440. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137557.

6 7 The Foundation The Best of the Brightest? Ideas and Their Consequences

What would Europe or East Asia look like today if Howard’s “wisdom was to contribute to a wider the United States had gone home in 1989–91? The perspective, whether in a debate behind closed fact is, making foreign policy in a world of great dan- doors or in public, about any live issue, with an ger and complexity, where the future is unknown, understanding of history that shed light on a topic restraint comes at its own high and often unrecog- from a different angle.” An urgent task before us — nized costs, and even the best, most well-meaning one this journal is deeply committed to — is how efforts can end in tragedy, is very hard. do we get the best from our brightest? As we navi- Similar to Schelling’s time, debates over how, in gate the current national and global crisis, and con- what ways, and for what purposes the United States front great uncertainty about the future, let us be should or should not engage the world carry more inspired by Howard’s legacy, a combination of mod- than academic interest. This introduction is written esty, intense curiosity, and penetrating, searching as COVID-19 and its consequences are devastating intellect, oriented toward helping decision-makers America and the world. The crisis has also generat- — something that is increasingly needed today. ed deep worry and concern about the future of U.S. foreign policy and international relations. On the Francis J. Gavin is the chair of the editorial one hand, the restaurant crowd’s argument about board of the Texas National Security Review. He the inapplicability of old-fashioned military inter- is the Giovanni Agnelli Distinguished Professor and ventions to emerging global challenges is lucid. On the inaugural director of the Henry A. Kissinger the other hand, this hardly seems a time to dismiss Center for Global Affairs at SAIS-Johns Hopkins the deep knowledge and expertise of public policy University. His writings include Gold, Dollars, and officials, nor does continuing America’s retreat from Power: The Politics of International Monetary Rela- the world seem wise. Perhaps a Trump administra- tions, 1958–1971 (University of North Carolina Press, tion better staffed with more members of the blob, 2004) and Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy actively engaged and advocating America’s interests in America’s Atomic Age (Cornell University Press, in the world, would have generated a more coherent, 2012). His latest book is Nuclear Weapons and better coordinated global response that may have American Grand Strategy (Brookings Institution saved countless lives. Press, 2020). Which leads to the final essay in this issue, a beautiful tribute by Beatrice Heuser to her men- tor, the great military historian Sir Michael How- ard, who passed away late last year. Howard had fought in World War II and understood the trage- dy of conflict. When asked by a student which was his favorite war, he replied, “Why, I hate them all!” Yet, having come of age in the 1930s, he understood that pacifism and simply withdrawing from the in- ternational system was not an option. Howard was, in many ways, the opposite of Schelling in temperament, focusing on humility and the difficulty of understanding, to say nothing of shaping, a complicated world. To Howard, the- ories were at best “heuristic” and could “never be predictive.” They should always be recognized as “tentative hypotheses to be critically re-examined as new data become available.”14 History had no lessons, only patterns. Yet, like Schelling, Howard believed that intellectuals had a moral obligation to their societies to provide their best ideas to help decision-makers navigate the difficult questions of making policy in a confusing and dangerous world. His gentle style was not in accord with the sharp barbs and hot takes common in the age of social media. “Persuasion, rather than hostile confronta- tion, was to him a cardinal goal,” Heuser writes.

14 Michael Howard, The Lessons of History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 9.

8 9 10 The Scholar 11

The Scholar

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of scholars. Our aim is for articles published in this journal to end up on university syllabi and policy desks from Washington to Tokyo, and to be cited as the foundational research and analysis on world affairs.

10 11 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

Scholars and strategists have long debated whether cutting off an opponent’s trade is an effective strategy in war. In this debate, success or failure has usually been judged based on whether the state subjected to economic isolation surrenders without being DESPERATE MEASURES: defeated on the battlefield. This approach, however, has missed THE EFFECTS OF a more important way in which economic isolation affects its ECONOMIC ISOLATION target: strategy. Economic isolation constrains a state’s strategic choices and leaves its leaders to choose from the remaining ON WARRING POWERS options, which are almost always riskier. As analyses of German decision-making in World Wars I and II demonstrate, these riskier Erik Sand strategies often involve escalating the conflict at hand.

ow does a state’s access to the inter- region at the start of a conflict.2 On the other hand, national economy affect its strategy not all potential U.S. adversaries are so well con- to prevail in war? This question bears nected to the international economy. North Ko- on some of the most important inter- rea, for example, maintains a national ideology of nationalH challenges facing the United States today. self-sufficiency and does its best to isolate itself Economic sanctions have become a frequent tool from the world, to avoid being vulnerable to such in American foreign policy — witness the current maneuverings. If the United States found itself at campaigns of “maximum pressure” against Iran, war with either of these countries, what would a North Korea, and Venezuela as well as increased strategy of economic isolation accomplish? Would economic sanctions against Russia and the return it lead to victory? of the embargo against Cuba.1 The United States The traditional scholarly answer is “no”: Industri- would almost certainly expand such measures as al economies are sufficiently robust and economic part of its strategy were one of these disputes to isolation is sufficiently difficult such that states fac- escalate into open conflict. More importantly, per- ing economic isolation can easily adapt, except in haps, a strategy of economic isolation is already be- extraordinary circumstances.3 This article challeng- ing explicitly discussed as an option in the event of es that claim. While economic isolation alone may a war between the United States and China. China not lead directly to defeat, it places important con- is highly integrated into the international economy, straints on a power’s strategic decision-making by and some U.S. strategists argue that blocking the limiting the options that are available. Economically Strait of Malacca to disrupt China’s supply of oil isolated powers tend to pursue riskier strategies, would be a good alternative to the “AirSea Battle” often launching attacks that expand the conflict at concept, whose advocates call for strikes against hand. These broader conflicts then frequently end sensors and long-range weapons located in main- in defeat. Moreover, this effect holds regardless of a land China to reduce threats to U.S. forces in the state’s prewar level of economic integration.

1 Adam Taylor, “What Coronavirus? With Indictment of Venezeula’s Maduro and Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Doubles down on ‘Maximum Pressure,’” Washington Post, March 27, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/maduro-indictment-maximum-pressure-coronavi- rus-trump-venezuela/2020/03/26/82809364-6f86-11ea-a156-0048b62cdb51_story.html; Kenneth Rapoza, “Russia’s Latest Sanctions a Year in the Making but Surprise Everyone,” Forbes, Aug. 2, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/08/02/russias-latest-sanctions-a-year-in-the- making-but-surprises-everyone/; and Nora Gámez Torres, “Trump Readies New Sanctions on Cuba; Immigration Policies Likely to Remain Same in 2020,” Miami Herald, Dec. 30, 2019, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/cuba/article238826998.html. 2 T. X. Hammes, “Strategy for an Unthinkable Conflict,” The Diplomat, July 27, 2012, https://thediplomat.com/2012/07/military-strate- gy-for-an-unthinkable-conflict/. 3 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Economics of the Wartime Shortage: A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic War and in World Wars I and II (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1963); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated ed. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

12 13 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

In the first section of this article, I begin by review- close blockade of the Chinese economy to achieve Using economic and financial sanctions, the United While there has been significant examination of the ing the debate surrounding the potential U.S. strate- American goals coercively. States is actively engaging in campaigns of “maxi- deterrent effects of bilateral trading partnerships, gies in the event of a conflict with China, before dis- A significant portion of the debate concerning mum pressure” against both Iran and North Korea. little modern scholarship has investigated how a cussing the principal existing arguments about how the economic isolation approach has focused on If tensions with either of those countries were to single state’s broad economic integration affects its prewar economic integration affects wars and the the feasibility of a blockade strategy. China does escalate into open hostilities, economic isolation security and what happens when a state loses ac- effects of economic isolation during war. In section appear to be vulnerable to isolation: In 2018, Chi- would almost certainly remain part of U.S. strat- cess to the global economy in wartime. This article two, I develop a theory of how economic isolation na imported 69.8 percent of its oil consumption, a egy. Thus, understanding how economic isolation seeks, in part, to fill this gap. leads to risky decision-making, identifying two ways number that is expected to rise to 80 percent by would impact an opponent’s strategy, especially The second approach examines the strategic in which economic isolation impacts a country’s de- 2030.6 While China is roughly self-sufficient when during a war, is crucial. value of isolating states from the global economy cision-makers as well as two types of obviously risky it comes to grain production, food imports by value A discussion of how economic isolation affects during war. Scholars have found that economic strategies. I briefly discuss case selection before ex- increased significantly between 2005 and 2015 and strategy must be based in an understanding of how isolation is generally ineffective at coercing states ploring two critical examples of economic isolation are a key source of animal fodder.7 Douglas Peifer scholars have viewed the interaction between in- to surrender. Mancur Olson’s study of the subma- in sections three and four: Germany in World Wars I and Sean Mirski have both argued that a blockade ternational economic integration, isolation, and rine blockades of Great Britain during World Wars and II. I conclude the article with a discussion of the would be feasible and less escalatory than an Air- war. In general, scholars have approached this I and II finds that substitution and trade reorienta- relevance of these two cases today and the implica- Sea Battle campaign,8 with Mirski providing a de- interaction from two directions. First, scholars tion can help minimize the impact of leaky block- tions of my analysis. tailed plan for how such a blockade might occur. have examined the role that economic integration ades.16 While Robert Pape argues that economic However, other scholars, such as Gabriel Collins and interdependence play in making war less like- isolation was principally responsible for coercing and William Murray, and Evan Montgomery, have ly. One infamous example is Norman Angell, who Japan’s surrender in 1945, John Mearsheimer, who War and Economic Isolation countered that a strategy of economic escalation argued that economic integration made war un- conducted the only thorough evaluation of block- would not only be unlikely to succeed but could thinkable on the eve of World War I.11 Most mod- ades against great powers, takes the position that For more than a decade, policymakers, scholars, provide the illusion of taking a less escalatory ap- ern scholarship on the effect of bilateral trade be- this case is an outlier.17 He finds no other examples and pundits have debated how the United States proach while drawing the United States deeper tween individual pairs of trading states has indeed of economic isolation via blockade winning a war. should respond to the rise of China. A key compo- into a conflict.9 Discussion in media outlets has found a modest deterrent effect between trading Mearsheimer asserts that blockades fail because nent of this debate has been what strategy the Unit- mirrored this scholarly divide, focusing on wheth- partners, attributed to the costs of states losing ac- they are difficult to implement and become porous ed States should adopt if it finds itself in a conflict er it would be possible to isolate China economi- cess to their trading partner if they go to war.12 This over time, and because great powers adapt through with China, given China’s growing investment in cally, and how best to execute such a campaign.10 finding, however, is hotly debated,13 because war- substitution, stockpiling, and conquest.18 anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems. There are Both sets of thinkers are largely in agreement as ring states often continue trading with each oth- At first glance, it might seem economically iso- three basic opinions: Most aggressive are the advo- to how isolation would affect China if successfully er.14 Other scholarship maintains that capital and lated states ought to be less likely to win wars — cates of the AirSea Battle concept, which propos- implemented. Should violent conflict occur, they monetary interdependence can provide effective after all, these states would not be able to access es striking deep into China to roll back the A2/AD see economic isolation as a means either to co- mechanisms for costly signaling,15 allowing states resources beyond their borders — while well-re- envelope and allow American forces to approach.4 erce Chinese surrender or to reduce China’s mili- to bargain more credibly, and that current trade sourced states ought to be more likely to win A second group argues that A2/AD systems will tary capabilities, the traditional consequences by levels and expectations of future trade interact to wars, especially wars of attrition. Traditionally, ad- enhance the defensive abilities of American allies which policymakers and scholars have judged the encourage or discourage war. Whether the deter- vocates of economic isolation have argued either in the region, thus potentially allowing the United effectiveness of economic isolation. None, howev- rent effect of bilateral trade arises simply from the that economic warfare alone can directly coerce a States to achieve its objectives with minimal direct er, have assessed how a campaign of economic iso- general economic cost of war or because economic surrender or that economic isolation will stress an military commitment.5 The final group contends lation might affect Chinese strategy. costs could impair the warfighting effort is unclear. opponent’s armed forces and make them less effec- that the United States should adopt a strategy Moreover, economic isolation is among the most of economic isolation through either a distant or common tools in the U.S. coercive toolbox today. 11 Norman Angell, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (New York: Putnam, 1910). 4 Jan van Tol et al., AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, May 18, 2010, 12 John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russet, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985,” International https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-battle-concept/publication/1. Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 267–93, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2478.00042; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “Assessing the Liberal Peace with Alternative Specifications: Trade Still Reduces Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (July 1999): 423–42, https://doi.org/10.117 5 Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of 7%2F0022343399036004003; Solomon William Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no. 1 (1980): 55, https://doi.org/ the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249; and Michael Beckley, “The 10.1177%2F002200278002400103; and Solomon W. Polachek, John Robst, and Yuan-Ching Chang, “Liberalism and Interdependence: Extending the Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): Trade-Conflict Model,” Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 4 (1999): 405–22, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343399036004002. 78–119, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294. 13 Katherine Barbieri, “Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of Interstate Conflict?” Journal of Peace Research 33, 6 “China Commercial Guide,” International Trade Administration, accessed Jan. 14, 2020, https://www.export.gov/article?id=China-Oil-and-Gas. no. 1 (1996): 29–49, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343396033001003; and Erik Gartzke, Quan Li, and Charles Boehmer, “Investing in the 7 “How Is China Feeding Its Population of 1.4 Billion?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, China Power Team, accessed Jan. 14, 2020, Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict,” International Organization 55, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 391–438, https://doi. https://chinapower.csis.org/china-food-security/. org/10.1162/00208180151140612. 8 Douglas C. Peifer, “China, the German Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational Concept,” Orbis 55, no. 1 (January 2011): 114–31, https://doi. 14 Jack S. Levy and Katherine Barbieri, “Trading with the Enemy During Wartime,” Security Studies 13, no. 3 (2004): 1–47, https://doi. org/10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.009; and Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China,” org/10.1080/09636410490914059. Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 3 (2013): 385–421, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2012.743885. 15 “Costly signaling” is a counter to “cheap talk.” Audiences take messages more seriously when their senders must commit resources or forego 9 Gabriel B. Collins and William S. Murray, “No Oil for the Lamps of China?” Naval War College Review 61, no. 2 (2008): 79–95, https://digital- opportunities to send them. Senders would not bear the costs of sending these messages if they were not serious about following through. For the commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss2/10; and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Reconsidering a Naval Blockade of China: A Response to Mirski,” application of costly signaling to economic interdependence and war, see, Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer, “Investing in the Peace.” For the interaction of Journal of Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (August 2013): 615–23, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2013.790811. current and expected trade, see, Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” International Security 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 5–41, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.20.4.5. 10 Jason Glab, “Blockading China: A Guide,” War on the Rocks, Oct. 1, 2013, https://warontherocks.com/2013/10/blockading-china-a-guide/; Sean Mirski, “How a Massive Naval Blockade Could Bring China to Its Knees in a War,” National Interest, April 6, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/ 16 Olson, The Economics of the Wartime Shortage. blog/buzz/how-massive-naval-blockade-could-bring-china-its-knees-war-50957; David Lague and Benjamin Kang Lim, “China’s Fear of an American 17 Robert Anthony Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). Mearsheimer, The Tragedy Blockade,” Reuters, April 30, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-army-blockade/chinas-fear-of-an-american-blockade-idUSKCN1S6140; of Great Power Politics. Matthew Conners, “Blockade the First Island Chain,” U.S. Naval Institute, June 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/june/ blockade-first-island-chain; and Peifer, “China, the German Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational Concept.” 18 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 93–96.

14 15 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

tive in battle.19 However, this logic is flawed in two adapt to economic isolation with aggression is Ja- the target state’s population to try to overthrow undertaking, including both their probability and important ways. First, it assumes that an econom- pan prior to Pearl Harbor. When the United States its government.24 The political impact mechanism their severity. However, two challenges arise when ically isolated state has fewer resources within its embargoed oil after the Japanese occupied French identified here is the same except that rather than attempting to assess risk. First, and most obvious- own borders than the state (or states) it opposes. Indochina, Japan seized oil fields in the Dutch East the isolation causing the target state’s govern- ly, making an accurate prediction of outcomes in Second, it ignores the efficiency with which that Indies in order to continue its war in China.22 To ment to accept the demands of the state imposing real time is difficult, while evaluating the accuracy state uses its resources and the strategy it adopts. secure the transportation route from the East In- isolation — usually surrender — it causes it to of a prediction after the fact is often hampered Empirically, resources alone are a poor predictor dies to Japan, it was necessary to neutralize Brit- adopt riskier strategies. by outcome bias. Second, and more importantly, of war outcomes. One must also evaluate a state’s ish and American positions in the Western Pacific. To evaluate this theory, we must understand how effective wartime strategy usually requires the strategy.20 In short, economic isolation is an es- Seeking to maximize the element of surprise, Japan to identify when states are economically isolated use of “calculated risk” as Adm. Chester Nimitz sential tool in the U.S. toolbox, but scholars have attacked Pearl Harbor. Thus, to secure a new oil and when they are pursuing risky strategies. To defined it before the Battle of Midway. Nimitz in- neither investigated how a state’s broad economic supply after the U.S. embargo, Japan went to war identify when a state is economically isolated, we structed his commanders to “[avoid] … exposure integration affects its security nor how economic with Britain, Australia and New Zealand, the Neth- must first understand what a state needs in order of [their] force to attack by superior enemy forces isolation in war can affect a state’s strategy. erlands, and the United States. to have access to the international economy. For a without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of The second mechanism by which economic state to have effective access to the international such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.“25 isolation can affect strategy is political impact. economy it must meet three requirements. First, The essence of Nimitz’s instruction is that strate- Evaluating the Theory: Shortages that have a political impact interact surplus goods (either raw materials or finished gists must weigh the probability and “severity” of Economic Isolation and Strategy with existing political pathologies to make lead- products) must exist in a state that is willing to success against the probability and severity of the ers feel constrained. In these circumstances, lead- trade. Second, a state must be able to transport im- attendant hazards, and that greater risks should I argue that wartime economic isolation makes ers fear that the hardships of economic isolation ported goods to a location where it can use them. sometimes be accepted in the pursuit of greater states more likely to pursue risky strategy, and that will cause the civilian population to withdraw Third, a state must have hard currency or credit as gains. Thus, the best option for a decision-maker this effect holds even when states have low prewar support from the government unless it can even- well as a means of transmitting payment to be able to choose may not always be the least risky one. levels of integration into the global economy. Lack of tually provide gains that compensate for those to pay for the goods it imports, unless it finds a In combination, these two factors make risk as- economic access can affect a state’s strategy in two hardships. In these circumstances, governments partner willing to donate the goods as aid. Remov- sessment both complicated and subjective. ways: It can have a direct impact or a political im- have an incentive to “gamble for resurrection.”23 ing any one of these three requirements will limit a To minimize debates over the appropriate bal- pact. Effective economic isolation induces or exac- Just as with direct impact, these governments state’s access to the international economy. Strat- ancing of relative risk, I define two types of obvi- erbates shortages of critical resources. When those may decide to operate within the constraints that egies of economic isolation often target more than ously and especially risky strategies. By obviously shortages have a direct impact, economically iso- economic isolation imposes, for example, by fore- one of these. Regardless of which requirements are risky, I mean that these strategies have character- lated states experience a reduction in the resourc- stalling consideration of a negotiated solution, or targeted, a state’s ability to access the international istics that should be identifiable a priori to deci- es that can be put toward their war effort. These they may choose to adapt and seek additional re- economy is best assessed by looking at two factors: sion-makers with imperfect information, if they reductions may constrain leaders, eliminating some sources to alleviate those constraints. Again, the imports and shortages. The more severely a state’s choose to look for them. By especially risky, I mean of their strategic options. Some leaders may simply strategies that remain possible for the leaders of imports are reduced — in particular imports of that these strategies are outliers on the distribution accept these reductions and choose from among an economically isolated state to choose are likely critical goods — the more effective the strategy of of risky strategies and most observers would agree their reduced set of options. Alternately, some lead- riskier. This mechanism is similar to that which economic isolation. Shortages can also shed light that they are indeed risky. Other types of risky ers may choose to adapt, adjusting their strategy to underlies the coercive use of economic isolation on whether economic isolation is having an impact. strategies exist, but because the types of strategies attempt to gain additional resources rather than ac- against governments. Scholars who have claimed If a state makes adjustments to its economy during presented below are both obviously and especially cept the constraints of economic isolation.21 This ap- that economic isolation can coerce target govern- wartime, it could mean that that state is no longer risky they are more self-evident than others. I call proach usually involves greater risk as conquering ments into changing their behavior have claimed self-sufficient in producing a good it previously these two types of strategies the “Hail Mary” and territory to gain more resources frequently escalates that the target governments choose to comply was. For example, a state which produced enough the “Shoot the Moon.” While these strategies are the war, increasing its geographic spread and swell- with the demands of the states imposing the chemical fertilizer to meet domestic demand, could not mutually exclusive and indeed often overlap, ing the opposing coalition. isolation because the isolation causes economic in wartime use the nitrates it previously used to they each have unique characteristics. The canonical case of a country choosing to hardship that, were it to continue, might cause make fertilizer to make explosives instead and find Hail Mary strategies are defined by their ex- that it was no longer self-sufficient in fertilizer. If tremely low probability of success. Success is re- that state had access to the international economy, mote while the possible costs of failure are real. 19 For an example of the argument that shortages can make enemy forces less effective, see, W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2 it could import fertilizer to make up for its shortage Decision-makers choosing a Hail Mary strategy may (London: H. M. Stationery Off, 1952), 630. (as long as there was no absolute global shortage). believe themselves in a bad or worsening situation 20 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Allan C. Stam III, Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Thus, shortages may indicate an inability to import and feel that because things are already so bad, they Politics and the Crucible of War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996). goods and imply that a strategy of economic isola- have little to lose by trying an idea that probably will 21 Similarly, Rosemary Kelanic argues that, in the special case of oil, states attempt to mitigate their assessed vulnerabilities prior to conflict to minimize the potential effect of economic isolation, though she also notes that in some cases states adapt by seeking to conquer reliable oil sup- tion has been effective. not work. Because forecasting is difficult and pathol- plies. Rosemary A. Kelanic, “The Petroleum Paradox: Oil, Coercive Vulnerability, and Great Power Behavior,” Security Studies 25, no. 2 (April 2016): Evaluating the riskiness of a strategy is difficult. ogies sometimes lead to overly optimistic risk as- 181–213, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2016.1171966. Traditional risk analysis focuses on the potential sessments, leaders may choose a Hail Mary strategy 22 Scott D. Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18, no. 4 (Spring 1988): 893–922, https://doi. for negative outcomes in the course of a given believing their chances of success are higher than org/10.2307/204828; and Dale C. Copeland, “A Tragic Choice: Japanese Preventive Motivations and the Origins of the Pacific War,”International Interactions 37, no. 1 (2011): 116–26, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2011.546722. 23 “Gambling for resurrection” is a political science theory that claims that when leaders begin losing a war they are more likely to “double 24 Nikolay Marinov, “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 3 (July 2005): 564–76, down” and seek to win rather than pursue a negotiated settlement — thus gaining the political benefits of winning and avoiding the political costs https://www.jstor.org/stable/3647732. of a settlement short of “victory” — even if the negotiated settlement would be more likely to leave the country as a whole better off. George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War,” American Journal of 25 Quoted in, Robert C. Rubel, “Deconstructing Nimitz’s Principle of Calculated Risk,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 1, Political Science 38, no. 2 (May 1994): 362–80, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111408. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss1/4/.

16 17 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

they actually are. While such cases provide evidence egy. These strategies are inherently risky because a spurred Germany to embrace a risky strategy, which tory would maintain their status. This belief led for the argument that economic isolation increases small disruption can lead to catastrophe. A quintes- ultimately helped bring about its defeat. Influenced them to make large gambles, including deciding the likelihood of a state adopting risky strategies, sential Shoot the Moon strategy is a nuclear coun- by its experience in World War I, the Nazis attempt- to restart unrestricted submarine warfare in late Hail Mary strategies provide even stronger support terforce first strike. In theory (and setting aside sec- ed to create an autarkic Germany to prepare for 1916, which brought the United States into the for my claims when the decision-makers choosing ond-order effects), if the attacking state successfully what would be World War II. The war’s conquests war. Pursuing this risky Shoot the Moon strategy those strategies have been presented with accurate destroys all of its target’s nuclear weapons in one should have provided the country with additional ensured Germany’s ultimate defeat. assessments of their probability of success prior to initial blow, it gains a great advantage. If, however, security: By 1941, Germany controlled most of the From Germany’s unification in 1871 to 1913, the making their decision. For example, after the United it misses even one of its target’s nuclear weapons European continent and was ruthless in its willing- German economy more than tripled in size while States imposed its oil embargo against Japan in Au- — a small disturbance from the planned course of ness to sacrifice occupied populations to the needs its population increased by only about 50 per- gust 1941, Japan decided to attack the United States events — it invites almost certain nuclear retaliation of its war economy. These characteristics make it cent.30 International trade was a key part of this despite knowing that it would almost certainly lose with potentially catastrophic effects. a particularly hard test for the argument that eco- growth. Between 1872 and 1913, German exports the war. In the summer of 1941, Japan’s new Total If a state faces a choice between a Hail Mary and nomic isolation leads to risky strategies, yet Allied (excluding re-exports) more than quadrupled and War Research Institute, staffed with the most prom- a Shoot the Moon strategy, it is likely to choose the economic warfare still shaped Germany’s decisions imports more than tripled. In 1913, the country ising mid-grade officers with access to the most Shoot the Moon strategy because it has a higher through the direct impact mechanism, causing it took a larger share of world trade than any power accurate information Japan possessed, wargamed probability of success. Moreover, once implement- once again to embrace a risky strategy.29 except Britain.31 Food and raw materials to feed a conflict between Japan and the United States if ed, Shoot the Moon strategies may appear to suc- In both cases, wartime Germany became eco- Germany’s population and industry made up 27 Japan were to seek to secure oil in Southeast Asia. ceed at first before a small disruption causes them nomically isolated, and in both cases that isolation percent and 46 percent of German imports, re- The analysis reached the “unequivocal conclusion to fail or time runs out. Because Hail Mary strate- led the German government to make disastrous spectively, by value.32 By the early 1900s, German that the war was unwinnable” and briefed that opin- gies have low absolute probabilities of success, they strategic choices: In World War I that took the iron ore no longer met the needs of the Ruhr’s ion directly to the Japanese cabinet.26 War Minister often appear as an obviously bad choice. Only es- form of adopting unrestricted submarine warfare; blast furnaces.33 German industrialists invested (and soon Prime Minister) Hideki Tojo was reported pecially desperate states are likely to choose them. in World War II it was the decision to invade the in French mines and signed long-term contracts to have paid close attention. And yet, less than four Either way, because both Hail Mary and Shoot the Soviet Union. with the Swedes.34 By 1913, Germany was import- months later, he started the war he had been told Moon strategies are easily identifiable andespecially ing 25 percent of its iron and lead and 78 per- was unwinnable to resolve the problems created by risky, if states choose to follow them, their choice cent of its copper consumption.35 Germany also the American effort at economic isolation. He fol- leaves little doubt they are pursuing risky strategies. Political Impact: depended on imports for asphalt, hides, timber, lowed a Hail Mary strategy. In the following sections, I examine Germany’s be- Germany in World War I tanning chemicals, resins, phosphates, tin, nickel, havior in World Wars I and II in depth mercury, manganese, oil, and sulfur.36 to evaluate this article’s claims — that When World War I began, the Entente powers Although it would rely heavily on imported raw effective economic isolation makes the imposed a blockade on Germany, which had be- materials until the start of World War I, the Ger- target state more likely to purse risky come deeply embedded in the international econ- man government sought to reduce the country’s strategies and that prewar levels of in- omy over the previous 40 years. This economic dependence on imported food through agricultur- ternational economic integration have isolation caused Germany to suffer severe food al protection. Beginning in 1880, the imperial gov- little effect on this likelihood. Germany and raw material shortages, which in turn affect- ernment imposed tariffs to counter cheap grain provides an appropriate but challenging ed German decision-making through the political from the United States, Russia, and Hungary. test for whether economic isolation in- impact mechanism. The shortages undermined While the initial tariffs were modest, the German fluences strategy regardless of a state’s the fragile political relationship between the government increased them repeatedly over the level of prewar economic integration. elite and the working population, and the elites following 25 years.37 It also facilitated investment On the one hand, the efforts to blockade came to believe that only an overwhelming vic- in new intensive agricultural methods. German Germany in both world wars form key Shoot the Moon strategies — like the strategy cases for claims that isolation is generally ineffec- 27 29 This article does not consider the effect of selecting into war. In particular, states that are vulnerable to economic isolation may be deterred in the card game “Hearts” — leave the states that tive. On the other hand, some recent scholars have from war when led by leaders of “normal” aggressiveness. If vulnerability to economic isolation had this effect, the only states vulnerable to eco- employ them better off if completely successful but used analogies to Germany in pushing the argument nomic isolation that would actually initiate wars would be those led by unusually aggressive leaders. These aggressive leaders would then be more worse off even if mostly, but not completely, suc- for pursuing an isolation strategy toward China.28 likely to expand a war in response to the pressures of economic isolation. Leaders of average aggression, on the other hand, would be deterred from initiating a war in the first place by their state’s vulnerability to economic isolation. Even if this selection effect exists, however, the pattern cessful. These strategies have severely negative In both periods I examine, Germany was an in- observed in the two case studies presented here should hold across the set of observed wars both past and future, making it an important consid- outcomes that will occur with only a small distur- dustrialized, continental power that bordered many eration for decision-makers. Future research should investigate how vulnerability to economic isolation and leader aggressiveness interact to affect the likelihood of war breaking out. bance to the planned sequence of actions or if the states — exactly the sort of state that conventional 30 Angus Maddison, “Historical GDP Data,” University of Groningen, accessed April 18, 2020, https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/ strategy is not successful within a certain period of wisdom says should be able to cope with wartime maddison/releases/maddison-database-2010. time. These characteristics make Shoot the Moon economic isolation. Prior to World War I, Germany 31 Katherine Barbieri and Omar Keshk, “Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0.” Correlates of War Project, 2016, https://correlatesofwar.org/ strategies easy to identify a priori because they do was deeply integrated into the international econo- data-sets/bilateral-trade. not include probability assessments. Thus, in the- my. Once the war began, economic isolation formed 32 Gustav Stolper, Karl Häuser, and Knut Borchardt, The German Economy, 1870 to the Present (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), 30. ory, a decision-maker without accurate probability a key part of the Allied strategy. Operating through 33 Martin Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany, 1815–1914 (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 274. forecasts could still identify a Shoot the Moon strat- the political impact mechanism, economic isolation 34 Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany, 275. 35 Robert B. Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor: A Study of the Military-Industrial Complex in Germany During World War I (The 26 Eri Hotta, Japan 1941: Countdown to Infamy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), 167. Hague: MNijhoff, 1964), 4. 27 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 90. 36 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 4. 28 Peifer, “China, the German Analogy, and the New AirSea Operational Concept.” 37 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 37.

18 19 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

grain and potato production rose dramatically be- been less able to specialize. In short, an autarkic tween the late 1870s and the first decade of the Germany would have been left behind. 20th century. Average wheat yields increased by However, integration also carried with it the risk The German 38 percent, rye yields by 53 percent, and potato that, should Germany lose access to the internation- yields by 90 percent. The amount of land being al market, the German economy would struggle. Pri- cultivated rose, and total grain and potato pro- or to World War I, Germany imported a third of its government, either duction roughly doubled.38 And yet, it was not food and animal fodder requirements. Three-quar- enough to feed the German people. In the 10 years ters of all German imports during this time traveled out of ignorance or before the war began, domestic production varied by sea (if one includes goods transshipped through between 75 and 80 percent of consumption. If one ports in neighboring states).44 An effective blockade includes animal fodder, Germany only produced would quickly cause shortages. Industrial depend- overconfidence in its two-thirds of the total food it consumed.39 For ence on raw materials posed a similar problem. some foods, like vegetables, Germany imported These risks would place important constraints on three-fifths of its consumption.40 German decision-makers in the event of a conflict. war plan, assumed Nonetheless, German agriculture remained Whether Germany’s leaders recognized these embedded in the world market. Germany ex- risks is unclear. During the July Crisis in 1914, that it would continue ported grain surpluses in the fall, which meant German leaders cared greatly about whether the it needed to import more food at other times of British would enter the conflict, but they did lit- the year than simple production-to-consumption tle to hedge against a blockade.45 While Germany to have access to the ratios would suggest.41 Some of the increases in had built a first-rate navy in the years before the German agricultural production were attributa- war, the “risk theory” — first proposed by Adm. ble to changes in world markets. German farm- Alfred von Tirpitz and used as the strategic ration- international market ers specialized in agricultural sectors where they ale behind the naval construction program — saw held competitive advantage in international mar- the High Seas Fleet as a means to deter the Brit- in the event of a war. kets. As British mills replaced German wool with ish from going to war with Germany, rather than cheaper sources, German farmers took to raising as a way to break a British blockade. Instead, Tir- veal, which commanded a higher price and kept pitz’s goal had been to build a fleet large enough more acreage available for crops.42 that even if the Royal Navy defeated the Germans Integration with the world economy had come in battle, it would be a pyrrhic victory — the British with both benefits and risks. Considering Germa- fleet would be so heavily damaged that it could no ny’s dependence on imported raw materials and the longer maintain the rest of its worldwide commit- vibrancy of its export markets, it is difficult to think ments.46 In the end, his fleet had the opposite of a that Germany could have sustained its rapid indus- deterrent effect, triggering a naval arms race that trialization had it been economically independent. pushed the British to align with the French. There was not enough domestic demand to sustain Overall, the German government saw economic German growth, and even if there had been, domes- planning as unimportant. The Ministry of War be- tic supply, both of labor and of raw materials, would lieved in the Schlieffen plan — designed to defeat not have been able to keep up.43 Even if it had been France and then Russia swiftly. Internal logistics free of both of these constraints, German economic plans assumed the war would last nine months at efficiency would have suffered had it not been en- most.47 The General Staff dismissed the importance gaged in the world economy because it would have of economic planning, delegating the matter to ci-

38 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 21. 39 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 62. 40 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 4. 41 Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany, 248. 42 Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany, 205. 43 German agriculture relied on foreign labor, needing almost a million foreign workers in the years before the war. Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 4. 44 Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 335. 45 Offer argues that German leaders sought a quick victory war plan, which the Schlieffen Plan fulfilled, not only because of the threat of a two- front war, but also because of the threat of a naval blockade and Germany’s economic vulnerability. If this hypothesis is true, it only re-enforces the central argument of this article that economic isolation constrains leaders to choose risky strategies. Offer, The First World War, 348. 46 Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 2nd ed. (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1983), 215. 47 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 3.

20 21 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

vilians in the Ministry of War, who in turn passed it and Sweden. While multiple problems bedeviled ernment redistributed workers to factory towns, It would be wrong to infer from these data on to the Ministry of Interior.48 The economic plan- British attempts to enforce the blockade in the housing ran short.61 that Germans suffered no hunger. After all ning that did occur was minimal and ignored the first part of the war, in 1916, the British govern- The food shortage had the most pronounced these were only averages. Evened out, the risk of economic isolation. The government made ment reorganized its effort.54 The blockade’s “bite” effect. The German government instituted food food was sufficient, more or less, to main- no specific preparations to feed the population or worsened. By late 1916, the blockade expanded to rationing in January 1915. Physical and social tain weight. But rations fluctuated a great ensure access to raw materials for war production. severely limit transshipment to Germany via adja- characteristics determined an individual’s ration. deal from week to week. If the average just Instead, it stockpiled cash.49 Cash reserves, how- cent neutral countries.55 Conquests in Romania and Soldiers, farmers, hard laborers, children, and matched the food norm, then it is likely ever, were only useful if Germany retained access the Ukraine would provide Germany some oil and pregnant women had special rations above the base that half the time the people ate less than to the international market. Plans also existed to grain, but “Germany soon found herself in the po- amount.62 The base ration, which not all Germans the norm. Many people ate less all the time. prohibit exports and eliminate import controls in sition of a beleaguered fortress.”56 could always get, was shockingly low. Though it And there must have been a great deal of wartime.50 So poor was the planning for any kind Within two weeks of the war’s outbreak, short- varied throughout the war, from late 1916 onward, hunger from week to week.67 of economic disruption that, during the July Crisis, ages of industrial raw materials caused production 225 grams of bread or flour per person per day and Imperial Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hol- problems.57 Scarcity led to the end of the market 56–68 grams of fat (butter, lard, oil, or margarine) The shortages would not have starved Germany lweg rejected his interior secretary’s recommen- economy. The government instituted price controls per person per week was typical.63 This ration even if that war had continued longer than it did, dation to purchase extra grain supplies, fearing it and directed raw materials to prioritized war indus- amounted to about 1,000 calories a day.64 but they were more than enough to cause signifi- would give the appearance of economic mobiliza- tries.58 Shortages of rubber, oil, and some metals However, actual caloric consumption was prob- cant discontent. tion.51 Historian Martin Kitchen argued that, had persisted throughout the war.59 In 1916, under the ably higher, although it is more difficult to assess. These shortages were largely due to the block- the war come a month later, Germany’s food situ- Hindenburg Plan’s “War Socialism,” the government Since fruits and vegetables were usually available ade, but other problems worsened them. Undoubt- ation would have been far worse as it would have took total command of the economy. Workers could and not included in the ration, total caloric intake edly, mismanagement of food stocks played a role already exported most of its fall harvest.52 The Ger- not change jobs without government permission was somewhat higher than the ration even before — even the German army eventually had to resort man government, either out of ignorance or over- and could be conscripted for specific factories. The considering food available through the black mar- to the black market to secure food supplies.68 More confidence in its war plan, assumed that it would government closed industries whose products were ket. While often cited figures from 1916 suggest importantly, a domestic supply problem aggravat- continue to have access to the international market insufficiently valuable for war, repurposed their ma- 86–90 percent of the food Germans consumed ed the shortages. During the war, agricultural pro- in the event of a war. chinery, and redirected their workers.60 came from rations, one survey of actual calories duction collapsed, exacerbating food problems in Unsurprisingly, the war brought severe econom- While extreme measures allowed industrial pro- consumed by families in Leipzig conducted during an economy that previously produced only two- ic consequences for the unprepared German state. duction to keep up with war demands, the bur- the war, which was forgotten for 70 years, recorded thirds of its annual needs. By the end of the war, The British imposed a blockade that isolated Ger- den fell heavily on the population. By the third actual intake at almost 50 percent higher on aver- grain production was half its prewar level. The many from the international market.53 The combi- winter of the war, coal stocks were insufficient to age than the base ration, except during times of collapse had several immediate causes, including nation of the naval blockade and facing enemies on heat homes and maintain production. By the last real shortages like the winter of 1916–17 (the crit- redistribution of manpower from farms to indus- most of its land frontiers limited Germany to trad- year of the war, shortages of raw material made ical time period for my argument).65 According to try and the army, shortages and attrition of farm ing with its Austrian ally and the adjacent neutral clothing, shoes, and soap scarce. Miners could economic historian Avner Offer, the higher Leipzig equipment, and the redirection of nitrates from countries: the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, not wash away coal dust. Lice spread. As the gov- estimate of actual calories consumed — about 1900 fertilizer to the munitions industry.69 These prob- — just reached “base energy needs once people lems, too, were related to the blockade.70 In 1913, had lost sufficient weight and limited their exer- for example, Germany had imported 210,000 tons tions somewhat.”66 But, as Offer summarizes, of fertilizer. By 1916, it could only obtain 38 percent 48 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 3. of that amount.71 Had Germany had access to inter- 49 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 154. 50 Karl Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 12. 61 Gerald D. Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918 (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1966), 459. 51 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 3. 62 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 63. 52 Kitchen, The Political Economy of Germany, 248. 63 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 63. Hardach provides a daily ration for a “city dweller” in the final year of the war as 53 It took time for the British to make the blockade effective. Nicholas Lambert documents the challenges the British faced in the first half of 440 grams of potatoes, 200 grams of bread, 50 grams of sugar, 35 grams of meat, and 9 grams of fat, though he too notes that it was not always the war. Nicholas A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, available. Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 13, n. 7. This ration amounts to 2,981 calories, substantially more 2012). Eric Osborne examines the blockade’s increasing effectiveness over the entire course of the war. Eric W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Block- than Stolper et al.’s number, though Hardach’s numbers for bread and fat are slightly lower. It may be that Stolper et al.’s research missed the inclu- ade of Germany, 1914–1919 (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004). Historians differ on the blockade’s eventual degree of effectiveness. According to sion of items other than flour and bread. More likely, however, it seems that, since many city dwellers were industrial workers and Hardach provides Maurice Parmelee, both German and British contemporary statistics showed that, by late 1916 and early 1917, German imports had fallen by over 90 the ration for a typical city dweller, his number is a laborer’s ration rather than the base ration. As is discussed later, inequality in rations was, in percent. Later research reported by Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman indicates that, overall, German imports had fallen by 61 percent from prewar itself, a source of political discontent. levels by 1917. Regardless, the drop was substantial. Maurice Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power: The Blockade, 1914–1919, and Its Significance for a World State (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1924), 190–232; and Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An 64 The caloric total of the ration described is 970 if calculated using U.S. Department of Agriculture standard calorie conversion of four calories Economic History since 1750 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 164. per gram of protein and carbohydrates and nine calories per gram of fat. Davis and Engerman suggest that rations had fallen to 1,344 calories by late 1916 and 1,100 by summer 1917 with only about 1,000 calories actually being consumed after accounting for waste in cooking. Davis and 54 Lambert, Planning Armageddon. Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War, 204. 55 For discussion of British efforts to disrupt transshipment, see, “Memorandum in Regard to the Present Position of the Blockade,” United 65 Offer,The First World War, 52–53. This estimate also roughly coincides with the report that a third of civilian food consumption was distributed via Kingdom War Cabinet, Jan. 1, 1917, U.K. National Archives, CAB 1/22, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/firstworldwar/spotlights/p_ black market by the end of the war. Jürgen Kocka, Facing Total War: German Society 1914–1918 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 24. memo_blockade.htm. For evidence of the impressive effectiveness of these efforts, see, Louis Guichard,The Naval Blockade, 1914–1918, (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1930), 77. 66 Offer, The First World War, 53. 56 Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 12. 67 Offer, The First World War, 53. 57 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 65. 68 Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918, 462. 58 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 66. 69 Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 12. 59 Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 12. 70 Parmelee, Blockade and Sea Power, 236. 60 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 67. 71 Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919, 147.

