Petty Commodity Production in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: a Comparative Study of Ghana and South Africa’

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How to cite this thesis

Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017). Petty Commodity Production in Artisanal and Small- scale Mining: A Comparative Study of Ghana and South Africa

Hibist Wendemu Kassa

201495114

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Literature and Philosophy

in the

Department of Sociology

of the

Faculty of Humanities

at the

University of Johannesburg.

Supervised by

Prof Kate (formerly Peter) Alexander

and

Prof. Akua Opokua Britwum

Date of submission

31 January, 2019

Abstract

The rapid expansion of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) has raised questions on the nature of transformations occurring in African economies. This study addresses two problems: first, to explain the persistence of ASM in the contemporary period; second, to explain why ASM does not become Large-Scale Mining (LSM). Literature on ASM has tended to focus on phenomenal aspects, to the neglect of the processes shaping of the evolution of the sector. Classical Marxism provides the theoretical tools to analyse capital as a process but remains limited in scope. Jarius Banaji provides a holistic account of capitalist development which integrates an understanding of its heterogeity that is relevant to the Global South. Banaji lays a foundation for empirical investigations into multiple forms of exploitation that are subsumed under capitalism. In this framework, Banaji integrates pre-capitalist forms of production which are subsumed under capitalism. This thesis attempts to go beyond Marx and Banaji by expanding the conceptual framework to grapple with empirical evidence drawn from tracing the evolution of cases of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Ghana and South Africa. The study draws on empirical evidence from ASM in gold mining which has been historically embedded in the emergence of LSM operations in both countries. The case studies centred on ‘illegal’ ASM known as ‘galamsey’ in Obuasi, a mining town in Ghana. In South Africa, empirical evidence was drawn from ‘illegal’ ASM in the Gauteng Province known as ‘zama zama’. Interviews were conducted with twelve galamsey miners, including financiers, in Ghana and twelve zama zama miners in South Africa. This comparison reveals significant similarities, most notably, that petty commodity producers and petty capitalists fill a gap left by LSM and the state. ASM persists because of its distinctive character which is shaped by interactions between the elements’ logic, orientation and linkages. The distinctive character has bearing on opening up possibilities for alternatives, if the means of production are socialised. ASM does not become LSM mainly due to exogenous forces, with the state playing a dominant and contradictory role. I conceptualise this as mediated disarticulation. The original contribution of this study is to compare two country cases of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Africa, and conceptualise the elements and forces that shape their evolution.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the National Research Fund of South Africa which provided funding for this study. Without this support, I would not have been able to undertake this study. The nesting place from within which I was able to nurse this work was the Centre for Social Change (CSC), of which Prof. Kate Alexander is the director, as well as designated supervisor of this project. The CSC has been an important space for the development of young radical intellectuals. Prof. Akua Opokua Britwum, who is also my supervisor, provided me with the intellectual guidance to shape this study. Medaase. Ms. Claire Ceruti, thank you. To be in dialogue with you as a Marixst intellectual has been invaluable. Prof Viviene Taylor, thank you for your kindness, thoughtful guidance and support in what was a challenging and transformative process. Ms. Delicia Langenhoven, thank you for not only proof reading this thesis, but also recognising its value. Mr. Justice Dzivon Mensah, you have been of immense logistical and intellectual support during my fieldwork in Obuasi when it was under military occupation. Mr. Richard Elimah, director of the Centre for Social Impact Studies, provided important perspectives which were critical in analysing the ‘galamsey’ question. Your keen insights were vital in keeping this study grounded to reflect a nuanced understanding of mining in Ghana. Dr. Grace Idahosa, who joined my research team in KwaThema, also provided support in what were difficult conditions. Mr. Hendrick Moore, Mr. Sandile Nombeni and Ms. Sabatini Mngadi, both activists working within mining communities including the zama zama, provided immense intellectual and logistical support in Gauteng. Ms. Thembelihle Maseko and Ms. Boikanyo Moloto both meticulously transcribed the interviews and provided critical reflections on the translation, meanings and trustworthiness of the data. I cannot thank you all enough. Kea Leboga, Ngiyabonga. My parents, Ambassador Wendemu Kassa and Weyzero Senayet Ambaye, thank you for your patience, care and faith in spite of all the angst I put you through by being your absent child. Ato. Weyzero Genet Ambaye, Weyzero Atatu Ambaye and Ato Matewos Ambaye, thank you immensely for the critical support you gave me when I first arrived in South Africa. Weyzero Emu Bahiru, Ato Taffesse Birhanu and Ato. Dagmawi Kassa, thank you for ensuring I had a constant supply of coffee. Coffee was a close companion through many tough days and nights. Dr Zelalem Birhanu and Ato Assefa

Gezagn, I am deeply grateful to you both for providing critical support towards the end of this study. Amesegenalew. My friends and comrades thank you for showering me with love and words of wisdom. You have given me the courage and playfulness of heart to see this through. Mr. Kgothatso Mokgele, you provided friendship in scholarship. The emotional, intellectual, material and technical support enabled me to survive moments of deep crisis. Thank you for being present, engaged and affirming the value of this work. Every step I took to advance this work was made possible by your support. The faith you all had in me, even when I had lost all hope, kept me focused long enough to achieve what I believed was never truly possible…to bring my people’s thoughts into the written word and fame this on a stage I had the privilege to set up. To the extent that the stage setting is entirely my doing, I can only hope that I did them justice. I thank all, whether you knew it or not, who helped me on this journey. I could not have made it this far without you. For love, for revolution and for our future(s).

CONTENTS

Abstract ...... ii Affidavit ...... iii Acknowledgement ...... i Photographs and Figures...... vi Tables ...... vi Maps...... vi Acronyms ...... vii

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background to the Study ...... 1 1.1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1.1 Transformation and the ASM Policy Space ...... 4 1.2 The Problem of the Study ...... 8 1.3 Defining Key Concepts ...... 9 1.3.1 Artisanal and Small-scale Mining ...... 9 1.3.2 Petty Commodity Production ...... 10 1.3.3 Evolution ...... 11 1.3.4 Mediation ...... 11 1.4 Original Contribution ...... 12 1.4.1 Tracing the evolution of petty commodity production in mining ...... 13 1.5 Thesis Structure ...... 14 Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework and Historical Overview ...... 16 2.1 Introduction ...... 16 2.2 The Challenge of Thinking Through Modes of Production ...... 17 2.3 The Post-Independence Industrialisation Challenge ...... 20 2.4 The Capital/Non-Capital Debate ...... 23 2.5 Petty Commodity Production and Capital ...... 29 2.6 Heterogenous Economies in the Neoliberal Phase ...... 31 2.7 Nationalisation of Mineral Economies ...... 34 2.8 The State and Mediation of Capital ...... 38 2.9 Conclusion: Aspects for Further Elaboration ...... 39 Chapter 3: Methodology ...... 41 3.1 Introduction ...... 41 3.2 Approach Adopted in the Chapters ...... 42 3.3 Phases of Research ...... 45 3.3.1 Selection of Methods ...... 46

iii

3.3.2 The Selection of Cases ...... 52 3.4 Trustworthiness ...... 54 3.4.1 Ethics, Conditions of the Miners and the Empirical Research ...... 54 3.4.2 The challenge of securing consent...... 56 3.5 Self-Reflexivity ...... 60 3.6 Collaborative Approach in Research Teams ...... 62 3.7 Translation ...... 66 3.8 Citizenship and Indigeneity ...... 67 3.9 Conclusion ...... 68 Chapter 4: Policy Approaches to Formalising Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining and Implications for Petty Commodity Production ...... 70 4.1 Introduction ...... 70 4.2 Defining Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining ...... 71 4.2.1 Implications of Definitional Problems for ASM Policy ...... 73 4.3 Policy Gaps in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining ...... 76 4.4 Problems and Contradictions of State Interventions in ASM ...... 79 4.5 Gender and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining ...... 83 4.6 Conclusion ...... 86 Chapter 5: Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism in Obuasi ...... 88 5.1 Introduction ...... 88 5.2 Mining Regime from Late Colonial to Post Independence Period ...... 90 5.3 State Interventions in Galamsey Operations ...... 93 5.4 Ashanti Gold Corporation and Obuasi Municipality ...... 95 5.4.1 The Colonial State and Petty Commodity Production in Obuasi ...... 98 5.4.2 State Interventions in Obuasi Galamsey ...... 100 5.4.3 Social Mobility or Capital ‘Becoming’? ...... 113 5.4.4 Galamsey Production Relations ...... 116 5.5 Conclusion ...... 120 Chapter 6: Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism in Gauteng Province ...... 123 6.1 Introduction ...... 123 6.2 Dispossession and the Rise of Large-scale Mining in South Africa ...... 125 6.3 Locating ASM in the Mining Regime ...... 130 6.3.1 Deindustrualisation in Ekurhuleni...... 134 6.3.2 Reprocessing of Mine Tailings ...... 136 6.4 Zama zama Production Relations ...... 146 6.5 Zama zama as a Livelihood Strategy in Conditions of Precarity...... 152 6.6 State Interventions the Zama zama Want ...... 157 6.7 Conclusion ...... 163

Chapter 7: Comparison of Obuasi and Gauteng: Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism, Capital becoming...... 165 7.1 Introduction ...... 165 7.2 Locating ASM in the Mining Regimes ...... 168 7.2.1 The nature of state interventions in ASM ...... 176 7.2.2 The Implications for the Zama zama and Galamsey ...... 179 7.3 Livelihood, Social Mobility or Capital Becoming? ...... 183 7.4 Linkages: the known, the unknown and the possibilities ...... 188 7.4.1 Degree of Mechanisation ...... 191 7.5 Orientation ...... 197 7.5.1 Limits on the Zama zama and Galamsey Operations ...... 197 7.5.2 Degree of Organising by Zama zama and Galamsey ...... 203 7.6 Conclusion ...... 205 Chapter 8: Conclusions: The Essence of Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism ...... 208 8.1 Introduction ...... 208 8.2 Logic ...... 210 8.2.1 Character of Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism ...... 211 8.3 Way Forward: The Conditions within which the Zama zama, Galamsey and Allies Organise ...... 214 8.4 Recommendations for Further Research ...... 217 8.5 Original Contribution ...... 219 Appendix I: Check list for Interviews in Obuasi ...... 221 General Checklist for ASM operations ...... 221 Checklist for Interview with Anglo Gold Ashanti (Obuasi) ...... 222 Checklist for ASM in Gauteng ...... 223 Appendix II: Consent form ...... 226 Appendix III: Statement from Kimberley Artisanal Mine Workers (zama zamas) ...... 228 List of Interviews ...... 231 Bibliography ...... 233

Photographs and Figures Photo 1 showing an excavator and trucks to transport mine tailings and gravel stones at Vlakfontein TSF..………………………………………….………………………………….140 Photo 2 of mine private security positioned on top of a large heap of rocks, 10 July 2018...... 141 Figure 1 of Ergo Plant. DRDGOLD. Ergo, 2018...... 142 Photo 3 shows zama zamas operating a phenduka. From SABC Documentary Lehile La Sechaba, ‘Zama zamas’ ...... 151 Photo 4 shows the metal balls which crush the ore in the phenduka. From SABC Documentary Lehile La Sechaba, ‘Zama zamas’ ...... 152 Photo 5 shows a Zama Zama miner working a silting implement...... 153 Photo 6 shows a silting implement used by Zama Zamas...... 154 Photo 7 of a march by Kimberley Zama Zama and MACUA on April 3 2017. Photo by Mr. Christopher Rutledge...... 162

Tables

Table 1 showing Participant Profile in Ghana and South Africa ...... 51 Table 2 showing the logics of LSM and ASM in Ghana and South Africa ...... 172 Table 3 showing the cases highlighting linkages, mechanisation and key moments of alliance building ...... 187

Maps

Map 1 Obuasi Municipality showing settlements (from Medium Term Development Plan Report, 2015-2017)...... 95 Map 2: Vlakfontein TSF and surrounding townships. (Google Satellite Maps, 12th July 2018) ...... 137 Map 3: Proximity of residences to the TSF. Goodle Satellite Maps 12th July 2018...... 137

Acronyms

ASM Artisanal and Small-scale Mining AfDB African Development Bank AGC Ashanti Gold Company AGA Anglo Gold Ashanti AGCEU Ashanti Gold Corporation Employees Union AUC African Union Commission BBBEE Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment BEE Black Economic Empowerment BLF Black First Land First CSIS Centre for Social Impact Studies DMR Department of Mineral Resources DRD Durban Roodepoort Deep ECG Electricity Company of Ghana EEO Ekurhuleni Environmental Organisation EPA Environmental Protection Agency GNASSM Ghana National Association of Small-scale Miners GTUC Ghana Trades Union Congress LSM Large -Scale Mining MACUA Mining Affected Communities United in Action MEU Mines Employees’ Union MCE Municipal Chief Executive NDC National Democratic Congress NPP New Patriotic Party NRC National Redemption Council National PMMC Precious Minerals Marketing Company PNDC Provisional National Democratic Congress PP Progress Party SABC South African Broadcasting Corporation SAHRC South African Human Rights Commission TSF Tailing Storage Facility UoMAT University of Mines and Technology UNCTAD United Nations Commission on Trade and Development

vii

UNDP United Nations Development Program UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa WAMUA Women in Mining Affected Communities United in Action

viii

Chapter 1: Introduction and Background to the Study

1.1 Introduction

The rapid expansion of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) has raised questions on the nature of transformations occurring in developing economies (Hilson, Amankwah and Ofori-Sarpong, 2013). Artisanal and small-scale mining, in this study, are both understood as covering variations of mining which exist along a spectrum. Within this spectrum of mining operations, there are mechanised and capital intensive operations which are integrated within Large-Scale Mining (LSM) dominated mining as junior miners. On the other end of the spectrum is petty commodity production which is characterised by self-exploitation, family labour, and at times, wage labour. The persistence of petty commodity production in the contemporary period, and its expansion in recent years, has drawn attention to transformations ongoing in economies in the periphery. Literature on ASM has shed light on the dynamism of the sector, but has tended to focus on phenomenal aspects. As a result, a predominant assumption is that the sector is poverty driven with the potential to alleviate it (Hilson and McQuilken, 2014; Yakovelva, 2007; Hilson, 2005; Sarpong, 2015). This neglects the processes shaping the trajectory of the sector, and the transformations these have potential to engender. Simply, this is conceptualised as evolution. On this basis, the study addresses two problems: first, to explain the persistence of ASM in the contemporary period; second, to explain why ASM does not become Large-Scale Mining (LSM). In other words, the study examines why ASM persists, but does not transform into LSM or big capital. To address this, the study traces the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. These categories were found to be more useful than ASM which includes a broad range of operations, including junior miners. Petty commodity production tends to depend on self-exploitation, limited mechanisation and low levels of accumulation. Petty capitalism in mining tends to develop from petty commodity production but is restrained in its further evolution. Petty commodity production literature tends to be applied to retail, smallholder agriculture and manufacturing (Bernstein, 1988; Harris-White, 2006; Harris-White, 2014) with rare instances of its application to mining

(Bannock Consulting, 2005). The relative niche area of ASM in South Africa has been gaining greater attention due to the growing interest in ‘illegal’ gold mining. The study grapples with the unstable coexistence between these forms of mining and Large-Scale Mining (LSM). The study focused on the evolution of these forms of mining as a route to analyse the process of capital itself. The primary text guiding this is Karl Marx’s (1973) Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Marx provides a critical understanding of the logic of capital in motion, and its ideal state, as capital being. This is what Sanyal (2007) builds on by interpreting the informal sector as being in a state of becoming but never being capital. Banaji (2010) draws attention to how wage-labour and capital existed in the ‘pre-capitalist’ period providing a more holistic account of the evolution of capitalism. In capitalism’s ideal state, one gains a view into the core elements shaping the process of accumulation and historical development of capitalism. These are of course subject to change depending on the forms that production relations take (Callinicos, 1999: 97). Change also opens the question of whether new modes of production have the potential to or are in the process of emerging, and the transformations these can open up. Amin (2014: 118). In examining the case of China, one observes that petty production has persisted as a core part of national output. This can either spur the commodification of land or open up space for a socialist path. In the Preface to a “Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy”, Marx (1977) succinctly grapples with the tensions that underlie persistence of older production relations and the emergence of new forms.

No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society (emphasis added).

The above illustrates the interpenetrating and dependent nature between older and new production relations. In Grundrise, Marx (1973) traces the processes underlying capital while also integrated, mediation as the means that enables its continued expansion. This is conceptualised as integral to the accumulation process itself. In as much as this does provide insights into the processes underlying persistence, this writer argues that it remains limited to analyse the nature of operations which are distorted by

historical processes of dispossession and subordination in a global capitalist system. The limits placed on their evolution requires an approach that grapples with their specifity. The conceptualisation needs to be expanded on the basis of empirical evidence. This is drawn from cases of petty commodity production or petty capitalism in mining in two countries, Ghana and South Africa. The study traces the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM in gold to establish the extent to which the cases investigated are consigned to becoming capital and nothing more. The case studied in Ghana is in the Obuasi Municipality (a primarily rural setting in the Ashanti Region of Ghana), in comparison with cases in urban areas in Gauteng, a province in South Africa. While alluvial and surface gold deposits are being extracted in Ghana, South African gold deposit seams are underground and therefore dependant on existing mine shafts. The selection of Obuasi as a case is informed by ASM operations centering on abandoned and active shafts of Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA). Historically, gold mining was at the centre of the emergence of LSM operations in both countries and was a primary commodity for export. In both countries, gold mining that developed into LSM operations (Ofosu-Mensah, 2011; Taylor, 2006: 170; Munakamwe, 2017; Nhlengetwa and Hein, 2015). LSM facilitated the integration of both economies into the orbit of imperialist capitalism. The state, at its nascent stage of formation, plays a critical role in this process. This has bearing on colonial and apartheid era laws, polices and interventions. The present day growth of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in the terrain LSM-dominated mining highlights contradictions that can provide important insights into the trajectory of capitalism. Literature on both country cases emphasise that these activities as part of livelihood strategies which are taken up to survive in harsh conditions. On this basis, there is a tendency to presume ASM is poverty driven (Hilson, 2001; Hentchel, Hruschka, Priester, 2002; Ofei–Aboagye, 2004; Hilson, 2006; Nyoni, 2017; Munakamwe, 2017, Munakamwe, 2018). This approach closes off space to think about the processes underlying petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining. The growing attention on ASM in both countries has resulted in varied perspectives. In South Africa, ASM is a relatively new and growing area of research (Mutemeri and Petersen, 2002; Ledwaba 2014, Ledwaba and Mutemeri 2017). While there is a case for decriminalization (Munakamwe, 2014, 2017; Thornton, 2014, Nyoni, 2017; Lempiere, 2017; Mining Review Africa, 2017) there are also calls for ASM in abandoned mines to be brought under community management (Tunatazama, 2017;

Mngadi, 2018; Nombeni, 2018, Mbangula, 2018). LSM operations, which tend to neglect safety measures during mine closures, are blamed for inadvertently facilitating access for miners in abandoned shafts (Benchmarks, 2017). Literature on Ghana is extensive (Hilson, 2001; Ofei–Aboagye, 2004; Hilson, 2006; Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010; McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). While there is emphasis on understanding the dynamics within ASM mining sites, and the nature of the policy environment (Hilson and Hilson, 2017), there is also attention on ongoing transformations in rural economies (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010; Hilson, Amankwah and Ofori-Sarpong, 2013). Civil society draws attention to the environmental and social cost of ASM operations, but retains recognition of how ASM operations represent a critique of LSM-dominated mining (Interview: Elimah, 2017). In the midst of this, whether ASM can present an alternative to LSM operations remains to be established (Bush, 2009).

