ISSN 1010-9536

POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS

115 – Needs of Streamlining Overlapping Functions and Bringing Reform In Decision-making Structure Aurangzeb Chowdhury

135 Returnee Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs): Evolving Threats and Response Strategy Sheikh Masud Ahmed

161 Potential of New Business Corridors Between Bangladesh and India’s Northeast: Bangladesh Perspective Mahfuz Kabir Rubiat Afrose Raka

179 Explaining Challenges of Energy Connectivity in South Asia Lam-ya Mostaque

203 Belt and Road Initiative and the Geopolitics of Energy Shanjida Shahab Uddin

Volume 40 Number 2 2019 I Contacts Designation Telephone (Office) E-mail Chairman, Board of Governors 88-02-9347914 [email protected] Director General 88-02-8312609 [email protected] Research Director-1 88-02-9331977 [email protected] Research Director-2 88-02-9347984 [email protected] VOLUME 40 NUMBER 2 APRIL 2019

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Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS) Chief Editor A K M Abdur Rahman

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BIISS Journal is indexed by the International Political Science Abstracts, Paris. Article index and abstracts may also be found on BIISS webpage. CONTENTS

VOLUME 40 NUMBER 2 APRIL 2019

Aurangzeb Chowdhury Bangladesh Coast Guard – Needs of Streamlining Overlapping Functions and Bringing Reform In Decision-making Structure 115

Sheikh Masud Ahmed Returnee Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs): Evolving Threats and Response Strategy 135

Mahfuz Kabir Rubiat Afrose Raka Potential of New Business Corridors Between Bangladesh and India’s Northeast: Bangladesh Perspective 161

Lam-ya Mostaque Explaining Challenges of Energy Connectivity in South Asia 179

Shanjida Shahab Uddin Belt and Road Initiative and the Geopolitics of Energy 203 CONTENTS

VOLUME 40 NUMBER 2 APRIL 2019

Aurangzeb Chowdhury Bangladesh Coast Guard – Needs of Streamlining Overlapping Functions and Bringing Reform In Decision-making Structure 115

Sheikh Masud Ahmed Returnee Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs): Evolving Threats and Response Strategy 135

Mahfuz Kabir Rubiat Afrose Raka Potential of New Business Corridors Between Bangladesh and India’s Northeast: Bangladesh Perspective 161

Lam-ya Mostaque Explaining Challenges of Energy Connectivity in South Asia 179

Shanjida Shahab Uddin Belt and Road Initiative and the Geopolitics of Energy 203

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019: 115-133

Aurangzeb Chowdhury BANGLADESH COAST GUARD – NEEDS OF STREAMLINING OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS AND BRINGING REFORM IN DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE

Abstract

Bangladesh Coast Guard (BCG) came into being in 1995. As the youngest law enforcing agency, it finds some difficulties in making required elbow room among other forces. In course of time, overlaps with other forces cropped up. BCG believes that the overlaps can be eliminated through clear demarcation of responsibilities and areas of jurisdiction. Besides, providing limited magistracy power at sea and making BCG the maritime service provider for other law enforcing agencies would strengthen the law enforcing efforts and save resources. On the other hand, BCG’s decision-making structure has a huge scope of deeper engagement towards obtaining better decisions for BCG. Placement of BCG officers in the ministry and establishing seamless communications with the decision-making structure are some of the measures to overcome this hindrance. Experiences of other coast guards across the globe also suggest similar steps. Towards building a more effective and efficient decision-making structure, ministry-BCG overlapping placements and engaging the decision- makers more deeply can be suggested along with a few other measures. With these teething problems resolved, one believes that BCG would be in a far better position to become the true ‘Guardian at sea’.

Keywords: Guardian at sea, BCG’s AOR, Overlapping Responsibility, Specialized Maritime Skills, Decision-making Structure Reform

1. Introduction

Bangladesh Coast Guard (BCG) can be said to be the youngest force in the country. It was established through the enactment of the Coast Guard Act 1994 and officially started its journey on 14th February 1995.1 Being the last to emerge as a law enforcing agency, BCG had to accommodate itself in the overall operational environment. In doing so, BCG has been undergoing a continuous fine-tuning to create adequate elbow room for itself. In the process, incidents of overlaps crop up with other forces, making readjustments essential in the overall operating

Admiral Aurangzeb Chowdhury, NBP, OSP, BCGM, PCGM, BCGMS, ndc, psc is the Chief of Naval Staff of (BN). His e-mail address is: [email protected]; [email protected] © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019. 1 Bangladesh Coast Guard Headquarters, Coast Guard Vision Document 2041, Dhaka: Coast Guard Headquarters, 2019, p. 3. 115 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 environment of law enforcement. These teething issues are relatively new, causing problems of different nature to deal and need to be addressed appropriately. Being a law enforcing agency, Bangladesh Coast Guard is well-placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) from the inception. BCG looks for strategic guidance from MoHA and expects the ministry to make appropriate decisions for smooth functioning of the force. However, BCG is a specialized force and it has specialized functions which are highly technical and specialized in nature. BCG is principally a maritime service and it has functions like Search and Rescue (SAR), salvage, pollution control, protection of bio-diversity and endangered species, air operations, operations with maritime surveillance drones, hovercraft operations and so on, which need high degree of technical and operational know-how. Hence, decision-making about the force’s matters necessitates a great deal of Coast Guard- specific knowledge and understanding. However, the current decision-making system shows significant scope of improvement and reform. Besides, apart from being a law enforcing agency, Coast Guard is also the only maritime organization under MoHA. But the ministry is not equipped with necessary manpower or specialists to receive professional appraisals in making decisions on maritime matters. Hence, many a times decisions reached are devoid of adequate Coast Guard-specific inputs. BCG has behind it almost a quarter of a century, gathering a good deal of experience and maturity. With the delimitation of maritime boundary and consequent emphasis on ‘Blue Economy’, BCG is expected to undertake its mainstream activities such as patrolling in the whole of Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf (CS) as well as specialized jobs, i.e., pollution control, SAR, salvage, protection of bio-diversity and so on.2 All these activities need to be supported by sound, timely and effective decision-making at the strategic and operational level. Besides, anomalies such as overlapping of responsibilities with other forces should not hinder the force’s operations. Against this backdrop, the paper seeks to delve into the research question namely what are the needs of streamlining BCG’s overlapping functions (with other forces) and what reforms are necessary in BCG’s decision-making structure so as to enable the force function to its fullest level? The question being closely related to the fundamental activities of the force, it is necessary to carry out a research to find out the extent to which these factors are affecting the force’s activities and how these can be eliminated. To this end, this paper will start with a discussion on the overlapping responsibilities with other forces and lacunas in decision-making structure and examine how these are affecting BCG’s activities. Thereafter, it will look into the context of other coast guards across the globe. These two-pronged discussions will then lead to a viable solution of the said problems. The methodology followed in this paper is qualitative in nature based on primary and secondary data.

2 Bangladesh National Parliament, Coast Guard Act 2016, Dhaka: Bangladesh Government Press, 2016, p. 2072-2080. 116 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD

2. Literature Review

The available literature does not specifically deal with Bangladesh Coast Guard, let alone its intricate issues with the ministry and other forces. Armed Forces Division, with a view to bringing jointmanship among the forces, has published a draft “Joint Warfare Doctrine” which has described in great details the joint operational aspects of .3 It dealt with pure military subjects like the operational art in joint environment and Command, Control and Communication (C3) aspects. A very broad direction about how the future joint operations will look like, and how Coast Guard could fit into it, could be obtained from the document. However, no mention about the operational environment of BCG or its relationship with the ministry and other law enforcing agencies was found. A more specific mention on BCG was found in the recently published “Defence Policy of Bangladesh”, wherein its wartime roles have been broadly defined.4 However, Bangladesh Navy, in its publications “Maritime Doctrine of Bangladesh”5 and “BN Forces Goal- 2030”6 has identified BCG’s role during wartime along with its preparations to that end. The essence of these documents helped the researcher shed some light on the military nature of the force and its need of obtaining quick and appropriate decisions. In carrying out a research on BCG, the questions on the genesis, development and current practices of the contemporary coast guards across the globe automatically came to light. In this regard, (ICG) Headquarters published book named “History of Indian Coast Guard”, which gives an account of the genesis of formation of ICG and its chronology, has been a good reference.7 Nevertheless, the book has not highlighted ICG’s working relationship with Indian Ministry of Defence and other forces of India, which could have been useful for the current research. Khurana has identified the relationship between Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy as ‘uneasy companionship’.8 Besides, there is a parliamentary committee report on Indian Coast Guard which suggested increase of its budget and make a few other reforms.9 On the other hand, Tom Beard, in his definitive, officially illustrated book “The Coast Guard” accounts the story from US Coast Guard’s origin to its activities in the current periods.10 Needless to mention, for the current research, a good number

3 Armed Forces Division, Joint Warfare Doctrine, Dhaka: Armed Forces Division, 2018. 4 Armed Forces Division, Defence Policy of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Armed Forces Division, 2018. 5 Bangladesh Navy, Maritime Doctrine of Bangladesh, Dhaka: Naval Headquarters, 2010. 6 Bangladesh Navy, Forces Goal 2030, Dhaka: Naval Headquarters, 2010. 7 Indian Coast Guard Headquarters, History of Indian Coast Guard, New Delhi: Indian Coast Guard, 2010. 8 Gurpreet Singh Khurana, “India’s Evolving Coastal Security Architecture: A Case for a New Central Force”, National Maritime Foundation, 2019, p. 1. 9 Standing Committee on Defence, Performance of Coast Guard Organisation, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 2011. 10 Tom Beard, The Coast Guard, Washington D.C.: Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 2010. 117 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 of analogies and examples including those related to manpower issues, could be drawn from these documents. After 23 years of journey, Bangladesh Coast Guard has published and adopted Coast Guard Vision Document, in January 2019, in which it has laid down the force’s future plans up to 2041. This elaborate document has described in details the current problems, lacunas being faced by the force and pressures from different corners on the force to build its capacities and perform the duties entrusted on the force.11 The document also touched upon the force’s issues with the ministry and the sister forces. However, for obvious reasons, an elaborate discussion on these sensitive matters was avoided, because it was not the aim of the document. The propositions of the document need to be validated through detailed research and analysis. Besides, the literature do not discuss the BCG’s issues with the ministries and other law enforcing agencies which come into play in BCG’s day to day activities. Hence, it is evident that there is a significant gap in the research which need to be covered by a fresh research on the issue. Therefore, the current research will shed new lights on the matter, discuss pros and cons, examine different aspects of the issue and create solutions to the benefit of BCG and other stakeholders.

3. BCG’s Area of Responsibility and Convergence with Other Forces

3.1 BCG’s Area of Responsibility

Seven years after the emergence of Bangladesh Coast Guard, government delineated its areas of responsibility through a gazette notification.12 Other than the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf (CS) as mentioned in the Coast Guard Act 2016, the areas are Territorial water and adjacent estuary in according to Territorial waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1974 (Act no. XXVI of 1974); all rivers and canals of ; Passur river (from estuary to Chalna) to Shibsha river; Mongla Nala, Polihara river and Panguchi river; Haringhata and Dhareshwari rivers (from estuary to Kumarkhali); Bishkhali river; Payra/ Burishawar river (from estuary to Aamtali); Andharmanik, Nilganj and Khapra Bhanga rivers; Mohipur river; Rabnabad channel and Galachipa river (from estuary to Galachipa); Darchirra and Bura Gourango rivers; Shahbajpur and Meghna rivers (from Meghna to Chowkighata); Karnaphuli river (estuary to Kalurghat river); (estuary to Jaldhar channel); Kutubdia, Maheskhali and Sandwip channel; Bangladesh portion in Naaf river (from estuary to Teknaf Bazar); All the rivers and channels falling into

11 Bangladesh Coast Guard Headquarters, Coast Guard Vision Document 2041, Dhaka: Coast Guard Headquarters, 2019. 12 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Gazette Notification No. 23-Law/2002, 30 January 2002. 118 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD the (from estuary to 5 nautical miles upstream); The waterways from Chattogram and Mongla sea ports to Dhaka; and other rivers, channels, island and port areas declared by the government. Later on, through another gazette notification, government extended the force’s AOR up to one kilometer towards inside the land from the river bank or sea shore, principally to allow the force to continue ‘hot pursuit’ of the criminals.13 The list makes it clear that the river ways in the southern part of the country have been entrusted to the force. During the force’s emergence, there was no other force operating in these areas. So, BCG operated in those areas alone and without any friction or overlap. However, in 2018, Nou Police was established, and it was revealed that its AOR and charter of duties are partially in duplication with those of BCG. The duties vested on BCG are patrolling, anti-smuggling, anti-piracy, anti- robbery, Search and Rescue, salvage of vessels, protection of bio-diversity, pollution control, prevention of illegal migration and human-trafficking, security of sea ports, enforcing court’s order on any vessel and assisting Bangladesh Navy during war and so on. These duties are generally unique in nature, however, some are in overlap with the Nou Police which will be discussed in ensuing paragraphs.

3.2 History of Nou Police

‘Nou Police’ is the riverine unit of . The word ‘Nou’ according to Bangla Academy dictionary and Banglapedia means ‘riverine.’ Although ‘Nou Police’ is actually Riverine Police, an official English name of the force is yet to come.14 However, ‘Nou Police’ is not a separate force per se – it is a part of Bangladesh Police. The areas of jurisdiction of Riverine Police are as under:15

• Any river, canal, lake or navigable riverine route and tidal riverine route or part thereof which have been published in Government Gazette as per Bangladesh Inland Shipping Ordinance 1976 Section 2, subsection (f).

• Fifty-meter area extending into the land from the high water mark of the rivers; except religious installations, educational institutions, market places or any other installations;

13 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Gazette Notification SRO No. 23-Law/2002, 30 January 2002. 14 Discussion with SK. Md. Maruf Hasan, bpm, ppm, DIG Nou Police, DIG (currently AIG and Rector, Police Staff College). 15 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Gazette Notification SRO No. 249-Law/2015, 05 August 2015. 119 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

• Installations regarding riverine traffic such as, riverine terminals, ferry ghats, river ports or other installations.

In its areas of jurisdiction, the Nou Police is supposed to carry out certain principal functions16 which are, assisting in river traffic management; increasing awareness against riverine accidents; maintaining law and order in places like riverine ports; ferry terminals; passenger waiting areas; checking registration, fitness and other documents of riverine craft; assisting in taking legal actions against carrying of passengers beyond allowed capacity; against charging of excessive fares in all ferries and vessels; against transportation of smuggling goods or narcotics. Its other duties are: assisting concerned authorities in taking legal actions against pollution of environment; against violating laws and regulations regarding protection and conservation of fishery and against violating laws and rules for prohibition of impeding; poaching; illegal earth filling; diverting of river routes and the like. Furthermore, its responsibilities include arranging; conducting and participating in national and international research; convention; seminar; symposium regarding the management of river routes and riverine environment; and last but not the least performing any other duties as per other concerned laws, rules, regulations, legal documents or as ordered by the Inspector General of Bangladesh Police or the government; also falls under the duties of Nou Police.

3.3 Overlaps with BCG

The functions and areas of responsibility of the Riverine Police are overlapping with those of Bangladesh Coast Guard to some extent. More specifically, the riverine part of area of responsibility of BCG is in overlap with that of the Riverine Police. The two overlapping functions are: conservation of fishery; and prevention of smuggling and transportation of drugs. Another duty, i.e. assisting the concerned authorities in taking legal actions against pollution of environment can eventually overlap with BCG’s duties if not properly interpreted and materialized by the Riverine Police. The current overlap could have been avoided if the Riverine Police’s AOR were kept outside the AOR of BCG. As per the government gazette, BCG’s AOR extends from Dhaka to the southern part of the country; it needs not (and it does not), for instance, operate in Surma river, Brahmaputra river, Padma river (in Rajshahi) or in Kaptai lake (which was given to BCG once). Currently, in some areas, the maritime stakeholders are not clear as to whose jurisdiction is where. There remains the risk of duplication of effort as well as one force countering the other creating unnecessary rivalry and clashes of interests. On the contrary, at times it can become

16 Ibid. 120 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD from everybody’s job to nobody’s business. One feels that such overlaps in AOR and functions could have been well avoided at the beginning.

4. Clear Demarcation, Incidental Magistracy and Maritime Assistance Services

It may be mentioned that the operation and activities of the law enforcing agencies cost significant amount of national resources. Duplication of activities would mean wastage of these resources, which should be avoided at all costs. Hence, the overlapping functions and responsibilities of the forces must be resolved by making clear demarcation of responsibilities and areas of jurisdiction. Demarcation of AOR and responsibilities would entail viewing the things from overall perspective, judging clearly who’s duty is what, determining the needs of the nation and stakeholders and after considering all pros and cons, making such decisions which may be unpopular to many. In order to do all these, there is a need of a person or body who would look at the things from the overall perspective of the nation, and not submit to any myopic view or petty interest of anyone. This organization or person must put the country’s interest first, carry out detail analysis, and moderate the things towards the best interest of the country. The person or body needs to be higher in position and authority and moderate things with binding conclusions. The person or body should also make clear delineation of the forces’ areas of responsibility, functions and resources, as well as avoid duplication of resources. MoHA can undertake the task to some extent, however, one feels that an organization such as National Security Council (NSC) would be the most appropriate to undertake the task. Government has formed a National Committee on Security Affairs (NCSA) in March (and later re-formed it in May) this year and appointed ex-DMP Commissioner as its Chief Executive Officer (CEO).17 One feels that, such an organization, directly under the head of the government, can perform the said task effectively. From the experience of other coast guards across the globe, it is felt that the NSC or similar body should also consider giving incidental and limited magistracy power to Bangladesh Coast Guard. While securing the nation’s interest out at sea, BCG encounters a number of offenders on a daily basis. If one BCG vessel encounters a group of offender vessels, arresting them and escorting them to shore for handing over to police cannot become economical. The area of operation would remain unattended and more offenders would engage in illegal ventures. Hence, if BCG vessel could instantly levy a fine on the perpetrators, the overall effect would be much more positive and economical. Such examples are known to exist in Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (or Malaysia Coast Guard) and Korean Coast Guard.18 They are

17 Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Cabinet Division, Bangladesh Gazette Notification dated 22 May 2019. 18 Discussion with Inspector Lee Eun Swob of and Lieutenant Commander Fadli Esa 121 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 authorized to impose instant fines on the perpetrators at sea up to a certain limit. The fines should be such that they leave the illegal ventures no more profitable for the offenders. One strongly feels that such a step has become necessary for BCG. As many of the forces need to operate in maritime environment, a competent service should be tasked to provide maritime assistance to all. Experience says that maritime service is highly technical and needs specially trained manpower. There are essential and indispensable skills that the force has to acquire and keep developing continuously in order to operate truly in maritime environment, some of which, but not limited to, are 19: i) Terrestrial navigation, through the waters (which entails the use of navigational equipment); ii) Blind pilotage, which means piloting a vessel to the desired destination even when one cannot see anything around, especially during impaired visibility due to fog, mist, heavy rainfall and other reasons, and also during inclement weather conditions; iii) Seamanship, which includes the upkeeping, maintenance, effectively living and performing duties on board a watercraft even when the weather conditions are adverse; iv) Rules of the Road (ROR), which means the national and international rules for the vessels to navigate through waterways; v) Chart work, which means the study of using maps of water ways; vi) Basic hydrography, which means study of the depth of water and characteristics of river and waterways; vii) Meteorology, which is the study of weather and climate; viii) Ship’s Husbandry, which means the methods of maintaining and upkeeping a vessel; ix) Marine engineering, which means the professional skills to run and maintain engines, generators and associated equipment; x) Electrical and Electronics; xi) Marine communication; xii) Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence (NBCD) including Fire-Fighting (FF) and Damage Control (DC); xiii) Operational Logistics; xiv) PME, which means repair and maintenance including periodical docking and xv) Diving operations and similar other operations. All these things are specialized skills and people create their life-long careers on them.20 Hence, it may not be a non-maritime organization’s priority to develop such skills or set up institutions for them. In Bangladesh, only Navy and Coast Guard have true maritime capability.21 Therefore, if BCG would be tasked to provide maritime services to other forces and organizations, be it in the form of providing logistics support or carrying out patrolling by a team in certain places or doing maintenance of certain vessels, that would benefit everyone. At present, BCG faces shortages of skilled personnel, however, the force is vying to recruit its own manpower soon and would be able to provide seamless assistance in the service of other forces.22

of Malaysia Coast Guard during working level meeting of Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) held during 11-12 July 2018 in Dhaka. 19 Basing on the Author’s 41-year-long service experience in Bangladesh Navy. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Bangladesh Coast Guard, Coast Guard Vision Document 2041, Dhaka: Coast Guard Headquarters, 2019. 122 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD

5. Needs of Bringing Reform in Decision-Making Structure

Bangladesh Coast Guard at its inception has been placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), like BGB. It is the only maritime force under MoHA, not to mention, its activities are specialized in nature. Being under MoHA, BCG has to fall back to the ministry for decisions regarding important matters arising frequently as well as those arising seldom. It is critical for the force to get decisions which are prudent and made without avoidable delay. In order to make such decisions, the organizational structure of the force as well as the ministry needs to be such that necessary information are at hand when needed and flow upwards as soon as necessary. An examination of the current decision-making structure reveals significant scopes of adjustment in this regard, which is elaborated in the subsequent paragraphs.

5.1 BCG’s Relation with MoHA and Other Relevant Ministries

Towards examining the subject in details, at first it is necessary to take a look at the organogram of MoHA, which is given below in Figure 1.23

23 Constructed based on , MoHA’s original and existing organogram, available at https://mhapsd.gov.bd/site/organogram, accessed on 03 August 2019. 123 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Figure 1: Organization Structure of MoHA

Minister (Home Ministery)

Secy (Public Security Division)

Addl Secy Addl Secy Addl Secy Addl Secy Addl Secy (Admin and Finance (Political & ICT) (Ansar & Border) (Police & NTMC) (Develpment)

Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy Joint Secy (Admin) (Budget) (Law) (Political -1) (Political -2) Border (Ansar) (Police-2) (Discipline) (Police-1) (NTMC) (NTMC-1)

Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy (Admin-1) (Admin-3) (Political-1) (Political-2) (Political-3) (Ansar-1) (Police-2) (Police-1) (RAB-1)

Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy Deputy Secy (Admin-2) (Budget-1) (Political-5) (Political-4) (RAB-2) (Police-4) (Police-3) (Plan) & Private Deputy Secy Secy to the (Security-2) Secy (addl) & addl (ICT cell)

Senior Assistant Senior Assistant Senior Assistant Senior Assistant Senior Assistant Secy Secy Senior Assistant Secy Secy Secy Chief (Plan-1) (Budget-2) (Police-5) Political-6 Political-3 (Ansar-2)

Asst Assistant Secy Accounting Programmer Assistant Secy (Law-2) Assistant Secy Assistant Secy Officer (IC T Cell) (Law-1) Attached (Border-2) (Discipline-2)

The principal matters of BCG are dealt by Deputy Secretary (Border-3), who reports to Joint Secretary (Border), who in turn reports to Additional Secretary (Ansar and Border). The Additional Secretary reports to the Secretary who falls back to the Minister for decisions. Matters regarding the development projects of BCG are taken up by Senior Assistant Chief (Planning-1), who reports to Deputy Chief (Planning) and the hierarchy goes up to the Minister through Additional Secretary (Development). These officers are from Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration) or BCS (Economic) cadre (now merged with BCS Administration cadre).24 They have good idea about how police force works, because they were magistrates in the fields. They have gained a wide exposure of field administration and law and order through their service in different capacities. However, they are not generally exposed to maritime matters. Although an exposure to the Armed Forces is given to them through an orientation course in , no exposure to the maritime field is given to them. One can well assume that an orientation programmme in Bangladesh Coast Guard would make them well acquainted with the force and enable them to make effective decisions for it.

24 “BCS admin and economic cadres merged”, Dhaka Tribune, 14 November 2018, available at https://www. dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/government-affairs/2018/11/14/bcs-admin-and-economic-cadres-merged, accessed on 03 September 2019. 124 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD

Here the onus lies on BCG to look for opportunities to orient its decision- makers in a suitable way. It is evident that there are a number of peculiarities of the force which are not easy to see. For example, as a maritime service, BCG adheres to a specific set of traditions, which has descended from the Royal Navy. Besides, BCG becomes a war-fighting force under Bangladesh Navy during war, for which it needs constant training and preparation. At that time, BCG ships must be capable to perform the three classical roles of a warship – float, move and fight in a hostile operational environment. BCG ships should, therefore, be so built as to be able to be fitted with modern weaponry at the quickest possible time and merge into naval war fleet. At the same time, BCG officers and men must be able to take part into naval combat without any new teaching or training. It is peculiar for the force that it has to wear the mask of a policeman, while maintain the vigour of a combatant. BCG needs to find out ways to project these kinds of uniqueness to its hierarchy constantly. Outside MoHA, two other ministries are especially important for BCG – Ministry of Public Administration (MoPA) and Ministry of Finance (MoF). These ministries approve or reject BCG’s proposals for inclusion of manpower and hardware in the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). BCG’s communication with these two ministries are especially important and there is a lot of scope to improve it, as will be seen subsequently. A few other ministries have very little involvements with BCG, which are the Cabinet Division, Ministry of Land and Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs.

5.2 Scopes Where Decision-Making can be Revamped

For the smooth functioning of a force in line with the country’s policies and development needs, the decision-making must be timely, harmonious, seamless and smooth-flowing. As stated earlier, for making a decision on BCG, a good deal of understanding on the force becomes necessary. It is in BCG’s sake to bring the ministries on board, keep them informed about the specialized aspects of the force and continuously strive to see that the decision-making is more favourable to it. Currently, there are a number of scopes where the decision-making can be revamped, which are enumerated in the subsequent paragraphs.

5.2.1 Common and Recurring Decisions

At Present whenever a matter arises warranting a decision, MoHA and other ministries, being devoid of Coast Guard-specific information, send letters to BCG and waits for inputs. Moving of official memos back and forth consumes a lot of work, attention and man-hour, which could be utilized otherwise. Since, it is a recurrent matter, placing a Coast Guard officer in the ministry would have made BCG-related information and explanations available at hand. 125 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

5.2.2 Decisions with Lasting Effects

There are a few decisions which have lasting effects on BCG and other forces. One example is the decision regarding sanction of manpower and equipment to be included in the force’s Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E). Being a new force, BCG needs to get new manpower, new ships, boats, bases, stations and outposts sanctioned in its TO&E. Inclusion of manpower or equipment in TO&E creates permanent financial liability on the government and therefore, the ministries become extra cautious while scrutinizing them. The current system requires the proposal of the force to be scrutinized by the parent ministry, i.e. MoHA in the form of a formal internal meeting. Then the proposal goes to the Ministry of Public Administration’s branch named Organization and Management (O&M). This branch holds an internal meeting where it may or may not call the concerned organization for opinion or explanation. After scrutiny, the proposal is forwarded to the Ministry of Finance, Finance Division, Expenditure Management branch. This branch approves or disapproves proposals basing on government’s priorities. In this process, experiences have found that Coast Guard’s input are not communicated to these bodies effectively and proposal’s are severely cut down or even rejected. One believes that if BCG’s actual needs, priorities, contributions and other bright sides could be communicated adequately through presentations, informal discussions, formal meetings, visits of decision-makers to BCG ships and installations, the result could have been just and more appropriate. It seems that BCG needs to engage the officers in decision-making channel more effectively and keep them engaged, in order to solidify its impression in their minds. Besides, another relevant thing here is a proposal for TO&E takes long time – months, sometimes even years. This time lag happens due to the above-mentioned problem - communication gap. One feels that BCG needs to persuade the concerned authorities to create a ‘one-stop service’ by which all concerned ministries come to sit together to consider a TO&E proposal and make an instant decision. By this, the travelling of official files from desk to desk could be minimized avoiding procrastinations and saving valuable time.

5.2.3 Decisions Regarding Resource-Sharing and Optimization

The law enforcing agencies have many capabilities and resources which are common in nature. It is in the interest of the nation that those costly resources are shared towards saving valuable resources of the country. The onus of such steps naturally lies on MoHA, being the controlling body of the forces. For example, since Bangladesh Navy (BN) has almost all types of maritime training institutions, BCG does not need to develop them, rather send its personnel for training in those institutions. BCG only needs to develop Coast Guard-specific institutions, which

126 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD are not in the navy. Similarly, as BN is maintaining diving schools of high standard, Bangladesh Army and Fire Service and Civil Defence divers are getting trained there, saving tremendous resources and investments. The same is true for the maritime related resources and services and in this regard BCG should be asked and be able to provide. Such decisions should come from the ministries as and when needed.

6. Experience of Other Coast Guards

Towards finding a solution to bridge the gap between the force and the ministry, the experiences of other coast guards of the world can be helpful. Since more matured nations have struggled with the matter for much longer periods, they have invented various ways to close the gap. The decision-makers in the ministry in many other countries also understand the impracticability of knowing everything of their coast guards and have made a system of obtaining information as and when necessary. The most common practice is putting one or more members of the force as advisor to the decision-maker. An examination of the organogram of the US Coast Guard, which is the largest force of its kind in the world, would make the point clear. As is known, the US Department for Homeland Security (DHS) is analogous to Ministry of Home Affairs in Bangladesh. The US Coast Guard is the only military service under US Department for Homeland Security. In order to make decisions on military matters, the topmost decision maker of DHS, i.e. the Secretary (analogous to Home Minister in Bangladesh) consults his Military Advisor, who reports to him through the Chief of Staff. Thus, the Secretary, being a political person, always has by his/her side one military specialist to advise him/her on military matters including the US Coast Guard. This enables him to make decisions on the US Coast Guard without even asking the force. One can imagine that a similar system, tailored to the needs of all, has become a need of time for Bangladesh.