22 23 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

ability to manage class conflict to the pressures of Ludendorff noted that “what General Headquarters the war and blockade.84 German leaders concluded could achieve by patriotic education … amounted that only a quickly settled “victorious war” would only to giving crumbs to the hungry.”90 The political preserve their authority.85 The blockade had affect- situation that the blockade had induced eliminated ed German decision-making through the political all routes that promised anything short of victory. impact mechanism. As a result, the German leadership was left with Had there been no blockade, in January 1917 the option 3 — a return to unrestricted submarine war- German government would have had at least three fare. Despite clear warnings that the United States national markets, it might have imported new farm tressing food shortages.”78 Alfred Rosenberg saw a options: 1) Continue the land campaigns on the would enter the war if Germany recommenced un- equipment or increased its supply of nitrates. With connection between the war’s hardship and a shift eastern and western fronts, both of which were at a restricted submarine warfare, Germany did so any- the blockade in place, these options did not exist. in the politics of the working classes. According to stalemate, and hope for a breakthrough; 2) attempt way. Its military leaders did not dispute that unre- While post-unification German politics had al- him, “the experience of war awoke the masses to to negotiate peace with the Allied Powers (Wood- stricted submarine warfare would bring the United ways featured a struggle between conservative a consciousness that many things could no longer row Wilson had recently made a peace initiative); States into the war, but the German naval leadership elites and liberalizers, the blockade-induced food be endured that had formerly been tolerated.”79 He or 3) recommence unrestricted submarine warfare. believed the submarine blockade would break the shortages undermined social solidarity. The poor tied this shift directly to the food shortage.80 However, through the political impact mechanism, British within six months and lead to victory before felt that the rich, who could afford to augment The German elite understood this growing chal- the blockade eliminated all but the riskiest option. the United States could mobilize. This combination their rations through the black market, were un- lenge to their authority. Armeson explains that Ironically, with hindsight, the first option — sit- made the unrestricted submarine warfare decision willing to shoulder the burdens of the war.72 Mean- German conservatives ting tight — might have led to the best outcome a classic example of a Shoot the Moon strategy — a while, the rich felt their social position was being for Germany. The Russian government would soon strategy in which anything less than complete suc- challenged as the government allotted industrial feared that an unsuccessful war would lead collapse and Britain and France were barely able to cess would lead to a bad outcome. workers greater rations.73 German leaders recog- to the overthrow of the domestic status quo. repulse the German offensive in the spring of 1918. Both German leaders and outside observers tied nized the risk to their political power. In 1915, Tir- They were apprehensive of reforms which Indeed, the western Allied armies came so close to the decision for unrestricted submarine warfare to pitz noted the blockade could induce a revolution, should alter the Prussian franchise system or breaking under the spring offensive that the Allies the blockade. In 1916, the British blockade was begin- writing, “Gradually the blockade of Germany must would introduce true parliamentarism into needed to radically increase the size of the Ameri- ning to have a much greater impact. In fact, the Ger- affect the whole temper of the nation and one can German political life. Any new orientation in can army bound for Europe in response.86 Without man U-boat campaign was launched at the time of never know whether a section of the proletariat the domestic sphere after the war … would America’s entry into the war, a direct response to Germany’s greatest food shortages during the war.91 may not break out like a carrion vulture.”74 75 mean, as Heinrich Class so well expressed it, Germany’s pursuit of unrestricted submarine war- Though out of government in 1916, Adm. Tirpitz lat- By 1916, this hardship broke the unwritten com- ‘that the war had been lost domestically.’81 fare, the Allies may have buckled. In January 1917, er remembered that in the discussions of submarine promise that had sustained German politics since however, maintaining the course appeared a recipe warfare in 1915 he felt the appropriate concession 1890 in which elite interest groups relied on the Historian Gerald Feldman agrees, writing that for stalemate and attrition. for restraining his submarines would be a relaxation support of the votes of nationalist mass political “neither the leaders of heavy industry nor the lead- Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg argued for option of the blockade.92 When the German government did groups to defeat socialist politicians.76 Food riots ers of the army … were willing to create the basis 2 — negotiating peace. However, the growing divi- limit submarine warfare in response to American started to occur, and by 1917, food shortages had for a permanent integration of the workers into the sions at home convinced most German elites that demands in May 1916, it reserved the right to recom- sparked repeated waves of strikes across Germany. state.”82 In her history of life in Germany during only a great military victory would preserve their mence unrestricted submarine warfare if the United Multiple historians have tied this unrest directly to World War I, Belinda Davis documents how the position, thus foreclosing any serious consideration States could not pressure Britain to lift the block- the food shortages and the blockade. Robert Arme- German government repeatedly tried to respond to of a negotiated settlement.87 The military leaders be- ade.93 In his memoirs, Gen. Paul von Hindenburg son called the blockade “a basic underlying cause” its population’s concerns about food and econom- lieved a negotiated peace would “cheat” Germany of opened the chapter in which he discussed the deci- of the unrest,77 and Gustav Stolper argued that ic hardship, but never achieved lasting success.83 the war’s gains.88 By late 1916, German conservatives sion to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare by the strikes “were sufficiently explained by the dis- Jürgen Kocka linked the breakdown of the state’s feared time was running out domestically.89 They describing German suffering under the blockade.94 seemed out of options. In his memoirs, Gen. Erich Numerous postwar Allied observers and later his-

72 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 70–71; and Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, 1871–1918, trans. Ian 84 Kocka, Facing Total War, 160. F.D. Morrow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1931), 90. 85 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 22. 73 Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918, 467. 86 Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany, 15–16. 74 Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1919), 306. 87 For detailed evidence that German elites felt constrained from pursuing a negotiated settlement because of concerns about the working 75 Archibald Colquhoun Bell, A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War, Austria-Hungary, class’s likely political demands, see, H. E. Goemans and Mark Fey, “Risky but Rational: War as an Institutionally Induced Gamble,” Journal of Politics Bulgaria, and Turkey, 1914–1918 (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1961), 572. 71, no. 1 (January 2009): 35–54, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608090038; and Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, 1871–1918. 76 For a discussion of how cartelized politics lead to the politics of imperial expansion in Germany, see, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic 88 David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, and Bonny Lin, Blinders, Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (Santa Monica, CA: Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 109. RAND Corporation, 2014), 64, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR768.html. 77 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 110. 89 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 98–99. 78 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 71. 90 Erich Ludendorff, My War Memories, 1914–1918 (London: Hutchinson, 1920), 438. 79 Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, 1871–1918, 90. 91 Offer, The First World War, 47, 77. 80 Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic, 1871–1918, 91. 92 Tirpitz, My Memoirs, 148. 81 Armeson, Total Warfare and Compulsory Labor, 21. 93 “Reply of May 4th, by the German Secretary of Foreign Affairs, to the Ultimatum of April 18th,” in Source Records of the Great War, Vol. IV, 82 Feldman, Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914–1918, 456. ed. Charles F. Horne (New York: National Alumni, 1923), 101. 83 Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 94 Paul von Hindenburg, Out of My Life (London: Cassell and co., ltd., 1920), 250.

24 25 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

torians also connected the tightening blockade to to fight a major war, must either be free of the Brit- domestic production was able to satisfy demand. the world market prices for their food. When Ger- the decision for unrestricted submarine warfare.95 ish Blockade … or must have access to Russian raw The imports were used to build up Germany’s grain many imported food, it frequently did so in the Historian Avner Offer suggested that Germany may materials and transit trade.”98 Adolf Hitler believed stocks. By 1939, Germany had enough grain stock- context of arrangements negotiated for reasons not have initiated the U-boat campaign without the that Germany needed to be self-sufficient and at- piled to provide a year’s worth of bread.102 However, that were more political than economic, and it paid Allied blockade.96 Absent the blockade, it is hard to tempted to make it so. His government’s efforts re- Germany never reached self-sufficiency in animal premium prices to ensure loyalty.109 Moreover, the imagine German leaders would have made the risky duced Germany’s dependence on external supplies, fodder, fruit, eggs, or fats, importing 40 percent of domestic development of synthetic oil and rubber decision to unleash their U-boats, given that their but only partially and at significant cost. Once the the latter before the war began.103 were costly. These industries required new capi- decision brought the United States into the war and war began, a renewed blockade re-imposed com- As the war approached, German food reserves tal-intensive industrial plants. The 1939 war prepa- greatly increased their likelihood of defeat. plete isolation on the country. Even after conquer- were less than RNS planners had hoped. Herbert ration plan to increase German oil production Before World War I, Germany was deeply integrat- ing most of Europe, Germany struggled to find food Backe, a top RNS leader in 1939 and later Reich would have required as much steel for synthetic oil ed into the world economy. This integration allowed and raw materials. These shortages drove Hitler’s food and agriculture minister, wanted to have plant construction as it would take to build a fleet for specialization and dramatic industrial growth. decision to invade the Soviet Union in mid-1941 stocks to last for three years of fighting. He knew 3.5 times the size of the British navy.110 Synthetic Germany became a leading European power, but it while Germany was still at war in the west — an the war would disrupt production as men left the rubber production proved very costly: seven times could not secure wartime sea control. When it found example of the direct impact of the blockade — a fields for the army. The loss of workforce would the production of its natural equivalent.111 itself at war with the leading sea power as well as decision that doomed his empire. reduce the production of labor-intensive crops like most of its neighbors, it became isolated from the Hitler believed that Germany should be inde- potatoes and root vegetables, which, in turn, would global economy. The blockade devastated the Ger- pendent from global markets in both food and in- reduce the supplies of meat and milk as crops were man economy and undermined the stability of Ger- dustrial production. His call for lebensraum — land diverted from fodder to food.104 man politics. Having induced the breakdown of to be used as “living space” for German settlers in Germany never achieved autarky in raw materials German politics, the blockade operated through the Eastern Europe — grew from his obsession with either. In 1934, Germany established administrative political impact mechanism to restrict the strategic food supplies. In the 1930s, Germans blamed the bureaus similar to the RNS to manage raw materi- options available to German leaders to only those World War I blockade for the deaths of more than als.105 And yet, on the eve of the war, Germany was that were the most risky.97 Facing limited options, 424,000.99 At the 1936 party convention, Hitler set a still importing 65 percent of its iron ore and oil. Only German leaders chose the highly risky Shoot the goal of being independent in raw materials by 1940. half of its oil imports came from Europe, leaving Moon strategy of unrestricted submarine warfare. But rather than pursuing these goals to increase open the possibility that a blockade could interrupt This decision ensured Germany’s ultimate defeat. the standard of living in the country, his economic its supply.106 The situation for other strategic raw The point is not that the blockade itself cost the plan attempted to “make Germany invincible” — a materials was similar. Germany imported substan- Germans the war, but rather that it constrained and goal it would fail to meet.100 tial portions of industrial metals: 25 percent of its shaped the strategic choices the German leadership The Nazi government’s attempt to achieve food zinc, 50 percent of its lead, 70 percent of its cop- felt it had. The options that remained were highly independence began as soon as it came to power. per, and more than 90 percent of its tin and nickel.107 risky, and their selection expanded the war and led In 1933, Hitler created the Reichsnährstand (RNS) Germany also imported 90 percent of its bauxite to Germany’s eventual defeat. to regulate food production and the food supply. (though mostly from Eastern Europe) and 80 per- On the eve of World War II, Germany’s attempt This government body supervised German agri- cent of its textiles. German investments in synthetic at economic independence had failed. Hitler had re- culture and food markets, directly controlling 6 rubber and synthetic oil helped it meet demand, but duced trade to just above 10 percent of GDP, lower Direct Impact: million independent agricultural producers in ad- it was not enough. When the war began, Germany than almost any point since unification.112 The coun- Germany and World War II dition to the 40 percent of the German workforce had less than six months’ worth of bauxite, iron, try remained dependent on imported raw materials employed in occupations under RNS regulation. and copper on hand. Tires and aviation gas stocks for industrial production and key parts of its food The German experience in World War II flows It also set the price of food and drink throughout were enough to last only one and five months, re- supply. Unlike before World War I, however, Ger- from Germany’s experience in World War I. The the Reich.101 In 1936, the RNS restarted grain im- spectively, at peacetime consumption rates.108 many had thought carefully about its vulnerabili- British blockade in World War I profoundly shaped ports to meet German demand, which amounted These meager returns on German efforts at ties and stockpiled some resources in preparation the Nazi leadership’s world view. As historian Rob- to more than a million tons that year. Imports rose self-sufficiency came with high costs to efficiency. for the war, but these preparations had come with ert Cecil would later write, “It was clear to all [in in 1937 to 1.6 million tons and continued until the German consumers paid prices much higher than a cost. Germany’s economy was less efficient and the German leadership] … that the Reich, in order war began, although, beginning in 1937, German

102 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 193. 95 W. Arnold-Forster, The Blockade, 1914–1919: Before the Armistice—and After, Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, no. 17 (Oxford: Clarendon 103 Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 77. Press, 1939), 25; Guichard, The Naval Blockade, 1914–1918, 25, 79–80; Nigel Hawkins, The Starvation Blockades: Naval Blockades of WWI (Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 2002), 192; Lawrence Sondhaus, The Great War at Sea: A Naval History of the First World War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 104 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 361. Press, 2014), 246; and C. Paul Vincent, The Politics of Hunger: The Allied Blockade of Germany, 1915–1919 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1985), 46. 105 Avraham Barkai, Nazi Economics: Ideology, Theory, and Policy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 230. 96 Offer, The First World War, 76. 106 Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 77. 97 While the particular circumstances of German politics that led to these decisions were unique, the phenomenon of wartime leaders taking 107 Berenice Anita Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague and Paris: Mouton & Co., 1968), 177. big risks when wars go poorly to head off domestic opposition is not. Indeed, the problem may be worse in democracies with better accountability. See, Downs and Rocke, “Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection”; and Goemans and Fey, “Risky but Rational.” 108 Hardach, The Political Economy of Germany in the Twentieth Century, 77–78. 98 Robert Cecil, Hitler’s Decision to Invade Russia, 1941 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1975), 137. 109 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 266. 99 Franz Bumm, ed., Deutschlands Gesundheitsverhältnisse unter dem Einfluss des Weltkrieges (Stuttgart, Berlin, and Leipzig: Deutsche Verlags- 110 W. Victor Madej, German War Economy: The Motorization Myth (Allentown, PA: Game PubCo, 1984), 17. Anstalt; New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1928), 22–61. 111 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 136. 100 Stolper, Häuser, and Borchardt, The German Economy, 135. 112 Trade as a percentage of GDP was calculated using trade data from Barbieri and Keshk, “Trade Data Set Codebook, Version 4.0.”; and GDP 101 Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 188. data from Maddison, “Historical GDP Data.”

26 27 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

tons of grain a year from places like Argentina and mismanagement, and social discontent. Despite Canada as well as more than 700,000 tons of oil their police state, the Nazis remained sensitive seed. The highly productive dairy farms of France, throughout the war to how food shortages might the Netherlands, and Denmark relied on import- affect civilian morale.122 ed fodder.115 After Germany’s conquest of Western Raw material shortages continued as well. Eu- Europe, it had no quick way to replace these loss- rope faced a major coal shortage the second win- es when the blockade severed Western Europe’s ter of the war. In 1940, French coal production, access to imports. The result was food shortages the third highest in Europe after Britain and Ger- across Europe. In late September 1939, the RNS set many, fell 18 percent and never recovered. In the German food rations at 2,570 calories per day, with spring of 1940, German-controlled Europe faced soldiers receiving up to 4,000 calories per day. For an annual coal deficit of 36.4 million tons.123 Mak- poor Germans, these allotments increased their ca- ing matters worse, in 1941, French and Belgian coal loric intake.116 The harvests, however, did not sup- miners went on strike to protest food shortages.124 port such generosity, requiring the RNS to dip into Coal shortages created both domestic discontent its stocks. The RNS began the war with 8.8 million and industrial problems. In the spring of 1941, the tons of grain. By the fall of 1940, only 1.3 million Wehrmacht discharged soldiers who had previous- tons remained.117 The Nazis were already prioritiz- ly been trained as mine workers to head off crit- ing Germans over residents of occupied territories: icism should another coal shortage materialize.125 In late 1940, the ration for Poles was a paltry 938 Steel production in Lorraine — France’s major steel calories while that for Jews in Poland was 369 cal- producing region — collapsed as local coal availa- ories.118 The base ration in France and Belgium in bility dropped to half its prewar level.126 Germany 1941 dropped to as low as 1,300 calories a day.119 The had already increased steel production in January poor harvest of 1940–41 assured continuing prob- 1940, cutting into its iron ore stockpiles to meet the lems. At the RNS, Backe recognized that unless army’s needs on the assumption that the conquest Germany could find millions of tons of additional of France and the Low Countries would provide ad- grain, ration cuts would be inevitable. Such cuts ditional resources to make up the shortfall.127 would begin with the large-scale slaughter of live- Oil posed another problem. Germany’s econo- stock so that animal fodder could be used to feed my and armed forces could not operate without it. its standard of living lower than it would have been new territories exacerbated Germany’s problems people. This action would permanently reduce the From 1940 to 1943, Germany imported 1.5 million with a more internationally engaged economy. as occupation and the blockade took their toll on availability of protein and fat, and would dredge tons of oil from Romania. At the beginning of the When war began with Britain and France in Sep- the rest of Europe. Interlinked shortages of food up memories of the 1916 “pig massacre” — when same period, Germany produced 4 million tons of tember 1939, the western blockade was imposed and raw materials combined to create new prob- German authorities ordered the killing of 9 million synthetic oil, increasing production to 6.5 million again. Economically, it disconnected Germany from lems that would eventually compel Hitler to invade pigs because they believed the pigs were compet- tons by 1943.128 Thus, total German oil consumption the outside world. The blockade reduced oil sup- the Soviet Union when he did. ing with human food consumption.120 At the time, was capped at between 5.5 million and 8 million plies by more than 50 percent and imports in gener- Soon after the German invasion of Western Eu- the sudden loss of animals, and farmers’ decisions tons per year for that three-year period of the war. al by 84.9 percent. Specific raw material supplies fell rope, agriculture in that part of the continent col- to hide some of the remaining livestock, caused a In contrast, Britain imported 10.2 million tons dur- even more: manganese by 96 percent, molybdenum lapsed. Grain yields fell across Denmark, Holland, jump in food prices and, in some places, food ri- ing the darkest days of the Battle of the Atlantic in by 93 percent, tungsten by 85 percent, and nickel by France, and Germany. In France, which had been a ots.121 Memories of the event conjured hard times, 1942 and more than 20 million tons in 1944.129 When 77 percent.113 By early 1940 — only 10 months into major grain producer, the 1940 harvest was half that the war — Germany’s rapid conquests meant that of 1938. As in Germany, France’s high yield farms re- 115 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 418. almost all of Europe lay under German control. With lied on large amounts of nitrate fertilizer. Nitrates 116 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 361. this stunning success, it would seem that Germa- were also a key ingredient in explosives and the lim- 117 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 419; Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, 643. Medlicott reports a slightly smaller reserve of 7 million ny would achieve its autarkic goal — but it did not. ited stocks disappeared into the German war ma- metric (7.7 million short) tons but a similar consumption rate. By the second half of 1940, Germany controlled the chine. Western European farms also depended on 118 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 366. entire European continent but still faced significant the labor of millions of horses, oxen, and humans. 119 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 419. shortages of strategic materials. The Germans redirected fodder, animals, and labor 120 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 419. Germany did gain some advantages from its con- across occupied Europe to support the war, and a 121 Ian Passingham, All the Kaiser’s Men: The Life and Death of the German Army on the Western Front 1914–1918 (Cheltenham, UK: The History quests. It annexed Poland’s most fertile land and Europe-wide agricultural crisis ensued.114 Press, 2011), chap. 7. “recruited” Polish workers for use as slave labor. While Germany removed itself from the world ag- 122 Barkai, Nazi Economics, 238–39. French coal and iron fell under German control as ricultural market in the years before the war, West- 123 John R. Gillingham, Industry and Politics in the Third Reich: Ruhr Coal, Hitler and Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 122. did France’s oil reserves while access to Romanian ern Europe had continued importing food, making 124 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 414. oil initially appeared assured. These gains, howev- it vulnerable to blockade. In the late 1930s, Western 125 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 418. er, proved not to be as great as anticipated. The European countries imported more than 7 million 126 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 415. 127 Carroll, Design for Total War, 199–200; and Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 357. 113 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, 633. 128 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 411. 114 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 418–19. 129 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 412.

28 29 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

British intelligence estimated German oil supplies counter-blockade and seek to starve Britain into a ble the Mediterranean strategy — neither expressed there the coal, iron, and metal ores needed to (accurately, as it would later prove), they revised surrender. Third, he could pursue the peripheral much interest.138 Even had the Spanish or French de- sustain the military-industrial complex. Only them upward because they could not believe Ger- “Mediterranean strategy,” which Grand-Admiral cided to join him — and Hitler did not try very hard in the Caucasus was there the oil necessary many would start a war with such a small supply.130 Erich Raeder proposed, to challenge the British to get them on board — attacking Britain’s empire to make Europe independent of overseas In the short run, the conquest of Western Europe Empire and secure even more U-boat bases. And would have weakened the British but not defeated supply. Only with access to these resources helped: The one-time use of captured Western Eu- finally, Hitler could invade the Soviet Union. Given them, at least in the short run. As with the other could Germany face a long war against Britain ropean oil stocks made up 44 percent of German oil Germany’s economic isolation, however, not all of options, the Mediterranean strategy would have tak- and America with any confidence.141 consumption in 1940.131 In the long run, however, these options were feasible. en time to force Britain’s surrender— something the the European conquests simply increased the oil The primary effect of the blockade, and the Ger- blockade ensured Germany did not have. Only an invasion of the Soviet Union could allevi- consumers under German rule without increasing mans’ fear of it, was to limit the time Germany had Invading the Soviet Union appeared the best ate the economic problems imposed by the British production. Additionally, the Germans had to wor- to win the war if it was not able to find other sourc- option. Economically, Hitler was sure he could blockade and lead to true autarky. ry about more than their own consumption: Their es of food and raw materials. By the fall of 1940, it acquire the needed food and raw materials in the Indeed, the Nazi planners themselves held this Italian allies depended entirely on German and Ro- became clear to Hitler that the bombing campaign Soviet Union. He already had a taste of the Rus- view. In November 1940, Hermann Göring commis- manian oil sources.132 alone would not force Britain’s surrender. Moreover, sian resources because the Soviet Union had been sioned a report from the Economic and Armaments These shortages of both food and raw materials Germany had failed to gain control of the English the critical hole in the British blockade. Under the Section of the Wehrmacht High Command that meant that Germany could not sustain a long war. Channel for German transports, without which any 1940 Soviet-German commercial pact, the Soviet called for quickly taking control of Russian territo- In November 1939, the German army’s economic invasion attempt would expose German landing Union exported millions of tons of supplies to Ger- ry, especially Ukraine and the Caucasus, to allevi- staff estimated that with careful management of barges to Royal Navy interdiction, dramatically low- many. In 1940 alone, it provided Germany with al- ate economic shortages in Germany.142 In early 1941, domestic stocks and a secure flow of imports Ger- ering the chances of successfully crossing the chan- most 900,000 metric tons of grain, almost a million German war economists determined that if the many could hold out for two years — twice what nel for an invasion. Such a plan would have been a metric tons of timber products, more than 650,000 Wehrmacht could conquer the portion of the So- it had previously estimated.133 Just a month later, highly risky Hail Mary strategy. A less risky invasion metric tons of oil, as well as textiles, metals, and viet Union that lay to the west of the line that runs however, Hitler gave orders to make up for short- of Britain might still have been possible, but only raw and finished materials of all types.139 So impor- from Archangel to Astrakhan, the resulting sur- ages that were affecting production by using the with significant investment in naval ships and ship- tant were these resources to the German war effort plus would make up for almost all German short- stockpiles, resulting in reports that his decisions ping, and constructing such a fleet would take time. that Germany continued to supply the Soviets with ages.143 The Economic Policy Directive of May 23, would limit Germany’s resources for a long war.134 Similar problems plagued the second and third machine tools, of which there were a critical short- 1941, specifically called for exporting Russian grain These reports demonstrated a paradox in the ef- options — to use U-boats to starve Britain out or age in Russia, right up to the German invasion. to Germany after the invasion even though such a fects of economic isolation: The more Germany to pursue the Mediterranean strategy. Both had a Hitler even placed their production priority on par policy would result in starvation for the Russian mobilized its industrial base to increase war pro- similar primary goal — to economically isolate Brit- with the Wehrmacht’s production requirements to population. The planners wrote that feeding the duction, the more quickly it burned through its ain — and both suffered from the same problem — ensure continued Soviet supplies.140 Russian population would “undermine Germany’s stockpiled resources and the greater the shortages economic strangulation would only affect Britain German economic planners thought conquering ability to hold on in the war and to withstand the Germany would face down the road. Investigating slowly.136 A more robust U-boat campaign would western Russia would resolve the rest of Germa- blockade.”144 In his 1942 book, Backe (of the RNS) the economic facets of Blitzkrieg, historian Alan have required time to build more U-boats. After ny’s economic problems. Historian Adam Tooze argued that Germany needed lebensraum to make Milward concluded, “There can be little doubt that Germany built those boats, it would have taken still summarizes the German situation perfectly: itself immune to blockade.145 the Allied policy of blockade was fully justified. In more time to train their crews and then for those This approach was yet another risky Shoot the fact, the Blitzkrieg drove stocks of vital raw ma- boats to go to sea and actually sink British ships. In the short term the only way to sustain Moon strategy. The German plans premised suc- terials down to dangerously low levels.”135 By late Hitler also briefly considered the Mediterranean Germany’s Western European Grossraum at cess against the Soviet Union on a quick victory. 1940, looming shortages of food and raw materials strategy, which would have emphasized a combined anything like its pre-war level of economic Both Hitler and the German High Command be- constrained German options and forced Germany land and sea campaign in the Mediterranean basin activity was to secure a vast increase in fuel lieved the Russian army would crumble under an to seek quick solutions. and northern Africa to isolate Britain from its empire and raw material deliveries from the Soviet assault. German planners estimated they could Given this situation, what options did Hitler in the Middle East and India while simultaneously Union. Only the Ukraine produced the net ag- complete their campaign against Russia in just six have in late 1940 and early 1941 to pursue the war improving Germany’s position in the Atlantic should ricultural surpluses necessary to support the to eight weeks.146 The entire German campaign plan against Britain or otherwise improve Germany’s the United States choose to enter the war.137 Hitler densely packed animal populations of West- was based on the need to destroy the Russian army position? At least four existed. First, Hitler could even met with both Francisco Franco and Philippe ern Europe. Only in the Soviet Union were within 500 kilometers of the border, before it had a invade Britain in late 1940, something he briefly Pétain in fall 1940 in an attempt to gain Spanish and considered. Second, he could intensify the U-boat French entry into the war as German allies to ena- 138 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45, 328–33. 139 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, 668–69. 140 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 423. 130 W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1 (London: H. M. Stationery Off, 1952), 51. 141 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 420. 131 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, 652. 142 Bryan I. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), 71. 132 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 411. 143 Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1957), 307. 133 Carroll, Design for Total War, 199. 144 Quoted in Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, 643. 134 Carroll, Design for Total War, 209. 145 Herbert Backe, Um die Nahrungsfreiheit Europas, Weltwirtschaft oder Grossraum (Leipzig: Goldmann, 1942) quoted in Medlicott, The Eco- 135 Alan S. Milward, The German Economy at War (London: Athlone Press, 1965), 48. nomic Blockade, Vol. 2, 644. 136 Barry A. Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 1939–1941 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 51. 146 Gerd Niepold, “Plan Barbarossa,” in The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June – August 1941: Proceedings of the Fourth “Art of 137 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45: Nemesis (New York : W. W. Norton, 2000), 326. War Symposium,” Garmisch, October, 1987, ed. David M. Glantz (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1993), 70.

30 31 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

chance to retreat. German logistics could not sup- troleum available to Germany.153 the seizure of war-essential economic centers as Hitler’s focus was clearly on the economic re- port a deeper offensive.147 Estimates that Germany Copeland’s argument is premised on the belief the main objective of the campaign.”158 In January sources in the south, but did he seek primarily to could use Russian agriculture and raw materials to that Hitler saw Britain as a sideshow and Russia as and February of 1941, Hitler included “seizure of cut the Soviets off from their economic supply or make up for its shortages similarly assumed a quick the main threat, a claim recent historians dispute. the most important industrial regions” among his to gain that supply for Germany? Two days after victory — the Germans lacked the fuel and rubber Both Kershaw and Tooze argue that the threat Hit- top goals of the operation.159 Hitler’s influence en- Hitler issued this directive, he met with his gen- to be confident of victory in a longer campaign.148 If ler feared most was a continued war with the Brit- sured, as the Wehrmacht High Command drafted a erals, including Guderian, who had returned from the Germans could quickly and completely defeat ish Empire, which he believed would eventually series of plans, that Ukraine, with its fertile steppe the front for the conference, on August 23. Guder- the Soviet Union, they would be in an unassailable be backed by the United States. Hitler’s generals and industrial Donets region, remained a critical ian sought to convince Hitler to attack Moscow, position. But, if their estimates proved wrong, they shared this concern.154 Indeed, Hitler came to believe objective. Even Bryan Fugate, who generally argues and recorded Hitler’s response, in which Hitler ex- would lose Russian aid, and find themselves em- the only reason Britain continued to refuse to nego- for the primacy of strategic military factors in the plained his rationale: broiled in a larger two-front war, potentially with- tiate was because of the hope that the Soviet Union planning for Operation Barbarossa, acknowledges out the raw materials they needed to succeed. would enter the war. Kershaw argues that the desire that Hitler pushed the High Command’s plan to He [Hitler] then began to talk and described Of course, other arguments exist as to why Hitler to remove this British hope along with the growing account for economic requirements, when earlier in detail the considerations which led him invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, including economic shortages, which Russian food and raw army plans did not.160 to make a different decision [the attack on ideology, preventative war, military strategy, and materials would solve, determined Hitler’s decision Moreover, while German optimism had meant Kiev]. He said that the raw materials and economics.149 Teasing apart these rationales is par- to invade the Soviet Union before finishing off Brit- that strategic and economic requirements could agriculture of the Ukraine were vitally nec- ticularly difficult as Hitler used portions of all these ain.155 Tooze agrees that Britain was the top threat, coexist in the planning phase, once the campaign essary for the future prosecution of the war. arguments to make his case, depending on the but prioritizes the economic rationale for Germany’s began, this coexistence was no longer possible: He spoke once again of the need of neutral- audience he was addressing, and doubtless all of invasion of the Soviet Union.156 When faced with a choice between pressing the as- izing the Crimea, ‘that Soviet aircraft carrier them affected his thinking.150 But which were most These two concerns — the fear of a long war with sault on Moscow or reinforcing the effort to capture for attacking the Rumanian oilfields.’ For the important? Ideology alone is unpersuasive. Hitler’s Britain and the United States and the shortages Ukraine, Hitler chose to focus on Ukraine. Against first time I heard him use the phrase: ‘My ideology required eastward expansion, but it did caused by the blockade — are linked. In 1941, the the advice of his field commanders, in August 1941, generals know nothing about the economic not require a two-front fight. The Molotov-Ribben- principal means by which Britain applied pressure Hitler diverted all of Army Group Center’s Pan- aspects of war.’ [Italics added]162 trop pact had already demonstrated Hitler could to Germany was through economic warfare. If Hit- zer formations to support Army Group North and accommodate the Soviets when he needed to. The ler and his generals expected Germany to weaken Army Group South. In particular, he shifted Heinz Hitler made it clear to his generals that he sought central question one must ask is why Hitler chose as the war in the west continued, the primary ex- Guderian’s Panzer Group II to the offensive encir- to gain Ukraine’s supply to strengthen Germany. to invade the Soviet Union when he did — in 1941 planation was the blockade.157 Quickly conquering cling Kiev. He did so because he needed Ukraine’s Even the reasons for Hitler’s emphasis on Crimea before finishing the fight in the west. Indeed, Ian Russia held the potential of both bringing Britain to resources. Hitler was explicit about his reasons. In were to protect the supply of Romanian oil. This Kershaw, Hitler’s modern biographer, argues con- the negotiating table and, if that failed, securing the Führer Directive 33 he wrote: reasoning is in sync with Hitler’s thoughts from an vincingly against the role of ideology in motivating raw materials Germany needed. Thus, these stra- earlier meeting on August 4 at which he discussed the attack in 1941.151 tegic and economic rationales are intertwined and I am not in agreement with the proposals the importance of both the industrial areas around Dale Copeland argues that Hitler and his generals serve as evidence that the fear of blockade drove submitted by the Army for the prosecution Leningrad and Ukraine.163 Guderian’s recollection feared a rising Russia, and that preventative think- the timing of the invasion of the Soviet Union. of the war in the East and dated August 18th. generally matches Niepold’s and has been used by ing — the idea that Germany needed to defeat Rus- Perhaps the best evidence that shortages moti- I therefore order as follows: 1. Of primary multiple historians as the primary record of both sia before Russia became too strong — motivated vated the decision to invade the Soviet Union lies in importance before the outbreak of winter is meetings.164 Hitler’s emphasis on economics also the decision to attack.152 Undoubtedly, many in the the plans and execution of the invasion itself. Dur- not the capture of Moscow but rather the matches the emphasis of Hermann Göring, the German High Command supported a preventative ing the planning of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler occupation of the Crimea, of the industrial number two man in the Reich (whose portfolio in- war with Russia, but this support was still shaped repeatedly pushed the Wehrmacht High Command and coalmining area of the Donetz basin, cluded economic planning), Gen. Alfred Jodl, and, by the blockade: A key motivation for taking pre- to consider economic factors. In the 1980s, Gerd the cutting of the Russian supply route from at times, Gen. Franz Halder.165 ventative action in the German High Command Niepold, who had been responsible for planning the Caucasian oilfields, and in the north, the The importance of economic factors and the was fear of a Soviet attack on Romania’s oil fields Operation Barbarossa, recalled that by December investment of Leningrad and the establish- blockade continued into the second — and last — — after 1939, the only source of non-synthetic pe- 1940, “It also became manifest that Hitler regarded ment of contact with the Finns.161 year of Germany’s offensive campaign in Russia. German operations in 1942 would focus substan- 147 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 452–53. 148 Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 1939–1941, 143–44. 158 Gerd Niepold, “Plan Barbarossa,” 66. 149 For a succinct discussion of all four, see, Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich at War (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 160–62. 159 Gerd Niepold, “Plan Barbarossa,” 70. 150 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45, 343. 160 Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, 90. 151 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45, 388. 161 Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Dutton, 1952), 202–03. 152 Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 131–43. 162 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 200. 153 Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, 91. Copeland’s argument, however, suffers from other problems as well, as Robert Kaufman documents. Rob- 163 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 189–90. ert G. Kaufman, “On the Uses and Abuses of History in International Relations Theory: Dale Copeland’s The Origins of Major War,” Security Studies 164 Niepold, “Plan Barbarossa,” 71; Fugate, Operation Barbarossa; David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cam- 10, no. 4 (2001): 179–211, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410108429448. bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 432–44; and Leach, German Strategy Against Russia, 221. Even historians who focus on military 154 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45, 341. reasons for shifting the offensive to the south, like David Glantz, focus on the reasons why an offensive against Moscow in August and September would have been more difficult than is usually thought because of heavy German losses around Smolensk — an argument that fits with the eco- 155 Kershaw, Hitler 1936–45, 388. nomic importance of the Ukraine as it portended a longer war. (Glantz does not directly address economics.) David Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed: The 156 Tooze, The Wages of Destruction, 424–25. Battle for Smolensk, 10 July–10 September 1941, Vol. 2 (Solihull, UK: Helion & Company, 2010), 512–15. 157 Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, 91. 165 Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, 205–43.

32 33 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

tially on securing Russian oil for Germany.166 Even quirements of the German economy and the block- financial flows and trade in goods reached a peak also impose economic isolation through the phys- as late as August 1942, Adm. Raeder still argued, ade-induced shortages shaped German strategy af- in the wave of globalization that preceded World ical interdiction of goods and by interrupting the “It is urgently necessary to defeat Russia and thus ter the invasion. Indeed, the official historian of the War I, something that has only been surpassed in financing of trade. More importantly, the increased create a Lebensraum which is blockade-proof and blockade would write that one key achievement of the modern waves of globalization.170 All else being use of secondary sanctions, which directly target easy to defend.” Hitler is reported to have agreed.167 the blockade was “the creation of an encirclement equal, because the extent of international econom- international firms, suggests that the increased Could international economic access have made neurosis with marked effect on German political ic integration is greater today than before World number of trading states is not a major impedi- and military strategy.”169 War I, if economic isolation proved effective after ment to imposing economic isolation today, es- Invading Russia, however, the period of globalization that ended in 1914, the pecially since most financial flows must still pass was a risky Shoot the Moon impacts of losing access to the international econ- through the United States. strategy. Though it was not omy should also be greater today. The shift to services poses different technical foreordained, the Red Army However, three key differences exist between challenges to isolating a state’s economy than in would destroy the German the present and the first half of the 20th centu- the past. The trade of services usually does not army. Nine out of 10 German ry that could potentially make it more difficult to require the movement of physical items. As a re- soldiers killed in the war died impose economic isolation on an adversary. First, sult, interrupting it requires different techniques on the Eastern Front. If Hit- more independent trading states exist today than than interrupting the flows of goods. As discussed ler’s defeat was determined in in that time period. Second, facilitated by dramat- below, however, even in World Wars I and II, the any single place it was on the ic improvements in communications technologies, Allies’ strategy of economic isolation relied heav- Russian steppe, but this great trade in services (a non-tangible subset of goods) ily on controls other than physical interdiction. clash of land armies was sub- is much higher today than it ever has been.171 These types of controls should be equally effective a difference in Germany’s strategic choices? To stantially shaped and driven by the economic block- Third, internationalized production — global sup- at interfering with services today as they were at imagine away Allied sea control is a highly spec- ade of Germany. Working through the direct impact ply chains that require trade in components — is interfering with physical goods. In addition, in the ulative counterfactual exercise. Nonetheless, both mechanism, economic isolation constrained Hitler’s much more prevalent today relative to trade in past 20 years, the United States has developed ex- oil and grain surpluses and Nazi sympathizers decision-making leading him to accept a risky and finished goods than it was prior to 1914.172 Each of tensive methods to control services — primarily existed in Latin America. Venezuelan oil exports escalatory strategy of Shooting the Moon. these changes could affect the ability to isolate a financial services — to support various programs to Germany peaked in 1939 and ceased only be- state from the international economy in one of two of economic sanctions. In short, the blockades of cause of the blockade.168 Argentina possessed ways. First, they could alter the intensity of the ef- the world wars required coercive measures against large grain surpluses, and its regime proved suffi- Assessing the Effects fect of a state’s isolation. That is, the changes could the target state’s potential trading partners to be ciently sympathetic to allow many Nazis to immi- of Economic Isolation Today make present-day economic isolation “bite” less or effective. Similar modern measures should work to grate after the war. Without the blockade, Hitler more than its historical equivalent. For example, disrupt the trade in services. may very well have had access to these resources. The cases discussed above make clear that eco- interference with the shipment of physical goods The globalization of production increases the in- By preventing this access, British economic war- nomic isolation can significantly impact a state’s today may have an effect on a wider range of fin- tensity of the effect of economic isolation without fare constrained Hitler’s strategic decision-mak- decision-making, even when that state has done all ished products than in the past because all their substantially changing the technical difficulty of ing such that invading Russia seemed to be his it can to become self-sufficient. But how much do manufacturers require the same sub-component, isolating an adversary. Stephen Brooks argues that best option. these two precedents for the effects of economic which is usually imported. Second, the changes the internationalization of weapons production, for Just as the pressure of a blockade had driv- isolation on strategy from the first half of the 20th could make it harder or easier for a state to isolate example, makes war less likely because states will en Germany’s leaders to make risky decisions in century matter for today’s international economy? an adversary from the global economy. For exam- not be able to acquire the weapons they need to World War I, Hitler faced the same conundrum in Despite many changes in the international econo- ple, services that do not require the actual physical fight wars if their potential adversaries are part of late 1940 and early 1941. Hitler worked to avoid this my since 1914, crucial similarities exist between the movement of goods (like banking) are more com- their munition supply chain.173 If, however, a war situation. The German government had tried hard pre-World War I economy and the modern interna- mon and may be more difficult to disrupt than the did break out under such circumstances, the con- to reduce the country’s reliance on imports in the tional economy that make the two periods of eco- transfer of physical goods. ditions Brooks describes would make access to the 1930s as much as it could, but even after this ef- nomic integration comparable for the purposes of The increase in the number of trading states international economy more important today than fort and conquering most of Europe, the economic this article and make Germany’s experience before means that, in general, more potential suppliers it was in 1914. Assuming the belligerents mustered isolation still affected Germany. Considering the World War I of continuing relevance today — es- exist than in the past. Because many strategies of the will to impose a strategy of economic isola- industrial and food shortages in Europe and the in- pecially when considering a potential blockade of economic isolation rely on pressuring third-party tion from the global economy, that action would dustrial capacity of Britain and the United States, China. Economists broadly consider three catego- states not to trade with the target state, the in- increase the dislocation to production lines that Hitler could not be certain of victory in a long war. ries in which economic integration occurs: flows of crease in the number of states may make it more Brooks foresees and increase the intensity of the Operating through the direct impact mechanism, financial capital, of goods, and of people. The first difficult to isolate states today than it was in the effects of the isolation. Moreover, the internation- the blockade constricted Hitler’s options. Conquer- two are relevant here as wartime flows of people first half of the 20th century. However, states can alization of supply chains has increased the spe- ing Russia in 1941 looked like it would solve Hitler’s between states are less important in determining economic problems. As one would expect, the re- whether shortages of goods occur. Integration of 170 Richard E. Baldwin and Philippe Martin, “Two Waves of Globalization: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, no. 6904 (1999); and Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, 166 Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Free Press, 1992), 336–37. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 4. Vol. 2, 646. 171 Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Diana Beltekian, “Trade and Globalization,” Our World in Data, Revised October 2018, https://ourworldindata.org/ 167 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, 646. trade-and-globalization. 168 Thomas M. Leonard and John F. Bratzel, eds., Latin America During World War II (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 172 Brooks, Producing Security, 4; and Ortiz-Ospina and Beltekian, “Trade and Globalization.” 169 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 2, 659. 173 Brooks, Producing Security.

34 35 The Scholar Desperate Measures: The Effects of Economic Isolation on Warring Powers

cialization in production. Rather than importing a vies, together with support from a rotation of oth- escalation. In both world wars, German leaders ex- highly risky manner. Approaches that dismiss con- small number of raw materials, states must import er navies, maintained the Multinational Intercep- panded their wars under the pressure of economic sidering seapower, airpower, and non-military ca- a large number of intermediate components. The tion Force, which patrolled the northern Persian isolation — in one case as a gamble for resurrec- pabilities — like the ability to effectively implement more individual components a state must import, Gulf and stopped and inspected the paperwork tion and in the other to gain resources to continue sanctions — when assessing the relative power of the more opportunities exist for disrupting the and cargo of ships bound for Iraq to verify their the war. Economic isolation, whether in the form of states fall into this trap. Second, grand strategists supply chain, and the costlier it becomes to con- compliance with U.N. resolutions — in essence the peacetime sanctions or a wartime blockade, is often must integrate all aspects of national power into struct alternative domestic production facilities. same “pre-clearance” and enforcement technique seen as a less escalatory alternative to more direct their analysis. While each state’s national power is Internationalized production still relies on ship- the Royal Navy used in World War I.175 Similarly, military action. The analysis in this article, howev- the combination of its various types of constituent ping goods from place to place, and the problems the Proliferation Security Initiative relies on intel- er, suggests that effective economic isolation leads power (economic, financial, diplomatic, military, of seeking to evade controls by transshipping ligence collection and clearance of cargos backed affected states to attempt to escalate their way out naval, air, etc.), they do not aggregate linearly. As through neutral countries or reselling cargos at sea with the threat of maritime intercepts and inspec- before they succumb to the isolation. Assuming the the two cases discussed above demonstrate, in- and shifting their destinations existed in the ear- tions.176 And of course, the United States has made isolated state is unsuccessful in gaining addition- teractions between these various types of power ly 20th century as it does today. Techniques used significant use of secondary sanctions in its efforts al resources militarily, its economic isolation may can occur in seemingly counterintuitive ways. One in the past to stop the flows of raw materials or to isolate the Iranian economy. cause a war to end sooner (if the isolated state fac- must consider how using particular types of power finished goods will still be effective in disrupting In summary, while this article used two cases of es a stronger coalition due to its escalation) but may affect what battles are fought as well as what flows of intermediate products. blockade from the first half of the 20th century as it may also increase the intensity and geographic happens in those battles. As technology prolifer- Indeed, the complex methods required to in- examples of economic isolation, they are still sur- spread of the violence until it does. In an extreme ates and with the increased focus on space and the terdict German access to the international econ- prisingly relevant. The differences in the modern case, a nuclear-armed state could threaten to use development of cyber weapons, these considera- omy during both wars were strikingly similar to international economy that existed in the years its nuclear weapons rather than surrender to the tions will only become more important. their modern equivalents. Upon hearing the word before 1914 are not such that they undermine the blockade. Indeed, if the ultimate coercive leverage “blockade,” most people envision ships turning applicability of the earlier cases. Moreover, the of economic isolation stems from the possibil- Erik Sand is a PhD candidate in the MIT Securi- back or sinking all commercial shipping seeking methods the Allies employed in executing those ity that hardship will drive populations to revolt ty Studies Program. to enter a port. While this picture may accurately blockades were more modern than they initially against their leaders, economic isolation is, at the describe blockades of the 18th and 19th centuries, appear. A state targeted by effective economic iso- extreme, a regime-change strategy. In this circum- Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Frank by the first half of the 20th century, such methods lation today would still likely find itself constrained stance, we should expect that the leadership of the Gavin, James Steinberg, Kenneth Oye, Vipin Na- no longer sufficed. The challenge in economically to only risky strategic options. targeted state may pursue any remaining options rang, Lena Andrews, Ryan Hilger, Rachel Tecott, isolating Germany was not in stopping German before succumbing, especially if domestic political Sara Plana, Andy Halterman, Aiden Milliff, and shipping. German ships were quickly identified and pathologies exist. the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier impounded at the start of World War I. The chal- Conclusion These implications are relevant to the ongoing drafts. Any errors are mine alone. lenge was in stopping neutrally flagged commerce debate as to the best strategy to pursue in a poten- bound for Germany either directly or through Ger- As the two cases above demonstrate, a state’s tial conflict between the United States and China. many’s neutral neighbors. To achieve these ends, wartime access to the world economy affects its If a strategy of economic isolation, regardless of the British, and then the Allies, implemented a strategy, regardless of its level of prewar economic whether it uses kinetic means or not, is effective system called “Control at the Source” that appears integration. Economic access, or lack thereof, can at creating shortages and hardships for China, it far more like modern economic sanctions than any reduce or impose constraints on a state’s strate- may lead Chinese leaders to pursue riskier strate- 18th-century blockade. British agents deployed gy, with more constraints leading to riskier deci- gies to either gain additional resources or provide around the world pre-cleared cargos bound for Eu- sions. In the most constrained situations, only bad a perceived reward to their people. Rather than be- rope, often with eyes to pre-approved quotas for decisions remain. Ironically, strenuous efforts to ing a low-cost means of gaining leverage, an effec- various goods. Royal Navy ships on blockade duty achieve self-sufficiency only reduce the flexibility tive blockade could cause the conflict to spread or served as a monitoring mechanism for enforce- states have to adapt to externally imposed restric- escalate. These possibilities do not eliminate eco- ment. The British government even employed what tions. In the cases examined in this article, eco- nomic isolation as a viable wartime strategy, but are now called secondary sanctions. Possessing nomic isolation drove Germany to risky strategies U.S. decision-makers ought to weigh them when near dominance in its control of repair yards, re- in which Germany expanded its wars in ways that considering their options. In summary, economic fueling stations, and maritime shipping insurance, swelled enemy coalitions, and ultimately brought isolation is not necessarily the de-escalatory op- Britain leveraged its market power and threatened about its defeat. tion it is usually considered to be. to cut off any shipping firm that refused to comply Although economic isolation effectively con- The analysis presented in this article has two with its pre-clearance mechanisms.174 strains the strategies available to the target state, implications for grand strategy that go beyond the These techniques were a preview of modern that does not mean it is always wise to impose it. issue of economic isolation. First, strategists must techniques for enforcing economic sanctions. For Economically isolated states are frequently defeat- consider multiple levels of effects. That states rare- example, from 1991 to 2003, the U.S. and Royal Na- ed because they respond to economic isolation with ly appear to surrender due to the direct effects of wartime blockades does not mean those efforts do not play a critical role in determining the outcome 174 Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, Vol. 1, 422. of a war. The state with the strongest army will be 175 George A. Lopez and David Cortright, “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2004), https://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/iraq/2004-07-01/containing-iraq-sanctions-worked. unable to take maximum advantage of that strength 176 “About the Proliferation Security Initiative,” United States Department of State, March 19, 2019, https://www.state.gov/about-the-prolifera- if the strategic constraints imposed by economic tion-security-initiative/. isolation require that army to be employed in a

36 37 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

In the last three decades, historians of the “U.S. in the World” have taken two methodological turns — the international and transnational turns — that have implicitly decentered the RECENTERING United States from the historiography of U.S. foreign relations. THE UNITED STATES Although these developments have had several salutary effects IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY on the field, we argue that, for two reasons, scholars should bring the United States — and especially, the U.S. state — OF AMERICAN FOREIGN back to the center of diplomatic historiography. First, the RELATIONS United States was the most powerful actor of the post-1945 world and shaped the direction of global affairs more than any other nation. Second, domestic processes and phenomena often Daniel Bessner had more of an effect on the course of U.S. foreign affairs than Fredrik Logevall international or transnational processes. It is our belief that incorporating the insights of a reinvigorated domestic history of American foreign relations with those produced by international and transnational historians will enable the writing of scholarly works that encompass a diversity of spatial geographies and provide a fuller account of the making, implementation, effects, and limits of U.S. foreign policy.