1.1.1 Transformation and the ASM Policy Space

The impact on rural and urban livelihood strategies in the context of deepening inequality, in the aftermath of structural adjustment, is an important juncture in the evolution of ASM. The mineral commodity boom in the 2000s and the multiple global crises in 2008 accelerated these processes. Economic liberalisation has had direct bearing on undermining livelihoods and formal sector employment, is emphasised in the expansion of ASM (Lahiri-Dutt, 2004; Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010). Mining has been drawn into these processes, with large-scale retrenchments, casualisation of the workforce, a minerals commodity boom in 2000s and the shift to open cast mining (which destroys more of the surface). The combination of some of these factors has further accelerated these processes in the aftermath of the 2008 multiple global crises in Africa which facilitated land grabs (Randriamaro, 2014). The decade long minerals commodity boom in the 2000s fuelled this process with the rapid expansion of ASM as an alternative livelihood strategy, and laid the basis for a transformation of production in primarily rural economies (Hilson, Amankwah and Ofori- Sampong, 2013) and intersected with ongoing waves of migration after structural adjustment (Garba, 2017: 1-2) which in turn spurred processes of social change (Darkwah, Awumbila and Teye, 2016). This set the stage for the expansion of ASM within both the selected country case studies with linkages across borders, for instance in terms

of labour, technology and finance. ASM has offered an alternative livelihood strategy, in some contexts, displacing smallholder agriculture (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010). It is in these conditions of crises that dependence on non-farm incomes by rural households in the developing world has increased (Barrett et al, 2001) as in rural communities in South Africa (Alemu, 2012). This has led households to turn to non- farming sources of income, outside of waged work, instead of activities complementary to agrarian production, as in the case of Ghana (Dary and Kuunibe, 2012). In response, there is increasing attention on how communities have responded to changes in production (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010) and how these transformations are reshaping the political economy of Africa, potentially laying a new basis for class formation on the continent (Capps, 2016). Varied configurations of ASM exist along a spectrum which includes small units of production, on one end, and larger scale operations such as junior miners, on the other. Petty commodity production in mining exists within this spectrum and operates to an extent within but without necessarily being capital. It is embedded within the dominant capitalist production but does not completely transform into a capitalist mode of production. Instead, it is in a process of becoming capital (Sanyal, 2007) and subject to limitations imposed by the state and constraints on labour, technological advancement, finance and geomorphology, may be consigned to be largely criminalised, and more vulnerable to attempts to eliminate it in extreme cases. The African region in particular presents a context of low level industrialisation which implies that local capital faces obstacles such as inaccessibility of appropriate technology and finance, due to a context of low level industrialisation (UNECA, 2002: 27; UNECA, 2003). In the meantime, the Addis Ababa Action agenda, a global financing for development processes, among other things, makes room for technology facilitation mechanism (AU, UNECA, AfDB and UNDP, 2016: 95) illustrating the importance attached to access to technology. This fits within a regional agenda to enable the integration of appropriate technology. Part of what can enable this, is access to finance and appropriate technology from across borders. ASM operations deploy rudimentary technology, but in a process of evolution, and therefore increasing degrees of mechanisation, varying combinations of scale of production, finance and specialisation of skills. In gold mining, access to milling machines contributes to increasing the scale of production. In as much as ASM miners are usually charged with being inefficient, studies show how so called rudimentary technology in gold

mining can be efficient for deposits with fine grains in Guyana (Styles, 2001: 2) or coarse grains as found in the Philippines and Ecuador (Appleton and Williams, 1998). Zimbabwe’s Inziza Riverbed Mining Project was focused on improving technology in gold mining (UNECA, 2002: 44-45). The entry of Chinese investors in Ghana’s small-scale sector has also enabled the entry of sophisticated machinery (Botchwey and Crawford, 2016: 8). Nonetheless, small-scale mining in Ghanaian law is exclusive for citizens, understood in terms of investors and, in practice, not necessarily exclusive of non-Ghanaian workers. This form of restriction on ASM operations limits the further development of the sector (UNECA, 2002: 24). In South Africa, junior miners deploy technology that is more sophisticated and undertake specialised tasks such as prospecting and exploration. They operate on the opposite end of the spectrum from petty commodity production and petty capitalism. They tend to be capital intensive with greater mechanisation and scales of operations. Critically, junior miners are integrated within LSM operations. ‘Emerging mining’ in South Africa refers to junior miners, which tend to be an opening for black South African entrepreneurs in mining to redress historical exclusion (Mitchell, 2017; Mitchell, 2016). ASM, as a concept, covers variations of mining operations which exist along a spectrum. Petty commodity production exists on the lower end of the spectrum and is characterised by self-exploitation, low level of mechanisation, family labour, and at times, wage labour. Ultimately, this form of production does not always expand due to limits placed on its further evolution. The study argues that the boundaries that create this condition are drawn by the state and in relation to LSM operations as the dominant actors in mining. These are the limits encoded in the mining regime within which ASM attempts to develop and persist, and in this process, could present a form of alternative to LSM. ASM operations in gold are located within the space of abandoned or active mine facilities, newly discovered concessions or areas where minor or large deposits are profitable to explore. They can undertake exploration and production, but can be limited by the state if it is determined that it is more efficient for LSM operations to take over production (Bugnossen, 2005). The cases selected in South Africa, contribute to existing work on urban based artisanal mining (Munakamwe, 2014; Munakamwe, 2017; Nyoni, 2017) which has provided an alternative livelihood option for communities excluded from the formal sector employment, as the unemployed or as casualised workers with low waged work (Barchiesi, 2010: 72-75).

In South Africa, zama zama therefore presents an option for those who have been excluded from formal sector employment. ‘Zama’ in isiZulu means to try, since the miners ‘are trying’ to make a living, to ensure they are able to cover basic living costs within their households and also to lay the basis for concrete improvements in their own and their dependents’ living conditions. Interviews with zama zama in Gauteng trace the origins of their operations to the early 1990s and the end of apartheid. ‘Galamsey’, on the other hand, is derived from ‘gather-them-and-sell’, and emerges from the period immediately after independence in Ghana when white workers in the mining sector would purchase gold from locals (Interview: Abubakar, 2017). This draws attention to a similarity between both cases where galamsey and zama zama emerge in the moment of ‘freedom’. (Chapters 5 and 6 show how galamsey emerged in the immediate post independence period, while zama zama appear right after the end of apartheid). This study attempts to go beyond a focus on phenomenal aspects to outline internal dynamics, with petty commodity production understood to also be dynamic, and therefore in a process of evolution. These endogenous processes are found to evolve in interaction with exogenous forces in which the state and LSM dominated mining are found to play a significant role. Endogenous processes to a greater extent bring to the fore the three elements: logic, linkages and orientation. The interactions between these elements generate a distinct character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. This provides an understanding of their internal dynamism and an explanation for the persistence of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM. Petty commodity production and petty capitalism provide the conceptual framing within which forms of ASM in Ghana and South Africa are analysed. A key empirical finding is that petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM have a distinctive character. The character is composed of the logic, the linkages and the orientation. (This is elaborated in Section 1.3). ASM persists because of these elements which are more clearly visible in petty commodity production and petty capitalism. The latter evolves in gaps left by LSM operations and the state. ASM does not become LSM because of the state which plays a key role in mediating the evolution of ASM, in a contradictory manner. This researcher conceptualises this as mediated disarticulation.

1.2 The Problem of the Study

The study explores the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining in the aftermath of liberalisation in Ghana and South Africa. This leads to the following core questions: • Why does ASM persist? • Why has ASM not become LSM? A precondition for capitalist development is exclusion from the means of production. This is capital in its ideal state which is assumed to be homogeneous and totalising. This does not integrate in its view contexts like Ghana, where landed property does not exclude smallholder farmers, or where petty commodity production in mining expands rapidly. It also does not include cases like South Africa where an extreme case of dispossession creates a basis for the re-emergence of petty commodity production in mining. A more holistic account, building on Banaji (2010) and Sanyal (2007), is required. The state’s role is primarily to protect society for the ends of the market (Hart, 2006: 982). The market, which is not a neutral terrain, by design does not prioritise nor completely preclude the further development of ASM. The dynamic nature of capitalism the variations within itself, and in relation to other modes of production not centred on accumulation, need to be integrated to analyse cases in the Global South. In both countries, petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining are understood to being integrated with the formal sector in the contemporary period, but nonetheless remains criminalised The government of Ghana (1989) has had explicit regulation on ASM since 1989. Ostensibly, this was to ensure legalisation, but recently descended into a moratorium on ASM in gold - an extreme case of elimination - which has since been lifted. There is no explicit regulation on ASM in South Africa, but it has pieces of legislation to regulate aspects of ASM operations. Criminalization is a common thread between both cases. While Ghana’s ASM in gold is inclusive of alluvial and underground mining, including abandoned and active mine shafts, South Africa’s gold mining is exclusively underground with the exception of surface mining documented in Khutsong, Carltonville (See Chapter 6). Even though the study focuses on a case in Obuasi that is an underground operation, it is acknowledged that these operations also evolve in relation to other forms of ASM. For instance, the potential integration of technologies in the production process and

specialised skills of ASM miners. The comparison appears to draw on two cases which are significantly different. However, Amanor-Wilks (2007), in a comparison between Zimbabwe and South Africa, concludes the latter is shaped by more extreme processes. Considering South Africa (and Zimbabwe) were formed out of a settler colonies, and Ghana was not, this also adds to the presumption of difference, and amplifies a position of South African exceptionalism. The study attempts to explain how these differences shape production processes and the form that these similarities have taken by drawing on empirical evidence.

The study’s goals and aims are the following: • Examine the similarities and differences between the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining; • Assess similarities and differences between the nature of state interventions in Ghana and South Africa, and the implications for the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism; • Examine how the above has had bearing on the character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining operations and the local and or national economies and global processes; • Elaborate on similarities and differences between the orientation of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining, within both countries.

1.3 Defining Key Concepts This section outlines the definitions of key concepts used in the study. ASM and petty commodity production are not used interchangeably. Thus this section defines them separately. Nonetheless, petty commodity production and ASM are both understood as undergoing a process of evolution.

1.3.1 Artisanal and Small-scale Mining Globally, attempts to provide a generic definition of ASM have largely failed (Hentchel et al, 2002). ASM operations include a diverse range of operations. Varied combinations of low level mechanisation, labour intensive production, minimal capital investment, informality and self-exploitation, exist alongside, capital intensive production which are mechanised, formalised and integrate wage labour.

This has to do with the nebulous character of the sector, which in real terms exists as LSM’s ‘other’. For the purposes of this study, the micro cases studied are conceptualised as petty commodity producers and petty capitalists, which tend to be captured within the outlined characteristics. These forms will enable study of the core elements at play in shaping processes of evolution in the sector.

1.3.2 Petty Commodity Production

Petty commodity production is composed of producers and traders who deploy low levels of capital and utilise their own labour, as a form of disguised wage labour, under the dominance of market forces (Harris-White, 2006: 982). The study understands petty commodity production as primarily a site of value production. Exploitation in petty commodity production (and petty capitalism) within capitalism entails various forms of exploitation in which recruitment, exploitation and control are reproduced (Banaji, 2010: 145). Petty commodity production as part of the economic process is itself in motion, and is potentially in a process of becoming, and in some cases may become petty capitalist. Petty commodity production in mining can be characterised by accumulation that leads to reinvestment, but only in a very limited sense, such as ensuring viability of the activity. Any surplus generated also tends to be used mainly to cover living expenses in households. Reinvestment leads to an expansion in production and integration of wage labour and mechanisation, mainly as a response to an impulse to expand for profit, which in this study is a mark of petty capitalism. It is also the case that exploitation, in varied forms, is more clearly established in petty capitalism. This draws attention to a process by which accumulation, among other things, can enable petty commodity production in mining to become petty capitalism. As a result, there is a need for a distinction between petty commodity production and petty capitalism (Cook and Binford, 1986: 23). Petty commodity production is not centred on capital accumulation and as being connected to capital either totally or only through certain aspects, but retaining its independence and therefore characterised as non-capital. Surplus value generated is appropriated through a network of exchange relations, which connects actors ranging from buyers at the site of mining operations to middle men and others connected to the global markets (Munakamwe, 2017). The manner in which these linkages are interrelated shapes the distinctive character of the operation.

1.3.3 Evolution

Evolution in this study refers to the processes of change that emerges from contradictions within the mining sector. The persistence of ASM, and the processes which enables, undermines or limits its further development, are analysed. This traces the processes on a conceptualised degree of mechanisation, financing, scale, efficiency and integration of wage labour. Accumulation which is defined as reinvestment and expansion in production is a key indicator of a transformation of petty commodity production to petty capitalism. The study does not presume evolution will necessarily result in the transformation or the transition of petty commodity production to petty capitalism. Instead, the study conceptualises the cases studied as caught in a dynamic between petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining in a process of becoming but never being capital (Sanyal, 2007). This provides a more useful prism with which to investigate the selected cases. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion on this. This framing draws an understanding of how changes in production relations have bearing on economic categories (Callinicos, 1999: 97). ASM provides space for the development of indigenous mining (UNECA and UNDESA, 2002), but this is not to be presumed to be a form of non-capitalism. Even through forms of petty commodity production can be identified, it is understood to be a process of becoming a form of petty capitalism, but in some cases, never being capital. In mapping the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM, the study interprets the cases studied to be in the process of becoming capital. To trace evolution, the study focused on the degree of mechanisation, specialisation of skills, the scale of production, improved productivity and flexibility of labour arrangements to identify processes of evolution. As a result, there is a need to interrogate these processes based on observable aspects of production relations, but not limited by them. This brings to the fore the processes that enable or undermine petty commodity production and petty capitalism.

1.3.4 Mediation

Mediation refers to a process that lubricates the extraction of surplus value within a system of generalised production (Saad-Filho, 2003: 30; Banaji, 2010: 62). Historically,

in developing countries, this translates into the role of pre-capitalist forms of production that enable the process of capitalist exploitation (Amin, 2014: 118; Banaji, 2010: 62). Amin (1976:237) contrasts the articulation of developed economies, as integrated entities, with the disarticulation of underdeveloped economies, which are not similarly integrated. He outlines precisely the processes within domestic economies that orient them to the metropolitan core of developed economies. Amin (1976: 245) explains further that this has consequences for capital accumulation in the periphery. Integration into global markets undermines investment by local capital in industry. Instead, investment is oriented towards export related activities. Expansion in the tertiary sector is concealed unemployment. Finally, as an extension of a distortion created by the expansion in tertiary activities instead of capital, ground rent expands. What is yet to be focused on is the extent to which petty commodity production and petty capitalism are also mediated beyond generalised production of commodities. This has bearing on the extent to which petty commodity production and petty capitalism have space to evolve. The study argues that the process which shapes the boundaries of the space is mediated disarticulation. This is the summation of external factors which shape the process of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining. This is a combination of global markets, geology and interventions by the state and LSM operation on ASM operations. Mediated disarticulation is more clearly visible with the state and its contradictory interventions in petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. This form of intervention, in relation to petty commodity production and petty capitalism, has bearing on the character of the state (Amin, 2014: 118) and in turn shapes the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. The next section outlines how this approach makes an original contribution to knowledge.

1.4 Original Contribution

Mahmoud Mamdani (1996) in his landmark publication, Citizen and Subject, presents an important intervention in understanding the native question in Africa, as mediated by a bifurcated state formed in the colonial period. He draws attention to the implications this has for citizenship and indigeneity in the contemporary period. Mamdani makes a persuasive case for how lines of inclusion and exclusion, between urban and rural spaces and between ethnicities, persist. Mamdani assumes that a historical materialist approach focused on labour does not address this central problem. Amin (2014: 118) argues that

the character of the state can be revealed by how it intervenes in petty commodity production. By focusing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism, this study shows that the manner that capital accumulation is mediated has bearing on the state and the contestation over citizenship, which in turn shapes resistance. The original contribution of this study is to compare two country cases of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Africa, and to conceptualise elements and forces that shape their evolution. The study also draws attention to how this has bearing on the contradictory character of the state interventions which is conceptualised as mediated disarticulation.

1.4.1 Tracing the evolution of petty commodity production in mining

ASM is understood as variations of operations existing on a spectrum dominated by LSM (as big capital). Petty commodity production operates at the lower end of the spectrum, but is assumed to be in a process of evolution to potentially become capital. Understanding that these economic processes are constantly in motion where some cases show potential to become petty capitalism, while those that do so may remain stagnant. Even though it is acknowledged that competition and other factors could determine such outcomes, the role of the state remains dominant. Drawing on empirical evidence, there is no neat delineation between petty commodity production and petty capitalism. Instead, they are constantly in motion and in a process of evolution - but within set limits. On the basis of this, the central argument is that petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining holds a distinctive character which shapes its evolution. The character is composed of the logic, orientation and linkages of units of production. These elements are interacting with exogenous forces such as the state and LSM dominated mining. The context within which ASM evolves is understood to be shaped by intersections between the mining regime, state interventions and construction of citizenship, the latter to which entitlements are ascribed. This is a terrain of contestation over the legitimacy of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM. The contradictory character of state interventions, which overriding interest is to impose limits on petty commodity production and petty capitalism but also have moments when they appear to play an enabling role, is conceptualised as mediated disarticulation.

This can guide an understanding of the extent to which the petty commodity production and petty capitalism are integrated, undermined or outrightly excluded, in a period of the convergence of intensified neoliberalisation. This also entails understanding why the forms of petty commodity production in mining are not integrated completely in capital, but instead are consigned to becoming, and nothing more. Potentially, the above could provide a framework to locate petty commodity production in the broader mineral economy and contradictions that have emerged, which would give some insights into the trajectory of capitalism.

1.5 Thesis Structure

Chapter Two, entitled ‘Conceptual Framework and Historical Overview’, explores how the growth of petty commodity production and petty capitalist production is to be explained in the African context. It also situates the thesis within a body of literature on capital, modes of production and petty commodity production and establishes whether new categories are needed to understand the processes unfolding in contemporary economies. It highlights the contribution that the study makes to a deeper theoretical understanding of the variations in ASM and how this can enable us to explain the growth of ASM in spite of the factors that undermine its further evolution. Chapter Three, titled ‘Methodology’, outlines the methods and techniques of the study and the strategies deployed to overcome challenges in the process of collecting data. Both countries presented problems because of the criminalisation of the miners whose views were critical in shaping the analysis at the core of this work. The chapter elaborates on this and the hurdles faced as a result of the positionality of the researcher and the inclusion of civil society actors in South Africa and a journalist in Ghana in the process of research. These experiences provide insightful lessons. Chapter Four - Policy Approaches to Formalising Artisanal and Small-scale Mining: Problems, Contradictions and Possibilities - explores how state intervention has had the contradictory outcome of persistent criminalisation of ASM. The chapter outlines the regulatory framework covering small-scale mining in both country’s cases, Ghana and South Africa. This enables identification of policy gaps, and cites ongoing processes of reform. It links with the empirical chapters, Five and Six, and also with the comparison Chapter Seven.

Chapter Five, on The Political Economy of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in Obuasi, presents the case of one of the oldest mining towns in Ghana. LSM operations were set up in the aftermath of the Southern African minerals revolution, thereby providing insights into the particular manner in which the mining regime, in formation, shaped the relation between LSM operations, the colonial state and small-scale mining, as well as the bearing this has on the construction of citizenship and identity in Obuasi. This draws the focus to the manner in which criminalisation and legitimation of ASM takes shape and has had bearing on Ghana after independence. State interventions show its shifting policy posture from one of state-led industrialisation and economic diversification, and the role that ASM occupies after structural adjustment reforms and broader liberalisation of the economy. Chapter Six, on The Political Economy of Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in Gauteng, investigates cases in Gauteng province of South Africa. Historical processes of dispossession and emergence of LSM operations are traced through to the contemporary period. This highlights ongoing contestation to redress historical injustice in the formation of the mining regime, state formation and construction of citizenship. The chapter also explores cases of ASM operations to identify forms of ASM in gold mining to trace the processes of evolution of ASM in the context of liberalisation of the economy and livelihood strategies deployed by households in crisis. This enables a better understanding of the different forms of ASM in gold mining in Gauteng. The chapter also integrates analysis from the case of Kimberley Diamond mines and the manner in which the state and LSM operations have intervened there. Chapter Seven, Comparison, reflects on the core themes from both cases, comparing processes within and between the country cases to emphasise common threads, differences, and the extent to which processes may have been mutually constitutive. This enables a more reflective analysis of the empirical chapters and builds towards a better understanding of ASM operations in both country cases. Chapter Eight, Findings and Conclusions, summarises the key themes and conclusions made in the study. It outlines the research questions, aims and objectives and draws out the extent to which findings and conclusions respond to them. The chapter also identifies limitations and further areas for inquiry in future research.

Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework and Historical Overview

2.1 Introduction

The problem this chapter seeks to overcome is how to investigate the character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in the contemporary period. This entails an examination of articulations, disarticulations and the interpenetrating nature of processes which have bearing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. Petty commodity production, as a concept, contributes to an understanding that goes beyond capital-centric approaches. The debates about the transition of petty commodity production to petty capitalism and their growth in mining in the contemporary period provide an important starting point to elaborate on the above. The assumption that petty commodity production would be eliminated by capital or big capital, and supposed ‘failure’ to do so, taken as an anomaly to be explained, previously undermined attempts to provide a holistic account of capitalism. Jarius Banaji (2010) and Kalyan Sanyal (2007), make critical interventions to set up more inclusive interpretations of global capitalist development. This inevitably entails an attempt to break away from neat separations between pre-colonial/colonial/post-colonial framing. Integrating an expanded understanding of economic processes which does not focus solely on big capital - in this case large-scale mining, shows the significance of other terrains in the economy (Gibson-Graham, 1996). This contributes to an understanding of the nature of the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in terms of the continuities, discontinuities, re-emergence and disarticulations within the mineral economy. With an understanding of the heterogeneity of the economy, there is a need to expand the tools of analysis, on the basis of empirical evidence. This is not only a theoretical concern. It foregrounds the predicament facing the national bourgeoisie in Africa in the post Independence decades. Nationalisation of mines tended to become the focus of policy interventions as was the case with Ghana in 1961. This was in its own terms an important political act to establish control over natural resources and spur industrialisation to reinforce demands for social infrastructure and

diversification of economies. The limited gains of these attempts to nationalise the mining, and later liberalisation, emphasises the need to investigate the nature of the state and its role in mediation of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists. The above framing goes beyond analysing the manner that surplus value is produced, appropriated and distributed. It also provides a means to analyse the manner that these processes have been shaped by exogenous forces. On this basis, it is possible to investigate the central problems, which are, first, to explain the persistence of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) and second, to establish why it does not become Large- Scale Mining (LSM). To frame debates that speak to the above, the chapter addresses the modes of production debate, post-independence industrialisation challenge, capital/non-capital debates, petty commodity production and capital, heterogeity of economies, nationalisation and the state and mediation.

2.2 The Challenge of Thinking Through Modes of Production

Modes of production might at best be regarded as providing a model within which the possibilities of an epoch are made clearer as opposed to presenting a typology of non- capitalism. Understanding how different modes of production are articulated is particularly difficult. This a question that Clarence-Smith (1985) who rejects theorising articulation of modes of production. She argues that the modes of production models does not actually exist in the social world to be articulated and transformed. This is an extreme argument to make, which could stem from a reference to the European case, as found in the contemporary period, as the model modes of production, hence dismissing attempts to examine processes of articulation (and in this case disarticulation). The dynamism of capitalism and its variations both within itself, and in relation to other forms of production which are not based on accumulation, needs to be integrated to analyse cases in the global South. This approach will also enable a more holistic analysis of capitalism itself. This is related to earlier attempts at developing neat categories into which concrete cases can fit. However, the specific cases have such variations that these categories were often found to be inadequate. This resulted in fragmentation of modes of production into various elements, and attempts at articulation which further fragment this. As a critique of ethnographic evidence being drawn upon to begin to map articulations, Patrick Harries (1985) warns that this presents a static view of societies.