127 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Figure 2: US Department of Homeland Security 25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Executive Secretary Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff Military Advisor

Science & Management Office of Strategy, Office of the Office of Office of Public Office of Inspector Techonology Directorate Policy, and Plans General Counsel Legislative Affairs Affairs General Directorate

Chief Information Chief Financial Officer Officer

Federal Law Countering Office of Office of Office of The Citizenship Office of Operations Office for Civil Enforcement Weapons of Mass Partnership & Intelligence & & Immigration Services Privacy Office Coordination Right & Civil Training Centers Destruction Office Engagement Analysis Ombudsman Liberties

Cybersecurity and U.S. Citizenship & Federal Emergency U.S. Immigration & Transportation U.S. Customs & Infrastructure Immigration Management U.S. Coast Guard Customs U.S. Secret Service Security Border Protection Security Agency Services Agency Enforcement A Ministration

India has placed its Coast Guard under the Ministry of Defence since inception. Indian Ministry of Defence is run by Indian Civil Service officers like Bangladesh and many other countries. Government of India constituted the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) under the Ministry of Defence through a notification on 23 November 2001.26 The IDS came out as a part of Ministry of Defence by the cumulative pressure from Kargil Review Committee (KRC), Group of Ministers (a group formed to review the defence matters) and Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence Matters.27 Located in South Block of Indian secretariat and headquartered in Integrated Defence Staff building complex which is at Mehram Nagar, Delhi Cantonment, the HQ is headed by a Lieutenant General (or equivalent officer) and manned by mostly defence officers.28 The IDS advises the MoD on defence matters of operational natures. As such, decisions regarding defence-specific matters such as defence’s acquisition, planning, budgeting, training, deployment in humanitarian assistance, medical services and international cooperation on defence matters are dealt by the IDS.29 On the other hand, matters relating to defence industries, welfare

25 Available at dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0628_dhs-organizations-chart.pdf, accessed on 15 January 2019 26 “Vision and History”, Integrated Defence Staff, available at https://www.ids.nic.in/vision.php, accessed on 10 September 2019. 27 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2018, New Delhi: Government of India, 2018, pp. 10-11. 28 Prabhash K Dutta, “Why Modi govt needs to go beyond CDS”, India Today, 16 August 2019, available at https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/chief-of-defence-staff-cds-narendra-modi-1581393-2019-08-16, accessed on 25 August 2019. 29 “What We Do?”, Integrated Defence Staff, available at https://www.ids.nic.in/what-we-do.php, accessed on 01 September 2019. 128 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD of retired servicemen and defence research and development are dealt by branches of the MoD consisting of both civilian and military personnel.30 One can easily conclude that this example can be well adopted in Bangladesh and BCG personnel may well be incorporated in the MoHA’s organogram to provide required input on the force as and when required. is placed under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT). Japan is a nation which is surrounded by the sea on all sides and its sea area is more than twelve times bigger than its land area.31 Hence, maritime trade and fishing contribute significantly to its economy. But unfortunately, Japan’s maritime areas are plagued by smuggling, illegal migration, illegal fishing, pollution of marine environment, violation of maritime boundary and so on. With a view to curbing these crimes, Japan Coast Guard was established in May 1948. The force runs 457 vessels and 83 aircraft with about 13,994 personnel. During 2016, the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe decided to boost Coast Guard activities, increase its budget and set the trend of appointing a regular JCG officer (graduate from JCG Academy) as commandant of the force.32 Since then, JCG has got the third commandant consecutively from its own members with increased responsibility and activity. In overseeing the force, currently the MLIT is assisted by 19 JCG officers who are working in MLIT’s organs such as secretariat, policy bureau, maritime bureau and aviation bureau.33 The system is known to provide a smooth link between this specialized force and the MLIT, which is the second-largest executive agency of the Japanese government. One can easily tend to believe that the same system could work well to establish better communication link in Bangladesh context.

7. Towards Building a More Effective Decision-Making Structure

Needless to say, the current decision-making structure, i.e. the organogram of MoHA needs an adjustment in order to make effective decisions for the forces which are technical in nature. Here, the fundamental problem is to communicate the BCG-related inputs, particularly about the specialized aspects of the force, to the decision-makers in a timely and convincing way. Several propositions can be worked out, some of which are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

30 “About the Ministry”, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, available at https://mod.gov.in/about-- ministry, accessed on 10 September 2019. 31 “Japan Coast Guard Annual Report 2016”, Japan Coast Guard (JCG), available at https://www.kaiho.mlit. go.jp/e/anuual_report_of_jcg.html, accessed on 10 September 2019. 32 Reiji Yoshida, “Next Coast Guard chief to come up from ranks”, The Japan Times, 18 July 2013, available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/07/18/national/next-coast-guard-chief-to-come-up-from-ranks/#. XXdhCJ4zZPa, accessed on 10 September 2019. 33 Interview with Masako Nohara, Coast Guard Officer Senior Grade, Japan Coast Guard, on 10 September 2019. 129 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

7.1 Ministry-BCG Overlapping Placements

In order to obtain and keep ready BCG-related inputs at hand, MoHA can include staff officers from the forces in its organogram by creating appropriate posts. The officers then become a part of the ministry and with their knowledge and experience, can decode the Coast Guard jargons into ministerial language. They will become officers of the ministry, putting on Coast Guard uniform. They can make effective contributions to the ministry’s decision-making about the Coast Guard. This system is far ahead of other alternatives like making phone calls to BCG Headquarters or calling concerned BCG officer to the ministry or holding frequent meetings. Similarly, BCG may include a number of ministerial officers in its organogram. It may be mentioned that Indian Coast Guard (ICG) has created a post of Additional Secretary in the Coast Guard Headquarters under the Director General. By doing this, ICG has been dealing with the ministry very well, especially in budgetary matters. BCG may also try this system, which is surely to bridge its communication gaps with the ministries.

7.2 BCG Orientation for Ministry Officers

Systems may be made for BCS (Administration) cadre officers to undergo orientation training before taking over a post which deals with specialized organizations. Orientation courses may be arranged under their parent ministry, i.e. Ministry of Public Administration (MoPA) in BPATC, Savar (for theoretical part) and in the establishments of the forces for practical experience. For example, someone posted to Border-3 sub-branch of MoHA may undergo an orientation training (theory and practical orientation) of suitable duration in Bangladesh Coast Guard. The orientation training may be followed by a sea trip of one-week duration or so. At the end, he should be given an overview of the force in Coast Guard Headquarters with a comprehensive presentation. Someone posted as Joint Secretary (Border) may also undergo an orientation training of suitable duration in the Coast Guard, followed by a sea trip. The details of the training can be worked out after discussions. In order to make the training effective, at first a certain amount of interest has to be grown in the trainee. Therefore, these postings should be as far as possible voluntary, so that someone who has some interest is allowed to come. Then adequate incentives such as visit to forces of other countries may be kept as a part of the training so that an overall picture can be assimilated by the future incumbent.

7.3 Sensitizing MoPA for Placement of BCS Officers

BCG may approach MoPA to transfer officers with interests in maritime fields in posts dealing with BCG matters. Currently, the BCG Administration cadre

130 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD officers are frequently rotated from a post to another due to their career compulsion. Generally, there is no relation between one posting and the subsequent one, because the postings are on the basis of arising vacancies. However, if one officer could be rotated between the posts of, for example, Deputy Secretary (MoD, dealing with naval matters), Deputy Secretary (in MoHA, Border-3 section, dealing with BCG matters), Deputy Secretary (Ministry of Shipping) and Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock, he could have got a wide exposure in maritime field. One feels that, a system may be put in place so that the decision-makers can steadily grow expertise on the fields in which they are expected to make critical decisions in future.

7.4 Taking Decision-Maker On-board

BCG should create a culture of bringing its decision-makers on board through visits to BCG bases, stations and outposts and taking them on board for sea trips. BCG should endeavour to give the officers in MoHA, MoPA and MoF a practical ‘feel’ of the force and let them grow a deeper understanding. BCG should also time to time explain to the ministry officials its highly technical nature and specialized activities like SAR, pollution control, salvage, protection of bio-diversity, etc. and so on to appraise them of the intricacies of sea service. Such steps are sure to create intimate feeling among the decision-makers and make them deliver far more knowledgeable decisions.

7.5 Forming All-ministry Committee for TO&E

BCG should endeavour to create a system so that while determining the TO&E for any unit of the force, a committee consisting representatives from MoHA, MoPA and MoF sit together with BCG and put forward their opinions, debate together and finalize the TO&E. Later, when the TO&E should pass through MoPA and MoF, they should not be cut down or rejected in part or as a whole.

7.6 Building Rapport with Decision-Makers from the Beginning

Since BCG officers need to deal with the BCS (Administration) cadre officers very frequently, they should be sent for joint training with those officers. At present, the alma mater for the BCS cadre officers, i.e. the BPATC is conducting Senior Staff Course for Joint Secretary level and Advanced Course on Administration and Development (ACAD) for Deputy Secretary level.34 BCG needs to send its officers for those courses or get those navy officers posted who underwent those courses.

34 “Bangladesh Public Administration Training Center”, available at http:// www.bpatc.org.bd/index.php? pageid=223, accessed on 30 August 2019. 131 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Such courses can create highly effective camaraderie with the civil officers which can offer lasting benefits for the force through personal relations and understanding.

8. Conclusion

Having emerged as the youngest force, Bangladesh Coast Guard has been facing ‘teething problems’ in making its foothold in a firm way. Although nearly one quarter of a century has elapsed since its inception, the problems still persist. Inception of some wings or parts of a force has created on obvious overlap with BCG in respect of areas of operations and functions. Some of the function of those wings turn out to be basically Coast Guard jobs and the stakeholders are now confused as to whose duty is what. Both BCG and other law enforcing agencies are under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the onus lies on the ministry to draw clear-cut boundaries in this regard and remove overlaps. Alternately, the long-awaited and recently formed National Committee on Security Affairs (NCSA), as the apex body, can look at the problem from the overall perspective and resolve the matter. In order for the overlaps not to occur in future, BCG may act as single maritime service provider for all law enforcing agencies. In order to run as a force, BCG looks towards the ministry for various decisions. There it seems that there is ample scope for the decision-making structure to be more inclusive and vibrant. For now, the current system tends to create and sustain a communication gap between the ministry and BCG for which neither party is to be blamed. But the gap must be bridged, and BCG must find out ways and means to close it as quickly and effectively as possible. To this end, BCG may make deliberate efforts to orient and equip the officers of the ministry with a practical ‘feel’ about the force through an orientation programs and effective communications. At the same time, the ministry may find out some way to include some of the BCG members in its organizational structure towards making BCG-related information and explanations at hand. Coast Guard officers, permanently posted or on attachment in the ministry and assisting the ministry in decision-making, are surely able to close the gap, as the experience of the progressive countries reveals. After one quarter of a century, it has become imperative for all to see that Bangladesh Coast Guard delivers its best to the maritime Bangladesh to the best of its ability. It is the duty of all others concerned to see that the force is able to do so by functioning smoothly. Coast Guard has undergone quite a bumpy ride along the way; and it struggle till today for many basic things like manpower, land, buildings, ships, boats and so on. The force has tremendous potentiality - it makes a return of 10 taka for every one taka of recurrent expenditure by the government.35 Potentially, the

35 Bangladesh Coast Guard Headquarters, Coast Guard Vision Document 2041, Dhaka: Coast Guard Headquarters, 2019, p. 14. 132 BANGLADESH COAST GUARD force is able to make our sea area safe for the seafarers to explore and extract. ‘Blue Economy’ related activities, deep into the country sea area can become an easy and fearless venture under the vigilant watch of the force. With the ‘teething problems’ resolved, and with the active support and co-operation from all the corners, the force is surely to become the true ‘Guardian at Sea’ in future days to come.

133

BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019: 135-160

Sheikh Masud Ahmed RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS (FTFs): EVOLVING THREATS AND RESPONSE STRATEGY

Abstract

The ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF)’ phenomenon in contemporary time has got prominence since the inception of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Thousands of different nationals especially from European countries travelled or made efforts to travel in war-torn Iraq and Syria to fight for the terrorist groups, predominantly the Islamic State (IS/Da’esh). It is argued that a bulk of the FTFs might have gone back to the countries of origin or home countries after the substantial loss of IS territory/Caliphate in Syria. The concern regarding the returnee FTFs assumed high priority on the political agenda of many Western countries for about last half a decade and stressed on a broad array of policies and strategies: policy on prevention of radicalization; information sharing and intelligence exchange; responses to returnees with criminal justice trial; de- radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration with the mainstream population. However, the ‘Global Village’ is not immune from the menace and spillover effects of FTFs and the returnees. Thus, the present paper makes an effort to trace the universal response strategies against FTFs and the returnees including the associated families. It attempts to answer some fundamental questions, i.e., who are the foreign terrorist fighters? why do they go to foreign land to fight? and what are they likely to do when the fight is over? It furthermore examines how some of the affected countries have responded to the menace of FTFs and the returnees. The paper also argues that global communities are facing formidable challenges to counter the terrorist activities of FTFs and the returnees. Thus, there is a need to have a comprehensive approach to eliminate the risks eminating from contemporary FTF phenomenon.

Keywords: Foreign Terrorist Fighter, Returnee, Radicalization, Terrorism, IS, Da’esh, Syria

1. Introduction

The versatile terrorist activities conducted by returnee FTFs demand more insight into the prevalent trends from different parts of the world. Scholars and policymakers by and large agree on the importance and implications of the returnee FTFs’ trend in contemporary time as they pose major national and international security threats.1 Today, many countries have already experienced the terrifying

Sheikh Masud Ahmed, SPP, psc is Research Director at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected] © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019. 1 Hamed el-Said and Richard Barrett, Enhancing the Understanding of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon in Syria, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, July 2017. 135 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 blow and many more around the globe are in trauma as to who will be the next. The deadly concern is heightened with the expansion of so-called Islamic State (IS) in conducting their terrorist attacks, propagating their ideology and widening their networks beyond the Middle Eastern countries. There is no denying of the fact that Middle Eastern civil wars have attracted numerous individuals from different countries around the globe to fight for the belligerent groups. Some governments with their unskilled, untrained and under-resourced law enforcement agencies face practical difficulties in monitoring, identifying, plotting and foiling the terrorist attempts of FTFs due to scanty information. The danger is that the experiences of pandemonium can cause psychological trauma like post-traumatic stress syndrome many war veterans suffer from, let alone further radicalization.2 Arguably, some of the FTFs have either committed severe war crimes or had been the onlooker of the atrocities.3 FTFs generally operate in ‘Hard-to-Reach’ areas and /or war-torn countries as it is difficult to reach out to them in terms of both negotiation and gunning them down.4 There prevails a great fear that the FTFs upon returning to home country may engage in terrorist activities and expand their radicalization efforts. With the recent piece-meal attacks in Western societies, for example, Paris and Brussels in particular, the emerging challenges posed by FTFs and the returnees seem to be more critical than ever. It demands that the governments and the security agencies should be more proactive in dealing with the spill over effect. FTFs, building on their experiences, may engage in further recruitment and radicalization or carry out terrorist attacks in their home countries.5 According to some estimates 2,000 to 3,000 FTFs (as of September 2014) from Western countries might have participated in Syria and Iraq conflicts including over 100 Americans.6 To date, the majority of the FTFs come from Western countries like France, Britain, Belgium and Germany.7 It is argued that FTFs, who travelled to Syria and Iraq, vary between 30,000 to more than 42,000.8 The problem of returnee FTFs may further aggravate due to the protracted nature of Middle Eastern conflicts.9

2 Amy-Jane Gielen, “Supporting Families of Foreign Fighters. A Realistic Approach for Measuring the Effectiveness”, Journal for Deradicalization, No. 2, 2015, pp. 22-48. 3 Sandra Kraehenman, “The Obligations under International Law of the Foreign Fighter’s State of Nationality or Habitual Residence, State of Transit and State of Destination”, in Andrea de Guttry, Francesea Capone and Christophe Paulusses (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser, 2016, pp. 229-258. 4 Kim Mans and Ruben Tuitel, Foreign Fighters in their own Words: Using YouTube as a Source, The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 5 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq”, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Policy Paper No. 34, 2014. 6 Agence France Presse, “3,000 European jihadis now in Syria, Iraq: EU official,”The Daily Star, 23 September 2014. 7 Dafna Rand and Anthony Vassalo, Bringing the Fight Back Home: Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, Center for a New American Security (CNAS), 2014, p.1. 8 Radicalization Awarness Network, Responses to Returnees: Foreign Terrorist Fighters and their Families, European Union: Radicalization Awareness Network, 2017. 9 Richard Barrett, Foreign Fighters in Syria, New York: The Soufan Group, June 2014. 136 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Indeed, concerns are on the rise about the expansion of networks and applications of acquired skills elsewhere to fight against the similar grievances. According to one expert, the menace is something like a ‘ticking time bomb’.10 The belligerents in the war zone especially in the Middle East and Afghanistan have all the potential to influence one another and cross-fertilize within the different groups and individuals. There are possibilities of further polarization by those who impart training and run the training camps for new recruits. Usually, the lone fighters go to the war zone and in the process start working in the bigger canvas.11 This bigger extremist network and its associated bonds can invoke other extremist groups to stimulate violence against the perceived grievances in any part of the world.12 Some FTF returnees might also involve in self-motivated terrorist activities due to sympathetic radicalization and ideological alikeness with the fighting in Syria or Iraq. The ‘Global Village’ is not immune from the menace and spill over effects of FTFs and the returnees. The disquiet about FTFs assumes high place on the political agenda of many Western countries for about last half a decade and emphasizes upon a wide range of policies and strategies. Policymakers and security practitioner are mostly concerned with prevention of radicalization, intelligence sharing and exchange of information, criminal justice responses to FTFs and the returnees, de- radicalization, rehabilitation and integration with the mainstream population. In this context, the paper attempts to answer some fundamental questions, i.e., who are the foreign terrorist fighters? why do they go to foreign land to fight? and what are they likely to do when the fight is over? It furthermore examines how some of the affected countries have responded to the menace of returnee FTFs. The study argues that global communities are facing formidable challenges to counter terrorist activities of FTFs and the returnees. Thus, there is a need to have a comprehensive approach to eliminate the risks eminating from contemporary FTF phenomenon. The paper has five sections. Section 1 is the introduction. Section 2 highlights on the contours of foreign fighters. Section 3 attempts to figure out the recruitment and radicalization process while section 4 deals with the response strategy where a sub-section has been dedicated to understand Bangladesh perspective.

10 Colum Lynch, “Europe’s New ‘Time Bomb’ Is Ticking in Syria”, Foreign Policy, 09 July 2013. 11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes, Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System, Vienna: United Nations, 2017. 12 Erica Harper, Reconceptualizing the Drivers of Violent Extremism: An Agenda for Child & Youth Resilience, Terre des homes and WANA Institute, 2018. 137 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

2. Contours of Foreign Terrorist Fighters

2.1 Who They Are?

The term ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ (FTF) is not defined in international law but the term is used today primarily to refer to jihadist fighters.13 The phenomenon of FTFs does not have an ascertained legal meaning under the existing international legal framework.14 With the emergence of FTF phenomenon in the second decade of the 21st century primarily due to Middle East conflicts including Afghanistan, question comes in mind as to ‘Who are the FTFs?’ A simple definition of FTF entails ‘individuals, driven mainly by ideology, religion and/or kinship, who leave their country of origin or their country of habitual residence to join a group engaged in an armed conflict in another country’.15 In the UN system framework, FTFs are only addressed when they are connected to any or some terrorist groups or likely to commit terrorist attacks, i.e., when they are terrorists.16 This definition however, does not differentiate between FTFs who joined violent extremist groups and those who joined government forces. Over time, terrorists have emerged in different forms with different names in different era and conflicts. However, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reaffirms ‘that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations, whenever and by whosoever committed’.17 According to UNSC resolution S/RES/2178 (2014), FTFs are the ‘nationals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training.’18 Though the contemporary FTFs phenomenon is viewed in the context of Syria and Iraq as the largest FTFs mobilization hub, it actually began with the

13 Marcello Flores, “Foreign Fighters Involvement in National and International Wars: A Historical Survey”, in Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds.), Foreign Fighters Under International Law and Beyond, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, pp. 27-47. 14 Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen, “Introduction”, in Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, pp.1-3. 15 Almir Maljevic, Sean Griffin and Simon Goddard, Foreign Terrorist Fighters Manual for Judicial Training Institutes South-Eastern Europe, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2017. 16 Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen, “Concluding Remarks”, in Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, pp. 259-282 ; see also Andrea Guttry, “The Role Played by the UN in Countering the Phenomenon of Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, in Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, pp. 517-522. 17 United Nations Security Council, UNSC Resolution S/RES/2178 (2014), UNSC, 2014, available at http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_ doc.asp? symbol=S/RES/2178(2014), accessed on 18 Ibid., para. 6(a). 138 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s.19 Apart from the numerical size, the modern FTF formation is distinctive of the forerunners on two different counts. Firstly, from the graphic illustration in figure 1, it is seen that the threat is, indeed, global where the Middle East centric terrorist organizations have attracted FTFs from as many as 120 countries from around the globe.20 Secondly, while the previous FTFs were more or

Figure 1: Foreign Fighters by Region21

5% 3% Former Soviet Union- 8717 30% Middle East-7054 18%

Western Europe-5718 20% 24% The Maghreb-5319

S and SE Asia-1568

Balkans-845 less the individuals of combat age (recruiting age of a military soldier), the present FTFs wave is demographically more diverse to include men, women and children.22 Following Table shows foreign women and children in the Islamic State.

19 Rik Coolsaet, “Facing the Fourth Foreign Fighters Wave: What Drives Europeans to Syria, and to Islamic State? Insights from the Belgian Case”, Egmont-Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont Paper No. 81, 2016. 20 Ibid. 21 Richard Barrett, Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees, New York: The Soufan Center, 2017. 22 Timothy Holman and Cerwyn Moore, “Remainers and Leavers: Foreign Fighters after the Islamic State”, CREST Security Review, No. 4, 2017. 139 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Table 1: Foreign Women and Children in the Islamic State23 Country Total Women Children Germany ~ 900 ~ 190 56 Indonesia ~600 113 Italy 110 6 Kazakhstan ~500 >200 women and children Kyrgyzstan ~500 >130 Kosovo ~300 44 27 Malaysia 91 12 17 Morocco 1.623 ~275 Netherland 280 >90 >90 Russia 3.417 >350 Spain 204 21 Sweden 267 ~70 45 Switzerland ~70 7 Tunisia ~3000 ~1000 UK ~850 >100 50 Australia 165 -25 70 Austria <300 17 40 Belgium ~528 ~85 ~118 Bosnia 148 60 81 Canada ~185 ~35 EU ~4,000 ~680 France 1,910 ~320 460

Many scholars and security analysts opine that FTFs triggered and exacerbated the conflicts in Middle East with widespread sexual and sectarian violence24 which arguably helped to stimulate ‘the largest humanitarian crisis since the creation of the United Nations’.25 In the plight of terrorism, the FTFs get the scope to develop close tie with sympathizers from across the world.26 It is argued that the current FTFs’ wave is ‘the most operationally experienced, lethally skilled

23 Richard Barrett, op. cit. 24 Holman and Moore, op. cit. 25 Stephen O’Brien, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs/Emergency Relief Coordinator statement to the Security Council on Missions to Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia and Kenya and an Update on the Oslo Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, 10 March 2017. 26 Daniel L. Byman, “What Happens when Arab Foreign Fighters Return Home”, Brookings Institution, 07 May 2015. 140 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS and highly networked group to date’27 and with the changing power dynamics, there look like two generations within the current wave, i.e., individuals not taking part in the close combat and the ones who stay in the combat zones with varying length of time fighting actively in the front line with sufficient military training and diverse experiences.28

2.2 Oversight and Relapse

The diverse experiences and the multiplicity of contemporary returnee FTFs might emerge with varied potential outcomes bypassing or penetrating through the national governments’ intelligent toolkits. The typological illustration of different effects can include:29

a) The FTF(s) who die during fighting can be regarded as ‘martyr’ in the home country, thereby can have inductive impact on the community. b) Veteran FTFs can have temporary return to the country of residence and can shift to other conflict zone(s). c) FTFs upon returning home can make an effort to recruit others in disguise. d) A reintegrated FTF can display apparent disengagement from violence while looking for opportune moment. e) Returnee FTF(s) can resort to terrorist plot(s) displaying apparent normalcy in activities.

There can emerge sub-categories of returnee reintegrated FTFs who could truly disengage upon becoming disillusioned but there could be yet another group who disengages without being disillusioned still bearing core extremist ideology.30 The latter group can perpetrate violence and terrorist acts on the opportunity or the sensitive targets. For example, on 24 May 2014, a French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche killed four people in Brussels who were inside a Jewish Museum.31 It was later known that the attacker participated in the fighting in Syria in the previous year. For many Western intelligence practitioners, it appeared to be a forerunner of many more. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) report in October 2016

27 Lydia Khalil and Rodger Shanahan, “Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: The day after”, Lowy Institute, 13 September 2016, available at https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/khalil_ and_shanahan_ foreign_ fighters_in_syria_and_iraq_final_ web_120916_0.pdf, accessed on 05 January 2019. 28 Radicalization Awarness Network, op. cit. 29 Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn, “The Foreign Fighters’ Threat: What History Can (not) Tell Us”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 8, No. 5, 2014, pp. 59-73. 30 Colin P. Clarke and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Where Do ISIS Fighters Go When the Caliphate Falls? They have options”, The Atlantic, 06 March 2017. 31 Anne Penketh, “Brussels Jewish Museum shooting: suspect with Islamist links arrested”, The Guardian, 01 June 2014. 141 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 finds that 50 foreign fighters from Western countries were so outlawed that they had been directly speaking in front of the video camera which were later uploaded on YouTube.32 Figure-2 shows the participation of Western FTFs in videos during Syrian conflict. Figure 2: Western FTFs in Videos Who Participated in Syria (N=50)33

There is a fear that Syria and Iraq conflict might wage a brutal wave of terrorism across Europe and other parts of the world.34 The extensively reported connection of quite a few ex- FTFs in the attacks in Brussels, London, Paris and Istanbul from 2015 to 2017 seem to substantiate the fear. Several researches also suggest that though returnee FTF-related attacks are infrequent, the past incidents had been particularly lethal and brutal.35 As such there is a need to develop some perspective on the terrorism perpetrated by returnee FTFs though their numbers may be relatively small.36 Arguably, this kind of terrorism may be conducted based on absolutely home country’s dynamics without any ‘foreign’ engagement.37 Thus, the threats which the returnee FTFs pose

32 Kim Mans and Ruben Tuitel, op. cit. 33 Ibid. 34 Kim Willsher, “Returning jihadists ‘threaten new wave of terror in Europe”, The Guardian, 19 December 2018. 35 Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives, New York: United Nations, 2018; Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013, p. 11. 36 Charles Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration?”, Brookings Institution, Policy Briefing, August 2015, p. 2. 37 Alastair Reed, Johanna Pohl and Marjolein Jegerings, “The Four Dimensions of the Foreign Fighter Threat: Making Sense of an Evolving Phenomenon”, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, Policy Brief, June 2017, available at https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ICCT-Reed-Pohl-The-Four-Dimensions-of-the- Foreign-Fighters-Threat-June-2017.pdf, accessed on 08 January 2019. 142 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS in the countries of origin or return are intrinsically difficult to measure and require constant analysis. Available statistics suggest that FTFs who went to the Middle East conflict zones and actively participated with the associated terrorist groups in Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen and Somalia, travelled from approxiamately 110 countries around the globe. It has been also suggested that more than 40,000 FTFs had travelled to Iraq and Syria alone until late 2017.38 Such huge influx raises big question about the effectiveness and awareness of the intelligence agencies of the countries of origin let alone the countries of transit. Despite the reality of danger, the threat emanating from FTFs and the returnees can also be exaggerated. Since the 2003 United States of America’s (USA) war against Iraq and War on terror in Afghanistan, there was an apprehension about the huge influx of the returnee FTFs who were perceived to take part in those conflicts from foreign countries. Indeed, the oversight of sympathizers, volunteers, FTFs and the returnees with respect to Syria and Iraq Civil Wars seems to have fallen heavily on the overall security affairs of the Western life with the potentiality of expanding to other parts of the world. Arguably, FTFs fill the void created due to lapses and poor responses of the respective governments and international community on the Muslim sufferings especially, the oversight of the crimes against Sunni Muslims in Syria and Iraq.39

2.3 Trends and Potentials

The returnee FTFs from Syria and Iraq are viewed differently by the Western societies and security agencies than the past FTFs phenomenon.40 It is feared that young European and American Muslims may go off and volunteer to fight in Syria and Iraq and thereafter, return as anti-Western terrorists.41 Moreover, while in the combat zone, they may be connected with and/or establish terrorist networks with the sympathizers and volunteers around the world, intensify the radicalization efforts and provide training, weapon and ammunitions and financial support to new recruits. This would strengthen their motivation and raise level of confidence. According to Charles Farr, a UK Security and Counter Terrorism (CT) expert, ‘Syria is a very profound game-changer’42 and ‘the returnees are not only coming back with radical