Part I: U.S. Foreign Relations two trends that have emphasized the former rather After World War II than the latter. To begin with, the “international turn” (turn being the standard term among histo- The history of U.S. foreign relations in the Amer- rians to denote major shifts in disciplinary empha- ican academy is uniquely situated between two sis) has underlined the ways in which foreign na- broader fields: international history (the study tion-states, peoples, and cultures have influenced of international society, the international system, American foreign relations, and how American and inter-, supra-, and substate interactions), and foreign relations have informed the lives of people U.S. history (the study of domestic processes and living abroad.2 In addition, the “transnational turn” events).1 Since the early 1990s, the historiography of has highlighted that nonstate and transstate pro- post-1945 U.S. foreign relations has been shaped by cesses, organizations, and movements have often

1 As this sentence suggests, this article refers explicitly to the American academy. In other academic contexts, especially the United Kingdom and Europe, the fields of international and transnational history have different histories. 2 For the sake of style, in this essay we use the adjectives “U.S.” and “American” interchangeably, though we recognize that “American” does not necessarily refer to the United States.

38 39 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

impacted American global behavior. power abroad and the ways in which foreign actors determined by it.”6) Although it is not possible nor derstand the course of post-1945 U.S. foreign policy In important respects, these two trends have and conditions have shaped the implementation of desirable for diplomatic history to be defined by and international politics, they must take seriously had salutary effects on the scholarship and the U.S. foreign policy, we do not know nearly enough methodological nationalism, it is also true that, af- the governmental and other elites who formulated field more broadly, demonstrating that historians about topics such as the institutionalization of the ter 1945, the United States was not merely “a nation and implemented this policy and must therefore must frequently look beyond the United States national security state; the perceived political im- among nations,” but was rather a global hegemon immerse themselves in American archival sources. and its government if they are to understand ful- peratives that have shaped foreign policymaking; whose state exerted unprecedented influence on Third, we argue that domestic processes and phe- ly the origins, development, and consequences of the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other mil- international affairs.7 nomena — elections, institutions, coalition-build- U.S. foreign policy. In particular, the internation- itary voices in U.S. foreign relations; the impact Second, the U.S. state has been the chief mak- ing, business interests, ideologies, individual pride, al and transnational turns have had three crucial of interest groups on foreign policy; the elite net- er and implementer of American foreign policy.8 and careerist ambition — often have had more of benefits. First, international history has under- works that have shaped U.S. decision-making; the While in some instances nonstate actors, non- an effect on the course of U.S. foreign relations than lined the agency of foreign peoples by showing emergence, character, and limits of the bipartisan governmental organizations, and international in- international processes. “The primacy of domes- that conditions “on the ground” have shaped U.S. consensus that has underwritten the American em- stitutions have been influential, when it comes to tic politics,” the historian Fritz Fischer famously policy’s impact in myriad ways.3 That is to say, it pire since at least 1945; and, in the broadest sense, the subject of U.S. foreign relations, government called it with respect to Germany and the outbreak has demonstrated that although the United States the nature of U.S. national power and the American agencies and departments have been more impor- of World War I — we’re suggesting that the same is the world’s most powerful nation, it has often political-military state. tant — they have had more causal impact on the applies to many American foreign policies enacted been constrained, and sometimes informed, by In no way do we wish to deny the utility of inter- nation’s relationship to the rest of the world and after 1945.9 Because of the tremendous geographic the actions of weaker states and groups. In this national or transnational approaches to the histo- on the world itself. State power, we must always advantages afforded by two oceans and the pres- way, the international turn has “de-exceptional- ry of U.S. foreign relations. Rather, we are arguing remind ourselves, matters, and as such we must ence of geopolitically weak neighbors, as well as ized” the history of U.S. foreign policy by placing that these approaches, while crucial, do not fully give deep and sustained attention to the wielders the sheer power of U.S. military might, Americans it in a comparative or global context. Second, the explain why the United States — particularly the of that power. In the case of the United States, have not had to concern themselves with external transnational turn has established that nonstate U.S. state and associated institutions — acted in that means, above all, the presidency and the ex- realities to the degree that others around the world actors, people-to-people relations, and transstate the world as it did. More to the point, we believe ecutive agencies of the federal government. After did — they could afford to remain parochial. Or, processes have regularly influenced American pol- that the recent turn toward international and trans- all, in every foreign country, American executive as Young put it, “Fundamentally, other countries icy and the nation’s relations with the rest of the national history, which has encouraged historians politics is a topic of major, even pressing concern. simply do not have much purchase on the Amer- globe. Finally, the two turns have together helped to train their analytical lenses on non-American Why? Because foreign peoples know what most of ican imagination.”10 Thus, in contrast to structur- diversify the scholarship in U.S. foreign relations actors and states, has tended to tacitly deempha- us based in the United States also intuitively know: al realists such as Kenneth N. Waltz and John J. history, especially in terms of incorporating wom- size three important realities of U.S. — and, indeed, that since World War II the occupant of the Oval Mearsheimer, we do not believe that the actors en into the professional fold.4 The overall effect of global — history since 1945. First, the United States Office has had an extraordinary impact on the di- who comprised the American state ever merely re- the outpouring of scholarship over the past three has been, by far, the most dominant nation of the rection of global affairs. Foreign peoples might even acted to “objective” international considerations. decades has been to deepen and broaden scholars’ post-1945 world, sufficiently powerful that when- know this better than those who reside in the Unit- Instead, these considerations were always filtered understanding of America’s role in the world and ever it has intervened in a particular world region, ed States, as it is they who most directly suffer the through domestic frameworks and processes that the field itself. it has exerted a major (and often decisive) impact. often malign influence of the U.S. state. That this gave them new meaning.11 Accordingly, the interna- Nevertheless, in this article we argue that the Throughout the postwar era and down to today, influence is circumscribed in important and some- tional and transnational turns don’t actually help turns to international and transnational history the United States has enjoyed more military, polit- times unforeseen respects, that American presi- us answer key questions about the sources and na- have led historians, at least implicitly, to deem- ical, economic, ideological, social, cultural, scientif- dents often find themselves stymied in unexpected ture of U.S. power, even as they teach us a great phasize unduly subjects that traditionally stood ic, and technological power than any other nation ways, and that U.S. power abroad is often limited, deal about the effects and limits of American for- at the center of the historiography of U.S. foreign — and by a colossal margin. To use the metaphor does not refute the point. If historians hope to un- eign policy. For all these reasons, an important task relations: policymaking and its relationship to the of our solar system, the United States is the sun projection of power. Simply put, since the end of that delimits the entire system’s structure. Though the Cold War many historians of the “U.S. in the other states may have followed their own unique 6 Raymond Aron, Peace & War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Routledge, 2003 [1966]), 95. 7 Walter LaFeber’s assertion from almost four decades ago is worth recalling: “The present world system, to a surprising extent, has been World” — the current, if somewhat awkward, trajectories, they all have orbited around America. shaped not by some imagined balance-of-power concept but by the initiatives of Woodrow Wilson and his successors. The United Nations, multi- designation of choice — have examined this histo- As Marilyn Young argued in 2002, “for the past fifty lateral trade institutions, ideas about self-determination and economic development, determining influences on international culture, and strategic ry in relation to its international and transnational years, the United States has been the most pow- military planning have sprung from the United States more than from other actors in the global theater.” “Responses to Charles S. Maier, ‘Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,” Diplomatic History 5, no. 4 (October 1981): 362, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1981. contexts, which has had the effect of downplaying erful country in the world,” and therefore all na- tb00788.x. We are not, of course, saying that U.S. international relations remained static after 1945. We are, however, arguing that despite relative the domestic institutions and processes that, we tions “had little choice but to engage the central- shifts in power, from the end of World War II until today the United States has been the most influential military, economic, political, social, and argue, are crucial to understanding why American ity of American power.”5 (Years earlier, Raymond cultural force on earth. 8 Domestic historians of the United States have recently refocused their own attentions on the history of the American imperial state. See, decision-makers have made the policies they have. Aron made the same key point: “In each period the James T. Sparrow, Warfare State: World War II Americans and the Age of Big Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Ira Katznel- Thus, while we are rapidly gaining a deeper un- principal actors [in the international system] have son, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time (New York: Liverlight, 2013); Anne M. Kornhauser, Debating the American State: Liberal derstanding of the impact and limits of American determined the system more than they have been Anxieties and the New Leviathan, 1930–1970 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Jennifer Mittelstadt, The Rise of the Military Welfare State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); and William Bendix and Paul J. Quirk, eds., “Governing the Security State,” special issue, Journal of Policy History 28, no. 3 (July 2016). For other takes on the importance of the U.S. state to 20th-century history, see, Brent Cebul, Lily Geismer, and Mason B. Williams, eds., Shaped by the State: Toward a New Political History of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). 3 For the ways in which the term “international history” has been used, see, Paul A. Kramer, “Power and Connection: Imperial Histories of the United States in the World,” American Historical Review 115, no. 5 (December 2011): 1383–85, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23309640. 9 Fritz Fischer, Krieg der Illusionen: Die deutsche Politik von 1911 bis 1914 (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1969). 4 The Committee on Women in SHAFR (Nicole Anslover et al.), “The Status of Women in Diplomatic and International History, 2013–2017: A 10 Young, “The Age of Global Power,” 275–76. This is also a main theme in Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics Follow-Up Report,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 49, no. 3 (January 2019): 50–58. of Insecurity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). 5 Marilyn B. Young, “The Age of Global Power,” in Rethinking American History in a Global Age, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley: University of 11 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Co., 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great California Press, 2002), 275. Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

40 41 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

for historians of U.S. foreign relations in the com- relations, even as these terms were often resisted. ed international history involving several states.15 of Gaddis and William Taubman, the MacArthur ing years will be to recenter the United States and If historians heed our call, in the coming years it As Richard H. Immerman remarked in 1990, inter- Foundation awarded the Woodrow Wilson Interna- concentrate their analytical lenses more squarely will be possible to incorporate the insights of a re- national history tional Center for Scholars a grant of $987,100 to es- on its domestic history. invigorated domestic history of American foreign tablish the Program on International History of the Skeptical readers will wonder if we’re making our relations with those produced by international and requires the practitioner to be sensitive to the Cold War (which eventually became the Cold War case rather too strongly. Surely, they will say, most transnational historians. This will enable the writ- personal, social, cultural, economic, geopolit- International History Project), which was intended scholars in the field accept the centrality of U.S. ing of scholarly works that encompass a diversity ical, ideological, systemic, and other consid- to, first, gather, translate, and disseminate docu- power, of the U.S. state, and of domestic impera- of spatial geographies and provide a fuller account erations that influence each nation’s foreign ments from the Communist Bloc, and, second, be- tives to the history of the United States in the world. of the making, implementation, effects, and limits outlook and postures, each’s fears, values, gin building a community of scholars dedicated, to But implicit recognition of these realities does not of U.S. foreign policy. interests, objectives, and available resources, borrow Gaddis’ phrasing, to “reassessing the Cold mean that the complexities of these historical phe- and each’s estimations of its own power and War from the perspective of the ‘other side.’”20 The nomena are being worked out in detail. Indeed, the perceptions of its allies and enemies.16 availability of new sources and the financial sup- inherent difficulties of international history (which Part II: Historicizing the International port of the MacArthur Foundation engendered a requires one to work in multiple national archives, and Transnational Turns This was, he averred, impossible — it simply lay newfound interest in international history among read documents in numerous languages, and tri- beyond the capacity of even the most tireless and diplomatic historians. angulate the interests of various state, suprastate, Over the past four decades, scholars have repeat- talented researcher. Moreover, it was the sad re- During the 1990s, international history received and substate actors) and transnational history edly implored historians of U.S. foreign relations ality that in the era of the Cold War many foreign the imprimatur of several leading members of the (which requires one to trace often-elusive flows of to adopt a broad perspective that places American archives remained closed to Western researchers. Society for Historians of American Foreign Rela- people, ideas, and capital across time and borders) policymaking in an international or comparative For these reasons, on the eve of the Soviet Union’s tions (SHAFR), diplomatic history’s chief scholarly make this an almost impossible task. Put simply, in context.12 Doing so, historians like Sally Marks ar- collapse most diplomatic historians considered association.21 None made a bigger splash than Mi- our considered judgment international and trans- gued in the 1980s, would force diplomatic histori- their field to be part and parcel of a broader Amer- chael H. Hunt, who in his 1990 SHAFR presidential national historians collectively deemphasize the ans to recognize that the most important sources ican history. address advocated multinational, multilanguage above realities, even if most would admit them. for U.S. foreign policy were frequently foreign in or- This consensus, however, began to fray with the research as a means to broaden and enrich schol- Our call to recenter the United States does not igin. As Marks put it, “Although the American gov- end of the Cold War and the piecemeal opening of arship.22 Hunt’s program quickly won enthusiastic mean we are advocating for a return to the time ernment can and does undertake major policy ini- archives from the (soon-to-be-former) Communist support within the field and the broader profes- when diplomatic history meant just that — the his- tiatives, it is often reacting to situations or policies Bloc.17 In the summer of 1990, the deteriorating sion.23 It is not difficult to see why. First and fore- tory of high-level interactions among governments elsewhere.”13 By developing the requisite linguistic Soviet Union started to release previously classi- most, the international turn allowed historians to — and when the impact of U.S. foreign policy on skills that would enable them to use foreign archi- fied materials.18 These releases, as John Lewis Gad- address novel questions using new sources recent- peoples abroad was downplayed or even ignored. val sources, diplomatic historians could, according dis noted in 1991, led many scholars to conclude ly made available from the previously inaccessible Indeed, one of the most exciting and productive to critics like Marks, combat the ethnocentrism that “[t]he prospects for a truly ‘international’ ap- “other side.” More prosaically, by the early 1990s developments in the field of foreign relations his- and exceptionalism that limited their scholarship. proach to Cold War history had suddenly bright- the field of diplomatic history had been riven by 25 tory in the past 30 years has been its expansion Until the Cold War’s end, however, internation- ened.”19 Furthermore, in late 1990, at the urging years of paradigm disputes that pitted “orthodox” to include previously marginalized voices, and we alists in this Marksian sense remained a minority

hope and expect for such work to continue. We are within the subfield of diplomatic history — the 15 Robert J. McMahon, “The Study of American Foreign Relations: National History or International History?” Diplomatic History 14, no. 4 also not suggesting that every historian study the majority of historians were reticent about taking (October 1990): 554–64, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00108.x; Richard H. Immerman, “The History of U.S. Foreign Policy: A Plea American state and ignore the plethora of organ- an international turn. Walter LaFeber gave voice to for Pluralism,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 4 (October 1990): 574–83, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00110.x; and Thomas G. Pater- son, “Defining and Doing the History of American Foreign Relations: A Primer,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 4 (October 1990): 584–601, https://doi. izations and movements that inform the nation’s many in the field when he argued in 1981 that, given org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00111.x. overseas actions and relationships. Rather, we are the reality of U.S. dominance after World War I, it 16 Immerman, “The History of U.S. Foreign Policy,” 575. calling for two things: first, a rebalancing in which would “be misleading if all parts of the [interna- 17 For the importance of archival openings to the writing of international history, see, Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, “Introduction,” the study of U.S. foreign policy, and in particular tional] ‘system’ are considered to be roughly equal, in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 1st ed., ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 6–7; Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University the domestic history of policymaking, reclaims a or if the influence of that system on the United Press, 2005), 7; Jeremi Suri, “The Cold War, Decolonization, and Global Social Awakenings: Historical Intersections,” Cold War History 6, no. 3 — not the — central place in the scholarship; and States is assumed to be as great as the American (August 2006): 361, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740600795519; and Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” second, a general recognition that the overweening influence on the system.”14 The majority of LaFe- Journal of American History 95, no. 4 (March 2009): 1060–61, https://doi.org/10.2307/27694560. power of the United States in the period after 1945 ber’s colleagues shared this perspective, and, in 18 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Soviet Side of the Cold War: A Symposium: Introduction,” Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (October 1991): 525, https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1991.tb00145.x. enabled the nation to set the terms of international fact, doubted whether one could write sophisticat- 19 Gaddis, “The Soviet Side of the Cold War,” 525. As this quote indicates, Gaddis, and many in his intellectual generation, viewed international history primarily as bipolar, East-West history, bypassing non-communist countries of the Global South. 20 Gaddis, “The Soviet Side of the Cold War,” 525. On Gaddis’ and Taubman’s roles in founding the project, see, John Lewis Gaddis, “May- be You Can Go Home Again,” H-Diplo Essay 208, March 27, 2020, 5, https://issforum.org/essays/PDF/E208.pdf. Also see, “Woodrow Wilson Center Grants,” MacArthur Foundation, accessed March 20, 2020, https://www.macfound.org/grants/?page=2&q=Wilson+Center&_ajax- =true#grant-search. The MacArthur Foundation continued to fund the Wilson Center’s Cold War project. In 1995, the foundation granted the project $750,000, which it did again in 1998. In 2001, the foundation provided the project with another $550,000. In 2008, it granted the project a further 12 Charles S. Maier, “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,” in The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in $500,000, which it did again in 2012 and 2016. the United States, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 356–57; “Responses to Charles S. Maier,” 356–58; Sally Marks, “Review: The World According to Washington,” Diplomatic History 11, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 265–82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24911732; Chris- 21 More research needs to be done on the apparent disconnect between the fact that, at the very height of America’s post-Cold War global topher Thorne, “Review: After the Europeans: American Designs for the Remaking of Southeast Asia,” Diplomatic History 12, no. 2 (Spring 1988): hegemony, diplomatic historians decided to deemphasize U.S. power in their scholarship. 201–08, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24911763; and Akira Iriye, “The Internationalization of History,” American Historical Review 94, no. 1 (February 22 Michael H. Hunt, “Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical Agenda,” Diplomatic History 15, no. 1 (January 1991): 1–11, https://doi. 1989): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/94.1.1. org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1991.tb00116.x. 13 Marks, “The World According to Washington,” 266. 23 Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, “Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East: Recent Historiography and the National Security 14 “Responses to Charles S. Maier,” 362. Imperative,” Diplomatic History 17, no. 2 (April 1993): 270, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1993.tb00550.x.

42 43 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

historians against “revisionists,” who themselves terials from the Communist Bloc to demonstrate PhD dissertation was judged.30 As a consequence But the international turn was not the only one battled “post-revisionists” and “corporatists.”24 that the Soviet Union was as bad as they had al- of these trends, institutions dedicated to interna- diplomatic historians made in the 1990s and 2000s. Many scholars of foreign relations were weary of ways claimed. Moreover, many historians were tional history were either created or expanded. Be- They also took a transnational turn that deempha- this squabbling, which, they insisted, made it dif- convinced that after the Cold War, U.S. power was sides the Cold War International History Project, sized the centrality of state-to-state relations and, ficult for nonspecialists to understand their work in decline and multilateralism was on the rise, which emerged from the aforementioned MacAr- and prevented the field from presenting a united which necessitated the examination of non-Amer- thur Foundation grant, in 1997 Harvard established front to outsiders. As Melvyn P. Leffler argued in ican actors.27 Finally, since the 1970s, diplomatic the Project on Cold War Studies, which, in 1999, his 1995 SHAFR presidential address, “to make sig- historians had believed that social and cultural his- founded the Journal of Cold War Studies to publish nificant contributions to the larger enterprise of torians looked askance at their work because they scholarly articles based on foreign (especially Sovi- American history,” diplomatic historians needed to focused largely on elite white men, which primed et bloc) sources.31 Spurred by declassified foreign “overcome our own tendencies to fragment into … scholars entering the field to endorse a historio- materials, the financial support of these types of warring schools of interpretation.”25 Embracing in- graphical trend that encouraged them to examine groups, and the desire to be on the cutting edge, by ternational history enabled scholars of foreign rela- and give agency to Western and nonwhite — or, at the dawn of the new millennium many diplomatic tions to move beyond their paradigm wars.26 the very least, non-Anglo — actors.28 historians had moved decidedly away from an em- The international approach also enjoyed the The rise of international history was soon every- phasis, to borrow Leffler’s phrasing, on “the per- benefit of appealing to scholars on all sides of the where to be seen, and essays that explored the ceived interests of policymakers in Washington.”32 political spectrum. Those on the left could use for- holdings of foreign archives began to appear in Indeed, several prominent history departments, in- eign archives to give voice to previously neglected droves.29 Additionally, the use of such foreign ma- cluding those at the University of Texas at Austin, populations affected, often negatively, by Amer- terials became an important source of profession- the University of California at Berkeley, the Uni- ican foreign policy. More conservative historians, al recognition and a key way by which the signif- versity of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, in particular, the U.S. state, to the history of U.S. meanwhile, could use recently declassified ma- icance of a given monograph, scholarly article, or Temple, the University of Virginia, and the Univer- foreign relations. Trends within the broader field sity of Wisconsin at Madison, started programs in of American history encouraged this move. Bol- international history.33 Needless to say, the sheer stered by the emergence of “globalization” as the costs required to conduct international research — dominant phenomenon of the post-Cold War world 24 In brief, orthodox historians took a positive view of the motivations behind U.S. foreign relations, while revisionists linked U.S. foreign policy the need to travel to and live in distant countries, and the rise in importance of nonstate actors like to the search for foreign markets. In contrast to revisionists, post-revisionists emphasized the centrality of security to U.S. foreign policymaking, while corporatists underlined the importance of institutions. The best account of these approaches is found in Steven Hurst, Cold War US Foreign spend years learning difficult languages, etc. — re- multinational corporations and terrorist organiza- Policy: Key Perspectives (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005). inforced inequalities within the field: Those at rich tions, in the last 30 years, manifold U.S. historians 25 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Presidential Address: New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations,” Diplomatic History 19, no. 2 institutions benefited while those at poor institu- have argued that scholars must analyze the ways in (March 1995): 177, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1995.tb00655.x. tions suffered.34 which American history has been shaped by trans- 26 Though it is difficult to quantify, the change in tone in Diplomatic History, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations’ journal, between the 1980s and today is striking. Gone, for the most part, are the sometimes-rancorous — yet intellectually exciting — disputes of the past. 27 See the essays contained in Michael J. Hogan, ed., The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (New York: Cambridge University 30 One can witness the shift in prestige from national to international history by comparing the pieces written by two recipients of the Stuart L. Press, 1992). Bernath Lecture Prize, which the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations awards to promising young scholars. Whereas in 1990, Richard H. Immerman delivered a lecture focused on Dwight D. Eisenhower, in 2000 Odd Arne Westad addressed “the new international history of the Cold 28 For diplomatic historians, social history, and the former’s feelings of inadequacy and oppression, see, Charles R. Lilley and Michael H. Hunt, War.” Richard H. Immerman, “Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (July 1990): 319–42, “On Social History, the State, and Foreign Relations: Commentary on ‘The Cosmopolitan Connection,’” Diplomatic History 11, no. 3 (July 1987): 243, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1990.tb00094.x; and Odd Arne Westad, “The New International History of the Cold War: Three (Possible) https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1987.tb00016.x; Thomas G. Paterson, “Introduction,” in “A Round Table: Explaining the History of American Paradigms,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (October 2000): 551–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00236. Furthermore, in the June 2000 edition Foreign Relations,” Journal of American History 77, no. 1 (June 1990): 96, https://doi.org/10.2307/2078640; Michael H. Hunt, “The Long Crisis in U.S. of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations’ newsletter, Thomas Schoonover published an essay that included tables that listed evi- Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure,” Diplomatic History 16, no. 1 (January 1992): 115, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1992.tb00492.x; Jerald dence of foreign research found in footnotes located in articles in Diplomatic History, the Pacific Historical Review, the Journal of American History, A Combs, “Review of The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume 1, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865, by Bradford and works that won the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article and Stuart L. Bernath Book Prizes (which are awarded by the Society for Historians of Perkins, et al.,” American Historical Review 99, no. 1 (February 1994): 178–79, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/99.1.178; Walter LaFeber, “The World and American Foreign Relations to an essay written by a junior scholar and a first book on U.S. foreign relations history, respectively). The implication the United States,” American Historical Review 100, no. 4 (October 1995): 1029, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/100.4.1015; Leffler, “New Approach- was clear: Foreign research, to some degree, indicated a piece of scholarship’s significance. Thomas Schoonover, “‘It’s Not What We Say, It’s What es,” 177; Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 4 We Do’: The Study and Writing of U.S. Foreign Relations in the United States,” The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter (October 1997): 499–500, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00086; Robert J. McMahon, “Toward a Pluralist Vision: The Study of American Foreign 31, no. 2 (June 2000): 31–36. Relations as International and National History,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed., ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 37–38; and Erez Manela, “Untitled,” Email on H-Diplo Discussion, March 28, 2009. 31 Mark Kramer, “Editor’s Note,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1162/15203970152521872. 29 Odd Arne Westad, “The Foreign Policy Archives of Russia: New Regulations for Declassification and Access,” The Society for Historians of 32 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Bringing It Together: The Parts and the Whole,” in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, ed. Odd American Foreign Relations Newsletter 23, no. 2 (June 1992): 1–10; Melvyn P. Leffler, “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened,” Foreign Arne Westad (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 54. For more on the international turn, see, Hoffmann, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life,” 500– Affairs 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996): 120–35, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/1996-07-01/inside-enemy-archives-cold-war-re- 01; Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 4 (October 2000): opened; Jonathan Haslam, “Russian Archival Revelations and Our Understanding of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 2 (April 1997): 217–28, 567–91, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00237; Westad, “New International History”; Odd Arne Westad, “Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War,” https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00065; Odd Arne Westad, “Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, 5; Akira Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” in Rethinking American War History,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 2 (April 1997): 259–71, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00068; and Max Paul Friedman, “It’s Not a Jungle History in a Global Age, 47–62; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “A Global Group of Worriers,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 3 (July 2002): 481–82, https:// Out There: Using Foreign Archives in Foreign Relations Research,” The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter 29, no. 4 doi.org/10.1111/1467-7709.00320; Frank Costigliola and Thomas G. Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of United States Foreign Relations: A (December 1998): 22–29. In the 2000s, many articles organized specifically around new archival revelations also began to appear. See, A. Stykalin, Primer,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd ed., 10–34; McMahon, “Toward a Pluralist Vision,” 41–44; C.A. Bayly et al., “AHR “The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents,” Cold War History 2, no. 1 (October 2001): 113–44, https:// Conversation: On Transnational History,” American Historical Review 111, no. 5 (December 2006): 1447–48, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.111.5.1441; doi.org/10.1080/713999938; Vojtech Mastny, “The New History of Cold War Alliances,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 55–84, Akira Iriye, “Environmental History and International History,” Diplomatic History 32, no. 4 (September 2008): 643, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467- https://doi.org/10.1162/152039702753649647; Jonathan Haslam, “Archival Review: Collecting and Assembling Pieces of the Jigsaw: Coping with 7709.2008.00717.x; Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon,” 1060–62; Matthew Connelly, “SHAFR in the World,” Passport: The Society for His- Cold War Archives,” Cold War History 4, no. 3 (April 2004): 140–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/1468274042000231196; Martin Grossheim, “‘Revision- torians of American Foreign Relations Review 42, no. 2 (September 2011): 4–7; Westad, “Exploring the Histories,” 54; Frank Costigliola and Michael ism’ in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: New Evidence from the East German Archives,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 451–77, J. Hogan, “Introduction,” in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941, 2nd ed., ed. Frank Costigliola and https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740500284804; Wolfgang Mueller, “Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1–4; Curt Cardwell, “The Cold War,” in America in the World: The Historiography the Cold War, 1938-53/55,” Cold War History 6, no. 1 (February 2006): 63–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740500395444; Isabella Ginor and of American Foreign Relations Since 1941, 2nd ed., 110; Andrew Johnstone, “Before the Water’s Edge: Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Relations,” Gideon Remez, “Un-Finnished Business: Archival Evidence Exposes the Diplomatic Aspect of the USSR’s Pre-Planning for the Six Day War,” Cold War Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 45, no. 3 (January 2015): 25; and Lien-Hang Nguyen, “Revolutionary History 6, no. 3 (August 2006): 377–95, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740600795568; Irina Mukhina, “New Revelations from the Former Soviet Circuits: Toward Internationalizing America in the World,” Diplomatic History 39, no. 3 (June 2015): 413, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhv026. Archives: The Kremlin, the Warsaw Uprising, and the Coming of the Cold War,” Cold War History 6, no. 3 (August 2006): 397–411, https://doi. 33 Connelly, “SHAFR in the World,” 6. org/10.1080/14682740600795584; Natalia I. Yegorova, “Russian Archives: Prospects for Cold War Studies,” Cold War History 6, no. 4 (November 2006): 543–48, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740600979311; and Wilfried Loth, “The German Question from Stalin to Khrushchev: The Meaning of 34 For more on the costs of international history, see, Benjamin R. Young, “Wealth, Access, and Archival Fetishism in the New Cold War History,” New Documents,” Cold War History 10, no. 2 (May 2010): 229–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740903065438. History News Network, Aug. 23, 2019, https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/172318.

44 45 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

national flows of people, ideas, and capital, as well which they had long felt excluded.38 After all, who es in our own work, as have our students.40 Some- this “orthodox” view, chose disastrously to inter- as by nonstate actors.35 This perspective, which better than diplomatic historians, who had tak- thing important, though, was lost. Subjects central vene in a struggle in which their adversaries — the swept the field, often implicitly downgraded the en an international turn that encouraged them to to the history of U.S. foreign relations — presiden- Communist government in Hanoi originally led by government’s significance to history. work abroad, to help Americanist colleagues famil- tial decision-making, diplomacy, partisan politics, Ho Chi Minh, and the southern insurgency known Somewhat surprisingly for members of a subfield iarize themselves with the foreign archives upon the resort to military force, state-making — were as the National Liberation Front — enjoyed the whose raison d’être had traditionally been the anal- which transnational history relied? Indeed, within deemphasized. Even more important, the sheer bulk of nationalist legitimacy. Though U.S. forces ysis of the state, many foreign relations historians a remarkably short amount of time — less than 10 ability of the United States to shape the charac- fought ably and effectively, these authors claimed, embraced the transnational turn with enthusiasm.36 years — the examination of nonstate and transna- ter of international systems, processes, and events they faced an impossible task because no strate- Why did they do so? Similar to other Americanists, tional actors, movements, and processes became was downplayed. Therefore, while the internation- gic victory was possible. Or, to be more precise, they were impressed by processes of globalization popular topics in the subfield.39 al and transnational turns were salutary develop- the political struggle was always more important and the impact of nonstate actors, both of which By 2020, the international and transnational ap- ments in many respects, they were also problemat- than the military struggle, and therefore the United seemed to demonstrate the decreasing prominence proaches had become central to the study of U.S. ic. In particular, they sometimes had the effect of States and its South Vietnamese allies never had a of the state to political, economic, social, and cul- foreign relations. Much of this scholarship, it must distorting the past by attributing too much causal realistic chance of winning. tural life.37 Moreover, transnational history provid- be emphasized, was excellent — deeply researched, force to international and transnational actors. To Thus David Halberstam’s widely influential book, ed an opportunity for diplomatic historians to, as conceptually sound, and highly instructive in illu- demonstrate this phenomenon, we now turn to The Best and the Brightest, which appeared in 1972, Thomas W. Zeiler put it, “reintegrate themselves minating areas of the “U.S. in the World” that had examining the historiography of the Vietnam War described how hubris and a historical sense of in- into the mainstream of the historical profession been little examined in the past. We ourselves have (by which we mean what is sometimes referred evitability had pulled American leaders, step by (in which [they] were once the leaders)” but from adopted international and transnational approach- to as the Second Indochina War, as distinct from step, into the “quagmire” of Vietnam.42 And thus the First, or French, Indochina War), which has Frances FitzGerald’s Pulitzer Prize-winning Fire emerged as one of the topics most affected by the in the Lake, published the same year, argued that 41 35 Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (October 1991): 1031–55, intellectual developments of the last 30 years. Americans foolishly blundered into another peo- https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/96.4.1031; Michael McGerr, “The Price of the ‘New Transnational History,’” American Historical Review 96, no. 4 (Octo- ple’s history, blithely ignorant of Vietnamese na- ber 1991): 1056, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/96.4.1056; David Thelen, “Of Audiences, Borderlands, and Comparisons: Toward the Internationaliza- 43 tion of American History,” Journal of American History 79, no. 2 (September 1992): 432–62, https://doi.org/10.2307/2080034; Amy Kaplan, “‘Left tionalism’s resiliency. In the context of Vietnam’s Alone with America’: The Absence of Empire in the Study of American Culture,” in Cultures of United States Imperialism, ed. Amy Kaplan and Donald Part III: The Vietnam War culture and history, FitzGerald argued, America’s E. Pease (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), 3–21; Donald E. Pease, “New Perspectives on U.S. Culture and Imperialism,” in Cultures of Unit- ed States Imperialism, 22–37; Leila J. Rupp, “Constructing Internationalism: The Case of Transnational Women’s Organizations, 1888-1945,” American in Domestic, International, awesome military might was ultimately irrelevant, Historical Review 99, no. 5 (December 1994): 1571–72, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/99.5.1571; “A Note to Readers on Internationalization of the and Transnational Perspective powerless to halt the inexorable force of Ho’s na- JAH,” Journal of American History 85, no. 4 (March 1999): 1279, https://doi.org/10.1093/jahist/85.4.1279; David Thelen, “Rethinking History and the Nation-State: Mexico and the United States,” Journal of American History 86, no. 2 (September 1999): 438–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2567038; tionalist revolution. As such, for FitzGerald, as for David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History,” Journal of American History 83, no. 3 (December 1999): For a long time during and after the Vietnam Halberstam, it was pointless to talk of alternative 965–75, https://doi.org/10.2307/2568601; Ian Tyrrell, “Making Nations/Making States: American Historians in the Context of Empire,” Journal of War, the literature was dominated by American U.S. strategies that might have brought success in American History 86, no. 3 (December 1999): 1015–44, https://doi.org/10.2307/2568604; Thomas Bender, “The LaPietra Report: A Report to the Profession,” Organization of American Historians, September 2000, http://www.oah.org/about/reports/reports-statements/the-lapietra-report- accounts addressing U.S.-centered questions. Even the struggle: No such options existed, as the en- a-report-to-the-profession/; Eric Foner, “American Freedom in a Global Age,” American Historical Review 106, no. 1 (February 2001): 1–16, https:// before the guns fell silent in 1975, a consensus took terprise was doomed from the start. Other early doi.org/10.1086/ahr/106.1.1; Louis A. Pérez Jr., “We Are the World: Internationalizing the National, Nationalizing the International,” Journal of American History 89, no. 2 (September 2002): 562–63, https://doi.org/10.2307/3092173; Bayly et al., “On Transnational History,” 1441–64; Marcus hold among many authors that successive presi- accounts that endorsed this basic line of argument Gräser, “World History in a Nation-State: The Transnational Disposition in Historical Writing in the United States,” Journal of American History 95, dential administrations had blundered into a strug- — though they differed among themselves in other no. 4 (March 2009): 1038–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/27694559; and Matthew Pratt Guterl, “Comment: The Futures of Transnational History,” American Historical Review 118, no. 1 (February 2013): 130–39, https://doi.org/10.1093/ahr/118.1.130. For the major transnational reinterpretations gle they did not understand, on behalf of a series important respects — included works by Chester of American history, see, Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006); Carl Guarneri, of Saigon governments that lacked authority and Cooper, Daniel Ellsberg, Bernard Fall, George Her- America in the World: United States History in Global Context (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2007); and Ian Tyrell, Transnational Nation: popular support, and which were riven by infight- ring, Paul Kattenburg, and Hans Morgenthau.44 United States History in Global Perspective Since 1789 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). ing and corruption. American leaders, according to This consensus view, which still has broad sup- 36 Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon,” 1054; and Thomas (“Tim”) Borstelmann, “A Worldly Tale: Global Influences on the Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations,” in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941, 2nd ed., 341. For the centrality of the state to diplomatic history, see, Anders Stephanson, “Diplomatic History in the Expanded Field,” Diplomatic History 22, no. 4 (October 1998): 40 Among the recent PhD dissertations Fredrik Logevall has directed are, Irene V. Lessmeister, Between Colonialism and Cold War: The Indo- 595, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00140; Hoffmann, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life,” 501; and Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History nesian War of Independence in World Politics, 1945–1949, PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 2012; Hajimu Masuda, Whispering Gallery: War and Bandwagon,” 1071–73. Society During the Korean Conflict and the Social Constitution of the Cold War, 1945–1953, PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 2012; Sean Fear, 37 Stephanson, “Expanded Field,” 595; Thomas W. Zeiler, “Just Do It! Globalization for Diplomatic Historians,” Diplomatic History 25, no. 4 Republican Saigon’s Clash of Constituents: Domestic Politics and Civil Society in U.S.-South Vietnamese Relations, 1967–1971, PhD Dissertation, Cor- (October 2001): 529–51, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00286; Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” 53; Akira Iriye, “The Transnation- nell University, 2016; Fritz Bartel, The Triumph of Broken Promises: Oil, Finance, and the End of the Cold War, PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, al Turn,” Diplomatic History 31, no. 3 (June 2007): 375, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00641.x; Borstelmann, “A Worldly Tale,” 339–41, 2017; and Mattias Fibiger, The International and Transnational Construction of Authoritarian Rule in Island Southeast Asia, 1969–1977, PhD Disser- 350–51; Thomas “Tim” Borstelmann, “Presidential Column: Exploring Borders in a Transnational Era,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American tation, Cornell University, 2018. Additionally, Logevall’s Embers of War is an international history and Bessner’s Democracy in Exile is a transnational Foreign Relations Review 45, no. 3 (January 2015): 6; and Emily S. Rosenberg,” Considering Borders,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign history, and both authors make extensive use of foreign language materials in their work. Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and Relations, 3rd ed., ed. Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 193–95. the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House, 2012); and Daniel Bessner, Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018). 38 Zeiler, “Just Do It!” 551. See also, Kristin Hoganson, “Hop Off the Bandwagon! It’s a Mass Movement, Not a Parade,” Journal of American History 95, no. 4 (March 2009): 1087–88, https://doi.org/10.2307/27694564. 41 The Second Indochina War is also sometimes referred to as the Second Vietnam War, the American War in Vietnam, or, in Vietnam, as the American War. 39 Brad Simpson, “Bringing the Non-State Back In: Human Rights and Terrorism since 1945,” in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941, 2nd ed., 260–83; and Barbara J. Keys, “Nonstate Actors,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign 42 David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972). Relations, 3rd ed., 119–34. See also, Akira Iriye, “A Century of NGOs,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 3 (July 1999): 421–35, https://doi.org/10.1111/0145- 43 Frances FitzGerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam (Boston: Little Brown, 1972). 2096.00175; Mark H. Lytle, “Review Essay: NGOs and the New Transnational Politics,” Diplomatic History 25, no. 1 (January 2001): 121, https:// doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00252; Gienow-Hecht, “A Global Group of Worriers,” 482; Costigliola and Paterson, “Defining and Doing the History of 44 Bernard B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967); Chester L. Cooper, The Lost United States Foreign Relations,” 10–11; Akira Iriye, “Culture and International History,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 2nd Crusade: America in Vietnam (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1970); Daniel Ellsberg, Papers on the War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972); George ed., 254; Iriye, “The Transnational Turn”; Manela, “untitled”; Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, “Introduction,” in Uncertain Empire: American History and C. Herring, Vietnam: An American Ordeal (St. Louis, MO: Forum Press, 1976); George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and the Idea of the Cold War, ed. Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4; Westad, “Exploring the Histories of the Cold Vietnam, 1950–1975 (New York: Wiley, 1979); and Paul M. Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945–75 (New Brunswick, NJ: War,” 54; Guterl, “The Futures of Transnational Histories,” 131–32; Mark Philip Bradley, “The Charlie Maier Scare and the Historiography of American Transaction Books, 1980). For Morgenthau’s take on Vietnam, which was contained in a series of articles, see, Jennifer W. See, “A Prophet Without Foreign Relations, 1959-1980,” in America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations Since 1941, 2nd ed., 20; W. Fitzhugh Honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955–1965,” Pacific Historical Review 70. No. 3 (August 2001): 419–48, http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ Brundage, “An Appeal Unimpaired,” Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review 44, no. 3 (January 2014): 37; Federico phr.2001.70.3.419; Ellen Glaser Rafshoon, “A Realist’s Moral Opposition to War: Hans J. Morgenthau and Vietnam,” Peace and Change 26, no. 1 (Janu- Romero, “Cold War Historiography at the Crossroads,” Cold War History 14, no. 4 (2014): 687, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2014.950249; and ary 2001): 55–77, https://doi.org/10.1111/0149-0508.00178; and Lorenzo Zambernardi, “The Impotence of Power: Morgenthau’s Critique of American Borstelmann, “Exploring Borders,” 6. Intervention in Vietnam,” Review of International Studies 37, no. 3 (July 2011): 1335–56, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210510001531.