Being primarily descriptive and caught up in the present, this is also trapped in a focus on structure that remains static, instead of a focus on process. Sanyal (2007), taking a simple definition of modes of production, explains it as the combination of productive forces and production relations. This refers to a structured combination of three elements of social production. These consist of labour, non-labour and means of labour which are combined through real appropriation and the techno- economic conditions of production. This is what forms part of the labour process and division of labour and are called the forces of production. Production relations rise out of property rights and entitlements (Sanyal, 2007). Petty commodity production has been understood as having little to no capital accumulation and as being connected to capital either totally or only through certain aspects, but retaining its independence and therefore characterised as non-capital. For instance, in petty commodity production, it is still possible to integrate wage labour. A Chayanovian position, for instance, views petty commodity production as consisting of an entirely other mode of production, which in its own terms, centred on the household, is non-capitalist. Petty commodity production has also been understood as being capitalist in its own terms. The nature of these debates draws attention to assumptions made of capital or Big Capital, and how these inform how petty commodity production has been understood. It is assumed that the process of the evolution of capital is necessarily tautological and dependent on accumulation and the rapid advancements in technology (Cook and Binford, 1986: 2-3). However, when an approach which views capital as heterogenous is adopted, it is possible to consider the meaning to be made of forms of production which are not characterised as such. It also helps one trying tounderstand the impulses underlying the elimination or transformation of petty commodity producers. Banaji (2010: 96-97) identifies an impulse of capital to erode the autonomy or independence of small-scale producers to spur transformation or evolution. He argues that the transformation centres on free labour becoming dependent on capital.

The compulsory enforced destruction of the small producer’s self-sufficiency figures here as the necessary foundations for the dominance of capital. It follows that in this articulation, except at the limit where the enterprise effectively ceases to exist, where its formal independence is converted into the complete

dependence of free labour on capital, the capitalist’s control over the labour- process retains a partial and sporadic character (emphasis added).

This insight is useful but the focus on labour detracts from the interaction between local capital and markets dominated by big capital, and the mediated process of transformation that has the potential to occur. This is part of the process of transition from non-capitalist production to capitalist production. These processes are neither inevitable nor smooth. To better engage on this, it is also important to think through the distinction between modes of production and production relations. Banaji (2010) highlights how conflation between these has led to an assumption that pre-capitalist forms of production mediated surplus extraction by being combined with the capitalist mode of production. This draws attention to how a focus on production relations is more fruitful - the structure of operations, degree of mechanisation, structure of property relations and access to finance, for instance. The difference between big and small capital has often informed that the case for small capital being equated with an alternative mode of production existing alongside the dominant capitalist mode of production. This framing is rigid and does not engage with the more fluid process of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism which are integrated into LSM dominated mining. However, the manner of this integration speaks to a different character that ultimately local capital can embody. An orientation towards local inputs, labour intensive methods, greater control by local entrepreneurs and supply to local artisans differs sharply from LSM operations. The latter centres on transnational corporations which deploy capital intensive methods, are heavily dependent on import of inputs, and critically, are oriented towards export of the refined minerals to the international market. Nonetheless, ASM’s evolution is mediated by varied forms of state interventions that also shape its trajectory. The state tends to shift from attempts to enable the further development of ASM, to weak implementation of regulations and policy gaps in terms of ASM needs, to criminalisation and outright elimination. ASM, and the configurations within which petty commodity production in the Ghanaian and South African economies emerge, can provide some important insights. This will enable thinking of the various forms of ASM and the particular ways that capital (both big and small), labour and markets interact, and their place within the national economy. This will assist in answering the research question that this study has set itself:

to establish why ASM persists in the contemporary period, and why ASM does not become LSM.

2.3 The Post-Independence Industrialisation Challenge

The post-Independence period brought to the fore a new layer of national bourgeoisie in charge of the state. Radical thinking of the economy considered the obstacles to national development emanating from the manner of integration in a global capitalist system that had undermined development in Africa (Rodney, 1973). Mining, a central pillar of extractivism, was implicated in this process. Import substitution industrialisation - initially viewed as offering a pathway towards building a domestic consumption-driven industrial base centred on manufacturing - faltered. This strategy faced limits emerging from a combination of ill-thought projects, dependence on costly imports as inputs and pressures on foreign reserves, among other factors. Commodity price volatilities also undermined the strategy. It is within these circumstances that Arrighi and Saul (1973: 45-46) identify a process of expansion of interests (beyond extractivism in the classical sense) to control the industrialisation process in the global South by multinationals. The latter recognised their benefit in integrating these forms of industries in the forms of partnerships with parastatals (Arrighi and Saul, 1973: 49-51) with more recent iterations being public private partnerships. This was partly informed by a fall in profitability of agriculture. In engaging on the potential of continental unity, Arrighi and Saul (1973: 51) go on to elaborate that ‘It is only unification aimed at a process of autonomous industrialization (a historical necessity for the successful modernization of African societies) that would antagonize industrial capitalism’ (my emphasis). Southern Africa, compared to the rest of sub Saharan Africa, was found to be the most advanced in terms of an industrial base, which was ascribed to the presence of a national bourgeoisie in South Africa and Rhodesia which was able to develop an industrial organic base. Income inequality - owing to the gap between African wage labour which was cheapened systematically by mechanisms of dispossession, segregation and apartheid, and, on the other end, higher valued European labour - is largely accountable for this (Arrighi and Saul, 1973: 55- 56). Frantz Fanon (1963) in ‘The Wretched of the Earth’ (Chapter Five of The Pitfalls of National Consciousness) makes a sharp observation of the weak position of the black

national bourgeoisie and their failure in the former colonies to undertake their historic mission. He zeros in on their failure to advance their societies through industrialisation (as in the North) to make a sharp break from petty commodity production or the ‘traditional economy’. This was an essential task of the national bourgeoisie to advance liberation. Fanon clearly states that the artisans persist because of failure of the national bourgeoisie. Implicit is a failure in undertaking through going primitive accumulation (that is, dispossession) and breaking away from petty commodity production under the control of local small-scale producers. It is assumed that the transition to production that is based on more sophisticated technology and presumably on an industrial scale lays a basis for broader social transformation. Valorising large-scale capitalist operations implies undervaluing the importance of petty commodity production. Fanon (1961: 151) explains that in these circumstances:

… the national bourgeoisie surround the artisan class with chauvinistic tenderness…This cult of the local products and its incapability to seek out new systems will be equally manifested by the bogging down of the national middle class in the methods of agricultural production which were characteristic of the colonial period.

This is a scathing criticism of the weaknesses of the national bourgeoisie and, in the context of decolonisation, showed the disdain towards development planning that was centred on small holder producers and not on urban industrial development, especially manufacturing. An inability to plan was understood as politically and ideologically flawed. The tension between a mainstream perspective which contradicts Fanon, and other radical Pan Africanists, comes out strongly in the work of W. Arthur Lewis, a pioneer of development economics. W. Arthur Lewis provided an early theory of structural change centring on a transfer of labour from rural subsistence production to urban industrial production. This is known as the “Lewis two-sector model” in which the rural economy is primarily subsistence and is assumed to be characterised by a labour surplus with zero marginal labour productivity. Lewis also draws attention to how this is a form of ‘disguised unemployment’ since labour surplus in agriculture can be transferred to urban industrial production without undermining overall productivity of agriculture. Lewis drew this conclusion based on case studies of India, Egypt and Jamaica. This meant labour can

be absorbed in the ‘modern’ or urban industrial economy without undermining output in the rural subsistence economy. In other words, the growth and output of the modern industrial economy absorbs labour surplus from the rural subsistence economy, without any impact on the latter (Todaro and Smith, 2012: 115-118). Lewis assumed the increase in the rate of investment and capital accumulation in the urban industrial had a direct impact on the rural subsistence economy by absorbing labour surplus. However, he also acknowledged that Ghana (then the Gold Coast), as in other parts of Africa and Latin America, presented the case of a labour shortage. This was a challenge to an interventionist approach to secure structural change in the economy, which required a different approach (Lewis, 1954: 2, 6-8). In Ghana, where Lewis was an economic advisor in 1957, he paid close attention to the nature of the market failure problem. Due to low productivity in agriculture, he instead advised a measured intervention towards industrialisation, with greater emphasis on improving food production and public services. Lewis recognised the problem of labour shortage which could be overcome with increased productivity in agriculture and direct state investment in manufacturing (Kanbur, 2017: 17-19). In the case of Ghana, concern for the limits of state led industrialisation was to prove insightful in later years, when manufacturing placing stress on foreign exchange reserves and mounting debt reached crisis proportions in the mid-1970s and 1980s. This draws attention to how to interpret the form nationalism takes and how it is weaponised. The bearing that nationalism has on the question of rights and an ability (or lack thereof) to make claims on the state and legitimisation of livelihoods is also key. Additionally, it also helps question the kinds of interests that are playing a dominant role in shaping state policy and how those interests can shift over time. Mike Davis (2015: 49- 50) observes that the formation of national identities at the micro level of ‘social interaction and conflict’ are in themselves the spaces from which the energies that drive these identities emerge. In reference to Marx, who was trying to explain the French small holders in the countryside under Napoleon who were nostalgically looking towards Empire, drew on their class position and material interests to explain this phenomenon (Davis, 2015: 56-57). Davis (2015: 57) elaborates that nationalism can be analysed by drawing out ‘sectoral and national interests’ from the macro level as shaped by production relations alongside racial and ethnic domination. There is therefore a need to pay attention to how petty commodity production and petty capitalism are embedded in these forms of relations, at the micro and macro levels. It also draws attention to how to interpret

these forms of production and how they may have bearing on the political arena. On this basis, the chapter now turns to the debate on whether they are an alternative to capital or present a point of tension within it.

2.4 The Capital/Non-Capital Debate A tendency to equate development and progress with the emergence of capitalism is an ‘imaginary’ rooted in the colonial experience (Escobar, 1995). This critique of the presumed dominance of capitalism, which is equated with Western societies being presented as progress or modernity, is articulated by Arturo Escobar (1995) in Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Escobar exposes the fraught nature of this position, and advances an understanding of local economies and traditional practices in opposition to the global ones. This is further advanced in the work of Gibson-Graham (1996) in The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) which builds on the binary framework, but seeks to destabilise capital-centric framing of the development discourse. A key motive of this is to reveal difference and divergence. The capital/non-capital debates provides a more holistic framing to analyse heterogenous economies and the implications of coexistence of different modes of production. In “After” Development: Re-imagining Economy and Class, Gibson-Graham and Ruccio (2001: 168-170), emphasise how capital and noncapitalist social relations coexist. She speaks of how difference is usually codified in hierarchical terms. In this framing, non-capitalist class processes are understood in terms of ‘weakness’, incapable of ‘independence’ or ‘expansion’. They are either destined to be eliminated or to compliment capitalism. To counter this, they propose a narrow focus on class processes in terms of producing, appropriating and distributing surplus value. This enables attention on ‘practices and flows of labour’ and to move from class as noun to adjective, as an anti- essentialist approach to class enables a view into the heterogeneous form of the economy and an understanding of a non-capitalist class processes ‘as becoming’. Sanyal (2007) also posits a process of non-capital as consigned to a state of becoming. He adds that the very processes of primitive accumulation, though it initially undermines non-capital, also creates the conditions (based on the needs of expanded reproduction of capital) for non-capital’s re-emergence. As a result, capital is instead viewed as ‘fragile and vulnerable’, on one hand, undermining non-capitalist forms of production with commodification and proleterianisation, on the other, ‘creating conditions within which non-capitalist forms are also produced. It counters the view of dominance

by capital, with the alternative of difference and heterogeneity existing within the economy. Capital exists successfully in producing that difference’ (Harvey, 2001: 123).

Sanyal (2007: 53), however, posits that non-capital (and the informal economy) is in effect a zone of exclusion of the dispossessed who are not proletarianized. However, a case for non-capital implies economic activities which emerge outside the circulation of capital. These are therefore not implicated in patterns of accumulation. Sanyal (2007) uses his concept of the need economy, which is not based on profit but consumption only. However, surplus value is still being extracted and appropriated, even if indirectly. Also, Sanyal (2007) refers to production which is in the commodity form, which implies that it is oriented to the market. It is also the case that the market forces, dominated by the presence of transnational capital, can push down prices of commodities to a point that incomes of petty commodity producers remain low. In a broad historical study, Banaji (2010) unpacks the ‘transhistoricity of capitalism’ by showing how forms of wage-labour and capital existed in the so called ‘pre- capitalist’ period by drawing Western and non-Western societies into a more holistic understanding of the evolution of capitalism. Importantly, he makes the case that capitalism not only deploys different forms of exploitation, including pre-capitalist forms, within its own logic of accumulation, it also creates them where they did not exist. This latter exposition is crucial to understand how methods of production associated with indigenous mining persist or re-emerge in the post-independence and post-apartheid period in Ghana and South Africa respectively. Banaji (2010) further explains that petty commodity producers do not merely coexist alongside the formal economy. Instead, he argues they are integrated in the wider economy through the dominance of capital. The extent to which capital dominates over simple commodity producers is limited by the persistence of patriarchal controls over this mode of production. However, he states, this may be misconstrued as independence but actually disguises the dominance of capital. This opens the possibility of rethinking ASM as it operates within the economy. It also enables a more detailed examination of how mining petty commodity production is being organised. However, what Banaji does not give recognition to is that patriarchal controls can also act to enable and even deepen exploitation. This cuts across production and reproduction and the extent to which patriarchal forms of oppression can also undermine or restrain this.

Drawing on Althusser and Foucault, Gibson-Graham (1996) who takes the post development narrative into a critical exposition of the relation between capital and non- capital, with the aim of emasculating capitalism to reveal the way its hegemony is maybe undermined by non-capital. The heterogenous form of the economy is emphasised and brought into view. This calls for a broader understanding that does not view capitalism as necessarily the only mode of production. Non-capital in this formulation immediately takes on a radical character and presents often ignored spaces of resilience, survival and even resistance to capital. However, this reinforces a neat binary framework vulnerable to an assumption that there is a simplified form of hegemony that also does not enable a critical examination of the informal economy. It leaves one with the impression that any form of activity which takes a counter-hegemonic position in relation to capital, or to a dominant form of capital, is necessarily radical. To overcome this, there is a need for a more complex understanding of hegemony. Similarly, Massimo De Angelis (2006) draws on an understanding of an ‘outside’ of capital. This is to understand that ‘concrete struggles of the poors that turn poverty into conditions of production of community, social cooperation and dignity, can be locally criminalised: after all they threaten macro-economic stability’. These struggles therefore act as a constitutive force of new forms of social relations. The ‘poors’ are criminalised whenever they challenge the neoliberal discourse. De Angelis (2006), by focusing rigidly on neoliberalism, takes a narrow understanding of the dynamics at play, as neoliberalism’s core is capitalist forms of production and the reproduction which sustains this. The poor are criminalised when the fundamental institutions and values are challenged or tampered with, especially when this threatens to undermine capitalist accumulation. De Angelis (2006 :3) theorises the outside as created by struggles ‘…from within, a social space to create relational patterns that are other than and incompatible to the relational practices of capital’. It exists outside the realm of capital and therefore counters capitalism, even at times conflicting with it. The extent to which these relational patterns can operate within or run parallel to capital also needs to be understood. In Grundrisse, Marx (1973: 192-194) explains that circulation is itself an appearance of interactions with the exchange of money or commodities but is not the energy driving the accumulation processes. It is only after the realisation of value of the commodity that the process can repeat itself. Circulation can therefore not drive a process of ‘self-renewal’ and therefore relies on mediation, not only in each of its moments in the ‘exchange of value creation’ but in the entire process. Mediation can be understood here

occurring through generalised commodity relations (Saad-Filho, 2003: 45). Circulation is merely its appearance, but it is the production of commodities and the creation of exchange value which is the source of energies to drive the process. Production does not cause circulation, but only appears concurrently to presuppose it while in real terms setting the basis for exchange value. This process in motion can be traced historically in various forms, building towards labour which creates value, but is also a system of production which is driven by exchange value, ‘[t]he subjugation of production itself to exchange value’ (Marx, 1973: 196). Marx (1973: 274) posits labour as a use value which is in tension with capital understood as exchange value. The negation of capital is labour. Labour as ‘not-capital’ is in tension with capital which in turn exchanges itself in relation to it. In the pre-capitalist era, commodities are exchanged for use value, but they do not possess value in themselves. In this regard, objectified labour does contain some accumulated labour but this does not have bearing on the content of commodities exchanged. However, accumulated labour ‘already contains within it a quantity of objects within which labour is realised’. As a result, the circulation of exchange value in this process becomes transformed. Marx (1973: 193) draws on the example of the transformation of the mode of production in agriculture in England in the 16th to 17th centuries, where the entire mode of production is transformed on interacting with imports from the Netherlands. Economic relations which corresponded to production relations of the old order were destroyed. The new forces of production and relations emerged from within and in antithesis to the existing development of production and property relations of the old order. Marx (1973: 214) assumes that in ‘the bourgeois economic system, every economic relation presupposes the other’. He adds:

The organic system itself, as a totality, has its presuppositions, and its development to its totality consists precisely in subordinating all elements of society to itself, or in creating out of it, the organs which it still lacks. This is historically how it becomes a totality. The process of becoming this totality forms a moment of its process, of its development.

Marx also adds that capital, understood as distinct from value and money, in its generalised form is in its process of becoming. This does not focus on capital at a specific moment as it is constantly in motion - that is, in the process of becoming.

This dialectical process of its becoming is only the ideal expression of the real movement through which capital comes into being. The later relations are to be regarded as developments coming out of this germ. But it is necessary to establish the specific form in which it is posited at a certain point. Otherwise confusion arises… He goes further to cite the West Indian plantation in 1857, where former slaves were content with producing for their own consumption only. In this case, surplus value is not extracted and neither are market forces dominating petty commodity production. Describing them as ‘self-sustaining peasants’, he goes on to add that in this case ‘capital does not exist as capital’ because autonomous wealth can only exist on the basis of direct forced labour (slavery) or indirect forced labour (wage work). This points to how production relations - holistically speaking and not just labour relations - which lie at the core of a mode of production shape whether this can be understood as capital or its antithesis. On the other hand, ‘if capital is developed to its totality, it takes hold of new territories but immediately requires the creation of landed property as capitalised rent’. A precondition is exclusion from ‘direct use of the soil’. This is an idealised process that assumes that capital in its fully developed state is homogenous and totalising. This does not account for contexts in Africa where landed property does not fully displace smallholder producers, and where small-scale production in mining expands rapidly. It also is not able to account for contexts like in South Africa, where dispossession is an extreme case, and where the re-emergence of petty commodity production in mining consequently needs to be explained. It is in this regard that making the distinction between petty capitalism and petty commodity production can be tricky, but remains critical. There is a temptation to assume that a low level of technology, low organic composition of capital and other such characteristics would categorise these economic activities as petty commodity production. Instead, it is useful to consider the factors that undermine or enable the further movement of petty commodity production into petty capitalist operations. It is also necessary to consider what operates similarly to petty capitalist operations. This can provide a basis to examine the factors or conditions that have bearing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalist production.

Harris-White (2006: 982) defines petty commodity production as ‘the class position of producers and traders combining both micro-capital and labour (self- exploitation) under conditions of market exchange’ (emphasis added). Petty commodity production is further categorised as disguised wage labour, pluri-activity (deploying incomes generated from other activities into petty commodity production) and petty capitalism. This conflates petty commodity production with petty capitalism. It is rather useful to consider that petty commodity production is itself in motion, and in a process of becoming, and in some cases may become petty capitalist. However, a distinction (even if blurred) is still necessary for analytical purposes. On the other hand, in a study in Oaxaca, Mexico, Cook and Binford (1986: 23) make a distinction between petty capitalism and petty commodity production.

Once it is shown that small enterprises accumulate capital between turnover periods, that they reinvest capital to further production (in a way that raises productive capacity, even if not in a technologically innovative way that raises labour productivity), that they regularly employ wage-labour by piece-rate, and that the value created by that labour is unequally distributed between wages and profits, then it is logical to assume that they represent some form of capitalism, and not of petty commodity production.

This approach centres the wage-labour relation, which is critical, but it is still necessary to pay attention to the entire process of accumulation or the circulation of capital. Richard Roberts (1982), referring to African labour historians, emphasises that an understanding of the working class in Africa must take the labour process as the starting point. This demands a unit of analysis that focuses on the worker, located within the context of industry in the world economy. Sanyal (2007) criticises Marxist Structuralism, arguing that its argument is tautological and assumes that a self-subsistent capital is inevitable and views all articulation between pre-capital and capital as ending with capital being. The logic of articulation between capital and non-capital cannot be found in the economic alone. It must be political, cultural and ideological. This helps broaden the scope of analysis of the processes driving changes in modes of production. By equating modernity with progress, capitalism and Western society, it is presumed that primitive accumulation is a necessary and inevitable stage that must be actualised fully for the path to progress to be cleared. Therefore, the resilience of petty

commodity production (especially in agriculture) and an expanding informal economy continues to be viewed as problematic in its failure to transform or transition as the North had done over centuries. The case of South Africa also show reversals are possible even in an extreme case of dispossession and dominance of big capital. Inevitably this calls for intervention and transformation to be speeded up in the South to enable it to fit within the script of the Western model of progress. This also diverts attention away from understanding the actual processes of articulation and disarticulation as they unfold in the cases selected in Ghana and South Africa.