38 United Nations, “Greater Cooperation Needed to Tackle Danger Posed by Returning Foreign Fighters, Head of Counter-Terrorism Office Tells Security Council”, available at https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc13097. doc.htm, accessed on 08 January 2019. 39 International Crisis Group, "How the Islamic State Rose, Fell and Could Rise Again in the Maghreb", Middle East and North Africa Report N°178, Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 24 July 2017, available at https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/178-how-the-islamic-state-rose_0.pdf, accessed on 09 January 2019. 40 CTED, op. cit. 41 Kristin M. Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic Insurgencies”, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2014, pp. 140-187. 42 Colum Lynch, op. cit. 143 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 ideas; they are also traumatized and fully prepared to use violence.’43 It is also feared that ‘there’s going to be a Diaspora out of Syria at some point of time’ who might be the cause of future 9/11.44 Though history records comparatively less direct threat posed by the returnee FTFs, the successful ones were more lethal and deadly.45 It becomes difficult for states to assess which FTFs may pose a threat, or act as radicalizers, recruiters and creators or reinforcers of terrorist groups in the future.46 The FTFs are assumed to expand their networks globally and build strong ties with other terrorist groups and sympathizers.47 It is argued that the Western FTFs in Syria, who have gained skilled military training and experience, might have linkage to some other violent activists.48 Moreover, as the conflict continues, FTFs are gradually gaining ground, are increasing dramatically and looking for new targets around the globe once the war is over.49 Despite robust military operations and effective counter measures by respective countries, FTFs had played critical role in forming and strengthening terrorist groups and networks which, of course, include radicalization and recruitment process.50 The IS ‘exploits socioeconomic grievances and feelings of alienation, marginalization, discrimination, or victimization, precipitated by a host of factors, including real or perceived lack of opportunities, lack of good governance, inequality, injustice, and feelings of injustice’.51 Such complexities of the phenomenon can be associated with (a) spontaneous travel and return from and to Middle East conflict zones especially from Syria with relative ease,52 (b) changing motivational factors shifting from ideological travel decision to support the ‘Caliphate’53 and (c) taking advantage and making best use of technology and social media for spreading propaganda and reaching out to the global audience including financial transactions54 for attack plots

43 Minister of Security and Justice, Government of the Netherlands, “National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (NCTV): Level of Threat Continues to be Substantial”, available at https://www.government. nl/latest/news/2013/07/01/national-coordinator-for-security-and-counterterrorism-nctv-level-of-threat- continues-to-be-substantial, accessed on 11 January 2019. 44 Sari Horowitz and Adam Goldman, “FBI Director: Number of Americans Traveling to Fight in Syria Increasing”, The Washington Post, 02 May 2014. 45 “Foreign terrorist fighters pose long-term challenge: study”,Xinhua , 12 April 2018. 46 CTED, op. cit. 47 Marc Hecker and Elie Tenenbaum, France vs. Jihadism: The Republic in a New Age of Terror, Paris, France: The French Institute of International Relations, 2017. 48 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “Foreign Fighters in Syria”, available at http:// www. terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20607/E_207_13_1157524947.pdf, accessed on 11 January 2019. 49 Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, “Blowback Revisited”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6, 2005. 50 “Foreign terrorist fighters pose long-term challenge: study”, op. cit. 51 CTED, “Foreign Terrorist Fighters”, available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist- fighters/, accessed on 11 January 2019. 52 Thomas Hegghammer and Petter Nesser, “Assessing the Islamic State’s Commitment to Attacking the West”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2015, pp. 14-30. 53 CTED, op. cit. 54 Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State”, Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2015, pp. 107-116. 144 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS elsewhere upon losing the territory. In this context, Iraq seems to be more convenient than Afghanistan as it is geographically nearer to Arab heartland.55 Syria, on the other hand, provides easier route as Brian Fishman contends, ‘it is far easier for foreign fighters to enter Syria than it was in Iraq.’56

3. Recruitment and Radicalization

3.1 Functional Scheme

FTF returnees seem to have risen in status - gained a kind of street cred which enables them to radicalize and recruit others.57 Many a times, it has been found that FTF returnees from Iraq and Afghanistan have been praised for their valiant actions and bravery elevating them in prestige and thereby allowing them to convince others to enter the fray.58 In 2006, some 20 from France and 70 from the UK joined the fight in Iraq who later received greater honors and prestige from their community upon return.59 Figure 3 shows the schematic model of FTFs radicalization.60

55 Shaarik H. Zafar, “Western Foreign Fighters in Syria: Implications for U.S. CVE Efforts”, The Washington Institute, 14 March 2014, available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/western- foreign-fighters-in-syria-implications-for-u.s.-cve-efforts, accessed on 12 January 2019. 56 Brian Fishman, “Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq to Al-Qa’ida’s Operations”, CTC Sentinel, Vol. 6, No. 11, 2013, pp. 1-2. 57 Lorenzo Vidino, Livio Pigoni and Aglaya Snetkov, Foreign Fighters: An Overview of Responses in Eleven Countries, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies, 2014. 58 Ibid. 59 Jean-Pierre Filiu, “Ansar al-Fatah and ‘Iraqi’ Networks in France”, in Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares (eds.), The Evolution of the Global Terrorism Threat: From 9/11 to Osama Bin Laden’s Death, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, pp. 353-372. 60 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, op. cit. 145 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Figure 3: Schematic Model of FTFs Radicalization

The transformation into FTFs maintains a cyclic chain where a new recruit at the end of the process becomes the skilled recruiter. The process is repetitive, with today’s follower becoming tomorrow’s leader. Not surprisingly, this process poses a real threat because returnee FTFs are likely to craft a wave of terrorism not only in the West but also in any part of the globe. During the 2000s, FTFs started using social media, e.g., YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, etc., as new tools to recruit, motivate and muster the followers.61 These tools have been effectively made use of globally and especially in Syrian conflict which is called ‘the most socially mediated civil conflict in history’.62 The recruits are mostly the youths between 16 and 25 years which is a principal social media age.63 It is possible to quickly disseminate the extremist ideas and other associated

61 Shiraz Maher, “British Foreign Fighters in Syria”, ICSR Insight, 15 October 2013, available at https://icsr. info/2013/10/15/british-foreign-fighters-in-syria/, accessed on 14 January 2019. 62 Marc Lynch Deen and Freelon Sean Aday, “Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War”, United States Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 91, 2014. 63 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al Qaida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records, West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007, available at https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2010/06/ aqs-foreign-fighters-in-iraq.pdf, accessed on 14 January 2019. 146 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS information by using social media across the wide range of sympathizers, volunteers and followers.64 The perpetrators target to motivate the supporters by providing sermons, showing brutal actions against the perceived enemy and many other varieties of propaganda.65 Some of the FTF groups including some individuals make use of the social media to motivate the radicals to carry out attacks in their home countries.66 It is argued that IS is particularly skilled at stirring up their image by using social media and recruiting FTFs.67

3.2 Apprehension and Reality

The fear and apprehension regarding FTF and returnee phenomenon are sometimes exaggerated but its prevalence and impact are justified. The analysis from historical records says that most of the FTFs have not ended up as terrorists.68 There are many mitigating factors which restrict the conversion rate of FTFs into terrorists and keep the number far lower than feared. This can be further controlled and kept low by devising appropriate policy thus decreasing the dangers which the returnee FTFs pose. According to a security analyst, though the Iraq war contributed to the formation of terrorist network, the same was effectively disrupted from further expansion.69 Teun van Dongen contends, ‘plausible as this may have sounded; no successful terrorist attack has been carried out by a jihadist who gained experience by fighting in Iraq.’70 It is argued that all the returnee FTFs do not perpetrate terrorism in the home country; at one point of time some might have gained anti-Western mentality, but they never indulged in violent hatred of the West before.71 Though Mohammad

64 Aris Roussinos, “Jihad Selfies: These British Extremists in Syria Love Social Media”, Vice Channels, 05 December 2013, available at https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gq8g5b/syrian-jihadist-selfies-tell-us-a-lot- about-their-war, accessed on 15 January 2019. 65 Joseph A. Carter, Shiraz Maher and Peter R. Neumann, Greenbirds: Measuring the Importance and Influence of Foreign Fighter Networks, London, United Kingdom: ICSR, 2014. 66 Abul Taher and Amanda Perthen, “From shop assistant to the British Bin Laden: Former House of Fraser trainee is sadistic Al Qaeda killer fighting with Syrian civil war’s most brutal gang - and he calls for violence in the UK on social media”, Mail Online, 01 June 2014, available at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-2644895/The-British-Bin-Laden-House-Fraser-trainee-unmasked-sadistic-Al-Qaeda-killer.html, accessed on 15 January 2019. 67 Jeff Stone, “ISIS Attacks Twitter Streams, Hacks Accounts To Make Jihadi Message Go Viral”, International Business Times, 17 June 2014. 68 Rik Coolsaet and Thomas Renard, Returnees: who are they, why are they (not) Coming Back and how should we Deal with them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, Egmont–The Royal Institute for International Relations, 2018, available at http://www. egmontinstitute.be/returnees-assessing-policies-on-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-belgium germany-and- the-netherlands/, accessed on 15 January 2019. 69 Jean-Pierre Filiu, op. cit. 70 Daniel Byman, “What do the Paris attacks tell us about foreign fighters?”,The Washington Post, 16 November 2015. 71 Caroline Cox and John Marks, The West, Islam and Islamism: Is Ideological Islam Compatible with Liberal Democracy?, London: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, 2003. 147 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Merah is often cited by French officials as an example of FTFs, indeed, hewas already indulged in anti-Western terrorism before he joined fighting in the foreign land.72 Merah himself chose to carry out terrorist attacks in France, not necessarily directed by the IS, Al-Qaeda core or any other terrorist organization.73 This kind of argument has been challenged in recent times where some countries have suffered setbacks from the attack of returnee FTFs. Hegghammer argues that the radicalized FTFs from the West are more likely to travel to conflict zones than to conduct terrorist activities at home.74 However, according to Malet ‘the vast majority of them went on to lead essentially ordinary lives,’ despite their political activeness.75 But the recent terrorist attack in Indonesia by an IS affiliated organization named Jamaah Ansaurut Daula (JAD)76 has been an eye opener to the rest of the world that the menace of returnee FTFs is not only West-centric, but also has all the potentials to spread and expand to other parts of the world. They can leverage the strongly knitted domestic support to conduct terrorist attacks both at home and abroad. They can even connect to the disengaged former transnational terrorist groups and get combat and financial support to perpetrate attacks on their designated targets.

3.3 Motivating Factors

An analysis of the case of Merah reveals that he had three reasons for the violent cruelty; ‘to avenge the killing of Palestinian children by Israel; to punish France for its ban on the burqa for Muslim women and to exact a price from France for sending troops to Afghanistan’.77 Though the crises in Middle Eastern Muslim countries began with foreign intervention in Iraq, the present conflicts consciously or unconsciously involve the ideological differences and more of sectarian clashes between different ethnic communities. It does not seem to confine to Middle East conflicts and grievances only, also involves global ‘Muslimophobia’. Of course, the legacies of ancient theological divide have added fuel to the ongoing conflicts and at times resurgence of conflicts in Muslim countries beyond the Middle East. Growing sectarian clashes are argued to have stimulated transnational terrorist networks that

72 Christopher Dickey, “Mohamed Merah and the War on Terror’s New Front”, The Daily Beast, 22 March 2012, available at https://www.thedailybeast.com/mohamed-merah-and-the-war-on-terrors-new-front, accessed on 15 January 2019. 73 Ibid. 74 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, op. cit. 75 David Malet, “Foreign Fighters Playbook: What the Texas Revolution and the Spanish Civil War Reveal about al Qaeda”, Foreign Affairs, 08 April 2014. 76 Sylvene See, “Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: A Catalyst for Recidivism Among Disengaged Terrorists”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Vol. 10, No. 6, 2018, pp.7-15. 77 Dickey, op. cit. 148 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS pose grave threat beyond the Middle East region.78 These kinds of sentiments have grown during Iraq war which has sprouted through the Syrian conflict.79 But the nature and prevalence of conflicts depict that both the regimes of Syria and Iraq have consciously used the conflict from sectarian perspective to discredit opponents and rally the non-Sunnis behind the governments.80 As a result, many groups in opposition have taken the advantage of and embraced sectarianism. Some may argue that the menace emerged as the by-product of the ‘Arab Spring’, in reality, the turmoil in many countries of the Middle East including North Africa paved the way to develop political space that helped religious bigots to establish influence and power.81 However, it may be reckoned that many volunteers who participated in the Syrian conflict in last half of 2013 were encouraged and motivated by prominent religious leaders to defend Sunnis’ interests against the Shias.82 Along with the grievances arising from Muslim sufferings due to arguably unjust war/Civil Wars, political exploitation and biased governments, the sectarianism is also one of the deeply rooted motivating factors for the radicalization of many FTFs. Eschatological motivation is another discourse which the FTFs and new recruiters take on the basis of inevitable apocalypse. They view the Syrian conflict as a war between God’s forces and his enemies. It reflects that both symbolically and historically, Syria is reckoned as the spiritual heart of the Arab and Muslim world, concerned with the final ‘Day of Judgment’. Historical evidence shows that Syria was one of the first countries which oriented itself with Islamic religion as soon as Muslim forces expanded its influence from the Arabian Peninsula during the th7 and 8th centuries (661–750 CE) and ‘ruled by one of Islam’s most important dynasties, the Umayyads - the first great Muslim dynasty to rule the empire of the Caliphate.’83 The glorification of such historic narratives influences many FTFs to commence clandestine activities to achieve their utopian goals. Theologically, the ultimate fate and the sufferings of Syria are connected with the core Muslim beliefs all over the world. According to an apocalyptic prophecy by the last and final prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), Syria would

78 Council on Foreign Relations, “The Sunni- Shia Divide”, available at https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni- shia-divide#!/sunni-shia-divide, accessed on 12 January 2019. 79 Geneive Abdo, “The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a Sunni Divide”, Brookings Institution, 10 April 2013, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ sunni-shia-abdo.pdf, accessed on 15 January 2019. 80 Justin J. Gengler, “Understanding Sectarianism in the Persian Gulf”, in Lawrence G. Potter (ed.), Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, London: Hurst and Company, 2013, pp. 31– 66. 81 Daniel Byman, “Sectarianism Afflicts the New Middle East”,Survival , Vol. 56, No. 1, 2014. 82 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, “ISIS: Portrait of a Jihadi Terrorist Organization”, available at https://www.terrorism-info.org.il//Data/articles/Art_20733/101_14_Ef_ 1329270214.pdf, accessed on 15 January 2019. 83 Asma Afsaruddin, “Umayyad Dynasty: Islamic History”, Encyclopedia Britannica, available at https://www. britannica.com/topic/Umayyad-dynasty-Islamic-history, accessed on 16 January 2019. 149 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 be the final place for decisive last battles for the end of time.84 William McCants,85 an expert on terrorism and Islam argues that the IS leaderships motivate the recruits ‘by being more ruthless, more apocalyptic and more devoted to state-building than its competitors. The shrewd leaders of the IS combined two of the most powerful yet contradictory ideas in Islam-the return of the Islamic Empire and the end of the world- into a mission and a message that shapes its strategy and inspires its army of zealous fighters.’ McCants fears that the returnee FTFs have already defied conventional views of waging wars and acquiring recruits. He further argues that even if the IS is defeated, jihadist terrorism will never be the same.86 Importantly, lessons can be taken from recent incidents that the returnee FTFs learn from the predecessors’ failures or successes thus, emerging as ever-evolving threats. This nature of threats can take up the bloody role of IS even if they are gone. Thus, it is significant to understand the motivational aspects from the perspective of ideology, history and politics with a view to grasping the threats’ discourse including foreseeing future developments in the arena of global terrorism arising from returnee FTFs. There remains a psychological impact to connect the conflict of Middle Eastern Muslim countries to the problems at home, such as discrimination or specific affronts, such as the cartoons published by a Danish newspaper that mocked the prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him).87 Thus, new-fangled motivation reinforces the existing grievances and strengthens local-global nexus. Furthermore, when FTFs’ networks find that their comrades are consistently targeted, some can divert their efforts on the home government rather than fighting in the foreign land. Such kind of coercive measure might also construct ‘suspect communities’ where it would provide fertile ground for radicalization and where the community as a whole is less likely to cooperate with the security agencies in particular and the government as a whole.88 According to one expert, the youths of such communities become more prone to be FTFs with the potentiality to return to home country and carry out terrorist acts.89

84 Mariam Karouny, “Apocalyptic prophecies drive both sides to Syrian battle for end of time”, Reuters, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-prophecy-insight/apocalyptic-prophecies-drive-both-sides- to-syrian-battle-for-end-of-time-idUSBREA3013420140401, accessed on 16 January 2019. 85 McCants, op. cit. 86 Ibid. 87 Shaarik H. Zafar, op. cit. 88 Floris Vermeulen, “Suspect communities—Targeting Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in Amsterdam, Berlin, and London”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2014, pp. 286-306, 89 Lynn Davies, Review of Educational Initiatives in Countering-Extremism Internationally: What Works, Gothenburg, University of Gothenburg: The Segerstedt Institute, 2018. 150 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Figure 4: Complex Model of Foreign Fighter Radicalization90

The governments across the globe are yet to develop coherent counter- narrative for discouraging potential recruits to volunteer for foreign fighters. The ‘would-be’ jihadists arguably bear the same view, as Western governments, of blaming the Assad regime for committing atrocities against civilians, and that he should be removed.91 Not only that, the sympathizers and would-be volunteers are also very critical about the passive role of the global community on the Muslim sufferings in the Middle East and around the world in general and Syria and Iraq in particular. It is argued that the U.S. intervention in Iraq for defending religious and ethnic minority Yazidis who are regarded as infidels (unbelievers) by mainstream Muslims92 and devil-worshippers by some93, has, indeed, strengthened this narrative.

90 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, op. cit. 91 Shiraz Maher, “British Foreign Fighters in Syria”, op. cit. 92 Human Rights Council, “They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis”, available at https:// www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/A_HRC_32 _CRP.2_en.pdf, accessed on 16 January 2019. 93 Raya Jalabi, “Who are the Yazidis and why is Isis hunting them?”, The Guardian, 11 August 2014, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/who-yazidi-isis-iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains, accessed on 15 January 2019. 151 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

4. Response Strategy

Terrorism, being a small-numbers’ game, is perpetrated by only a few well- trained, de-motivated but diehard individuals which creates panic, psychological trauma and horrific devastation basically on unarmed and innocent civilian lives. The model in figure 4 outlines the ‘terrorist production system’ from the perspective of Syria and Iraq conflict. The system is more or less effective in each stage and inevitably upon completion of the journey through the cycles, some will emerge as deadly terrorists. However, effective and timely intervention at every stage in the process would certainly break the chain, reduce the numbers of individuals transforming to be FTFs and thus dramatically decreasing the odds and effectiveness of the returnees. Upon analyzing the data and facts, it can be argued that the numbers of sympathizers and volunteers joining Syria and Iraq conflict should neither be neglected nor be overstated. It has been noted earlier that some sympathizers may turn to be FTFs after the fight while many others are likely to be subjected to death during fight, continue the fight till death and/or come to normalcy upon returning to the home country. Legal measures and effective intelligence are yet other factors that can neutralize or at least reduce and squeeze the domain of FTFs and returnees.

4.1 Intervention at Decision Stage

Intervention at decision stage is one of the most effective ways to reduce the number of fighters willing to travel and fight in the conflict zones. It makes sense that those who cannot travel to conflict zones, cannot be further radicalized by in-situ and combatant foreign fighters. The concerned authorities can raise the awareness among the local community of potential sympathizers forecasting about the dangers and consequences of fighting in the foreign land, such as losing welfare-oriented facilities. They can also establish hotlines to enable families and local community to inform the concerned authority about any suspicion or apprehension regarding potential move to conflict zone abroad especially Syria,94 capitalize on Muslim women to persuade the potential travellers from being radicalized and to refrain from joining the fray,95 including ‘Prevent’ program aiming to reduce extremism.96 All these have been proved to be effective. Moreover, community awareness briefings and consultations highlighting the realities and dangers of travelling to Syria intended to engage

94 Radicalization Awarness Network, Working with Families and Safeguarding Children from Radicalization: Step-by-Step Guidance Paper for Practitioners and Policy-makers, Nice, France: Radicalization Awarness Network, 2017. 95 Murad Batal al-Shishani, “The challenge of keeping Denmark’s Muslims out of Syria”, BBC News, 19 May 2014, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-27423789, accessed on 18 January 2019. 96 Byman and Shapiro, op. cit. 152 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS communities, share information and appropriately participate in the development of community-led efforts to counter violent extremism97 is another successful program of this kind. These briefings provide unique opportunity to foster trust between local communities and the government agencies, which over time can establish a two-way means of communication, whereby the community can learn about the efforts of the government in countering extremism as well as services offered by law enforcement to protect their neighbourhoods from these and other threats and public officials can receive information from the community about emerging threats.98 It is important for vulnerable countries to provide counter-narratives against the brutality of the conflict and the internecine violence among extremists. Unfortunately, most of the governments’ efforts seemed to be poor in developing counter-narratives which fall short of community credibility.99 As community leaderships enjoy better command and control over their own community, it is argued that they should be mobilized to raise the voice against atrocity and violence with appropriate and correct narratives because government’s channel may be perceived hostile by the aggrieved sympathizers. Pragmatic point of view can better serve the purpose alongside the theological explanation; of course, concerned governments must take guard against inept religious authority. It would be particularly effective and convincing to the sympathizers and community people if they can hear from the returned foreign fighters about the atrocities, miseries and misguided actions. Saudi Arabia has alerted its citizens on Saudi state television for not travelling to Syria for fighting and telecasting running interviews with disillusioned returned fighters.100 Indeed, these kinds of efforts are likely to spread across the message that upon return, the FTFs would be welcomed by the host community and would be able to lead a normal peaceful life. Indeed, with the intelligent use of social media, security organizations can follow, monitor, detect and disrupt the FTFs’ attack schemes and foil them before occurance. There is no denying of the fact that danger posed by returnee FTFs is alarming and real. It is assumed that Western security agencies have the tools to disrupt and mitigate the threat. These tools need to be developed and deployed across the globe and be adapted in the new context of Syria and Iraq. Experience thus far validates perspectives of security cooperation at global level so that the threats of returnee FTFs cannot become pandemic.

97 Shaarik H. Zafar, op. cit. 98 Lisa O. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism remarks at the Harvard Kennedy School Forum, 15 April 2014, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2014/04/16/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-lisa-, accessed on 18 January 2019. 99 Ibid. 100 Robert F. Worth, “Saudis Back Syrian Rebels Despite Risks”, The New York Times, 07 January 2014. 153 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

4.2 Travel Monitoring

An important stage in the process of radicalization of potential FTFs is concerned with travelling to the conflict zone(s). Disruption during the transit through different countries is argued to be one of the most effective ways of dipping the threat of FTFs to Western countries and other parts of the world. Doing so will primarily require better cooperation among governments especially nodal transit countries. All governments must reckon that the menace of FTFs would not remain confined to the Western world only; the rest of the world would also receive the brunt of the same. Thus, cooperation amongst all is highly essential. The global security communities should establish effective and functional channels with intelligence agencies of vital transit counties to Iraq and Syria to warn about specific individuals travelling to them. It would help stop the individual right at the borders and deport them before getting into the fight. Intelligence gathered from FTFs’ mutual communications using phones and/or social media, monitoring shared open-sources and other inter-intelligence agencies exchanges can be effective tools for discerning transnational extremist networks. Cooperation among countries is essential for curbing the travel of ‘would- be’ FTFs as radicals from one country often try to travel to the conflict zones in the Middle East via another country for avoiding detection.

4.3 Disrupting the Functional Scheme

FTFs mostly train and fight in conflict zones especially in the Middle East, remaining beyond the influence and reach of security forces and intelligence agencies. Of course, there are obvious ways and means to sway the FTFs’ production function. One of the effective ways of lowering the morale of FTFs is sowing seeds of doubt about their success due to security forces’ intervention both at home and abroad including fragile loyalty of the volunteers. Social workers-providing humanitarian assistance can work as a great source of information. But this has to be performed with due caution, because they can be viewed by the FTFs as potential spies as well. Awareness building is yet another effective way to family, community and social monitoring of suspicious activities. It is significant for security communities and practitioners in the field of counter-radicalization to exchange best practices and lessons. Organizing family and community meetings for prevention, outreach, rehabilitation and reintegration101 can help keep redicalization efforts at low ebb. The other kinds of supports can be therapeutic, stimulating parents to address their emotions and anxieties or encourage families to actively challenge and deconstruct

101 Radicalization Awarness Network, “The RAN Declaration of Good Practices for Engagement with Foreign Fighters for Prevention, Outreach, Rehabilitation and Reintegration”, available at http://www.icct.nl/download/ file/RAN-Declaration-Good-Practices-for-Engagement-with-Foreign-Fighters.pdf, accessed on 154 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS some of the extremist narratives through motivating those who are at risk so that they willingly refrain and volunteer to return for reintegration with the community.102 Likewise, practitioners of specific fields can help parents and family members adopt appropriate method of communication and interaction with respective relatives who are at a risk of being radicalized or already caught up by the ideology of violent extremism. Promoting and propagating counter-narrative is significant where parents, religious and community leaders are encouraged and expected to take the lead.103 Communities in general and families in particular can often be great source of assistance as there is no trust deficit between them and the government.104 It is argued that community-based programmes to win the hearts and minds of the concerned families are effective especially for obtaining information about the returnee FTFs, but providing the same to intelligence organization to arrest the defected family member(s) may prevent fearful households from coming forward for spotting at-risk individuals.105 In this context, appropriate community programmes of cognitive conditioning can be more effective for changing the psychological orientation of the radicalized faction rather than applying force or detention. There should be an effort to turn the mindset of returnee FTFs towards non-violence so that they themselves can play a catalyst role in the community. It may be noted here that coercion or hounding FTF returnees with the threat of arrest or creating an environment and feeling of alienation can backfire. Experience shows that many family and community members have been able to steer the returnee FTFs towards normalcy in the past; some of them even provided valuable information about their former collaborators and associates.106

4.4 Plotting the Plots

According to a UN estimate in 2015, more than 25,000 FTFs from over 100 countries joined Iraq and Syria conflicts.107 Another study in 2016 suggests that a combination of more than 30,000 FTFs of all kinds participated throughout the entire conflict in Iraq and Syria since 2011.108 It is significant being nuanced while

102 Available at https://hayat-deutschland.de/english/, accessed on 15 January 2019. 103 United Nations Office on Drug and Crimes and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Use of the Internet to Counter the Appeal of Extremist Violence, New York: United Nations, 2011. 104 Ahmad Mansour, “Mum, I’m Fighting for Allah Now”, The Washington Institute, 06 February 2014, available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/mum-im-fighting-for-allah-now, accessed on 105 Andrew McDonnell, “Community Approach to Jihadis’ Rehabilitation in Tunisia”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 September 2018, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/77358, accessed on 106 John Mueller (ed.), Terrorism since 9/11: The American Cases, Ohio, USA: Mershon Center, 2019. 107 “Statement by the President of the Security Council”, available at http://undocs.org/S/PRST/2015/11, accessed on 15 January 2019. 108 Edwin BakkerMark Singleton, “Foreign Fighters in the Syria and Iraq Conflict: Statistics and Characteristics of a Rapidly Growing Phenomenon”, in Andrea Guttry, Francesca Capone and Christophe Paulussen (eds.), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2016, pp. 9-25. 155 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 arguing on the FTF phenomenon in Syria that all who joined the Syrian conflict, do not turn terrorists after returning to home country: a small faction may perpetrate terrorism after returning. Having said so, it would be probably incorrect to deduce that foreign fighters of Syria and Iraq would pose no potential threat. It is argued that individuals with the experience of foreign training and/or fighting have the potential for terrorist plots.109 Thomas Hegghammer, a Norwegian academic argues that terrorists with foreign experience are far more lethal, dangerous and sophisticated than purely domestic cells.110 The veteran FTF returnees appear to pose more threats than non-veteran ‘would-be domestic jihadist’.111 One study finds that Syrian conflict has impinged Muslims across the globe to an extent which can be compared to the conflicts in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s and Iraq in the 2000s.112 However, what we should be concerned about most is the FTFs who joined the IS in Iraq and Syria. To disrupt the attack plots of FTFs, concerned security agencies must remain focused on the trail of returnees. For this, they must acquire modern and sufficient devices and gazettes to monitor the footprints of returnee FTFs. There must be fore plan on the part of home governments to overcome the resource limitation with the increase numbers of returnee FTFs for maintaining effective and strong vigilance. Surveillance and monitoring a large number of suspects are highly resource intensive and costly as well. According to an Australian security services’ estimate, it would cost US$ 7.4 million a year to monitor just one returnee FTF round the clock.113 Yet failing to monitor a known suspect would be difficult to justify in hindsight after an attack. More so, for intelligence agencies, often the difficulty remains with processing, analyzing and following up the information in a timely manner because data are often buried in a mountain of data.114

4.5 Adopting Holistic and Comprehensive Strategy

The phenomenon of FTFs involves responsibilities not only of the countries of origin and destination but also of the countries of transit. Involvement of these three types of countries also necessitates that the issue of FTFs should be dealt

109 Edwin Bakker, Christoph Paulussen and Eva Entenmann, “Returning Jihadist Foreign Fighters: Challenges Pertaining to Threat Assessment and Governance of this Pan-European Problem”, Security and Human Rights, Vol. 25, 2014, pp. 11-32. 110 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting”, op. cit. 111 Christopher J. Wright, “How Dangerous Are Domestic Terror Plotters with Foreign Fighter Experience? The Case of Homegrown Jihadis in the US”, Perspective on Terrorism, Vol.10, No. 1, 2016. pp. 32-40. 112 Aaron Y. Zelin, “European Foreign Fighters in Syria”, The Washington Institute, 02 April 2013, available at https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/european-foreign-fighters-in-syria, accessed on 113 CTED, op. cit. 114 Byman and Shapiro, op. cit. 156 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS at national, regional and global levels. Therefore, what would be the mode of response at national, regional and global levels necessitates another area of global framework. This includes legal responses as well as other socio-economic and developmental approaches to counter this phenomenon, in brief, devising a holistic and comprehensive approach. It can be argued broadly that so far, policy responses adopted by countries follow three main approaches: (a) imprisonment, (b) elimination and (c) re-integration. Whatever policies are undertaken, it needs to be respectful to the principles of individual rights and rule of law whereas responses should be adequate and proportional to ensure people’s safety and national security. Crucial questions dwell around keeping track of the individual(s) who can make attempt to travel to and return from the Middle East conflict zones, their activities in the home country upon return from the fight, the process of reintegration in the society, motivation of family members and associates and societal involvement. These are key questions that must inform policies. While studies are limited in this field, a number of reports by academics, civil society and inter-state institutions, including the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), contribute to the understanding of FTF motivations and contributing factors, including by giving voice to disengaged FTFs.115 Upon being gradually defeated on building and defending its caliphate, the IS seemingly started following the Al-Qaeda tactics of targeting the ‘far enemy’ with the same official motto ‘remaining and expanding’.116 Holding the motto good, the concept of ‘expansion’ seems to have shifted from acquiring new provinces117 to creating multiple theatres of threats. For example, Europe has suffered from several attacks while thwarting many more. France foiled 20 planned terror attacks in a span of 12 months in 2017 alone,118 from April 2017 to June 2017 the UK experienced three successful attacks while the security agencies could foil five plots119 and in 2016 Germany bore five attacks.120 It is thus important for international, regional and national security communities to take all possible steps to guard against the menace of FTF phenomenon holistically and comprehensively.