46 47 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

port among students of the war, was never without among serious scholars of the war. Despite their attitudes and policies in the war’s final years.48 been a decades-long, large-scale, and, especially, challengers. Beginning in the late 1970s, a “revision- differences, however, both the orthodox and revi- This recent work is hugely important, and we can globalized, Vietnam War at all.50 As Daniel Ellsberg ist” interpretation gained a foothold, arguing two sionist interpretations were U.S.-centric, in terms expect more excellent research exploring the non- averred more than four decades ago in the docu- principal points. First, U.S. intervention was en- of their analysis as well as in the sources upon U.S. dimensions of the war in the years to come as mentary Hearts and Minds, “A war in which one tirely justified on national security grounds. In the which they relied. As a result, for a long time much more archival materials in Vietnam and elsewhere side [i.e., the Republic of Vietnam] is entirely fi- zero-sum game that was the Cold War, so the claim of the history written about this long and bitter become available and as more scholars gain the nanced and equipped and supported by foreigners went, an easy communist success in a strategically struggle was, to borrow Gaddis Smith’s earlier de- linguistic ability to work with them. To the extent is not a civil war.” (He might have added that the important area like Vietnam would have grievously scription of the scholarship on the Cold War, “the that this new work has the effect of decentering Democratic Republic of Vietnam too had major out- harmed U.S. interests by emboldening the Soviets history of one hand clapping.”46 the United States, however, it carries a risk: spe- side assistance, especially from China, even if this and Chinese to be more aggressive elsewhere or by Over the past two decades, an important shift cifically, that too many interpretations of the war aid was always dwarfed by what the United States encouraging “Third World” governments to shift has occurred. Historians, influenced by the inter- become ahistorical by attributing too much causal provided to Saigon.) In Ellsberg’s view, Americans their allegiance to the Communists. Second, revi- national and transnational turns, have broadened force for the war’s course to local and transnation- should not have asked whether “we were on the sionists insisted that the war was far from unwin- their research focus to include Vietnamese, Chi- al actors. One sees this in the increasingly common wrong side in the Vietnamese war”; instead, they nable. Indeed, some revisionists maintained that nese, and Soviet archival materials, which now bol- conception of the Vietnam conflict as primarily a should have recognized that “we are the wrong victory was well on the way to being achieved on ster the voluminous English- and French-language civil war into which the United States imprudent- side.”51 Andrew J. Bacevich recently echoed Ells- two separate occasions: during the presidency of sources upon which the earlier historiography of ly stumbled. This view, which to be sure can al- berg’s claim in his review of Ken Burns and Lynn Ngo Dinh Diem (1955–63) and in the aftermath of the war was premised.47 In so doing, scholars have ready be identified in some of the orthodox liter- Novick’s documentary The Vietnam War, asserting produced a more well-round- ature, is not so much wrong as incomplete. The that “[t]he United States screwed up not because it ed picture of the struggle that struggle unquestionably pitted Vietnamese against picked the wrong side in the Vietnam conflict, but has brought needed attention Vietnamese. It bears emphasizing that, as numer- because it stuck its nose where it didn’t belong.”52 to North Vietnamese deci- ous scholars have shown, skirmishing among and Of course, none of the recent international and sion-making as well as to South within rival anti- and pro-colonial factions had transnational histories deny the centrality of the Vietnamese culture, politics, and commenced well before France made its bid to re- United States to the war in Vietnam. Indeed, many society. Not least, we now have claim control of Indochina after World War II, and include sophisticated analyses of U.S. motivations a much better understanding of may have erupted into some sort of violent con- and decision-making. A problem, however, emerg- the Diem years, thanks to stud- flict whether or not Western powers intervened.49 es when the scholarship gives equal or near-equal ies illuminating the complexities Still, it’s unlikely that, absent first French and then causal weight for the war’s military, political, eco- of southern Vietnamese political American military intervention, there would have nomic, and social course to non-American or trans- conditions from both the view the Tet Offensive of early 1968. In both instances, of the Saigon government and the perspectives of 48 The new scholarship is voluminous, but see, e.g., Tran Thi Lien, “The Catholic Question in North Vietnam: From Polish Sources 1954–56,” Cold revisionists affirmed, American actions forestalled its domestic opponents. We also know more about War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 431–52, https://doi.org/10.1080/14682740500284747; Mark Philip Bradley, Vietnam at War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Mark Atwood Lawrence, The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Pierre success. On one hand, Washington officials failed how U.S. rivals, most importantly the People’s Re- Journoud, “Diplomatie informelle et réseaux transnationaux. Une contribution française à la fin de la guerre Vietnam,” Relations Internationales 2, no. to stick with Diem and even helped engineer his public of China and the Soviet Union, attempted 138 (2009): 93–109, https://doi.org/10.3917/ri.138.0093; Meredith H. Lair, Armed with Abundance: Consumerism and Soldiering in the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Harish C. Mehta, “North Vietnam’s Informal Diplomacy with Bertrand Russell: Peace Activism ouster in a coup d’état. On the other hand, after to shape the war. Furthermore, some historians and the International War Crimes Tribunal,” Peace and Change 37, no. 1 (January 2012): 64–94, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2011.00732.x; Tet they foolishly chose not to press the advantage have started to place the conflict in its wider trans- Lien-Hang Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); when communist forces were allegedly reeling.45 national context, exploring the role religious and Heather Marie Stur, Beyond Combat: Women and Gender in the Vietnam War Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jessica M. Chap- man, Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Jessica M. The revisionist argument won enthusiastic back- nongovernmental organizations and movements Frazier, Women’s Antiwar Diplomacy During the Vietnam War Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Edward Miller, Misalliance: ing in some quarters, including at America’s mili- played in the war, while still others have begun to Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013); Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, Radicals on the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism During the Vietnam Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Pierre Asselin, Hanoi’s tary academies, but it was always a minority view focus on northern as well as southern Vietnamese Road to the Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Nguyen, “Revolutionary Circuits”; Tuong Vu, Vietnam’s Com- munist Revolution: The Power and Limits of Ideology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Jessica Elkind, Aid Under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016); Christopher Goscha, Vietnam: A New History (New York: Basic Books, 2016); Fear, “Republican Saigon’s Clash of Constituents”; Geoffrey C. Stewart, Vietnam’s Lost Revolution: Ngo Dinh Diem’s Failure to Build an Independent Nation, 1955–1963 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Sophie Quinn-Judge, The Third Force in the Vietnam Wars: The Elusive Search for Peace, 1954–75 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017); and Simon Toner, “Imagining Taiwan: The Nixon Administration, the Developmental States, and South Vietnam’s Search for Economic Viability, 1969–1975,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 4 (September 2017): 772–98, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhw057. 49 Indeed, the skirmishing regularly turned violent, suggesting that the previous view of a largely unified and coherent Vietnamese nationalism 45 Notable revisionist works include, Guenter Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Harry G. Summers, Jr., On was misplaced. Nor should we necessarily presume, as historians often have, that the Communists were destined to prevail in this internal struggle. Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981); Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unex- amined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1999); and Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: 50 This is not to deny Christopher Goscha’s important point that the inter- and intra-factional disputes might have become more violent absent The Vietnam War, 1954–1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Even while the war was still ongoing, President Richard M. Nixon tried the French and later the American wars, or his corollary claim that the necessities of anti-colonial warfare proved vitally important in giving the to build support for an argument that anticipated later revisionist claims. See, e.g., “Key Points to Be Made with Respect to Vietnam Agreement,” Viet Minh the necessary discipline and military skill to eventually rule the entire country. However, these disputes would have played out locally Folder “Vietnam 2,” n.d., H.R. Haldeman Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library, as cited in, Jeffrey P. Kimball, “‘Peace with Honor’: Richard Nixon and would have had little effect on the United States or the broader international system. See, Christopher Goscha, Vietnam, Un Etat né de la and the Diplomacy of Threat and Symbolism,” in Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945–1975, ed. David L. Anderson guerre (Paris: Armand Colin, 2011). On the longer-term Vietnamese roots of the conflict, see also, Christopher Goscha, Vietnam or Indochina?: Con- (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 152–83. testing Conceptions of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism, 1887–1954 (Copenhagen: NIAS Books, 1995); François Guillemot, Dai Viêt, independance et revolution au Viêt-Nam: l’échec de la troisième voie (1938–1955), PhD Dissertation, École Pratique des Hautes Études, 2003; Shawn Frederick 46 Gaddis Smith, “Glasnost, Diplomatic History, and the Post-Cold War Agenda,” Yale Journal of World Affairs 1, no. 1 (Summer 1989): 50. McHale, Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004); 47 See, e.g., Chen Jian, “China and the First Indo-China War, 1950–54,” China Quarterly, no. 133 (March 1993): 85–110, https://doi.org/10.1017/ Shawn McHale, “Understanding the Fanatic Mind? The Viet Minh and Race Hatred in the First Indochina War (1945–1954),” Journal of Vietnamese S0305741000018208; Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–69,” China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 356–87, https://doi. Studies 4, no. 3 (Fall 2009): 98–138, http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/vs.2009.4.3.98; Charles Keith, Catholic Vietnam: A Church from Empire to Nation org/10.1017/S0305741000034974; Mari Olsen, Solidarity and National Revolution: The Soviet Union and the Vietnamese Communists, 1954–60 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); and Brett Reilly, “The Sovereign States of Vietnam, 1945–1955,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 11, (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1997); Qiang Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, nos. 3–4 (Summer-Fall 2016): 103–39, http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jvs.2016.11.3-4.103. 2000); Yang Kuisong, “Changes in Mao Zedong’s Attitude Toward the Indochina War, 1949–1973,” Cold War International History Project Working 51 Hearts and Minds, directed by Peter Davis (1974; Chicago, IL: Home Vision, 2002), DVD. Paper no. 34, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2002, 6–11; and Ilya Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy Toward the Indo- china Conflict, 1954–1963 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 52 Andrew J. Bacevich, “Past All Reason,” The Nation, Sept. 19, 2017, https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/the-vietnam-war-past-all-reason/.

48 49 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

national actors. That is, the problem comes in the prosecute the war as it saw fit. The fact remains implicit decentering of the United States from the that only the United States sprayed some 19 mil- struggle when the war’s history so clearly under- lion gallons of defoliants on South Vietnam in an lines America’s centrality to it. In the aftermath of attempt to deny enemy forces jungle cover and World War II, French leaders made the decision to food, and only the United States spent billions on put down by force of arms the Ho Chi Minh-led nation-building programs and other nonmilitary Vietnamese revolution. The violent conflict that activities that prolonged and defined the conflict.56 followed quickly became America’s almost as much When one combines the insights of the new as France’s — Washington footed much of the scholarship with those of the old, it is clear that bill, supplied most of the weaponry, and pressed American policy bore major responsibility for a war French policymakers to hang tough when their will that generated some three million deaths, perhaps slackened. Long before American ground troops two-thirds of them civilians, and immense physical set foot in Indochina, the United States was the destruction in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.57 To principal player in making the struggle what it be- repeat, we are not claiming that absent Western in- came, and its importance only grew as time went tervention postcolonial Vietnam necessarily would on.53 Though the (ostensibly temporary) partition have been at peace — some sort of internal conflict of Vietnam in 1954 was not primarily an American was likely inevitable. Neither are we maintaining gambit, and though the basic political structure that the United States ever had political control of of what became South Vietnam was already then South Vietnam — it very clearly did not. The Unit- emerging, the U.S. role in building up and sustain- ed States also did not determine the conflict’s end ing that state was from the start vital in shaping its, — after all, it lost the war (although the American and the subsequent conflict’s, character.54 public’s growing unwillingness to pay the cost of When large-scale fighting resumed in 1965, the continued fighting certainly affected the timing of Lyndon B. Johnson administration tried hard to get the Paris Peace Accords). What we are asserting, Allied nations to commit ground forces under the however, is that without the massive U.S. inter- “More Flags” program, but the results were mod- vention any postcolonial conflict in Vietnam would est — it was Washington that committed millions have taken a very different, more localized, form, of troops to the war effort, and it was Washing- one having at most a marginal impact on American ton that dropped some 8 million tons of bombs on and global diplomacy, politics, and society. of importance.59 In the case of Vietnam, it becomes namese struggle would have looked very different. North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos between 1962 Ultimately, ours is an argument about causality, all but impossible to imagine large-scale war after One occasionally hears the argument that a cer- and 1973.55 The war-fighting capabilities of Saigon and specifically about constructing causal hierar- 1954 absent the decision of three successive U.S. tain decentering of the United States in the schol- and Hanoi could not, and never did, come any- chies.58 Methodologically, we are in accord with administrations to build up, sustain, and defend by arship on Vietnam is warranted because all the where near America’s, even when Hanoi was aided E.H. Carr, who argued in his classic work What force of arms the government of South Vietnam. U.S.-related questions about the war have already by China and the Soviet Union. Although Wash- Is History? that historians must not simply list X There is no question that Hanoi’s decision-making been examined. But this seems misguided. To cite ington found from an early point that its influence number of causes of whatever phenomenon they also influenced the course of the war, but it’s surely only a few examples, we need more studies on the over South Vietnamese political developments was are investigating, but rather must distinguish telling that through the spring of 1965 North Vi- process by which the Americanization of the war limited, this did not seriously hamper its ability to among them in an attempt to establish a ranking etnamese leaders hoped to avoid a major military deepened between 1965 and 1967; the growing dis- conflict with the United States.60 Put another way: illusionment within the Johnson administration Without the United States, the history of the Viet- with the war; the bureaucratic politics of the war; 53 See, Logevall, Embers of War. 54 This is not to argue that the United States installed Diem or that he was an American creation. U.S. officials knew little about him in the spring of 1954, and moreover he had his own power base in Vietnam. But the U.S. role in his ascension to power was nonetheless crucial. See, 59 E.H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage, 1961). One way to establish causal hierarchies is to do so through careful counterfactual Logevall, Embers of War, 588–90; and Miller, Misalliance. analysis, which, by bringing to the fore plausible but unrealized alternatives to what actually occurred, can convey the differing dimensions of past, 55 Fredrik Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of the War in Vietnam (Berkeley: University of California Press, contingent situations. Though counterfactuals have a negative reputation among many professional historians, thinking about alternatives is, in fact, 1999), 175–96; and Fredrik Logevall, “America Isolated: The Western Powers and the Escalation of the War,” in America, the Vietnam War, and the an indispensable, if usually implicit, part of the historian’s craft — we can judge the forces that won out only by comparing them with those that World: Comparative and International Perspectives, ed. Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd C. Gardner, and Wilfried Mausbach (New York: Cambridge Universi- were defeated. Simply put, the investigation of unrealized alternatives provides crucial insight into why things occurred as they did. See, e.g., Jon ty Press, 2003), 175–96. Elster, Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), especially chapter 6; Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Niall Ferguson, Virtual His- 56 As Max Hastings remarked: “An extraordinary aspect of the decision-making in Washington between 1961 and 1975 was that Vietnamese tory: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (London: Penguin Press, 1997); Philip E. Tetlock and Geoffrey Parker, “Counterfactual Thought Experiments,” were seldom if ever allowed to intrude upon it. Successive administrations ignored any claims by the people who inhabited the battlefields to a in Unmaking the West: “What-If?” Scenarios that Rewrite World History, ed. Philip E. Tetlock, Richard Ned Lebow, and Geoffrey Parker (Ann Arbor: voice in determining their own fate: business was done in a cocoon of Americanness.” Max Hastings, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945–1975 (New University of Michigan Press, 2006), 14–44; and Fredrik Logevall, “Presidential Address: Structure, Contingency, and the War in Vietnam,” Diplomatic York: Harper, 2018), 121. We’re grateful to Andrew Preston for this reference. History 39, no. 1 (January 2015): 4–5, https://doi.org/10.1093/dh/dhu072. 57 See here the penetrating analysis in Christian G. Appy, “What Was the Vietnam War About?” New York Times, March 26, 2018, https://www. 60 As Sophie Quinn-Judge recently argued in an H-Diplo roundtable, “studies of ‘Hanoi’s War’ foreground the hardline, aggressive nature of nytimes.com/2018/03/26/opinion/what-was-the-vietnam-war-about.html. With respect to the “Vietnamese civil war” argument, Appy suggests a the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) throughout the American Vietnam War. They go back to the original U.S. interpretation of the war as a counterfactual “thought experiment. What if our own Civil War bore some resemblance to the Vietnamese ‘civil war’? For starters, we would have to case of Communist aggression against an independent RVN [Republic of Vietnam]. Saigon’s flaunting of the Geneva final statement on the holding imagine that in 1860 a global superpower — say Britain — had strongly promoted Southern secession, provided virtually all of the funding for the of nationwide elections in 1956 and the legitimate right of the DRV to fight for unification (that they thought they had won in 1954) are down- ensuing war and dedicated its vast military to the battle. We must also imagine that in every Southern state, local, pro-Union forces took up arms played. In other words, there is no dramatic new evidence that the war was initiated by Hanoi or was Hanoi’s responsibility.” Sophie Quinn-Judge’s against the Confederacy. Despite enormous British support, Union forces prevailed. What would Americans call such a war? Most, I think, would response in George Fujii, “H-Diplo Roundtable XX, 6 on Sophie Quinn-Judge’s The Third Force in the Vietnam War: The Elusive Search for Peace, remember it as the Second War of Independence. Perhaps African-Americans would call it the First War of Liberation. Only former Confederates 1954–1975,” H-Diplo, Oct. 8, 2018, https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/2671535/h-diplo-roundtable-xx-6-sophie-quinn-judges- and the British might recall it as a ‘civil war.’” third-force-vietnam. For the contrary view that suggests it was Hanoi that initiated the major escalation in 1965, see, Asselin, Hanoi’s Road; and 58 Of course, not all histories of U.S. foreign relations must be centrally concerned with causality, and there are many worthy historical topics Zachary Shore, “Provoking America: Le Duan and the Origins of the Vietnam War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 17, no. 4 (Fall 2015): 86–108, https:// able to legitimately elide such issues. doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00598. An analysis that assigns broadly equal responsibility to both sides is Goscha, Vietnam, chaps. 7–9.

50 51 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

the growth in congressional assertiveness on Vi- — hold on the country for almost a decade, before Part IV: The U.S. in the II American state was the creation of a network of etnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s; and the the Americans themselves assumed responsibility World after the International parastate institutions — e.g., think tanks, corpo- war’s lasting effects on global finance and the de- for the newly created Republic of Vietnam. As Ho’s and Transnational Turns rations, nongovernmental organizations, and uni- mise of Bretton Woods, among other topics. None- appeal to Truman reveals, long before France’s de- versity research centers — that worked primarily theless, we appreciate that, as the new histories of feat at Đien Bien Phu in 1954, North Vietnamese The Vietnam War is only one of several topics on government contracts. Furthermore, after 1945 Vietnam demonstrate, the United States was nev- leaders recognized an emergent United States, not central to post-1945 U.S. and global history that a the official organizations of the state, especially er omnipotent and was never able to rule by fiat, an enfeebled France, as their principal foe, and ad- domestic perspective steeped in American sourc- those groups concerned with war-making, signif- and to understand the war in all its dimensions we justed their strategy accordingly.62 es can help illuminate. First and foremost, histo- icantly increased in size. Though several histori- must study non-U.S. and transnational actors. In- In fact, from the start of the conflict in 1945–1946 rians must analyze the rise of U.S. hyperpower, ans have examined this subject, much more work deed, an exciting future undertaking would be to until the fall of Saigon 30 years later, the American primacy, and unilateralism. (Henry R. Luce’s no- on the ways in which the postwar national securi- integrate Vietnamese and other non-U.S. sources state did much to determine the course of the First tion of an “American Century,” articulated in 1941, ty state grew and spread its tentacles throughout with the rich — and recently declassified — archi- and Second Indochina Wars. To be sure, other ac- has had its share of critics, but the label has stuck American society remains to be done.65 Relatedly, val materials available at repositories across the tors, especially North Vietnam, South Vietnam, for a reason.63) Though foreign archival materials we should know more about how the executive United States.61 And certainly, scholars should be China, and the Soviet Union, as well as nongovern- are not without utility in the quest to understand branch and the “imperial presidency” came to ac- wary of explicit or implicit claims that internation- mental organizations of various kinds, influenced U.S. dominance — indeed, they can teach us much crue enormous authority over Congress in mat- al and transnational approaches are more impor- the conflict in various ways, but on balance it was about how leaders overseas viewed that emerging ters of war and foreign policy.66 Fourth, historians tant merely because they emphasize the non-U.S. American officials ensconced in the White House, dominance, and adjusted to it — the most impor- have tended to elide, or at least deemphasize, the dimensions of the story and draw on non-Eng- Defense Department, State Department, and CIA tant source material for explicating the formation central role domestic politics played in determin- lish-language sources. who exerted the most profound effect on the wars. and exercise of U.S. power (if not its effects) is lo- ing U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War. Furthermore, the history of U.S. foreign affairs Moreover, U.S. policymakers’ decisions were mo- cated in presidential and other American archives. Since 1945, electoral considerations, the machina- during the Vietnam War highlights the salience of tivated mainly by the notion of “credibility,” in Second, historians do not yet know enough about tions of special interest lobbying groups, and the several points we made in this article’s introduc- two specific senses. First, the Cold War led deci- the origins and operation of the bipartisan consen- vagaries of political coalitions have profoundly tory section: First, that the United States was the sion-makers to be concerned with the geopolitical sus that has, since World War II, assumed U.S. pri- shaped U.S. foreign policy, yet we do not know most dominant nation in the post-1945 world, that credibility of the United States. Would Western macy and hegemony. How and why did policymak- enough about this complex process.67 Indeed, his- this dominance was recognized by all global policy- European allies trust America to defend them if it ers, lawmakers in Congress, think tank analysts, torians have largely ceded this scholarly ground makers, and that U.S. power enabled Washington failed to stop the ever-growing communist menace mainstream journalists, and other elites in the to political scientists. to shape the character of conflicts in which it in- in Southeast Asia? Would the nations of the emer- United States come to share similar assumptions Fifth, the steady marginalization of elite-centered volved itself; second, that the American state was gent “Third World” conclude that capitalism was about U.S. globalism that remained remarkably sta- or “traditional” military history — i.e., the study of the chief maker of foreign policy; and finally, that feckless if South Vietnam fell? In other words, the ble over a long period of time?64 strategy, tactics, and the influence of high-ranking domestic determinants were the primary, if not logic of the Cold War compelled U.S. policymakers Third, we need to learn more about the peculiar military officers on foreign affairs — in the Amer- only, sources of U.S. foreign policy. to intervene in Vietnam. Put crudely and counter- evolution of the U.S. national security state. One ican academy has engendered significant gaps in To a degree difficult to fully recapture today, factually: No Cold War, no American military in- of the major developments of the post-World War diplomatic historians’ understanding of U.S. pow- World War II witnessed the emergence of the Unit- tervention in Vietnam. Second — and more impor- ed States to a position of predominant power in tant — from beginning to end, perceived domestic global, and especially Asian, affairs. Even before political imperatives were crucial to the formation the defeat of the Japanese Empire in the summer of U.S. policy toward Vietnam. For each of the six of 1945, all sides in the incipient struggle for In- presidents who dealt with Vietnam after World 63 Henry R. Luce, “The American Century,” Life, Feb. 17, 1941, 61–65. dochina grasped just how important the American War II (Truman through Gerald Ford) the struggle 64 Several books have examined aspects of this topic. See, Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National role was likely to be in the postwar world. “What there mattered principally, if not solely, because Security State, 1945–1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War; and Stephen Wertheim, Tomorrow, will the Americans do?” was the question that res- of the damage it could do to their domestic polit- the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy in World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2020). 65 See, Hogan, Cross of Iron; Aaron L. Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America’s Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Grand Strategy onated in the halls of power in Paris, London, Ha- ical position. Presidential administrations always (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Douglas T. Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of the Law that Transformed noi, Saigon, Chongqing, and Moscow. Small won- viewed the stakes in Vietnam — and the millions America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). For some works that examine nongovernmental and parastate national security organiza- der that on Aug. 30, 1945 — before Japan officially of Vietnamese killed and maimed during the wars tions, see, Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Donald L.M. Blackmer, The MIT Center for International Studies: The Founding Years, 1951–1969 (Cambridge, MA: The surrendered — Ho Chi Minh sent a letter to Pres- — through the prism of their own domestic inter- MIT Center for International Studies, 2002); Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore, MD: Johns ident Harry S. Truman asking for the Viet Minh to ests, anxieties, and experiences. For these reasons, Hopkins University Press, 2003); David C. Engerman, Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America’s Soviet Experts (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American be involved in any Allied discussion regarding Viet- the key to understanding America’s role in the In- Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research During the nam’s postwar status. (Truman, similar to Wood- dochina Wars ultimately lies not in Vietnam, or in Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Osamah F. Khalil, America’s Dream Palace: Middle East Expertise and the Rise of the National row Wilson before him, ignored Ho.) The Vietnam- the broader international community, or in various Security State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); and Bessner, Democracy in Exile. ese leader was right to worry about U.S. policy. As transnational movements, but at home. 66 See, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973); and Jeremi Suri, The Impossible Presidency: The Rise and Fall of America’s Highest Office (New York: Basic Books, 2017). described above, American resources soon enabled 67 See, for some examples, Ernest R. May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975); Melvin Small, the French to maintain their tenuous — and bloody Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Craig and Logevall, America’s Cold War; Thomas Alan Schwartz, “‘Henry, …Winning an Election Is Terribly Important’: Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 2 (April 2009): 173–90, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2008.00759.x; Fredrik Logevall, 61 In addition to the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Ford presidential libraries, there is abundant material available at the “Domestic Politics,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, 3rd ed., 151–67; Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Global Visions and Parochial National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD, the Library of Congress in Washington, DC, the National Security Archive in Politics: The Persistent Dilemma of the ‘American Century,’” Diplomatic History 27, no. 4 (September 2003): 423–47, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467- Washington, DC, and the Vietnam Center and Sam Johnson Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, TX. The personal papers of indi- 7709.00363; Julian E. Zelizer, Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism (New York: Basic vidual policymakers and lawmakers are scattered at institutions across the country. Books, 2010); and Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (Lexington: University Press of 62 This is a theme in Logevall, Embers of War. Kansas, 2010).

52 53 The Scholar Recentering the United States in the Historiography of American Foreign Relations

er.68 In a nation in which the budget of the Defense on U.S.-centered histories of foreign policy and powerful nation in the world; when it wanted to, Department has long dwarfed that of the State De- decision-making should be admitted to doctoral it shaped global affairs; and it usually did so for partment, we must know more about how military programs at the same rate as those who intend to domestic reasons. As such, to understand the his- elites informed, and in some cases drove, U.S. for- adopt international and transnational approaches tory of the U.S. in the world, we must recenter the eign policy. Sixth, historians ought to analyze the in their work. Second, prize and fellowship com- United States. impact that intelligence and the intelligence com- mittees should give full consideration to works munity have had on U.S. foreign affairs. In the last examining U.S. decision-making and the role of Daniel Bessner is Anne H.H. and Kenneth B. Pyle several years, the CIA and other groups have de- domestic determinants, including partisan pol- Associate Professor in American Foreign Policy in classified massive amounts of material that could itics, careerism, and elections, in shaping it. Fi- the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies transform our understanding of America’s role in nally, scholars should organize conferences and at the University of Washington. He is the author of the world, and these documents should occupy a panels with the explicit purpose of bridging the Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the central place in future scholarship. gaps between domestic, international, and trans- Defense Intellectual (Cornell University Press, 2018). Finally, historians have not explored fully the national historians. In particular, such gatherings concatenation of political, economic, cultural, and should emphasize the importance of establishing Fredrik Logevall is Laurence D. Belfer Professor ideological factors that have encouraged the Unit- causal hierarchies, which might provide a means of International Affairs and Professor of History at ed States to engage in what Bacevich has pun- of integrating the insights of recent international Harvard University. His new book, JFK: Coming of gently referred to as “permanent” or “endless” and transnational scholarship with those of do- Age in the American Century, 1917–1956 (Random war.69 In the eight decades that have elapsed since mestic-focused histories. House), will be published in September 2020. Pearl Harbor, the United States has been in a state Buoyed by the end of the Cold War and the of near-constant war and has deployed military rise of globalization, in the 1990s and 2000s U.S.- Acknowledgements: The authors would like force abroad scores of times. We must know more based diplomatic historians took international to thank Brooke Blower, Sean Fear, Nils Gilman, about why and how this state of affairs came to and transnational turns that moved their subfield Will Hitchcock, Daniel Immerwahr, Jennifer Mill- be. Of course, this list of topics could be expand- away from methodological nationalism. While er, Mario del Pero, Stuart Schrader, Sarah Snyder, ed, and every historian will have her own specific these turns in some ways reinvigorated the field, Stephen Wertheim, the Texas National Security Re- set of subjects in which she is most interested. their broad adoption threatens to ahistorically rei- view’s two anonymous reviewers, and audiences at The important point is that each of the above top- fy a unique historical moment — that of post-Cold Harvard, the University of Wisconsin at Madison, ics is America-centric and best explored through War neoliberal capitalist globalization — by read- the University of Washington, and Yale for their deep immersion in U.S. archives.70 ing this moment into the past. Though scholars comments, criticisms, and suggestions. There are several important steps scholars can must of course be always on the lookout for inno- take to help recenter the United States in the his- vative ways of analyzing history, we must also be N.B. Final revisions for this article were under- toriography of U.S. foreign relations. First, pro- careful not to embrace innovation for innovation’s taken in the spring of 2020, during the height of the spective graduate students who intend to focus sake. After 1945, the United States was the most COVID-19 viral outbreak, when many public and private institutions were shuttered. For this reason,

68 On the marginalization of military history, see, Robert M. Citino, “Military Histories: Old and New: A Reintroduction,” American Historical access to university libraries was severely impeded, Review 112, no. 4 (October 2007): 1070, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.4.1070; and Tami Davis Biddle and Robert M. Citino, “The Role of Military and when double-checking citations we were forced History in the Contemporary Academy,” Army History 96 (Summer 2015): 26, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26300415. For an account that dis- to rely on notes and materials available online. agrees with military historians’ claims of marginalization, see, Ann M. Little, “Here We Go Again: Military Historian Complains that No One Teaches or Writes About Military History Any More, Part Eleventybillion,” Historiann, March 19, 2016, https://historiann.com/2016/03/19/here-we-go-again- military-historian-complains-that-no-one-teaches-or-writes-about-military-history-any-more-part-eleventybillion/. Photo: Department of Defense 69 Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); and Andrew J. Bacevich, “Ending Endless War: A Pragmatic Military Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 5 (September/October 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ united-states/2016-08-03/ending-endless-war. Mary L. Dudziak’s War-Time is an exception that proves the rule. See, Mary L. Dudziak, War-Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). For an earlier take on a similar subject, see, Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930’s (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995). 70 Though our concern in this article has been with the international and transnational turns, one may also speak of a “cultural turn” in dip- lomatic history that has done much to enrich the field. In the last three decades, a plethora of historians have demonstrated the myriad ways in which race, gender (both femininity and masculinity), sexuality, religion, human rights, consumerism, developmentalism, domesticity, and other structures and ideologies shaped the formulation and use of U.S. power. See, e.g., Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935–1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Frank Costigliola, “‘Unceasing Pressure for Penetration’: Gender, Pathology, and Emotion in George Kennan’s Formation of the Cold War,” Journal of American History 83, no. 4 (March 1997): 1309–39, https://doi. org/10.2307/2952904; Penny M. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937–1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Gilman, Mandarins of the Future; Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003); Christopher Endy, Cold War Holidays: American Tourism in France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); Seth Jacobs, Amer- ica’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Donna Alvah, Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946–1965 (New York: New York University Press, 2007); Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012); Barbara J. Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Daniel Immerwahr, Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015); Nancy H. Kwak, A World of Homeowners: American Power and the Politics of Housing Aid (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); and Sarah B. Snyder, From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

54 55 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to increase military efficiency, but also poses unique challenges to multinational military operations and decision-making that scholars and policymakers ALLIES AND ARTIFICIAL have yet to explore. The data- and resource-intensive nature INTELLIGENCE: of AI development creates barriers to burden-sharing and OBSTACLES TO interoperability that can hamper multinational operations. By accelerating the speed of combat and providing adversaries with OPERATIONS AND a tool to heighten mistrust between allies, AI can also strain DECISION-MAKING the complex processes that allies and security partners use to make decisions. To overcome these challenges and prepare for AI-enabled warfare, policymakers need to develop institutional, Erik Lin-Greenberg procedural, and technical solutions that streamline decision- making and enhance interoperability.

n June 2019, the United States announced the challenges of AI collaboration in the security a new artificial intelligence (AI) partnership domain. President Donald Trump’s executive order with Singapore that calls for collaboration on AI directs “enhance[ed] international and indus- on the development and use of AI technol- try collaboration with foreign partners and allies” ogiesI in the national security domain.1 Is this type to maintain “American leadership in AI.”2 Similar- of cooperation a harbinger of things to come? The ly, the congressionally chartered National Security burgeoning military use of AI — technology that Commission on Artificial Intelligence warns, “If the carries out tasks that normally require human in- United States and its allies do not coordinate early telligence — has the potential to alter how states and often on AI-enabled capabilities, the effective- carry out military operations. AI-enabled technol- ness of our military coalitions will suffer.”3 Several ogies — like autonomous drone swarms and algo- of Washington’s allies have echoed these calls for rithms that quickly sift through massive amounts collaboration. Germany’s 2019 National AI Strate- of information — can increase the speed and effi- gy advocates for “work[ing] with the nations lead- ciency of warfare, but they may also exacerbate the ing in this field … to conduct joint bilateral and/or coordination and decision-making challenges fre- multilateral R&D activities on the development and quently associated with multinational military op- use of AI.”4 While cooperation is important, what erations carried out by allies and security partners. challenges might allies and partners encounter as Policymakers and experts in the United States they work together to develop and deploy AI in the and other countries have urged international co- military domain? And what steps might states take operation on the development and use of AI, but to overcome these obstacles? this guidance overlooks important questions about States are racing to achieve superiority in the

1 Prashanth Parameswaran, “What’s in the New US-Singapore Artificial Intelligence Defense Partnership?” The Diplomat, July 1, 2019, https:// thediplomat.com/2019/07/whats-in-the-new-us-singapore-artificial-intelligence-defense-partnership/. 2 Donald J. Trump, “Executive Order on Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” The White House, Feb. 11, 2019, https://www. whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-maintaining-american-leadership-artificial-intelligence/. 3 “Interim Report,” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, November 2019, 45, https://drive.google.com/file/d/153OrxnuGE- jsUvlxWsFYauslwNeCEkvUb/view. The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence is an independent group of experts chartered by Congress to help shape U.S. AI development. 4 Nationale Strategie Für Künstliche Intelligenz [Artificial Intelligence Strategy], German Federal Government, November 2018, 41, http://www. ki-strategie-deutschland.de/.

56 57 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

AI domain, and AI research and development is military command-and-control processes. and processes,13 their effectiveness at reassuring inform policymaking. flourishing: In early 2019, the U.S. Department of Second, AI could hamper alliance and coalition friends and deterring rivals,14 and their survival This paper proceeds in five parts. First, I briefly Defense unveiled its AI strategy.5 Meanwhile, Chi- decision-making by straining the processes and re- amid changing political conditions.15 Much of this define artificial intelligence and describe its mili- na has pledged to develop a $150 billion AI sector lationships that undergird decisions on the use of work has overlooked the effects of specific tech- tary applications. Second, I survey the scholarly lit- by 2030,6 and Russian President Vladimir Putin force. By increasing the speed of warfare, AI could nologies on alliance politics, with the exception of erature on alliance politics and multinational oper- famously asserted, “whoever becomes the leader decrease the time leaders, from the tactical to stra- studies on nuclear weapons. Second, the article ations, focusing on the challenges of planning and in [AI] will become the ruler of the world.”7 AI de- tegic levels, have to debate policies and make deci- builds upon research examining the role of emerg- carrying out operations. Third, I identify how AI velopment promises to bring enhanced accuracy sions. These compressed timelines may not allow ing technologies in international security, more can magnify these challenges. Fourth, I investigate and efficiency to complex and dangerous tasks, for the complex negotiations and compromises broadly. Existing studies have explored how mil- how these AI-associated challenges might be over- but policymakers and scholars have yet to fully ex- that are defining characteristics of alliance poli- itaries adopt new technologies,16 how those tech- come. I conclude by outlining potential avenues for plore how these benefits compare with potential tics.10 Decision-making may be further hampered nologies affect conflict initiation and escalation,17 future research. risks — particularly in the context of multinational if the “black box” and unexplainable nature of AI and how they shape force structure and doctrine.18 military operations.8 To be sure, decision-makers causes leaders to lack confidence in AI-enabled This article broadens this line of research by in- have expressed concerns about the reliability of AI systems. And, just as adversaries could use AI to vestigating how technology can both stymie and Artificial Intelligence and technologies and the ethical implications of dele- interfere with command and control, they could advance cooperation between states in the secu- International Security Applications gating military operations to computers.9 These also use AI to launch misinformation campaigns rity domain. Third, the paper contributes to poli- AI-specific challenges, however, may magnify the that sow discord among allies and heighten fears cy debates surrounding the increasing use of AI in Broadly defined, AI is the ability of computers coordination and commitment challenges that fre- that allies will renege on their commitments. military settings. Existing analyses have explored and machines to perform tasks that traditionally quently plague military operations conducted by To be sure, barriers to multinational military co- potential applications of AI,19 its effects on the bal- require human intelligence.22 AI has been applied to multinational alliances and coalitions. operation are not new, but AI may intensify these ance of power,20 and the ethical and domestic po- control self-driving cars and swarms of unmanned Drawing from theories of alliance politics and difficulties.11 To help overcome these obstacles to litical considerations associated with battlefield AI aircraft, to assist physicians in making medical di- analysis of emerging AI technologies, I map out two coordination and decision-making challenges, alli- use.21 A deeper understanding of how AI can influ- agnoses, and at the more quotidian level, to screen areas where AI could hamper multinational military ance and coalition leaders can draw lessons from ence security partnerships and alliances may help spam emails and act as virtual personal assis- operations. First, AI could pose challenges to opera- past cases of successful cooperation and a grow- tional coordination by complicating burden-sharing ing corpus of national-level AI strategies to devel- 13 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science 3, no. 1 (June 2000): 63–83, https://doi. and the interoperability of multinational forces. Not op international agreements and standards that org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.3.1.63; Daina Chiba, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds, “Careful Commitments: Democratic States and Alliance all alliance or coalition members will possess AI ca- streamline the integration of AI into multinational Design,” Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 2015): 968–82, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/682074. pabilities, raising barriers to military cooperation as operations. 14 Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 461–95, https://www.jstor.org/sta- AI-enabled warfare becomes increasingly common. This article makes three contributions to schol- ble/2010183; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 137–68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706792; Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassess- States with AI technologies will also need to over- arly and policy debates in international relations. ing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” International Security 39, no. 4 (Spring 2015): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00197; Michael come political barriers to sharing the sensitive data First, it investigates how technology shapes alli- R. Kenwick, John A. Vasquez, and Matthew A. Powers, “Do Alliances Really Deter?” Journal of Politics 77, no. 4 (October 2015): 943–54, https://doi. org/10.1086/681958. required to develop and operate AI-enabled sys- ance relationships and multinational military op- 15 Robert B. McCalla, “NATO’s Persistence After the Cold War,” International Organization 50, no. 3 (Summer 1996): 445–75, https://doi. tems. At the same time, rivals can stymie multina- erations. Most scholarly work on alliances and org/10.1017/S0020818300033440; Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International Organi- tional coordination by using AI to launch deception security partnerships has focused on the reasons zation 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 705–35, https://doi.org/10.1162/002081800551343; Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Ex- campaigns aimed at interfering with an alliance’s behind their creation,12 their institutional design plaining State Decisions to Violate Treaties,” International Organization 57, no. 4 (Fall 2003): 801–27, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303574057; Brett Ashley Leeds and Burcu Savun, “Terminating Alliances: Why Do States Abrogate Agreements?” Journal of Politics 69, no. 4 (November 2007): 1118–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2007.00612.x; Molly Berkemeier and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Reassessing the Fulfillment of Alliance Com- mitments in War,” Research & Politics 5, no. 2 (April 2018), https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2053168018779697. 16 Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 17 Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation,” Interna- tional Security 41, no. 2 (Fall 2016): 7–42, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00257; Sarah E. Kreps and Jacquelyn Schneider, “Escalation Firebreaks in the Cyber, Conventional, and Nuclear Domains: Moving Beyond Effects-Based Logics,” SSRN, Jan. 17, 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 5 Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense, 2019, https://media.defense. cfm?abstract_id=3104014. gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. 18 Eliot A. Cohen, “A Revolution in Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 37–54, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 6 Arthur Herman, “China’s Brave New World Of AI,” Forbes, Aug. 30, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arthurherman/2018/08/30/chinas- united-states/1996-03-01/revolution-warfare; Melissa K. Griffith, “A Comprehensive Security Approach: Bolstering Finnish Cybersecurity Capacity,” brave-new-world-of-ai/#3a7918bf28e9. Journal of Cyber Policy 3, no. 3 (September 2018): 407–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/23738871.2018.1561919; Max Smeets, “Integrating Offensive Cyber Capabilities: Meaning, Dilemmas, and Assessment,” Defence Studies 18, no. 4 (October 2018): 395–410, https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2 7 Radina Gigova, “Who Putin Thinks Will Rule the World,” CNN, Sept. 2, 2017, https://www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/world/putin-artificial-intelli- 018.1508349. gence-will-rule-world/index.html. 19 Michael C. Horowitz, “The Promise and Peril of Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 23, 2018, 8 For one exception see, Martin Dufour, “Will Artificial Intelligence Challenge NATO Interoperability,” NATO Defense College Policy Brief, Dec. 10, https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/the-promise-and-peril-of-military-applications-of-artificial-intelligence/; Paul Scharre, Army of None: Autonomous 2018, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239. Weapons and the Future of War (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2019). 9 Colin Clark, “Air Combat Commander Doesn’t Trust Project Maven’s Artificial Intelligence — Yet,” Breaking Defense, Aug. 21, 2019, https:// 20 Michael C. Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 3 breakingdefense.com/2019/08/air-combat-commander-doesnt-trust-project-mavens-artificial-intelligence-yet/. (May 2018): 36–57, https://doi.org/10.15781/T2639KP49; Adrian Pecotic, “Whoever Predicts the Future Will Win the AI Arms Race,” Foreign Policy, 10 Throughout the article, I use the term “alliance politics” to describe the political coordination among both formal treaty allies and less institu- March 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/05/whoever-predicts-the-future-correctly-will-win-the-ai-arms-race-russia-china-united-states- tionalized security partners. Furthermore, for clarity, I use the term “allies” to encompass both formal allies and other security partners. artificial-intelligence-defense/. 11 Keith Hartley, “NATO, Standardisation and Nationalism: An Economist’s View,” RUSI Journal 123, no. 3 (1978): 57–60, https://doi. 21 Peter Asaro, “On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making,” org/10.1080/03071847809422917; David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union,” Survival 42, no. 4 (December 2000): 205. International Review of the Red Cross 94, no. 886 (Summer 2012), https://doi.org/10.1017/S1816383112000768; On the domestic politics of AI-enabled weapons use, see, Michael C Horowitz, “Public Opinion and the Politics of the Killer Robots Debate,” Research & Politics 3, no. 1 (January 12 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 2016): 1–8, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2053168015627183. University Press, 1997); Jesse C. Johnson, “External Threat and Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly 61, no. 3 (September 2017): 736–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqw054; Matthew Digiuseppe and Paul Poast, “Arms Versus Democratic Allies,” British Journal of Political 22 Summary of the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, U.S. Department of Defense, February 2019, https://media. Science 48, no. 4 (October 2018): 981–1003, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123416000247. defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.