2.5 Petty Commodity Production and Capital

Mamdani (1996: 6-7) views this phase as deracialisation of the bifurcated state, which in spite of radical intentions of liberation movements retained its colonial character. This is rooted in state formation in this period and how the colonial project was stabilised on the basis of addressing the native question by segregating along ethnic lines and dividing populations between rural and urban. This understanding of the state formation, and its undemocratic character which persisted after independence, is traced to the colonial period and the imposition of chiefs and headmen by the colonial authorities to govern Africans. He goes on to highlight that a historical materialist perspective that privileges labour does not provide the analytical tools needed to address the central problem in the colonial period, which is the native question. The formation of chieftaincy and control over communal custodianship of land are understood as political and administrative functions. Capps (2010: 30-34) criticises this approach as being narrowly politically deterministic, and not considering these outcomes as a product of economic processes. In his own words, Mamdani (1996: 28) argues that ‘the bifurcated state tried to keep apart forcibly that which socioeconomic processes tended to bring together freely: the urban and the rural, one ethnicity and another’. He identifies that a focus on the labour question, and not the native question, creates an impression of South African exceptionalism instead of locating these processes within continental Africa.

That commonality, I argue, lies not in the political economy but in the form of the state: the bifurcated state. Forged in response to the ever present dilemma of how to secure political order, the bifurcated state was like a spidery beast that sought to pin its prey to the ground, using

a minimum of force—judicious, some would say—to keep in check its most dynamic tendencies. The more dynamic and assertive these tendencies, as they inevitably were in a semi-industrial setting like South Africa, the greater the force it unleashed to keep them in check (Mamdani, 1996: 28).

Anne Phillips (1989: 156) highlights that colonialism was necessarily a ‘make shift’ project. The colonists failed to unleash full scale proleterianisation in a short period, whereas in Europe, alternative subsistence had been closed off over centuries. The use of coercion in the colonies was therefore a critical part of colonisation but this was also exercised with caution. The state structures which were set up were weak and fragile, and therefore also limited in their capacity to contain the masses of dispossessed. What does it mean for us today? The study draws attention to how the nature of state interventions have had a strong bearing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. The contradictory character of interventions have had an overriding effect of placing limits in the process of evolution. Its weaknesses have also created gaps which have enabled the further evolution of the sector (See Chapter 7.2.1). In a context where private property was an alien concept, any attempt at land appropriation led to immediate protestations and resistance against dispossession. This was inevitable due to the clash between different values and regimes of land tenure and relations of production. Assuming the colonial project was supposedly to develop the colonised, the limits of such an undertaking were most visible in the encounter with pre- existing and resilient relations of production. A classic case in point is the production of cocoa and palm oil in the then Gold Coast and Nigeria controlled by petty commodity producers in concert with merchant capital, integrating them in the ‘imperial networks of trade’ evolved in a context of the absence of a settler demands for African land and cheap wage labour (Phillips, 1989). Salt mining, primarily undertaken by women in south-eastern Ghana, has been embedded for centuries in regional networks of exchange and has been resilient in the face of invasions from indigenous groups and colonial and postcolonial regimes attempting corporate control over the production and sale of salt (Committee of Ada Songor, 1989). The Ada Songor Cooperative, in Who Killed Maggie?, refer to an 1884 Arabic manuscript, Tarikh Gonja: ‘All the people bought (Dabayo) salt except the people of Asante who do not like it, and prefer the salt of Idasadabude (Ada and Labadi) which

is expensive.’ Ada Songor salt mining illustrates the resilience of communal forms of managing resources and regulating production, with the needs of the community (material, cultural and spiritual needs) as a priority. This resilience created conditions of labour shortage, particularly for Large-Scale Mining (LSM). The persistent labour shortage problem dogged mining and large-scale plantations throughout the colonial period. To overcome this, colonists and settlers turned to slavery and indentured labour, alongside other coercive methods, such as the use of poll tax, hut tax, and use of bride price and chieftaincy to secure a stable labour supply. Considering the existence of similar processes across the pre-colonial/colonial/postcolonial divide draws attention to understanding each epoch and the concrete configurations of its production relations. The dominant mode of production being capitalist is pervasive, but even in these circumstances, varied forms of production relations can still exist. Saad-Filho (2003: 45, 39) warns that capital is not to be assumed as operating universally in all commodities and production relations across space and time. He argues that the distinguishing element of capital is the direct and indirect employment of wage labour which exists within a market economy dominated by a system of generalised commodity production. In this regard, petty commodity production and petty capitalism offer a view into the variations that are formed within the economy. This calls for a more holistic understanding of processes as they unfold within and across each phase. The turn to neoliberalism in the aftermath of global crises in the 1970s has transformed the nature of state interventions, and marked the labour regime with widespread precarious labour and high unemployment which, in turn, fuelled the expansion of petty commodity producers. These processes have had direct bearing on the expansion of ASM. It is this neoliberal phase that the next subsection addresses.

2.6 Heterogenous Economies in the Neoliberal Phase

It is therefore critical to understand the heterogenous form of economic activities within capitalism, and the contradictory and complex relations that exist within them can illuminate relations of production and reproduction. In Denaturalising Dispossession: Critical Ethnography in the Age of Resurgent Imperialism, Gillian Hart (2006: 982-995) draws attention to the significance of such an approach. Hart points to processes of ‘…constitution, connection and disconnection…’ She introduces relational comparison as

an approach which focuses on ‘…mutual processes of constitution…’. This, she argues, can provide new perspectives on understanding space and place, which are understood as ‘embodied practices and processes of production’ and which are simultaneously ‘material and discursive’. What emerges from Hart is her emphasis on continuities and discontinuities, which draws into focus articulations and disarticulations as occurring simultaneously. It implies that the relations of production and the material basis are not always relating as smoothly as one might assume. To investigate this, it is necessary to consider capital accumulation and situate it in the current neoliberal phase. Harvey (2001: 124-125) offers insights into a process of flexible accumulation through processes of decentralisation, in addition to, ‘spatial dispersal of production’. This process of fragmentation of capital is aided by the withdrawal of state intervention in the economy. State owned enterprises, for instance, were key instruments that preserved centralisation of capital beyond Fordism. Harvey concludes that this is a phase of transition of capitalism itself to postmodern ways of ‘thinking and operating’. If capital is understood as a process that operates within the creation of exchange value and accumulation, the attribution of some agency to this form appears to be exaggerated. Instead, what Harvey (2001, 2010, 2015 and 2017) offers is an understanding of the logic of capital itself and shifts occurring in the contemporary period. The ‘spatial dispersal of production’ is, on one level, a key element in the recreation of space for forms of capital that are outside of the framework set by the state and dominated by LSM operations. Their emergence remains integrated within the formal economy, but not in the same way as forms of ASM operating in the informal economy. The latter process has ensured the integration of forms of ASM operations or local capital. The role of the state in this process is therefore key. The neoliberal state is depicted as one that has absconded from an interventionist approach. However, as the manner that ASM has been regulated has shown, the state mainly deploys a strategy of negotiation, containment and even near elimination in conditions of extreme criminalisation. Thus, there are moments when the state has intervened in favour of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining, but the overriding nature of interventions remains to undermine, limit and attempt to eliminate these operations. This is an orientation that can be traced to the colonial period of state formation and the emergence of the contemporary mining regime.

Understanding that ASM, in all its variations, can potentially represent a threat to big capital and its dominance in the national economy is important. However, it is necessary to further disaggregate this and understand that the variations amongst small- scale producers will most likely have different meaning. In this regard, petty commodity production could represent a counter movement to ‘the centralisation of capital’ (Harris- White, 2006: 1242) while petty capitalist production could represent a form of centralisation of capital in motion but out of the direct control of Large-Scale Mining (LSM). Both forms appear to present a threat to Big Capital or LSM. Drawing attention to the state’s regulatory capacity, Harris-White (2006: 1242), refers to how the state absconding from direct regulation of petty commodity producers in retail and commodity production in India leaves room for forms of self-regulation to emerge. These tend to be localised and arbitrary. The emergence of these social institutions which tend to form under guilds and associations is regulated on the basis of ethnicity, religion and gender. In another vein, she also draws attention to government policy that sought to eliminate petty commodity producers, who were argued to be inefficient. This shows the Indian state as being absent in particular ways but present in others in relation to petty commodity production. This is useful to consider the manner that the Ghanaian and South African states have intervened in ASM. In both cases, they have taken up interventions that have continued and even escalated criminalisation, while also attempting regulation in some ways. This contradictory position of the state needs to be understood better. In this regard, Kalyan Sanyal (2007) makes a generative theoretical intervention by integrating Antonio Gramsci’s concept of passive revolution into his analysis of non- capital. For Sanyal (2007: 192-222) the informal sector is non-capital which is the ‘internal “other” to the modern capital’. Regarding Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality, Sanyal (2007) argues that this has been deployed in development discourse in ‘managing poverty’. It is a space created by dispossession and exclusion. As a result, it is an outcome of capital, as opposed to coming into existence prior to the spread of capital, which is driven by the need for accumulation. This marks a major distinction, as the so-called informal economy is oriented towards consumption. Sanyal (2007) acknowledges that accumulation does occur in the informal economy, but its primary driver remains the satisfaction of need. This is regardless of the relations of production, mode of labour and organisational form. Money is core to initiating the process of production. There is more control over the labour process.

Vinay Gidwani (2008) in Capital, Interrupted: Agrarian Development and the Politics of Work in India, when reflecting on the rise of Hinduvta, draws attention to a gap by the left. The easy route, according to Gidwani, is to admonish the neoliberal turn. However, what remains unattended is an understanding of the very nature of capital accumulation which can still be diverted to ‘equalitarian ends’. These are not inevitable outcomes but the product of contestation of hegemony. Amilcar Cabral concisely concurs: ‘The petty bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and the reactionary strata in its own country to try and preserve itself as a petty bourgeoisie or ally itself with workers and peasants who must themselves take power’ (Cabral, 1974: 60-61). The informal economy is complicated within itself, with petty capitalists operating alongside petty commodity producers. Determining clear distinctions between these is not always easy. It requires mapping values that inform the structuring of work, relations of production and reproduction, and mapping networks of exchange. Focusing on the production of surplus value, its appropriation and distribution provides an important prism. Another key aspect to be clarified is what exactly the activities being undertaken mean to those participating in these processes. What principles inform them? The conditions of life and their agency in deploying multiple livelihood strategies, emergent opportunities and exposure to extreme conditions of precarious existence need to be understood better. The forces unleashed by liberalisation tie into the paradox of economic globalisation. In the contemporary period, accumulation by dispossession continues unrelentingly and with renewed vigour in the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis. Land grabbing, public-private partnerships, privatisation of public services, and gentrification in urban areas are all manifestations of accumulation by dispossession. These processes also present the possibility of new forms of social relations and relations of production. Understanding the contradictory forces unleashed requires a reflection on dispossession, the extractivist nature of minerals economy and postcolonial fragility.

2.7 Nationalisation of Mineral Economies

The post-independence period was marked by attempts to place greater national control on the minerals economy, at least at the level of rhetoric. In practice, despite measures for Africanisation in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique, these faced intense resistance

from mining corporations. Majority shareholding was a tactic used by African States following the successful example of Chile where mining corporations capitulated to demands for state intervention. The aim was three-fold: to control national resources which were key to achieving developmental goals, to overcome distortions created by slavery and colonialism and to rebuild economic linkages to other sectors. Austen (1987), in African Economic History, explores how the continent presents a case where the core issue is the ‘…problem of linkages between various systems of production’. He describes how, prior to colonial penetration, there was a wide network of domestic and transcontinental trade routes which were well established before the entry of European firms in the 18th century. By the mid-1970s, most mineral economies in Africa had been nationalised. In terms of jobs, indigenisation was also pursued at all levels. It was also the aim to swap the corporate motive dominating the minerals economy for one driven by social welfare ends. This would reinforce attempts at economic diversification. Subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies came under greater scrutiny. However, the overall structure of the minerals economy remained firmly in the hands of multinational corporate interests. The level of Africanisation was limited. The present- day Democratic Republic of Congo (then named Zaire) under Mobutu faced intense struggles with Belgium over control of mineral resources, and attempted to open up space for the entry of American companies to directly trade with Congo, instead of trading through networks controlled by Belgium. The struggle to nationalise Union Minière du Haut Katanga was understood as one of the ways to indigenize the labour force, along with the entire minerals economy. The break with Belgium (which was ironically the main trigger for the assassination of Lumumba) and the Congo crisis remained a fault line that the Mobutu regime was proactive in challenging. Yet Ajayi (2006: 3) highlights how this period was also marked by many African countries which emphasised attracting foreign investment as a priority of the state. Graham notes that one of the leading figures of Pan Africanism, Nkrumah, was very clear on not undertaking radical reforms against corporate interests. Akinsanya (1981: 771 cited in Graham, n.d.: 38-39) quotes Nkrumah in 1962:

Our government has no plans whatever to take over industries in the private sector…. Where government has taken over private industry, it has done so either because - as in the case of the acquisition of the gold-mines - the owners had

indicated their intention of closing down, or - as in other cases - because the owners themselves had made a proposition to the Government. The Government has in no case attempted to expropriate enterprise….Where it becomes necessary to take over private business at the request of private enterprise itself, the government will… ensure that adequate compensation is paid to the owner.

However, Ghana was not as dependent on minerals as Zambia or the Congo. Cocoa produced by small holder farmers was Ghana’s primary export, with minerals contributing about 25% of GDP. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the sense of urgency attached to reconfiguring the relation with multinational corporations did not rank as high as in the latter cases. In another vein, Greenhalgh (1985, cited in Graham, n.d.: 41) highlights the establishment of the Accra Diamond Market which was set up after diamond prices fell after the Korean War and losses were incurred by diggers and banks. In the context of anti-colonial ferment, diggers in Ghana pressed for state intervention to control the banks. Other West African countries, such as Liberia, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, followed a similar path. Six years after Tanzania gained independence, it also embarked upon nationalisation (as part of the pursuit of socialism and self-reliance) with the adoption of the Arusha Declaration. This was in the context of the collapse of gold prices since 1934 and closing down of mines which led to more policy focus on agriculture. In manufacturing, commercial and finance sectors, there was a dramatic shift from 90% foreign ownership in 1967 to 80% public-sector owned in 1972 (Saul, 1973: 240). Nyerere (Saul, 1974: 240) in his own words explains:

The question is not whether nations control their economy, but how they do so. The real ideological choice is between controlling the economy through domestic private enterprise, or doing so through state or other collective institution. But although this is an ideological choice, it is extremely doubtful whether it is a practical choice for an African nationalist…For I do not think there is a free state in Africa where there is sufficient local capital, or a sufficient number of local entrepreneurs, for locally based capitalism to dominate the economy. Private investment in Africa means overwhelming foreign private investment. A capitalist economy means a foreign-dominated economy. These are the facts of Africa’s

situation. The only way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the economic institutions of socialism (emphasis added).

Tanzania deliberately undermined the emergence of a local bourgeoisie which was assumed to be a reactionary force. For instance, the rise of a techno-bureaucratic elite with direct links with foreign private interests was prevented, with prohibitions in the Arusha Declaration on involvement in the private sector. The focus was on state led, publicly owned projects under the slogan of self-reliance (Saul, 1973: 238-240). Nonetheless, the impact of the global crises of the 1970s and 1980s, with mounting debt, collapse of commodity prices (including agricultural exports) and trade imbalances marked a decline in the attempts at nationalisation (Makandawire and Soludo, 1998). This vulnerability opened up the terrain for neoliberal reform of the sector and led to a scaling back on nationalistic initiatives. Therefore, in the case of the Congo, the IMF stepped in, offering loans to the Mobutu regime and rebuffing their attempt at nationalisation. In the case of Tanzania, state led mining was ‘underperforming’. The 1979 Minerals Act was introduced to enable Tanzanians to also prospect in designated areas and to engage in mining on a small-scale (Bryceson and Geenen, 2016) (as Germans once did in the 1800s in the then Tanganyika). This opened the terrain to artisanal mining and enabled the revival of the mining industry. More generally, however, the structural adjustment phase undermined the agrarian base of these economies and therefore livelihoods. In South Africa, the liberalisation phase led to a process of de-industrialisation and casualisation of work, which undermined mining and manufacturing (Barchiesi, 2010: 72-75). Commodity price volatilities have continued to escalate this decline. This also went along withthe later liberalisation of the mining sector with privatisation of state owned mines and lowering of royalties and taxation of mines which have been described as the beginning of a race to the bottom. Zambia remains highly dependent on copper as its main export. It is also a key example of this vulnerability in nationalisation strategies of this kind due to volatilities in commodity prices. It is within these conditions that the persistence and growth of ASM, and especially petty commodity production and petty capitalist operations, appear to be a contestation of control over mineral resources. From below, they appear to be contesting LSM dominance. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily mean they are not integrated within or subordinated under capitalism. Instead, there is a possibility that can be

explored if the means of production are socialised. Therefore, to understand the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism under the dominance of capital, it is also necessary to interpret the nature of state interventions.

2.8 The State and Mediation of Capital

The assumption that the state is the handmaiden of the capitalist class has been a simplistic and pervasive reading of the nature of the state. Marx had left this aspect theoretically underdeveloped, creating a conundrum. One perspective was that the state acts at the behest of the ruling class (Miliband, 1983), while an opposed view was that the state acted autonomously of the state (Poulantzas, 1980: 19-20). Both positions analyse the state not as a product of the contradictions inherent in class struggles and capitalism (Barker, 1978). Both positions assume that the capitalist class are in a position to give expression to common demands. This study, in examining the relation between petty commodity production and petty capitalism in relation to big capital, makes the case for a complicated understanding of varied actors, interests and processes within and beyond capital. As a result, a key proposition is to think of the state as mediating most directly through the aggregate manner in which the inter-relations between capital “within” and “outside” its territorial boundaries’ manifest (Barker, 1978). Mediation is associated with pre-capitalist forms of production, which enable capitalist forms of production (Banaji, 2010). This approach does not question how these sets of relations bear on the character of the state (Barker, 1978; Amin, 2014), which in turn has bearing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. The manner in which state interventions have had bearing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism is the aspect which this study engages. This is conceptualised as imposing disarticulation in the period of primitive accumulation when small-scale producers are dispossessed and production networks reoriented to the export of raw materials. The contradictory nature of state interventions, which are elaborated on in the empirical chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six), are conceptualised as a form of mediated disarticulation. This study argues that this has shaped the evolution of ASM, and to a certain degree explains the conditions within which it is able to persist. This is also useful in addressing why ASM does not become LSM.

2.9 Conclusion: Aspects for Further Elaboration

The above is an attempt to draw threads of analysis from literature that seek to destabilise approaches that centralise capital in the economy. This is to enable the analysis of the heterogeneous economic activities in a manner that focuses on interlinkages, synergies and the interpenetrating nature of ASM operations understood as existing on a spectrum. The latter focuses on the processes of production, appropriation and distribution of surplus value and the practices and principles which underlie this. This highlights the process of state formation which intersects with the emergence of LSM operations and shapes the setting within which citizenship is constructed. The study also goes beyond phenomenal aspects of ASM operations to investigate the processes of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in LSM-dominated mining. This approach also leaves room to analyse forms that potentially exist outside of capital. From this emerges a framework to reveal with greater clarity petty commodity production and petty capitalism which do not become fully integrated as capital but are dominated by it without being completely in isolation. This process of exclusion is created by the state and LSM operations which in turn dominate the market. Thus, while capital integrates ASM and petty commodity production, the structures resist this process of full integration. This points to the contradictory outcomes of policy, while the construction of citizenship reveals further layers of complexity and tensions. The manner in which surplus is produced, appropriated and distributed, and the values and practices underlying them reveal complexity, tensions and contradictions. Ultimately, this will enable a better understanding of processes of articulation/ disarticulation, subordination/re-emergence, domination/resistance within capital. A more complex understanding is required to overcome these binaries and make visible interpenetrating relations and synergies that emerge while remaining simultaneously independent. This study attempts to develop this approach to enable analysis of the distinctive character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. An approach that can achieve this is to conceive of capital, and petty commodity production, as existing in motion and constantly in a process with potential for further development. By mapping the contours of local capital (and non-capital) formation, this study grapples with this process to contribute to an understanding that goes beyond capital- centric approaches to explore ‘other’ domains where surplus value is produced,

appropriated and distributed. This is to make visible the modes of production which can potentially be understood as petty commodity production and establish the manner in which petty commodity production exists in interaction with capital.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the process that guided the development of the study. This includes the development of the conceptual framework and how this was in turn shaped by the selection and analysis of cases on petty commodity production and petty capitalism in two countries, Ghana and South Africa. The research questions of the study are: Why does ASM persist? And Why has ASM not become LSM? To address this the study focuses on petty commodity production and petty capitalism which operate on the lower end of the spectrum of ASM. These forms are argued to be composed of elements which enable a better understanding of the distinctive character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. These elements are logic, orientation and linkages. This chapter assesses, with hindsight, the rationale and conditions within which the data was gathered and the link with how this in turn had bearing on the analysis that was developed. It also highlights the interventions that were necessary to respond to challenges that emerged but also acknowledges the limitations of the methods deployed. With hind sight, some of the errors are also acknowledged and the extent of trustworthiness of data is assessed, with recommendations where necessary. This chapter begins by providing an overview of the approach adopted in the thesis. This intends to grapple with how this study investigated ASM which was shaped by the precarious condition of the majority of participants who were miners in two countries with varying forms of criminalisation. Values guiding the study outline how data was gathered, and how this information was interpreted to assure trustworthiness. The methods deployed and rationale behind them are elaborated. Analysis of the conditions within which the miners operate or have been forced to cease operations (as in Ghana) provides a better understanding of the context within which the study has been conducted. This lays the basis for discussing the construction of consent, which proved to be challenging given the circumstances. This was in part shaped by the gender of the author, perceived nationality and socio-economic status. The positionality of the writer is explored in the section on self-reflexivity. The experience of working with the support of research teams to gather data is reflected on as well as the measures put in place to control for distortions. Regarding this, the

challenges of a collaborative approach to research is drawn into focus. There is also a focused discussion on translation and the bearing it had on the analysis and the processes used to control for distortions. The constitution of citizenship and indigeneity was revealing in how interviews were conducted. Finally, the chapter addresses the selection of the cases and the bearing this had on shaping the study.