115 Hamed el-Saidand and Richard Barrett, op. cit. 116 Aaron Y. Zelin, op. cit. 117 Nicholas A. Glavin, “Remaining and Expanding: Why Local Violent Extremist Organizations Reflag to ISIS”, Small Wars Journal, available at https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/remaining-and-expanding-why- local-violent-extremist-organizations-reflag-isis, accessed on 21 January 2019. 118 “France foils 20 planned terror attacks in 12 months”, The Local, 09 January 2018, available at https://www. thelocal.fr/20180109/france-foils-20-terror-attacks-in-12-months, accessed on 21 January 2019. 119 Vikram Dodd and Robert Booth, “London Bridge attack: terror threat in UK now at ‘completely different’ level”, The Guardian, 06 June 2016. 120 German Federal Ministry of the Interior, “Brief Summary 2016 Report on the Protection of the Constitu- tion Facts and Trends”, available at https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/annual-report-2016-summary. pdf, accessed on 21 January 2019. 157 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

4.6 Bangladesh Perspective

Bangladesh being a developing nation has its limitations in terms of resources and capabilities. Nevertheless, the country has made tremendous success in countering terrorism and violent extremism following a heightened level of extremist attacks during 2013-2016. Following the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in June 2016, government has undertaken ‘zero tolerance’ policy and all-out counter terrorism efforts. Yet in March 2017 alone, Bangladesh had experienced three terrorist attacks. Bangladesh government continues with ‘zero-tolerance’ policy against terrorism and the use of its land as a terrorist safe haven.121 As far as returnee FTFs are concerned, in Bangladesh, there is no exact statistics, but it is usually perceived that individuals left the country for joining the fight in Syria and Iraq would be very insignificant if not nil. However, Bangladesh needs international assistance in devising appropriate response strategy. One area of required assistance lies in establishing and instituting modern and sophisticated border control and immigration system so that any suspicious movement across and along the border can be successfully detected and intercepted. When analyzing the correlates of terrorism, Bangladesh should care for different factors that are statistically significant depending on the level of social construct. Socio-economic factors such as youth unemployment, militant politics, levels of criminality, access to weapons and distrust among communities are argued to be the most statistically significant factors correlating with terrorism. These reinforces some of the well-known drivers of radicalization and extremism. In developing countries, the history of conflict, levels of corruption, acceptance of the rights of others and group based inequalities are more significantly related to terrorist activity.122 Besides, the FTFs phenomenon appears to be a staple feature of many of the local, regional and international armed conflicts for many decades.123 A wide-ranging risk analysis especially its shifting nature alongside encompassing the threats associated with growing societal polarization which both FTFs and state react to, is vital in alleviating the menace.124 In terms of policy responses at the international level, Bangladesh should make use of every effort and experience of global security communities and concerned stakeholders including adapting to the best practices of the most affected countries. Besides, the government can make an effort to prepare and propagate counter- narrative by empowering community and religious leaders to eradicate the theological

121 United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Bangladesh”, available at https:// www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1fb6140.html, accessed on 21 January 2019. 122 Institute for Economics and Peace, “Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism”, available at http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index- 2016.2.pdf, accessed on 21 January 2019. 123 Marcello Flores, op. cit. 124 Alastair Reed Johanna Pohl Marjolein Jegerings, op. cit. 158 RETURNEE FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS misinterpretation of terror and killing. Local police should be trained in a way so that they can able to identify the existence of extremist behaviour in a community they interact with. The security forces should be equipped with modern counter-terrorism training, building unit capacity in crisis response, crime scene investigations, collection of evidence, protection of infrastructures, institutional development and sustainment including enhancement of digital and cyber investigation capabilities.125 There should be monitoring and feedback mechanism at community level so that concerned law enforcement agencies can be informed about any extremist and terrorist plot at the earliest opportunity. Given the complexity of FTF and the returnee phenomenon, the work requires collaboration among the United Nations (UN), regional multilateral organizations, national and local governments and civil society organization (CSO).126 Because of individual psychosocial processes, it also requires sustained and trusted engagement and involvement of local mentors, including educators and religious leaders, families and other supportive social networks. In this context, locally-rooted CSOs have a crucial contribution to make. They have the trust of and access to the affected individuals, families and communities. Not only that, they can also be effective interlocutors with government and security actors.127 Bangladesh as a nation of resilience, should be able to effectively engage the social strength to the national effort thus maintaining the national cohesion to face the odds.

5. Conclusion

Though the trends of FTFs are declining, the threats of returnees to the home countries now are rising. Respective countries and global communities have much to do to reduce the threats posed by returnee FTFs. The West strongly perceives the returnee FTFs’ attack as almost inevitable. But it is possible to keep the country and its people safe from returnee FTFs’ terrorist ploys in any part of the world with appropriate strategy and actions. Unfortunately, terrorism has emerged as a cruel facet of modern life.128 It is argued that the threat cannot be fully eradicated, but definitely be controlled and neutralized. Arguably, the fallout of Syria andIraq

125 United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 – Bangladesh”, op. cit. 126 “Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary - General”, available at http://unoy. org/wp-content/uploads/UN-Plan-of-Action-to-Prevent-Violent-Extremism.pdf, accessed on 21 January 2019. 127 “10 Steps to Strengthening Rehabilitation and Reintegration Efforts for Terrorism Offenders, Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters, and Victims of Violent Extremism”, International Civil Society Action Network, 06 May 2018, available at https://www.icanpeacework.org/2018/05/06/10-steps-strengthening-rehabilitation- reintegration-efforts-terrorism-offenders-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-victims-violent-extremism/, accessed on 21 January 2019. 128 Miryam Lindberg, “Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century”, available at http://www.gees. org/files/article/20022010093237_Analisis-07561.pdf, accessed on 22 January 2019. 159 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 conflicts would aggravate the situation and make it more difficult.129 However, it is significant to assure the respective citizens not to panic. It is to recognize that the West as a whole has been able to deal with such phenomenon before and has adopted effective counter measures to significantly reduce the threat emanating from FTF returnees. It is important to revisit the response strategy to avoid policy mistakes and overreaction because failure would destine all to be doomed. All respective governments should ensure that concerned stakeholders be adequately resourced and the same is shared with other global security communities. Another recommendation would entail assessing the effectiveness of intervention programmes and determining the implementation feasibility in different geographies. Law enforcement agencies work diligently within their jurisdictions despite resource constraints. This aspect needs due attention in terms of resource allocation and enhanced training so that they can demonstrate measures of effectiveness. This would also provide a window to prioritize efforts with regards to focus and resources. Local law enforcers should also share their best practices with other jurisdictions regarding intervention programmes aimed at disengaging community members from radicalization efforts. These programmes are especially useful since they encounter local conditions and community dynamics. Security cooperation among UN member states under the UN umbrella is absolutely necessary. Other regional and sub-regional cooperation can also be effective in intercepting and disrupting terrorist plots. For example, the networks of FTFs with Iraq experience were disrupted in part by joint cooperation of American, European and Arab security services.130 Intelligence gathered from mutual interactions and communications of FTFs, shared open-sources, social media connections and exchanges and other information obtained by one intelligence organization can prove significant in tracking and tracing transnational networks. Worries remain among countries especially in Europe about attacks emanating from their neighbours rather than from their homeland, where they have effective surveillance capabilities. It can, therefore, be recommended that law enforcement and intelligence agencies at all levels enhance mutual cooperation on global scale, focusing on identification of radicalization indicators among community people in which terrorism breeds. Local police should be trained at a level to be able to identify the existence of extremist behaviour in a community they interact. They usually arrive first on the scene after any occurrence; they should be able to find out the clues of radicalization, extremism and potential terrorist threats. The government should provide adequate fund and greater resources to law enforcement and security agencies to enable them to control the threat at the lowest level possible.

129 William Young, David Stebbins, Bryan A. Frederick and Omar Al-Shahery, Spillover from the Conflict in Syria: An Assessment of the Factors that Aid and Impede the Spread of Violence, Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 2014. 130 Jean-Pierre Filiu, op. cit. 160 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019: 161-178

Mahfuz Kabir Rubiat Afrose Raka POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA’S NORTHEAST: BANGLADESH PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

The convergence of interests and shared sense of connectivity between Bangladesh and India have opened up potential of new business corridors between the former and the latter’s Northeast. But three states in that region, viz. Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland are not engaging with Bangladesh like Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya; which needs to be addressed to unlock the potentials since both Bangladesh and Northeast India have been given importance in India’s ‘Act East Policy’. Enhancement of trade, investment, connectivity, energy, cultural exchanges, etc. are possible with seamless transport and communication network. The paper suggests that India’s Northeast serves as an easy source of raw materials and intermediate products for different industries in Bangladesh. Advanced infrastructural development with inland water connectivity, rail and road transportation will boost bilateral trade relations and open up more business opportunities with relatively less connected states of India’s Northeast.

Keywords: India’s Northeast,Trade, Connectivity, Business Corridor, Investment

1. Introduction

For Bangladesh, India’s Northeast has been an area of considerable business and economic interest. Close ties between Bangladesh and Northeast India have been forged by the convergence of interests and shared sense of connectivity between Bangladesh and India. In recent years, trade and investment of Bangladesh with India have reached at such level, which has opened up new business potentials with Northeast India. Though states like Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya are utilizing the benefits of coming closer to Bangladesh and accessing India’s mainland through the country; other Northeastern states, such as Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram are yet to tap benefit of accessing the rest of India via Bangladesh and accessing infrastructure and market of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is potentially the most important business and economic partner for India’s Northeast given its size and location, which has begun to be tapped but not yet at the desired level. Specifically, it is believed that

Mahfuz Kabir, PhD is Research Director, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). His e-mail address is: [email protected]. Rubiat Afrose Raka is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]. 161 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Northeast’s agricultural products in which it has strong comparative advantage can work as a backward linkage for Bangladesh’s emerging food processing industry; while processed foods can again enter the Northeast’s market through which both parties would benefit significantly. On the other hand, by reducing perceived and real non-tariff barriers, promoting efficient customs procedures and border facilities, Bangladeshi companies would be encouraged to invest in Northeast India. Thus, it is perceived that connectivity through business corridors with Chattogram hill districts and Sylhet areas has a potential ‘win-win’ outcome for both Bangladesh and the less highlighted Northeastern states, viz. Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram, although there are several challenges as well. Given this backdrop, the present paper is based on the analysis of literature and interview of experts and business representatives with the purpose of providing a fresh perspective on the country’s potential of new business corridors with selected states of India’s Northeast. The paper is qualitative in nature and the rest of it has been organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Indo-Bangladesh economic relations throughout the years. Section 3 focuses on Bangladesh’s business opportunities with Northeast India; especially Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland while section 4 highlights the drawbacks and challenges in tapping those business opportunities. Finally, Section 5 provides some way forward to overcome those challenges in order to ensure a congenial trade and business environment of Bangladesh with India’s Northeast.

2. Bangladesh-India Economic Relations: Recent Trends

Bangladesh has experienced several mixed trends in bilateral economic relations with India over the last ten years, most of which are positive in nature. First, bilateral trade has increased significantly along with power trade. Second, the trade gap has been mounting which is heavily tilted in favour of India. Third, India has granted duty-free access of almost all products to its market. Fourth, Bangladesh has been receiving a considerable amount of credit from India, which aims to develop some important physical infrastructures and transport communications. Fifth, Bangladesh has decided to provide a sub-regional transit facility which would largely benefit India to connect its mainland with the Northeast. Sixth, persisting non-tariff and para-tariff barriers that include the recent imposition of antidumping duty on Bangladeshi jute products by India. Bangladesh’s export earnings increased significantly in 2017-18 due to the rise of exports of readymade garments (RMGs), agricultural products, ceramic products, handicrafts, some jute goods (although most of them are suffering from anti-dumping duty), chemical products, woven garments, etc. India was the second largest source of import (15.19 per cent) after China.1 In 2017-18, imports from

1 Economic Adviser’s Wing, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Bangladesh Economic Review 2018, Dhaka: Bangladesh Government Press, 2018. 162 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS

India increased by 40 per cent, whereas exports to India increased by 30 per cent. The trade deficit was US$7.75 billion which is 42 per cent higher than the previous year. Trade deficit between Bangladesh and India has been an issue of discontent in their bilateral trade. Indian leaders have indicated to reduce the imbalance and India has already taken some steps in this regard. However, anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties, negative product lists and other trade barriers imposed by India are actually hurting Bangladeshi exports to India. Thus, removing various tariff and non-tariff barriers on exports from Bangladesh by Indian authorities is the key to reduce the trade gap between the two neighbouring countries.

Table 1.1: Bangladesh-India Bilateral Trade Statistics2 Year Export Import Trade Ratio (Million US$) (Million US$) 2009-10 304.62 3,202.1 1:11 2010-11 512.5 4,560 1:9 2011-12 490.42 4,758.89 1:10 2012-13 563.96 4,776.9 1: 8.47 2013-14 456.633 6,035.5 1:13.22 2014-15 527.16 5,828.10 1:11.05 2015-16 689.622 5,452.9 1:7.9 2016-17 672.4 6,146.2 1:9.15 2017-18 873.27 8,621.5 1: 10

Table 1.2: Top Ten Export Items by Product Category, 2017-183 HS Products (2-digit HS Code) Million US$ Code 62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted 207.62 53 Other vegetable textile fibres; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper 158.10 yarn 61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted 71.06 15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared 39.16 edible fats, animal or vegetable waxes. 63 Other made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile 33.62 articles; rags 78 Lead and articles thereof 29.96 03 Fish and crustaceans, mollusc and other aquatic invertebrates 27.13 22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 25.67 74 Copper and articles thereof 23.80 39 Plastics and articles thereof 23.49

2 Based on data of and Export Promotion Bureau (EPB) of Bangladesh. 3 Based on EPB database. 163 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Total (10 product category) 639.61 % of Total Exports to India 73.24

Table 1.3: Top Ten Import Items at HS 2-Digit Level, 2017-1845 HS code Product Description Million US$ 52 Cotton 1,729.89 10 Cereals 1330.1 87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway 983.82 84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery 649.84 23 Residues and waste from the food industry 371.14 7 Edible vegetable and certain roots 341.89 85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts 282.12 72 Iron and Steel 279.44 39 Plastics and articles thereof 220.97 29 Organic chemicals 213.42 Total (10 product category) 6601.67 % of total imports from India 76.57

In terms of energy cooperation, trade and connectivity, the two countries have moved far towards potential areas where cooperation would be mutually beneficial and long-lasting. Using the transmission link between West Bengal and Bangladesh, around 1.16 gigawatt of power is now being supplied from India to Bangladesh. This journey from megawatts (MW) to gigawatts (GW) was described as ‘The Golden Chapter’ by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2018.5 The 60-point Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and signing of 22 agreements on all possible sectors including multi-modal connectivity during the visit of Modi in 2015 was of significant importance.6 For smooth facilitation of trade, the two countries are going to further improve the Land Custom Station in the border.7 The Kolkata-Khulna Bandhan Express has already started and the Akhaura-Agartala rail connectivity is expected to provide another link in cross-border connectivity. In the last eight years, India has extended three lines of credits (LoCs) to Bangladesh amounting US$8 billion in total and making Bangladesh the largest recipient of LoC funds from India. To broaden its export base, Bangladesh has offered three Special Economic Zones (SEZs), namely, Mongla, Bheramara and Mirsarai for Indian investors and sought substantial investment from Indian investors in these three economic zones. Indian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

4 Based on data from Bangladesh Bank. 5 Abhishek Law, “PM: It’s the golden era of India-Bangladesh relations”, The Hindu, 25 May 2018. 6 C D Sahay, “Prime Minister Modi’s Visit to Bangladesh- a Review”, available at https://www.vifindia.org/ article/2015/june/10/prime-minister-modi-s-visit-to-bangladesh-a-review, accessed on 10 July 2019. 7 Smruti S Pattanaik, “Pegging Sub-regionalism with Bilateralism”, The Daily Star, 09 June 2015. 164 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS in Bangladesh reached US$95.41 million in 2016-17 which was the seventh highest investment in Bangladesh. Moreover, total Indian investment proposals in Bangladesh registered with the Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) exceeded US$3 billion in the same year.8 Export of power from Tripura to Bangladesh and export of internet bandwidth from Bangladesh to Tripura started in 2016. The 1,320MW coal-fired Maitree thermal power plant is being developed at Rampal by joint venture between India and Bangladesh. The 500MW power transfer from West Bengal’s Baharampur grid to Kushtia’s Bheramara has started through video conference by the prime ministers of the two countries. To supply diesel to Bangladesh, they also inaugurated the construction of the first Bangladesh-India Friendship Pipeline between Siliguri in West Bengal and Parbatipur in Dinajpur. At present, diesel is transported through a cross-border train from Numaligarh refinery in Assam.9 If Bangladesh is regarded as ‘India-locked’, then it is also true that India’s Northeast is ‘Bangladesh-locked’.10 The rumbling problems will continue to aggravate without a thriving and developed Northeast. For speedy movement of goods between the western and eastern parts of India, Bangladesh remains the only shorter and cheaper option.11 The loss of Bangladesh’s exports to Indian Northeast due to transit (that includes transshipment) offered to India can be compensated by boosting bilateral trade and offsetting trade imbalance through coastal shipping. In India’s ‘Act East Policy’, Bangladesh and Northeast India have been considered as the gateway to connect New Delhi with various Southeast Asian capitals and beyond.12 The convergence of interests and a shared sense of connectivity between Bangladesh and India forged close ties between Bangladesh and Northeast India. Bangladesh’s decision to grant transit to India, setting up of ‘border haats’ and establishing road and rail connectivity with Northeast India have connected the region to mainland India through trade and business. In the energy sector, the relation has been experiencing greater cooperation through electricity trade and the benefits of cross-border energy grids as well. These undertakings not only altered the nature of Bangladesh-India relations, but they also have the potential to transform Northeast India into an economically vibrant region.

8 Momtaj Monwara, “Economic trends in Indo-Bangla relations”, Dhaka Tribune, 05 November 2018. 9 Ibid. 10 Shahedul Anam Khan, “India has achieved its strategic aim – have we?”, The Daily Star, 09 June 2015. 11 Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, “Act East through Northeast: Success depends on implementing CMs’ suggestions”, available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/act-east-through-north-east-success-depends-implementing- suggestions/, accessed on 23 July 2019. 12 Mehedi Hasan, “Bangladesh can benefit from improved connectivity with North-East India”,Dhaka Tribune, 13 May 2019. 165 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

3. Bangladesh’s Business Opportunities with Northeast India

Three states of India’s Northeast are comparatively less connected in terms of trade and business, viz. Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland vis-à-vis other states. It is believed from both Bangladesh and those states’ sides that further trade and economic linkage through new corridors would enhance the welfare of the people living on both sides.13 Mizoram shares 318 kilometer (km) boundary with Bangladesh. It is the third largest power surplus state in India14. Thus, it can be a source of electricity for Chattogram hill which are currently suffering from power shortage. Mizoram State Roads II — Regional Transport Connectivity Project (RTCP) is the World Bank’s US$107 million project to improve transport connectivity for that state and to help utilize the potential for regional trade among neighboring countries, viz. Bangladesh and Myanmar. The project aimed to enhance road links of Mizoram and other Northeastern states with Bangladesh. Connectivity is essential for a distant hill state like Mizoram, which is geographically isolated from the mainland and its shared border area in Bangladesh is also hilly area. Difficult transport routes in its predominantly mountainous terrain have long hindered trade and business with mainland India and neighboring Bangladesh.15

13 Juby Thomas, “The untold story of a Northeast India – Bangladesh bonding”, Meghalaya Times, 31 March 2019. 14 Utpal Parashar, “Mizoram can become key transit for trade with Myanmar, Bangladesh: PM Modi”, Hindustan Times, 16 December 2017. 15 Haroon Habib, “Northeast, gateway to Bangladesh ties”, The Hindu, 11 August 2016. 166 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS

Map: Geography of Mutual Interest16

Mizoram’s road network is poor and underdeveloped with among the lowest density in India that leads to difficulty in connecting with larger markets. The distance from its capital Aizawl to the nearest Indian port of Kolkata via 11km wide Siliguri corridor (‘Chicken’s Neck’) is 1,547km and extremely time consuming compared to Chattogram port in Bangladesh, which is very closely located. Basic food items, such as rice, sugar, tea and tomato are three times costlier in Mizoram than Bangladesh, especially in Chattogram hill districts which just touches its border. The World Bank project, therefore, aims to increase the connectivity within the state, improve access

16 Based on Google Map. 167 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 to transport infrastructure and services to important international trunk roads and transport corridors that connect to Bangladesh and especially Chattogram seaport.17 On Mizoram side, the road that has been considered to establish a new business corridor is a 22km section of Lunglei-Tlabung-Kawrpuichhuah road on the border with Bangladesh. On the other hand, Bangladesh and India’s bilateral decision to construct a bridge over Mizoram’s Khawthlangtuipui (or Bangladesh’s Karnaphuli) river to mainly establish a business corridor would improve road connectivity and strengthen people-to-people connectivity on both sides of the border. For that to happen, the location of the bridge is adjacent to the nearest land custom station in the Bangladesh side.18 Bangladesh will be able to export the staple foods and daily necessities to Mizoram which have huge demand because of their high cost and scarcity. Thus, border trade and business of Bangladesh would improve given that border infrastructures such as well-established connecting road, bridge and an integrated check post at Kawrpuichhuah in eastern Mizoram along Bangladesh frontier are fully functional.19 Bangladesh’s other Northeastern potential business partner is Manipur which cannot tap the fullest potential due to lack of seamless transport and communication network. In this regard, a new 15km rail link between Akhaura in Bangladesh and Agartala in Tripura is mooted to help reduce time and costs of goods transportation on both sides of the border. It is likely to foster Bangladesh’s trade directly with Tripura and its adjacent Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. Bangladesh’s agricultural products that already have a huge market in the Northeastern states are expected to ease significantly through this rail connectivity.20 Bangladesh’s increased trade with Manipur is beneficial for both parties because of the former’s comparative advantage in exports and the latter’s cost advantage in imports of food and other necessary items. Bangladesh is interested to export other items, such as readymade garments, furniture, medicines and food items to Manipur and Nagaland. Considerable demand for Bangladeshi products in Manipur and higher cost and scarcity of those products in mainland India indicate mutually beneficial business between Bangladesh and Manipur.21 Bangladesh also has a good potential for beneficial bilateral trade with Nagaland which cannot be tapped fully due to lack of supporting trade corridor. The state is located closely with Manipur, Mizoram and Bangladesh. Commodities, such

17 Aung Phyo, “WB to Fund $107m to Connect Mizoram with Bangladesh and Myanmar”, Myanmar Business Today, 18 June 2014. 18 “India, Bangladesh to construct bridge along Mizoram border”, Business Standard, 08 July 2017. 19 Joyeeta Bhattacharjee, “Trade with Bangladesh: Opportunities for North East”, available at https://www. orfonline.org/research/trade-with-bangladesh-opportunities-for-north-east/, accessed on 03 July 2019. 20 “Railway to increase BD-India connectivity, boost trade”, The Daily Observer, 29 November 2017. 21 “Bangladesh eager to export quality products to India’s Manipur: Tofail”, Daily Sun, 08 April 2016; See also, Sanjay Kathuria, “Bangladesh Corridor Vital to India’s ‘Act East’ Policy”, The World Bank, 27 September 2017. 168 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS as Naga king chili, khollar, large cardamom, pineapple, ginger, passion fruit and wild apple can be imported to Bangladesh at low prices. 22 But it requires seamless road/ rail connectivity with Sylhet through Manipur and direct air cargo transportation. There is also a good potential for tourism in Nagaland that Bangladesh can easily export through better physical connectivity.

4. Drawbacks and Challenges in Tapping Business Opportunities

There are natural advantages between Bangladesh and India’s Northeast as they are geographically and culturally connected, like the same community of both sides, which reflects the historical connection. This kind of contiguous location is important for business and trade-based relations. However, hostility and non- cooperation of Bangladesh-India relations was the reason for not developing good business relations of Bangladesh with Northeast India for a long time until recently. Bangladesh did not give proper attention to business relation with most of the Northeastern states even when there was warm relationship with India’s mainland. There are many dimensions to understand the economic prospect of a region. Firstly, economic importance is considered with trade and investment potentials. Secondly, the prospects of import importance and potential of export destination are very important. The other two major dimensions are energy trade and people-to- people connectivity which is known as ‘tourism’. In terms of import source, India’s Northeast is important for agricultural products which are nearly similar to products of Bangladesh. But there are other products, such as mango to produce juice or pulp. Minerals, such as coal can be useful and imported easily at low cost. Currently, Tripura and Assam play an important role for Bangladesh due to border connections. There are few land customs stations through which goods and human movements take place. Over the last few years, the region has got a new dimension in trade, business and mobilization of people of bordering places through opening ‘border haats’. Absence of physical connectivity and customs stations was a major challenge to tap business potential with Mizoram for a long time which is currently being addressed by the two parties. Northeast’s minerals, agricultural products and industrial raw materials can be useful for Bangladesh but they are not that much developed in the region unlike mainland India. There are also numbers of limited items of import quality.

22 “Nagaland can trade with neighbouring countries”, Eastern Mirror, 29 November 2017. 169 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Table 2: Basic Socio-Economic Profile of Seven Northeastern States22 Tripura Mizoram Naga- Manipur Megha- Assam Arunachal land laya Pradesh Area (km2) 10,492 21,087 16,579 22,327 22,429 78,438 83,743 Population (mil- 3.67 1.09 1.99 2.86 3.2 39.21 1.38 lion), 2011 GDP (US$ billion), 2.80 0.86 1.76 1.26 1.97 13.77 0.94 2012-13 (constant 2004-05 prices) Per capita GDP (US$), 2012-13 763 786 883 439 616 351 680 GDP growth (%), 8.70 7.23 6.45 3.95 2.18 6.06 4.65 2012-13 Poverty rate (%) 14.05 20.40 18.88 36.89 11.87 31.98 34.67 Literacy rate (%) 94.65 91.58 80.1 75.84 72.19 66.95 HDI 0.662 0.651 0.770 0.707 0.585 0.598 0.617 (me- (me- (high, (high, (me- (me- (medium, dium, dium, 2005) 2005) dium, dium, 2005) 2014) 2011) 2005) 2005)

From an export perspective, the first problem is: demand for Bangladeshi products is low in that region because of low per capita income, gross underdevelopment and meagre total population there as depicted in Table 2. The ratio of export to Northeast India is therefore, meagre compared to total export to India. In other words, big market ambitions do not realize because the market is very small in terms of population and per capita income with less import demand due to low income. For that reason, small business and entrepreneurship programmes could be a viable option. On the issue of border haats, both the governments of India and Bangladesh have agreed to set up some markets in the no-man’s land on the Bangladesh-India border. During Sheikh Hasina’s New Delhi visit in 2010, this innovative idea was introduced with the aim to increase people-to-people connectivity, reduce cross-border smuggling and boost trade in border areas. Subsequently, the MoU, Mode of Operation of Border Haats and the Addendum to Mode of Operation of Border Haats were signed by both the governments on 23 October 2010 and 15 May 2012 respectively.24 The first set of haats at the border points of Northeast India was opened on a pilot basis after the initial 70 border haat locations — 35 with Northeast India and the rest with West Bengal were identified. At present, four border haats are operational, of which two are with Meghalaya and two are with Tripura. Each haat has an annual

23 Based on the 15th Indian Census 2011; State of Literacy, Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India; State governments’ economy reports; and Indian Planning Commission data tables, 2014. 24 “MoU between India and Bangladesh and Mode of Operation of Border Haats for setting up of Border Haats”, PMIndia, 06 January 2016. 170 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS turnover of average US$0.61 million during the 52-week trading year according to the World Bank-funded Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) study.25 These haats follow the traditional system of trading- local products in exchange for local currency or on the basis of barter managed by the Haat Management Committees (HMCs). The products sold in these markets are excused from custom duties and other taxes levied by the concerned authorities of both countries.26 Bangladesh and India have decided to extend the agreement on the haats from 3 to 5 years due to their popularity. They also decided to increase the number of vendors — from 25 to 50 in each haat and to double each vendor’s trading cap from US$100 to 200.27 Tripura has expressed its demand for more than 100 such haats and the state government of Meghalaya is working to finalize a proposal for 22 border haats.28 By formalizing informal trade as well as building trust and higher trade openness between the two territories, these weekly border haats facilitate the economic welfare and enhance people-to-people contacts for ones living in bordering areas. However, arrangement of border haats with Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland is not yet to be finalized and it needs immediate consideration. The second obstacle is though the infrastructure is not bad, inter state or intra-state communication between major hubs is very much poor in nature. Thus, to reach out for transport route in any part of India’s Northeast is difficult. Moreover, the hilly terrains of those regions do not match with the smooth and plain lands. For most Indians, Northeast is like ‘on the map but off the mind’, though it is connected through the 22km-wide Siliguri Corridor with the Indian mainland.29 Due to this geographical barrier, the Northeast has long been neglected in the policy preference and business ventures of mainland India. However, since 1990s, due to its geographical proximity to Southeast Asia and China, the Northeast has gained immense significance. India aims to make this region the vanguard of the country’s ‘Look East Policy’, as intended by the ‘North Eastern Region Vision 2020’ document.30 But still there is a long way to go with connectivity of Northeast to mainland India as well as Bangladesh especially with Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The third obstacle is the non-tariff barriers. With India, Bangladesh literally has more than five thousand non-tariff barriers. These non-tariff barriers are politically dominated to a great extent. There are natural non-tariff barriers along

25 Pratim Ranjan Bose, “Plugging the gaps on India-Bangladesh border haats”, Hindu BusinessLine, 02 November 2016. 26 Ashish Nath, “Border Haats: New Dimension in Cross-Border Trade”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 53, No. 11, 2018, p. 45. 27 Pratim Ranjan Bose, op.cit. 28 “Tripura wants 100 border haats with Bangladesh”, bdnews24.com, 30 July 2014. 29 Sanjib Baruah, Postfrontier Blues: Toward a New Policy Framework for Northeast India, Washington: East West Center, 2007, p. 4. 30 North Eastern Council, North Eastern Region Vision 2020, Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, Government of India, 2008. 171 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 with tariff barriers. The non-tariff barriers are traditional in nature.31 In this sector, banking is a major problem. The banking channel is not smooth for Bangladesh and India. Thus, Northeast India also is a part of it and does not fall as a separate entity as such.