58 59 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

tants.23 Underlying AI technologies are a variety of el and Russia, for instance, have reportedly tested cles, with little human involvement.35 In contrast, personnel and equipment, alliances allow for the approaches including mathematical optimization, self-driving tanks and armored vehicles capable of geospatial intelligence exploitation that is not as- division of labor across all member states. To facili- statistical methods, and artificial neural networks identifying targets without human direction.31 The sisted by AI is a time-intensive and manpower-in- tate cooperation, allies often engage in consultative — computer systems that attempt to perform spe- United States is making headway on Project Ma- tensive process.36 AI can also be used to operate decision-making, develop shared operating proce- cific tasks in a similar way to the human brain.24 ven, the Defense Department’s effort to use ma- autonomous weapon systems that allow states to dures, build integrated command-and-control net- Regardless of approach, AI typically uses large chine learning — an application of AI — to stream- launch military operations without putting friend- works, acquire interoperable weapon systems that amounts of data to train and feed algorithms to line the analysis of video gathered by drones.32 ly personnel in harm’s way. These systems can can integrate on the battlefield, and participate in accomplish tasks and processes that are normally Similarly, Japan’s Self-Defense Force announced decrease the risk of friendly casualties and reduce joint military exercises. associated with human cognition. Most current AI that it will equip its P-1 maritime patrol aircraft the political barriers to launching military opera- Although alliances and multilateral coalitions is considered to be “narrow,” designed to achieve with AI technology that will more effectively iden- tions.37 The efficiency-enhancing and risk-reduc- can bolster the security of member states and the a specific task — like identifying objects in images. tify vessels and other potential targets.33 States ing characteristics of AI-enabled systems will like- efficiency of their military operations, member- Researchers, however, are working to develop arti- have also begun incorporating AI into autono- ly appeal to casualty-averse and cost-conscious ship can create complications for decision-making ficial general intelligence that can accomplish any mous systems that can navigate without direction leaders. Indeed, AI technologies might allow these and the coordination of military operations. First, task the human brain can.25 by human operators, often in swarms intended leaders to launch operations not previously possi- alliances and coalitions must overcome opera- Narrow AI technology has increasingly been ap- to overwhelm an enemy’s defenses. In 2017, for ble because of efficiency concerns or high degrees tional challenges surrounding the integration and plied in the national security domain. Although instance, the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and of risk to friendly forces. coordination of military forces. Modern military much policy and scholarly writing focuses on le- the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency operations require the close coordination of par- thal autonomous weapon systems — “killer ro- hosted a large-scale experiment where swarms of ticipating forces, shared intelligence to guide plan- bots” that can identify and engage targets without autonomous drones flew simulated combat mis- Allies, Partners, and the ning and mission execution, and weapon systems human intervention — AI is far more commonly sions against each other.34 Challenges of Artificial Intelligence capable of communicating with and operating employed in a range of more mundane military and The development of these systems should not alongside each other. The military of each alliance national security tasks.26 In some cases, AI is part come as a surprise. Military and political deci- Military operations today are commonly carried or coalition member state brings with it different of analytical processes, like the use of machine sion-makers seek to enhance the efficiency and ac- out by alliances or other multilateral coalitions — equipment, policies, and tactics, meaning that learning to classify targets in satellite imagery.27 In curacy of their state’s military and to reduce risk formal or informal arrangements between states.38 a state’s forces may not fully integrate with the other instances, it is part of the software used to and costs during operations. AI can help accom- Allies cooperate militarily and diplomatically to forces of its allies.42 Moreover, partners are often operate physical systems, like autonomous planes plish these objectives. In many contexts, AI can respond to mutual threats and achieve common reluctant to share sensitive operational and intel- or ships.28 In both cases, AI is not a military capa- make assessments and judgements with greater objectives, yielding both political and military ben- ligence information.43 Beyond these institutional bility in itself, but an enabler that can enhance the speed and accuracy than humans, and with less efits.39 Politically, multinational operations can im- issues, more commonplace matters — such as the efficiency of military tasks and systems.29 manpower. For example, AI can help quickly dig part legitimacy to military operations in the eyes different languages and military cultures of each Many regional and global military powers have through vast quantities of imagery and video data of both domestic and international audiences. Sup- member state — can hinder interoperability dur- already fielded AI-enabled military systems.30 Isra- to pinpoint objects of interest, like military vehi- port for military action from a broad coalition of ing contingency operations.44 allies and partners can serve as a cue to the public Second, alliance and coalition leaders may have

23 Javier Chagoya, “NPS, Academic Partners Take to the Skies in First-Ever UAV Swarm Dogfight,” Naval Postgraduate School, Feb. 22, 2017, that the action is justified, and help counter narra- trouble deciding what policies their coalition https://web.nps.edu/About/News/NPS-Academic-Partners-Take-to-the-Skies-in-First-Ever-UAV-Swarm-Dogfight.html; Riccardo Miotto et al., “Deep tives that a state’s military operations are improper should pursue. Although allies typically face a Patient: An Unsupervised Representation to Predict the Future of Patients from the Electronic Health Records,” Scientific Reports, no. 6 (2016), 40 https://doi.org/10.1038/srep26094. or seek to upset the status quo. From a military common threat and share many policy objectives, perspective, alliances and coalitions allow states each state still maintains its own priorities and 24 For a primer on these concepts, see, Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). to share the burden of operations.41 Unlike unilat- goals. State leaders therefore respond to domes- 25 For some of the latest research on artificial general intelligence, see, Patrick Hammer et al., eds., Proceedings of the 12th International Con- ference on Artificial General Intelligence (Shenzhen, China) (New York: Springer, 2019). eral operations, where a single state provides all tic constituencies and pursue their own national 26 M.L. Cummings, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare, Chatham House, January 2017, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/de- fault/files/publications/research/2017-01-26-artificial-intelligence-future-warfare-cummings-final.pdf. 27 “Deep Learning Model Speeds Up, Automates Satellite Image Analysis,” Lockheed Martin, June 5, 2019, https://news.lockheedmartin.com/ 35 Cheryl Pellerin, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone by Year’s End,” U.S. Department of Defense, July 21, 2017, news-releases?item=128745. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1254719/project-maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-war-zone-by-years-end/. 28 Megan Eckstein, “Sea Hunter Unmanned Ship Continues Autonomy Testing as NAVSEA Moves Forward with Draft RFP,” USNI News, April 29, 36 For studies that assess the time intensive nature of intelligence analysis, see, Dino A. Brugioni, Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA and Cold 2019, https://news.usni.org/2019/04/29/sea-hunter-unmanned-ship-continues-autonomy-testing-as-navsea-moves-forward-with-draft-rfp. War Aerial Espionage (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010); Hugh Gusterson, Drone: Remote Control Warfare (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2016), 59–82; Chris Woods, Sudden Justice: America’s Secret Drone Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 29 Horowitz, “The Promise and Peril of Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence.” 37 John Kaag and Sarah Kreps, Drone Warfare (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2014). 30 This paragraph focuses on the use of AI for conventional interstate military operations, but states are also using AI to bolster their internal security. Autocratic states have leveraged AI to monitor domestic populations and root out dissent. China, for example, is building a web of sur- 38 Walt, The Origins of Alliance, 12. veillance systems that employ automated facial recognition and other AI technology to track members of the public. See, Paul Mozur, “One Month, 39 Snyder, Alliance Politics, 7. 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using A.I. to Profile a Minority,” New York Times, April 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/technol- ogy/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html. 40 Jonathan A. Chu, “Essays on Liberal Norms, Public Opinion, and the Law of War,” PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 2018. Support from international organizations other than alliances can also serve as a cue. See, Erik Voeten, “The Political Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability 31 Sebastien Roblin, “Russia’s Uran-9 Robot Tank Went to War in Syria (It Didn’t Go Very Well),” National Interest, Jan. 6, 2019, https://na- to Legitimize the Use of Force,” International Organization 59, no. 3 (July 2005): 527–57, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050198. tionalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-uran-9-robot-tank-went-war-syria-it-didnt-go-very-well-40677; Judah Ari Gross, “Defense Ministry Unveils 3 Prototypes for Israel’s Tanks of the Future,” Times of Israel, Aug. 4, 2019, https://www.timesofisrael.com/defense-ministry-unveils-3-prototypes-for- 41 Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” Review of Economics and Statistics 48, no. 3 (August 1966): israels-tanks-of-the-future/. 266–79, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1927082; Andres J. Gannon, “How States Fight: Measuring Heterogeneity in the Distribution of State Military Capabilities” (Working Paper, 2019). 32 Colin Clark, “In 1st Interview, PDUSDI Bingen Talks Artificial Intelligence, Project Maven, Ethics,” Breaking Defense, Aug. 26, 2019, https:// breakingdefense.com/2019/08/in-1st-interview-pdusdi-bingen-talks-artificial-intelligence-project-maven-ethics/. 42 Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 1, 2019, I-3,https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/ pubs/jp3_16.pdf; Eric Larson et al., Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2000). 33 Kosuke Takahashi, “Japan to Outfit Kawasaki P-1 MPAs with AI Technology,” Jane’s 360, Nov. 13, 2019, https://www.janes.com/article/92545/ japan-to-outfit-kawasaki-p-1-mpas-with-ai-technology. 43 James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), chap. 1. 34 Chagoya, “NPS, Academic Partners Take to the Skies in First-Ever UAV Swarm Dogfight.” 44 Roger H. Palin, Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

60 61 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

interests, which, at times, may be at odds with help strengthen ties and coordination between United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States to computers. One recent cross-national survey, alliance goals.45 At best, these divergent interests allies. The analysis in this article applies across receive high marks for AI readiness, while other al- for instance, finds significant public disapproval of result in coordination problems that draw out de- the continuum of formalization, but the challeng- lies like Spain, Turkey, and Montenegro fall lower the use of lethal autonomous weapons among key cision-making timelines.46 At worst, they generate es that AI poses to alliance operations and deci- on the readiness scale.52 This unequal distribution U.S. allies. To be sure, autonomous weapons and mistrust between partners and raise concerns of sion-making should be more vexing for coalitions of AI technology can result from differences in the AI are distinct, but AI is incorporated into the soft- being abandoned during a crisis or “chain-ganged” that lack formalization. For clarity throughout the organizational, financial, and human capital avail- ware architecture of most autonomous systems, into unwanted wars.47 remainder of the article, I use the term alliances able to develop and deploy new technologies and and pundits and the public often conflate the two.57 to describe security partnerships across the spec- differences in political support for the use of AI.53 In South Korea and Germany, 74 and 72 percent trum of formalization. Uneven distribution of AI technologies has impor- of the local populations, respectively, oppose their tant implications for the ability of allies and part- use (compared to 52 percent opposition among the AI Obstacles to Alliance Operations ners to divide military tasks during crises. U.S. public).58 These two countries are close U.S. Variation in the capacity to adopt and integrate allies that host dozens of U.S. military installations At the operational level, AI can complicate bur- AI technology into state militaries can create AI and over 60,000 American troops.59 den-sharing and the interoperability of alliance “haves” and “have-nots.” Some states — like Ger- Tepid public support at home and abroad can military forces. The development and integration many — possess a robust technology sector, have stymie alliance military operations in two ways. of AI technology in the security domain poses the financial resources to fund research and acqui- First, public opposition to the use of AI among al- three challenges to coordination during alliance sitions, and maintain defense bureaucracies that lied populations may lead policymakers to restrict military operations. First, not all states will de- are sufficiently skilled and flexible to integrate new the use of AI-enabled technologies for military op- velop military applications of AI at the same rate. AI technologies.54 Indeed, many of these states erations. In the event of future hostilities, for ex- Within an alliance, some states will possess and have created government institutions to manage ample, the South Korean or German governments effectively operate AI-enabled capabilities, while military AI development. The United States, for ex- might oppose an ally’s use of AI-enabled lethal others will not. This unequal distribution of tech- ample, established the Joint Artificial Intelligence weapon systems on their territory.60 Indeed, advo- While alliances and coalitions are comprised nology can hinder burden-sharing and interop- Center in 2018 to coordinate the Defense Depart- cacy from the public and activist groups has led a of member states with shared interests, there is erability. Second, allies will need to resolve the ment’s AI programs.55 Other states lack these re- growing number of states — including U.S. allies significant variation in the degree of formalization political and technical challenges associated with sources and are unable to rigorously pursue new like Pakistan and Jordan — to call for bans on the of security partnerships that can affect how they developing interoperable AI-enabled systems and AI capabilities. For instance, many of NATO’s eco- use of lethal autonomous weapon systems.61 plan and execute military operations. On the for- sharing the data that underpins AI technology. nomically weaker members have focused their de- Second, civilian engineers and researchers that mal end of the continuum are alliances like NATO Data are often difficult to share and states are fense spending on modernizing conventional forc- develop AI technology may refuse to work on mil- that are governed by treaties. These formal trea- often loath to share sensitive information. Third, es and updating Cold War-era hardware, and not itary AI contracts. Disruptions to AI development ties invoke obligations and a sense of trust not adversaries are likely to use AI to disrupt allied on AI development.56 can hinder the fielding of new capabilities and gen- typically found in less formalized, tacit arrange- military operations. Even if a state has the resources to develop AI erate mistrust between the government and civil- ments.48 On the less formal end of the spectrum capabilities, limited public support for AI-enabled ian firms. Google employees, for instance, protest- are coalitions, security arrangements that are Complicating Burden-Sharing: Artificial Intelligence military systems can hamper such efforts. Oppo- ed their involvement in Project Maven, a Defense generally more ad hoc and focused on achieving a Haves and Have-Nots sition can stem from the uncertainty surrounding Department program that uses AI to analyze video specific and narrow goal.49 For example, George W. AI’s functionality, or from moral and ethical objec- collected by military drones.62 In a letter to their Bush’s “coalition of the willing” brought together Despite the surge in international attention on tions to delegating decisions on the use of force CEO, the employees argued that “Google should more than three dozen countries during the 2003 AI, not all states have developed robust AI capa- Iraq War.50 Because of their more limited goals, bilities, particularly for military applications. One 52 Government Artificial Intelligence Readiness Index 2019, 32–37. coalitions are often temporary entities that exist recent study finds significant variation in the ca- only until their mission is accomplished, and fre- pacity of states to “exploit the innovative potential 53 Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, chap. 2. 51 54 For research on the factors that can lead to variation in military innovation and technological adoption, see, Rosen, Winning the Next War; quently lack the institutional arrangements that of AI” for government purposes. States like the Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010); and Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power. 55 Terri Moon Cronk, “DOD Unveils Its Artificial Intelligence Strategy,” U.S. Department of Defense, Feb. 12, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/ 45 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 1979), 163-170; Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Explore/News/Article/Article/1755942/dod-unveils-its-artificial-intelligence-strategy/. Politics”; John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/1995): 11, https://www. jstor.org/stable/2539078. 56 Albania, for instance, has focused on replacing Cold War-era equipment. “Modernization of the Armed Forces,” Republic of Albania Ministry of Defense, Oct. 12, 2019, http://www.mod.gov.al/eng/index.php/security-policies/others-from-mod/modernization/68-moderniza- 46 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 32; For an assessment of the various factors that can shape decision-making tion-of-the-armed-forces. timelines in international organizations, see, Heidi Hardt, Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 57 “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense,” Defense Innovation Board, Oct. 31, 2019, 5, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF. 47 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks”; Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”; Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War.” Some scholars argue that the risks of entangling alliances are overstated: Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances.” 58 “Six in Ten (61%) Respondents Across 26 Countries Oppose the Use of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems,” Ipsos, Jan. 21, 2019, https:// www.ipsos.com/en-us/news-polls/human-rights-watch-six-in-ten-oppose-autonomous-weapons. 48 Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down? 59 “Number of Military and DoD Appropriated Fund Civilian Personnel Permanently Assigned by Duty Location and Service/Component (as of 49 Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations, I-3. This type of relationship is sometimes referred to as an “alignment.” Roger Dingman, Sept. 30, 2019),” Defense Manpower Data Center, Nov. 8, 2019, https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/dwp_reports.jsp. “Theories of, and Approaches to, Alliance Politics,” in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 245–66. 60 Recent research suggests public opposition to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems decreases when rivals acquire similar systems. See, Horowitz, “Public Opinion and the Politics of the Killer Robots Debate.” 50 Ewen MacAskill, “US Claims 45 Nations in ‘Coalition of Willing,’” The Guardian, March 18, 2003, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/ mar/19/iraq.usa. 61 “Country Views on Killer Robots,” Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Aug. 21, 2019, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/up- loads/2019/08/KRC_CountryViews21Aug2019.pdf. 51 Government Artificial Intelligence Readiness Index 2019, Government of Canada and Oxford Insights, 2019, 5, https://ai4d.ai/wp-content/ uploads/2019/05/ai-gov-readiness-report_v08.pdf. 62 Pellerin, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone by Year’s End.”

62 63 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

not be in the business of war,” explaining that entiate missile sites from other facilities by studying promise ongoing operations or strain political re- an alliance, the same type of data might reside the company should not “outsource the moral re- images of known missile sites. The more data used lationships. During the Vietnam War, for example, on hundreds of different networks and in differ- sponsibility of [its] technologies to third parties,” to train these systems, the more accurate the sys- the United States was hesitant to share intelligence ent formats, making it difficult to share data or to and that work on Defense Department-backed AI tem will be.66 Once fielded, AI-enabled systems like with its ally South Vietnam. Officials feared that develop interoperable systems. To use data from would “irreparably damage Google’s brand.”63 The the image classifier must continue to be fed imagery communist sympathizers in the ranks of South other alliance partners, data must first be located, resistance ultimately led Google to terminate its from reconnaissance aircraft, satellites, or other as- Vietnam’s military and intelligence services would transferred out of a state’s classified computer net- involvement in the contract and generated public sets in a format that allows for target identification. pass information to North Vietnam and the Viet- work, and reformatted into a standardized, usable criticism of the Defense Department’s AI efforts.64 Shared data might be needed to enhance the accu- cong. They were also concerned that intelligence form. Given that the U.S. military has faced signif- The existence of “AI haves” and “AI have-nots” racy of AI-enabled systems or to increase the effec- might highlight that the United States was plan- icant data management challenges in its own AI within an alliance can complicate burden-sharing — tiveness of multinational operations. For example, ning operations that did not align with South Vi- development, we should expect alliances — with a central tenet of military alliances. On one hand, some member states may be better positioned than etnam’s government priorities.71 States also worry their greater number of institutional actors and states with robust AI capabilities can specialize their others to gather data on a shared rival, increasing that shared information could be used for purpos- data sources — to encounter even greater obsta- contributions to alliance operations and focus on the amount of data available to AI systems.67 es other than initially intended or in ways that are cles to data sharing. providing AI-related capabilities. If, however, AI ap- Because of its central role in AI development and at odds with the sharing state’s interests. Turkey, plications become a necessity for warfighting in the operations, the U.S. military has described data as a for instance, may have used intelligence shared as Vulnerabilities: AI and Data future, states that lack AI capabilities may be less “strategic asset,” yet sharing data — even within the part of counter-Islamic State operations to instead able to contribute to alliance operations. States bet- U.S. military — has posed a significant challenge.68 target Kurdish forces in northern Syria.72 In addition to barriers to sharing, allies face the ter equipped with AI capabilities may subsequently Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, founding director of the To minimize these perceived risks, states often possibility that the data that they do share may be be forced to take on a greater share of work, gen- Department of Defense’s Joint Artificial Intelligence impose restrictions on information sharing. One especially vulnerable to adversary manipulation. erating both political and operational challenges. Center, lamented that data “has stymied most of the of the most common control measures is sharing Engineers and military leaders worry that rivals Politically, “AI haves” may complain that “AI have- [military] services when they dive into AI.” Specif- only finished intelligence — products such as brief- could hack into data repositories and “poison” nots” are not adequately contributing to a mission, ically, “they realize how hard it is to get the right ings or reports derived from a variety of different data — inserting fake data or making existing data straining relations between allies. Operationally, ca- data to the right place, get it cleaned up, and train intelligence sources.73 These products provide as- deliberately flawed.75 In one recent academic study, pability gaps can hamper an alliance’s ability to de- algorithms on it.”69 There are two primary factors sessments, but generally omit technical data — like researchers used data poisoning to cause an algo- ploy forces or achieve military objectives. During the that underlie these challenges. First, data resides in details about the information source — that could rithm designed to identify street signs to misclassi- NATO-led air war over Kosovo in 1999, for instance, thousands of different repositories and often lacks reveal intelligence-gathering procedures and meth- fy stop signs as speed limit signs.76 In the military many NATO members possessed limited numbers standardized formatting. Video from the U.S. mili- ods. Although data sharing is a type of intelligence domain, a rival could poison imagery data in order of precision-guided munitions in their arsenals and tary’s fleet of reconnaissance aircraft, for instance, sharing, developing and operating AI-enabled sys- to throw off AI target recognition systems, leading often lacked the training to employ them, curtailing is stored on multiple separate networks and in dif- tems may require the exchange of more complete the system to miss military targets, classify them their ability to contribute to operations.65 As a re- ferent data formats. Second, significant amounts of raw data in far larger quantities than traditional in- as nonmilitary ones, or identify civilian infrastruc- sult, responsibility for carrying out the air campaign data collected by weapons and sensor systems are telligence sharing. Raw data, which includes image- ture as military facilities. At best, this could require fell to a small number of allies. In a larger conflict, considered proprietary by the contractors that de- ry files and signals intercepts, can include metadata manpower-intensive efforts to secure and sanitize burden-sharing might be critical to sustaining oper- sign and maintain the equipment. Firms must first such as spectral signatures of imagery or charac- data or lead states to turn back to manual analysis ations or securing battlefield victories. release or “unlock” this data before it can be analyz- teristics of electronic emissions that can be used to of targets. At worst, this could lead to the inadvert- ed or fed into other systems.70 feed AI systems.74 Since this information can expose ent targeting of noncombatants. Data Sharing and Standardization Although shared data is needed to develop AI precise capabilities and shortcomings of a state’s in- While the risk of data poisoning plagues all AI technologies that can integrate with allied equip- telligence systems, decision-makers may be hesitant users, alliance military operations may be particu- As the number of states that employ military ment, states face both political and technical bar- to share it — especially in the large quantities need- larly susceptible because data inputs from multi- AI applications grows, the ability of allies to oper- riers to sharing security sector information. From ed to develop and run many AI-enabled systems. ple states are used to train and operate AI-enabled ate collectively will depend, in part, on the sharing a political standpoint, even the closest allies may There are also technical obstacles to data shar- systems across the alliance. Flawed data inputs of data that fuels AI systems. AI requires massive be hesitant to share the sensitive data that under- ing. Just as the U.S. intelligence community and from one state can therefore have cascading ef- amounts of data to train and feed algorithms and girds military AI systems. States fear that sharing military stores information in nonstandardized fects across an alliance’s operations. Rivals will models. To identify a surface-to-air missile site, for sensitive data might reveal intelligence sources formats on multiple systems, so too do national recognize that different members of an alliance de- instance, an AI image classifier must learn to differ- and methods, the revelation of which could com- security institutions in other allied states. Across fend their networks and data with different levels

63 “Letter from Google Employees to Alphabet CEO Regarding Project Maven,” April 2018, https://static01.nyt.com/files/2018/technology/ googleletter.pdf. 64 Daisuke Wakabayashi and Scott Shane, “Google Will Not Renew Pentagon Contract That Upset Employees,” New York Times, June 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html. 71 Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 59–78. 65 Larson et al., Interoperability, 18. 72 Ben Hubbard and Carlotta Gall, “Turkey Launches Offensive Against U.S.-Backed Syrian Militia,” New York Times, Oct. 9, 2019, https://www. 66 This assumes that training data is accurate. nytimes.com/2019/10/09/world/middleeast/turkey-attacks-syria.html. 67 Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 7–8. 73 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Thousand Oaks, CA: CQ Press, 2012), 74–75. 68 The United States Air Force Artificial Intelligence Annex to the Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy, United States Air 74 D. L. Young, “Motion Imagery Metadata Standards Assist in Object and Activity Classification,” in 2010 IEEE 39th Applied Imagery Pattern Force, 2019, https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/5/USAF-AI-Annex-to-DoD-AI-Strategy.pdf. Recognition Workshop (AIPR), 2010, 1–4. 69 Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Pentagon’s AI Problem Is ‘Dirty’ Data: Lt. Gen. Shanahan,” Breaking Defense, Nov. 13, 2019, https://breakingdefense. 75 David J. Miller, Zhen Xiang, and George Kesidis, “Adversarial Learning in Statistical Classification: A Comprehensive Review of Defenses com/2019/11/exclusive-pentagons-ai-problem-is-dirty-data-lt-gen-shanahan/. Against Attacks,” ArVix, Dec. 2, 2019, 3–4, https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.06292. 70 Freedberg, “Pentagon’s AI Problem Is ‘Dirty’ Data.” 76 Tianyu Gu et al., “BadNets: Evaluating Backdooring Attacks on Deep Neural Networks,” IEEE Access, no. 7 (2019): 47230–44.

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of safeguards. As a result, rivals may target data nology advances, rivals may be better able to use stored by states where they have easier access.77 AI to carry out deception campaigns. Adversaries can also use AI to launch deception Deepfakes could be used in a variety of ways. An campaigns designed to interfere with alliance mil- adversary might create deepfakes of senior alliance itary command and control. Militaries have long commanders to issue incorrect or contradictory tried to deceive their adversaries during wartime orders to troops in the field, or use AI to produce and crises. During World War II, for instance, allied fake intelligence reports.81 A rival might use video forces used a complex ruse involving imaginary ar- or audio recordings of an actual commander ob- mies equipped with inflatable tank and plane de- tained from public media reports or intercepted coys to deceive Nazi planners about the location communications to generate deepfake commands. of the D-Day landings.78 While states and other Or, they could use generative adversarial networks actors have a range of tools with which to carry to create fake satellite intelligence imagery that out deception operations, AI allows them to launch misrepresents the ground truth.82 Once transmit- deception campaigns using digital decoys and mis- ted via video teleconference, phone, email, or ra- information rather than physical ones. dio, these false commands and intelligence reports One AI tool actors can use to complicate alli- could cause troops to redeploy in a way that aids ance operations are deepfakes, manipulated videos the rival or simply generates confusion. Nefarious and audio that realistically mimic the behaviors or actors have already successfully employed these speech of an actual person. In 2018, for instance, types of ruses. In 2019, for example, criminals used the digital media outlet Buzzfeed produced a film AI to clone the voice of a British energy firm exec- in which a deepfake of former President Barack utive and directed a company employee to transfer Obama appeared to utter obscenities and criticize hundreds of thousands of dollars into a bank ac- In the military domain, a rival Trump.79 Deepfake creation relies on deep-learning count controlled by the criminals.83 The software algorithms that learn by observing photos, audio, needed to carry out these efforts is easily available, could poison imagery data in order and video of an individual to produce lifelike rep- demands little data for training, and increasingly resentations that can be programmed to say or do requires minimal computer programming knowl- to throw off AI target recognition things that the actual person never did. Although edge. Indeed, some voice cloning programs are early deepfakes were easily detectable to the naked available for free or at a low cost on the internet.84 systems, leading the system to miss eye, techniques such as generative adversarial net- Alliance military forces may be particularly vul- works have enhanced the quality and believability nerable to AI-enabled misinformation and decep- of deepfakes. This technique features two compet- tion because multinational command-and-control military targets, classify them as ing neural networks: a generator and a discrimi- processes involve coordination across multiple nator. The generator produces an initial deepfake, states.85 Personnel may have limited previous ex- nonmilitary ones, or identify civilian while the discriminator compares the AI-generated perience working with international partners, and “fake” with genuine images from a training data as a result, be unfamiliar with their ally’s operating infrastructure as military facilities. set. The generator then updates the fakes until the protocols and less adept at working within a multi- discriminator can no longer distinguish the AI-gen- national chain of command. Adversaries can exploit erated image from the actual images.80 As AI tech- this unfamiliarity with coalition operations to inject

77 Rivals often seek less secured sources of classified data. For instance, Chinese hackers routinely targeted U.S. defense contractors, which were perceived as less secure, in addition to military networks. See, Gordon Lubold and Dustin Volz, “Chinese Hackers Breach U.S. Navy Con- tractors,” Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-navy-is-struggling-to-fend-off-chinese-hackers-officials- say-11544783401. 78 Joshua Levine, Operation Fortitude: The Story of the Spies and the Spy Operation That Saved D-Day (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2011). 79 David Mack, “This PSA About Fake News from Barack Obama Is Not What It Appears,” BuzzFeed News, April 17, 2018, https://www.buzz- feednews.com/article/davidmack/obama-fake-news-jordan-peele-psa-video-buzzfeed. 80 Martin Giles, “The GANfather: The Man Who’s Given Machines the Gift of Imagination,” MIT Technology Review, Feb. 21, 2018, https://www. technologyreview.com/s/610253/the-ganfather-the-man-whos-given-machines-the-gift-of-imagination/. 81 The U.S. government considers “The transmission of false or misleading radio or telephone message [of] false orders purporting to have been issued by the enemy command” to be a legitimate ruse to degrade adversary operations. See, Field Manual 3-13.4: Army Support to Military Decep- tion, U.S. Army, 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1006341, 2-18. 82 In recent years, China has made significant advances in this type of AI application. See, Patrick Tucker, “The Newest AI-Enabled Weapon: ‘Deep-Faking’ Photos of the Earth,” Defense One, March 31, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/03/next-phase-ai-deep-faking- whole-world-and-china-ahead/155944/. 83 Drew Harwell, “An Artificial-Intelligence First: Voice-Mimicking Software Reportedly Used in a Major Theft,” Washington Post, Sept. 4, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/09/04/an-artificial-intelligence-first-voice-mimicking-software-reportedly-used-major-theft/. 84 Software like Lyrebird AI can create a digital voice using just a small audio sample. 85 Joint Publication 3-16: Multinational Operations, chap. II.

66 67 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

AI-generated false commands. The time pressure, tems when making decisions on the use of force. paring to deploy strategic forces — like ballistic for military decision-making.95 A publication from stressors, and complexity of military operations Third, adversaries may use AI-enabled disinfor- missile submarines or mobile missile launchers the Central Military Commission Joint Operations increase the likelihood that lower-level command- mation campaigns to degrade trust between allies — from its garrisons during a crisis. In such a Command Center, for example, described how ers will carry out these deepfake commands. These and heighten fears that member states will renege case, senior policymakers from various alliance the use of AI to play the complex board game Go challenges will become more vexing as the quality of on their alliance commitments. member states might hold differing opinions on “demonstrated the enormous potential of artificial deepfakes increases and deciphering real from tam- how best to respond, but would have little time to intelligence in combat command, program deduc- pered content becomes more difficult. Compressed Decision-Making Timelines debate their options before the adversary’s forces tion, and decisionmaking.”96 These systems could are dispersed and more difficult to locate.91 Com- be employed against the United States and its allies Obstacles to Alliance Decision-Making The proliferation of AI-enabled technologies manders at the operational and tactical levels of in the Indo-Pacific region, forcing allied command- among both friends and rivals will compress the alliance operations will face similar challenges as ers to respond more quickly to these threats. In addition to creating obstacles to the conduct time policymakers and military commanders AI-enabled systems more rapidly provide battle- of multinational military operations, AI can also have to deliberate over political and military de- field intelligence about rival forces. As a result, Uncertainty Surrounding AI Technology strain the ability of alliance leaders to make de- cisions. In the hands of allies, AI-assisted intelli- commanders may be forced to quickly decide cisions during a crisis. Alliance decision-making gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance or com- whether to strike a fleeting target detected by an AI can also strain alliance decision-making by is often characterized as a contentious process mand-and-control systems may identify adversary AI-enabled system. To be sure, decision-makers fueling uncertainty about information and mil- in which policymakers from states with different military maneuvers faster than non-AI systems. in unilateral operations will confront these same itary actions. Unlike human analysts or military national interests, military capabilities, and risk Once presented with this information, alliance de- issues, but settling on the best course of action is personnel who can be asked to explain and justify tolerances coordinate their preferences.86 Policy- cision-makers may need to quickly decide how to more complex in settings where multiple actors their findings or decisions, AI generally operates makers seek to advance their state’s own inter- respond — particularly if adversary forces pose an have a say in the decision-making process.92 in a “black box.”97 The neural networks that un- ests during deliberations, frequently leading to immediate threat or must be targeted within a nar- An adversary’s use of AI-enabled systems can derpin many cutting-edge AI systems are opaque negotiated policy compromises. NATO allies, for row window of opportunity. also compress timelines and complicate alliance and offer little insight into how they arrive at their instance, routinely have policy disagreements — The U.S. military has already started to devel- decision-making. Just as AI can boost the tempo conclusions.98 These networks rely on deep learn- take, for instance, clashes over the response to op this type of capability. As part of a series of of allied operations, it can increase the frequency ing, a process that passes information from large Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 exercises, the Defense Department demonstrated and speed of a rival’s military actions. AI-enabled data sets through a hierarchy of digital nodes that and over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.87 Alliances a command-and-control network that uses AI to autonomous weapon systems that allow states to analyze data inputs and make predictions using and coalitions are also fraught with commitment automatically detect enemy activity and pass tar- launch military operations without putting person- mathematical rules. As data flows through the problems, where states fear that allies will back geting information between multiple intelligence nel in harm’s way may lead rival leaders to launch neural network, the net makes internal adjust- out of agreements or drag them into unwanted and military assets. During one of these exercises, operations that they might not otherwise carry ments to refine the quality of outputs. Research- conflicts.88 Divergent national positions and fears a space asset detected a simulated enemy ship, but out.93 China, for instance, has developed and ex- ers are often unable to explain how neural nets of abandonment can lead decision-making con- was unable to identify it. The network automatical- ported autonomous drones capable of identifying make these internal adjustments. Because of this sultations between states to be drawn out, and, if ly cued an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- targets and carrying out lethal strikes with little or lack of “explainability,” users of AI systems may conducted in the midst of a crisis, leave alliances sance platform to collect additional information on no human oversight.94 Further, a rival’s integration have difficulty understanding failures and cor- unable to respond decisively to threats.89 the adversary vessel, which it then sent to a com- of AI into its command-and-control networks may recting errors.99 AI can complicate the coordination required mand-and-control asset. The command-and-con- speed its decision-making process. Indeed, China’s Policymakers have called for the development for alliance decision-making and the subsequent trol platform used AI to select the best platform military has expressed an interest in leveraging AI of more transparent AI systems, and researchers ability to command and control multinational available to strike the enemy ship and passed tar- forces in three key ways. First, AI technologies geting data to the nearby U.S. naval destroyer that promise to accelerate the speed of military op- would engage the adversary vessel. AI significantly erations, reducing the amount of time available shortened the targeting process relative to efforts for deliberations between states. Second, there without AI technology. When describing the AI-en- 91 For divergent viewpoints on the challenge of finding mobile targets see, Michael S. Gerson, “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy,” International Security 35, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 26–27, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00018; Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, are varying levels of uncertainty surrounding the abled network in November 2019, U.S. Air Force “Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy,” Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1–2 (2015): 38–73, reliability and effectiveness of AI technologies. If Chief of Staff Gen. David Goldfein announced, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.958150. 90 decision-makers from different states hold differ- “This is no longer PowerPoint. It’s real.” 92 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 53–65. ent degrees of trust in the ability of AI systems to At the strategic level, this type of AI-enabled 93 Scholars have argued that technologies that reduce risk to friendly forces create a moral hazard where leaders deploy military forces on provide accurate information or take appropriate command-and-control system could present deci- missions where they would otherwise not use force. See, Kaag and Kreps, Drone Warfare. actions, they may be hesitant to use these sys- sion-makers with intelligence that a rival is pre- 94 Patrick Tucker, “SecDef: China Is Exporting Killer Robots to the Mideast,” Defense One, Nov. 5, 2019, https://www.defenseone.com/technolo- gy/2019/11/secdef-china-exporting-killer-robots-mideast/161100/. 95 Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation in the AI Revolution,” The RUSI Journal 164, no. 5–6 (2019): 26–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071 86 Michelle L. Pryor et al., “The Multinational Interoperability Council: Enhancing Coalition Operations,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 82 (July 2016), 847.2019.1693803. http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/793350/the-multinational-interoperability-council-enhancing-coalition-operations/. 96 Gregory C. Allen, “Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” 87 Philip Zelikow and Ernest R. May, Suez Deconstructed: An Interactive Study in Crisis, War, and Peacemaking (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Center for a New American Security, Feb. 2019, 6. Institution Press, 2018); Steven R. Weisman, “Threats and Responses: The Alliance; Fallout from Iraq Rift: NATO May Feel a Strain,” New York Times, 97 Ariel Bleicher, “Demystifying the Black Box that Is AI,” Scientific American, Aug. 9, 2017, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/demysti- Feb. 11, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/11/world/threats-and-responses-the-alliance-fallout-from-iraq-rift-nato-may-feel-a-strain.html. fying-the-black-box-that-is-ai/. 88 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” 98 Paul Scharre, Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk, Center for New American Security, February 2016, 14–17, https://s3.amazonaws. 89 Paul B. Stares, Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 1991), 8–9. com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf?mtime=20160906080515; Paul Scharre, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2019), 29–32. 90 Valerie Insinna, “US Air Force Chief Calls on Gulf Nations to Resolve Political Tensions, Focus on Iran Threat,” Defense News, Nov. 16, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2019/11/16/us-air-force-chief-calls-on-gulf-nations-to-resolve-political-ten- 99 David Gunning, “Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI),” Presentation at Proposers Day, DARPA, Aug. 11, 2016, https://www.darpa.mil/attach- sions-focus-on-iran-threat/. ments/XAIIndustryDay_Final.pptx.

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are working to develop explainable AI tools that AI-enabled systems — like autonomous aircraft or peer inside the AI black box.100 Yet, many deci- ships — in the same way as actions carried out sion-makers remain uncomfortable with the un- by traditionally manned assets. Existing doctrine certainty surrounding AI-enabled systems. The and law are generally silent on these issues, pro- commander of the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat viding no guidance on the appropriate response. Command, for instance, publicly explained that States have drafted domestic policies to govern he was not yet willing to rely on AI programs to their own use of autonomous weapon systems, analyze the full-motion video collected by recon- but these regulations and international law make naissance drones. He argued that although sys- no distinction between how states should react to tems are improving, they are still unable to con- a rival’s AI-enabled military actions versus “tra- sistently provide accurate analysis.101 So long as ditional” military actions.103 Yet, decision-makers the decisions and analysis of AI systems remain may believe that a rival’s use of AI technologies opaque, military commanders may be reluctant demands different responses than those involv- to trust AI-enabled systems. And if used, AI may ing manned platforms.104 What happens if a rival contribute to the fog of war, rather than reduce it, claims that an attack carried out by an AI-ena- making it difficult to make decisions using infor- bled system was the result of a flawed algorithm? mation delivered by AI technologies. Should air defense forces respond differently to The operational implications associated with an adversary’s autonomous drones that penetrate uncertainty and lack of trust in AI would likely friendly airspace than to a manned aircraft that be exacerbated in multinational alliance contexts. does the same? Decision-makers may find them- There is significant cross-national variation in selves with little time to consider these compli- trust in AI technologies, even among close allies. cated issues, particularly as AI technology accel- One 2018 survey, for instance, found that just 13 erates the speed of a rival’s military operations. percent of respondents in Japan and 17 percent of respondents in South Korea trust artificial in- Adversary Manipulation and Interference telligence, compared to 25 percent of respondents in the United States. Similar disparities exist be- Even if states were to trust their own AI tech- tween the United States and many of its NATO nologies, rivals and malicious actors can use AI allies. In Spain, 34 percent of respondents trust to sow discord that can hamper decision-making. publicly questioned the value of defending certain The Way Forward artificial intelligence, compared to 21 percent in Trust and close relationships are crucial when NATO member states.107 An adversary could use Canada, 40 percent in Poland, and 43 percent in multiple states coordinate security-related deci- AI to drive misinformation campaigns that latch Although the proliferation of military AI tech- Turkey.102 Given this variation, policymakers and sions since policymakers must be confident that onto these concerns in an effort to strain ties or nology has the potential to frustrate alliance commanders from some states may be more re- allies will not renege on commitments. Leaders deepen cleavages between allies. military operations and decision-making, these luctant to use AI-enabled systems or trust the have long held fears of being abandoned by al- Just as adversaries can use deepfakes to in- obstacles are not insurmountable. Allies have pre- information they deliver than leaders from other lies or of being drawn into unwanted conflicts.105 terfere with operational-level coordination, they viously worked together on missions that involved states during multinational operations. These fears are magnified when leaders suggest can also use AI technologies to breed confusion new technology, shared highly sensitive informa- Allied decision-makers will also face uncertain- they might not follow through with their alliance and mistrust that hamper strategic decision-mak- tion, and learned to cope with compressed deci- ty when confronting a rival’s use of AI-enabled commitments or engage in provocative actions.106 ing. Actors seeking to disrupt alliance cohesion sion-making timelines. Drawing lessons from his- technologies. Leaders will be forced to wrestle Trump, for instance, raised questions about might create deepfakes depicting leaders of alli- torical exemplar cases where allies have wrestled with whether to respond to actions carried out by Washington’s commitment to its allies when he ance member states questioning the value of an with new technology, coupled with guidance from alliance, criticizing other leaders, or threatening emerging national AI policies and analysis of new 100 DARPA, for instance, has launched a program to develop AI that allows for greater transparency and interpretability. Gunning, “Explainable Ar- to take actions that could draw an alliance into technologies, I identify ways that alliances can tificial Intelligence (XAI)”; “AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense (Washington, D.C.: an unwanted conflict. These falsified videos or re- overcome the pitfalls of AI integration in an envi- Defense Innovation Board, 2019),” 9, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Oct/31/2002204458/-1/-1/0/DIB_AI_PRINCIPLES_PRIMARY_DOCUMENT.PDF. cordings could boost uncertainty of an ally’s com- ronment in which AI is increasingly common. 101 Clark, “Air Combat Commander Doesn’t Trust Project Maven’s Artificial Intelligence — Yet.” mitments or induce panic over fears of abandon- 102 “Entrepreneurialism: The Emergence of Social Entrepreneurialism to Compete with Business Entrepreneurialism,” Ipsos Global Affairs, No- vember 2018, 40, https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2018-10/entrepreneurialism-2018-global-report.pdf. Respon- ment during a crisis. The decision-making process Increasing AI Interoperability dents were asked whether they “agree,” are “neutral”, or “disagree” with the statement, “I trust artificial intelligence.” may be slowed as policymakers try to understand and Data Sharing 103 “Department of Defense Directive 3000.09: Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Department of Defense, Nov. 21, 2012, https://www.hsdl. their allies’ true intentions and preferences, or org/?view&did=726163. convince domestic publics that an ally’s “state- To ensure alliances and coalitions are able to 104 Trump, for instance, argued that the downing of an unmanned drone demanded a different response than the downing of a manned aircraft. ments” are in fact AI-produced misinformation. leverage AI technologies during their operations, See, Michael D. Shear et al., “Strikes on Iran Approved by Trump, then Abruptly Pulled Back,” New York Times, June 20, 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html; For a more generalized study on escalation in response to activity by and involving states will need to remove barriers to data shar- unmanned platforms, see, Erik Lin-Greenberg, “(War)Game of Drones: Remote Warfighting Technology and Escalation Control (Evidence from War- ing and access. One initial step to enabling this games),” SSRN Scholarly Paper, June 25, 2019, https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3288988. type of interoperability is to establish formal 105 Christensen and Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks.” One study shows that states fail to fulfill alliance commitments, on average, 50 percent of the time; Berkemeier and Fuhrmann, “Reassessing the Fulfillment of Alliance Commitments in War.” 106 Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. from NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia,” New York Times, 107 Eileen Sullivan, “Trump Questions the Core of NATO: Mutual Defense, Including Montenegro,” New York Times, July 18, 2018, https://www. Jan. 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html. nytimes.com/2018/07/18/world/europe/trump-nato-self-defense-montenegro.html.

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agreements that govern the development and use tercept equipment and decryption and translation input that remains secret, but provide an output are developed in harmony” to help allies “operate of AI-enabled technologies and associated data. processes.112 Specifically, the agreement called on that is public to all authorized users.115 Secure multi- effectively together while optimizing the use of re- These formal agreements will not only prescribe states to “make available to the other [states] con- party computation has been increasingly used in the sources.”119 procedures for collaboration, but help assuage tinuously, currently, and without request, all raw medical and financial sectors where analysts seek fears that allies will renege on commitments.108 traffic, [communications intelligence] end-product to assess trends but need to protect individual-lev- Streamlining Decision-Making Agreements that explicitly define the responsibili- and technical material acquired or produced.”113 el health and fiscal data to avoid violating privacy and Command and Control ties and expectations of member states help elim- Some existing intelligence sharing agreements regulations.116 This and other privacy preserving ap- inate vagaries that otherwise allow a state to back might allow for the exchange of the sensitive data proaches could be applied to a range of AI-enabled AI is not the first military development to reduce out of commitments with partners.109 needed to train and operate AI systems. When ex- alliance military tasks, such as the classification the amount of time alliance leaders have for cri- To integrate AI into alliance operations, policy- isting agreements are not in place or do not cover of objects in satellite and reconnaissance imagery. sis decision-making. Warsaw Pact military mod- makers will need to first establish how they will the types of data required for AI-enabled warfare, Member states might feed sensitive intelligence ernization in the 1970s, for instance, led NATO to jointly develop and employ AI capabilities. This policymakers will need to develop new bilateral or data into a secure multiparty computation-based reevaluate the amount of warning it would have in entails identifying the types of operations in which multilateral agreements that enable interoperabil- system managed by an alliance’s intelligence fusion advance of an invasion of Western Europe. Prior to allies are willing to use AI-enabled technologies. ity and data sharing. These agreements and the center, which would then return information about 1978, analysts estimated that the Soviets and their Some states may only be willing to employ AI mil- procedures used to implement them will likely vary potential targets, without revealing attributes about allies needed 30 days to prepare for an attack, giv- itary systems in limited areas and eschew using AI depending on the states involved and the degree each state’s intelligence inputs. ing alliance leaders a week to decide on response for certain tasks. The U.S.-Singapore agreement, and purpose of cooperation. In some cases, coop- To successfully integrate AI and share data, how- options. The expansion of Warsaw Pact offensive for example, stipulates that the two states will fo- eration may be narrowly scoped to limited data ever, partners will also need to establish technical military capabilities reduced the preparation time- cus their AI efforts on humanitarian assistance and sharing in support of a specific operation. In other standards to ensure data is stored and formatted line to 14 days, slashing the window for NATO de- disaster relief operations.110 More narrowly scoped cases, agreements may be far broader and cover in ways that make it easily accessible to and usa- liberation to just four days.120 To mitigate the risks agreements that focus on noncombat operations issues related to research and development, inter- ble by various alliance members. In design- may prove more palatable to policymakers and their operability, and extensive data sharing. ing these agreements, alliance policymakers domestic publics. These narrow agreements could Even when formalized agreements establish the might draw insights from existing state-level serve as useful first steps to collaboration, but still processes and institutions that enable AI coopera- AI guidelines and alliance standardization yield lessons and best practices applicable across tion between states, many leaders may remain hes- protocols. The U.S. National Institute for the full range of military operations. itant to share the sensitive data that underpins AI Standards and Technology, for example, Developing data-sharing policies and techni- development and operations. Information-sharing released its AI standards in February 2019. cal standards may be difficult given the sensitive arrangements are plagued by commitment prob- The guidance calls for defining data spec- nature of national security information and the lems as states can back out of their agreements to ifications that ensure AI technologies meet variation in technical standards across alliance exchange data if they fear that data will be leaked “critical objectives for functionality, inter- member states. Allies, however, have found ways or their capabilities and shortcomings will be re- operability, and trustworthiness.”117 In the to coordinate cooperation, even in sensitive areas. vealed.114 This might be particularly true in ad hoc alliance military context, this might mean The United States and its Five Eyes partners — coalitions or larger alliances, where relationships ensuring that data associated with geospa- the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New between member states may be weaker. Recent tial or signals intelligence are formatted and Zealand — have long maintained agreements that technological advances, however, may help over- labeled in a common manner and stored on govern intelligence collaboration. The 1946 United come these commitment problems by convincing shared alliance networks. Or, it could mean Kingdom-United States Agreement, for example, member states that their data will remain secure establishing alliance-wide protocols for data securi- of protracted decision-making timelines, NATO established formal rules for sharing signals intel- even when shared. ty and integrity to minimize the risks of data poison- took several steps to improve its ability to rapidly ligence — intercepted electronic emissions and In particular, developments in the field of cryp- ing. These specifications could be codified in formal react. Specifically, senior NATO military command- communications.111 The agreement spelled out how tology allow states to share data with partners for arrangements like NATO’s standardization agree- ers were given greater authority to order defensive the states would cooperate on the collection, analy- use in AI systems, while hiding the exact content ments, which provide standards for thousands of measures in time-sensitive circumstances that pre- sis, and dissemination of signals intelligence, while of input data. Secure multiparty computation, for systems and processes ranging from aerial refueling cluded political authorization. The alliance also re- a technical appendix provided detailed technical example, is a privacy-preserving technique in which equipment to satellite imagery products.118 These vamped and streamlined communications systems and procedural guidance on communications in- AI algorithms perform their computations using an standards ensure “doctrine, tactics, and techniques and procedures that facilitated alliance consulta-

115 Andrew C. Yao, “Protocols for Secure Computations,” in SFCS: ‘82: Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, November 1982, 160–64. 116 Dan Bogdanov, Riivo Talviste, and Jan Willemson, “Deploying Secure Multi-Party Computation for Financial Data Analysis,” Working Paper, 108 Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” 2011, http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/662; Mbarek Marwan, Ali Kartit, and Hassan Ouahmane, “Applying Secure Multi-Party Computation to Improve Collaboration in Healthcare Cloud,” 2016 Third International Conference on Systems of Collaboration (SysCo), 2016, 1–6. 109 On the importance of explicit commitments, see, Snyder, Alliance Politics. 117 U.S. Leadership in AI: A Plan for Federal Engagement in Developing Technical Standards and Related Tools, National Institute of Standards 110 Parameswaran, “What’s in the New US-Singapore Artificial Intelligence Defense Partnership?” and Technology, Aug. 9, 2019, 8, https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2019/08/10/ai_standards_fedengagement_plan_9aug2019.pdf. 111 For a description of the agreement and a collection of declassified documents about the agreement, see, “Declassified Documents: UKUSA Agree- 118 “Standardization Agreement 3971: Air-to-Air Refuelling,” NATO Standardization Office, April 26, 2019; “Standardization Agreement 2586: ment Release 1940-1956,” National Security Agency, accessed Dec. 8, 2019, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/. NATO Geospatial Metadata Profile” NATO Standardization Office, Feb. 25, 2019). A complete list of standardization agreements is available at: 112 “British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement (Previously Classified Top Secret),” March 5, 1946, retrieved from the U.S. National Se- https://nso.nato.int/nso/nsdd/listpromulg.html. curity Administration, https://www.nsa.gov/Portals/70/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/ukusa/agreement_outline_5mar46.pdf. 119 Cihangir Aksit, “Smart Standarization: A Historical and Contemporary Success at NATO,” NATO Standardization Agency, May 2014, 1, 113 “British-U.S. Communication Intelligence Agreement (Previously Classified Top Secret),” appendix C. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_05/20140528_140528-smart-standardization.pdf. 114 Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, 9–11. 120 Stares, Command Performance, 9–10.