3.2 Approach Adopted in the Chapters

This qualitative study adopts a comparative historical approach to study the political economy of ASM in two countries, Ghana and South Africa. It applies the extended case method drawn from Michael Burawoy (1998) and applies it both to internal and external factors shaping the evolution of ASM within national boundaries, and transnationally. The comparative-historical approach is intended to draw a balance between explanations of the evolution of ASM in gold after liberalisation in both countries, while presenting an explanation for the nature of operations in the specific cases cited in both countries. Initially, the study sought to uncover whether livelihood strategies within the informal sector represented an alternative or a resistance to big capital. As a zone for those excluded from the formal sector, these livelihood strategies opened up alternative terrains for survival within the need economy (Sanyal and Bhattacharyya, 2009). This was argued to be a terrain of non-capital, ‘the other’ in the economic realm, which exists as an alternative to capital (Sanyal, 2007; Gibson-Graham, 1996). The intersections between these processes and the gendered segmentation of labour was also of keen interest. Banaji’s (2010) case for multiple modes of exploitation existing under the capitalist mode of production added further layers. It became clear that drawing a neat line between petty commodity production and capital was problematic. The need economy as argued by Sanyal remained embedded in consumption and thereby part of the accumulation process and not distinct from capital (Gidwani and Wainwright, 2014). This implied that drawing a neat conceptual separation between non-capital and capital would not be helpful. After fieldwork in Obuasi, and the third phase of interviews in Gauteng, it became clear that the processes unfolding were forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism which were in motion. There was a grey area between these which was in a process of evolution and required an approach to dredge out the elements shaping them.

Drawing on The Extended Case Method by Michael Burawoy (1998), this study applied an approach of structuration which examines ‘social processes at sites of research’ and traced these as being mutually determined by external forces. In this regard, this approach helped explain how the evolution of ASM in both country cases is affected by liberalisation and highlights the state’s capacity (or weakness of it) to regulate LSM/ASM mining, on one hand, and how the constitution of citizenship and indigeneity is deployed in both countries to simultaneously undermine and legitimise ASM, on the other. This lays a basis for analysis of micro level processes and trends highlighting the evolution of ASM, attempts at regulation and criminalisation in both cases, and how these connect with macro level concerns over the evolution of capital in both economies. This is the setting within which contradictory state interventions are analysed. These aspects are conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. This study did not adopt an ethnographic approach in conducting fieldwork as Burowoy does, but instead integrates some aspects of his methodology in terms of its approach to analysing primary data from fieldwork and secondary data. Burowoy (1998: 5) explains the logic of the extended case method:

Reflexive science starts out from dialogue, virtual or real, between observer and participants, embeds such dialogue within a second dialogue between local processes and extra-local forces that in turn can only be comprehended through a third, expanding dialogue of theory with itself…The extended case method applies reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from the “micro” to the “macro,” and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory.

This study takes up the task of establishing linkages between micro level processes, experiences and relations and macro level actors, processes and social forces. For instance, apart from observation, in depth interviews were conducted with fourteen participants in South Africa, and twelve participants in Ghana. The interviews in South Africa were predominantly with male zama zama. The interviews in Ghana were similar, while including actors such as the spokesperson of the Obuasi branch of the Ghana Artisanal and Small-scale Mining Association. The nature of the ASM operations were being impacted by multiparty politics, and those interviewed were drawn from the two dominant political parties. This enabled an understanding of how the local committee

formed in the early 2000s, and later integrated into the Ghana Association of Small Scale Miners (GNASSM), was shaped by these dynamics at a macro level. An overview of the political economy of both countries, with a focus on gold mining, foregrounds the study. Therefore, the study draws on secondary sources and existing historical and contemporary studies to outline how large-scale mining emerged in both contexts. In Ghana, this provides a narrative of the manner in which displacement of small-scale producers such as artisanal miners and small holder farmers unfolded. It outlines how the shift from subsistence agriculture and artisanal mining to large-scale production in mining took place and how this was linked to the colonial project that drew these economies into the orbit of the global economy. In South Africa, unemployment, in addition to the liberalisation of the mining and labour regimes, coupled with deindustrialisation, set the stage for ASM in gold to re-emerge. Therefore, Chapter Two establishes the approach adopted to investigate the empirical cases outlined in Chapters Four, Five and Six. Chapter Four elaborated on the nature of reforms of the mining regime and how this had important implications for labour, environment, health and safety, and regulation of mining by the state. Secondary data from policy documents, reports and socio-economic and environmental impacts were relied upon to investigate policy implications for livelihoods. The empirical chapters on Ghana and South Africa, in Chapters Five and Six, explore how production relations of forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism have been structured and, among other aspects, highlights the contradictory nature of state interventions. It is on the basis of the empirical chapters that the study argues that petty commodity production and petty capitalilsm in mining has a distinctive character which has bearing on undermining LSM-dominated mining. This distinctive character is shaped by the elements: logic, linkages and orientation. This enables a comparison of how petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold production in both countries has evolved. This outlines gendered labour segmentation, migratory patterns, and the degree of organisation. To do this, the researcher visited gold mining areas in both countries where ASM is taking place. In South Africa, interviews were held in Vlakfontein (in KwaThema), Langlaagte and Khutsong. In Ghana, interviews were conducted in Obuasi. Interviews with women engaged in direct production were limited, mainly due to time constraints, and therefore the gender analysis is constrained. It is hoped this gap can be filled by further research.

3.3 Phases of Research

The study was undertaken in a phased approach. Initially, there was a desktop review of existing literature on ASM. This mapping exercise traced the history of ASM research and policy interventions. It was also necessary to trace the rise of LSM operations and their bearing on the mining regime. Altogether, this draws close attention to the contradictory nature of state interventions in mining. The question of whether forms of ASM were a kind of non-capital absorbed the initial theoretical framing. It initially seemed possible that the logic of capital is to create space for the emergence of non-capital. The latter could be the negation of the former. These initial ideas were nursed alongside pilot interviews conducted in Vlakfontein Tailing Storage Facilities (TSF) in KwaThema. At this point in 2015, the cases of petty commodity production observed, were conceived of as non-capital whose evolution was being undermined by police and private security harassment. The construction of illegality was a central factor undermining their operations at this period. The interviews at this point were very limited and largely distorted due to intensified surveillance and arrests by police. The heightened sense of insecurity raised the anxiety of both women and men at the zama zama operations. It later became clear that there were also challenges within the initial research team. The participants were also trying to ensure their own protection in the midst of intensified police harassment. At this stage, LSM operations also reprocessing tailings was not systematically integrated in the analysis as a core source of contradiction. At this stage, the zama zama did not raise this as a problem. Closer to another site in Brakpan, there was a narrative of a Chinese firm which had displaced the zama zama. The assumption that this form of mining was non-capital with LSM operations coexisting in tense relations laid a basis for a narrow approach. It became necessary to retrace debates on modes of production and the questions of coexistence of pre-capitalist forms of production with capitalist firms. Pre- capitalist forms of production mediate the operations of capitalism. At a first stage, this involves the historical entry of capitalist forms into new spaces. Mediation usually refers to how capitalist units of production benefit from pre-capitalist forms of operations. The latter supply inputs, including labour at a reduced cost, securing higher profit rates. Establishing this, with the forms of ASM observed, could have been fruitful especially

since the gold ore in both countries could be traced into the formal sector. Nonetheless, pre-capitalist forms of production could be understood as existing in a specific historical moment. These forms operated within a logic that was articulated within the domestic economy, but the entry of capital and emergence of LSM operations unleashed a process of disarticulation. This is the historical processes within which ASM operates. Further interviews in Vlakfontein were still limited at this stage, and fieldwork in Obuasi had not yet been done. The study was stuck conceptually. Marx in Grundrisse drew out the core dynamic that operates in capital as a process. The understanding of capital as in motion was an important dynamic aspect to enable a more useful interpretation of operations. It was necessary to draw on petty commodity production and petty capitalism, but reject an expectation of observing ideal types. These abstractions were useful to explain complex phenomena but neat lines of differences between them were proving less than helpful. After interviews were conducted in Obuasi in 2017, this line of thinking was strengthened. The interviews conducted in Obuasi drew on indigenous mining which has evolved into a form of petty capitalism. This is illustrated in the shift from the honeycomb method to more sophisticated methods (See Section 5.8). The forms of mining observed in Vlakfontein and the Brakpan workshop both appeared to be forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism respectively. However, Vlakfontein could not easily be labelled as petty commodity production, while ignoring petty commodity producers own embeddedness in capital dominated mining and gradual mechanisation. Instead, it was necessary to interpret both as forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism that are in motion and evolving, or in the process of becoming capital. The former does not necessarily become capital in its ideal sense so this is not a tautological argument.

3.3.1 Selection of Methods

This is a qualitative study which deployed a purposive non-random sampling technique. This did not have to be representative of the population given the variations within the ASM as a sector. Instead, there was understanding of the interviews providing insights into a specific forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM. Considering that ASM is found to be varied to the extent that arriving at a firm definition is challenging (see Chapter Four for a discussion on the definition problem), the cases highlighted are studied in terms of their own specificities. Nonetheless, the

relation between social forces in and around ASM and external factors within and beyond their borders have had bearing on their operations. This enables the findings and conclusions to draw out generalisations which will be useful to understand the factors that hinder the evolution of ASM, so as to explain its persistence in the contemporary period. Both men and women ASM miners were engaged in face to face interviews and in group discussions. The questions covered basic biographical information, with a focus on migratory history, employment history and an understanding of how they were recruited into ASM. This establishes a better understanding of what pull factors drive people into ASM, how skills and inputs are acquired, and the gendered division of labour. Some of the questions also trace networks of relations between ASM miners, traders, sponsors and buyers. The extent to which companies, and possibly large-scale mining firms, participate in ASM will also be explored. Therefore, this involved gathering primary data through interviews with miners in ASM, including women engaged in direct production. Interview questions focused on how production is organised, how and why specific roles are allocated, and to whom. Twelve interviews were held in South Africa and Ghana respectively. Out of these, six participants in Ghana were cited in the study. Please see Tables 1 and 2 below. With the consent of each interviewee, audio recordings and notes were taken during the interviews. Pseudonyms are used unless interviewees verbally declared that it was not a concern for them. In the instances where they did not want to be recorded, notes were taken. All who agreed to give interviews were given the option of communicating in a local language with the aid of translators. These were transcribed in a local language and then translated into English, with the aid of research assistants from the Centre for Social Change, namely Ms. Thembelihle Maseko and Ms. Boikanyo Moloto, for the South African interviews. The methods deployed include face to face interviews, observation and group discussions. Each was selected based not only on the characteristics of the participant but also the context within which they are situated and the form of dialogue that they were more willing to accept. The interviews were conducted with the aid of checklists (See Appendix I) with each set of questions being adapted to the context. The checklist was not used to determine the questions posed but instead, to pinpoint some key issues. In practice, the dialogue during interviews was directed by the responses provided by the respondents. At times, interviews would begin with a conversation about an immediate

concern or a challenge facing participants. This includes the displacement of zama zama by Benoni Gold in Vlakfontein, or the military patrol of Sanso, a town situated on the outskirts of Obuasi. These immediate concerns would spark conversation and sharing information on the situation, which is the context of the interview being held. As the interview flowed in an organic manner, some of the concerns in the checklist were even covered ahead of direct questioning. After a first phase of conversation, the checklist was then used to guide a deeper examination of issues such as the background of participants (migration and employment history), structure of operations, values guiding work at the site, reproduction (on and off the site), interventions by state agencies and relations with the communities close to the sites. As stated earlier, there was an intention to also draw in how women’s productive and reproductive roles are interconnected and how this is transformed or cemented in ASM operations. As interviews were undertaken, the snowball method was deployed, it became clear another approach was required to interview women. Not only did they have to be approached with an all women team, but also a phased process for multiple interviews was needed. More time was required to ensure that these interviews occurred in different settings and included a group discussion. The first phase, as a first contact, could happen on the mining site. Due to safety concerns, follow up interviews could be on neutral points. If enough trust was built, it would have been possible to interview women in their homes. This process would have required considerable trust, time and resources to have been created. It always proved difficult to ask even male miners to meet at neutral points, due to their heightened sense of vulnerability to law enforcement. In Obuasi, it was also difficult to connect with women who were primarily in charge of the daily sustenance of households with petty trading in the midst of the moratorium on galamsey operations. Female financiers of ASM operations in Obuasi, who were known to some interviewees, were hard to contact. Interviewees were either unwilling or unable to find their contact information. Interviewees would describe how challenging the position of the female financiers is, due to limited respect thereceived from mineworkers and supervisors of galamsey operations alike, as financiers of operations. More time was needed to find their contact information. Contacts would have been explored with other networks and organisations which are more likely to be supporting female entrepreneurs in Obuasi. In Gauteng, there was no indication of knowledge of female financiers or buyers from any of the interviewees. All the women

who were aware of zama zama operations were either working on mine tailings or providing auxiliary services for underground operations. This did not show the dynamism which the investigator was hoping to investigate on gender; instead it was a male dominated. With hind sight, this was still a useful prism with which to analyse women’s autonomy within this context. Some interviews highlighted these aspects and were integrated in the analysis. A flexible approach was required to adapt to the precarious conditions within which the miners were operating. For instance, in Sanso (on the outskirts of Obuasi) a group of fifteen young men were found at a meeting space for the community. They were initially very concerned about an interview due to the presence of military units which were part of Operation Vanguard patrolling the area. It is also the case that with Operation Vanguard in Ghana, the people in galamsey operations who faced direct threats were the miners engaged in production. Chinese sponsors were also under direct threat due to prohibitions on foreigners running small-scale mining operations combined with a rising tide of xenophobia. The miners needed to be assured that speaking openly about their work and audio recording of the interviews would not compromise their security. They were not willing to sign consent forms which they felt was a paper trail that they could not risk. They also expressed a desire to speak collectively instead of on a one-on-one basis. This further eased their anxiety. Experts on mining, supervisors and sponsors of operations in Obuasi had no concerns about coming under direct assault from the police or military. It was easy for them to agree to audio recordings and to sign consent forms. One of the implications of relying on the group discussion in Sanso was the exclusion of women. Initially it was assumed that women were not present at the community meeting space because they were busy with petty trading and farming to enable them to provide for their families. Women, who often struggle with time poverty, are constantly busy with securing incomes to support daily sustenance of households while also juggling housework. This was the case but there was more meaning behind their absence. A bias against women had prevailed and ensured their exclusion. During the group discussion with men, it was clear that there was no knowledge of women’s involvement in artisanal mining in the precolonial era. Their marginalisation in galamsey sites was also affirmed with taboos. When the absence of women in the discussion was raised, this led to some debate, with one participant strongly arguing that women did not have useful knowledge to share. His position was overruled by the group and contact of

a woman known to the group (and who was living nearby) was provided. She agreed to a face to face interview and also provided contacts of other women in Sanso. This was important for building relationships which would facilitate further clarification on the kind of details sought. This would also enable deeper conversations and levels of trust which could not be built with the direct form of questioning deployed in this study. This limitation undermined the depth of the interviews with women miners and could not deepen the analysis beyond a certain limit. However, the nature of organisational relationships that the researcher already had, in experiences as an activist ensure that it was possible to contain these problems.1 The Director of the Centre for Social Impact Studies (CSIS), Mr. Richard Elimah who is based in Obuasi, and works on the environmental and social impacts of mining in Ghana, provided the contacts of a local journalist who assisted immensely with field work. Mr. Justice Dzivon provided logistics in the context of a military occupation and a moratorium on ASM in Obuasi. With his assistance, it was still possible to meet with different actors who played different roles in ASM. He also had direct involvement in the Movement Committee which was set up to negotiate the ending of the nine month occupation in Obuasi AGA concession. His embeddedness in the galamsey question provided critical analysis and contacts. His professionalism as a journalist also enabled the analysis to be trustworthy and reasonably balanced. Given the manner in which party politics has permeated a lot of aspects of everyday life, including the galamsey question, his balanced perspective was critical. In South Africa, this writer worked with the Ekurhuleni Environmental Organisation (EEO) and other sister organisations working on mining and ASM in particular. Collaboration was possible on organising field trips and setting up interviews with ASM miners. The context of criminalisation in Gauteng created a tense environment in which it was very challenging for miners to grant interviews. As a result, there were two phases in the fieldwork. In South Africa, three elite interviews were held in addition to a dialogue on ASM policy in South Africa. In Ghana, two such interviews were held. This made it possible to lay out the context of both countries, and describe how the state and corporations perceive, relate to or intervene on ASM.

1 In South Africa, I had built these relations in structures such as Keep Left, the United Front- Johannesburg, Housing Assembly and Women in Mining (a regional network based in Johannesburg). I was also invited to events organised by the Ekurhuleni Environmental Organisation (EEO).

Table 1 showing Participant Profile in Ghana and South Africa

Country Participant Sex Ethnicity Employment History prior to ASM Ghana Alhaji Ben Male Northern linage NA Abdullah

Haruna Seidu Male Northern linage NA Aboagye

Benjamin Annan Male Asante Assembly Member; Spokesperson of Obuasi Small- Scale Miners Association Comfort Amoah Female Asante Food trading

Zacharia Essiedu Male Northern Linage Privately managed Public Transport

Mohammed Male Northern linage Photography Abubakar

South Tshepiso Female Mozambique NA Africa Khumalo

Alfred Tshabalala Male Lesotho LSM operations

Issac Phanyeko Male South Africa LSM operations

Mangaliso Mbatha Male South Africa None prior to ASM

Lucy Zwane Female South Africa NA

Moses Khoza Male Lesotho Construction

Azande Khoza Female South Africa Currently a Pensioner, no other information

3.3.2 The Selection of Cases

The study investigated petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining in Obuasi and Gauteng. The areas selected for direct interviews with mineworkers and community activists working on mining were Sanso in Obuasi, and Vlakfontein (in KwaThema), Brakpan, Roodeport and Khutsong for Gauteng. The areas selected all presented cases of male dominated mining, with women being visible as carriers in Obuasi and in the reprocessing of mine tailings in Gauteng. There were reports of women engaged as sponsors in Obuasi but more time was required to get in touch with them. Moreover, in the aftermath of the moratorium in Ghana, women who had already been struggling due to discrimination to hold operations together were not easy to come across in Obuasi. More time was required to meet with them in a manner that was not of inconvenience to them. The same applied to carriers whose homesteads were in the throes of crises with the moratorium converging with large-scale retrenchments in Obuasi. They needed to prioritise petty trading alongside farming to prevent their families from starving. More time was therefore needed to also track these women and speak to more of them in very sharp and time conscious interviews. The study had set itself the task of showing how gendered identities are in flux and contested terrains within which ASM operations, on one hand, present the possibility of transformation and, on the other, entrench gendered segmentation. It was not possible to fully explore this with the limitations of time and the nature of the cases themselves. Instead, the cases presented the opportunity to look into how women were embedded in male dominated operations, and to better understand how they were juggling care responsibilities. The study also set itself the task of undertaking a comparison of ASM in Ghana and South Africa. By drawing on the selected cases in both countries, it is possible to compare cases that are found to have significant similarities. Both cases are of mining that begins in the late 1800s, and that is based on the dispossession of artisanal miners. The exclusion at this point from the emerging large-scale mining takes slightly different forms with the seeds of citizenship and indigeneity taking shape after independence and

the end of apartheid. These moments are significant since it also marks the emergence of the galamsey and zama zama. The timing for ASM in Ghana also converges with structural adjustment in the mid-1980s, and liberalisation in South Africa. The slight differences in timing, however, still present similar processes. The tables below provide an overview of the key country cases and the micro cases. The overview for the country cases juxtaposes LSM logic with ASM logic, while the micro cases also highlight aspects of mechanisation and alliance formation. This draws out the key elements which shape the character of petty commodity production in ASM. The logic draws out the essence of petty commodity production in mining, which is in turn formed by its orientation and linkages. These elements are interconnected and mutually constitutive. Relational comparison (Hart, 2006) is made possible by the presence of Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA) in both Ghana and South Africa. It can help explain how the dominance of LSM has had differential impacts on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in both contexts with ASM in Ghana expanding rapidly and deploying more sophisticated mechanisation, while in South Africa, it remains comparatively rudimentary. To what extent is this an exaggeration? The involvement of Chinese investors in Ghana has played the role of dynamizing the sector, particularly in alluvial mining (Botchwey and Crawford, 2016: 8), but they do not have a presence in Obuasi. It remains firmly under control of Ghanaians. However, galamsey use a crusher for milling and are connected to the national electricity grid. On the other hand, zama zama use manual power or gas for the phenduka (milling machines). This reveals the openings that exist for integration in the local economy and infrastructure, which on first sight can be attributed to weak capacity on the part of the Ghanaian state. However, this can also be understood as weakness in terms of serving the interests of the dominance of LSM and opening up of space for ASM operations - a space that has not been created for petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM operations in South Africa. In this regard, artisanal miners in Ghana have taken the initiative well ahead of this study. In 2000, a Ghanaian journalist had been deployed by the GNASSM in Obuasi to undertake an assessment of the kind of interventions being taken by AGA in South Africa, where the corporation is based. The purpose of this was to better understand the situation of artisanal and small-scale miners in South Africa because it was thought that they were also active in South Africa, and had greater room to operate. This was also mentioned in the group discussion in Sanso. It is unclear how the galamsey in Obuasi

drew this conclusion. Regardless, they did send the journalist to find out information to further arm themselves in advocating for their rights in Ghana against the AGA. There was also keen interest in communities affected by mining in Khutsong and KwaThema for such a broader understanding of the phenomenon of ASM. In spite of the potential for a relational comparison approach to this study, the cases selected in South Africa did not offer a direct connection with AGA. This does not preclude the possibility of further work based on this study to build towards this.