Table 3: Structure of Customs Duty at Import Stage, 2017-1831 Cus- Live Ani- Vegetable Animal or Vegetable Prepared Food- Jute Total Ag- toms mal and Product Fat and Oil and their stuff; Bever- ricultural Duty Animal Cleavage Product; age, Spirit and Commod- (Rate, Product Prepared Edible Fat; Vinegar; Tobacco ity %) Animal or Vegetable and Manufac- tured Tobacco Substitute 0 32 75 3 13 1 124 5 25 53 2 17 4 101 10 17 112 32 10 4 175 15 0 5 0 0 0 5 25 601 313 16 194 15 1,139 Total 675 558 53 239 24 1,549

Table 3 shows the structure of customs duty at the import stage in fiscal year 2017-18 of Bangladesh. Import duties on agricultural items are considerably high among custom duties as portrayed by the agricultural duty structure of Bangladesh in recent years. Among them, 25 per cent of customs duty was imposed on 89 per cent of live animal and animal products, 56 per cent of vegetable products, 30 per cent of animal/vegetable fats and oil and their cleavage products, 86 per cent of prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits and vinegars and 63 per cent of jute.33 Trade barriers imposed by India, such as anti-dumping duties, negative product list, countervailing duties and others are actually hurting Bangladeshi exports to India. Bangladesh has registration procedures and other regulatory requirements along with high tariff rates and supplementary duties that often inhibit market access.34 Consulted business representatives and experts perceive that there is a good potential to establish joint projects to import electricity and minerals from the Northeast in a cost-effective manner. Meghalaya, Tripura and Assam are the potential sources of electricity until Bangladesh becomes self-sufficient in this area. They

31 See, for details, Selim Raihan, Mostafa Abid Khan and Shaquib Quoreshi, NTMs in South Asia: Assessment and Analysis, Nepal, Kathmandu: SAARC-TPN, 2014. 32 National Board of Revenue of Bangladesh, 2017. 33 Mustafizur Rahman and Estiaque Bari, Bangladesh’s Formal and Informal Agricultural Trade with SAARC Countries: Emerging Trends and Policy Challenges, Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Working Paper No. 114, 2018. 34 “Bangladesh -Trade Barriers”, export.gov, 12 October 2018. 172 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS opined that India was perhaps not considering Bangladesh as the only consumer of their energy. Rather, it wants a regional grid to sell its electricity from surplus states to Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladesh. However, for historical and political reasons, energy dimensions were least discussed. Northeast India not only wants connectivity with mainland India but also with other countries through the Bay of Bengal. Services like connectivity, banking facility, hotel and transport quality are the factors which are considered by Bangladesh in strengthening business with the Northeast. However, the Northeast considers Bangladesh as connecting hub to Southeast Asia or East Asia. Their priority project reflects their connectivity. Bangladesh also wants connectivity to Southeast Asia through Northeast India. India is constructing trilateral highway with Thailand and Myanmar but Bangladesh is excluded from that highway. Conversely, Bangladesh- Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) initiative is important for sub-regional cooperation. If implemented properly, BBIN could be a venue to explore many other prospects to establish new business routes in the Northeast. However, Bhutan has given the ‘go ahead’ signal to the other member countries, it is still suffering from uncertainty in execution. Although road connectivity through bus services had been opened between Dhaka and Kolkata in 1999 and between Dhaka and Agartala in 2003, two more such services have now been inaugurated in 2015: Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala and Dhaka-Shillong-Guwahati.35 Bangladesh in November 2017, revealed its plan to restore 12 railway lines between the two countries.36 In doing so, Northeastern states of India will save more than 50 per cent of their transport costs and travel time and Bangladesh will also benefit from the foreign exchange earnings in terms of rail charges, port charges and transit fees. The development pattern within Northeast India is different compared to Bangladesh and not symmetric or equitable in nature among the Northeast itself. Developments in Guwahati or Tripura are not similar to the other parts of Northeast India. Business over there is very much urban-centric in nature. The markets are being created within the urban atmospheres. Thus, market concentration is also very limited. As a result, market expansion is not also taking place because of the low pace of development. For creation of market, there should be a purchasing capacity. For that, the product should have a low price which needs effective infrastructure and non-tariff barriers. Transportation and other costs will result in price escalation. The fact is, most products of Bangladesh are competitive. The manufacturing and production hubs of India are all in the mainland, from West Bengal and onwards. For topographic reasons, manufacturing hubs of the Northeast are very poor. Due to long-drawn insurgencies, the Northeast has always been a wasteland.37 The mainland and Northeast India always had

35 “Bus service linking Kolkata and Agartala via Dhaka launched”, The Daily Star, 17 October 2015. 36 “Abandoned after Partition, railway lines between India and Bangladesh to be restored”, Think Change India, 09 November 2017. 37 G Parthasarathy, “New security challenges in North-East”, The Hindu Business Line, 17 April 2019. 173 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 administrative as well as political differences which created a huge gap between them. For this reason, Bangladesh is unable to develop a trading hub in that region as there is no big market. It is the concern of Bangladeshi investors whether they can benefit from this region or not. One kind of investment would be benevolent in nature, but the question is how much facility private sectors are deriving from these investments. The market range within the private sector is not that big and Indian conglomerates do not opt for investments in the Northeast. As a result, it is facing chronic deficiency in development which is unlikely to provide a lucrative return for investment. The rhetoric is, Bangladesh has market in the Northeast, and the reality is the market is both limited and complicated at the same time. Huge varieties of products should be the focus of Bangladesh for boosting up economic relations with the Northeast. Bangladesh can offer cheaper goods in this competitive market because of geographical proximity. To form market, Bangladesh can send products at cheaper costs. Once the market is created, ultimately the investment will follow. Bangladesh already has a competitive advantage here. But non-tariff barriers occur without harmonization on different products. The certificate of the Bureau of Indian Standards for confirmation of quality standards of different products takes time.38 Traders or entrepreneurs are not much interested in investing or trading in that region. India’s Northeast serves as an easy source of raw materials and intermediate products for different industries in Bangladesh.39 Bangladesh’s leather products and pharmaceuticals are recognized all over the world. Processed food products are also lucrative in terms of trading capacities. Northeast Indians have huge interests in Bangladesh’s processed food products. The reason is that Bangladesh’s products have high quantitative content in the market of that region. Its agro-based products and garments have large potential in the Northeast. Jute products and processed cement also have good potential. The advantage here is that Bangladeshi businessmen know the culture of the Northeast. However, Bangladesh’s exports to the Northeast are affected by directives coming from central or provincial authorities. Besides, informal border trade is hampering such significant potentials. According to the interviewed experts, India is still struggling for integration with its Northeast and insurgency movements are creating pressure on the central government. This is also an obstacle in the way of setting better business relations for Bangladesh with the Northeast. If a region is not politically or strategically stable, then it is difficult for anyone to explore the business potentials over there. The relationship of Bangladesh with the Northeast is mostly ‘duopolized’ by Assam and Tripura. As a result, there were no such prominent business relations with Manipur, Mizoram or Nagaland.

38 Available at https://bis.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GoLGuidelines_01052019.pdf, accessed on 12 July 2019. 39 Md. Sohel Rana, “Transformation of Indo-Bangladesh Relations: From Insecurity to Cooperation in Northeast India”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 42, No. 6, 2018, pp. 559-577. 174 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS

It is a structural problem of the Bangladesh economy that its exports are extensively dependent on RMGs and there is need for export basket diversification. The country has comparative advantage in many labour-intensive sectors other than the garment products40 which can be supported by the Northeast as a source of raw materials and destination of finished goods. Leather and leather goods, furniture and many other sectors will get exactly the same facilities like the apparel sector as they have huge potential. Access to cheaper and greater variety of products, enhancing growth opportunities for Bangladeshi firms, improved access to cheaper inputs, export markets for finished goods, partnership arrangements for knowledge transfer and skill upgrading and investment opportunities through FDI can boost trade relations of Bangladesh with Northeast. Bangladesh’s economy has the potential to grow up to 10 per cent annually in the next couple of years by leveraging trade opportunities in regional and global markets.41 When Bangladesh entered into a market-based system in the early1990s, some positive changes took place due to natural interdependence on each other’s market. Mineral resources and consumer goods’ market was created but cultural and political relationship was not developed. In terms of connectivity, Northeast India is located quite distantly from mainland India. Though Bangladesh does not have any historical conflict with the region, still there were no effective trust-building measures. The psychological barrier with the Northeast was not culturally addressed. Bangladesh did not try to manage duty-free market access and special treatment for promoting investment which was difficult for India to initiate development in the past. This delay of Bangladesh has made its relations with the Northeast quite costly. The moment Bangladesh is looking at Northeast India, India itself is focusing on this region through its Act East policy. Now the question is whether it is clashing with Bangladesh rather than complementing or supplementing with it. It is gradually becoming a major challenge for Bangladesh.

5. Concluding Remarks

There is nothing called too late in trade and business. Initiatives should be taken to improve both trade and investment. Most of Northeast India is still unexplored by Bangladesh. Assam and Tripura are more advanced in the region and economic relations are more feasible with them; but still there are prospects for developing economic relationship with Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland as well. The Sylhet region of Bangladesh can be an important hub for trade and cultural

40 Muktadir Rashid, “India wants Bangladesh land for Agartala airport expansion”, New Age, 02 August 2019. 41 “Media News Report Bangladesh- Leveraging Growth Opportunities in the Neighborhood”, Policy Research Institute, 13 May 2019. 175 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 exchanges between Northeast India and Bangladesh.42 Export diversification and flexibility of tariffs in case of infant industries will promote access to cheaper and greater variety of products.43 Import duties on products, especially on the agricultural ones should be reduced. Illegal bilateral trades can be stopped through more small business and entrepreneurship programmes. Most export products of Bangladesh have got competitiveness in the region, in which the transportation leverage can beat other countries. For the capacity building of Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, Bangladesh should start exchanges of training, technology transfer and education facilities. Cultural and educational exchanges must be there along with economic interactions, otherwise it will not work. As India’s central government is keen of this region, they want to establish it as an industrial hub, particularly as a source of energy. Besides, the abovementioned three Northeast Indian states have good relations with China. Therefore, government of Bangladesh and business chambers need to initiate interactions with the state government as well as with chamber of commerce vis-à-vis regular business-to- business communications. People-to-people contact can be the starting point of trade relations where tourism is a major aspect because ‘illegal ’44 is currently a sensitive issue in Nagaland. As the number of middle-class people in Bangladesh is increasing, tourism has great opportunity. There can be three basic routes of economic corridors: one is Assam-centric, second one is Tripura-centric and the third one is with Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland. The proposed road through the Chattogram Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh needs to be further examined. Though it could not be seen prospective in terms of economy, in the long run, there are huge business potentials of this route. The economically backward region of Bangladesh will fall into this category which will be beneficial for Bangladesh. On the other hand, there isa proposed route through Sylhet as well. Therefore, there is no option of viewing the routes exclusively; rather, importance should be given to all of them because all are interconnected and create feedback effects. Though markets with Tripura and Assam are developed, prospects of corridors with Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland are not less as well. What Bangladesh needs now is to start the initiative. Increased connectivity through bus and rail services can act as catalyst in trade and business sector of the two countries. In the proposal of Asian highway, Sylhet, Meghalaya and Myanmar are the points for connectivity. Another route is from CHT but that is hilly and conflict-prone area and the same goes to Myanmar.

42 Mohammed Serajul Islam, “Indian envoy: Sylhet an important hub between Bangladesh, northeast India”, Dhaka Tribune, 31 July 2019. 43 Harjit Hansi and DB Shekatkar, “Engaging Bangladesh for Lasting Peace in Northeast”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), 2015, pp. 64-69. 44 Utpal Parashar, “Nagaland town adopts resolution to keep illegal Bangladeshi immigrants away”, Hindustan Times, 06 October 2017. 176 POTENTIAL OF NEW BUSINESS CORRIDORS

And now it is difficult because of the bilateral relation with Myanmar. However, policy should be made where political cause should not be overwhelmed. Bangladesh must keep in mind that Myanmar is an important route of connectivity after India. If it goes from Sylhet, then it will connect Meghalaya; if it goes from CHT, then it will connect Myanmar. Bangladesh should not close that option with Myanmar. It had a proposal to Myanmar to build a road inside Myanmar, but they did not respond. If it goes to Meghalaya, then it will connect India only; but from CHT, it will connect others. Trade deficit between Bangladesh and India is the biggest problem and both sides are working on how to reduce the imbalance. Boosting bilateral trade through coastal shipping could be an effective option. Indian FDI in Bangladesh is huge and its proper utilization should be done at the SEZs of Bangladesh. Bangladesh should also effectively consider the growth zones of sea route. India is also considering the inland water way. Particularly, there are many growth zones in hostile regions. If that happens, then both the countries will not have to import products from Singapore. Inland water connectivity can connect Mumbai and other states. Land routes and water routes both are important. Potential of rail is more important than road because the roads of Bangladesh are already overcrowded. Bangladesh needs to focus on prioritization of its own interest in the Northeast. On the issue of connectivity and corridors, people-to-people and business to business connectivity should be promoted further. Besides improving infrastructure and easing movement of goods and passengers through existing land ports, the initiative of increasing the number of border haats is expected to be catalytic to strengthen business ties between Bangladesh and India’s Northeast. The border haat is an innovative model of business-cum-people-to-people connectivity that worked very well. Different kinds of demands are being created through the haats in bordering areas. Thus, increased number of border haats and more vendors will enhance the annual turnover through benefitting both the economies. Lessons should be learnt from historical relation of Bangladesh with Assam or Tripura. Guwahati was one of the major trading hubs and there was direct train connectivity with it as well. There are several types of corridors and already different types of initiatives are going on, such as BBIN, Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM EC), etc. Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal Motor Vehicles Agreement (BBIN MVA) has given the most recent formal space at sub-regional level to best utilize the infrastructure, river and sea ports and business opportunities in Bangladesh. But the essential component needed at present is the establishment of the people-to-people contact which is largely missing with Mizoram and other places. The chambers from both the sides should come together in this respect — both local and apex chambers should facilitate the process. The potentials should be found out through dialogues and discussions. Thus, the cycle and circle of business barriers should be addressed to properly utilize the potential of the corridors.

177 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Annex: Experts and Officials Consulted

1. Professor Dr Delwar Hossain, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka.

2. Professor Shahab Enam Khan, Former Chairman, Department of International Relations, Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka.

3. Mr. Manzur Ahmed, Advisor, Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI), Dhaka.

4. Dr Khondaker Golam Moazzem, Research Director, Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Dhaka.

178 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019: 179-201

Lam-ya Mostaque Explaining Challenges of Energy Connectivity in South Asia

Abstract

Ensuring energy security has emerged as one of the key challenges all over the world. To meet that challenge, countries have resorted to increasing cooperation among themselves which resulted in many successful energy connectivity initiatives. In South Asia, countries are facing increasing energy demand with its rapid economic development. The concept of energy cooperation is not new in South Asia and countries have tried to initiate it through many regional and sub-regional forums. However, the success in implementing them has been very limited. This paper tries to understand why energy connectivity initiatives in South Asia has remained elusive. To that end, the paper conceptualizes energy connectivity and identifies enabling factors that help a n energy connectivity initiative. It finds that some of those factors are missing in South Asia, which is why implementing energy connectivity initiatives has been challenging and the challenges are often intertwined. The paper concludes by stressing that energy connectivity is vital for meeting the future energy needs of the region and countries should take a step by step approach to implement it.

Keywords: Energy, Connectivity, South Asia, Energy Cooperation

1. Introduction Throughout human history, energy has been the driving force for human advancement. Therefore, pursuing energy security has been of central importance for countries. Whether it is coal, oil gas, or hydropower; access and control over energy resources has been one of the central issues of international politics. One way or the other, countries have tried to ensure an adequate supply of energy for their national demand. With time, the use of energy has been increasing rapidly and people’s life and national economy are becoming increasingly dependent on the usage of energy. Therefore, ensuring energy security continues to be a major challenge facing all countries of the world. However, the nature of the energy sector has changed significantly. In the 21st century, global energy challenges are diverse; from connecting more population to the grid who still live without electricity to replacing fossil fuels with cleaner energy sources; the amount and type of energy extracted, traded and used has a profound impact on security and sustainability.1 With this change, a country’s approach

Lam-ya Mostaque is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies. Her E-mail address is: [email protected] © Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, 2019. 1 Aleh Cherp and Jessica Jewell, “Forward”, in Kacper Szulecki, (eds.), Energy Security in Europe: Divergent 179 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 towards ensuring security has also changed. Previously, national energy policies used to be inward-looking and import-substitution–based which gaining aimed at elusive goal of national self-sufficiency.2 But as globalization and multilateralism became popular, mutual dependence and cooperation are becoming new norms in the global energy scenario. The end of the Cold War gave the rise of regional institutions all over the world.3 The rise of regionalism has led to the emergence of regional blocs where internal interdependence became separated from global interdependence.4 This trend persisted in the energy sector as well, with countries taking initiative to improve energy cooperation within a region or its neighbours. Cross border energy trade and trans-boundary pipelines are being developed between and among countries. In many regions of the world, energy connectivity initiatives have been successfully implemented. Some of those initiatives have been implemented through regional arrangements while others through multilateral cooperation. For example, in Southeast Asia, there is integrated electricity market named the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), in Europe; they have Central and South Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC), in Africa and they have South African Power Pool (SAPP). Some of them, such as the SAPP has been successfully functioning for over 20 years. South Asian countries are also facing similar realities. With increased energy consumption, ensuring energy security has been an important concern for policymakers. The countries, in general, with inadequate availability of indigenous energy supplies and a large population base, are significantly dependent on energy imports. As such, energy connectivity among them is vital for its future prospects since it can significantly reduce the import costs and improve resource diversification avenues. However, South Asian track record on this particular issue has not been so impressive. Energy connectivity in South Asia has mostly consisted of cross-border electricity trade. Though most of the regional and sub-regional arrangements in South Asia such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN), Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)5 have ventured in the energy sector, progress has been slow and the South Asian energy sector is far from being integrated. While discussions and agreements on energy cooperation are common, little success has been achieved in making progress in implementation.

Perceptions and Policy Challenges, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p.V. 2 A Ahmed, C M Shahariar and M A Rashid Sarkar, “Energy Cooperation in South Asia: Prospects and Challenges”, available at http://bea-bd.org/site/images/pdf/4.pdf, accessed on 27 February 2019. 3 Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, p. 331. 4 Lukas M Müller, “The False Promise of Interregionalism? Assessing the Determinants of EU-ASEAN Complex Interregionalism”, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 2015, Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Freiburg, Germany. 5 BIMSTEC has been included in the discussion since five of its seven members are part of SouthAsia. 180 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY

Further, there are no major connectivity projects like pipelines, regional power grid or energy markets in South Asia (there is a BIMSTEC grid interconnection in discussion).6 Given this backdrop, the paper seeks to enquire the major challenges of energy connectivity in South Asia. To do so, the paper seeks to find the enabling factors for energy connectivity initiatives and whether those factors are present in the South Asian context. The paper limits its scope in analyzing the challenges of energy connectivity in South Asia. It does not aim at providing policy suggestions for a way forward. The paper is qualitative in nature. It uses books, articles, newspapers and online sources for information. Additionally, data from various government and international sources are also used. It is divided into five parts. The second section conceptualizes energy connectivity and establishes a list of enabling factors for successful energy connectivity initiative. The following section overviews the energy cooperation situation in South Asia plus. In the fourth section, it proceeds to explain the challenges of energy connectivity initiatives in South Asia. The fifth section concludes the paper.

2. Conceptualizing Energy Connectivity

Conceptualizing energy connectivity is a challenging task for several reasons. There is a substantial vacuum in the literature dealing with energy cooperation, in terms of the number of studies, theory development and use of methodological approaches.7 Academic work on the area of energy mostly deals with the concept of energy security and tends to work on the global energy market.8 On the other hand, the concept of energy connectivity is relatively new and there are only a few academic articles written on the issue, furthermore, most are technical studies. There is also limited employment of theoretical perspective in energy cooperation at the regional level since most of the studies and research were done on the topic is of empirical nature. A recurring theme of these kinds of literature is doing a stocktake of the present scenario of energy cooperation and listing the existing prospects, challenges and ways ahead.9 The paper tries to address these challenges by looking

6 “Bimstec Summit: Leaders agree on regional power grid”, The Daily Star, 01 September, 2018. 7 Özgür Özdamar, “Energy, Security, and Foreign Policy”, in Robert A. Denemark and Renée Marlin-Bennett (eds.), The International Studies Encyclopedia, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p. 1416. 8 André Bengt, Johansson Lars and J Nilsson, “Assessing Energy Security: An Overview of Commonly used Methodologies”, Energy, Vol. 73, 14 August 2014, pp. 1-14; Robert Copper, “American Energy Security in a Changing Global Energy Market”, available at https://www.e-ir.info/2013/07/27/american-energy-security-in-a- changing-global-energy-market/, accessed on 15 March 2019; Françoise Nicolas, François Godement and Taizo Yakushiji, “Asia-Europe Cooperation on Energy Security: An Overview of Options and Challenges”, available at https://inis.iaea.org/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/37/121/37121774.pdf, accessed on 15 March 2019. 9 Olivia Gippner, “Energy Cooperation in South Asia: Prospects And Challenges”, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment (SAWTREE), 2010; Priyantha Wijayatunga and P N Fernando, “An Overview of Energy Cooperation in South Asia”, ADB South Asia Working Paper Series, No. 19, May 2013; Manfred Hafner, Simone Tagliapietra and Lucia De Strasser, Energy in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, available at https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-92219-5.pdf, accessed on 12 January 2019. 181 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 into energy connectivity in a holistic manner and combining the theoretical and empirical perspectives.

2.1 Theoretical Perspective

Connectivity can be defined as the level and effectiveness of networks to facilitate flows of goods, services, people and knowledge across countries. Connectivity initiatives include both ʻhard’, or physical infrastructure networks and ʻsoft’ infrastructure, such as the policy, legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks.10 Its main goal is to increase physical and digital infrastructure networks among countries which in turn, open up physical and virtual access to regional and global markets. While economic/trade connectivity is most discussed, connectivity between and among countries in areas such as transport, ICT, energy, people and technology is also considered very important.11 In fact, on a regional level, connectivity in the aforementioned areas has been seen as the first step of the overall regional integration 12process. In this regard, energy connectivity includes both energy networks and flows; physical energy connections between countries such as oil, gas, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) pipelines, energy market, particularly cross-border power trade and electricity grids and also topics of renewables and energy efficiency.13 Initiatives of agreement, treaties and regulatory framework between countries for energy connectivity make up the ‘soft’ part of energy connectivity; while the physical infrastructure constitutes the ‘hard’ part. In international relations theory, the realist perspective believes that the major actors of the international relations are states who are driven by the desire to gain power and they act for preserving their self-interest. The realist view on international cooperation is pessimistic. From a realist perspective, scholarly debates on energy focus on issues related to access and control over resources, while ignoring the economic aspects and marginalizing the role of international cooperation.14 Realists believe that control over energy resources is an important factor of global dominance. Powerful states try to gain control over energy resources, while energy-producing states use their resources to expand

10 UNESCAP, Regional Connectivity for Shared Prosperity, Bangkok: United Nation Publication, 2014, p. 2. 11 Ibid. 12 UNESCAP, Towards a Sustainable Future Energy Connectivity in Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok: United Nation Publication, 2016. 13 European Commission, Explaining the European Union’s approach to connecting Europe and Asia, Brussels: European Commission, 2018. 14 Michael F. Keating, Caroline Kuzemko, Andrei V. Belyi, and Andreas Goldthau, “Introduction: Bringing Energy into International Political Economy”, in Caroline Kuzemko, Andrei V. Bely, Andreas Goldthau and Michael F. Keating (eds.), Dynamics of Energy Governance in Europe and Russia, United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 2-3. 182 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY their influence abroad; as energy resource importers and transit states seek better relations in order to get access to these resources.15 On the other hand neoliberalism theory in international relations believes that states can work for their ultimate benefits, without comparing their relative benefit to other states. It also argues that states consider absolute gains to be made from an agreement, including potential longer-term gains.16 Thus, neoliberal analysts believe that cooperation in energy will occur in cases where there is a common interest and all will benefit from cooperation and multilateralism.17 They do not recognize the political factors which impact on international energy policy choices sufficiently.18 Economists also focus on supply-demand mechanism while studying energy markets and attribute political aspects as an intervening variable or as a cause of market externalities.19 However, none of these approaches is comprehensive enough to explain energy connectivity. It has to be kept in mind that dynamics of international energy trade is deeply interrelated with global politics, state’s political interest, as well as international law or organizations, or informal norms such as concern over climate change, institutions, or the activities of a state or other non-market actors.20 In this regard, an interdisciplinary approach such as the international political economy (IPE) is more suited for explaining energy connectivity. IPE focuses on the complex dynamics of the production, flow and trade of the energy commodities.21 It encompasses both the role played by state actors and non-state actors in the energy sector. It also includes a discussion of political aspects such as institutional governing regimes and trade and energy relations. This approach believes that the energy market reduces the likelihood of conflict among countries and thus has a value of itself. Keating et al. identified four core characteristics of IPE in studying energy: “(1) An interdisciplinary approach, (2) Engagement with a multiplicity of actors and institutions, (3) Recognition of the systematic interdependence of global, regional and domestic ‘levels’ and (4) Openness to diverse methods and normative concerns.”22

15 Giedrius Česnakas, “Energy Resources in Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Approach”, Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2010, pp. 30-52. 16 Alexander Whyte, “Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism: born of the same approach?”, available at https://www.e-ir.info/2012/06/11/neorealism-and-neoliberal-institutionalism-born-of-the-same-approach/, accessed on 31 October 2019. 17 Ayhan Gücüyener, “The Clash of Realism and Liberalism: Understanding the Nature of Cooperation on Energy Security between Turkey-Azerbaijan and Georgia”, The Market for Ideas, available at http://www. themarketforideas.com/the-clash-of-realism-and-liberalism-understanding-the-nature-of-cooperation-on- energy-security-between-turkey-azerbaijan-and-georgia-a181/, accessed on 5 February 2019. 18 Keating et al., op. cit. pp. 2-3. 19 Özdamar, op. cit, p. 1416. 20 Keating et al., op. cit., p. 5. 21 Andreas Goldthau and Nick Sitter, “Conceptualizing the Energy Nexus in Global Public Policy and International Political Economy”, in Andreas Goldthau, Michael F. Keating and Caroline Kuzemko (eds.), Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy and Natural Resources, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018, pp. 23-25. 22 Keating et al., op. cit., p. 4. 183 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Several authors have taken the IPE approach to empirically examine the factors necessary for energy connectivity in a region to be successful.23 These studies consider both political factors, such as the role of guiding visions and foresight, number and characteristics of actors and arenas involved in the transition process, and economic factors such as course of institutionalization process, or development of energy and material flow over time. For the South Asian reality, the IPE perspective is particularly useful in explaining the current energy cooperation situation. Neoliberal theories cannot explain why cooperation does not occur in South Asia, even though there is a mutual benefit to be gained by all countries in successful energy cooperation. While the realist perspective is good for explaining why cooperation does not occur under regional organizations (due to clash of politician interest), it cannot explain why same countries who do not proceed to cooperate under regional organizations agree to cooperate in other energy connectivity initiatives between them. Therefore, the IPE approach, which takes into account both political and economic considerations of states, is better suited to explain the energy connectivity challenges in South Asia. Coming to the studies concentrating particularly on energy connectivity; the UNESCAP has a study24 focused on the development of energy connectivity in the Asia-Pacific region. This study identifies a number of drivers for energy connectivity, which are: regional mandates for enhanced energy connectivity, development agenda and rising energy demand, resource diversity, sustainable energy for all, energy security and social and environmental drivers, knowledge-sharing, innovation and technology. Similarly, a World Bank study25 names the mismatch between energy demand growth and energy resource, implications to energy security, benefits to the smaller exporting economies, relief from energy constraints for rapid economic growth, environmental imperatives, climate change imperatives, reduction of supply cost and cash flow implications as the rationale for energy trade. While both studies are influenced by the neo-classical approach, they also acknowledge the importance of political mandate and a state need to serve their national interest in their list of drivers. Looking into the factors that have been considered as drivers of energy connectivity and trade, it is evident that increased connectivity is a way for countries

23 Romano Wyss, Susan Mühlemeier and Claudia R. Binder, “An Indicator-Based Approach for Analysing the Resilience of Transitions for Energy Regions. Part II: Empirical Application to the Case of Weiz- Gleisdorf, Austria”, Energies, Vol. 11, No. 9, pp. 22-63, 2018; Matthias Ruth, Onur Özgün, Jakob Wachsmuth, Stefan Gößling-Reisemann, “Dynamics of Energy Transitions Under Changing Socioeconomic, Technological and Climate Conditions in Northwest Germany”, Ecological Economics, Vol. 111, 2015, pp. 29–47. 24 UNESCAP, 2016, op. cit, pp. 14-26. 25 Energy Sector Management Assistance Program and the South Asia Regional Cooperation Program, “Potential and Prospects for Regional Energy Trade in the South Asia Region”, Formal Report 334/08, Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2008, pp. xvii-xviii. 184 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY to ensure their energy security. In this note, questions may arise that why countries cooperate, rather than using force to ensure their energy supply. In explaining why conflict does not break out, Mandel’s framework26 on the occurrence of international conflicts over resources is useful. Mandel, in his 1980 article, lists in the factors that determine the occurrence of transnational conflicts on resources. Here he notes, among other reasons, decreasing global supply; increasing or constant inelastic demand for these resources on a global, rather than national or local level; and a drastic reduction in access27 as factors for international conflict over resources. While global energy demand is increasing and fossil fuel resources are reducing, many energy resources still remain unexplored (including renewable resources such as solar, wind and wave); which is why countries are choosing to cooperate to increase their energy supply and efficiency.