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tions and engaged in additional exercises focused AI-enabled deception campaigns. government institutions, and conduct counter-in- operations from the tactical through strategic lev- on military alerts and mobilizations.121 In addition to streamlining decision-making pro- surgency operations. The computer networks of els and help update alliance doctrine and policies More recently, NATO’s development of an al- cesses, it is crucial that alliance leaders find ways to each of these member states were initially isolated as AI technology evolves. Individual states have al- liance ballistic missile defense capability again mitigate the risks that AI-enabled misinformation and generally unable to communicate with those ready taken some of these steps. The U.S. Depart- raised the prospect that military commanders or deception campaigns pose to alliance solidarity of other states. As a result, there was no common ment of Defense activated its Joint AI Center in might be forced to make decisions on the use of and military command and control. The develop- operating picture for critical warfighting functions 2018 and, in 2019, the U.S. Air Force and the Massa- force — albeit in a defensive manner — without ment of strategic communication strategies helps such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- chusetts Institute of Technology launched a jointly time for political deliberations. In the event a rival counter misinformation, and technical and proce- sance or coordinating artillery strikes.128 These staffed organization to develop AI algorithms and were to fire missiles at Europe, intercept timelines dural updates can harden command-and-control insulated networks slowed decision-making and systems for military applications.131 would not allow for political consultation.122 To pre- processes against AI-enabled interference. NATO command and control and complicated battlefield Second, incorporating AI-enabled capabilities pare for the potentiality of defending Europe from has already taken steps in this direction, establish- coordination because information could not easi- into alliance planning exercises and wargames will missile attack, NATO considered pre-delegating ing a Strategic Communications Center of Excel- ly be transmitted up and down the chain of com- help prepare policymakers and commanders to launch authority to lower-level commanders.123 Un- lence that supports the development of best prac- mand. To allow the International Stabilization and better employ AI.132 Wargames, for instance, might der specific rules of engagement, NATO command- tices to minimize the effects of disinformation.125 Assistance Force to exchange information from the ask leaders to employ AI-enabled capabilities or ers would be authorized to make decisions on the Among the center’s priorities is boosting resilience headquarters to the tactical level, NATO planners respond to a rival’s use of AI-enabled weapons. targeting of inbound missiles without waiting for to misinformation campaigns by raising awareness drafted intelligence sharing agreements and built These events allow leaders to test and refine insti- approval from higher headquarters. These guide- about the ways that rivals might disseminate fake the Afghan Mission Network.129 tutional processes in a low-risk environment, while lines would ensure the alliance would be able to information.126 These efforts can be bolstered by To be sure, establishing a shared computer net- also socializing practitioners to the potential uses, defend itself even if there was insufficient time for leveraging technological advances like deepfake work is a far different task from developing interop- limitations, and risks of AI-enabled warfare. more senior commanders and policymakers to de- detection software that quickly identifies falsified erable, AI-enabled military capabilities. The Afghan bate policy choices. information.127 Alliances and coalitions could also Mission Network, however, demonstrates that a Just as pre-delegation of authorities to lower-lev- create agencies charged with detecting deepfakes combination of policy and technical fixes can help Conclusion el commanders helped NATO streamline crisis de- that threaten alliance cohesion or military oper- members of a large, multinational coalition remove cision-making in the past, it may also help alliance ations and then informing the public or military barriers to decision-making and operations and en- As additional funding and research drive increas- decision-makers respond to “machine speed” oper- units about these falsified videos, recordings, and able interoperability and the sharing of sensitive es in the effectiveness and reliability of AI, the mil- ations that leave insufficient time for deliberation.124 images. Creating these organizations, however, re- data. Indeed, the Afghan Mission Network was so itary use of AI technologies will likely expand. And Military commanders need guidelines for how to re- quires manpower and funding that allies may be successful that NATO used it as a foundation for as more states integrate AI into their armed forces, spond to an adversary’s AI-enabled actions and for unwilling to contribute. its Federated Mission Network, which helps en- the United States will find itself working with al- how to employ information provided by friendly AI sure connectivity and information sharing between lies to build and exercise AI capabilities that are systems. As states increasingly deploy autonomous A Path Forward for Alliance AI Integration NATO members outside the Afghan theater.130 interoperable and support alliance decision-mak- weapon systems that incorporate AI technologies, The institutional changes described above will ing processes. Failure to cooperate early and often military commanders also need to know whether In recent years, alliances have successfully relied take time to implement fully and requirements will on the development and use of AI may leave allies to react differently to a rival’s operations that are on a mix of formal agreements and technical meas- evolve as AI technology matures. There are sever- ill-prepared for operations in an era in which AI is carried out using traditional platforms than to those ures — like those described above — to streamline al steps policymakers can take to ensure alliances an increasingly common fixture in the arsenals of conducted using AI-enabled systems. More impor- interoperability and decision-making. For example, remain sufficiently flexible and postured to inte- both friends and foes.133 tantly, they need the authority to make these de- NATO established the Afghan Mission Network, a grate the latest advances in military AI technology. Alliances face two broad sets of challenges when cisions without real-time direction from superiors. computer system that enabled participants in the First, alliance member states can work to develop integrating AI into operations. First, AI complicates While pre-delegation may increase the ability of de- NATO-led International Stabilization and Assis- a corps of subject-matter experts with deep tech- alliance operations. The resource and data require- cision-makers to respond quickly, it has its down- tance Force to communicate and exchange battle- nical knowledge about AI and AI-enabled opera- ments needed to build and maintain AI systems sides. Junior commanders may inadvertently use field information. At its height, this force included tions. These experts, who gain expertise through pose obstacles to burden-sharing and interopera- force in ways not desired by alliance policymakers, personnel from more than three dozen states work- graduate education programs or fellowships in the bility. Adversaries can also use AI to launch military or increase the opportunities for rivals to launch ing to train Afghan security forces, rebuild Afghan private sector, could staff alliance-run AI centers deception campaigns that complicate operational of excellence, AI development labs, and working coordination. Second, AI can significantly strain 121 Stares, Command Performance, 10; Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution groups. Using their knowledge, they would identify alliance decision-making. New AI technologies Press, 1982), 222–23. where and how AI can best contribute to alliance promise to increase the speed with which allies 122 Stephan Frühling and Svenja Sinjen, “Missile Defense: Challenges and Opportunities for NATO,” NATO Defense College Research Paper, no. 60 (June 2010), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/120605/rp_60.pdf. 128 Barry Rosenberg, “Battlefield Network Connects Allied Forces in Afghanistan,” Sept. 14, 2010, Defense Systems, https://defensesystems. 123 In 2010, the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO recommended this type of delegation in the event of a missile or cyber com/articles/2010/09/02/c4isr-2-afghan-mission-network-connects-allies.aspx. attack. See, “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement,” NATO, May 17, 2010, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ pdf_2010_05/20100517_100517_expertsreport.pdf. 129 Chad C. Serena et al., Lessons Learned from the Afghan Mission Network: Developing a Coalition Contingency Network (Washington, D.C.: RAND Corp., 2014), 3–7, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR302.html. 124 Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work used the term “machine speed” to describe the acceleration of operations carried out by AI systems. See, Bob Work, “Remarks to the Association of the U.S. Army Annual Convention,” U.S. Department of Defense, Oct. 4, 2016, https:// 130 “Federated Mission Networking,” NATO Allied Command Transformation, accessed Feb. 20, 2020, https://www.act.nato.int/activities/fmn. www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/974075/remarks-to-the-association-of-the-us-army-annual-convention/. 131 Rob Matheson, “MIT and U.S. Air Force Sign Agreement to Launch AI Accelerator,” MIT News, May 20, 2019, http://news.mit.edu/2019/mit- 125 “About Us,” NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, accessed Feb. 20, 2020, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us. and-us-air-force-sign-agreement-new-ai-accelerator-0520. 126 “NATO Takes Aim At Disinformation Campaigns,” NPR Morning Edition, May 10, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/05/10/527720078/na- 132 For an example of how NATO is integrating AI into exercises, see, Patrick Tucker, “How NATO’s Transformation Chief Is Pushing the Alliance to-takes-aim-at-disinformation-campaigns. to Keep Up in AI,” Defense One, May 18, 2018, https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/05/how-natos-transformation-chief-pushing-alli- ance-keep-ai/148301/. 127 “Semantic Forensics (SemaFor) Proposers Day,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, accessed Aug. 28, 2019, https://www.darpa. mil/news-events/semantic-forensics-proposers-day. 133 “Interim Report,” 45.

74 75 The Scholar Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making

and adversaries conduct operations, decreasing institutional solutions that best promote AI inter- the time partners have to debate potential courses operability. Do alliance decision-makers see for- of action. Decision-making can also be disrupted if mal agreements or technical solutions as a more adversaries use AI to generate misinformation that effective means of ensuring data sharing? Schol- can degrade trust among allies. To overcome these ars can explore these questions using a variety of challenges, allies will need to establish multina- methodological approaches including experimen- tional agreements and standardization guidelines tal research involving alliance decision-makers or that help ensure data is structured in ways that in-depth case studies informed by interviews of promote interoperability, while technical measures senior policymakers. will help preserve data privacy, allow for data shar- Researchers might also consider the effects of AI ing, and minimize the consequences of AI use on on alliances in areas beyond decision-making and the part of adversaries. interoperability. For example, how does the use of Whether and how states grapple with these chal- AI affect strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, and lenges will shape the conduct of multinational op- alliance reassurance? Does the increased tempo erations and has implications for alliance politics of AI-enabled warfare make it harder or easier for and the global balance of power. Alliances that ef- states to deter rivals and reassure allies? Studies fectively integrate AI technology will be better po- that address these questions would not only expand sitioned to counter threats, while those that allow our scholarly understanding of the relationship be- AI to stymie decision-making and operations may tween emerging technology and international secu- find themselves disadvantaged on the battlefield. rity, but would help policymakers design better pro- Within alliances, member states that quickly mas- cesses and institutions for a security environment in ter the integration of AI into their militaries may which AI use is becoming widespread. gain significant influence, even if they are less pow- As AI becomes increasingly common in military erful than other alliance partners in conventional arsenals around the world, it is crucial for states terms. Because of their AI know-how, these states to understand the potential challenges AI poses may play a dominant role in developing the norms, to multinational operations and work to overcome standards, and doctrine for AI use and help set them. To prepare for warfare at machine speed, al- an alliance’s AI strategy. In a similar vein, Estonia liances should develop policies and practices that leveraged its cyber warfare expertise to bolster its streamline data sharing and decision-making, and position in NATO. Despite being territorially small take procedural and technical measures to bolster and weak in conventional military terms, Estonia’s their defenses against AI-equipped rivals. specialized expertise allowed it to play a leading role in shaping NATO’s cyber doctrine.134 A state’s Erik Lin-Greenberg is a postdoctoral fellow at successful development of AI can therefore in- the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. crease its voice and sway within complex multina- tional institutions. Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Jonathan This article represents a first step in understand- Chu, Theo Milonopoulos, Michael Horowitz, Jor- ing how the burgeoning development of AI tech- dan Sorensen, Alexander Vershbow, participants nologies will affect alliances, and offers a frame- at 2019 Perry World House Global Order Colloqui- work for future hypothesis testing. Future work um, and the anonymous reviewers for comments might more systematically explore the ways in on earlier drafts. which AI-enabled systems influence multinational military decision-making and operations. For in- Photo: Staff Sgt. Jacob Osborne stance, do national security decision-makers trust information provided by AI technologies more or less than information delivered by non-AI enabled sources? Under what conditions are decision-mak- ers more or less likely to believe this information? Are military leaders from certain states more will- ing than those from other states to rely on AI tech- nologies? If so, what drives this variation? Scholars might also try to identify the types of technical or

134 Josh Gold, “How Estonia Uses Cybersecurity to Strengthen Its Position in NATO,” International Centre for Defense and Security, May 27, 2019, https://icds.ee/how-estonia-uses-cybersecurity-to-strengthen-its-position-in-nato/. Estonia now hosts NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence.

76 77 78 The Strategist 79

The Strategist

This section is dedicated to publishing the work of current and former senior policymakers, members of the military, and civilian national security practitioners. The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

What are the implications of the Department of Defense’s adoption of a one-war standard that is focused on defeating a great-power rival? Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery discuss the gap between America’s global commitments and the military challenges it can realistically meet.

A quiet revolution in American defense strategy is the U.S. military has done in decades, and that currently underway. The U.S. military is no longer fo- losing a great-power war would be devastating to cusing on combating rogue states, terrorist groups, America’s global interests. It is meant to galvanize and other deadly, albeit relatively weak, enemies. In- a sluggish bureaucracy to undertake the radical stead, the Defense Department is setting its sights changes necessary to prevent this grim scenario on China and Russia: great-power rivals that are from coming to pass. Yet, it is far more dangerous contesting American military advantages and threat- than its advocates publicly acknowledge.2 ening to reorder the world. “The central challenge The most obvious risk of a one-war standard is to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence that America might need to fight more than one of long-term, strategic competition by … revisionist war at a time. In fact, a one-war standard could in- powers,” the 2018 National Defense Strategy states.1 crease this risk by tempting an opportunistic adver- Deterring these rivals, and defeating them should sary to use force in one theater while Washington deterrence fail, will require far-reaching changes in is occupied in another. Proponents of the one-war what the American military buys and how it fights. approach offer a number of options for avoiding a The main pillar of this strategy is a new approach second war, if possible, or fighting it, if necessary, to force planning, which outlines how the U.S. mili- but these options are not promising: They would tary should be built to fight. For more than a genera- leave the United States strategically exposed, mili- tion, the United States maintained a two-war stand- tarily overextended, or much more reliant on high- ard to ensure that it could defeat a pair of regional ly escalatory options that lack credibility. And as adversaries simultaneously or in quick succession. America loses the ability to handle challenges in Now, the Defense Department has adopted a one- more than one theater, it will also lose leverage war standard geared toward defeating a great-power in peacetime competitions and diplomatic crises. rival. In other words, rather than planning to win In short, the one-war standard exposes a serious multiple medium-sized wars, the Defense Depart- mismatch between America’s global commitments ment is preparing to win a single major war against a and the military challenges it can realistically meet formidable competitor, one that can match (at least — a grand strategy-defense strategy gap that may ONE WAR IS NOT in some areas) American military might. This shift prove extremely damaging in war and peace alike. represents the most significant departure in Ameri- ENOUGH: STRATEGY can defense strategy since the end of the Cold War, and it has tremendous ramifications for a country Why This National Defense that still has security commitments — and security Strategy Matters AND FORCE PLANNING challenges — around the globe. The one-war standard reflects serious strategic At the core of every U.S. defense review is a thinking and is rooted in real budgetary constraints. “force planning construct,” which specifies the FOR GREAT-POWER It is a recognition that defeating a great-power ad- number, type, and frequency of conflicts that the COMPETITION versary would be far more difficult than anything American military must be prepared to face.3 This 1 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, Department of Defense, January 2018, https://dod.defense. gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 2 The shift to a one-war construct has received relatively limited public attention, perhaps because the publicly released version of the National Defense Strategy discusses the force-planning construct only briefly. As a result, while the headlines of the strategy document — particularly the emphasis on great-power competition — are widely understood, other critical aspects of it are not. The logic of the force-planning construct and other key elements of the National Defense Strategy have been spelled out in greater detail in writings by former Defense Department officials, congressional testimony, and the report of the nonpartisan National Defense Strategy Commission. For one critique of the one-war standard, see, Pro- Hal Brands viding for the Common Defense: The Assessments and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission, National Defense Strategy Commission, November 2018, https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/11/providing-common-defense. Evan Braden Montgomery 3 On the importance of force planning constructs, see, Mark Gunzinger et al., Force Planning for the Era of Great Power Competition (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017).

81 The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

construct is arguably the most important element The Case for the One-War Standard tries should conflicts erupt. From this perspective, tention and resources. Dean Acheson once wrote of a defense review. It establishes what the Defense shifting to a great-power-centric force planning con- that the true purpose of NSC-68, another landmark Department should buy, how it should organize its The 2018 National Defense Strategy thus signals struct reflects a frank acknowledgment that Ameri- statement of U.S. defense strategy, was “to so bludg- forces, and what contingencies it should prioritize. that America must reshape its military for a new era. ca now lives in a very different world. eon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only In other words, it spells out what the U.S. military That shift is based on four key factors. First, and The strategic argument is reinforced by resource could the President make a decision but that the de- must be able to do, and how big and how capable it most important, are strategic considerations. Unlike considerations. The fact that America faced relative- cision could be carried out.”13 The one-war standard must be, to achieve the nation’s objectives. in the 1990s or 2000s, when America’s main oppo- ly weak rivals during the post-Cold War era made aims to achieve something similar within a large and The key innovation of the 2018 National Defense nents were non-state actors or rogue states, Wash- it plausible, at least in theory, for the Defense De- unwieldy Department of Defense. Strategy is its one-war, great-power-centric force ington’s chief competitors now include resurgent partment to defeat more than one at a time.9 To- Finally, there is the influence of historical trends. planning construct. “In wartime,” the document or rising great powers — near-peer competitors, in day, however, a conflict with either China or Russia If the one-war standard marks a departure from states, “the fully mobilized Joint Force will be ca- Pentagon parlance — that pose a serious threat to would consume the vast majority of America’s glob- post-Cold War defense planning, it is nonetheless pable of: defeating aggression by a major power; U.S. military primacy and could seriously challenge al combat power as well as critical enablers such as part of a longer-running pattern. Since the mid- deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and American alliance commitments in key regions. airlift and sealift (its ability to move forces and ma- 2000s, the Defense Department has been gradually disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats.”4 Since the early 2000s, both China and Russia have teriel into key theaters via air or sea). As a result, moving toward less expansive defense strategies in Of these tasks, the first — defeating great-power undertaken far-reaching military modernization the United States simply cannot defeat two rivals response to resource constraints and the growing aggression — is also the most important. As Jim programs that have emphasized the tools needed to — whether two great powers or one great power and difficulties of war. Mitre, who helped develop the strategy, writes, the coerce U.S. allies and hold at bay American forces one weaker power — simultaneously or nearly si- In the early 2000s, the U.S. military was sized to National Defense Strategy shifts the Department of that would presumably come riding to the rescue. multaneously with the resources at hand. Indeed, it defeat aggression in one theater, while also pursu- Defense away from planning for “two simultaneous As a result, both countries now combine increasing- is not clear whether the Department of Defense can ing forcible regime change in another theater and major wars, in separate theaters against mid-tier ly advanced capabilities with profound geographic even execute the one-war standard outlined in the conducting multiple, smaller operations elsewhere enemies,” in favor of a laser-like focus on “defeat- advantages, given that plausible conflict scenarios National Defense Strategy with the resources avail- — all of which added up to a highly ambitious, ing aggression by a [single] great power.”5 That would unfold in their own back yards. These factors, able to it.10 In this sense, anything beyond a one-war “two-plus war” standard.14 By 2012, budget cuts means the U.S. military should be sized and shaped in turn, would require the United States to project standard defies the laws of budgetary physics. and the sobering experiences of Iraq and Afghan- to beat China or Russia in a high-intensity war, not military power into the jaws of Chinese or Russian The shift to a one-war standard also reflects bu- istan had led the Obama administration to under- to defeat some combination of weaker states such anti-access/area-denial capabilities in order to de- reaucratic considerations. For years, U.S. officials take a subtle retrenchment. Obama’s 2012 Defense as Iran and North Korea. fend local allies and partners.7 — including several secretaries of defense — have Strategic Guidance called for an ability to defeat The one-war construct is significant because This challenge is far more severe than anything understood that great-power competition is return- aggression in one theater while simply imposing it breaks with every U.S. defense strategy of the the Defense Department has faced in recent dec- ing.11 And for years, bureaucratic inertia has kept “unacceptable costs” in another theater — a less- post-Cold War era. From George H.W. Bush’s “Base ades. It will require fundamentally rethinking how the Department of Defense from adapting as rapid- er, “two-minus war” standard.15 The one-war force Force” concept to Barack Obama’s Defense Stra- U.S. forces will project power into contested envi- ly as it should. Key Defense Department stakehold- planning construct then emerged after years of rel- tegic Guidance, multiple administrations have re- ronments, operate without secure rear areas, cope ers have often prioritized capacity (the size of the ative defense austerity, and as Chinese and Russian affirmed that the United States must be able to with attacks on their supply lines and communica- force) over new and disruptive capabilities, while modernization made the Defense Department’s prevail in two conflicts simultaneously or nearly tions infrastructure, and prevent a numerically su- clinging to legacy systems that are becoming less “pacing threats” far more formidable than before.16 simultaneously. In the 1990s, for example, the U.S. perior adversary from overrunning exposed allies relevant for great-power conflicts.12 The shift to a one-war standard was thus not un- military was structured to defeat Saddam Hus- and partners before America can mount an effective The one-war force planning construct thus serves dertaken lightly. It rests on a set of powerful and, in sein’s Iraq without fatally compromising its abil- response. It will undoubtedly demand a very differ- as a bureaucratic blunt instrument. It is an unmis- many ways, reasonable considerations. The trouble ity to fight North Korea. The idea was to ensure ent type of force than the one that thrashed Saddam takable signal to actors within the Pentagon that is that the National Defense Strategy also carries that a bad actor in one theater could not exploit Hussein in 1991 and 2003, conducted stability oper- the department must fundamentally change what with it a great deal of risk and offers few solutions America’s preoccupation in another theater. That, ations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and has chased ter- it buys, how it trains, and where it focuses its at- for how to manage it. in turn, was critical to the credibility of a grand rorists around the greater Middle East since 2001.8 strategy based on upholding stability in multiple And because the consequences of losing a conflict 9 There were, however, questions about whether the United States had sufficient strategic lift and other key capabilities to fight two regional wars theaters around the world. As the 1997 Quadrenni- against China or Russia would be so damaging — at once, which was one reason the Defense Department hedged by including “near-simultaneous” conflicts in the two-war standard. al Defense Review declared, a two-war capability is from fracturing alliances to causing unfavorable 10 Providing for the Common Defense; Hal Brands, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2018), chap. 6. “the sine qua non of a superpower.”6 shifts in regional balances of power — the United 11 Indeed, this was the message — implicit or explicit — of two major strategic initiatives of the past decade: the Pacific pivot (or Asia-Pacific States must ensure that it can defeat these coun- rebalance) that began in 2011 and the Third Offset Strategy, unveiled by Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work in 2014–2015. See, for instance, Robert Work, “The Third U.S. Offset Strategy and Its Implications for Partners and Allies,” Speech Delivered at the Willard Hotel, Washington, DC, Jan. 28, 2015, https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/606641/the-third-us-offset-strategy-and-its-implications-for-part- 4 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. ners-and-allies/. 5 Jim Mitre, “A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct,” Washington Quarterly 41, no. 4 (Winter 2019): esp. 8, https://doi.org/10.1080/016366 12 See, for instance, Mackenzie Eaglen, “Just Say No: The Pentagon Needs to Drop the Distractions and Move Great Power Competition Beyond 0X.2018.1557479. See also, Elbridge Colby, “Testimony Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Implementation of the National Lip Service,” War on the Rocks, Oct. 28, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/10/just-say-no-the-pentagon-needs-to-drop-the-distractions-and- Defense Strategy,” Senate Armed Services Committee, Jan. 29, 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Colby_01-29-19.pdf. move-great-power-competition-beyond-lip-service/; Mark F. Cancian, “U.S. Military Forces in FY 2020: The Strategic and Budget Context,” Center for 6 William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, May 1997, 12, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/ Strategic and International Studies, Sept. 30, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-military-forces-fy-2020-strategic-and-budget-context. a326554.pdf. See also, Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 13 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1971), 374. University Press, 2016), 324–25, 331–32. 14 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Department of Defense, Sept. 30, 2001, https://archive.defense.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 7 Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2019); Eric Edelman and Whitney M. McNamara, U.S. Strategy for Maintaining a Europe Whole and Free (Wash- 15 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Department of Defense, January 2012, https://archive.defense.gov/ ington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017); Evan Braden Montgomery, “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific: China’s Rise news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. and the Future of U.S. Power Projection,” International Security 38, no. 4 (Spring 2014): 115–49, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00160. 16 Providing for the Common Defense; Mackenzie Eaglen, “Trump’s Small Change: Why U.S. Defense Spending Will Continue to Muddle Through,” 8 See, Chris Dougherty, Why America Needs a New Way of War (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2019). Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-11/trumps-small-change.

82 83 The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

Can America Avoid a Second War? and if Washington intervened and quickly achieved a decisive victory, then leaders in Russia, Iran, The most obvious risk of a one-war standard North Korea, and elsewhere would surely hesitate is that the United States could confront two or to exploit the situation, fearful that they would more conflicts at the same time. This is hardly far- meet the same fate. In other words, the dreaded fetched given that the United States currently fac- window of opportunity for American adversaries es at least five potential opponents — China, Rus- would never open or would quickly slam shut. And sia, North Korea, Iran, and several major terrorist because the ability to deter a second contingency organizations — across three separate theaters turns on the outcome of the first, there is a clear — Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacif- rationale for focusing relentlessly on acquiring ic — in addition to the possibility that unexpect- the capabilities and competencies needed to win ed events or crises, such as a massive chemical one major war, rather than sustaining the capacity weapons attack in Syria, a civil war in Venezuela, needed to fight two. or a natural disaster at home or abroad, could re- The demonstration argument is intuitively plau- quire the use of the American military. sible, but also problematic. After all, demonstra- A two-war scenario could occur organically, with tions cut both ways: They can reveal weaknesses two crises escalating to conflicts more or less inde- as well as strengths.19 Even the most effective force pendently, which happened in 1965 when the Unit- can experience human errors, suffer technical fail- ed States invaded the Dominican Republic to avert ures, and take losses that tarnish its image of in- a feared Communist takeover at the same time as it vulnerability. At the very least, its performance will was escalating its involvement in Vietnam. Alterna- divulge information about its preferred methods of tively, the fact that the United States has a one-war operating as well as its tolerance for risk, which standard could actually make a two-war scenario watchful rivals might use to their advantage. more likely. If American troops were involved in In addition, the strengths that U.S. forces would a major contingency but the United States lacked showcase in this scenario may not be relevant to sufficient reserves to fight other rivals, then revi- other threats the country faces. Like earlier stra- sionist actors might see a window of opportuni- tegic reviews, the 2018 National Defense Strategy ty to alter the status quo in their favor and jump calls for the United States to deter aggression. But through it while they had the chance. aggression comes in many different forms, from A second argument holds that the United States Opting for delay risks allowing an opportunistic In either case, Washington would face the unen- large-scale military campaigns to less overt gray- need not deter a second war because it can simply aggressor to successfully alter the status quo in viable dilemma of either sending whatever forces zone provocations.20 The demonstrated ability to choose to delay its military response and fight that ways that could be difficult to reverse. Indeed, Na- were available to a second theater, even if they thwart one form of aggression may not translate second conflict after it has wrapped up the first. tional Defense Strategy advocates make a compelling were outmatched, or allowing a major challenge into effective deterrence against others. To return From this perspective, America’s most important case for the virtues of denial — that is, a convention- to go unanswered. Proponents of a one-war stand- to the previous example, stopping a Chinese con- consideration would be to concentrate on the busi- al defense strategy that emphasizes disrupting and ard are not blind to the possibility of simultaneous ventional assault on Taiwan does not necessarily ness at hand — namely, winning the war that is un- degrading enemy operations so that an adversary conflicts. But they downplay this danger with argu- prove that the Department of Defense could defeat derway rather than spreading U.S. forces too thin by never achieves its aims in the first place — because ments that all have serious limitations.17 a Russian paramilitary incursion in Eastern Eu- trying to fight a pair of wars at once. After the Unit- the political and military costs of trying to restore The first argument holds that America can avoid rope. Moreover, success in dealing with one type of ed States has defeated Russia’s bid to dominate the the status quo ante after an opponent has secured a second war by dominating the first war. The De- challenge might simply convince a rival to under- Baltic states, for instance, it could turn its attention its objectives are likely to be far higher.21 But delay- partment of Defense’s ability to prevent oppor- take another. Finally, and most important, even if toward defeating Iranian aggression in the Persian ing intervention takes denial off the table, unless the tunistic aggression, the thinking goes, ultimately the United States won the first war, victory against Gulf or meeting a Chinese challenge in the South United States is fortunate enough to face a particu- rests on the battlefield effectiveness of U.S. forces. a capable state rival would almost certainly take a China Sea — with the understanding that it would larly inept second aggressor that fails to make gains Hence, demonstrations of strength are the key to heavy toll. Because the U.S. military relies on high- have to roll back some gains that the second adver- even while unopposed by American forces. deterrence. If those forces perform well enough in ly skilled personnel who cannot be replaced easily sary made while America was otherwise occupied. An even bigger limitation, however, is that the the initial war, and if they win quickly enough to and highly complex platforms that cannot be re- The delay argument also makes sense at first delay argument only makes sense when the first avoid being tied down for too long, they will dis- constituted quickly, even modest losses would se- glance. The ability to fight conflicts sequentially in- war is also the most important war — when it courage potential challengers from starting anoth- riously hamper the Defense Department’s ability to stead of simultaneously might keep opportunistic is a conflict against China or Russia, rather than er conflict.18 For example, if China attacked Taiwan, take on another adversary in short order. aggressors in check because they know they will be against Iran, North Korea, or some other, lesser on the receiving end of a U.S. response eventually. threat. In this case, the dangers of failing to win Yet, the virtues of postponing intervention are not the first war would almost certainly outweigh the 17 It is also possible to argue that opportunistic aggression is not a problem that the United States needs to worry about because rivals are as clear-cut as they might seem. dangers of allowing aggression in a second theater unlikely to challenge the status quo when U.S. forces are tied down. Advocates of a one-war standard rarely make this argument, however, so we do not address it here. Nevertheless, the historical prevalence of opportunistic aggression is a topic that merits a closer look. 18 Mitre, “A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct,” 26. 21 See, Elbridge Colby, “Against the Great Powers: Reflections on Balancing Nuclear and Conventional Power,” Texas National Security Review 2,

no. 1 (November 2018) http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/864; and, Mike Gallagher, “State of (Deterrence by) Denial,” Washington Quarterly 42, no. 2 19 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Signals of Strength: Capability Demonstrations and Perceptions of Military Power,” Journal of Strategic Studies 43, (Summer 2019): 31–45, https://dx.doi.org/ 10.1080/0163660X.2019.1626687. For a comparison of denial versus alternative approaches vis-à-vis China, no. 2(2020): 309–30, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1626724. see, Evan B. Montgomery, Reinforcing the Frontline: U.S. Defense Strategy and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 20 See, Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015). Assessments, 2017), 31–36.

84 85 The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

to go temporarily unanswered. For instance, if the pation of U.S. influence and the destabilization of United States were fighting China and Iran tried to areas, such as the Korean Peninsula and the Mid- take advantage of the situation, few would disagree dle East, that still matter to American security. that Washington should focus on dealing with Bei- jing and only turn its attention to Tehran later. That calculus would be scrambled, however, if Strategy in the Second War the situation were reversed. If the United States was fighting a regional power like Iran when a If demonstrations, delay, and discipline cannot great power like China decided to initiate a cri- adequately reduce the danger that America will sis, the second war would be far more strategical- find itself confronting simultaneous conflicts, the ly consequential than the first, and the costs of Defense Department will need other methods of delay would probably be far higher. That would deterring or, if necessary, fighting multiple wars at leave the United States with the choice of either once, unless it is ready to walk away from long- breaking off the first conflict and fighting the sec- standing U.S. commitments. The public version of ond with a weakened force, or somehow trying to the National Defense Strategy hints that the Unit- The more juggle two wars with a force designed for one. Put ed States can indeed deter multiple rivals within another way, opportunistic aggression may not be the framework of a one-war standard but doesn’t significant concern a challenge that America can afford to ignore. provide much detail on how.23 There are three obvi- The final argument holds that the United States ous options, however, none of which are mutually is that swearing can avoid this dangerous situation — in which exclusive, but all of which have serious liabilities. fighting a regional power undercuts America’s The first option isoutsourcing deterrence and off wars against ability to fight a great power — by exercising stra- warfighting by relying on allies to preserve the certain opponents tegic discipline. That is, it can simply choose not status quo in their home regions. From the Nix- to intervene at all against hostile regional powers, on administration’s “Twin Pillars” approach in the comes perilously keeping its powder dry in case great-power con- Middle East, which depended on Saudi Arabia and flict breaks out.22 Iran as the first line of defense against regional in- close to abandoning There are, of course, many reasons to be cau- stability and Soviet encroachment, to the recurring tious about committing U.S. forces against second- attempts to court India as a bulwark against Chi- deterrence altogether. or third-tier opponents in lower-priority theaters. nese expansion in South Asia, the United States Adapting for an era of great-power competition has often tried to reduce the burdens of uphold- certainly requires stricter prioritization and the ing regional orders, especially (but not exclusively) more judicious application of limited resources. at moments when its relative power seemed to be Yet, the discipline argument still falls short, and in decline.24 Likewise, the National Defense Strat- not solely because the U.S. track record when it egy calls for the United States to “strengthen and comes to focusing on China and Russia (as op- evolve [its] alliances and partnerships into an ex- posed to, say, North Korea and Iran) is already tended network capable of deterring or decisively mixed at best. The more significant concern is acting to meet the shared challenges of our time.”25 that swearing off wars against certain opponents From this perspective, the Trump administration’s comes perilously close to abandoning deterrence efforts to compel allies to increase defense spend- altogether. No one should want to see the United ing and to sell additional arms to strategically im- States spend blood and treasure unnecessarily, portant states could lay the foundation for better or in ways that weaken its overall strategic po- burden-sharing or burden-shifting in the future.26 sition. Yet, simply refusing to use force against Calling on allies and partners plays on America’s second-tier opponents absent some truly extreme chief geostrategic advantage: its unrivaled global provocation signals that America cannot and will network of security relationships. Moreover, U.S. al- not respond forcefully to aggression short of the lies and partners from East Asia to the Persian Gulf outrageous. That, in turn, is a recipe for the dissi- to Western Europe certainly could enhance their

22 See, for instance, Elbridge Colby, “Don’t Let Iran Distract from China,” Wall Street Journal, Sept. 24, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont- let-iran-distract-from-china-11569366901. 23 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 24 Evan Braden Montgomery, In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 25 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 26 Hal Brands, “U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Nationalism: Fortress America and Its Alternatives,” Washington Quarterly, 40, no. 1 (Spring 2017): 73–94, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302740.

86 87 The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

military power in ways that would make them nuclear forces to deter threats in a second theater and has shed most of its tactical and theater nu- Under these conditions, would there be significant more resilient to coercion and aggression.27 Yet, or fight a second contingency if deterrence fails. clear capabilities, which could leave it in the posi- popular and political support for a U.S. military re- there are many reasons to be skeptical that al- Yet, escalating is even more problematic than tion of relying on “massive retaliation light.”32 sponse, let alone for marshaling the extra person- lies, in any of these regions, would be willing and outsourcing. A credible escalation strategy re- In sum, unless the United States is willing and nel and materiel necessary to fight a pair of wars? able to deter local threats largely on their own. quires pronounced nuclear advantages over po- able to reverse prior efforts to reduce the role of nu- Even if the case for intervention were clear cut Between resource constraints, domestic political tential enemies. Unfortunately, Washington does clear weapons in its defense strategy, unless it can and support for mobilization high, a variety of debates, divergent threat perceptions, and histor- not have the same advantages it did as recently rebuild its strategic arsenal over a relatively short factors — including years of consolidation among ical feuds that prevent allies from working close- as the early 2000s. China and Russia — as well period of time, and unless it can identify realistic leading defense companies, low production rates ly with one another, there are enough barriers to as other countries — have been developing and limited nuclear options (beyond the changes advo- of high-end weapons, and increasingly complex yet believe that true outsourcing is not a viable op- fielding new nuclear systems and, in some cas- cated for in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review) that fragile supply chains — suggest that the industri- tion. Indeed, the reason the United States has not es, expanding their nuclear arsenals. The United allow it to counter conventional threats or inflict se- al base is not equipped to ramp up production on been able to extricate itself from commitments States is just now beginning to recapitalize its ag- lective punishment — each a tall order in its own short notice.35 The United States can and should in these theaters — despite periodic efforts over ing nuclear arsenal after many years of deferring right — escalation is probably not the answer.33 take steps to improve its mobilization capacity, the past 70 years to do so — is precisely because modernization. Moreover, there are questions The third and final option is mobilizing: increas- just as it should modernize its nuclear arsenal and those allies and partners have not been able to about its ability to fund and field newer capabili- ing the capacity of the joint force to manage threats push its allies to fortify their defenses. But it prob- summon the collective will and capability to con- ties before older capabilities must be retired and after they materialize. If, for instance, the United ably cannot rely on these measures as substitutes front the threats they face without the promise of about whether planned modernization programs States were to face the strategic nightmare sce- for conventional forces-in-being. American military support. And even if the Unit- will actually produce new advantages given coun- nario — simultaneous conflicts against China and ed States could theoretically convince its allies in, tervailing steps by some opponents.30 Russia — it could undertake a World War II-style say, Europe and the Persian Gulf to develop vast- A strategy of escalation would face other credi- mobilization that would dramatically expand the Risk-Taking, Decision-Making, ly improved military capabilities by announcing bility problems, as well. If there were doubts about military and provide whatever level of resources and the Military Balance that America would not necessarily come to their America’s willingness to use nuclear weapons to was necessary.34 aid in a crisis, doing so would risk forfeiting the prevent the Soviet Union from overrunning West- Yet, the prospect of mobilization raises ques- Beyond the military challenges that a one-war other great benefit of U.S. security commitments ern Europe (and overturning the global balance tions of will and ability. If Russia and China both standard introduces are a set of broader diplomatic and force deployments — the suppression of con- of power) during the Cold War, it is presumably launched major, unprovoked assaults on U.S. in- and geopolitical challenges. The military balance — flictsbetween American allies and partners, which harder for allies or adversaries to believe that the terests, a large and rapid mobilization of Ameri- and the military options to which a country can real- has contributed enormously to the relative global United States would start a potentially cataclys- ca’s manpower and industrial resources might be istically resort in war — invariably shapes risk-taking peace of the post-World War II era.28 mic nuclear war to defend far less significant ter- politically feasible. It is not a given, however, that and decision-making in peacetime.36 Here, too, the The second strategic option is escalation: plac- ritories such as Estonia or Taiwan today.31 Using the public would support such a mobilization to one-war standard introduces deep challenges for a ing greater reliance on nuclear weapons to deter nuclear weapons first in a conflict against China fight limited wars that began in ambiguous ways in superpower that must manage peacetime compe- or fight an opportunistic aggressor. On its face, or Russia would require a fundamentally different theaters thousands of miles from American shores. tition and diplomatic crises in multiple theaters at this would seem to be a natural way of compen- approach to deterrence and warfighting — one for Adversaries, knowing this, could calibrate their once. sating for the limits of U.S. conventional military which American leaders have not sought to pre- aims and actions to increase the probability that Most of these implications flow from a basic im- strength.29 The United States retains a large nu- pare the American public or world opinion. Even U.S. mobilization and military intervention would balance between U.S. defense strategy and the larger clear arsenal to provide escalation dominance the credibility of first use against non-nuclear be controversial at home. China, for example, could grand strategy the National Defense Strategy is meant over at least some of its rivals, as well as to make armed states would be suspect in many scenarios. issue an ultimatum against Taiwan without actual- to support. The 2017 National Security Strategy makes credible its extended deterrence guarantees to al- The United States has worked for several decades ly firing a shot or use its coast guard vessels rather clear that America is not retrenching geopolitically: It lies. Since 1945, America has always reserved the to narrow the conditions under which it would than its navy to provoke Japan in the East China remains committed to its longstanding, three-theat- right to use nuclear weapons first during a con- employ nuclear weapons, counting instead on its Sea, while Russia might seize a small piece of ter- er grand strategy that aims to preserve stability and flict. Therefore, it should be well positioned to use conventional military power to deter aggression, ritory in a Baltic state rather than occupy an entire uphold favorable configurations of power in Europe, country, and might use unmarked soldiers or con- the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific.37 Yet, any grand 27 Evan Braden Montgomery, “Avoiding Fair Fights: Military Superiority and U.S. National Security,” Texas National Security Review, June 26, 2018, tractors rather than uniformed military personnel. strategy rests on a foundation of military power, and https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-pursuit-of-military-superiority/. For specific examples, see, James P. Thomas and Evan Braden Montgomery, “Developing a Strategy for a Long-Term Sino-American Competition,” in Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice, ed. Thomas G. Mahnken (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, America Abroad: 32 See, for instance, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Department of Defense, April 2010, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseR- The United States’ Global Role in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in eviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf. the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, U.S. AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249; Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors 33 The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for the United States to immediately develop and field a low-yield variant of the W76 subma- Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” International Security 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 78–119, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00294; and Eugene Gholz, rine-launched ballistic missile warhead, dubbed the W76-2, and to begin developing a new sea-launched cruise missile with a low-yield nuclear war- Benjamin Friedman, and Enea Gjoza, “Defensive Defense: A Better Way to Protect US Allies in Asia,” Washington Quarterly 42, no. 4 (Winter 2020): head, which will not be fielded for approximately a decade. Nuclear Posture Review, Department of Defense, February 2018, https://media.defense. 171–89, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693103. gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 28 See, Brooks and Wohlforth, America Abroad. 34 Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 140. 29 Providing for the Common Defense, esp. 20. 35 On the state of U.S. mobilization capabilities, see, Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Sup- ply Chain Resiliency of the United States: Report to President Donald J. Trump by the Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 30 For an overview of current and projected global nuclear forces, see, Jacob Cohn, Adam Lemon, and Evan Braden Montgomery, Assessing the 13806, Department of Defense, September 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-STRENGTHEN- Arsenals: Past, Present, and Future Capabilities (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019). ING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-RESILIENCY.PDF. 31 On the uncertainty of Cold War-era nuclear deterrence, see, Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New 36 The classic assessment is, Marc Trachtenberg, “A ‘Wasting Asset’: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949–1954,” Internation- York: Columbia University Press, 1998); H.W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” American Historical al Security 13, no. 3 (Winter 1988/89): 5–49, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538735. Review 94, no. 4 (October 1989): 963–89, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/94.4.963. Another type of escalation strategy — horizontal escalation — is equally problematic. See, Hal Brands, “The Too-Good-to-Be-True Way to Fight the Chinese Military,” Bloomberg Opinion, July 9, 2019, https://www. 37 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-09/how-to-fight-china-and-russia-on-american-terms. uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