3.4 Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of the study is assured by the combination of methods deployed and the concepts, theory and tradition guiding it (Mishler, 1990: 415). The interviews in South Africa were transcribed by research assistants, Ms. Thembelihle Maseko and Ms. Boikanyo Moloto, from the Centre of Social Change, who were able to provide their own assessment of the quality of data received. They also provided their assessment of the problems with translation and recommend that a dedicated translator be present throughout the interviews with the artisanal miners. During the Ghana interviews, a translator was consistently present and well briefed on the study. He also undertook transcriptions. It was the case that some aspects of the interviews were still not included due to discretion exercised by the transcriber. With hind sight, this probably reflected his own interpretations of what was appropriate for an academic study. Some details were lost. With hind sight, these omissions could have been addressed by ensuring a third party listens to the audio recordings and cross checks transcriptions. This task was undertaken to the extent that it was possible, with limited capacity.

3.4.1 Ethics, Conditions of the Miners and the Empirical Research

Obuasi presented the case of a mining town that was under military occupation. Even though inhabitants appeared to be undergoing their normal day to day activities, the presence of the military had created a tense atmosphere. There was a sense of repression with an inability to protest against the moratorium. The combination of the largescale retrenchments in AGA and the moratorium on galamsey was stifling livelihoods, while the military was also suppressing mass protest in Obuasi. These

conditions made it challenging to investigate the moratorium and the miners, as well as miners previously engaged in direct production, on the matter. They required assurances of their protection. The only exceptions were sponsors, supervisors, local politicians and an ASM Association spokesperson. The environmentally hazardous conditions in the mining town, which is dominated by large-scale mining, related to water contamination and the existence of mine tailings scattered around the mining town. These conditions are hazardous for the entire mining town and create poor health conditions. These conditions did not necessarily impact on the study to the extent that it is a condition experienced in the entire mining town. With a focus on the ASM operations which were not ongoing, the health hazard of the dust and use of mercury to amalgamate gold did not pose immediate health hazards to be observed. In South Africa, the research was undertaken primarily in mine tailings in Vlakfontein, with site visits to Langlaagte (underground mining) and Khutsong (community mining). Vlakfontein posed an extremely challenging space, with the entire area being covered with mine waste from processed tailings which contain toxins such as mercury, uranium, cyanide and lead. There were also pools of water which were being reused in zama zama mine operations with aid of ‘generators’ or pumps. The water is drawn from dams constructed in a previous cycle of LSM operations in the area. This toxic water was being reused for minework. It was clear that few of the miners were aware of the dangers posed by the toxic nature of the mine. Unfortunately, most were painfully unaware. On the first visit to Vlakfontein, a zama zama miner was seen drinking toxic water from a pool of water. No matter the explanations which were attempted, he did not accept that it would do harm to him. In other instances, miners were unaware of the health risk that mercury poses. During the interview with a couple in Roodeport, it was learnt both did not think mercury was dangerous, with the miner’s wife being adamant it was safe for pregnant women to consume mercury. In another case, the miner was aware of the greater danger from the mix of toxins present in mine tailings. He had moved to underground minework where he was facing other risks from rockfalls, poisonous gases and accidental explosions, in addition to gunfire between rival gangs. Prior to this, he had been employed as a contract worker in construction, where conditions were so poor he transitioned to work as a zama zama. His own father had been injured in the formal mines. The couple’s resistance to information on the dangers of mercury and their own knowledge of the range of risks they faced, both from mine tailings on the surface and underground mine shafts and tunnels,

revealed the challenge of providing information to groups who are bearing extreme risks in circumstances where they themselves are not privileged with options. This is not uncommon in ASM research. For those who were totally unaware of any risks in mine tailings, when it was possible to convey the risks they faced, the panic set in and yet an alternative could not be offered to them ,This is also another ethical problem in revealing such information on its own without providing the means for people to make other choices. For instance, Amina was informed that she was facing the possibility of contracting cancer from exposure to mercury. She immediately panicked and further information on the entire space she was working in was withheld. This was because it was not possible, in those circumstances, to support her with processing as what it means then for her life to keep working in Vlakfontein. She was deeply disturbed with the fraction of information shared. Even by withholding further information, it was also still having an impact on her life. Ultimately, there is no way of coming out of this situation without causing some form of damage to people’s lives even though one had good intentions. This is why it is crucial to also have activists present because they are more likely to take up some of these questions in meaningful ways for the long term. Regardless, even with the presence of activists, in most instances the problems as were found are not easily resolved. Instead, it was necessary to depart from the field leaving the zama zama and galamsey in the harsh conditions they were found in.

3.4.2 The challenge of securing consent

How to gain the consent of the zama zama miners was a problem throughout the research process. An immediate challenge with conducting research on zama zama miners is the context of criminalisation and hardship within which they work. In a first phase of consent, the aim of the study was explained as gathering information on how the ASM in gold operates in both contexts. In the course of questions being posed, there may have been some discomfort and in those instances, the rationale for such a line of questioning was also explained. At the end of interviews, in some cases, the interviewees would ask further questions about how the data would be used. Reassurances of the protection of their anonymity is important, but they also appreciated knowing how they would be cited. In the end, it is actually a phased process that one should be aware of in the whole interaction.

On the one hand, they do value having their understandings, experiences and demands finding articulation in the broader society. They are compelled to operate in clandestine manner and without structures of their own to find articulation. Even when they do, as in Obuasi with the presence of GNASSM, they can still be drowned out of the conversation and silenced by the presence of the military. However, a research study has limits in what it can offer to improve their situation. It holds no legitimacy when the potential interviewees question how this study would benefit them concretely. In the best cases, they agree to the dialogue with researchers on condition that not only will their identities be protected, but that their views and experiences will find an audience. The latter aspect remains a priority. In more challenging circumstances, there are demands for financial compensation for their time and information. These transactional relations were set up, in part, by the entry of other actors, especially one case of an international journalist. This raised barriers in some sites for researchers who do not offer such material incentives. In one case in 2015, an activist based in Carletonville, who was contacted through a network for precarious workers, reported the zama zama miners were demanding compensation of R300. The offer of assistance was declined from this contact and other options explored. In another case, on the West Rand, in the Makhulumaga informal settlement, it was discovered that there is a standard rate of R700 for an audience with the community and a tour of the abandoned underground mines. This entry is also controlled by the local councillor. After the first visit, it was bluntly communicated that persons who will not pay this fee should not be brought to the site. The offers to create a space for women’s experiences to be documented with a facilitated discussion on artisanal mining that could be supported by South Africa’s Women in Mining United in Action (WAMUA), were rejected. In fact when first contact with the EEO was made, it was assumed that this rate was known and would be paid to two male activists in the organisation. A similar situation was found in Obuasi with the interview with galamsey miners who had no work since the moratorium was in effect. They requested that breakfast be purchased for the group. In their case, the women in their households were the ones engaged in petty trading to raise funds to cover everyday household expenses, and the men had nothing to do. It was a painful situation for the men to bear since they were being emasculated and unable to fulfil a basic expectation of men as providers. To make matters worse, the consumers to whom the women were selling small-scale retail were not only being suffocated by the

moratorium but also by the large-scale retrenchments from Obuasi’s Anglo Gold Ashanti. Their situation was dire indeed. In contrast, the women galamsey and women zama zama did not ask for compensation of any kind. They were always open to discuss and share their perspectives. This raises an ethical conundrum. On one hand the researcher is asking for the time of persons whose line of work is not compensated according to hours or days worked, but instead rely solely on the product they are able to produce regardless of their labour time. The concept of ‘free time’ or ‘break time’ does not exist when they are ‘on site’. When one asks to meet them at another location at a more convenient time, they are usually reluctant to make such arrangements. In some cases, they would not want to even indicate which areas are more convenient for them. The work they do as zama zama in Vlakfontein in mine tailings is often viewed as shameful and dirty and therefore not a line of work they would like to make known in their neighbourhood or even their family. In this regard, asking them for 20 mins of their time, or even an hour (depending on how detailed the dialogue is) or even a part of a day’s worth of work will have a direct impact on their livelihoods from which they are not even assured a stable income. They therefore bear a significant cost to themselves for simply taking time away from their labours to speak to a researcher. Their demand for justification for them to leave their work and speak to the researcher is therefore important. This questioning of researchers, activists and journalists who merely extract information from them with no product presented back to the zama zama is not only on the site of research. For instance, there was the opportunity in 2016 to speak at a network for mining workshop where the author presented some key concerns as it relates to zama zama. During the question and answer session, one of the points raised by a woman activist present was how problematic the relationship was between those being researched and the researcher – a conundrum which is the focus of decolonising methodologies. The last interview held with Mr. Luvo, a zama zama miner, was critical. He was keen to connect the women activists with like-minded zama zama. He also recalled the entry of a group seeking to assist the miners in 2015, but this intervention had the effect of spreading panic among the miners. (This may have been a reference to the first phase of interviews for this research, as mentioned already. At the time, Mr. Luvo had not been met with. The research team only were able to chance upon him at a time he was perched

on a small hill of rocks which was a good vantage point to look around the entire mine tailing). This experience had informed his caution with mobilising the zama zama. The circumstances in Khutsong were a bit more accommodating. The miners interviewed were either within the informal settlement or operating on the edges of the informal settlement. In this case, their work was not hidden from the community, but nonetheless, they felt shame for having to do this form of ‘dirty work’. Therefore during the interviews it was necessary to keep cognisance of this condition. The interviews were conducted in June 2018 and contact was made as a result of a link with a community organisation working on mining in Khutsong. There was also a possibility of going to mine tailings, which were recommended as safer sites for research, where women were engaged in reprocessing. The community organisation was keen to have a briefing on zama zama in South Africa and Ghana which provided some inputs at the first meeting. There was not enough time to conduct a second round of interviews. This trip to Khutsong in Carletonville was an important contact to build in 2018. The attempts to contact Carletonville was through a Community Centre in 2015, and it was not possible to even arrange a visit. The information officer was unwilling to speak on zama zama due to the risks involved. Initially, he was warm to the idea of organising a meeting with women only but he later bailed out. There are clear limits to a research project’s potential to achieve meaningful concrete responses to support the zama zama miners in highly precarious conditions, and in the case in Ghana, they were unable to work at the time that the interviews were conducted. Therefore, it was crucial to have some balance between the extractivist oriented nature of research, and in the spirit of decolonisation of methodology, create interactions that at the bare minimum create conditions where the agency of actors can independently find expression, long after the project is completed. If one takes a more pragmatic understanding of the limits of this research project, presuming the subaltern will not be armed to speak fully in this interaction, how can their fuller voices find articulation? In contexts where their line of work is criminalised, and their own precarity is expressed (even in being designated as undocumented), how can they truly be able to take charge of the dialogue in a manner that preserves their voices? Probably this can have more meaning in other forms of interaction which are fully oriented to advancing their interests in the public discourse on the zama zama in South Africa. In retrospect, it is extremely important to have translators in the research team who are committed to the project and who also undertake transcription work to ensure consistency. Activists can

be present, but this should be controlled with some interviews conducted without their presence in the field. In one incident, the zama zama miners were thrown into intense debate over what the implication of the research team’s presence was and who would bear the risk for this interaction. There was an attempt by the activists to openly make their case for decriminalisation and a need to also capture the perspectives of the zama zama in their own words in progressive research projects. In spite of these attempts to outline this wider objective, the situation remained tense. The dialogue among the zama zama miners degenerated into threats to cause physical harm and even death to the miner who had brought the team to the site. His colleagues’ suspicions were triggered by his own guarded behaviour since he had immediately withdrawn to his worksite (which was over a hill) once he had introduced us to the first potential participants. He was himself very concerned about the presence of the research team. The eruption of the disagreement revealed the hierarchy that had formed at this section of the Vlakfontein site. The zama zama operated individually in Vlakfontein but they still had some form of hierarchy expressing power relations. At the top of this was a woman miner, named only as Caroline, who was playing a dominant role. Younger women and men at the site were keen not to offend her and were supplicant to her in the midst of the argument. Consent forms were completely irrelevant in this instance. In other cases in Langlaagte, zama zama would ask for evidence that the team was really from the University of Johannesburg. The researcher resorted to presenting the miner with the University of Johannesburg’s student ID. In that case, consent forms were not regarded as ‘hard evidence’. On the last visit in Vlakfontein, the researcher saw very young boys working on their own, with generators and silts. The investigators attempted to find out how old they were but they were evasive and insisted on being 19 years. This was hard to believe based on their appearance. We did not attempt to interview them since they were very unsettled by the inquisitive visitors. A process of interviewing persons who were likely underaged, and in conditions of extreme precarity, in the absence of guardians raised further questions regarding how to acquire consent if it was necessary to interview them. This is another situation in which the consent form is once again unhelpful.

3.5 Self-Reflexivity

In the initial stages the researcher was uncertain about the best place to undertake this study. In the interactions within the research teams, and in relation to potential participants, the researcher was confronted with a gulf along the lines of gender, class and language. The distance from them was felt in a manner that did not assist to advance this study. As a cisgender black feminist, it was easier to interact with female miners and women activists working on mining. The empathy women share across class facilitated meaningful ways of interacting even though there remained a distinct social gap. This also enabled facing disagreements when they emerged. With the women activists, the disagreements were specific and momentary, with the social distance occasionally closing between us. On the other hand, the social distance between the author and theparticipants remained in place regardless of gender. This had to do with a vast gap in educational backgrounds, and also the condition in which they were found working. It was worse that the only language the writer is fluent in is English. This is the dominant official language in South Africa, and an official language in Ghana that the black middle class tend to speak in both countries. It is also the language of the colonisers, and therefore of power, and as a result undermined the ability to build a deeper connection with interviewees. However, having a basic understanding of Twi which is the main language spoken in Obuasi was a major plus. In Ghana, on the trip to Obuasi, the researcher came under direct verbal attack by women in the public bus during a six hour bus ride (which due to delay at the bus station was in reality a 12 hour trip). They reacted in this manner mainly because the author could only speak English and was marked out as a foreigner or a middle class person who was presumed to be unsympathetic towards them. It was perceived by them that there was a supposed superiority to the people on the bus whose class position was different from the writer’s. Even though it was possible to make a friend and connect with other women who were sympathetic, there was always discomfort in language limitations compelling them to think and speak English. Language immediately raises a class barrier to the few vocal women who thought it best to attack verbally as a form of social reprisal. This happened in a situation where the writer was not placed in a position of power of a sort - as someone being given permission to pose questions for the purposes of knowledge production in a higher education institution. This form of overt verbal

confrontation was also very strange and is a form of behaviour that was unfamiliar with one who had grown up in Ghana . During the interviews it was explained that the writer had grown up in Accra but this had no meaning at all. It may have been useful if fluent Twi were spoken, but as only had a basic knowledge of it was known, it was inappropriate at best to insert in an interview. Mr. Dzivon, who was present during all the interviews, also repeatedly introduced the researcher as a student from South Africa which also did not help matters. It was presumed that this meant he also did not see that there was also identification with Ghana either.It was not thought to be prudent to argue this matter because if multiple identities (which included considering the self as Ghanaian) did not find expression in our interactions, it ought not be forced into the dialogue. Instead, all these experiences need to be understood. Perhaps these instances are micro level expressions of the ‘Ghana First’ rhetoric which has even become a mantra of sections of the populist left in Ghana. This seems to indicate a shift in tone with how ‘other’ Africans are being related to in Ghana. This is deeply disturbing as the writer is also a foreigner in South Africa who has adapted to being cautious in public spaces due to the reality of xenophobia. For instance, during interviews in Obuasi, the perceived national identity of the interviewer was non-Ghanaian .This was often used as an example by interviewees for the basis of exclusion from being part of an ASM operation. In this regard, the role of activists in Gauteng and a journalist in Obuasi played a critical role in aiding entery into meaningful dialogues with participants. Nonetheless, these barriers could not be erased completely and had to be managed during interviews.

3.6 Collaborative Approach in Research Teams

The study adopted a collaborative approach to data collection. This was informed by a need to be embedded in existing networks of activists working on mining in both countries. Interviews were conducted with activists working directly with ASM miners in both countries. Data collection was also conducted with a collaborative approach to strengthen their interventions on ASM, and to also provide data to inform this study. Tensions emerged from this. Most immediately, this had to do with the overbearing presence of NGOs which pressured for immediate results as required by donors. This fault line has been engaged within feminist literature (Benson, 2009; Benson and Nagar,

2006). It undermined a more careful, laborious and unappealing process of organisational building for the activists working with the miners. On the other hand, there were also tensions between the research focus of this study and the organisation-building interests of the activists. Gender relations also shaped the dynamics within the research teams. To conduct fieldwork, a research team was composed in both Obuasi and Ekurhuleni. In the first case, Justice Mensah Dzivon, also known as ‘Ghana Ba’, is a journalist who was part of the Movement Committee which facilitated the exit of the galamsey miners occupying AGA in 2016. He facilitated interviews, with translation in some cases, with key actors who were part of negotiations around the occupation in Obuasi. He also provided part of the transcriptions. He had key insights into the occupation in Obuasi and the media’s role in the campaign to deepen the criminalization of galamsey. As someone who also comes from Obuasi, he had intimate knowledge of the operations of large-scale mines and their relations with mining communities and an appreciation of indigenous forms of mining. His insights and guidance on galamsey in Obuasi was important not only to facilitate entry into Obuasi and for translation but also for insights into the contestations around galamsey in Ghana. His role as a journalist also provided an open minded orientation, which was enough to sympathise with the challenges faced by senior staff of Anglo Gold Ashanti in Obuasi who were facing an intensely volatile and risky situation which had resulted in the accidental death of a colleague, an event to which Mr. Dzivon was a witness. He was also grounded enough on the issues to be equally concerned with documenting the killing of a community member by the military unit. This open minded approach facilitated a holistic approach to investigations in Obuasi. In Ekurhuleni, two sets of research teams were composed. In the first round of interviews in 2014, this included Mr. Sandile Nombeni, who was with EEO, and Mr. Hendrick Moore, an activist who has worked on other mining related research projects with the Centre for Social Change. The first attempts to contact zama zama operating in Vlakfontein were extremely challenging. This was a period of intense police harassment and therefore it was difficult to win over their trust. In 2018, follow-up interviews with a new set of miners revealed a changed context. There had not been a police raid in over a year. Not only were the miners quite eager to speak to us, they were also open to have audio recordings of our discussions. This was a breakthrough. In an interview with a zama zama who had been active since 1994, he explained that around the time the research team had made an appearance at the site,

a group had come to them with promises to assist, but had spread panic among the miners. If this was the writer’s research team, it shows how challenging that time was for the miners. Within the research team operating in Gauteng sites, there had also been challenges. This had to do with the presence of activists who were oriented to their own objective for organisation building, and their relationship with the writer who is also an activist but focused on the fieldwork for the purposes of research. The different interests at play undermined the focus of the interviews that were conducted since it was necessary to delve deeper into the histories of the participants and learn more about the technical aspects of production, eager to unravel evolutions (however small) and at the same time their experiences and networks of relationships that support their work both at the site and at the domestic space. In the first instance, working with an all male team as a woman researcher was challenging. The men in the team tended to want to dictate the pace and direction of analysis and assumed to have control of facts or knowledge without respect for the process of inquiry. In the interviews conducted with women, it was also extremely challenging to speak frankly in a safe dialogue with the men present. In one instance, an attempt was made to understand whether a woman zama zama, who held an authoritative position at the mine site, was the head of her household. She confirmed this but had an expression of deep shame when she was asked crudely if she was single. Further questioning established this was the case. Regardless, the initial question had been translated as her relationship status by the men and, in this instance, she was put in a position to have to respond to a man. It induced shame to put her in this position since it communicated that she had been ‘rejected’ by men by being a single woman, and she was also in the process of translation being held accountable for her ‘rejection’ to a man. If an all-women group had posed the same question, such harm would not have been done to her. In the second phase of interviews, an all-female research team was deliberately put together. Part of the team included a post doctoral researcher at the Centre for Social Change, Dr. Grace Idahosa. There were also two environmental activists, Ms. Sabatini Mngadi and Ms. Innocentia Nontsikelelo. Once again the tensions between an activist- oriented intervention and research-focused dialogue emerged. However, it was easier to correct this imbalance and refocus discussions with the zama zama miners on the research. Dr. Idahosa played a critical role in reinforcing the research orientation by subtly

reading the dynamics of the group as the researcher was busy with the interviews and providing important direction. This support was critical. Both of the activists were also helpful in explaining the purpose of the research but also highlighted their interest in advocating for the decriminalisation of zama zama miners with their own activist work. The unfortunate turn at the end of this phase of interviews was a disagreement over how the research ought to be documented. There was consensus on sharing write ups after the field work, and it was also offered to share drafts of the chapter in addition to transcripts of the interview. These did not seem to be useful in the interim. The immediate output was on the social media page of Ms. Mngadi where she posted some photos of the field trip. This researcher disagreed with specific photos which exposed the faces of the miners. In as much as it was attempted to convince her that this was a breach of the verbal consent that we got from the miners, she refused to remove three problematic photos. She did take one photo down from her page. Gaining the consent of the miners had been extremely difficult as they had experience of being exposed in public media such as documentaries or news programs which was traumatic to say the least. Most of them are undocumented and such exposure in a criminalised activity left them in a vulnerable situation. Due to the precarious and clandestine nature of their work, learning of actual impacts of research interventions are not guaranteed. On a personal note, the writer was well aware of the extent to which consent and protection of activists is prioritised in networks where Ms. Mngadi and I are active. It was therefore shocking to see that she did not extend the same courtesy, respect and concern towards the zama zama who are targets of harassment. It was an unexpected outcome. Based on this experience, it was clear that separate meetings should have been set up for the research team to deliberate on the study and its purposes while also giving space for the activists to elaborate their own interests and objectives. A conversation about values guiding research, and the consent challenge itself, also would have been fruitful and necessary before the fieldwork. An agreement on how to approach the interviews should have been set. This process of dialogue is not assumed to necessarily resolve all the contradictions but would create greater awareness of the tensions so all team members are able to more consciously understand each other in the field. More importantly, it would also be an attempt to raise further awareness of the real threats facing zama zama miners and the urgency of maintaining a high level of confidentiality. In the best case scenario, it would be possible for team members to hold each other accountable in a mutually respectful manner.