2.2 Empirical Examples

Since the number of academic works on energy connectivity is limited, the paper also explores two empirical examples to better understand the underlying factors that drive energy connectivity initiatives. One of them is an example of an arrangement among four countries, Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India Pipeline (TAPI) and another one is cooperation under a regional arrangement, Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). These two initiatives have been chosen because, despite the presence of negative factors that are traditionally linked with failure of cooperation (i.e., security concerns and historical rivalry), these energy connectivity projects went ahead. Moreover, the countries operating in these arrangements have similar politico-economic profiles (all are developing countries28 located in the global South) as those in South Asian countries, thus helps to understand how similar or same countries (in the case of TAPI, three out of the four countries are South Asian) work on energy connectivity. In the TAPI pipeline project, the starting point of the pipeline is the Galkynysh and adjacent gas fields (Turkmenistan) and it will go through Herat– Kandahar–Chamman–Zhob–DG Khan–Multan and end in Fazilika, India. A large part of the 1,814-kilometre pipeline goes through the UN declared extreme risk zone and the security concerns has been a major barrier in the implementation of the pipeline. On 23 February 2018, the construction work on the Afghan section of TAPI gas pipeline was launched and Turkmenistan has already completed the construction

26 Robert Mandel, “Transnational Resource Conflict: The Politics of Whaling”,International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1980, pp. 99‐127. 27 Ibid, p. 101. 28 “Developing Countries Population (2019-08-28)”, available at http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ developing-countries/, accessed on 11 September 2019. 185 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 of the gas pipeline in its section.29 The pipeline is expected to start its first gas flow in 2020 and will supply gas for 30 years, which is a good source for meeting the energy demand of the importing countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Turkmenistan has shown strong political leadership in this pipeline initiative, making it became a reality. It was eager to diversify its exports routes and reduce dependency on its traditional buyers. India is also eager to diversify its energy sources. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is supporting the project with financing which showed a positive influence. The member states worked out various initiatives (such as deploying security forces to guard the pipeline and increasing local participation) to face the security challenges. On the other hand, the SAPP was founded in 1995, under the aegis of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 12 members of the SAPP have created common power grids among them and a common market for electricity in the SADC region. The SAPP constitutes a capacity of 49,877 MW, combining 83 per cent thermal and 17 per cent hydro energy.30 It has combined two already existing power networks in that region in order to solve the seasonal disparities that the countries faced. One of them is the Southern Network, which connected Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique. This network was dominated by thermal-based power generation. And the other one is the Northern Network, which connected the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia and Zimbabwe and was mostly supported by hydropower generation. Despite the historical baggage of conflict, cooperation was possible because of the political will of the SADC countries. Achieving energy connectivity was easier since some of the energy infrastructures were already in place. In 2015, the net import of the SAPP countries were 6393 GWh and the net export 9,854 GWh. The World Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa and others such as USAID, DFID and DANIDA have been involved in financing for some of its projects.31 Though there is room for further development of the project, it is considered an example of successful regional energy connectivity. Based on the existing literature and taking into consideration the two empirical cases, the author applies the IPE approach and suggests that energy connectivity in a region takes place when there is a mixture of the following enabling conditions: a) Adequate energy resource compared to regional demand b) Need for resource diversification c) Guiding political visions and foresight d) Presence of uncomplicated institutional structures and e) Support of international institutions. This list of conditions is not exhaustive, there are other factors that can

29 Naveed Ahmad Khan, “TAPI most important project in region”, The Pakistan Observer, 13 February 2019. 30 Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADe), “Prospects for Regional Cooperation on Cross- Border Electricity Trade in South Asia”, 2013, available at https://sari-energy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ Prospects-for-Regional-Cooperation-CBET-2013.pdf, accessed on 13 February 2019. 31 Musara Beta, “Overview of the SAPP”, available at https://www.usea.org/sites/default/files/event-/SAPP%20 Overview.pdf, accessed on 13 February 2019. 186 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY also influence energy connectivity, but it reflects the major conditions necessary for energy connectivity. The paper applies this framework to examine the challenges of energy connectivity in South Asia.

3. Status of Energy Cooperation and Connectivity in South Asia Plus

For countries of South Asia, cooperation in the energy sector is not new. Energy cooperation is one of the issues that most regional and sub-regional initiatives have dealt with. Major regional cooperation mechanisms like the SAARC, a sub- regional mechanism such as BBIN and even intra-regional mechanism such as BIMSTEC, have all undertaken initiative in this area. On the other hand, there is also a number of initiatives on the bilateral or trilateral basis. Few of these initiatives also encompass more than two countries. This section overviews the major initiatives taken in the field of energy cooperation in South Asia and measures their success.

3.1 SAARC

As for the SAARC, it has a long history of energy cooperation initiatives since its inception. However, the cooperation on energy has intensified since the 2000s. Some of the major developments in the energy sector are as follows: in January 2000, a technical committee on energy was set up by SAARC. After that, in 2004, the Council of Ministers of SAARC approved the creation of a specialized working group on energy. The 13th SAARC summit decided to establish the SAARC Energy Center in Islamabad. Energy ministers, in the third meeting held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, on January 2009, approved the concept of a South Asia Energy Ring.32 In its 17th summit, SAARC declared the formation of an Inter-governmental Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation and issued a study on the Regional Power Exchange Concept and SAARC Market for Electricity.33 In the latest development, the SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity) was signed in November 2014.34 As described, most of the initiatives taken by SAARC are limited to studies and agreements.

32 M Ashique Rahman, “Role of Bangladesh in Promoting Regional Cooperation in South Asia”, presented in International Conference on Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty First Century SAARC on 04 April 2012, at BIISS Auditorium. 33 “Saarc summit adopts 20-point declaration”, The Daily Star, 12 November 2011. 34 Ministry of Power, Government of India, “SAARC Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation (Electricity)”, available at https://powermin.nic.in/en/content/saarc-framework-agreement-energy-cooperation- electricity, accessed on 19 February 2019. 187 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

3.2 BBIN

The sub-regional grouping of BBIN countries has focused on hydropower, mostly because two of its member states, Nepal and Bhutan have huge potential in this sector. The BBIN, as an initiative, has a number of joint working groups which work on various issues. one of them is the “Joint Working Groups (JWG) on Sub- Regional Cooperation between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) on Water Resources Management and Power/Hydropower”. The second meeting of this JWG was held in New Delhi on 30-31 January 2015, where it was agreed that joint efforts would be made to explore harnessing of water resources including hydropower and power from other sources available in the sub-region.35 In the following meeting of JWGs in 2016, specific hydropower projects under BBIN framework that could be concretized on equitable basis were discussed.36

3.3 BIMSTEC

For the BIMSTEC, energy has been one of the main focus areas and it has always been very active in the energy sector. Throughout the years, BIMSTEC has taken many initiatives in this area. In 2004, a feasibility study for a trans-BIMSTEC gas pipeline project was undertaken and it organized a task force meeting to decide the terms of reference for a detailed study on the proposed trans-BIMSTEC gas pipeline.37 As the leader of the BIMSTEC energy initiative, Myanmar has set up an energy information centre in 201138 and developed an energy trading network between members. India, Thailand and Myanmar, have also hosted ministerial meetings on energy and organized workshops on issues related to energy. There was also a proposal for construction of a trans-border BIMSTEC pipeline from the Shwe field in the Andaman Sea to India across Thailand and Bangladesh. However, that proposal was not implemented due to a number of issues.39 Since 2010, BIMSTEC has put greater attention on the integration of the electricity grid. The organization did a comprehensive study on the energy needs of

35 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Joint Press Release-The Second Joint Working Group (JWG) Meetings on Sub-Regional Cooperation between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) in (New Delhi (January 30-31, 2015)”, available at https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/24746/joint+press+ release+the+second+joint+working+group, accessed on 04 March 2019. 36 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Third Joint Working Group (JWG) Meetings on Sub- Regional Cooperation between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) (January 19-20, 2016)”, available at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/26284/Third+Joint+Working+Group+JWG+Meetings, accessed on 04 March 2019. 37 Lydia Powell, “Energy Cooperation Under BIMSTEC: Are Techno-Economic Rationales Sufficient?”,ORF Issue Brief, No. 206, November 2017, available at https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ ORF_Issue_Brief_206_BIMSTEC-Energy.pdf, accessed on 25 November 2018 38 BIMSTEC, “Energy sector”, available at https://bimstec.org/?page_id=268, accessed on 4 March 2019. 39 RIS, BIMSTEC: The Road Ahead, RIS: New Delhi, 2016, pp. 25-26. 188 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY member countries and a study report titled “BIMSTEC Energy Outlook 2030” was published in 2017.40 At the 4th BIMSTEC Summit, member states inked a deal for cross-country energy grid interconnection which will facilitate power trade between member countries.41 Figure 1 shows the timeline of the progress on BIMSTEC energy cooperation over the years.

Figure 1: Cooperation in Energy Connectivity under BIMSTEC42

The MoU on Grid Ideas of regional cooperation first Workshop on Harmonisation of mooted by Bangladesh, India, Sri Grid Standard was organised in Interconnection was Lanka and Thailand at a meeting in February in New Delhi. finalised. Bangkok in June 1997.

Bhutan and Nepal joined the forum in Four more meetings of the Task Force on February, 2004. First summit organised the BIMSTEC Trans-Power Exchange where the group was renamed as and Development Project held and BIMSTEC. hosted by various member countries.

1997 2004 2005 2006 2007-14 2015 2017

Myanmar admitted to the grouping The text of the MoU on the broader during a special ministerial framework for the implementation of meeting in Bangkok and the group First meeting of the Task grid interconnection for promoting was renamed BIMS-EC. Force for the BIMSTEC rational and optimal power Trans-Power Exchange transmission in the region was and Development Project finalised. in March.

First Ministerial Conference on Energy Cooperation was organised and the BIMSTEC Energy Centre constituted.

3.4 Bilateral Initiatives

The most prominent energy cooperation concerning South Asian countries is between Bhutan and India. With Indian technical and fi nancial assistance, Bhutan has developed its hydropower and that form of energy is its main export to India (about 1,000-1,200 MW).43 In addition, two 400kV D/C (quad) cross border interconnection lines are under implementation which, upon completion will increase the total transfer capacity to 4250MW.44

40 Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADe), “BIMSTEC Energy Outlook 2030”, December 2017, available at https://sari-energy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SARI-EI-Report-on-BIMSTEC- Energy-Outlook-2030-low-res-12th-March2018-Rajiv-SARI-EI-IRADe-1-1-1.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2019. 41 “BIMSTEC Summit: Leaders agree on regional power grid”, The Daily Star, 01 September 2018. 42 Adapted from Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADe), “BIMSTEC Energy Outlook 2030”, December 2017, available at https://sari-energy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/SARI-EI-Report-on- BIMSTEC-Energy-Outlook-2030-low-res-12th-March2018-Rajiv-SARI-EI-IRADe-1-1-1.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2019. 43 Malancha Chakrabarty, “Energy security in South Asia”, ORF Commentary, February 2016, available at https://www.orfonline.org/research/energy-security-in-south-asia/, accessed on 19 February 2018 44 Ministry of Energy, Government of India, “Interconnection with neighbouring countries”, available at https:// 189 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

As for Bangladesh, the main energy trade the country does is with India. Since 2013, India has been supplying 500MW of power from the Bheramara- Bahrampur interconnection to Bangladesh. About 160 MW power is also being supplied to Bangladesh using the Tripura-Comilla interconnection. As of June 2018, with doubling the capacity of the Baharampur-Bheramara transmission line from 500 MW to 1000 MW has been done and electricity import from India to Bangladesh has increased to 1,110 MW.45 There is also a joint initiative by the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and India’s Reliance Power for 3,000 mw LNG-based power plant in Bangladesh46 starting with 718 MW liquefied natural gas (LNG)- based power plant at Meghnaghat ( district), and a floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) terminal at Maheshkhali Island (Cox’s Bazar district).47 Other than bilateral cooperation, a trilateral investment of 1,125 MW hydro-power project (Dorjilung hydropower project) in Bhutan by Bangladesh, India and Bhutan, is also under discussion.48 Aside from this, in 2018, Nepal and Bangladesh signed an MoU for cooperation in the energy sector, where the two sides agreed to cooperate on “hydro-power development, transmission, energy efficiency and development of various types of renewable energy.”49 India and Nepal share one of the main energy trade initiatives in South Asia between them. In 2014, they have signed an MoU on electric power trade, cross- border transmission, interconnection and grid connectivity. Cross border electricity transmission capacity between the two countries is about 1500MW, with the Dhalkebar (Nepal)-Muzaffarpur (India) 400kV D/C transmission line being the most important transmission point.50 With assistance from India, Nepal has implemented four hydroelectric schemes which together have an aggregated installed capacity of about 50 MW. The two countries have also signed an agreement worth US$ 1.04 billion under which a 900 MW plant will be built on the Arun River.51 Recently, they agreed to construct a 40-kilometre pipeline to transport petroleum products from India to Nepal.52

powermin.nic.in/en/content/interconnection-neighbouring-countries, accessed on 26 June 2019. 45 “Another 500MW power import from India from June 10”, The New Age, 22 May 2018. 46 “RPower gets approval for LNG-based plant in Bangladesh”, The Hindu, 04 May 2016. 47 Aminur Rahman Rasel, “PDB to sign power purchase deal with India’s Reliance Power Ltd”, Dhaka Tribune, 13 September 2017. 48 “Bangladesh to invest in Bhutan’s hydropower sector”, The Daily Star, 18 May 2016. 49 “Memorandum Of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of Nepal and the Government of the People’s Republic Of Bangladesh on Co-operation in the Field of Power Sector”, available at http://www. moewri.gov.np/images/category/MoU-between-Nepal-and-Bangladesh.pdf, accessed on 26 June 2018. 50 Ministry of Energy, Government of India, “Interconnection with neighbouring countries”, op. cit. 51 Malancha Chakrabarty, op. cit. 52 Sultan Hafeez Rahman, Priyantha D. C. Wijayatunga, Herath Gunatilake, P. N. Fernando, Energy Trade in South Asia: Opportunities and Challenges, Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2012, p. 43. 190 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY

In recent times, Sri Lanka and India have signed an MoU with plans of energy cooperation. Specific plans include a 500 MW capacity LNG fired power plant in Kerawalapitiya; setting up a 50 MW solar power plant in Sampur and India assisting conversion of fuel-based power plants to LNG power plants, jointly with the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC).53 There are quite a number of initiatives for energy connectivity in South Asia. Despite those efforts, energy cooperation is still to achieve its expected level. An observable trend here is that most of the multilateral efforts have progressed well in documents and agreements, but could not show results on the field. Even the BIMSTEC, which has been more successful in energy cooperation than other arrangements could not realize the Trans-BIMSTEC pipeline due to disagreement between members. Again, initiatives such as establishment of the energy centre or data sharing may be classified as energy cooperation but they are not connectivity initiatives per se. Thus, energy connectivity initiatives in South Asia under regional and sub-regional arrangements are mostly confined within the ‘soft’ component of energy connectivity. On the other hand, bilateral efforts are more successful than regional/ multilateral arrangements. Most of the countries in the region have some bilateral energy cooperation deal but they mostly tend to be limited within cross-border power trade. In most cases, due to its central location in the region, the partner is India. Though there are quite a few bilateral connectivity projects, these have yet to be translated into meaningful influence in enhancing overall energy connectivity of the region. These realities have an impact on the development of energy connectivity in South Asia.

4. Challenges of Energy Connectivity in South Asia

In the South Asian context, there are shared concerns among the countries that can become key drivers for energy cooperation. All of the countries have a fair amount of their population who live outside the grid and need to increase the rate of access to electricity. They all want to reduce the loss of economic output due to power shortages, lower their dependency on fossil fuel and reduce carbon emissions. And they all have seasonal power demand hikes, which can be addressed through cooperation. However, as mentioned earlier, despite energy cooperation being high on the agenda of the countries, energy connectivity remained elusive in South Asia. This section uses the framework developed by the author in section two to explain why energy connectivity has not been successful in South Asia.

53 Kanika Khanna, “India’s Energy Diplomacy”, available at http://blog.sunkalp.com/indias-energy-diplomacy/, accessed on 27 April 2019. 191 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

4.1 Adequate Energy Resource to Meet the Regional Demand

The first factor that drives any energy connectivity is the availability of adequate resources that can fulfil the demands of the countries involved. Energy connectivity initiatives usually need a large amount of infrastructure development which requires a large investment. Therefore, countries are unlikely to be interested in developing energy connectivity projects unless there are enough resources to meet their energy demand substantially or for a long period of time. For example, the TAPI pipeline is supposed to supply gas to the importing countries for over 30 years. In the SAPP, during its inception, South Africa had enough electricity surplus to export to the other members.54 Now, if one looks at the energy resource endowment in South Asia, it can be seen that the reserve and potential for energy resources come from a wide variety of options. India and Pakistan, along with Bangladesh, have large coal reserves. Oil reserve has always been a constraint for the region which is rather inadequate to meet its oil demands. Thus, the region will remain dependent on oil imports. The natural gas reserves in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are sizeable but they are not seen by experts as a dependable source for long term planning.55 Hydroelectric potentials are pretty high in this region with possible locations being primarily in India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bhutan. Two mountainous countries, Nepal and Bhutan, have the potential to produce power from hydroelectric plants which are far in excess of their current or projected demands. Nepal’s unexploited hydropower potential exceeds 43,000 MW. 56 Table 1 shows the energy endowment of South Asian countries. Traditional fuels such as biomass and animal waste continue to contribute handsomely in the region’s energy mix, but at the same time, nuclear sources provide increasingly sizeable portions of power (in India and Pakistan), so do solar and wind power projects in India. The region as a whole is enriched with assorted energy resources, with enough potential in the renewable energy field. Therefore, it can be seen that the region has quite a few sources of energy in its arsenal, however, most of them are still left unexplored.

54 Alfonso Medinilla, Bruce Byiers and Karim Karaki, “African Power Pools, Regional Energy, National Power: Political Economy Dynamics of Regional Organisations in Africa”, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Discussion Paper No. 244, February 2019. 55 A Ahmed, C M Shahariar and M A Rashid Sarkar, op. cit. 56 “Energy Sector Management Assistance Program and the South Asia Regional Cooperation Program”, op. cit, p. xxiii. 192 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY

Table 1: Energy Endowment of South Asian Countries57 Coal Oil Natural gas Biomass Hydro Power Country (million (million (trillion (million tons) (gigawatts) tons) Barrels) cubic feet) Afghanistan 440 NA 15 18-27 25 Bhutan 2 0 0 26.6 30 Bangladesh 884 12 8 0.08 0.33 India 90,085 5,700 39 139 150 Maldives 0 0 0 0.06 0 Nepal NA 0 0 27.04 83 Pakistan 17,550 324 33 NA 59 Sri Lanka NA 150 0 12 2 Total 108,961 5,906 95 223 349.33

This reality has a number of implications for the region. Since its major energy resources are still unexplored and need a long time and investment to be harnessed, there is a tendency among countries to try to import energy from outside to meet their immediate demands. The natural gas and oil reserves of the region are not enough to fulfil the demands of the region.58 On the other hand, there are enough hydropower resources in Bhutan and Nepal to substantially meet the demand of India and Bangladesh, but the cost of exploring those resources is high and due to environmental factors involved, the process is rather complicated. Even then, there is a possibility for energy connectivity within the BBIN countries, in fact, they have been in talks about possible future cooperation in this area.

4.2 Increasing Energy Demand and Need for Resource Diversification

Another important factor in energy connectivity is the rapidly increasing demand for energy resources in a country, which cannot be fulfilled by domestic resources alone. However, meeting the demands of energy alone itself is not adequate. Countries also try to diversify their energy resources to reduce dependency on a single energy source. Seasonal disparities for energy demand can also trigger energy connectivity initiatives, as it happened in the SAPP, where drought in the countries who were depended on hydro-power fueled the initiative,

57 Sultan Hafeez Rahman, Priyantha D C Wijayatunga, Herath Gunatilake, P N Fernando, Energy Trade in South Asia: Opportunities and Challenges, Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2012, p. 15. 58 K Lahiri-Dutt, “Energy Resources: Will they be the last frontier in South Asia?”, ASARC Working Paper, No. 10, 2006. 193 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 who sought for reliable and affordable electricity when their hydropower capacity was constrained.59 In South Asia, all countries are faced with the challenge of meeting increasing energy consumption. As countries grow economically, electric power consumption per capita continues to rise in South Asian countries. As shown in figure 2, the countries have seen a significant boom in their energy consumption in recent years, with Bangladesh, India and Nepal taking the lead. With increased consumption, demand for energy has also risen. It is projected that electricity demand in South Asian countries will grow between 7 per cent to 9 per cent annually.60 By 2020, in many South Asian countries, the demand will be double or more than what it was in 2010.

Figure 2: Energy Consumption in the South Asian Countries (Energy use-kg of oil equivalent per capita)61

In addition to the challenge of the growing energy demand, most South Asian countries depend on a single source to provide more than 50 per cent of total electricity generation. For example, Bangladesh is mostly dependent on natural gas (91.5 per cent), India on coal (67.9 per cent), Bhutan and Nepal on hydropower (99.9 per cent) and Sri Lanka on oil (50.2 per cent).62 Pakistan has certain levels of diversity

59Alfonso Medinilla, Bruce Byiers and Karim Karaki, op. cit. 60 Integrated Research and Action for Development (IRADe), “Prospects for Regional Cooperation on Cross- Border Electricity Trade in South Asia”, op. cit. 61 Generated from the World Bank database, 2019 62 M N Iftikhar, F Najeeb and S A Khan, “Sustainable energy for all in South Asia: Potentials, Challenges and Solutions”, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Working paper, No. 151, 2015. 194 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY in their energy supply sources, while Afghanistan’s energy supply is dominated by electricity imports from Central and Western Asia.63 This sort of dependency on a single source of energy is not sustainable in its nature and makes them vulnerable to supply-side risks. Thus, it can be said that country-wise, there is a demand for more energy and a need for resource diversification. Most South Asian countries have been looking to diversify their energy resources, especially Bangladesh and India. This thirst for more energy is one of the key drivers for energy connectivity in South Asia. But instead of working with each other to meet their demands, they have been looking for sources outside the region to fulfil their resource diversification needs. Thus, the region having to compete with energy markets outside the region for energy trade, which is a barrier for energy connectivity. That being said, there is significant interest in India and Bangladesh to explore the hydropower in Bhutan and Nepal and Bangladesh has shown interest in India’s renewable sector.

4.3 Guiding Political Visions and Foresight

If one looks at the South Asian energy scenario, challenges of regional energy cooperation can thus be divided into two categories. One set of challenges is exclusive for energy cooperation itself such as the lack of infrastructure and unexplored resources. The other set of challenges in this area is the common challenges that countries face for any kind of cooperation. In the case of common challenges, there are political problems, geopolitical considerations and historical baggage. These challenges are inherent to South Asia and have been a major blocking factor for regional cooperation. The two energy connectivity initiatives investigated in the paper are being implemented despite many negative factors being present. The SAPP experience demonstrates that power trade, and the reliable and economical operation of the integrated system, are feasible even in the presence of historical baggage of political differences. The TAPI experience shows that strong political will helps the implementation of connectivity initiative, regardless of security risks. In fact, TAPI countries are thinking about innovative ways to address security risks, including involving the local population. Further, there is hope that the pipeline and its benefits will help the overall stability of the region. Both initiatives have been successful due to the strong political vision from one of the states within initiative which has played the key role of the region’s energy campaign. In the case of SAPP, South Africa played a key role in its establishment

63 Priyantha Wijayatunga and P. N. Fernando, “An Overview of Energy Cooperation in South Asia”, South Asia Working Paper Series, No. 19, May 2013, Asian Development Bank. 195 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 and remains one of the major political and economic forces behind the SAPP.64 On the other hand, the TAPI initiative has been pushed to success due to Turkmenistan’s strong role, which wanted to compete with the post-sanction Iran for being an energy supplier. It has also taken the role of consortium leader and has a 51 per cent stake in the project.65 South Asia also needs to have a country that will play the role of its leader for its energy connectivity initiatives to be successful. With its central geographical location and as an emerging player in the global power politics, it is expected that India should play a leading role in this regard. However, India’s energy policy focuses more on ensuring the overall energy imports for itself. India recognizes that it will remain dependent on oil and gas imports and would also need to import thermal coal in the upcoming years.66 In an effort for resource diversification, India has its energy cooperation initiatives spread across Africa to Southeast Asia.67 Further, due to its central location, India can and is enjoying bilateral energy trade with most of its neighbours. Thus, from an Indian perspective, increasing regional energy connectivity, unless it imports energy from outside the region (as is the case for TAPI), does not add much value to its overall goal. Since improving energy connectivity within South Asia is not on the priority list for Indian energy diplomacy, the initiatives do not get that level of importance. On the other hand, Bangladesh is trying its best to play a positive role in energy connectivity in the region. It has been agreeing to all major energy initiatives and has time and again expressed interest in importing energy, whether it is renewable from India or hydropower from Nepal and Bhutan. However, its efforts often fall short due to the lack of similar level enthusiasm from its partners. Its geographical position also limits its efforts.

4.4 Presence of Uncomplicated Institutional Structures

Any sort of connectivity initiative is dependent on infrastructure. For energy connectivity initiatives, this is even more true. Such initiatives need large scale investments for infrastructure development. There are environmental concerns to be addressed. There are also technical barriers such as grid compatibility, lack of advanced technology and knowledge coordination. Ensuring proper legislation for those infrastructures to work is also equally important.

64 The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa Secretariat, African Development Bank, “Regional power status in African Power Pools - 2016 update”, 2017. 65 Micha’el Tanchum, “Turkmenistan Pushes Ahead on TAPI Pipeline”, The Diplomat, available at https:// thediplomat.com/2015/09/turkmenistan-pushes-ahead-on-tapi-pipeline/, accessed on 27 June 2019. 66 Peter N Varghese AO, An India Economic Strategy to 2035: Navigating from Potential to Delivery, Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p. 166. 67 “India’s Energy Diplomacy: Key initiates, efforts done so far, way forward”, GKO Today, available at https:// www.gktoday.in/gk/indias-energy-diplomacy-key-initiates-efforts-done-so-far-way-forward/, accessed on 22 June 2019. 196 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY

Most of the existing energy connectivity initiatives begin when there is some sort of existing infrastructure that can be used as a starting point for further cooperation. The SAPP, for example, used the existing Northern and Southern grids68 for grid integration and eventually it was upgraded to a competitive regional energy market. The Central and South-eastern European Gas Connectivity (CESEC) is also working to ensure swift completion of cross-border and trans-European projects, which will integrate the central-eastern and southeastern European gas and electricity markets.69 But they too, are mostly working with already existing lines.

Table 2. Cross-border Transmission Interconnections: Proposed and Under Implementation70 Countries Interconnection Description Capacity (MW) Status Bhutan-India Grid reinforcement to evacu- 4250MW (total) Reinforcement to be com- ate power from Punatsangch- pleted in 2019 hu I and II Tala HEP 400kV line

Chukha HEP 220kV line

Kurichu HEP 132kV line Nepal-India Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur 950 MW (total) Under operation 400kV line Various places through 11kV, 33kV, 132kV, and 220kV lines India- Pakistan Amritsar (IND) and Lahore 500MW Yet to be formally dis- (PAK) HVDC line cussed India- Srilanka Interconnection from Madu- Under discussion rai (India) to New Habarana (Sri Lanka) Bangladesh- 400kV HVDC back-to-back 1200MW Completed (additional India asynchronous link lines are under implemen- 400kV (operated at 132kV) tation, which will increase interconnection from Suraj- the power transfer capacity maninagar in Tripura to 1540 MW)

68 Southern Network connected Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique. Northern Network connected the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 69 European Commission, “Central and South Eastern Europe Energy Connectivity (CESEC)”, available at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/high-level-groups/central-and-south-eastern-europe- energy-connectivity, accessed on 26 June 2018. 70 Compiled by the author from various sources

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Now, looking into the South Asian situation, Table 2 shows the major cross border power connections among South Asian Countries. It can be seen that apart from India’s trade with Bhutan, the amount of energy trade between the countries is not very significant.71 As a result, the existence of physical infrastructure is also limited. But physical transmission interconnection is a necessary precondition to have cross border electricity trade in the region, without which the development of energy connectivity will be difficult to achieve. On the other hand, each of the countries has its own legal and regulatory network, which will need to be harmonized for the connectivity process. In the case of exploring hydroelectricity, which is of major importance for energy connectivity initiatives in South Asia especially for the BBIN sub-region, the consideration of environmental factors adds another challenge for building infrastructure. In recent times, the BIMSTEC is also attempting at regional grid integration. But it is needless to that for the initiative to be successful, it will need to build infrastructures and ensure that the countries’ grids are compatible with each other. In this regard, it can learn from the SAPP’s experiences and decide legal and regulatory frameworks at an early stage.