88 89 The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

the National Defense Strategy essentially acknowl- — issuing coercive threats that can’t be carried out war standard sharpens this timeless dilemma by and international order erodes. edges that Washington has only one theater’s worth without inflicting unacceptable costs on America’s widening the gap between the number of theaters in There is no magic formula for solving this prob- of military power should war break out. If it is true, as broader global posture — with all the accompanying which the United States is committed and the num- lem. There are steps the United States can take to Defense Department planners have long argued, that dangers if that bluff is eventually called.39 ber of theaters in which it can plausibly respond. narrow the gap between its defense strategy and its the ability to respond to more than one challenge at Indeed, the fact that the United States is execut- The wider that gap becomes, the more it will influ- global commitments: pushing allies to strengthen a time is critical to America’s global credibility and ing a three-theater grand strategy with a one-war ence the decisions of the United States and other their defense capabilities, modernizing America’s confidence, then a one-war standard will presumably military will not be lost on other countries. In an ex- countries in war and peace. nuclear arsenal and developing more limited nuclear affect the calculations of policymakers in the United treme scenario, American competitors could exploit It is true, of course, that there are also clear risks options, improving the country’s mobilization base, States and around the world. U.S. intervention in one theater to roll the iron dice in associated with not focusing intently enough on be- and others. But Washington should be adopting Consider the view from Washington. If U.S. of- another, or they could lend support, whether covert ing able to defeat a single great-power adversary. many of these measures under any defense strate- ficials know that fighting Iran or North Korea will or overt, to Washington’s adversary in order to bleed If America cannot credibly claim that it can rebuff gy, and, moreover, they still might not fully close the fatally undermine the Defense Department’s ability U.S. forces and further deplete their ability to inter- Russian or Chinese aggression because it has re- gap that the National Defense Strategy reveals. to defeat China or Russia, they will be less likely to vene elsewhere.40 Short of such measures, American mained preoccupied with lesser threats, then U.S. Ultimately, the shift to a one-war standard is act assertively — through military measures or even competitors could use the conflict as a source of dip- geopolitical leverage in Europe and the Western Pa- bringing the United States face-to-face with a more diplomatic or economic sanctions that risk escalation lomatic leverage against the United States — taking cific will decline precipitously — as will America’s fundamental choice: It can pare back its commit- — in response to provocations by Tehran or Pyong- advantage of Washington’s weak bargaining position ability to deter conflict. Yet, in buying down this par- ments to bring them into alignment with existing yang. By the same token, if an American president to force U.S. officials to accept a nonviolent change in ticular type of geopolitical risk, the one-war stand- resources, or it can increase its resources to better understands that a conflict with either China or Rus- the status quo.41 ard threatens to expose the United States to all the meet existing commitments. It is unlikely that the sia would eat up the country’s global combat power, An overstretched superpower could also lose lever- other risks that come from having a one-theater Defense Department will ever get back to the com- she may be less willing to risk war in a crisis over age vis-à-vis its rivals before even a single conflict is force in a three-theater world. paratively halcyon days in which it prepared for two Taiwan, the South China Sea, or the Baltic for fear of underway. If Washington faces so much as a realistic wars against regional powers that it would almost leaving America strategically exposed in the Middle prospect of war with Russia or China in the coming certainly win. It is just as unlikely, absent some East or Northeast Asia. The United States could unin- years, North Korea or Iran may feel emboldened to A Time for Choosing NSC-68-style explosion in defense spending, that tentionally end up not with a one-war standard but a push for gains below the threshold of outright conflict, the Defense Department can secure sufficient re- zero-war strategy, because committing the American confident that U.S. officials will not escalate because The architects of the National Defense Strategy sources to fight multiple wars against great powers, military anywhere poses too great a risk to Washing- the Defense Department cannot handle multiple chal- are right about one thing: The Defense Department let alone to fight three or more conflicts simultane- ton’s commitments and interests everywhere.38 lenges at once. Russian leaders might perceive that cannot go back to business as usual if that means ously. The last time the United States had anything To be clear, the argument here is not that an Amer- they have greater geopolitical running room in East- focusing on relatively weak rivals at the expense of like a 2.5 war standard, it was spending roughly 8 or ican president would decline to respond to a clear- ern Europe or the Middle East if the United States transforming the military to deal with hostile great 9 percent of GDP on defense — more than twice the cut, large-scale assault on U.S. interests — such as finds itself in a crisis, or facing higher tensions, with powers. A world in which the United States has the amount of GDP it is spending today.44 Yet, additional a North Korean missile attack on Japan or America China. Meanwhile, the calculations of U.S. allies and force structure to defeat North Korea and Iran but funding could allow the Department of Defense to itself, or an outright Russian invasion of Estonia or partners will also be affected. The National Defense not the advanced capabilities and concepts needed reduce the risks it is starting to run — and therefore Poland. Nor is it that fighting a war against Iran or Strategy is premised on helping regional allies and to defeat China or Russia would be incredibly dan- to rely less on outsourcing, escalating, or mobilizing. North Korea (much less China or Russia) is a desira- partners become more assertive and self-reliant so gerous from the perspective of American alliances In this scenario, the Defense Department would ble outcome. The argument is that American leaders they can decrease the overall burdens on the United and geopolitical stability. To remain relevant in to- maintain at least a 1.5 war standard: It would com- will feel less confident that they can assert the na- States.42 But American friends in the Persian Gulf or day’s global environment, any defense strategy must bine the capabilities needed to defeat a great power tion’s interests vigorously in a crisis or competition Western Pacific may instead feel forced to draw in keep rival great powers in the crosshairs. like Russia or China with the capacity required to that falls short of outright war, that they will be more their horns at a time of U.S. involvement in a faraway Yet, the Defense Department’s current approach also fight a regional power war at more or less the hesitant in committing U.S. forces abroad, and that theater, lest they end up in one war while Washing- is far riskier than it might appear. Pairing a one-war same time. This approach would require simulta- this will inevitably undermine Washington’s geopo- ton is preoccupied with another. defense standard with America’s existing global neously developing the innovative capabilities and litical leverage in dealing with great powers and less- In short, every global power — from the British commitments is a recipe for disaster. Without ad- concepts needed to deal with a great-power rival er powers alike. U.S. policymakers might be self-de- Empire at its peak to the United States during the equate military muscle to back up its threats and and preserving (or strengthening) the force struc- terred from issuing coercive threats against Iran for Cold War — faces the same basic dilemma: It can- promises, Washington could grow so reluctant to ture, sealift and airlift, munitions stockpiles, and fear of compromising the Defense Department’s abil- not possibly meet all of the threats to its interests if uphold its security commitments that they become other assets needed to do more than one thing at a ity to defeat China. Or they might just have to bluff those threats manifest at the same time.43 The one- nearly worthless. Or it could try to enforce those time. That might not be enough to avoid the night- commitments and fail. In either case, adversaries mare scenario of facing overlapping great-power

38 On this point, see, “Testimony of Mara Karlin to the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Recommendations for a Future National would have more incentives to challenge the status conflicts, which would remain unmanageable with- Defense Strategy,” U.S. Armed Services Committee, Nov. 30, 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Karlin_11-30-17.pdf. quo, while allies would have more incentives to look out a far greater mobilization of American society 39 Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, Avoiding a Strategy of Bluff: The Crisis of American Military Primacy(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and out for themselves. The United States could find it- as a whole. Nevertheless, it would help to deter re- Budgetary Assessments, 2017), esp. 19–22. self fighting conflicts for which it is not prepared — gional-power aggression if the United States were 40 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), 153–54. or sliding, by default rather than by design, into a fighting a great-power war (and vice versa), while 41 One could imagine, for instance, China exploiting a U.S.-Russian conflict to seek American acquiescence to changes in that status quo in the less ambitious grand strategy that compels it to stay also providing a cushion if a great-power war went East China Sea or the South China Sea. on the sidelines as American influence plummets worse than expected. It would not completely close 42 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy; Elbridge Colby, “How to Win America’s Next War,” Foreign Policy, May 5, 2019, https://for- eignpolicy.com/2019/05/05/how-to-win-americas-next-war-china-russia-military-infrastructure/. 43 See, Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988); 44 See the figures for the Kennedy and Johnson eras in, John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Melvyn P. Leffler,A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992). Security Policy During the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 393.

90 91 The Strategist One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition

the gap between America’s commitments and its this approach relies on heroic assumptions about capabilities, but it would narrow it and reduce the the possibility of diplomacy turning rivals — par- dangers it poses. ticularly Russia — into friends or at least nonthreat- Even that would be a considerable expense, how- ening neutrals.47 It also contradicts the Defense De- ever. The nonpartisan National Defense Strategy partment’s own logic by asserting that Washington Commission has estimated, for instance, that a force can pull back from key regions without jeopardizing capable of fighting more than one conflict simulta- its interests there. It is easy to say that the United neously would require at least a 3–5 percent annu- States should shrink commitments to restore stra- al increase in real defense spending over a period tegic solvency, but it is far harder to do so in a re- sponsible way. The flaws of the one-war standard can be thought of as the canary in the coal mine — the warning of greater perils and far sharper dilemmas to come. The United States must decide soon whether to invest significantly more resources in stiffening the hard-power backbone of its grand strategy or scale back that grand strategy to better fit its defense capabili- ties. What it should not do is assume that this choice between unpalatable options can somehow be avoided. The worst ap- proach to dealing with any glaring strate- gic problem is to pretend that the prob- lem does not exist. of at least five years. But most observers currently expect Defense Department outlays to stagnate at Hal Brands is Henry Kissinger Distinguished best and decline at worst in the years ahead.45 And Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins money is only one part of the equation. It is now School of Advanced International Studies, a scholar widely recognized that, in addition to new capabili- at the American Enterprise Institute, and a Bloomb- ties, the Defense Department also needs new ideas: erg Opinion columnist. His most recent book, with novel operational concepts for fighting in contested Charles Edel, is The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft environments. What is often overlooked is that this and World Order (2019). He is currently writing a point does not just apply to rival great powers.46 The book on how history can inform America’s approach United States also needs more effective and efficient to long-term competitions with China and Russia. ways of warfare for dealing with second-tier rivals like North Korea and Iran, especially as those pow- Evan Braden Montgomery is senior fellow and ers become increasingly capable. director of research and studies at the Center for Alternatively, the United States could undertake Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He is the au- a more searching reevaluation of its grand strate- thor of In the Hegemon’s Shadow: Leading States gy: It could explicitly retreat from commitments in and the Rise of Regional Powers (2016), as well as the Middle East and make painful concessions to articles in Foreign Affairs, International Security, Se- Vladimir Putin’s Russia in hopes of easing the hostil- curity Studies, and the Journal of Strategic Studies. ity of one great-power rival. It could withdraw from the Korean Peninsula, counting on South Korea and Photo: U.S. Navy other regional powers to deter or defeat North Ko- rean aggression without significant American help, or otherwise shrink America’s global ambitions. Yet,

45 Providing for the Common Defense; see also, the Washington Post graphic, accessed March 8, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graph- ics/politics/policy-2020/foreign-policy/defense-budget/; Rick Berger and Gary Schmitt, “Budget Deal Is No Win for the Military,” Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/budget-deal-is-no-win-for-the-military-11564337478; Long-Term Implications of the 2020 Future Years Defense Program, Congressional Budget Office, August 2019, https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-08/55500-CBO-2020-FYDP_0.pdf. 46 See, for example, Thomas G. Mahnken, Grace B. Kim, and Adam Lemon, Piercing the Fog of Peace: Developing Innovative Operational Concepts for a New Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019). 47 See, Hal Brands, “Trump Can’t Split Russia from China—Yet,” Bloomberg Opinion, July 31, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/arti- cles/2018-07-31/trump-can-t-split-russia-from-china-yet.

92 93 The Strategist Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners

While coercion theory may be well understood in the academy, it is less well understood by practitioners, especially in the military. This can cause difficulties in civil-military communications and cause problems for national strategy and military outcomes. In this essay, Tami Davis Biddle clarifies, systematizes, and makes more readily accessible the language of coercion theory.

oercion theory is one of the most fully process. One does not, they believe, “bargain” with developed bodies of theory in the social one’s enemies — one fights them. Nor do they find sciences, one that has advanced the field congenial the idea that coercion requires the co- of national security by illuminating the operation of the enemy. Even if one explains that logicC that underlies threats, violence, and war. Co- this is by no means happy cooperation, it rankles ercion has a long history, of course, but its mani- nonetheless because they (especially those in the festation as a sustained point of focus in contem- U.S. military) believe they should own the initiative porary social science may arguably be traced to and maintain dominance across the full spectrum Thomas Crombie Schelling’s 1966 book, Arms and of conflict at all times.4 Influence.1 An economist by training, Schelling de- The word “coercion” itself sits uneasily with mil- veloped his early work at a time when debates over itary professionals. It has overtones of blackmail nuclear strategy dominated the landscape, although and manipulation, which are anathema to their his work is applicable to all varieties of force.2 Over self-identity. In general, they also do not take readily the past 50 years, scholars have embraced and built to Schelling’s emphasis on threats. While they fully upon Schelling’s work, using it to shed light on an understand deterrence, they may draw back from array of issues in defense and national security.3 If the idea that they are in the business of “threaten- coercion theory is understood in the academy, how- ing” others (and sometimes making those threats ever, it is less well understood by practitioners, es- credible by actions) in order to deter and compel. Tami Davis Biddle pecially those in the military. This is a problem for For Schelling, conflicts involving coercion unfold civil-military communication, and, more generally, through a kind of violent communication about in- for national strategy and military outcomes. tentions and commitment. Understandably, few mil- On those occasions when they encounter coer- itary officers see killing and dying as just a form of cion theory, military practitioners are often instinc- communication.5 tively wary of it. In general, they tend to be skepti- Schelling’s phrase “brute force” receives no eas- cal that theories produced by academics can help ier reception. Here, the problem is rather easy to them understand war, which they believe is their understand since the phrase itself quickly conjures COERCION THEORY: dominion. After all, academics dwell in the realm of up images of indiscriminate and primal violence — the abstract and the theoretical while military pro- a kind of warfighting that lies in direct opposition fessionals dwell in the realm of the concrete and to the institutional identity of modern military pro- A BASIC INTRODUCTION the real. Moreover, military professionals are not fessionals. FOR PRACTITIONERS entirely comfortable with violence as a bargaining Military culture and identity thus prevent many 1 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008, reprint of the original 1966 edition). Thomas Schelling (1921–2016) taught in the economics department at Yale at the beginning of his career, and then moved to the economics department at Harvard. He also served in the government and worked for the RAND Corporation. He ended his career at the University of Maryland. In 2005, he won the Nobel Prize in Economics. See, William Grimes, “Thomas Schelling, Master Theorist of Nuclear Strategy, Dies at 95,” New York Times, Dec. 13, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/business/economy/thomas-schelling-dead-nobel-laureate.html. 2 Other contributors in this early era included: J. David Singer, Glenn Snyder, Morton Kaplan, William Simons, George Quester, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Albert Wohlstetter, and Herman Kahn. 3 Key contributors and critics include: Robert Jervis, Richard K. Betts, John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Lawrence Freedman, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Stein, Patrick Morgan, Richard Smoke, Alexander George, Robert Art, Charles Glaser, Scott Sagan, Robert Powell, Stephen Van Evera, Robert Pape, Bruce Russett, Paul K. Huth, Wallace Thies, Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, Patrick Cronin, Darryl Press, Alexander Downes, Todd Sechser, and Austin Long. Writers including Martin Libicki, Jon R. Lindsay, and Erik Gartzke have begun to look hard at deterrence in the cyber realm. 4 These observations are generalizations that rest largely on my many years of experience as a scholar responsible for teaching practitioners. 5 Here coercion theory also intersects with the bargaining theory of war, associated with scholars including James Fearon, Donald Wittman, Dan Reiter, Harrison Wagner, Suzanne Werner, and Geoffrey Blainey.

95 The Strategist Coercion Theory: A Basic Introduction for Practitioners

practitioners from embracing a body of theory that physically destroying his military capabilities. …It fusion, this essay seeks to clarify, systematize, and to calculate, to decide — based on his own interests offers them crucial insights into the nature and requires the enemy’s incapacitation as a viable mili- make readily accessible the language of coercion the- and position — whether or not to resist the threat practice of their own profession. Understanding tary force.” Erosion, by contrast, seeks “to convince ory. Drawing on Schelling’s original texts, I explain being made. coercion is central to developing and implementing the enemy that accepting our terms will be less the categories he used and the terms he developed. Observing human behavior, Schelling recognized sound strategy. When practitioners (either military painful than continuing to aggress or resist.” Its goal Throughout, I emphasize Schelling’s fundamental that humans use threats constantly to shape the be- or civilian) remain innocent of or resistant to coer- is to erode “the enemy leadership’s or the enemy point: Coercion is difficult, even for actors who hold havior of others. We do this for a range of reasons. cion theory, they fail to grasp the logic that animates society’s political will.” With erosion, military force a preponderance of coercive leverage in a given situa- Anyone who has raised a child has learned quickly their own decisions and strategies and to under- is employed “to raise the costs of resistance higher tion. Schelling and those who have further developed how to influence that child’s choices: A parent may stand the ways that their enemies may resist and than the enemy is willing to pay.” The authors of his ideas worked hard to demonstrate that coercion issue a threat in order to keep a child from harm, or thwart them, even when those enemies are materi- the doctrine argue that erosion is used “in pursuit is anything but simple, straightforward, or formula- to set boundaries to help prepare the child for civil ally weaker. It also causes them to misunderstand of limited political goals that we believe the enemy ic. It is not a silver bullet. Indeed, much of the mo- interaction with others. As children grow older, the the history of much of the U.S. military experience, leadership will ultimately be willing to accept.”7 tivation of Schelling’s 1966 effort was to explain the content of those behavior-influencing threats must especially since World War II. Most importantly, it The latter sentence is especially problematic, re- complexity of coercion and to provide insights into change in order to reflect the child’s level of compre- causes practitioners to systematically overestimate vealing the root of several U.S. failures. A coercer the challenges one should expect when employing it. hension and new interests and the parent’s chang- their own chances for quick and low-cost victories. may perceive that a contested stake is “limited,” Finally, this essay seeks to draw the attention of ing leverage over the child’s behavior.12 Another stumbling block to the full use of coercion but the state being coerced (i.e., the target state) practitioners in particular to a body of theoretical Similarly, if we wish to keep our homes safe from theory by practitioners is that scholars who write may not see it that way at all. U.S. efforts to coerce work that is exceptionally useful across the board intruders, we may install a security system and then about the topic do not always use consistent terms, the North Vietnamese in the 1960s were thwarted — and not least in an era of renewed international post a sign advertising it. A potential intruder is definitions, and categories. In some cases, the failure when the latter turned the tables and ultimately co- competition. As the United States leaves behind its alerted to the negative consequences that will greet of contemporary scholars to invest sufficient time in erced the United States by raising the price of vic- “long wars” and turns its attention back to near- any attempt to enter without permission. This ac- Schelling’s original texts have resulted in errors that tory higher than the Americans were willing to pay. peer competition and nuclear rivalry, the literature tion is meant to deter — to prevent someone from have muddied the theoretical waters. It does not To civilian ears, “erosion” sounds vague and un- on coercion theory will help strategists understand taking an action he otherwise might take. But threats help that Schelling himself wrote in an idiosyncrat- derspecified, while “annihilation” suggests some- and craft intelligent responses to current and fu- can be used to compel actions as well as deter them. ic way that is not readily grasped by those who do thing more dramatic than dispensing with the need ture political challenges.10 Understanding the In the film The Godfather, Don Corleone promises to not have the luxury of devoting extensive periods for enemy cooperation. Both terms leave room for language of coercion theory will also help practi- influence the decisions of the head of a film studio, of time to his work. Students in civilian programs miscommunication. tioners identify and distinguish the situations in stating, “I’m gonna make him an offer he can’t re- of extended duration have this luxury. Students in A new (as yet unpublished) version of Joint Pub- which adversaries seek gains by faits accomplis fuse.” If the recipient of the threat refuses to accept rather more hurried professional military education lication 1 not only confuses Schelling’s categories, and by working around red lines. The Joint Staff the “offer” (which is actually a demand), then harm programs do not. but uses his term “compellence” (which is a sub- have made “deterrence theory” a special area of will follow. The coercive threat is designed to com- This leaves room for substantial misunderstand- set of coercion), to describe what Schelling called emphasis for professional military education in the pel an individual to do something he would prefer ing and miscommunication. For many years, for in- “brute force.” If adopted, this publication will flip immediate future,11 but the utility of such a move not to do. If the threat derives from a source known stance, the foundational doctrine of the Joint Chiefs the meaning of two of Schelling’s most important will rest on a shared understanding of terms and to be willing and able to produce harm, then it is of Staff has used the language of coercion theory — terms, putting the military’s doctrinal categories concepts among scholars and practitioners. credible and must be taken seriously. but in ways that have varied from problematic to dramatically at odds with the civilian literature on An actor being coerced (i.e., the target state) must simply wrong. While the authors of contemporary coercion theory. Since doctrine ought to be a start- assess its own willingness and ability to endure joint doctrine recognize the distinction between ing place for military thought and a mechanism for Threats, Influence, and Behavior pain, as well as the credibility of the adversary’s Schelling’s fundamental categories of “coercion” civil-military communication, this revision could threat. “The power to hurt,” Schelling explained, “is and “brute force,” they do not use these same terms, have serious ramifications.8 On the other hand, the Schelling was interested in the ability of military a kind of bargaining power, not easy to use, but used or trace the intellectual provenance of the ideas. recent Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 (published in De- power to “hurt” the enemy — to inflict pain or pun- often.”13 Even great powers possessing high levels of Joint Publication 1, the Doctrine for the Armed Forc- cember 2019) uses the language of coercion theory ishment — and the inherent “bargaining power” this coercive leverage over others find that target states es of the United States, explains that there are “two accurately and is thus a welcome change. While a confers. Coercion is about future pain, about struc- can resist in unexpected ways, making the line be- fundamental strategies” in the use of military force: joint doctrine note does not supersede existing doc- turing the enemy’s incentives so that he behaves in tween the application of power and the achieve- “annihilation” and “erosion.”6 The first term corre- trine, it “facilitates information sharing on problems a particular way. It manipulates the power to hurt ment of a desired outcome anything but direct and sponds roughly to Schelling’s “brute force,” and the and potential solutions to support formal doctrine and involves making a threat to do something one straightforward. By its nature, coercion requires a second corresponds roughly to “coercion,” although development and revision.”9 This new publication has not yet done. The coercer forces another actor decision by the actor being coerced, thus placing the the parallels in each case are imperfect. Annihilation moves in the right direction.

seeks “to make the enemy helpless to resist us, by To help address this ongoing terminological con- 10 In an important essay, Richard Betts makes the case for turning our attention back to nuclear deterrence, under appropriate circumstances, in the contemporary threat environment. See, Richard K. Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence: What the Strategy that Won the Cold War Can — and Can’t — Do Now,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 2 (March/April 2013), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2013-02-11/lost-logic-deter- 6 Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013 (Incorporating Change 1, July 12, rence. Paul Bracken emphasizes that, in the current threat environment, the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence must be understood — as well as 2017), I-4, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf. their role in communication and bargaining. See, Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2013), esp. 61. 7 Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, I-4. If the military were to accept the terms generally used in the scholarly debate, they could communicate more easily with civilians trained in the field of national security, and could more readily tap into the 11 Joseph S. Dunford, “Special Areas of Emphasis for Joint Professional Military Education in Academic Years 2020 and 2021,” Joint Chiefs broad and useful body of literature that has developed in the wake of Schelling’s original work. of Staff, Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services, May 6, 2019, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/jpme_ sae_2020_2021.pdf. 8 Unpublished revision of Joint Publication 1: Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, chap. II. 12 Schelling, who raised four sons, pointed out that child-rearing had given him insights into ways of structuring incentives to create specific behav- 9 Joint Doctrine Note 2-19: Strategy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dec. 10, 2019, II-4–II-5. For quoted material, see, I, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/ iors. In Arms and Influence, he refers to the influence of parents over their children on a number of occasions. See, for instance, pages 74 and 136. Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn2_19.pdf?ver=2019-12-20-093655-890. (Readers should not confuse U.S. Joint Doctrine Note 2-19 with the U.K. Ministry of Defence JDN 2/19 of April 2019). 13 Schelling, Arms and Influence, xiii.

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outcome in the actor’s hands. This is what makes Deterrence, Compellence, ready started.”23 The United States, he notes, is one that because the future is uncertain and difficult to coercion difficult and complex — and distinct from and Brute Force: Definitions of the most frequent users of compellent threats.24 predict, states often make choices based on misper- a more direct use of power that Schelling defined as Examples abound. Sometimes they involve the use ception — and those choices sometimes involve en- “brute force,” wherein there is no need for a deci- In Schelling’s taxonomy, “coercion” is an over- (or threatened use) of U.S. troops, and sometimes tering into ill-advised wars.29 sion by the target state because power is imposed arching category encompassing both “deterrence” they do not. But military power always stands in Robert Jervis’s work elaborates in detail how and directly in such a way as to obviate choice. and “compellence.” The word “deterrence” was the background. In one notable example from 1956, why two actors may perceive (and respond to) the Political actors use coercive threats all the time in common usage when he wrote Arms and Influ- President Dwight Eisenhower used economic and same situation very differently.30 He insists that de- to protect themselves and to preserve and promote ence.17 The term “compellence” he coined himself, diplomatic threats to compel the British, French, cision-makers and analysts ask some key questions their interests. Schelling observed, after rejecting several alternatives. Since 1966, it and Israelis to cease the military operations they about coercion, including: Do the adversaries assess has become part of the lexicon of security stud- had begun in response to Egypt nationalizing the the stakes similarly? Do they view the credibility of The bargaining power that comes from the ies.18 (Schelling admired, but chose not to select, the Suez Canal. More recently, the administration of threats the same way? Are both sides equally con- physical harm a nation can do another na- terms “dissuasion” and “persuasion” that J. David President Donald Trump used a threat of economic cerned about reputation? Jervis points out that cul- tion is reflected in notions like deterrence, Singer had used several years earlier to describe a sanctions to try to compel the Mexican government tural norms and expectations vary, perspectives dif- retaliation, reprisal, terrorism, and wars of similar idea.)19 to more aggressively discourage population flows fer, and domestic political imperatives may override nerve, nuclear blackmail, armistice and sur- Deterrence involves a threat to keep an adversary across the U.S. border.25 other pressures. Opportunities for misperception render, as well as in reciprocal efforts to “from starting something,” or “to prevent [an adver- As a major power seeking to maintain the existing and miscommunication abound.31 restrain that harm in the treatment of pris- sary] from action by fear of consequences.” Compel- international structure, the United States possess- In the first pages of Arms and Influence, Schell- oners, in the limitation of war, and in the lence is “a threat intended to make an adversary do es coercive leverage and uses it over other states. A ing took pains to distinguish coercion from “brute regulation of armaments.14 something.”20 In deterrence, the punishment will be sense of its own power, combined with a desire to force,” which, he argues, is used “without [reliance imposed if the adversary acts; in compellence, the use that power to solve complex problems with min- on] persuasion or intimidation.” Later in the book, The power to hurt confers bargaining power, punishment is usually imposed until the adversary imum trouble and expenditure, has inclined Ameri- he uses the phrase “forcible action” as a synonym, a Schelling insisted. The willingness to exploit it is acts.21 As noted, the central characteristic of both can decision-makers to look to coercion repeatedly. preferable phrase because it does not carry so much diplomacy — “vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy.”15 forms of coercion is that they depend, ultimately, But coercion, especially compellence, is difficult, linguistic baggage.32 With brute force/forcible action Schelling explained that the use of “the power to on cooperation by the party receiving the threat. and provides no guarantee of success — not even there is no need for the opponent’s cooperation. The hurt” operates like blackmail in that it exploits an This is by no means friendly cooperation, but it is to very powerful actors.26 Reviewing five empirical actor simply takes what it wants. Schelling com- enemy’s fears and needs. The power to hurt is usu- cooperation nonetheless. Compellence can be used studies of coercion, Downes concludes that compel- pared this to the way a tank or a bulldozer can sim- ally most successful when it is held in reserve. Hos- in peacetime and in wartime, the former use being lence succeeds only about 35 percent of the time.27 ply “force its way, regardless of others’ interests.” tages, for instance, are taken and held for coercive referred to generally as coercive diplomacy.22 Karl Mueller adds further texture to the defini- Brute force, he explained, “is concerned with enemy purposes. Those taking the hostages seek to make Alexander Downes describes coercion as “the tion of deterrence: “causing someone not to do strengths, not enemy interests.”33 Adding detail to another actor give up something — money, political art of manipulating costs and benefits to affect the something because they expect or fear that they the idea, Schelling wrote: “Forcibly a country can re- prisoners, etc. But if they kill the hostage, the oth- behavior of an actor.” Explaining its two forms, he will be worse off if they do it than if they do not.” pel and expel, penetrate and occupy, seize, extermi- er actor no longer has an incentive to concede and writes, “Deterrence consists of threats of force de- He stresses that deterrence “happens in the mind nate, disarm, and disable, confine, deny access, and coercive hostage-taking fails. Any coercive act that signed to persuade a target to refrain from taking a of the potential aggressor.”28 Moreover, he observes directly frustrate intrusion or attack.” Brute force is kills the hostage, as it were, reduces its own effec- particular action. Compellence, by contrast, utilizes tiveness. Hostages, Schelling argued, “represent the force — or threats of force — to propel a target to power to hurt in its purest form.”16 take an action, or to stop taking an action it has al- 23 See, Alexander Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the Success and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove Foreign Leaders,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Greenhill and Krause, 96. 24 Other frequent users in history have been Japan, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia. See, Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences,” 93–114, esp. 112. 25 On the Suez crisis, see, for instance, Diane B. Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 14 Schelling, Arms and Influence, xiii–xiv. Press, 1991); “The Suez Crisis, 1956,” Office of the Historian, Department of State,https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez . On Mexico, see, Tracy Wilkinson and Noah Bierman, “US and Mexico Strike a Deal on Migration, Staving off Trump’s Tariff Plan,” Los Angeles Times, June 7, 2019, 15 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 2. https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-pol-us-mexico-tariffs-immigration-talks-20190607-story.html. 16 Schelling (in Arms and Influence) refers to hostages and hostage-taking on multiple occasions. See, for instance, pages 6 and 8. 26 Downes writes, “Studies of compellence in international relations confirm Thomas Schelling’s argument that success is elusive.” See, Downes, 17 Lawrence Freedman has observed that “Throughout the cold war the concept of deterrence was central to all strategic discourse. Every “Step Aside or Face the Consequences,” 97, also 93. See also, Art and Greenhill, who offer a useful summary of the reasons why coercion is difficult, strategic move of the West was made with reference to its requirements, and eventually this was also the case with the Soviet bloc.” See, Lawrence in “Coercion, An Analytical Overview,”18–19. Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), 1. 27 Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences,” 97. An individual author’s method for coding cases will of course affect these numbers, 18 See, Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70–71. See also Schelling’s preface to the 2008 reprinted edition, x. Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill but studies of compellence generally find that its success rate is surprisingly low. And nonnuclear deterrence fails more often than those who are point out that naming and categorization conventions have not been consistent in the literature: “Often the terms coercion and compellence are not well-versed in history expect. See, Richard Ned Lebow, “Thucydides and Deterrence,” Security Studies 16, no. 2 (2007): 163–88, https://doi. used interchangeably, but that erroneously implies that deterrence is not a form of coercion.” In their own work, they have chosen to stay with org/10.1080/09636410701399440. Schelling’s original categorization. See, Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in 28 Here one thinks of the famous line uttered in Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film, Dr. Strangelove. International Politics, ed. Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 5. 29 Karl P. Mueller, “Conventional Deterrence Redux: Avoiding Great Power Conflict in the 21st Century,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 12, no. 4 19 See, J. David Singer, “Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model,” American Political Science Review 57, no. 2 (June 1963): 420–30, https://doi. (Winter 2018): 78–79, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26533616. Italics added by this author. org/10.2307/1952832. Schelling found the related adjective “persuasive” problematic since it “is bound to suggest the adequacy or credibility of a threat, not the character of its objective.” See, Schelling, Arms and Influence, 71, note 17. It is clear that Singer’s work informed Schelling and 30 The foundational text is Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976); inspired him to further efforts. but Jervis is a prolific contributor with an extensive body of work on this topic. 20 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 69 and 71. Italics added by this author. 31 See, for instance, Robert Jervis, “Deterrence and Perception,” International Security 7, no. 3 (Winter 1982/1983), reprinted in Steven. E. Miller, Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984), 57–84; and Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychol- 21 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 70. ogy and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). 22 See, Art and Greenhill, “Coercion: An Analytical Overview,” 13–14. Alexander George has been a major contributor to the literature on 32 Schelling, Arms and Influence, esp. xiv, 2, and 3 for quoted material. “Forcible action” appears on page 80. coercive diplomacy. See, for instance, Alexander I. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1991). 33 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 4 and 3. On page 8, Schelling adds, importantly, “Brute force can only accomplish what requires no collaboration.”

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directly measurable and is usually measured relative An actor can also deter by (threat of) denial. This to an enemy’s strength, the one opposing the other.34 route seeks to dissuade an adversary by convincing Unlike coercion, brute force/forcible action does not him that any military campaign he may launch will place the outcome in the hands of the adversary.35 fail militarily because the coercer will deny the abil- Land power plays a particularly important role in ity to complete the action successfully.36 Richard K. the realm of brute force/forcible action. If an army Betts offers a definition of deterrence notable for its can control the situation on the ground, it ultimately lucidity and conciseness: can dispense with seeking an adversary’s coopera- tion. If it is strong enough, an army can remove an Deterrence is a strategy for combining two existing government and replace it with one that is competing goals: countering an enemy and more congenial to the political authorities it serves, avoiding war. Academics have explored and then control the aftermath. This is demanding countless variations on that theme, but the Precision of thought and costly, and is therefore typically reserved for basic concept is quite simple: an enemy will extreme situations. Of course, armies have many not strike if it knows the defender can defeat roles short of using brute force/forcible action. In- the attack, or can inflict unacceptable damage and language can deed, their existence affords decision-makers a crit- in retaliation. ical tool for deterrence and compellence. However, matter greatly in their role as agents of brute force/forcible action is Here Betts refers first to deterrence by threat crucially important. It is thus vital for students of of denial (“can defeat the attack”) and then to de- military power to understand the logical distinction terrence by threat of punishment (“can inflict un- compellence, while a between Schelling’s primary categories of coercion acceptable damage in retaliation”).37 It should be and brute force/forcible action, and the strengths noted here that deterrence and compellence can degree of vagueness and weaknesses of both. And it is equally important be used by small states as well as large states. It is for civilian authorities to understand the ways in an actor’s will and determination (to gain or hold a which different military instruments relate to them. stake), rather than its raw power — defined in phys- occasionally can be ical, military, or economic terms — that usually dic- tates the outcome in a coercive interaction.38 useful for deterrence. Methods of Coercion Deterrence by threat of denial and deterrence by threat of punishment are sometimes linked to one Actors can deter by threat of punishment or by another. For instance, a state may imply to an ene- threat of denial. The meaning of the first is easy to my that if denial fails, it will resort to punishment. In discern: The coercing state threatens to impose pain the Cold War era, deterring a Soviet grab for Western on the target state for failure to comply with the co- Europe involved both threats of denial and threats of ercer’s demand. This might involve an air strike on a punishment. Because NATO had fewer ground forces location valued by the target state or a naval blockade than the Warsaw Pact, both denial and punishment to deny it crucial resources. Perhaps the most famil- rested heavily on U.S.-funded and controlled nuclear iar version of deterrence since the advent of the Cold forces.39 Today, NATO ground forces once again are War is nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons certain- engaged in exercises designed to sharpen their con- ly are not necessary to inflict punishment, but, as ventional military skills, and thus to deter Russian Schelling pointed out, no weapon has ever surpassed action by threat of denial. Still standing in the back- nuclear weapons for threatening severe pain. ground, though, is the potential threat of punishment

34 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1–3. For quoted material see page 1. 35 Here it is important to note that coercive campaigns usually have components of brute force within them. Likewise, brute force campaigns involve elements of coercion. If you bomb a target (whether it’s an airfield or factory or city) then you are imposing direct destruction that people in the immediate area cannot control or influence. But the strategic purpose of this tactical brute force is to signal that you can impose future pain or punishment and will do so. By contrast, a successful tactical advance that causes the local defender to flee is coercive (since the defender fears further punishment), even if it takes place in the context of a larger brute force campaign. See, Schelling, Arms and Influence, 8–9. Note, too, that terror campaigns are coercive in that any given terrorist act (and the destruction it produces) is less important than the fear it raises about repeat (and perhaps escalated) acts. What is important for the strategist to focus on and prioritize is the intention and logic guiding his or her campaign. 36 Robert A. Pape offers an important discussion of denial in, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 18, 29–35, 69–79. 37 Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” 88. 38 But “will” is a slippery term since it is hard to measure (either in isolation or in comparison). This is another element explaining the challenge and difficulty inherent in coercion. 39 Today, the tables are turned and the Russians are weaker on the ground than NATO. This has inspired the Russian “escalate to de-escalate policy” that has recently unsettled those in the Defense Department. But it is based on the same logic that NATO used at a different moment in time, in the era of “Flexible Response.” See, for instance, Paul I. Bernstein, “The Emerging Nuclear Landscape,” in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 109.

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posed by U.S. nuclear weapons. rather than simply refrain from one — it is clear to ly to communicate in the very design of the threat rence.47 A nuanced understanding of the needs, Punishment and denial come into play in compel- all when compellence is successful. Moreover, the just what, or how much, is demanded.” Offering an fears, capabilities, interests, and will of the target lence as well. Airpower, particularly 21st-century air- actor being compelled is usually being forced into example, Schelling focused on the Western military state is essential. But the coercer must possess power, is often viewed as a coercive tool of choice some degree of humiliation. Robert Art explains that garrison in West Berlin during the Cold War, which, self-knowledge as well, including an understand- since it is easily scaled and tailored, and can be used compellence requires the target state’s “overt sub- he argued, had an unmistakable deterrent purpose. ing of the importance of the stake involved, and the by some air forces, including the U.S. Air Force, with mission.”41 The ability of a powerful state to compel Were it to intrude into East Berlin, though, “to in- likely commitment to it — by policymakers and by high precision against discrete targets. Air strikes a less powerful one is constrained and complicated duce Soviet or German Democratic Forces to give the domestic population — over time. And the co- can, at once, inflict pain and signal an intention to by this fact. Coercers, Downes argues, “tend to un- way,” there would be no “obvious interpretation” of ercer must be able to articulate the demand in ways inflict future pain. In a denial role, they can inter- derestimate the target’s concern for its reputation “where and how much Soviet and East German forc- the target state can comprehend and comply with. dict military supplies and destroy key military in- and thus offer too little compensation to obtain the es ought to give way unless the adventure could be To understand all this is to understand the deeper frastructure, preventing an adversary from fighting target’s acquiescence.” He adds, “The target’s fear invested with some unmistakable goal or limitation meaning of Carl von Clausewitz’s insistence on the effectively. for its reputation and the challenger’s unwillingness — a possibility not easily realized.”44 linkage between war and politics, and the need to For the practitioner, it is important to understand to lower its demands or offer side payment to com- The centrality of communication means that co- recognize the relationship between the stake and the fundamental logic being employed so that the pensate the target for the damage to its reputation ercion is heavily dependent on knowledge, and thus the scale of effort required to achieve it. It is also to strengths and weaknesses of the ways and means cause the target to resist threats from powerful on sophisticated intelligence.45 The coercer must un- understand, beyond a superficial level, the meaning utilized will be clear, thus reducing the likelihood states.”42 Thus, though the state being coerced may derstand the target state’s fears, vulnerabilities, and of Sun Tzu’s insistence on knowing one’s self, and of frustration or surprise when the enemy seeks to appear to be in a weaker position, this is not true interests — as well as its willingness to endure pain knowing one’s enemy. thwart or resist those ways and means. In 1990, for in one important sense: The state being coerced ul- on behalf of those interests. For these reasons, coer- One should note here, too, that democracies en- instance, Operation Desert Shield sent U.S. troops timately makes a decision about whether or not to cion is subject to cultural miscommunication while gaging in coercion will face a challenge inherent to the Middle East to deter an Iraqi incursion into comply — and in that sense it holds the initiative. brute force is not. As Schelling explained, in the structure of their system of governance: Saudi Arabia. In January 1991, air strikes against Iraq As Schelling pointed out, when it comes to timing Communication is complicated by multiple power were used largely to compel Iraq to pull out of Ku- deterrence can be indefinite while compellence, by To exploit a capacity for hurting and inflict- centers — built by design to check one another — wait, while air strikes against Kuwait served mainly contrast, must be definite. Without a deadline, the ing damage one needs to know what an ad- and myriad interest groups. Indeed, bureaucratic to undermine Iraqi capabilities in that theater. If the adversary being compelled has no incentive to act: versary treasures and what scares him, and (and organizational) models of decision-making are Iraqis did not concede, then the United States and “If the action carries no deadline it is only a posture, one needs the adversary to understand what at the center of many scholars’ critiques of U.S. for- its allies were committed to an invasion of Kuwait or a ceremony, with no consequences.” But on the behavior of his will cause the violence to be eign policy, and deterrence in general.48 designed to deny Iraq its gains, and, ultimately, to other hand, if too little time is given for compliance, inflicted, and what will cause it to be with- Communication by the coercer may be verbal, but drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait through brute then the coercer has put its adversary into an impos- held. The victim has to know what is want- it need not be. It can also be delivered through an force/forcible action.40 sible position, virtually ensuring that compellence ed, and he may have to be assured of what action itself. Schelling argued: will fail. Schelling summed this up by stating, “Too is not wanted.46 little time and compliance becomes impossible; too Unhappily, the power to hurt is often commu- Characteristics of Coercive Threats: much time and compliance becomes unnecessary.”43 Coercive action often begins with economic action nicated by some performance of it. Whether Distinctions and Requirements To compel successfully, a coercer must convey — the freezing of assets, perhaps, or the imposition it is sheer terroristic violence to induce an specific information to the actor being coerced. If of sanctions. The goal is to force the target state (or irrational response, or cool premeditated vi- The two main categories of coercion — deterrence compliance is being demanded, then how much, and actor) to choose between conceding the disputed olence to persuade somebody that you mean and compellence — are distinct in their nature and for how long? Moreover, the enemy must believe stake or suffering future pain that making such a it and may do it again, it is not the pain and requirements. When an actor refrains from a be- that the coercer will actually stop the pain if the tar- concession would avert. The target state must be damage itself but its influence on somebody’s havior, one does not and cannot know the specific get state concedes the stake. The promise to cease convinced that if it resists it will suffer, but if it con- behavior that matters.49 reason (or reasons) for that choice. Refraining from coercion if the enemy gives in must be believed, cedes it will not. If it suffers either way, or if it has an action can be attributed to causes other than the just as the threat to continue coercion if the target already suffered all it can, then it will not concede In many instances verbal threats are backed up by specific deterrent threat. The enemy may never have state withholds the stake must be. When it comes and coercion will fail. actions to ensure that the message is being taken se- intended to attack in the first place, for example, in to deterrence, a promise not to attack if the enemy One can thus see the many formidable challenges riously. But the coercer must be sure that language which case the deterrent threat is not what prevent- doesn’t invade is easier to believe — after all, there facing a coercer. Precision of thought and language and actions are aligned, clear, and suitably tailored ed the attack. In fact, it is never clear whether the is no attack taking place right now. In deterrence, can matter greatly in compellence, while a degree to create the behavior being sought. If miscommuni- absence of an attack is due to an enemy giving in to Schelling observed, “the objective is often communi- of vagueness occasionally can be useful for deter- cation occurs in any of these realms — due to care- a deterrent threat. This ambiguity enables enemies cated by the very preparations that make the threat

who have been deterred to save face. credible.” By contrast, compellent threats “tend to 44 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 73. See also page 75 where he states, “There is a tendency to … give too little emphasis to communicating Because compellence is active in ways that deter- communicate only the general direction of compli- what behavior will satisfy us.” rence is not — the target state must perform an act ance, and are less likely to be self-limiting, less like- 45 See, Austin Long, “Intelligence and Coercion: A Neglected Connection,” in Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics, ed. Greenhill and Krause, 33–54.

40 Some of the air strikes in Iraq proper served purposes of denial. The “Instant Thunder” strikes that aimed at “decapitation,” for instance, 46 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3–4. served to punish and to deny. With regard to the latter, the denial would come in the form of eroded command and control. For insights, see, Pape, 47 Here though, actors need to be careful. Any threat that is underspecified and can confuse the target state (potentially leading to miscommu- Bombing to Win, 211–53. nication) should be avoided. 41 Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy: What Do We Know,” in The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art and Patrick Cronin 48 See, for instance, Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1974); Robert Jervis, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), 362. Also Schelling, Arms and Influence, 82–84. “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” Center for Arms Control and Security Working Paper, no. 14 (1978); Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread 42 Downes, “Step Aside or Face the Consequences,” 99. of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003). 43 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 72. 49 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.