3.7 Translation

The researcher does not speak a Southern African language(other than English) and only has a basic knowledge of Twi, which is spoken widely in Obuasi. This limitation placed the researcher at a disadvantage in holding conversations meaningfully during the interviews.This meant that translators had to be highly depended on during interviews. The translation was affected by the dynamics within the research teams in both contexts. In the Obuasi case, since a basic knowledge of Twi, was available, responses could be followed during interviews and engage, to a limited degree, in useful dialogue with translation. Some interviews were purely in English, while others used a mixture of Twi and English. Cases where the interviews or dialogue were relying purely on Twi stretched the writer’s capacity. At the points when understanding the dialogue was difficult, and consistent translation was not available, questions we asked which toned down the richness of the dialogue that was building up. This undermined what could have been very fruitful conversations. The interviews with women miners were also undermined by the fact that translation was being facilitated by a man. It was critical to have an all women group to pose difficult questions to do with interpersonal relations, sexual violence and health. When interviews were held in Vlakfontein with an all-women research team, it was easier for women to speak about reproductive health and for the dialogue to extend to the question of the degree of their autonomy from their husbands. In one case, Amina’s husband was present during the interaction (as he was engaged in construction work) and Amina asked that we move away from him and other men so we may speak frankly. This made it clear that the space within which interviews were conducted had to be ideal. In another vein, it was also important to consider the limitations of the conditions within which the zama zama was found operating and that the ideal spaces were not available. Time and resource constraints created barriers to explore this. Further research can address these aspects. As the interviewer (and therefore holding a position of dominance as the one posing the questions and directing the dialogue) the researcherwas unable to speak their mother tongues or languages they have mastery over, and therefore barriers remained in place. This barrier emerged strongly in their body language which was a guarded posture. This may have to do with the fact that the language they were addressed in was

English which is the language of the dominant elites in South Africa, as mentioned earlier. During interviews the questions posed were not immediately translated. Only when the question was put in a difficult manner for interviewees to understand was translation requested and provided. In the first instance, they experience shame in not understanding the question. Apart from this, the ability to understand English when they did not ask for assistance is unknown until transcripts are assessed. Even in the circumstances that transcripts are relied upon, one does not know for sure. The vacuum left also had other implications. It was also difficult to carefully follow all that was being said between the activists and participants. To some degree, there were instances of miscommunication and commitments which the writer was unaware of and which were brought up in later interactions with the zama zama. The inability to carefully track this and ensure that there was consistency and honesty with which were were being projected to the zama zama was problematic. All these distortions came to light once the transcripts had been translated. After noticing these distortions, changes were made to the research team and implications were clarified, these mistakes were averted with the new all women team. Also there were benefits from the assessments of transcribers who also undertook translations of the interviews on the extent of the problem. Both confirmed there were instances when these problems emerged but the interviews were still of a good quality and data gathered was detailed and rich. In future, interviews should be conducted with a dedicated translator with transcription undertaken by another set of researchers who can validate the quality of the interviews and highlight any challenges.

3.8 Citizenship and Indigeneity

This theme emerged strongly in both contexts. In South Africa, it is a means of exclusion but also zama zama who hold South African citizenship view it as meaningless in their lives. Being identified as a South African had no real meaning. Nonetheless, how this question was raised was also a very delicate matter. To ask someone if they are South African or where they come from is a tough question due to the context of exclusion and xenophobia. In one case, a young man in Khutsong responded angrily noting that his whole life had been marred by his inability to present his birth certificate and that had led to him giving up on his life and dropping out of school. He was so deeply hurt by this. The manner the question was posed was inappropriate. The question wascrudely

asked,whether he was a South African instead of the usual careful approach of asking if he had an ID. This had been learned from previous interviews where the question of citizenship was reduced to a bureaucratic matter of possession of documentation. It therefore does not have bearing on a person’s identity or sense of belonging to the country and nor is it something that defines their being. Other inappropriate questions were if a person planned to ‘return home’. This happened in one instance. Such a question was inappropriate in how it was posed. The attempt was to understand migrants’ link with their places of origin and what concrete goals they intended to achieve with the zama zama work. It was possible to explore this without asking such a prejudice-laden question. As a migrant in South Africa, I could have avoided framing questions in this manner. In Ghana, during the interview with the District Assembly presiding officer of Ahanyewudua (which means ‘this place is not yours’), she narrated the history of the village she had mentioned to explain the meaning behind its name. It was fascinating to learn the village was named such by its founding chief who was forced into exile and named the village to taunt those who expelled him from his village of origin. She also explained that the writer had no right to undertake small-scale mining in Ghana which was preserved for citizens. The positionality of this writer was also highlighted by the spokesperson of the Obuasi branch of the Ghana Association of Artisanal and Small Scale Miners who also said that this researcher could not undertake mining as a non- citizen. Participants in this study were responding to their interpretation of the author as foreign and the entitlements which could therefore not be claimed. However, during interviews with the miners themselves, they were clear there were no limits on non- citizens as mineworkers. This is a significant difference with the South African situation where immigrant mineworkers are systematically criminalised.

3.9 Conclusion

This chapter outlined how the approach adopted in the study was developed. This included an understanding of the phases of the research in both countries, highlighting the selection of methods and selection of cases. The ethical values guiding the study were outlined by situating this in the conditions of the research and the challenge of securing consent. The constraints emerging from gender, nationality and class of the researcher are addressed in the section on reflexivity. This sets the stage for the

collaborative approaches adopted in the study. These relations were critical in investigating a challenging subject in harsh conditions. The limitations of this approach were made apparent with the quality of research. The manner that citizenship and indigeneity emerged as an important theme and affected the fieldwork was also highlighted. In both countries’ cases, the fieldwork was challenging to conduct in the context of criminalisation. Nonetheless, the challenges in themselves were revealing of internal dynamics within petty commodity production and petty capitalism and provided insights into the contradictory role of the state and LSM operations. It also revealed social and political aspects of galamsey and zama zama operations. The selected cases were limiting in terms of not encompassing a more visible role of women who, given the data gathered, are depicted as being marginalised in Obuasi and Gauteng. More time was required to ensure that women who played different roles in ASM operations would also have their perspectives, analyses and experiences captured. A relational comparison could have also been undertaken in this study with additional fieldwork in AGA concessions in South Africa. The language barrier introduced distortions that had to be controlled. The translation being undertaken by research associates and the presence of a postdoctoral researcher during fieldwork in KwaThema assisted in addressing some of these. The research teams in both countries also enabled the study to be more grounded, balanced and engaged. The narratives which emerged have been insightful of the history of the evolution of ASM, degree and nature of organisation, constitution of citizenship and indigeneity and the persistence of criminalisation and legitimation of zama zama and galamsey. Overall, this provides a basis to elaborate on the persistence of ASM, and the factors which explain why the state and LSM operations continue to simultaneously enable and hinder the further evolution of the sector.

Chapter 4: Policy Approaches to Formalising Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining and Implications for Petty Commodity Production

4.1 Introduction

Artisanal and Small-Scale mining (ASM) has increasingly become globally recognised as an important livelihood strategy with the need for its integration into poverty reduction strategies being affirmed, particularly within the context of increased impoverishment of rural populations and the search for alternative livelihood strategies to subsistence agriculture. In the meantime, there has been increasing interest in the role of women directly and indirectly involved in ASM who, among other things, carry the burden of care work in conditions of extreme precarity. Even though the activities remain largely criminalised and informal, formalisation was taken up by countries in the global South in the 1980s and 1990s in response to attempts to integrate the sector into the minerals’ economy, expand the tax base and eliminate so-called illegal activities (McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). Either specific legislation on ASM was passed, as in Ghana in 1989, or general mining laws were reformed. In this vein, intensified interest in the informal economy, as a route to poverty alleviation, led to a wave of legislative measures in the 1980s and 1990s seeking to regulate ASM, as a first step to formalisation. However, the cases in Ghana, as in other countries, have shown how these measures have created new challenges with ASM remaining largely illegal. Regulation has tended to sharpen and entrench mechanisms of exclusion, such as bureaucratic red tape and costs of licensing, resulting in the persistence of informality and criminalisation. The study grapples with the challenge of defining ASM and ties this to the conceptual framework adopted with a focus on petty commodity production and petty capitalism. These concepts, based on an understanding of capital in motion, enable the study to investigate the process of evolution of cases in Ghana and South Africa. In South Africa, abandoned and active mines have become sites of contestation over natural resources. Tailing Storage Facilities (TSFs) have also been the centre of reprocessing for artisanal miners, alongside mining corporations who have renewed

interest in contracting firms to undertake this. However, ASM in gold tends to be undertaken clandestinely or associated with illegality. Legislation itself rests on a crucial premise of the protection of private property, as opposed to the commons. Moreover, the existing legal framework in South Africa has not explicitly defined ASM as illegal. Instead, it is at best ‘non-legal’. In the meantime, the state has also responded to pressure from civil society groups and a committee of zama zama in Kimberley to license operations on a pilot basis (Tlhabenelo, 2018). It is therefore useful to reflect on international experiences of regulation while taking cognisance of what this reveals about the contradictory nature of the state. The chapter explores this by investigating the challenges with defining ASM, the historical processes of dispossession, the emergence of large-scale mining in South Africa and outlining policy gaps and gendered implications of interventions.

4.2 Defining Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining

The problem of defining ASM has plagued researchers, policymakers and civil society for over three decades (Hentchel et al, 2002). The use of concepts such as ‘pre-capitalist production’ ‘peasant mining’, ‘indigenous mining’, and ‘African diggers’ (Lanning and Mueller, 1979; Graulau, 2006; Graham, n.d.) points to the differing ways this form of mining is understood. In a study on indigenous mining in the Philippines, Graulau (2006) conceptualized petty commodity production in mining in the contemporary period as ‘peasant’ or pre-capitalist, and traces its roots as providing the basis for the penetration of transnational capital. This she outlines as primarily relying on women’s knowledge, skills and labour. However, Lahiri-Dutt (2012a: 203) points to how this is yet to be demonstrated. In part, these terms also reflect how mining which was responding to the impulses of the domestic economy had its own character. This counter mode of production was displaced by being drawn into the orbit of an expanding global capitalism. The entry of financiers into the economy, and the backing from the colonial administration, laid the basis for dispossession and ultimately elimination of artisanal miners in South Africa. In the precolonial period, mining was supplementary to subsistence farming and tended to be connected to spiritual and cultural value and indicated status. In terms of metallurgy, iron, copper and salt were the key commodities traded at the time. The quality of iron produced was of such a standard that the heavy concentration of carbon led some to

categorise it as steel. Well into the 19th century, iron wrought in Africa was considered of a higher quality than that which was produced in Europe with the latter considered by Africans as being ‘rotten’. This gives a strong indication of the forms of production which did get displaced with the later expansion of mining firms with the aid of the colonial and post-colonial state (Lanning and Mueller, 1979: 27-28). The dispossession of indigenous miners and the entry of large-scale producers with financiers in the metropoles was a general trend on the continent, and the global South (Lanning and Mueller, 1979; UNECA, 2011). It has also been suggested that categories can be developed with reference to the scale, degree (if any) of mechanization, number of workers, techniques deployed and the level of capitalization (Noestaller, 1987). Hentchel et al (2002) advises that these do not need to be present in all cases but can be combined to suit the country context. However, Noestaller (1987) explains that even the number of people working at a site cannot be used to conclude on the actual scale of an operation. The capital intensity and nature of deposits can shape a mine operation and distort an understanding of the scale of an operation. Mutemeri and Petersen (2002), referring to the South African Small Business Act of 1996, categorise businesses as micro, very small, small and medium, but this is not helpful when it comes to mining. Labour intensive operations in mining can utilise a fraction of the finance used by capital intensive operations run by far fewer workers. Also, ASM is not easily categorized as being either formal or informal, on one hand, legal or illegal on the other. Even in contexts where regulation has been attempted, as in Ghana, it is still primarily criminalised. The South African Chamber of Mines has sought to make a distinction between ‘criminal networks’ operating in ASM and those operations that are based in communities (SAHRC, 2015). In South Africa, as in Ghana, ASM does not only include precious and semi-precious minerals and metals but also non-precious minerals such as clay and kaolin. The latter however do not draw as much interest to control the value generated in ASM operations due to the low level of returns. Debrah et al (2014), in a similar vein to Ledwaba and Mutemeri (2017: 3), in a comparative study between South Africa and Ghana, add that ASM ought to be understood as existing within a continuum, and operations sufficiently contextualised. This includes junior miners. They therefore make a distinction between artisanal mining, on one hand, and small-scale mining, on the other. The former ‘… refers to unorganized mining activities that do not make use of sophisticated machinery, whereas 'small-scale'

is used in the context of organized miners that may not necessarily use sophisticated machinery but have a higher revenue turnover’. Instead, they propose looking at each form of ASM differently. The need for a distinction offered by Debrah et al (2014) is appreciated; however the presumption that artisanal miners are ‘unorganised’ needs to be further nuanced. The lack of sophisticated machinery or technology in an operation does not preclude some form of organisation. This may not be a formal structure, such as a cooperative or association, but there are values that guide how work is organised in informal mining operations. In the case of artisanal miners in gold production, there needs to be an agreement on where and how to process the ore or reprocess the waste from mine dumps. A basic principle of mutual respect and recognition of the right to work an area is needed to ensure a group can operate in an area, even if each individual operates autonomously. The interaction with middle men where the precious minerals are sold also needs to be negotiated and agreed upon by the teams collaborating in an operation. The question of safety and risk underground also depends on sharing information based on experience built up by the artisanal miners themselves. All this takes a degree of collaboration and agreement. These informal practices and principles, which enable some form of self-regulation of work and inter-personal relations in ASM operations (however fragmented they may appear), hold the potential to be supported for autonomous self-organisation by artisanal miners. Depending on the context, this can be in some form of interaction with communities affected by mining or other civil society groups. The state plays a crucial role in shaping these interactions in the manner it shapes the mining regime and economic policy more broadly.

4.2.1 Implications of Definitional Problems for ASM Policy

The mining regimes in Ghana and South Africa appear to cater for small-scale miners without any interventions that are also tailored to artisanal miners (SAHRC, 2015). There is also a need to understand the differences among artisanal miners. Within operations, sponsors and supervisors in charge of more profitable operations, who are usually men, are more likely to be better placed to access capital, technology, information on deposits and capacity building services. Altogether, this has bearing on barriers to obtain a licence.

Debrah et al (2014) conclude that a lack of definition has in fact undermined interventions and finer classifications are needed to fill this gap. Geenen (2012: 2) attributes this challenge in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) mainly to legal and policy limitations which are also a product of the period of neoliberal reforms which led to large tracts of land offered to industrial scale mining corporations as concessions, at the expense of small-scale producers. In these conditions, small-scale producers are unable to compete for concessions which are worthwhile. Also, in conditions which are increasingly competitive, industrial scale mining companies are less willing to let go of concessions, even if they are marginal. Few countries have made a distinction between artisanal and small-scale mining. The government of Ghana has defined small-scale mining as ‘operations of individual Ghanaians or organized groups of Ghanaians (4–8 individuals), or a co-operative often of more individuals, entirely financed by Ghanaian resources at a certain limit, and carried out on a full time basis using simple equipment and tools’. It also refers to prospecting and mining in an area designated, and which uses specialised technologies and methods not involving substantial expenditure’ (Bugnossen, 2005: 9). Also, a false dichotomy between the formal and informal sector undermines understanding of the linkages between ASM, on one hand, and Large-scale Mining (LSM), on the other (Altman, 2008). The contributions of ASM to the formal economy has been quite startling. In Ghana, diamond production is solely on the back of ASM.2 ASM has also contributed 31% of gold production, greater than any single LSM in Ghana. This has left research on artisanal and small-scale/informal mining in a rather ambiguous state, without a clear definition, with the adoption of a continuum approach (Debrah, Watson and Quansah, 2014; Ledwaba and Mutemeri, 2017). It may be the case that arriving at a firm definition may not actually be helpful. It may instead be more appropriate to arrive at context-specific descriptions situated within the history of the evolution of the particular instance of mining and the production and reproduction processes shaping operations. The former will entail unpacking the

2 Ghana Chamber of Mines reports a decline in production of diamonds from 185 376 in 2015 to 141 005 in 2016 mainly due to a short fall in production from small-scale miners. No explanation is provided for the shortfall. Available at https://ghanachamberofmines.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Performance- of-the-Mining-Industry-in-2016.pdf

configuration of relations between the state, transnational mining companies and ASM operations. The latter also calls for going beyond ASM which is found to be a nebulous definition. Instead, more precise forms of mining ought to be identified to explore production relations, organisational forms, geological aspects, degree of mechanisation, sources of finance, extent of reinvestment, and gendered segmentation of labour, among other things. To build towards this approach, the study interprets cases selected in both countries as forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. These are not neatly separated but are instead understood as being in a process of evolution. With regard to this, petty commodity production and petty capitalism are in motion, in a process of becoming capital, but never being. Beyond this, it is also important to understand the elements that shape the character of these forms of mining. The study argues that these elements are linkages, orientation and logic. These aspects tend to be endogenous factors. While the contradictory state interventions and LSM operations are exogenous factors. For instance, it is necessary to better understand the linkages between ASM operations and the domestic economy. Munakamwe (2014: 10-11; 2017: 173) illustrates how underground gold mines’ product is not only exported to the international markets but also supply refineries, such as the Rand Refinery, in South Africa. The Rand Refinery was established in 1920 by the Transvaal Chamber of Mines. It made the shift to processing newly mined gold in 1998. The Rand Refinery smelts, refines and recovers precious metals and adds value for luxury goods, industrial and retail uses. They also recover precious metals from electronic waste. Scraps, low grade and recycled precious metals are refined in the plant and therefore it is understandable how zama zama can channel gold mined in Durban Roodeport Deep mine. The Rand Refinery has a network which supplies its Germiston plant with precious metals from East, West, Central and Southern Africa. It also has projects to provide training on jewellery design and manufacturing. The firm also markets South African semi-processed gold in the international market as well as providing a Small Medium and Micro Enterprise production hive for jewellers in the Ekurhuleni Jewellery Project (Rand Refinery, ND). Taking into account the form of linkages related to the ASM operation can help inform a typology that brings into view the social, political and economic factors shaping how it is regulated in mining. These categories include types of mineral, methods

deployed in production, the nature of linkages within the domestic economy and the spaces within which the operations take place. A key determinant of the variations in ASM is the commodity being mined. Precious and semi-precious minerals such as gold, coltan, diamonds and other gemstones tend to attract greater attention for regulation. This can entail regulations not only on concessions but also over inputs. In the case of gold, this requires regulations on possession of mercury, a key and toxic element used in amalgamation. Similar attention is not directed to regulate non-precious minerals like clay kaolinite and salt. The methods deployed can cover rudimentary and low cost tools and techniques or more mechanised and capital intensive operations. This gradual shift towards more capital intensive and mechanised operations has been ongoing as the sector also expands production as in the case of Ghana. Therefore, the scale of the operations can be related to the degree of capitalisation and mechanisation which can lead to an expansion in labour required or also develop more specialised skills. Similarly, in South Africa, more sophisticated processing methods are gradually being integrated into gold ASM operations to undertake tasks like crushing rock ore. This evolving sector therefore requires regulations that seek to provide the required extension services to support operations especially due to the higher risks borne by ASM miners and women who also undertake care work. What will also be important to build on is an understanding of what ASM, in all its variations, means in the broader context where LSM has historically dominated the market. The state is also heavily skewed towards LSM to support, enable or facilitate mining in its regulatory role. To this extent, the focus in determining what becomes the focus of intervention by the state (be it regulation or non-legal status in South Africa) tends to centre on where, how and what is mined. The focus on precious minerals, in particular, dominates the emerging discourse around ASM and contestations around regulation and criminalisation.