4.5 Support of International Institutions

Various international institutions and donor agencies have been playing an important part in global development. Institutions such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other donor agencies have been supporting development initiatives through financing, technological and advisory support. Energy connectivity initiatives are not out of this trend. Due to the large infrastructure and technological requirement that energy connectivity initiatives entail, support from international institutions works as a positive catalyst. This is true for many energy connectivity initiatives. Throughout the history of SAPP, the initiative has received strong donor support. Grant funding has been provided for the creation, development and subsequent operationalization of the power pool. The World Bank, AfDB, KfW (managed by DBSA), NorFund and SIDA are some of the key contributors for the project development work of SAPP.72 This funding is one of the key strengths for the future growth of SAPP. As for the TAPI pipeline, the ADB is acting as the facilitator and coordinator and has provided funding for feasibility studies; while the Islamic Development Bank agreed to a loan

71 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “Regional trade the key to ensure energy security in South Asia”, ORF Commentaries, available at https://www.orfonline.org/research/regional-trade-the-key-to-ensure-energy- security-in-south-asia/, accessed on 26 June 2018 72 “Power pool interview with Omar Vajeth”, ESI Africa, 18 March 2018, available at https://www.esi-africa. com/industry-sectors/transmission-and-distribution/power-pool-interview-with-omar-vajeth/, accessed on 02 June 2019. 198 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY of $700 million for the implementation of the pipeline.73 Support from international organizations has helped these initiatives to move forward. For South Asia, this is even more important. The region has a number of growing economies who can benefit from increasing energy connectivity. But as mentioned earlier, there is a need for large scale infrastructure investment and technical support. Even exploring the untapped hydropower will require large scale investment. In this regard, international institutions have a huge role to play. So far, support from international institutions in regards to the energy sector in South Asia has mainly been in the form of funding studies. Most recently, the ADB has published a Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report in 2017,74 while the UNESCAP has published another study on integrating South Asia’s power grids.75 Similar report on regional trade integration in South Asia has also been done by the World Bank which included prospects of energy trade.76 However, involvement of international institutions on specific connectivity projects has not been visible. Thus, it appears that the challenges for energy connectivity are interconnected with each other. Even though there are energy resources and demand, energy remains untapped due to lack of exploration and grid interconnection. However, building infrastructure for exploration and line connections will require large scale investment which often makes it a less attractive option. This leads to countries looking at outside the region to fulfil their immediate energy needs. As they are looking at outside the region for a solution, there is not enough political prowess to gather support and initiate an ambitious project. That being said, there are also many incentives for South Asian countries to enhance energy connectivity within them. Specially, Nepal and Bhutan’s huge untapped hydropower provides a lucrative prospect. At the same time, improving grid interconnections will also help India to export its growing renewable energy, something that Bangladesh has also expressed interest in importing. Due to varying seasonal and daily load curves, there is a high potential for cross-border power trade in BBIN sub-region. Such arrangements would reduce investment requirements, lower transmission losses, improve reserve margin and enhance the reliability of supply. Again, improved energy connectivity within the region will help the South Asian countries to import energy from outside as well. The TAPI pipeline will transport natural gas from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India.

73 Alex Forbes, “Turkmenistan sees light at the end of the tunnel”, Petroleum Economist, available at https:// www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/upstream/exploration-production/2019/turkmenistan-sees-light-at- the-end-of-the-tunnel, accessed on 02 August 2019. 74 Dharshana Muthumuni, “South Asia Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation: Cross-Border Power Trade Development, Asian Development Bank, 2017. 75 UNESCAP, Integrating South Asia’s Power Grid for a Sustainable and Low Carbon Future, Bangkok: ESCAP Publications Office, 2018. 76 The World Bank and DFID, South Asia Regional Trade Integration Program: Enhancing Regional Economic Cooperation in South Asia (2012-2018). 199 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Those pipelines could be linked with Bangladesh, who also wants to import natural gas, already expressed interest in joining the TAPI pipeline. Thus, a regional gas grid in the region could help the South Asian countries obtain gas from Myanmar, Central Asia and West Asia. In both cases, India can benefit in terms of economic benefit and fulfilling its energy demand. Due to its central location, it could provide transit rights and benefit economically through charging fees. Importing energy from outside the region is also beneficial for India. Though bilateral trade is beneficial at present, improving over energy connectivity is essential for keeping up with the increasing energy demand of the region. The recent UNESCAP study also suggests that the economic benefits of grid interconnection exceed the cost and is viable.77 Thus, it is a good time for countries to re-evaluate the benefits of improving energy connectivity within the region. In this case, the recognition of tripartite arrangements and relaxation of provisions in India’s recent cross-border energy trading regulations78 is a welcome initiative.

5. Conclusion

With the passage of time, challenges concerning the energy sector have changed significantly. Countries worried about energy diversification and cleaner energy resources have resorted to enhancing energy connectivity within the region. In South Asia, countries have been engaging in energy cooperation talks for a long period of time. However, despite the many agreements and initiatives through regional and sub-regional initiatives, energy connectivity in South Asia is not up to the level. The area of energy connectivity is dominated by policy papers and technical reports but has not been explored academically to a large degree. However, the concept refers to physical energy connection and flows between and among countries that facilitate energy transmission. It includes energy markets, pipelines and grid interconnections etc. It also includes hard and soft sides; physical infrastructures make up the hard part while legal framework and regulation are included in soft. Energy connectivity includes both economic and political considerations, thus are better explained by IPE perspective. Based on the literature and practical examples, it can be said that adequate availability of resources, resource demand and diversification, political will and existing infrastructure and financial support work as enabling factor for energy connectivity. Most multilateral forums working in South Asia have some sort of energy cooperation initiative. The SAARC and BIMSTEC have been working on this area

77 UNESCAP, 2018, op. cit, pp. 26-29. 78 “Nepal, Bangladesh to use Indian grid for power trade”, The Daily Star, 23 June 2019. 200 EXPLAINING CHALLENGES OF ENERGY for around 20 years while the BBIN has touched on hydropower. In most cases, the multilateral initiatives do well on paper and agreement but fail to translate that on-ground. On the other hand, several countries of South Asia have been trading power between them, with India-Bhutan being the biggest trading partners. Bilateral initiatives have seen more success than a multilateral one. The importance of enhancing energy connectivity in the South Asian region is now more important than ever. Especially in a time when energy is also part of the broader strategic equation. Energy cooperation can be both carrot and stick in global geopolitics and also provide a platform for further cooperation. As China continues to pursue the energy element in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India too, need to make sure that the South Asian energy connectivity is improved and that it has a positive involvement in regional energy initiatives. In this regard, the variation of South Asian energy resource endowment presents prospects for energy connectivity initiatives, but a large part of that energy resource is still unexplored. Countries of the region have a growing demand for energy and need for diversification that can become the base for future energy connectivity initiatives. For any kind of connectivity initiative, including energy, there needs to be strong political leadership, which has been mostly missing in South Asia. At the same time, there is a lack of substantial existing infrastructure that can be used as a base for larger connectivity projects. Lastly, there is a need for huge investment and support from international organizations and donor agencies. However, despite these challenges, South Asian countries are working for enhancing energy connectivity among them. In the BBIN sub-region, energy trade has been increasing. Taking a step-by-step approach is beneficial for countries in establishing regional energy connectivity process. In this regard, the continued interest of Bangladesh and India in investing in Nepal and Bhutan’s hydropower can be a starting point for enhancing energy connectivity. Since, the importance of technical and physical infrastructure is far greater in energy connectivity, which means that there is a need for large investments. Thus, involvement of all actors, including international donors and the private sector is also important. Despite the many challenges, enhancing connectivity in the energy sector is crucial for overall development of the region and should be at the top of priorities for the countries.

201 202 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019: 203-226

Shanjida Shahab Uddin BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY

Abstract

This paper examines how China’s latest mega plan – the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will influence the geopolitics of energy. With a massive change in global energy supply and demand, the transition of international energy order is in the making. While the USA is going towards more isolationist path from its traditional superpower role, there are growing economies such as China, India, Japan and Russia which are undoubtedly playing important role on geopolitical stage. Several regions such as Central Asia, the Arctic, Eastern Mediterranean and South China Sea are offering huge natural gas and oil reserves and drawing global attention to develop energy cooperation. This situation is profoundly influencing the transition of energy order. In this transition, BRI is supposed to play an important role. As a mega development strategy with strong geostrategic dimension, it aims at promoting interconnectivity and cooperation in infrastructure, trade and development among the participating countries. This mega plan offers plenty of investments, infrastructure constructions and industrial integration in the energy sector. In addition, China is trying to build alternative energy shipping routes for evading heavy dependence on traditional energy chokepoints, specifically on the Strait of Malacca. In doing so, the country is trying to establish a multilateral platform for promoting and protecting energy cooperation under BRI. This paper, therefore, attempts to observe how this mega plan will contribute in re-shaping the existing energy order as well as the geopolitics of energy with a focus on multilateral energy cooperation.

Keywords: BRI, China, Geopolitics, Energy, Cooperation, Infrastructure

1. Introduction

Incomparable in size and capacity, China’s BRI is offering massive investments in its member countries across Asia, Europe and Africa. With its core leitmotif-connectivity and infrastructure development, this mega plan is marching high with its proposed and already started infrastructural projects across these three continents. While assessing its importance, scholars like Parag Khanna, in his latest book, significantly mentioned the role of BRI in the rise of Asia. He even

Shanjida Shahab Uddin is Research Officer at Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS). Her e-mail address is: [email protected]

© Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS), 2019. 203 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 said that the date of the Asian-led world order would be remembered on the day when 68 countries representing two-thirds of the world’s population assembled in Beijing to attend the first BRI summit in 2017. This gathering symbolizes the largest coordinated investment plan for interconnectivity and infrastructural development in the human history.1 Having such strong geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions, BRI promises to invest around US$ 1 trillion in Asia, Europe and Africa for implementing series of development projects.2 At first, energy was not officially mentioned in its five main areas– infrastructure, policy, finance, trade and culture. But the issue of energy security is diligently linked to BRI member countries and China. Therefore, this issue has been included in the ‘Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. It is a vision document that was issued in March 2015, two years after the announcement of this mega plan.3 After that, in May 2015, another vision document was released which was thoroughly dedicated for the issue of energy cooperation under BRI. The document was named ‘Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’. This vision document was issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration. A revised version of ‘Vision and Action on Energy Cooperation’ has been released in May 2017. In this latest document, seven key areas of energy cooperation through the BRI were identified. These are policy coordination, unimpeded trade, energy investment cooperation, energy production capacity cooperation, energy infrastructure connectivity, sustainable energy for all and better governance structure. Various bilateral and multilateral cooperation avenues for advancing energy cooperation were proposed in the latest document. Of them, creation of a ‘Belt and Road Energy Cooperation Club’ was an important proposal.4 Based on that proposal, the Belt and Road Energy Partnership (BREP) was launched in the second Belt and Road Forum that held from 25-27 April 2019.5 BREP is designed to practice the principles of cooperation and shared benefit, promote mutually beneficial energy cooperation, help countries and regions jointly solve problems facing energy development, achieve shared development and prosperity and make positive contributions to build a community with a shared

1 Parag Khanna, The Future is Asian: Commerce, Conflict and Culture in the 21st Century, Simon & Schuster: New York, 2019. 2 Peter Frankopan, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World, London: Bloomsbury, 2018. 3 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, 28 March 2015, available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/ newsrelease/201503/t2015330_669367.html, accessed on 20 April 2019. 4 Christopher Len, “Belt and Road Initiative: Beijing’s ambition to be a player in global energy governance”, The Asia Dialogue, 27 March 2018, available at https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/03/27/belt-and-road- initiative-beijings-ambition-to-be-a-major-player-in-global-energy-governance/, accessed on 20 April 2019. 5 Liu Zhihua, “Energy partnership announced for BRI”, China Daily, 25 April 2019. 204 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE future for humanity.6 During the meeting, a document on cooperation principles and concrete actions of BREP was released. According to the document, participating countries would strengthen infrastructure connectivity, enhance energy investment and promote cooperation in clean energy, energy efficiency, capacity building and personnel training.7 Although BREP platform is newly launched, China has already become engaged intensely with several energy infrastructure projects since the launching of BRI. With BRI, President Xi is moving with more confidence, China- centric approach of ‘striving for achievement’, in contrast with former president Deng Xiaoping’s maxim of ‘keeping a low profile’. Particularly in the energy sector, China has been focusing on the strategy of ‘going out’ to invest overseas. After the launching of BRI, the Chinese aspiration of deepening itself in international energy cooperation at all levels becomes prominent.8 Through BRI energy projects, the country is now preparing to integrate itself with the world energy system based on win-win cooperation. While strengthening a comprehensive international cooperation on energy, China also aims to develop a shared global energy future through the BRI. Since its inception, BRI energy projects are constantly achieving prolific results. Energy projects like Yamal Energy project is one of the successful projects that is worth notable. If the situation goes like this, then, China may become the significant and proactive player in shaping of global energy governance.9 In the geopolitical lens, comprehensive energy projects and consolidated approach for energy cooperation among BRI countries bear a significant importance in the geopolitics of energy. In the 18th and 19th centuries, coal and steam power sped up the industrial revolution and shaped the geopolitics of those centuries. Global control over coal production and trade was led by the British Empire during that century. After that, 20th century geopolitics was all about controlling over the production of and trade in oil.10 America’s hegemony started in that century by successfully proving its guardianship of the free flow of oil since the Arab oil embargo of 1973. Although the 21st century, is still favouring the fossil fuel – coal, oil and natural gas that accounts for 80 per cent of world energy, a gradual shift to investments in nuclear, hydro and renewable energy sources is increasing. The shale oil revolution in America and the transformation of natural gas into its liquefied form (LNG) are the striking features of the 21st century’s energy geopolitics. With the shale revolution, there is possibility that the US could become an energy exporter.

6 Ibid. 7 “Belt and Road Energy Partnership inaugurated in Beijing”, The Jakarta Post, 25 April 2019, available at https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2019/04/25/belt-and-road-energy-partnership-inaugurated-in-beijing. html, accessed on 20 May 2019. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Mustafa Aydin, “The geopolitics of energy resources”, Hurriyet Daily News, 14 April 2016, available at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opinion/mustafa-aydin/the-geopolitics-of-energy-resources-97774, accessed on 10 April 2019. 205 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Although this situation will not lessen American interest in stabilizing oil price in the global market, it will change the nature of America’s relationship with existing suppliers and new purchasers.11 In this context of changing energy order, China’s BRI can be a game changer. Through the BRI, China is initiating alternative energy routes to safeguard the flow of fossil fuel for China and the BRI countries. Thus, avoiding reliance on the existing energy route namely the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea, BRI countries can safely have their fossil fuel without facing any threat. This situation signals the new energy order in the present century. In addition, China has the leading position in renewable energy technologies. Through the BRI, China has notable renewable energy projects which can support in producing renewable energy. In this backdrop, it can be understood that BRI has all the potential to play a significant role in shaping the 21st century’s energy geopolitics. This paper, therefore, seeks to understand how BRI will be stimulating enormous energy benefits by expanding the scale, scope and impact of China’s energy footprint. Through its advanced energy projects, BRI might be empowering Beijing to increasingly shape the future of energy security environment across continental Eurasia and through the vital sea-lanes of Indo-Pacific. It may also enable BRI countries to be under the umbrella of energy cooperation mechanism that allows them to achieve maximum benefits without facing any major threat. With discussion of the BRI and energy geopolitics, this paper also argues BRI’s contribution in changing nature of the existing energy order that will gradually shape the future of energy geopolitics. To understand this argument, the synergy between energy geopolitics and BRI has been thoroughly discussed in the second section after the introduction. Third section depicts China’s current energy projects under the BRI for strengthening energy cooperation among BRI countries. The paper proceeds with analyzing the possible implications and influence of BRI’s energy infrastructure in shaping the geopolitics of energy. This discussion makes the fourth section of this paper. It concludes by echoing the broader context of its role in upholding energy cooperation among BRI countries by shaping energy geopolitics that ultimately paves the way for new energy order.

2. Synergy between BRI and the Geopolitics of Energy

From an energy security perspective, China’s mega plan BRI promises enormous contribution in creating an integrated network of supplies and value chains in the energy sector. Through the BRI, China can invest in energy projects such as development of onshore and offshore oil and gas fields, coalmines and coal- fired power plants, grid networks and expansion of renewable energy sources (RES). Encircling number of economic corridors, transportation routes and infrastructural

11 Ibid. 206 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE projects across 84 countries12, this mega plan can be the most ambitious development project in history. It is a proactive strategy for China to expand and deepen linkages with the partner countries of BRI. China’s growing dependence on seaborne energy trade indicates its quest for energy security.13 This growing energy demand promotes the imperatives for its energy diversification strategy by diversifying energy import sources and transit routes, protecting its interests and rights over Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) and developing the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) blue water capabilities. Thus, from the perspective of China’s energy security, the country’s infrastructural projects for developing transit pipelines through the partner countries of BRI, constructing ports and developing port facilities for the PLAN will be the defining features of the 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) of the BRI. However, to understand the synergy between BRI and the geopolitics of energy, primarily, there is a need to understand the concept of energy geopolitics. Energy resources have enormous impact on a state’s national strategy and economic growth. Therefore, accesses to these or having sufficient of them is essential to ensure national and global security. Although classical geopolitics mainly refers to the military field, changes have started to take place in conceptualizing geopolitics by incorporating multidisciplinary approaches. Energy is one such discipline that has the ability to influence a state’s foreign policy. Keeping this in mind, Ioannis Vidakis and Georgis Baltos created the concept of ‘geoenergia’. This concept is to understand the effects of energy resources in political and economic systems as well as on international relations.14 Although in the past, natural resources have had essential role in shaping international relations specially in the 18th and 19th centuries that were the age of coal, the issue of energy geopolitics gained momentum after the 1990s in the 20th century. Since that century, global natural resources especially fossil fuels started to become scarce in the face of growing world demand for energy. Particularly, the two oil crises of the 1970s revealed the degree of vulnerability and dependence on fossil fuels. From that time, classical studies on energy geopolitics started to gain attention. Number of analysis devoted to clarify the concept of energy geopolitics. Of them, Philip Andrews Speed pointed out that energy geopolitics referred to the study of national security and international politics in the context of the global energy scene. Therefore, the term ‘energy geopolitics’ refers to the management of energy-related relationships that exist among states. Although the most fundamental relationship

12 Frank Umbach, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its Energy-Security Dimensions”, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, No. 320, 03 January 2019, available at https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/ uploads/2019/01/WP320.pdf, accessed on 20 April 2019. 13 Ibid. 14 IoannisVidakis and Georgios Baltos, “Security Aspects of ‘Geoenergia’ and the Significance of Energy Resources Management in International Politics”, Geopolitics of Energy, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2015, pp. 2-16. 207 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 occurs between the energy suppliers and consumers, but an important relationship can also take place between and among competing consumer countries and group of consumer countries.15 The same important relationship can take shape between and among supplier countries or group of supplier countries as well. Other dynamics of relationships may occur such as relationships in one party or another can exploit its energy-related power to dominate other aspects of political or security relations with another country. Thus, the whole issue of energy geopolitics is intertwined with various dynamics of relationships between and among the energy suppliers, consumers and their relationships with other countries.16 Apart from energy-related relationship that shapes energy geopolitics, Philip also addressed some key factors of energy geopolitics. These are resource nationalism, rise of national oil companies, instability in oil-producing regions due to domestic, regional and international factors, reserve depletion among traditional suppliers and politics around SLOCs. Politics around these mentioned factors were seen in the past centuries. For example, during 18th and 19th centuries, coal was the main energy resource and the British Empire had the control over this resource. That time, British economy was converted from woodland-water-basis to a coal-and-iron basis with the promotion of industrial revolution. Therefore, 18th and 19th centuries energy geopolitics were centred around controlling over coal fields, its production and market. In the 20th century, oil became the most important energy resource. During the First World War, motorized equipment was introduced and coal was replaced by petroleum. Thus, oil became the cornerstone of war strategy and securing access to oil became vital. For the US, oil was a source of power and influence in the 20th century. Especially during the Cold War, one of the US policies was to control over oil fields for containing the Soviet Union at all competition levels. Later, the oil crisis of 1973 was a crucial turning point for the US.17 Since then, the country became the traditional security provider in maritime Asia through its naval presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These two oceans are the key conduits for energy imports from Africa and the Middle East. Important SLOCs such as the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Hormuz are situated in these oceans. US has been contributing an important guardianship role since the oil crisis in protecting international energy market by ensuring maritime freedom of navigation and security of SLOCs. Thus, as a sole superpower, it was the important player of energy geopolitics that centred around securing oil from the Middle East in the last decade.

15 Jianhua Yu and Yichen Dai, “Energy Politics and Security Concepts from Multidimensional Perspectives”, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2012, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/ doi/pdf/10.1080/19370679.2012.12023215, accessed on 20 April 2019. 16 Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, “Introduction”, in Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind (eds.), Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2010, p. 3. 17 Charles Issawi, “The 1973 Oil Crisis and After”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol. 1, No. 2, Winter 1978-79, pp. 3-26. 208 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

However, the 21st century is experiencing relative decline of US military capacity along with political deadlock at home. This situation has created uncertainty to the existing energy order. The situation has become more worrisome since Donald Trump became president, owing to his ‘America First’ rhetoric. Aside from President Donald Trump’s isolationist activities, America’s energy revolution has changed the existing scenario of world energy order.18 America made the global lead in energy production during President Obama’s second term. After that, US’s energy production has continued to grow nearly every year.19 Therefore, its new energy story has two sides. First, the US is becoming a major energy producer and exporter. While this will not lessen American interest in a low and stable oil price derived on the global market, it will change the nature of the country’s relationship with existing suppliers and new purchasers. Second, the US may become less interested in bilateral energy and strategic relationships that it has had with countries such as Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries. While US is going towards more isolationist path from its traditional superpower role once it carried in the last century, there are growing economic countries such as China, India, Brazil and Russia which are undoubtedly playing important role on geopolitical stage since the beginning of the 21st century specifically in the aftermath of 2008’s global financial crisis.20 With their growing economies, their energy consumption rates are also ascending progressively. Thus, to mitigate their additional demand for energy, they are now seeking alternative energy resources and routes for hassle free uninterrupted fossil fuel. Apart from these growing economies, several regions such as Central Asia, Arctic region, Eastern Mediterranean and South China Sea are offering huge gas reserves that are attracting growing economies to develop energy cooperation for exploration of those reserves. As well as traditional energy suppliers like Saudi Arabia and other emerging countries such as Venezuela, Russia and Iran are attracting global attention. For natural gas, Russia holds the largest reserves and the country is gaining popularity for processing natural gas to LNG. After Russia, Iran holds the second largest natural gas reserve in the world. But due to international sanction and unattractive investment framework, Iran failed to be a major natural gas exporter till now.21 The country has also proven oil reserves. With oil and gas reserves, it has potential to be the energy superpower together with

18 Bijan Khajehpour, “The Growing Significance of Geopolitics in the Energy Sector”,Eurasian Nexus Partners (EUNEPA), 19 January 2019, available at https://eunepa.com/the-growing-significance-of-geopolitics-in-the- energy-sector/, accessed on 22 April 2019. 19 Robert Rapier, “Yes, The U.S. Is The World’s Top Energy Producer”, Forbes, 08 August 2018, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2018/08/08/yes-the-u-s-is-the-worlds-top-energy-producer/#4b4b9caf1fab, accessed on 25 August 2018. 20 D. Ülke Ariboğan and Mert Bilgin, “New Energy Order Politics ‘Neopolitics’: From Geopolitics to Energeopolitics”, International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 20, Winter 2009, pp. 109-131. 21 Bezen Balamir Coşkun, “Global Energy Geopolitics and Iran”, Uluslararası İlişkiler (International Relations), Vol. 5, No. 20, Winter 2009, pp. 179-201. 209 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Russia. Having huge oil reserves and popularly known as ‘Petrostate’, Venezuela might also contribute in shaping the 21st century’s energy geopolitics if the country can manage to emerge from its recent tailspin.22 Therefore, along with oil, natural gas tends to play an important role in the 21st century’s energy geopolitics. Although, oil will remain one of the important energy sources, importance of natural gas exploration and renewable energy resources are gaining attention increasingly.23 Hence, the attention on natural gas and renewable energy generation is promoting the transformation of existing energy order that was on oil in the past century. In this transformation, emerging economies are playing an important role. Of them, China becomes the pioneer country since the country is promoting BRI’s energy projects around the world. As the energy order is an important issue, there are two essential questions for the future of the 21st century’s energy order. First, will China continue to accept the existing energy order or try to reshape it in accordance with its own perceived interests? Second, will the US devote economic and diplomatic resources necessary to preserve the liberal order it helped to create in the past century? While searching the answers of these questions, it is seen that China is losing its reliance on the existing West-led energy order. Although the country has heavy reliance on fossil fuel imports, it tends to expand its dependency on renewable energy. It has a leading position in innovation and deployment of renewable energy technologies. The country is the biggest location for renewable energy investment that accounts for more than 45 per cent of the global total in 2017.24 Now it becomes the world’s renewable energy superpower. The country is the world’s largest producer, exporter and installer of solar panel, wind turbines and electric vehicles.25 Along with natural gas, it is mostly supported that the advent of renewable energy is one of the important reasons behind the transformation of existing energy order. Renewable energy may reconfigure alliances and create new interdependencies. If global demand for fossil fuel decreases, alliances built on fossil fuels are likely to weaken. Alliances may be maintained for other reasons but the energy pillar will become relatively less important. Bilateral relations between states will also change. The alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia is a prime example where oil played a key role.26 Therefore, if renewable energy wins the heart of the consumers then the global energy dependency will shift from global energy markets to regional power grids. Countries who are importing oil today will seek to develop renewable and integrate power grids with neighbouring countries to buy and sell electricity. Regarding this sector, China is the forerunner.

22 Rocio Cara Labrador, “Venezuela: The Risa and Fall of a Petrostate”, Council on Foreign Relations, 24 January 2019, available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/venezuela-crisis, accessed on 20 April 2019. 23 D. Ülke Ariboğan and Mert Bilgin, op. cit. 24 Frankfurt School, United Nations Environment Program Centre and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2018, Germany: Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, 2018. 25 Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation, A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation, New York: International Renewable Energy Agency, 2019. 26 Ibid. 210 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Therefore, in transforming the existing energy order and shaping the energy geopolitics of the 21st century, China’s mega plan BRI has enormous implications. The synergy between energy geopolitics and the BRI is clearly seen as China’s latest mega plan has many projects which are fully dedicated for energy cooperation. This cooperation will largely promote new energy producers which can support in producing renewable energy, exploration of natural gas and new alternative energy routes that can ensure uninterrupted oil transport. Under this grandiose plan, China is willing to create a global supergrid called ‘Global Energy Interconnection (GEI)’. If implemented, this supergrid will link every continent to power the world.27 Since China is trying to decrease its dependency on fossil fuel imports that pass through SLOCs such as the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea, the country will support the energy transition from conventional fossil fuel to renewable energy. BRI can play a major role in this regard since its massive infrastructure framework will offer all the participating countries to be in the network of powergrids, integrated pipelines and upgraded infrastructures. Therefore, China’s infrastructure diplomacy through the BRI is an important strategy as the protection of sea lanes was to the hegemony of US in the 20th century. Thus, BRI is going to be the key role player in transforming the existing energy order and shaping the energy geopolitics of the 21st century. This role of BRI is extensively discussed in the following sections.

3. Energy Cooperation Under the BRI

Under the BRI, energy infrastructure and transportation projects play a key role in fostering greater trade and investment as well as interconnectivity between China and its neighbours. To do so, China is utilizing the BRI for strengthening energy cooperation along with BRI countries. BRI’s energy cooperation strategy revolves around four notable areas, namely, the international diversification of oil and gas production, energy-related infrastructure development along with the Belt and Road region, deepening of international energy technology cooperation and the support of international energy governance.28 This strategy has been reiterated in the Vision and Actions on energy cooperation document in May 2017. Apart from these four broad areas of energy cooperation, this latest vision and action document pointed out seven more areas of energy cooperation through BRI. These are policy coordination, unimpeded trade, energy investment cooperation, energy production capacity cooperation, energy infrastructure connectivity, sustainable energy for all and better governance structure.29 Based on all these proposed areas of cooperation,

27 Ibid. 28 Christopher Len, op. cit. 29 Ibid. 211 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

China has already started to work on strengthening energy cooperation through several BRI’s energy projects. By reviewing China’s current energy projects under the BRI, this section explores how China is promoting the energy cooperation along with all BRI countries.