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lessness, mixed messaging from different groups During the Cold War, what came to be called “Mu- within the coercing state, or cultural obtuseness — tually Assured Destruction” rested on the idea that then coercion is likely to fail. Military planners who a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States would understand this will have an elevated appreciation be answered by a U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet for the crucial importance of getting all the details Union, and vice versa.53 Whether the United States right when they are engaged in the important work would have risked a nuclear strike on its own ter- of operational design.50 And they will also have a ritory in order to protect Paris or Bonn, however, heightened appreciation of the need for a fastidious was not nearly so clear. But U.S. statesmen, through commitment to inter-agency coordination. words, policies, and actions, sought to convince their Credibility, which matters for deterrence and Soviet adversary that the threat was real. In other compellence, is neither unvarying nor permanent. parts of the world, the United States made similar Actors place different values on stakes. This means efforts. Describing the Formosa [Taiwan] Resolution that adversaries will constantly try to calculate each passed by the U.S. Congress in 1955, Schelling ob- other’s level of interest in and commitment to a giv- served that the resolution “was a ceremony to leave en stake. A preponderance of strength does not im- the Chinese and the Russians under no doubt that ply successful coercion. Daniel Byman and Matthew we [the United States] could not back down from Waxman have observed, “The United States failed the defense of Formosa without intolerable loss of to coerce North Vietnam; Russia failed to coerce prestige, reputation, and leadership.” He added, Chechen guerillas to give up their struggle; Israel “We were not merely communicating an intention has pulled out of Lebanon. These instances ... evince or obligation we already had, but actually enhancing the importance of vital, if rather ineffable factors.” the obligation in the process.”54 They add: “Will and credibility matter as much as, and often more than, the overall balance of forces. At times a coercer may have preponderant power in Airpower and Coercion a general sense but lack specific means to influence an adversary.”51 Naval forces have long been in a position to co- In the case of deterrence, a nation’s willingness to erce enemies via “gunboat diplomacy,” as well as by defend its own sovereign territory is typically clear. threatening or imposing an economic blockade.55 But Its willingness to defend another’s territory — or to the advent of airpower quite literally added a whole state’s leader and communication assets.58 It rests thwarting the effects of even overwhelming air risk drawing pain upon itself for the sake of another new dimension to the possibilities for coercion. on the idea that many warlike states are run by au- strikes.59 Pape found that airpower is most effective — is not as certain. Schelling explained: Three decades after Arms and Influence appeared, thoritarians — individuals who have highly person- as an instrument of denial, working to undermine an Robert Pape built on Schelling’s framework in his alized forms of governance that may be subjected adversary’s ability to attain military aims.60 To fight abroad is a military act, but to per- book Bombing to Win. He articulated and analyzed to direct assault. Decapitation, which rose to prom- Pape’s argument — that aerial coercion is not sim- suade enemies or allies that one would fight four types of coercion that could be carried out by inence in the era of precision bombing, informed ple or easy, and that punishment is less effective abroad, under circumstances of great cost airpower: punishment, denial, risk, and decapita- parts of the coercive air campaign over Iraq in the than most people expect — was important, and over and risk, requires more than a military ca- tion.56 The first two were clearly familiar to readers 1991 Gulf War. the years has been influential. But Pape did not look pability. It requires projecting intentions. of Schelling. Pape’s risk category, however, has not In general, Pape’s work found that punishment, in detail at the role of land power and the way it can It requires having those intentions, even generally been adopted in the literature because it risk, and decapitation all have problems as methods work as a central element of denial and an essential deliberately acquiring them, and commu- is not sufficiently distinguished from punishment.57 of aerial coercion. Leaders attached to a particular component of brute force. His analysis, though im- nicating them persuasively to make other Focusing on leadership as a center of gravity with- stake are often willing to pass the pain on to their portant, captures only part of the picture. There is countries behave.52 in an enemy state, decapitation seeks to disrupt an populations in order to protect the survival of the a need for further investigations into the way denial enemy’s will and ability to fight by attacking the regime. In many instances, local coercive measures actually works in terms of the interplay between air, — i.e., acts taken on the ground by secret police or sea, and ground forces. other privileged militia groups, such as the SS in In general, air forces and navies can impose pun- World War II — may overwhelm the effects of more ishment and can aid denial in myriad ways. Navies 50 See, Planners Handbook for Operational Design, Version 1.0, Joint Staff J-7, Oct. 7, 2011, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doc- remote aerial coercion. Culture and tradition, as in can prevent an adversary from receiving crucial sup- trine/pams_hands/opdesign_hbk.pdf. the case of Japan during World War II, may dissuade plies needed to fight, while air forces can seek to 51 Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 18. a population from rising against its leadership, thus interdict supplies, both strategically and operation- 52 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 36. 53 On Cold War nuclear theory and its history, see, Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martins, 1981). 58 The leading proponent of decapitation was Col. John Warden of the U.S. Air Force, who placed “leadership” in the center of his now-famous five targeting rings. 54 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 49–50 (quoted material on page 50). 59 On these points see, Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 270–78. Here I 55 An extreme example was the World War I naval blockade against Germany imposed by the British (and later joined by the United States). refer to the firebombing of Japan taking place between March and August 1945. The two nuclear attacks require a different analysis. Ultimately, it brought about widespread starvation and death in Germany. Official German estimates attributed 730,000 deaths to the blockade. See, Michael Howard, The First World War: A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 88. 60 Pape argued that the attainment of air superiority is an activity unto itself, and is a necessary prerequisite for all coercive bombing strategies. Some analysts feel that when airpower is focused primarily on denial then it is categorized more appropriately as part of a traditional 56 Pape’s Bombing to Win is now read widely by those seeking to understand airpower and coercion. combined arms campaign. The key is for the campaign planner or decision-maker to possess a clear sense, 1) of the intent of the act; 2) of the way 57 On this issue see, Art and Greenhill, “Coercion, An Analytical Overview,” 21. Schelling himself had no “risk” category distinct from “punishment.” that airpower is operating on the target state; and 3) of the way it is interacting with other elements of military and nonmilitary power.

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ally. At a basic level, ground forces in expeditionary the coercer is always able to overwhelm the adver- wrote of “vigorous campaigns to force conditions on of land power comes with strings attached that do campaigns cannot reach their destinations alone: sary in that area.”62 the enemy regardless of his will.”66 not usually accompany discrete uses of air and na- They must be transported to the location where What practitioners must understand is that esca- An army is a powerful, indeed indispensable, tool val power in independent coercive actions. An ar- they will fight. Furthermore, they rely on their sister lation dominance is not just a matter of having bet- in the tool box of a major power. Although neither my’s presence on the ground is at once its greatest services for a steady supply of the equipment and ter technology or more resources. War is a contest coercion nor brute force is ever a silver bullet, when strength and its greatest weakness. Deploying an materiel that allows them to fight. Navies thus seek of wills as much as it is a contest of instruments other coercive leverage has failed, the threat of a army is, first of all, obvious: It signals a commitment sufficient control of the sea lanes to maintain routes and materiel. Once an actor has entered into co- land invasion — even a vague threat — is sometimes that cannot be shrugged off later without humilia- for transportation and communications. ercive activity he must be prepared to go forward, enough to convince an adversary that the game is no tion and, perhaps, costs to one’s credibility. The use In land campaigns, ground forces rely on air forc- matching the adversary’s resistance in determina- longer worth the candle. And if a state with a power- of an army also does not guarantee success. A deter- es to win and maintain enough control over air tion as well as in capability. Again, this requires ful army (and sufficient resources to sustain it over mined weaker enemy may be willing to enter an es- space to enable the land battle to be carried on suc- that the coercer have considerable insight into not time) is simply determined to win a stake, regard- calatory contest, upping the ante by turning to irreg- cessfully. Since World War I, no industrial nation only his own commitment to a stake, but his ad- less of cost, it has the option to shift to brute force/ ular methods and relying on time (and a high pain has been able to fight a peer competitor successful- versary’s as well. And it may require the coercer to forcible action. Thus, any state that wants to protect threshold) to hold out against a stronger force. Or it ly without the ability to largely control its own air- climb the escalatory ladder longer than he would and preserve global interests must possess, and be may turn to irregular methods once a conventional space and contest enemy airspace. Today, combat have predicted or preferred. prepared to use, sophisticated forms of expedition- war has been fought, in order to shift the terms of forces (of the ground, air, and sea) must also rely Most practitioners think of nuclear weapons ary land power.67 surrender or alter the postwar political situation. on cyber warriors to protect the many systems that as the pinnacle of the escalatory ladder, and this Land power also can allow an actor to set and con- For all these reasons, an actor contemplating the enable communication, intelligence, navigation, ki- is certainly true. But coercers possessing nucle- trol the political terms of the post-hostilities phase, use of land power must be prepared to commit to netic action, and situational awareness. Likewise, ar weapons must also have maximum escalatory whether the circumstances involve enforcing the the possibility of a campaign that lasts years (or they rely on space-based assets to enable and fa- range in the conventional realm. This is because terms of a negotiated settlement or setting up a new decades) rather than days and months.69 An adver- cilitate their functioning.61 Securing these systems the stakes in a contest may be very important, but regime after having removed the previous one. The sary state will know all this, and will work hard to — which poses an array of new and difficult chal- perhaps not important enough for the coercer to political advantages accruing to a victor can be fully determine if a threat of land power is being made lenges — has become a high priority for all states credibly contemplate the use of nuclear weapons. realized only if settlement terms can be enforced, or genuinely and credibly. Thus, those who would de- that conceive of themselves as major players in the If an actor wishes to have dominance in conven- if a new (imposed) regime takes root in a form that ploy armies must face up to the risks involved in international system. Because of this, these sys- tional escalation, he must possess land power. is agreeable to the actor who did the imposing. And, doing so, and must be ruthlessly realistic about the tems — as assets to be protected — now figure, in The ability of ground armies to land on enemy at a basic level, a state that has taken down a previ- demands and costs of such an undertaking. increasingly important ways, in discussions about soil, defeat the adversary’s forces (with the aid of ously existing government in a foreign land becomes Persuading decision-makers to fully consider deterrence in particular. air and naval power) and bodily remove the ex- responsible for the political resolution; for postwar these risks and make crucial calculations can be dif- isting leadership — i.e., the threat of brute force/ justice (jus post bellum), including postwar political ficult, however. Political decision-makers generally forcible action — provides a coercive tool that is security and stability; and for the care and feeding seek to avoid acknowledging the potential costs of Escalation Dominance without parallel in the conventional realm. Byman of the domestic population until a new, functioning a land campaign — especially the complications of and the Role of Brute Force and Waxman explain, “The possible use of ground structure can be set up. This is an immense task, terminating a war and the requirements for trans- forces is a potent threat and, if credible, reinforc- and an unavoidably expensive one. If an army is forming what was won by armies into durable and A coercer, when setting out to influence another es other instruments by highlighting the potential used simply to enforce negotiated settlement terms, sustainable political gains.70 Politicians will avoid actor, must have a strategy for escalation in case for escalation.”63 Regarding the role of land power its responsibilities will be lighter, but they will be realistic cost estimates because they fear that do- its initial efforts fail. It must feel confident that it in the 1999 Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, they significant nonetheless.68 mestic populations will not want to hear them.71 possesses what theorists call “escalation domi- argue that “the threat of NATO ground forces — While armies are powerful tools, their use is ac- Meanwhile, military planners will gravitate to the nance.” Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman have though ambiguous — helped convince [Slobodan] companied by some significant risks and draw- operational details of opening and sustaining cam- explained this as, “the ability to increase the threat- Milosevic to meet NATO demands over Kosovo.”64 backs, even when the deployment is for something paigns involving land power — they will not be ened costs to the adversary while denying the ad- Land power is thus the ne plus ultra when it as seemingly straightforward as humanitarian assis- drawn, whether due to natural interest or organi- versary the opportunity to negate those costs or to comes to coercion that is below the nuclear thresh- tance. Moving and using an army is costly in terms zational culture, to the less immediate and perhaps counterescalate.” They add, “it is through the par- old.65 It can confer upon an actor the freedom to of time, treasure, and, sometimes, blood. The use less appealing details of the post-hostilities phases ties’ perceptions that the coercer can achieve the es- depart from the constraints and complications of calation dominance that enables coercive strategies coercion and move into the realm of brute force/for- 66 Huba Wass de Czege, “War with Implacable Foes: What All Statesmen and Generals Need to Know,” Army 56, no. 5 (May 2006): 9–14. For to succeed … it requires a preponderance that is rel- cible action, where the actor takes what he wants quoted material, see page 10. (Italics added by this author.) In the same essay he explains, “Winning wars against determined enemies will always evant to every form of possible escalation: no matter without seeking the adversary’s cooperation. This is require eliminating the enemy’s option to decide how and when the war ends.” See page 11. where the adversary chooses to increase pressure, what Brig. Gen. Huba Wass de Czege meant when he 67 As noted above, even if the intent of a land campaign (from the outset) is brute force, it will be coercive initially: The target state has, after all, the option to concede at any point, and may do so early if the handwriting is on the wall. 68 For important insights on postwar governance from a thoughtful observer, see, Nadia Schadlow, War and the Art of Governance: Consolidat- 61 Challenges to Security in Space, Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20 ing Combat Success into Political Victory (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017). Publications/Space_Threat_V14_020119_sm.pdf; Joint Publication 3-12: Cyberspace Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 8, 2018, https://www.jcs. mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_12.pdf; Sandeep Baliga, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, and Alexander Wolitzky, “The Case for a Cyber 69 There are, of course, examples of wars that were relatively short and relatively inexpensive for one side. The Franco-Prussian War (for the Deterrence Plan that Works,” National Interest, March 5, 2019, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/case-cyber-deterrence-plan-works-46207. Prussians) and the Falklands War (for the British) come to mind. But short and inexpensive wars have not been the norm in history. Many a state that has banked on such an outcome has been sorely disappointed. 62 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 38–39. 70 Here I am relying on language suggested to me by Dr. Richard Lacquement, dean of the School of Strategic Landpower at the U.S. Army 63 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 100. War College. 64 Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 101. 71 The need to reassure domestic audiences about costs is the main reason why some U.S. presidents have moved toward conflict while simul- 65 To express a similar idea, Lukas Milevski has used the phrase “Fortissimus Inter Pares.” See, Milevski, “Fortissimus Inter Pares: The Utility of taneously indicating that ground force will be ruled out. This approach, however, undermines the powerful threat inherent in land power, and thus Land Power in Grand Strategy,” Parameters 42, no. 2 (Summer 2012): esp. 10. erodes escalation dominance.

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of war. And they may not want to acknowledge fully landscape of war that the past no longer applies, tive, or both.77 This requires the United States, as lems and convey them effectively and persuasively. the asymmetric means and methods that might be then it is a pernicious tendency that works to Amer- it undergirds its defenses, to also communicate its Finally, an understanding of coercion theory employed by an enemy. ica’s disadvantage. As Clausewitz insisted, wars will intentions and offer reassurance to limit escalatory helps all students of strategy appreciate the time- Both of these are considerable problems that un- change in character over time, but their essential tendencies and arms races. lessness of the writings of strategists like Sun Tzu dermine strategy and war planning. In the United nature does not. National security professionals also need to un- and Clausewitz, who warned about the need to States in particular, they have led to anger directed As it emerges from the long wars that dominated derstand the ways in which military tools may be make careful assessments, not only of our enemy at the leaders of the U.S. Army and to claims that the first two decades of the 21st century, the Unit- used in crisis scenarios. Many military instruments but of ourselves. We must understand whether the military professionals are poorly trained in the art ed States is thinking again about the possibilities are versatile: They can be used to send strong sig- stake in a given contest is more valuable to us or of strategy. But the responsibility must be shared of conflict with near-peer competitors and nuclear nals that are not inherently escalatory. A good case to the enemy. And we must face, with honesty and by military and civilian decision-makers since, in de- states. In both realms, coercion theory has a great in point was the use of naval ships to “quarantine” sobriety, the likely cost of our choices in money, mocracies, both are responsible for strategy.72 deal to offer.74 Richard Betts, for instance, has argued Cuba against the placement of further nuclear weap- time, and blood. Above all, military professionals must be alert the case for using carefully crafted deterrent threats ons in 1962. This line in the sand (or water) drawn to the tendency of political decision-makers to as- to prevent Iran from using nuclear weapons against by the U.S. Navy was a very clear signal, but was Tami Davis Biddle is professor of history and sume that military force is easy to employ and that third parties. He argues for specific, tailored deter- not inherently escalatory. It gave the Soviets the op- national security at the U.S. Army War College in power equates to success. And they must realize rence. A broad nuclear retaliatory threat (against portunity to withdraw without further inflaming the Carlisle, Pennsylvania. She writes frequently on air- that strategy will never be sound if decision-mak- the Iranian population) might not be believed, but situation. No doubt it produced a tense and fraught power, grand strategy, and 20th- and 21st-century ers — both military and civilian — are not suffi- a more specific threat focused on the regime itself scenario: The Soviets, if they chose not to challenge warfare. She is the author, recently, of Strategy and ciently attentive to the logic of the campaign, the — a threat the United States is perfectly capable of the U.S. ships, could not escape without some de- Grand Strategy: What Students and Practitioners strength of the enemy’s will, and the enemy’s like- carrying out — might well deter Iran from using nu- gree of humiliation. But the situation was not nearly Need to Know (Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), and ly countermoves. In addition to the use of force, clear weapons in the future.75 so escalatory and unpredictable as an air strike on “On the Crest of Fear: The V-Weapons, the Battle of strategists are obligated to face up to and prepare Betts urges clarity when making deterrent threats. Cuban soil would have been.78 the Bulge, and the End of War in Europe, 1944-1945,” for what comes afterwards: the challenges of termi- He insists that, as a people and a nation, America In a similar way, the Berlin airlift of 1948–49 out- in the Journal of Military History (January 2019). nating war and the requirements of jus post bellum. ought to determine where its real interests are locat- flanked the Soviet isolation of West Berlin, which If civilian communication with the military is poor, ed, and then bolster them with credible threats to lay within the post-World War II Soviet occupation This article reflects the views of the author. It partial, or adversarial — or if civilians sidestep cru- potential trespassers. Citing the example of Korea zone, without automatically escalating the situation. does not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. cial issues of cost and commitment — strategy will prior to 1950, and of Iraq in 1990, he observes that The United States, Britain, and France held fast to Army or Department of Defense. suffer. Indeed, these problems can lead to the fail- when America has communicated its interests and their commitment to the occupants of the western ure of a campaign or a war.73 deterrent threats in vague language subject to mis- zones of the city, using a mechanism that was inno- Acknowledgements: I am grateful to colleagues interpretation, it has suffered for it. America should vative and ultimately effective. In both the Cuba and who offered ideas and helpful comments on earlier avoid ambiguity, mixed signals, and potential con- Berlin cases, the situation did not escalate automat- drafts of this essay, including Conrad Crane, Darrell The Ongoing Utility of Coercion Theory fusion — but he worries that this is precisely the ically as a result of U.S. actions. The Soviets them- Driver, Edward Kaplan, Michael Neiberg, Celestino situation in which the United States has placed itself selves would have had to take the responsibility for Perez, James Powell, Marybeth Ulrich, and Doug National security practitioners need to have a recently regarding Taiwan.76 upping the ante further.79 In neither case, happily, Winton. Stephen Biddle has influenced my thinking strong grasp of coercion theory if they are to be It is equally important to ensure — to the great- were they willing to do so. Creative thinking, in- on this topic for years. effective strategists and warfighters. The value of est extent possible — that any attempts America cluding nontraditional uses of military instruments, deterrence in particular has been lost among those makes to deter an adversary are not interpreted as proved to be just what the situation required. Photo: USAMHI worrying about threats in realms where deterrence offensive or provocative. If, for instance, the coun- Such creative thinking, however, depends on a is difficult, such as terrorism and cyber attacks. But try wishes to deter by threat of denial (perhaps by solid understanding of coercion theory. For strat- deterrence remains an invaluable asset for national bolstering military capability through exercises), it egists, this body of literature is crucial. It forces security. In the 21st century, it must be updated and must signal to a potential adversary that this is a planners and decision-makers to think through the applied intelligently to a new landscape of threats defensive action. Both statesmen and military pro- assumptions and the logic of their actions. And it and challenges. Yet this hardly means that all we fessionals must fully understand the implications pushes them away from the dangerous idea that know about deterrence from its long history is sud- of the “security dilemma”: Any steps the United material power or predominance guarantees victo- denly obsolete. If there is a tendency in the Defense States takes to bolster its own defense will be in- ry in conflict. The promise of a quick return on a Department to think that technology so changes the terpreted by an adversary as offensive or provoca- coercive action can be a dangerous siren song for decision-makers looking for a simple solution to a complex political problem. In any scenario involv-

72 See, Linda Robinson, et al., Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War (Arlington, VA: RAND Arroyo Center, 2014), www. ing potential conflict, military and intelligence pro- rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR816/RAND_RR816.pdf; Tami Davis Biddle, “Making Sense of the ‘Long Wars’ – Advice fessionals need to anticipate challenges and prob- to the US Army,” Parameters 46, no. 1 (Spring 2016): 7–11. 73 For perceptive and wise insights on these themes, see, Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Secu- 77 For a clear articulation of the concept, see, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and David A. Welch, Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Intro- rity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 3–18. On civil-military relations in particular, see pages 201–31. duction to Theory and History, 8th ed. (New York: Longman, 2011), 17–18, 74 Caitlin Talmadge uses the language of coercion theory to help illuminate risks of escalation in contemporary warfighting scenarios. See, “Too 78 Schelling, Arms and Influence, 77–78. Alexander George, Forceful Persuasion, 31–38. Much of a Good Thing? Conventional Military Effectiveness and the Dangers of Nuclear Escalation” in The Sword’s Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness, ed. Dan Reiter (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 197–226. 79 Dan Altman makes the case that the Berlin Blockade crisis (1948–49) should be perceived not in terms of traditional coercive bargaining, but rather as a new theoretical category he calls “advancing without attacking.” Not all historians or political scientists will agree, but the argument is 75 See, Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” 95. useful in that it refines our thinking about coercion, threats, redlines, and the act of the fait accompli. See, Dan Altman, “Advancing Without Attack- 76 Betts, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence,” 88, 92, 96–99. ing: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force,” Security Studies 27, no. 1 (2018), 58–88, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2017.1360074.

108 109 The Roundtable Feature

Roundtables are where we get to hear from multiple experts on either a subject matter or a recently published book. Roundtable Captain Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard

In this featured roundtable essay for Vol. 3, Iss. 2, Beatrice Heuser writes about the life and work of the late Sir Michael Howard.

n 1967, the professor of war studies of King’s Creighton Lecture at the University of London. It College London, then still an integral part was the last peak of the Cold War, and the lecture, of the University of London, was invited to entitled “The Causes of War,”3 was given in the give the ninth Harmon Memorial Lecture university’s Senate House, Britain’s most glorious CAPTAIN inI Military History at the U.S. Air Force Academy. fascistoid piece of architecture. Into this lecture I Ostensibly speaking about “Strategy and Policy in drifted, then myself a confused history student at 20th-Century Warfare,” the speaker, Michael How- the London School of Economics and a member of PROFESSOR SIR: ard, used this occasion to make a plug for widening the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, to find that military history to become more of a historiogra- it was the most inspiring thing I had heard on the SOME LESSONS FROM phy of war. He argued it should explain the tradi- subject of war. Sitting in the cold marble Art Deco tional campaign history in the larger context of the lecture room, I realized that I had discovered my ac- history of war, which, in turn, is an intrinsic part ademic model: a scholar who started a lecture with MICHAEL HOWARD of the history of society. Combat activities should Thucydides’ explanation of the origins of the Pelo- be seen as ”methods of implementing national pol- ponnesian War and ended it with a pointer to the icy, to be assessed in the light of political purposes horrendous dangers inherent in balance-of-power Beatrice Heuser which they are intended to serve.”1 Influenced by thinking. He conjured up the nightmare that a nucle- Edward Mead Earle’s famous Makers of Strategy, ar power might be tempted to go to war to prevent he identified this linkage between “national policy” an adversarial nuclear power from growing to the and the use of force as “strategy.” Almost 40 years point that it would become unbeatable. Not only did later, this is how he put it in his autobiography: he articulate the fears of Campaigners for Nuclear Disarmament, but he also intuitively caught the es- The history of war, I came to realize, was sence of how Soviet military leaders felt in the face more than the operational history of armed of NATO’s deployment of the Euromissiles or Inter- forces. It was the study of entire societies. mediate-Range Nuclear Forces.4 Only by studying their cultures could one Moreover, here was a historian who did not hes- come to understand what it was that they itate to sketch the big picture. I had had my fill of fought about and why they fought in the lecturers who, when asked about parallels across way that they did. Further, the fact that they time and space, claimed not to be able to comment did so fight had a reciprocal impact on their because that was “not their period.” I had also had social structure. I had to learn not only to my fill of lecturers who thought the study of histo- think about war in a different way, but also ry was worth pursuing because it was intriguing, to think about history itself in a different entertaining, and fascinating, but who proclaimed way. I would certainly not claim to have in- that history should be studied exclusively for its vented the concept of ‘War and Society’, but own sake — that it holds no wisdom for the pres- I think I did something to popularize it.2 ent. I realized that I had found the approach to his- tory that I have since made my own, not l’art pour I first encountered Michael Howard when his star l’art or history as entertainment, but a database for was at its zenith and he was invited to give another the study of human behavior, our only guide to un- celebrated lecture to another set of students, this derstanding rerum causas — the origins of things, time civilians. In 1981, as the incumbent of Britain’s of configurations of the present and the future. most prestigious chair in modern history — the Re- Howard was well aware of the potential for the gius Chair, which is appointed by the monarch on abuse of history.5 History, he said, does not teach the prime minister’s advice — he gave the annual lessons; historians do, some wisely, some less so.

1 Michael Howard, Strategy and Policy in 20th-Century Warfare, 9th Harmon Memorial Lecture in Military History (Colorado: United States Air Force Academy, 1967), 2. 2 Michael Howard, Captain Professor: The Memoirs of Sir Michael Howard (London: Continuum, 2006), 145. 3 This is printed as the first chapter in Howard, The Causes of Wars (London: Maurice Temple Smith, 1983, reprinted by Unwin paperbacks). 4 The Soviet hawks, we recall, were afraid of a NATO surprise attack with these weapons which could pass under the radar (cruise missiles) or take so little time to reach the Soviet Union that Moscow might not have time to react. See, Beatrice Heuser: “The Soviet Response to the Euromissile Crisis, 1982-83,” in The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975-1985, ed. Leopoldo Nuti (London: Routledge, 2008), 137–49. 5 See, Howard, “The Use and Abuse of Military History,” in The Causes of Wars, 208–17; and Howard, The Lessons of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), containing lectures he gave when at Oxford.

112 113 Roundtable Captain Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard

New evidence constantly emerges, requiring a con- government adviser: I have never seen the point stant re-evaluation of our understanding of past of studying international relations if one does not times, just when we thought we understood this want to engage with practitioners. Knighted in causality or that period reasonably well.6 Historians 1986 and honored with further distinctions, Sir Mi- can make few predictions of the future, but as his- chael Howard has been greatly honored by the Brit- torians perceived with glee, particularly in the late ish establishment, even though it was not always 1980s, the many theories of international relations plain sailing, as his opposition to a number of gov- could not do more. History furnishes us with pat- ernment decisions illustrates. He clearly did wield terns — not identical patterns as found in wallpa- influence in Whitehall through his articulate and per, which would allow us to formulate a verifiable, lucid statements at conferences and the wisdom of hard-and-fast theory that whenever there is a grey his insights, presented in a sincere yet tactful way. circle, then a brown square follows. But we do find His was always the approach of avoiding outrightly an erratic, unreliable, but nevertheless discernible offending an adversary, rather seeking to persuade repetition of basic configurations — structure and and to stimulate thinking. (Occasionally he gave in process, in the words of Howard7 — of human in- to the temptation of gentle mockery, but he would teractions, such as jealousy and competitive behav- equally turn this on himself.) ior between rivals and colleagues; the dynamics of Persuasion, rather than hostile confrontation, group decision-making in a cabinet of ministers or was to him a cardinal goal. I once was examiner to the NATO Council; inter-service rivalry; conspira- a PhD student who, to terminate NATO’s interven- cy theories; bureaucratic politics; the individual’s tion in Afghanistan, advocated bombing in winter temptation to defect from the group and follow his the villages of tribes known to back the mujahideen. or her own shortsighted, narrow interests; and the The student’s argument was that it would kill ene- distrust of any rising power, however peaceful and my supporters, and those who were out during the democratic it is, and the dangerous window-of-op- day — gathering firewood perhaps — would die of portunity thinking that might bring on avoidable exposure. The candidate added that “unfortunate- conflicts. History also provides examples of moral ly” the “Obama circles” in Washington refused to dilemmas that resurface time and again: what bal- contemplate this measure. Having read much the ance to strike between the liberty of the individual same about Wehrmacht tactics in occupied Russia and the sacrifice made for the collectivity or how to in World War II, I was horrified, and I turned to argue that nuclear weapons make major war an ideas were being taken seriously in the corridors of identify the lesser evil, given that the choice in poli- Howard for moral guidance. His answer: make the impossible rational choice. As he put it in 1981, power.”9 There is no doubt, however, that this in- tics and international relations is generally between candidate write as many pages on why it is that the stitute has provided an exceptional forum for inter- several bad options, rarely between good and bad. “Obama circles” refuse to contemplate this meas- Society may have accepted killing as a legit- national debate about war and peace, and for the ure. That would force him to take an even-handed imate instrument of state policy, but not, as exchange of knowledge between the government approach to the subject. yet, suicide. For that reason, I find it hard to and scholars. The Lessons He Taught In the same vein, Howard opposed the outlaw- believe that the abolition of nuclear weap- It was also Howard who founded the world-lead- ing of “Holocaust denial” in the United Kingdom: ons, even if it were feasible, would be an un- ing interdisciplinary Department of War Studies at Two years after hearing him speak, when I ap- He did not think it a parliament’s business to leg- mixed blessing. Nothing that makes it easi- King’s College London, which, under the leadership plied to do a DPhil at Oxford, I was assigned How- islate on the truth. By contrast, he thought one er for statesmen to regard war as a feasible of his disciple, Sir Lawrence Freedman, bloomed ard as my supervisor. I sent him a gushing note to should not cease to engage with those denying instrument of state policy, one from which into the world’s largest research and teaching insti- express my excitement about this. He wrote back, that genocide had taken place — under German they stand to gain rather than lose, is likely tution on war-related subjects. Its students are not kindly: “It is nice to be appreciated.” He must have occupation, or under the Young Turks, or under to contribute to lasting peace.8 merely normal civilian undergraduates and gradu- wondered how to respond to this effervescence of Pol Pot or Mao — and to confront them with ev- ates (as in London) — its Shrivenham branch is enthusiasm, and clearly, his British reserve kicked idence. Dialogue to him was key. In the heated In the furtherance of dialogue, one of his great now mainly responsible for the academic part in in. When, in the second year of my DPhil, he ab- debates about war and peace and nuclear deter- achievements was his leading role in setting up the the education of most British higher officers. sconded to Princeton for a sabbatical, however, he rence, he realized a long time before many of us Institute for Strategic Studies (later the Interna- Occasionally, this growth in war studies, pursued wrote glowing reports home in private letters about that Whitehall and the military had the same goal tional Institute for Strategic Studies) in London. with great enthusiasm by lecturers and students the enthusiasm of American students (letters now as the antinuclear campaigners: to avoid World Yet, in his memoirs, he was skeptical about the true alike, could lead to misunderstandings. When How- in the Liddell Hart Archive at King’s College Lon- War III. The disagreement was about how to do enthusiasm with which this was greeted among ard was invited back to King’s College from Oxford don). So he too could gush, but only in private! so, not about the goal itself. The disarmers mere- government officials (the institute scrupulous- for, as usual, a very stimulating guest lecture, an I worked with him for long enough then, and ly showed more concern about the ever-present ly refused any government financial support). He undergraduate asked him, “Sir, what is your fa- later, to take on board some of the major lessons danger of war, including nuclear escalation, by recalled: “Seldom can bureaucrats have listened vorite war?” He took a deep breath and, realizing he passed on beyond that of marrying history and accident or miscalculation, while the deterrers — so courteously to academics, and academics have that just such a misunderstanding had occurred, the present. One was that of his engagement as a who included Howard — argued and continue to basked so gladly under the happy illusion that their replied with a voice like thunder: “My favorite war?

6 Howard, The Lessons of History, 11. 8 Howard, The Causes of Wars (Unwin Paperback reprint, 1985), 22. 7 Howard, The Lessons of History, 188–200. 9 Howard, Captain Professor, 163.

114 115 Roundtable Captain Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard

Why, I hate them all!” Indeed, his memoirs of his Howard had a particular gift of finding the right the early 1980s — he was against both and thought culable and predictable. Clausewitz thought that own experience in World War II are full of regrets. words in his writing: He could summarize complex the American commitment to Europe’s defense in “[a]ll these attempts to base the conduct of war These include the likely unavoidable inaction of issues most beautifully and succinctly. Sitting in an NATO sufficient13 — or the debate on the U.S. “War upon arithmetic and geometrical principles are to the British contingent in Gorizia while Yugoslavs antique armchair in his exquisitely decorated office on Terror” following the 9/11 attacks. (In the latter be discarded, as the application of the rule exclude wrought their revenge on Italians for what Italian at Oriel College (I have a vague memory of pastel context he rightly pointed out that it is nonsense to the genius [probably better translated as ‘judg- occupation forces had done to Yugoslavs shortly colors including light green, grey, and pink, which speak about waging war on an abstract noun, while ment’] and limit the activity of intelligence.”16 In before.10 Years later, Howard was invited to lecture he also sported in his ties), an ornate 18th-century promoting a conflict with terrorists to the status of his “Abstract Principles of Strategy” of 1808/1809, in an Italian town, and found that not everybody golden clock ticking away above the fireplace, he war would only give them combatant protection.14) Clausewitz wrote: gave him a warm welcome: It turned out that the shared with his student a cup of tea or a crystal He saw that, as a historian, the best contribution British contingent that had liberated it had been glass of sherry as well as his recipe on how to write he could make was to put any issue in a wider con- The more I think about this part of the Art unaware that in a town nearby, a bloody reckoning a good lecture or chapter. It was derived from the text, to highlight the bigger picture, the recurrent of War [i.e. what we now call Strategy], the was taking place between two different factions of old Oxbridge essay style: Do all your reading, then patterns and questions, and the ethical dimensions more I become convinced that its theory Italians. He wrote in his memoirs that he was still retire for the evening with a good glass of red wine. beyond the specific technicalities of any ongoing can posit few or even no abstract principles wondering what else he could have done.11 He, for In nocte consilium: Rise early, write the whole thing negotiations, while insisting on precision in lan- [Sätze]; but not, as is commonly thought, one, was never so naïf as to think there was a good in one go, and then go back to your notes to in- guage and argument. This is an important lesson because the matter is too difficult, but be- answer to every such question. sert the footnotes. If you look closely, the chapters that academics can learn from the career of Mi- cause one would go under in stating the of his great think- chael Howard: It is in such contexts that they can all-too-obvious [Trivialitaten]. piece books, such make themselves most useful. as War and the On the one hand, he argued, Liberal Conscience or The Invention Translating Clausewitz In war, there are so many petty variables of Peace, are all [Umstände] which contribute to affect ac- roughly the length It is often said that Howard owed his reputation tion that if one wanted to include them ap- of a good 50-minute above all to his book on the Franco-Prussian War.15 propriately in his abstract rules, one would lecture. But his real rise to fame came when, jointly with appear as the biggest pedant. Howard also Peter Paret, he edited a new translation of Clause- knew what schol- witz’s On War, just as, in the wake of the Vietnam On the other hand, to ignore the many variables ars can and can- debacle, the idea that America had betrayed its Na- would be unrealistic.17 Nor did Clausewitz think it not contribute. poleonic-Clausewitzian “way of war” in Vietnam appropriate for the teacher to prescribe the mili- His wisdom was to and should return to a true “American Way of War” tary commander’s every actions in all contexts: contribute a wid- was seizing hold of the American military. Clause- Howard liked to quote the passage from On War in In dialogue with government officials as well as er perspective, whether in a debate behind closed witz became the flavor of the age, and Howard and which Clausewitz defined the role of the teacher as civilian students and military officers, Howard fol- doors or in public, about any live issue, with an Paret, together with their late colleague Angus Mal- to “educate the mind of the future military leader lowed a number of rules typical of the English School understanding of history that shed light on a topic colm of the British Foreign Office, turned obsoles- or rather give him guidance in his self-education, of Strategic Studies, of which another captain (one from a different angle. Few scholars have real-time cent German into pithy, up-to-date English prose. but not accompany him onto the battlefield, just as world war earlier), Sir Basil Liddell Hart, was the fa- insights into diplomatic and policymaking activi- Clausewitz, of course, has more to offer than mere- a teacher guides and facilitates the spiritual devel- ther. It is not by accident that Liddell Hart would also ties or could ever have the detailed knowledge of ly comments on high-intensive conflict or how to opment of a youth, without, however, keeping him become Howard’s chief mentor. True to the tradition the issues facing government officials and military organize large-scale resistance (“people’s war”) strapped in leading strings all his life.”18 of another “captain who taught generals” (as was said officers directly involved in negotiations within against an occupation regime (an aspect of On War Published in 1976, this new translation of On War, of Liddell Hart), Howard passed on the following ad- governments, alliances, or other international or- that impressed Mao Tse-tung). with its lengthy introductory chapters, gave Howard vice to his own disciples: Do not shroud your writing ganizations or arms control fora. Technical details Clausewitz was to give Howard much of the in- the material for many wise spin-off articles and lec- in jargon. Write clearly so that any halfway educated of weapons systems, for example, are usually the tellectual ammunition that he was still groping for tures. The very next year, Howard left London for person can understand what you are saying, and cite last to be declassified. And Howard, for one, was when he gave his lecture at the U.S. Air Force Acad- Oxford there to take up the Chichele Chair of the His- solid historical evidence to make your point, rather acutely aware that changes in technology could sig- emy in 1967: As director of Prussia’s General War tory of War — a chair created in 1910 as the Chair of than indulging in a game of theories. Find quotations nificantly change arguments about strategy.12 Yet, School, Clausewitz was at odds with his staff over Military History and renamed in 1946 to cover “war” from the original sources to illustrate your point; do sometimes choices emerge that are clear enough their excessively positivist determination to teach more generally — which perfectly suited Howard’s not quote or clutter your text with the names of other even to outsiders without knowing all the technical warfare through formulae — what would later be agenda of moving research from traditional military academics unless you intend to disagree with them. details involved. It is especially here that scholars called the principles of warfare — and make it cal- history to the history of war and of strategy. Write and speak succinctly. Your main argument is can weigh in and comment in ways that can enrich what matters. Don’t go off on tangents with details and enlighten the debate, as Howard did in the de- 13 Howard: “Surviving a Protest,” 116–33, 116f; “On Fighting a Nuclear War,” in The Causes of Wars, 133–50; and “Deterrence, Consensus and that thrill you but that distract your audience and bate about the United Kingdom’s acquisition of In- Reassurance in the Defence of Europe,” Adelphi Paper, no. 184 (London: IISS, 1983). readers from the main argument. termediate-Range Nuclear Forces and of Trident in 14 Michael Howard: “Mistake to Declare This a ‘War,’” RUSI Journal 146, no. 6 (2001), 1–4, https://doi.org/10.1080/03071840108446710. 15 Michael Howard: The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London: Hart-Davis, 1961). 10 Howard, Captain Professor, 108, 114–16. 16 Quoted in Rühle’s review of On War in the Allgemeine Militär Zeitung 8, no. 3 (1833) col. 22–24. And Clausewitz: On War, II.2. 11 Howard, Captain Professor, 109. 17 “Strategie aus dem Jahre 1809“, in Carl von Clausewitz: Verstreute kleine Schriften, ed. Werner Hahlweg (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1979), 46f. 12 See, for example, Howard, “Surviving a Protest,” first published in Encounter (1980), reprinted in The Causes of Wars, 116f. 18 Carl von Clausewitz: On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), book II.2, 141.

116 117 Roundtable Captain Professor Sir: Some Lessons from Michael Howard

But besides being the acknowledged lead histo- tative and theoretical analysis that has flooded Eu- founded the Scottish Centre for War Studies at the rian of war in the United Kingdom, the incumbent rope coming from — sorry, folks — American aca- University of Glasgow). For the last decade or so, was the obvious person to invite to conferences — deme. Historical evidence — particularly anything they found themselves turned away from working public and private — on all matters military, and that happened more than about 30 years ago — is with the Chichele Professor if their subjects had to bring over to Whitehall whenever one needed disregarded or brushed aside, myths are created a strong contemporary angle. Instead, those stu- a more academic (and historical) perspective on and happily passed on if they fit theories, and the dents were kept firmly in the social sciences fac- matters related to defense. Here, Howard’s forte names of obscure scholars and the jargon-heavy, ulty, as though examining what happened after would continue to be to provide the larger picture, and worse still monocausal, theories they have 1945 had to differ in methodology from examining and this he did outstandingly. This larger picture, produced reign supreme. Encrypted language pre- what happened before, and as though one period and the memory of similar questions that had been vails in this discourse addressed exclusively at the concerned only the arts and humanities, the oth- on the table a decade or several decades before, is initiates, which is also true for most internal gov- er the social sciences. Their work was shoehorned what government institutions notoriously lack, and ernment documents, although the acronyms and into international relations methodologies, with do not have the time or manpower to research with the jargon differ from those of the social scien- modelling, quantitative approaches, and, above all, the patience and thoroughness of a scholar. tists. This makes dialogue between academics and monocausal theories — “show me one ‘independ- practitioners a dialogue of the deaf. It should thus ent variable’ in war” as Michael Howard used to perhaps not surprise us that an increasing number say — and they were made to write in jargon-laden, His Legacy of international relations scholars see no way to — impenetrable prose. and have no ambition to — make themselves useful Perhaps we will find, looking back in some years, What of his heritage, half a century later? The to government: Speaking different languages, they that Sir Michael Howard’s death marks the passing International Institute for Strategic Studies and would not be able to communicate anyway. Others, of the understanding that we are part of eternal King’s College London are flourishing and have with their three-case-studies approach, will claim to change not of unchanging mechanisms. And it may both expanded to a size even their founder would have created, proved, or disproved theories that, in mark the passing of the use of lucid, jargon-free, not have dreamt of in the 1950s and 1960s. Military reality, have no predictive quality for the next case. universally intelligible prose in strategic studies history has truly changed into the history of war, But it would be dangerous in the extreme to expose that practitioners can immediately understand wherever it is tolerated. Unfortunately, that is not civil servants or military officers with an engineering without themselves having to read about arcane in many universities, as many scholars are still sus- background to such theories, which might fit even international relations theories. picious of anybody studying war. The “war and so- complex machines, but not the much greater com- ciety” approach has grown greatly, but with a mas- plexity of multiple human interactions. Beatrice Heuser holds her DPhil from the Uni- sive emphasis on social history, so that, outside Meanwhile, the split in academia between histo- versity of Oxford and a higher doctorate (Habilita- the Department of War Studies at King’s College ry and international relations seems complete in tion) from the University of Marburg. She has held London, and a small handful of chairs at universi- all but a handful of universities, with a few aging chairs in international relations and strategic stud- ties and the military academies, academics stud- academics still keeping a foot in both camps. Gone ies at King’s College London and the universities of ying war are more likely to study soldiers’ wives from international relations is an understanding Reading and Glasgow, and has been visiting profes- or patterns of desertion than strategy. Graduate that human societies are constantly evolving and sor at several universities in Paris. She has worked degrees including the term “strategy” or “strate- are not an unalterable clockwork, the mechanism briefly in NATO and continues to seek engagement gic” are most likely to deal with business or climate of which can be understood by any one theory. with practitioners on subjects such as nuclear strat- change, or include a token session on Clausewitz, International relations, as taught today, seems to egy and military exercises. She has published wide- taught by somebody with at best a passing ac- have begun in 1991, or at best, in 1945 (with a brief ly on strategy — e.g., Reading Clausewitz (Pimlico: quaintance with the Paret and Howard translation, back-hand to a supposed Westphalian system that 2002), The Evolution of Strategy (Cambridge: 2010), rarely the ability to read his works in the original. never existed and a Soviet-American division of Strategy Before Clausewitz (Routledge: 2017) — on The English School of Strategic Studies, of which the world at Yalta, which never happened), and nuclear strategy, and on asymmetric warfare. She Howard’s obituaries proclaim him to be a scion if furnishes an eclectic database — usually center- would like to thank Professors Robert O’Neill and not the founder, is now threatened by extinction. ing on U.S. foreign policy — for largely abstract Margaret Macmillan for their very helpful com- It just about flourishes still in the Department of theoretical cloud-cuckoo lands. Howard’s eminent ments. All mistakes and opinions are only her own. War Studies at King’s College London, but that is successors as Chichele Professors of the History not immune from the steady spread of jargon, re- of War were progressively barred from supervis- Photo: Paul the Archivist ductionism — “one independent variable, one de- ing doctoral students who were not working on a pendent variable” — and confirmation bias — “this purely historical subject with a narrowly historio- essay will argue” or “this article will show that.” graphic methodology. Brilliant students, often mili- Also waning are sensitivities for cultural diversity tary officers, from the world over had come specif- and the acquisition of “the language of the past” — ically to study with Howard, and after him, Robert and of other languages tout court. They have been O’Neill (one of his own disciples, and one-time drowned in “monoglot illiteracy” (to quote Lord director of the International Institute of Strategic Dacre)19 and the ever-increasing fashion of quanti- Studies) and Hew Strachan (who had previously

19 Howard, The Lessons of History, 13, 18.

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