3.1 Development of Energy Infrastructure

Ensuring proper energy requires huge levels of infrastructure development. In this regard, investment in developing every kind of infrastructure is the cornerstone of BRI. Since, energy cooperation is one of the important aspects of BRI, it adopts the ‘Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation’ document. This document includes the goals that are: promoting energy cooperation for an open, inclusive and beneficial community of shared interests, responsibility and destiny; improving regional energy safety and optimize the distribution of energy resources; integrating regional energy markets and pushing forward green and low-carbon development.30 Therefore, energy cooperation under the BRI can be understood as a massive collaboration of various actions among member countries’ governments, companies and individuals. Moreover, it is also understood from the mentioned goals that the proposed energy cooperation will not only ensure the energy security of China but also hugely benefit the member countries. Another important aspect is the objectives of all BRI projects. Many assume that all BRI projects may have underlying political agendas and these projects are purely commercial mainly to benefit China.31 Therefore, energy projects under BRI have to face these assumptions. Whatever results these energy projects will bring, at the initial stage, it can be said that if BRI maintains its proposed goals for energy cooperation, it can play an important role in integrating regional energy market and reducing each member country’s energy deficiency. By now, China is investing for 10 biggest power plant projects under the BRI. Of them eight power projects are in Pakistan within BRI’s one of the important economic corridors – the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).32 Eight power projects that are located in Pakistan under the CPEC are: (1) Suki Kinari Hydropower Project, that is being constructed on the Kunhar River in Pakhtunkhawa province and expected to generate 870 megawatt (MW) power; (2) Quaid-e- Azam Solar Park has been under construction since 2015 in Bahawalpur region, Punjab and supposed to generate 1,000MW power; (3) Kohala Hydel Project is under construction on the

30 Erica Downs, Mikkal E. Herberg, Michael Khugelman, Christopher Len and Kaho Yu, Asia’s Energy Security and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Seattle, Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, November 2017. 31 Ibid. 32 Digvijay Bhusan, “Biggest Power Plants under China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)”, 23 April 2019, available at https://www.power-technology.com/features/biggest-power-plants-chinas-belt-road-initiative/, accessed on 08 May 2019. 212 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Map 1: Major Power Projects of CPEC33

Jhelum River, 85km east of Islamabad and expected to generate 1100MW power; (4) Thar Mine Mouth Oracle Power Plant is a proposed coal-fired power project in the Thar Block-VI of the Thar coal mines in Sindh province and expected to generate 1320MW power; (5) SSRL Thar SEC Mine Mouth Power Plant is under construction in the Thar-Block-I region of Sindh and expected to generate 1320MW power; (6) China Power Hub Generation Company (CPHGC) Power Plant is a coal-fired power project in Hub city, Baluchistan, which is under construction and expected to generate 1320MW power; (7) Sahiwal coal-fired power plant is operational since 2017 in the Sahiwal region in the Punjab generating 1320MW and connected to Pakistan’s national grid in 2019 and (8) Port Qasim power project is a coal-based power plant in the Sindh and has been operational since 2018. Apart from these eight power projects in Pakistan, one power project named Hassyan clean coal project is under construction since 2016, in the Gulf co-operation council region, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The project is part of Dubai’s Integrated Energy Strategy 2030. While Dubai Electricity and Water Authority (DEWA) holds the majority (51 per cent) share in the project, ACWA Power holds 26.95 per cent, Harbin Electric International Company (HEI) holds 14.7 per cent and Silk Road Fund holds the remaining 7.35 per cent. This project will be generating 2400MW power. Another power project is the Kayan River cascade hydropower project. It is a multi-phase power development in the northern Kalimantan province, Indonesia. It has been under construction since 2010 and is part of Indonesia’s comprehensive economic corridor under the BRI. This project is expected to generate 9,000MW power.34

33 Available at https://obortunity.org/cpec-news/maps/, accessed on 08 May 2019. 34 Ibid. 213 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

For strengthening energy supply mechanism, in the ‘vision and Action’ document of the BRI, it is mentioned that through BRI, China will be trying to improve and expand the scale of oil and gas pipeline connectivity.35 For bypassing unstable and insecure chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and vulnerable routes in the disputed South China Sea, China is seeking to develop new land-based transit routes via friendly countries. Among friendly countries, Pakistan and Myanmar are two important countries with which China is trying to tie up for developing pipeline connectivity. In Myanmar, China has a crude oil and gas pipeline project. The oil pipeline is located in Kyaukpyu township in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. This project began operating in April 2017. This pipeline runs from Maday Island in Kyaukpyu township in Rakhine state to the city of Ruili in China’s southwestern Yunan province. It has the capacity to carry up to 22 million tons of oil annually. Another gas pipeline runs from Ramree Island in Kyaukpyu to China with an annual capacity of up to 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas.36 This crude oil and gas pipeline is supposed to be operated under the proposed China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) of BRI.37 With Pakistan, China is operating its CPEC project under which China has an oil pipeline development plan. It was reported in Pakistan in 2016 that the proposed oil pipeline would carry US$ 1 million barrels per day of Middle Eastern oil to China.38

35 National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration (PRC), “Vision and Actions on Energy Cooperation in Jointly Buliding Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st - Century Maritime Silk Road”, 12 May 2017, available at http://www.nea.gov.cn/2017-05/12/c_136277478.htm, accessed on 22 April 2019. 36 Christopher Len, “China’s Maritime Silk Road and Energy Geopolitics in the Indian Ocean: Motivations and Implications for the Region”, in Erica Downs, Mikkal E. Herberg, Michael Kugelman, Christopher Len and Kaho Yu (eds.), Asia’s Energy Security and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017. 37 Charles Williams, “Myanmar is set to embrace Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative”, Global Risks Insights, 04 January 2019, available at https://globalriskinsights.com/2019/01/myanmar-set-embrace-xis-belt-road-initiative/, accessed on 15 April 2019. 38 Christopher Len, op. cit. 214 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Map 2: Oil Pipeline from Myanmar to China39

In Central Asia, China is also cooperating through the BRI in developing integrated oil and gas pipeline. In this region, Azerbaijan is an important natural gas and oil rich country. The country has long aspiration to export its natural gas and oil to Turkey and Europe. Although Europeans made a project named ‘Nabucco’ in 2002 to export gas from Azerbaijan to Turkey and southern Europe, it failed due to lack of credit guarantees. In this context, China came to aid this project under its BRI. In 2011, a new pipeline named Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) had been introduced. The pipeline is supposed to carry Azeri gas to Turkey and connect with the proposed Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that would take the gas on to Italy.40 The most important thing in this newly announced pipeline project is that China is backing the whole project. China’s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) agreed to channel US$ 600 million to support the TANAP project. This financial support from the AIIB is the largest investment till now. TANAP is one of two pipelines under the Southern Gas Corridor. In this corridor, another gas pipeline is TAP. BRI is involved in this corridor by backing up TANAP through AIIB. The involvement of AIIB is signalling the spirit of BRI to aid in connecting countries of BRI.41 The TANAP gas is expected to deliver its first gas to European markets in 2020.42Another important aspect of this project is that this pipeline is expected to gas up only European countries, whereas most of the projects under the BRI end

39 Hang Dong, “CNPC breaks ground on Yunnan spur of China-Myanmar line”, Interfax Energy, available at http://interfaxenergy.com/article/14753/cnpc-breaks-ground-on-yunnan-spur-of-china-myanmar-line, 12 December 2012, accessed on 25 March 2019. 40 John Mathews and Hao Tan, “China’s new Silk Road: is it black or green?”, Energy Post, 24 April 2017, available at https://energypost.eu/chinas-new-silk-road-will-it-contribute-to-export-of-the-black-fossil-fueled- economy/, accessed on 20 April 2019. 41 Ibid. 42 “TANAP to strengthen Turkey’s energy position in region”, The Daily Sabah, 21 February 2019, available at https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2019/02/21/tanap-to-strengthen-turkeys-energy-position-in-region, accessed on 22 April 2019. 215 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 up reaching China. Therefore, this project shows the BRI spirit in connecting other countries not only with China but also among themselves.

Map 3: TANAP and TAP Pipeline43

In the map, it is showing that the Azeri gas is supposed to carry by TANAP from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz Gas field. This gas will run from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey’s 20 provinces and end at the Greek border of the Ipsala district Turkey’s Edrine province. From this point, another gas pipeline TAP will carry the gas to other European countries. Initially, the TAP will carry the gas from Greece through Albania to Italy. Through this gas corridor, European countries are trying to improve their energy security by bringing natural gas from Caspian region and reducing dependency over Russian gas. Among all the pipeline projects under the BRI, Yamal Liquefied Natural Gas (Yamal LNG) project has experienced success since its operation. The Yamal LNG project is located in Russia’s Yamal Peninsula in the Arctic. The project reached its full production with its three production lines, each production line has capacity of 5.5 million tons per year. The production lines’ operation started in December 2017, August 2018 and December 2018 respectively. It is the first mega-energy cooperation project in Russia under the BRI. The project is owned by Russia’s Novatek (50.1 per cent), France’s 20 per cent and China’s Silk Road Fund 9.9 per cent.44 Apart from financial involvement, Chinese contribution was also in the technical support for this project. China Offshore Oil Engineering Co. Ltd (COOEC) has an agreement with the Yamal project for manufacturing the

43 Necdet Pamir, “The Pros and Cons of the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP)”, Sigma Turkey, 24 January 2018, available at https://www.sigmaturkey.com/the-pros-and-cons-of-the-trans-anatolian-pipeline-tanap- energy/, accessed on 16 October 2019. ` 44 “10 Amazing Belt and Road Initiative Projects”, Belt and Road News, 06 April 2019, available at https:// www.beltandroad.news/2019/04/06/10-amazing-belt-and-road-initiative-projects/, accessed on 25 April 2019. 216 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

Module Fabrication Work Package for this project. By doing this, Chinese engineers gained knowledge of gas production in such a harsh Arctic climatic condition. After successful production of the Yamal LNG project, it increased BRI’s status in the world energy market. Furthermore, the successful launch of this project made prospective involvement of Chinese companies to other Arctic energy projects.45 The location of Yamal LNG Project also allows half shipping time through the Northern Sea Route compared to Southern Sea Route. Through Northern Sea Route, it takes 15 days to reach Asia, whereas it takes 30 days to reach Asia by the traditional Southern Route through the Suez Canal. As one of the shareholders of Yamal LNG, China started importing arctic gas from the project. Petro China’s Jiangsu Rudong LNG terminal is receiving arctic gas from this project. This gas is coming through Northern Sea Route.

Map 4: Yamal LNG and Arctic Route for Fuel Shipping46

In the map, it is showing that through the Northern Sea Route, the LNG shipment from the Yamal LNG project to China is taking half time compared to the traditional Southern Sea Route through the Suez Canal. After the success of this project, China now aims to build a ‘Polar Silk Road’ or ‘Ice Silk Road’ by developing arctic shipping routes. These shipping routes seem more viable than shipping through the Suez or Panama canals. In this regard, gas shipment from Yamal LNG project to China through the Northern Sea Route is increasing China’s confidence to develop Ice Silk road along the Arctic.47

45 Nadezhda Filimonova and Svetlana KrivoKhizh, “China’s Stakes in the Russian Arctic: What’s behind the China’s decision to invest in a Russian LNG project above the Arctic circle?”, The Diplomat, 18 January 2018, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-stakes-in-the-russian-arctic/, accessed on 22 March 2019. 46 “Arctic gas plants threatens native peoples in Ob River Mouth”, available at https://www.transrivers. org/2018/2188/, accessed on 25 April 2019. 47 “China to develop Arctic shipping routes opened by global warming”, BBC News, 26 January 2018, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-42833178, accessed on 25 April 2019. 217 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

Apart from connecting pipelines and power grids, China is also focusing on renewable energy projects along the BRI countries. As it is mentioned earlier that China is championing in the field of renewable energy, it is also notable that the country has become the world’s largest overseas investor of Renewable Energy Sources (RES). Over the next 20 years, it will be investing more than US$ 6 trillion in low-carbon power generation and other clean energy technologies. As part of its aspiration to build a ‘Green Belt and Road’, the country is now focusing on green and low-carbon clean energy. As part of this commitment, it is investing in the BRI countries’ renewable energy generation projects. In Argentina, China funded for solar power plant. It is a 500MW solar power plant named Cauchari Solar Power Plant. For this plant, China funded 85 per cent of its total expenditure.48 It is the largest renewable energy project in Latin America. Another major solar power project is situated in Egypt. China is also funding this project through the AIIB. This project is known as Benban Solar Park. Its capacity is 2 Gigawatt. China has also proposed hydro-power plant in Mongolia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Indonesia.49 In Turkey, China is also investing for renewable energy generation. In the upcoming years, China is expected to invest around US$ 600 million in Turkey’s renewable energy sector.50 In UAE, China is jointly developed the Sweihan Photovoltaic Independent Power project.51 It is a 1,177MW solar power generation project. It is anticipated that this power plant may generate power for 195,000 homes approximately. By doing so, it can cut seven million tonnes of carbon emissions a year.52 In Kenya, China is investing for wind power generation. Sinomatch and General Electric are jointly building 102MW wind power project in Kapedo, Kenya. China is also financing Germany’s Meerwind offshore wind farm.53

3.2 Alternative Energy Route

Ensuring uninterrupted energy supply is an utmost need for China’s huge economy. Therefore, this issue is given high priority in BRI. Since China is still

48 Hu Min and Diego Montero, “Leveraging China’s ‘Green Soft Power’ for Responsible Belt and Road Initiative Investment”, Forbes, 14 May 2019, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2019/05/14/ leveraging-chinas-green-soft-power-for-responsible-belt-and-road-initiative-investment/#c848e6b3e4f0, accessed on 20 May 2019. 49 Ibid. 50 “Belt and Road to prop up Chinese renewable projects in Turkey”, The Daily Sabah, 23 April 2019, available at https://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2019/04/23/belt-and-road-to-prop-up-chinese-renewable-projects-in-turkey, accessed on 20 May 2019. 51 Han Chen, “Greener Power Projects for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), NRDC, 22 April 2019, available at https://www.nrdc.org/experts/han-chen/greener-power-projects-belt-road-initiative-bri, accessed on 20 May 2019. 52 “Sweihan Photovoltaic Independent Power Project, Abu Dhabi”, Power Technology, available at https:// www.power-technology.com/projects/sweihan-photovoltaic-independent-power-project-abu-dhabi/, accessed on 20 May 2019. 53 Han Chen, op. cit. 218 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE relying heavily on fossil fuel, its fossil fuel shipments are heavily dependent on the Strait of Malacca. The country’s 80 per cent of oil imports come through this vital chock point.54 The map below is showing that the distance between the proposed route of Gwador Port in Baluchistan to the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang is only 2,000km whereas the existing energy sea route from Persian Gulf via the Strait of Malacca to Beijing is 12,900km. Famously known as China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ termed by the former Chinese President Hu Jintao,55 which means the country’s heavy reliance on this single chokepoint – the Strait of Malacca, is vulnerable to disruption. This chokepoint is China’s security concern because it is currently the only route through which China’s energy shipments have to pass. Therefore, any disruption or blockade of this chokepoint can lead to a serious energy and trade crises in China.56 Currently, the US is patrolling the Strait of Malacca chokepoint and India has developed credible naval presence in the Andaman Sea adjacent to this chokepoint. India is also partnering with the US and other countries for safeguarding this chokepoint. Hence, this situation can translate into a threat in any kind of conflict among rival navies. The blockade situation in the Strait of Malacca during any kind of conflict may lead to severe political and economic consequences in China.

Map 5: China’s Alternative Energy Route57

54 Steven Stashwick, “China’s Security Gambit in the Indian Ocean”, The Diplomat, 11 May 2018, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/chinas-security-gambit-in-the-indian-ocean/, accessed on 05 May 2019. 55 Vidya Sagar Reddy, “Reinforcing China’s Malacca Dilemma”, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 15 September 2016, available at http://cimsec.org/reinforcing-chinas-malacca-dilemma/28117, accessed on 07 May 2019. 56 Ibid. 57 Vidya Sagar Reddy, “Reinforcing China’s Malacca Dilemma”, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), 15 September 2016, available at http://cimsec.org/reinforcing-chinas-malacca-dilemma/28117, accessed on 07 May 2019. 219 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019

To avoid such disruption, China proposed new sea route from Gwadar Port to Xinjiang Province. The proposed route is under the CPEC of BRI. Since Pakistan links East Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East with land routes and sea lines, it allows Gwadar Port to be a hub of trade in BRI. This port is only 2000km away from China’s Xinjian province. Therefore, Gwadar port can be an alternative choice for China to avoid oil shipping through the Strait of Malacca.58 China is also involved with South China Sea dispute with Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam. As it is showing in the map that the Chinese oil shipments are passing from Persian Gulf through the Strait of Malacca via South China Sea. Therefore, any kind of volatile situation in the South China Sea will also create disruption in oil shipment.59 Currently Pakistan has two international deep-sea ports – Karachi Port and Port Qasim. Under the CPEC, China proposed Pakistan to help in building its third deep-sea port - Gwadar Port. Gwadar is located on the shores of the Arabian Sea in the western province of Balochistan. It is about 533km from Karachi and 120km from the Iranian border. Gwadar Port is located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, just outside the Strait of Hormuz, near the key shipping routes in and out of the Persian Gulf.60 Although the Gwadar port construction was inaugurated by Prime Minister Parvez Musharraf in 2005, it was announced in 2015 that the Gwadar Port would be developed under China’s CPEC initiative with Pakistan. From the year 2015, construction work in Gwadar Port started and this port city has been officially leased to China for 43 years until 2059.61 Once this port gets operational, it is expected that China may use a shorter and cheaper route for its oil shipments by circumventing the Strait of Malacca and vulnerable shipping lanes through disputed South China Sea. By constructing this deep-sea port, China is also creating an alternative route for other countries. Connecting the Arabian Sea to the Eurasian heartland, the port could serve as a transit point for alternative routes between China, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Middle Eastern countries.62 Therefore, the Gwadar Port under the CPEC of the BRI is going to bring a massive change in the existing energy order as it will usher a new route for oil shipments. Also, China can avoid any potential confrontation with the US in the context of the US’ growing presence in the South China Sea, where it is seeking to expand its influence as part of its pivot toAsia. 63

58 Kaho Yu, “Energy Cooperation and Regional Order in the Belt and Road Initiative: A Case Study of China’s Investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, London Asia Pacific Centre for Social Science, October 2018, available at https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/schools/global-affairs/lapc/lapc-wp-kaho-yu.pdf, accessed on 07 May 2019. 59 Roncevert Ganan Almond, “Trade, War, and the South China Sea”, The Diplomat, 01 September 2018, available at https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/trade-war-and-the-south-china-sea/, accessed on 25 June 2019. 60 “Gwadar port”, available at http://www.gwadarport.gov.pk/about%20us.aspx, accessed on 25 June 2019. 61 “Pakistan hands over 2,000 acres to China in Gwadar port city”, Indian Express, 12 November 2015, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-hands-over-2000-acres-to-china-in-gwadar- port-city/, accessed on 20 June 2019. 62 Kahu Yu, op. cit. 63 Omar Alam, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Towards a New Heartland?”, Centre for Security Studies, 21 December 2015, available at https://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/china-pakistan-economic-corridor- towards-a-new-heartland, accessed on 20 April 2019. 220 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

3.3 Regional Energy Market and Value Chain Integration

BRI may create opportunities for regional energy market in the long run. It may drive energy related industries due to numerous energy projects are running under this mega plan and many more projects are in the pipeline. Energy projects that involve pipeline construction, port development and power plant construction create markets for construction and machinery industries. Because of various energy projects in various countries, BRI may create opportunities for different energy hubs in different regions. These energy hubs will help countries to buy and sell power among themselves. Therefore, in the long run, BRI countries may consider establishing regional energy markets in different regions. For natural gas and power, regional markets will be developed around pipelines and transmission grids. Moreover, under BRI’s energy cooperation, it offers to diversify the value chain in energy generation from traditional upstream exploitation and exploration of fossil energy to downstream activities such as pipeline construction and petrochemical operations associated with renewable energy development. There might be opportunities for Chinese enterprises to adopt various practices including direct investment, mergers and acquisitions, public-private partnerships and engineering, procurement and construction contracts. There might be more diverse contract options including the utilization of joint ventures and production-sharing agreements.64

4. How Can BRI Influence the Geopolitics of Energy

BRI’s numerous successful operational energy projects will have a significant impact on the shaping of energy geopolitics in the coming days. These projects are transnational in nature and are contributing in both renewable and non-renewable energy generation. With these projects, BRI is likely to influence the transformation of the international energy order. Its energy principles are supporting the latest trend of international energy order which is replacing the 20th century’s energy order. BRI’s energy vision is also likely to manipulate the power politics of the Indian Ocean. China is growing its naval engagement and port establishment in the Indian Ocean due to safeguard its energy security which is also beneficial for BRI countries. But this situation has misgivings about a Sinocentric regional order. It has raised concern for the US and other Asian powers.65 Therefore, it is likely to increase strategic rivalry between regional powers.66 Another important influence that BRI is

64 Kaho Yu, “The Geopolitics of Energy Cooperation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, in Erica Downs, Mikkal E. Herberg, Michael Kugelman, Christopher Len and Kaho Yu (eds.), Asia’s Energy Security and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Seattle, Washington: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017. 65 Jae Ho Chung, “The Rise of China and East Asia: A New Regional Order on the Horizon?”, Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2016, pp. 47-59. 66 Ibid. 221 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 fuelling is the promotion of new multilateral institutions regarding energy. Hence, in this section, BRI’s influence over energy geopolitics has been discussed based on these three angles.

4.1 New Energy Order?

With an intense adjustment in international energy supply and demand, the transformation of international energy order is in the making. In this transformation, BRI is supposed to make an important contribution. It is promoting interaction between producers and consumers and providing new security and economic values to the international energy order. The shift in major players has made the international energy pattern more balanced. This situation helps in elevating the status of consumer countries in the international energy market. In the changing energy order, interactive relations among various actors tend to be equal and fair. A common, integrated, cooperative and sustainable international energy security concept and green and low-carbon energy economic values have begun to replace the traditional concepts based on zero-sum game and cost efficiency.67 BRI is in line with this trend. It promises to provide opportunities for countries and energy companies to expand oil and gas exploration and transportation capacity, enhance technologies and broaden the scope of new energy applications.68 In addition, there are three key variables in the analysis of international energy order. These are the structure of power distribution among international energy actors and their mode of interaction, the international energy institutions and their code of conduct and the values of international energy economy. These variables can be influenced by the energy cooperation under BRI in the coming days. Because, energy cooperation under the BRI promotes the interaction between producer and consumer countries by both boosting production capacity and creating a cooperative mechanism among consumer countries. The principle of upholding justice along with shared interests and new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security advocated by the BRI energy cooperation will also provide new security and economic values to the international energy order.69

4.2 Power Politics in the Indian Ocean Region

BRI’s network of ports in the Indian Ocean (IO) littoral countries has important contribution in shaping the power politics among regional and extra

67 Yang Chenxi, “Belt and Road Initiative and Transformation of International Energy Order”, Pressreader, 20 May 2018, available at https://www.pressreader.com/, accessed on 25 October 2018. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 222 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE regional powers of IO. Although the BRI aims to unite each and every littoral state of the IO under the BRI umbrella for common prosperity, some major states do not take this mega initiative lightly. India as one of the major powers of the region did not take the idea of BRI positively. For both China and India, IO is an important place for ensuring their energy security. Mainly for uninterrupted energy supply, China is creating network of ports and pipelines in IO littoral states to avoid heavy reliance over traditional chokepoints. Through these ports and pipelines, participating countries are also supposed to be benefitted in the long run. If any deadlock arises in the traditional chokepoints, namely the Strait of Malacca and sea lanes in the South China Sea, then, China and BRI countries can use alternative energy routes. However, India has discomfort with BRI and is unwelcoming China’s port construction for ensuring energy supply lines. Like India, some other neighbours such as Japan and Australia have also discomfiture about BRI. Another important point is that the current superpower, the US is also not very comfortable with Chinese idea of BRI. Due to China’s influence over most of the countries through BRI, the US is facing ‘polar influence’ from China.70 Particularly, BRI’s construction of ports, pipelines and infrastructures are creating concern for IO regional and extra regional powers. Considering security perspectives in the IO in the context of BRI, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) – has been formed by US, Japan, Australia and India. This reflects some quarters’ suspicious response over BRI. The QUAD is trying to set off the idea of ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ by promoting rules-based order in Asia. Apart from joint initiative, Quad countries separately showed their responses towards BRI. India in response to BRI introduced ‘Mausam’- a strategic project aims at reestablishing India’s trade and shipping links with IO countries, ‘Cotton Road’ – aims to firm up diplomatic and economic relations with IO countries.71 With Japan, Indian Prime Minister Modi agreed to establish Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) to enhance growth and connectivity between Asia and Africa. India is also constructing Chabahar Port in Iran for the betterment of transport and transit connectivity. Russia is also not very comfortable with China and views India as less of a competitor. In response to the BRI, Russia together with Iran and India signed an agreement to develop an International North- South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is supposed to be the shortest route to link the IO and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea via Iran and St Petersburg. Therefore, BRI is attractive to some countries since it offers incentives of trade, connectivity and infrastructure development. Others, especially regional powers and the US have resisted it directly or indirectly due to varying degrees of fear of increased competition. This situation creates the IO a growing area of

70 Naren Chitty, Dalbir Ahlawat, Mei Li and D Gopal, “The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the Indian Ocean Region: Sentiment towards Economic Prosperity and Security Implications”, The Indian Journal of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 1-2, 2018, pp. 1-20. 71 Ibid. 223 BIISS JOURNAL, VOL. 40, NO. 2, APRIL 2019 competition especially between the two regional powers, India and China. To have primacy over regional influence, regional powers are playing power politics to have the dominance. In this sense, BRI is fuelling this power play in the IO although its aim is not to create any competition rather than aiding development.72

4.3 Moving toward New Multilateralism?

With its numerous energy projects, BRI is promoting a platform for energy cooperation which is ultimately leading to new multilateralism in the energy sector. It is evident that China is no longer relying on the existing West-led energy order. Therefore, the country is trying to stimulate new energy order by promoting energy cooperation under BRI. This energy cooperation involves numerous transnational energy projects. Due to these transnational energy projects, Chinese overseas investments are also increasing day by day. Although, China through its BRI, is operating trillion dollars worth of energy projects in BRI countries, there is still a lack of appropriate international legal framework for safeguarding its overseas energy investments. In both regional and global levels, a well-structured energy governance will play an important role in successful implementation of the BRI. If there is any kind of trade disputes or cross-border transportation problem, then China and its BRI members will be in need of an authorized body to resolve these problems. BRI countries lack a transnational legal framework. Chinese enterprises that are closely linked with BRI’s energy projects have already started raising the issue of dispute settlement. In this context, since China is trying to avoid its reliance over West-led multilateral institutions for energy governance, the country launched the Belt and Road Energy Partnership (BREP) during the second Belt and Road Energy Forum in 2019. BREP may act as similar as the International Energy Agency (IEA). It may follow an energy charter like the IEA. China also established several other multilateral institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the South- South Cooperation Fund on Climate Change. These multilateral institutions are also directly or indirectly supporting BRI’s energy projects. Specifically, the AIIB is directly funding many BRI energy projects.73 Therefore, through energy cooperation under BRI, China is promoting multilateralism by establishing the BREP and other financial multilateral development institutions. These multilateral institutions will surely have a definite impact in shaping the energy order and energy governance.

72 Eleanor Albert, “Competition in the Indian Ocean”, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 May 2016, available at https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/competition-indian-ocean, accessed on 20 May 2019. 73 Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, “The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road”, China Economic Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016, pp. 116-139. 224 BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

5. Concluding Remarks

China’s BRI is offering huge amount of opportunities for investment and infrastructure building in the energy sector. Since energy got one of the highest priorities in BRI, the country is expanding its overseas energy projects gradually. Although securing its own energy demand is one of the main interests of China to expand its energy footprints overseas through BRI, this will be largely benefitting to all BRI countries. Under BRI energy projects, China is trying to diversify energy resource transportation routes away from traditional chokepoints and vulnerable sea lanes. These alternative routes are supposed to be beneficial for all BRI countries in any sudden blockade situation in traditional chokepoints. Energy cooperation among BRI countries is strengthening progressively with these alternative routes, newly developed shipping lanes and newly constructed ports and pipelines. BRI’s energy projects are also likely to influence in shaping the new energy order. Since the BRI is aiding the new energy powers by funding their energy projects, promoting renewable energy generation and promoting multilateral institutions to support energy governance, this mega plan is gradually contributing in shaping the new energy order. Through its massive contribution in energy sector – important variables of the energy order are likely to be influenced to a great extent. These variables are structure of power distribution among international energy actors and their mode of interaction, international energy institutions and their code of conduct and the values of international energy economy. Because, energy cooperation under BRI promotes the interaction between producer and consumer countries by both boosting production capacity and creating a cooperative mechanism among consumer countries. BRI energy cooperation supports the principle of upholding justice along with shared interests and new thinking on common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security. Therefore, this energy cooperation under BRI may provide new security and economic values to the international energy order. In closing, although the BRI offers a holistic approach to connect countries and regions for getting benefits from developed infrastructure, integrated trade facilities, sustainable energy as well as common prosperity for all, it creates confusion to some regional and extra regional stakeholders. Along with constructing ports and pipelines to develop the energy infrastructure, China is also increasing its naval engagement in the Indian Ocean to protect and safeguard its energy infrastructure. However, these developments are creating concerns for the US and other regional powers. Particularly, India is not comfortable with BRI’s energy projects throughout the Indian Ocean. In this context, if China successfully manages to avoid power rivalry and accommodate new energy powers, then BRI’s energy projects can provide the full benefit. Since the BRI is in conformity with the latest trend of energy generation, it will make the international energy structure more balanced. Once the energy structure becomes balanced, it will create credible patterns of interaction between buyer and seller. This will in the long-run establish new energy values and shape the geopolitics of energy.

225 BIISS Publications

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