4.3 Policy Gaps in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining

Artisanal mining has largely been understood as being poverty driven, and simultaneously offering a potential to alleviate it. In the 1980s, it had been assumed that artisanal mining was more a product of individual choice, adventurism and enterprise units (Noestaller, 1987). This has since been contested with the dominant view now being

that it is part of a livelihood strategy in a period of economic and social crisis that should be integrated into poverty reduction strategies (Hilson, 2005; Hilson and McQuilken, 2014). The hardship imposed by the structural adjustment policies is often cited as unleashing greater economic instability in rural economies and households creating even more room for the growth of alternative livelihood strategies. Artisanal mining came to fit into this, especially with volatilities in commodity prices. The World Bank initially adopted a position of treating artisanal mining in the same policy framework as large-scale mining. Altogether, these measures have been found to be largely inappropriate and too rigid to meet the needs and the interests of artisanal miners (Davidson, 1993: 315-317; Hilson, 2005: 2-3; Bugnossen, 2005: 15; Lahiri-Dutt, 2014: 43). A more holistic approach, outlined by Davidson (1993: 316) and Hilson (2005), points to how support in technical, managerial, education, marketing and finance, alongside a focus on political, social and cultural dimensions, is largely neglected. Hilson (2005) emphasises how there is very little information on the ‘socio-cultural characteristics’, levels of mechanisation and skills acquisition that is actually known by governments, to inform policy. Additionally, Bugnossen (2005), in an overview of legislation in the global South, explains that existing legislation tends to limit upgrading and transformation of small-scale mining - for instance, provisions that there is a limit on the depth of operations, sanctions on use of explosives and the prohibition of advanced technology. These highlight how well-intentioned policies can work to undermine or contain ASM. The picture becomes even more complex when reflecting on the gendered implications of policy interventions which intersect with cultural, political and social barriers. This creates tensions in which gendered implications are particularly marked. Hilson (2005) explains how the mainstream view concerns itself with stability of the macroeconomy and use of regulatory policies which prioritise the respect of property rights, the rule of law, and the strengthening of institutions. Initial policy focus on artisanal mining was primarily driven by institutions like the World Bank and International Labour Organisation in the 1980s and 1990s, in the phase when economic reforms were being pushed through, at the height of economic and political crises and especially with the decline in agriculture and the pursuit of alternative livelihoods (in rural as well as urban areas). Moreover, in circumstances where agriculture has become stagnant, with intensified rural poverty, the rural non-agricultural economy has gained importance. As a result, ASM has been acknowledged as an alternative livelihood strategy (G. Hilson,

2001; C.J Hilson, 2006), even though there remains a gap in policy at both national and international arenas (McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). Initially, ASM was left out of poverty alleviation programs and strategies since it was regarded as being marginal and too risky by international development agencies and governments, irrespective of the significant role it now plays in the mining sector and as an integrated part of rural economies in the global South (Davidson, 1993: 315; MacDonald, 2006; McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). Nonetheless, it has been widely argued that ASM has become more widespread and is largely driven by unemployment and poverty (Davidson, 1993; Hilson and Gatsinzi, 2014; Geenen, 2012; McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). In rural economies, in countries such as Ghana, smallholder farmers are shifting to ASM in conditions when agriculture has been suffering a decline since the 1980s, and artisanal mining has now been recognised as being integral to livelihood strategies in rural economies. It is within these conditions that regulation of ASM gained traction in Ghana. Additionally, retrenchment from LSM operations, the public sector and wider condition of de-industrialisation have created a livelihoods’ crisis (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010; Hilson and Gatsinzi, 2014). In South Africa, reprocessing mine tailings has become an important area where women are also directly involved in production. Fioramonti (2018) rightly points to how reprocessing of mine tailings represents an important frontier in mining with the potential to integrate automation in the hands of artisanal mineworkers. Artisanal miners in mine tailings have found themselves, in some cases, in competition with mining firms such as Benoni Gold and DRDGOLD, keen to reprocess mine waste (See Chapter 5). In Ekurhuleni, one such firm displaced artisanal miners and took over reprocessing. However, mine tailings pose serious health risks with exposure to toxic chemicals such as cyanide, mercury, lead and even uranium. In these circumstances, ASM in mine tailings raise a serious challenge about how this form of work should be organised, especially in terms of technology, and ultimately, who should control it. This role of the state in mediating ASM in terms of its linkages to the domestic economy is therefore critical in shaping its trajectory. The nature of the linkages in the mining sector from the colonial period can be understood as undergoing a process of disarticulation. The state itself adopts a contradictory posture towards ASM which is conceptualised in the study as mediating disarticulation. The next subsection explores the contradictory nature of the state interventions.

4.4 Problems and Contradictions of State Interventions in ASM

Interventions by the state have initially tended towards formalisation which is assumed to contain the more negative tendencies of ASM and amplify its positive aspects (Davidson, 1993; Bugnossen, 2005: 5-10; Hilson and Gatsinzi, 2014; McQuilken and Hilson, 2016). Concerns have centred on health and safety but also capturing revenues as part of widening the tax base in the domestic economy from the informal sector. What has been achieved so far in cases where explicit regulations of ASM are introduced is primarily increased control by the state over output of production (Hilson, 2005). Also, it has been possible for artisanal miners to produce directly for multinational corporations or state-owned mines when they are permitted to work on small deposits or to rework mine tailings (Davidson, 1993: 318). Bugnossen (2005: 13), however, explains that conflicts with large-scale mines are prevalent in areas already covered by mining rights for prospecting or exploration where artisanal or small mine operations are already ongoing. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, where artisanal mining took a dominant role with mines abandoned during the civil war, has intensified conflicts between multinationals and artisanal miners, with the state stepping in violently (Geenen, 2012). The killing of Valerien Salumu Kalubu, who was an activist with Voice of the Voiceless, by a police unit contracted to guard the Canadian mining company, Banro, triggered another four day occupation of the Mwendamboko Hill, which is on Baro’s concession. The same police unit is documented as committing human rights abuses against artisanal and small-scale miners (Verweijen, 2017; Geenen and Verweijen, 2017). This approach of criminalisation has dominated how the state has sought to intervene in ASM. These interventions have shifted from attempts to support ASM operations to weak implementation of regulations to criminalisation and outright elimination of ASM. There is an extent to which formalisation does occur, with registration and allocation of plots as is found in cases such as Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). However, due to bureaucratic obstacles such as high cost of licensing and red tape in processing applications, only a few small-scale producers are able to do this, and thereby operate legally. In fact, in most cases the land they are given access to by the state may not necessarily be plots that are lucrative.

In another vein, they are positioned to mine areas which are not profitable for large-scale mines. This is a strategy used in the Cordillera region of the Philippines, where the Acupan Contract Mining Project was reopened to small groups of ASM miners who had contracts to work the gold mine (Chaloping-March, 2006: 201-203). In the case of Ghana, Newmont and Gold Fields are known to have attempted similar strategies in concessions which were not profitable to mine but these attempts failed with the arrangement with the artisanal miners collapsing (Hilson et al, 2013). Indications are that these forms of interventions did not secure the interests of ASM miners. Any such approach should integrate an understanding of the different interests at play even within ASM operations. This should consider the positions of buyers, sponsors, supervisors, mine workers, suppliers for inputs and additional services and so on. The position of women and undocumented migrants also deserves specific attention. The absence of such an approach informing interventions speaks to policy failure (Hilson, 2005; Hilson, Yakovleva and Banchiriga, 2007). Geenen (2012: 3-7), in reflecting on the rationale behind formalisation, identifies how underlying this is a logic of creation of private property rights as ‘exclusive, transferable legal rights’ as opposed to common property rights held by the state. In the South African case, this has led to distinctions being made between ASM operations on concessions or mining shafts in active or abandoned mines as criminal activities and the traditional and local authority as potentially informal ASM which can be legalised (Ledwaba and Mutemeri, 2017: 8). This has translated into defence of property rights of transnational corporations and the outright criminalisation of ASM in precious minerals and metals. Meanwhile, the principles of communal ownership through local and traditional authority are more likely to be applied in the case of non-precious minerals. This is assumed to be an essential prerequisite for economic growth and productivity. However, this goes against a perspective which views artisanal mining as a livelihood option which seeks to address the problems of poverty and unemployment. Alongside other challenges with formalisation, mining titles have been found to lay the basis for the entry of multinational corporations, since governments give preference to them. Bryceson and Geenen (2016), in examining the case of DRC and Tanzania, highlight what they describe as ‘frontier’ artisanal mining operations which develop rapidly in the context of economic and political crises. These operations are primarily exploring deposits which would be developed by multinational corporations. They describe a

process of professionalisation, skills acquisition and a shared occupational identity emerging outside of the control of the state. In the mining frontiers, new economic and cultural practices emerge in contrast to agriculture based communities. In the absence of privatised forms of property ownership, therefore these, had to be created which further denotes the foundations of economies based on multinational capital. They conclude the trend of imposed formalisation in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not just a top down measure but an attempt to use technical and bureaucratic means to resolve what are social and political problems. Referring to the establishment of private property rights in 19th century United States and Australia, this process unfolded as the numbers of miners increased and technology also grew more complex (Geenen, 2012). This echoes the experience in the diamond diggings in South Africa, and which had bearing in gold mines in South Africa, when independent diggers were swept aside by financiers. In contemporary South Africa, it has been proposed that there is a need to distinguish between registered operations, traditional operations (outside of the law)3 and those operations that are outside the framework of the law in active and abandoned mine shafts. It is important to note that the latter are not illegal operations since there is no explicit legislation to cover them. Instead, they are non-legal with legal action taken on trespassing for instance (Munakamwe, 2014: 13). While it is also acknowledged that LSM often violate laws and undertake operations which function ‘outside the legal framework’, this is not addressed with urgency. Alongside these consequences are environmental destruction, health and safety of mining communities, and labour rights, among others as illustrated in Obuasi in Ghana (Akabzaa et al, 2007). The consequences of this have set the stage within which ASM operations have expanded. Instead, Lahiri-Dutt (2004: 126-127) points to worsening poverty and exclusion from formal mining with ‘a decaying subsistence base’. She further highlights the expansion in formal mining possibly spurring an expansion in informal mining. Citing the case of Indonesia, she draws attention to the convergence of democratisation and expansion in informal mining. With a longer period in view, Lahiri-Dutt (2014: 41-42) identifies colonial laws and postcolonial national mineral laws, ownership of natural resources by states, and environmental and social degradation by state-run or private

3 These include kaolin clay, gems and alluvial diamonds and tend to be described as informal mining (Ledwaba, 2017; Munakamwe, 2014).

multinational corporations. Ultimately, she concludes that a ‘politically engaged, historically informed, and locally embedded’ understanding is required. Andrew and Hilson (2005: 23), in reference to land use conflicts between small and large-scale producers, explain that liberalisation in the mining and minerals sector was intended to be facilitated by formalisation of informal mining. To ensure that foreign investors have access to land and mineral resources, formalisation of informal ASM was pursued to organise and localise mining activities. Davidson (1993: 315) explores further the question of transformation and upgrading of artisanal mining operations to amplify the potential of artisanal mining and minimise its drawbacks. The potential can be explored through value addition and supply of raw materials for local industries. Local refineries, for instance, can benefit from local supplies of raw materials. Therefore, the reconfiguration of artisanal mining can take different forms depending on the interest of the actors. For artisanal miners, policy focus has been on acquisition of mining rights, finance and support with marketing and appropriate technology. Other interest groups may focus on setting up organisational structures (cooperatives or associations) to facilitate upgrading the level of mechanisation while others would focus more broadly on building an indigenous viable mining sector. He also adds that experience from local participation in small-scale mining operations can provide a good basis to build. However, he also cites the case of Bolivia, where former mine workers participate in artisanal mining operations with a better ‘appreciation for scientific management skills’ to ensure the projects are viable. In the meantime, in practice, due to the leeway given to multinational corporations, there is a tendency for ASM operators to be prohibited from concessions that they are keen to access. By ignoring the interests and needs of ASM miners in this process, governments have largely undermined the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. These conditions have fuelled so called illegal operations (Bugnossen, 2005). The statement by the Minister of Mineral Resources, Mr. Samson Gwede Mantashe that permits issued in Kimberley are intended to curb zama zama operations by cutting off buyers who are linked to global markets, affirms the view that this measure is not intended to support the zama zama in the long run (Radio 702 News, 2018). In Ghana open cast mining has been pursued by LSM and has had devastating effects by displacing communities and destroying the environment and livelihoods (Akabzaa et al, 2007). Alongside this is the expansion of ASM which has been largely

outside the legal framework after regulations were introduced in 1989. This has also had significant effects on livelihoods, and more recently, devastation on the environment. Small-Scale investment in more efficient technology from China has intensified these tensions in recent years. This is more so since this has also broken laws which prohibit non-Ghanaians from investing in small-scale activities. Altogether, this has fed the rise of campaigns against illegal mining in Ghana (Ahiadeke, Quartey, Bawakyillenuo and Mensah, 2013: 9). Nonetheless, this provides an example where there has been increasing sophistication in ASM operations, and along with this, a sharpening of contradictions and tensions within society. The gendered segmentation of ASM operations further unravels another layer of contradictions which have bearing on outcomes of state intervention.

4.5 Gender and Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining

Attempts by the state to intervene in ASM have at times sought to ensure access to mining concessions, mine titles and even technical support. However, where concessions have been given, these are usually under duress or for portions which are largely ‘mined-out’. In a chapter on Women and Mining in South Africa, Valiani and Ndebele (2018) draw on field work in Kimberley, which has been mined out by the mining giant De Beers. However, smaller deposits have drawn in artisanal miners who are now forming cooperatives to license their operations. This has undermined the ability of agents or middle men to pay the miners below global market prices. This initiative is being driven by artisanal mining groups themselves and represents a crucially important example. The example of artisanal and small-scale miners in Brazil is also indicative of how this can go wrong. In 1993, 90% of an estimated 300 000 garimpeiros (Brazil’s equivalent of South Africa’s zama zama) have tended to operate outside unions or cooperatives. This was primarily due to the high cost of licensing operations, but also due to prohibitions from preferred concessions (Blore, 2008). This is similar to the problem faced in countries like Ghana. Mining companies in the Philippines (with the Benguet corporation at its Acupan mine) (Chaloping-March, 2006: 190-191), Zimbabwe and Ghana (Tarkwa Gold Mine), have made arrangements with artisanal miners to operate in marginal deposits or abandoned mines or to rework mine tailings, to purchase from them directly.

In cases where women have been recipients of targeted support to own mining titles, as in Tanzania, they face further hurdles in mine sites where men and chiefs do not recognise their rights. Not only are women undermined, in extreme cases they are perceived as a threat and come under violent assault. This is reinforced by women tending to be marginalised in auxiliary services or processing which excludes them from gaining a greater share of surplus extracted. As family labour, sometimes women are not even paid a daily wage by men in control of production but instead receive gifts (such as clothes) or nothing at all (Tallichet, Redlin and Harris, 2005: 191-192). This draws attention to the dynamics within artisanal and small-scale operations and inequalities which deepen in conditions of extreme precarity. Even in such conditions, women working in ASM operations still see this as an opportunity which offers an alternative to lower incomes in subsistence agriculture (as is the case in Ghana) (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010). This speaks to the contradictory position women occupy even as social, cultural and political shifts intersect in shaping production relations (and vice versa). These relations are replicated within LSM operations, which more recently have been obliged to integrate women in underground operations, and mining communities situated close to them (Benya, 2009; Ndibongo, 2014). The gendered relations which are shaped by these shifts, and in turn shape them, created opportunities and obstacles for women. This should also be understood within the framework of how artisanal mining fits within the broader set of livelihood strategies adopted by resident mining communities, and informal settlements near or at artisanal mining operations. Lahiri-Dutt (2014) acknowledges the long history of informal mining with family units working in some cases, such as coal mines in India and Indonesia. In the 1900s, women worked in these family units providing a source of cheaper labour for mine owners in formal mines (Alexander, 2007: 7; Nite, 2015). Women tend to have limited options in the job market especially with male dominance of ‘production and reproduction’. Traditional systems of land ownership, tributary and customary rights tend to be the framework that also guides which land is appropriated and who gets to decide and control royalties or compensation for instance. Amanor-Wilks (2009: 11) explains how these systems have been adapted to facilitate appropriation of land by transnational capital. Based on a comparative study of Ghana and Zimbabwe, she also points to how women in some cases have been able to navigate customary law to protect their interests by at least ensuring land is inherited by their children. Nevertheless, the problem of marginalisation persists.

In the context of predominantly agriculture based economies in sub-Saharan Africa, Bryceson and Jønsson (2014) describe a process of ‘mineralisation’ which is changing ‘the form and content of the African continent’s social, political and cultural foundations arising from the growing importance of mining in national, local and household economies’. They add that in these contexts this mineralisation process is organisationally distinct from ‘economic principles and social ties’ linked to agriculture and therefore has a transformative effect in relation to smallholder agriculture. Bryceson and Geenen (2016) explain how the emergence of artisanal mining in rural economies can potentially mean breaking away from patriarchal controls tied to agricultural production. However, there is a tendency by Bryceson and Geenen (2016) to view these relations as largely being egalitarian in nature, even though dominated by men, and also take up a rigid separation between digging (undertaken by men largely in the pit) and processing and auxiliary services (provided by women). It is, however, argued that artisanal mining has in turn reconfigured these relations in a different setting, which goes along with ‘tensions between democratisation and autocratic tendencies’ as highlighted by Bryceson and Geenen (2016), and are still open to negotiation and or contestation. This speaks to the specific ways women are both part of this ‘other’ of the excluded, but remain excluded within ASM operations via mechanisms of control over their rights to exploit natural resources, devaluing of their labour and perceived subordinate roles in society. This is a contradictory position for women to occupy in relation to economy and society. Spivak (1985: 102) describes this as a ‘violent shuttling … Between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-constitution and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the “third-world woman” caught between tradition and modernisation’ (emphasis added). This requires some reflection on the gendered nature of ASM and possibilities and problems it presents. As a critique of literature on women’s agency in mining, Lahiri-Dutt (2012b) not only identifies a problem with a focus on projecting women solely as victims, she also argues for an approach that goes beyond women as key actors in mining production or protest, or in reproduction, but also to enquire ‘what mining means to communities’. To this extent the chapter by Valiani and Ndebele (2018) highlights this where women artisanal miners themselves tend to emphasise harmonious mining communities which operate with values of mutual respect, especially between women and men. This calls

for a deeper inquiry which goes beyond an approach that assumes that the cost of ASM outweighs the opportunity for women (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010). Lahiri-Dutt (2014) adds: ‘Informal mining is yet to be deeply understood and theorised…a new feminist epistemology of mining would focus on women and men’s lives in informal extractive practices where they neither own the land and the minerals, nor are they “exploited” in the conventional sense as a “working class”.’ ASM operations in the informal sector, do not conform to the same requirements to respect worker rights as won by trade unions and recognised in legislation. It is however critical to recognise that the conditions of exploitation in these circumstances enable extraction of surplus value without the full cost of labour being factored into the final wage. It also places the risk of production on ASM miners. In Obuasi, a gold mining town in Ghana, sponsors and supervisors explained that in cases of injuries or health problems of ASM miners, they do cover hospital bills and ensure support for homecare (provided by women in the household). Women in ASM operations also face the health risks that come from undertaking processing of gold ore which usually involves an amalgamation process with mercury. In a study in Mpumlanga, Oosthuizen and Somerset (2010) concluded that some community members may be exposed to mercury through small-scale mining. The buyers of the gold from ASM sponsors and supervisors do not bear these costs. Literature on women specifically tends to focus on their roles and positions within structures. However, there is little explanation or analysis that makes a detailed account of the manner that the evolution of mining regimes, landed property and migratory patterns has had bearing on shaping the form that ASM has taken, moreover in contexts where customary laws have persisted (which are themselves subject to change or contestation) and converge to produce the gendered outcomes observed today.

4.6 Conclusion

Policy interventions in ASM continue to be a highly contested area. ASM itself is a nebulous term which is not helpful in shaping a more precise understanding of mining. For this reason, the study integrates the concept of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. These are conceptualised to be in motion and in a process of evolution with limits placed on this. The elements shaping the process of evolution are found to be the orientation, logic and linkages. This chapter focused on linkages and connected this to understanding how their functioning reveals the distinctive character of petty commodity

production and petty capitalism. It also reveals the contradictory nature of state interventions which are conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. Internationally, attempts at regulation have raised more problems and exposed tensions and contradictions. The continued criminalisation of ASM in contexts where attempts at formalisation have been attempted highlights this. Examining gendered implications in turn exposes further contradictory outcomes. It is necessary to take on board the perspectives of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining, combined with an understanding of the nature of the commodities, process of mining operations, linkages within the domestic economy and power relations within ASM operations. This can better inform policy approaches which work in the interests of ASM miners and the diverse interests in and around them so as not to deepen conditions of precarity. Beneficiation, which is also the focus of policy interventions, as it relates to ensuring linkages with the domestic economy, remains a strategic area of intervention for ensuring the development of ASM in the broader minerals economy. State interventions which seek to formalise ASM operations do not necessarily lead to progressive outcomes. Instead, the threat of deepening criminalisation and entrenching existing exclusions remain.

Chapter 5: Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism in Obuasi

5.1 Introduction This chapter focuses on Obuasi, a mining town, in the middle belt of Ghana. It traces the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. Obuasi is historically central to the emergence of LSM in the then Gold Coast with indigenous mining organised since the precolonial period. In the aftermath of the Southern African minerals revolution, LSM operations expanded on the continent in the late 1800s and displaced indigenous gold miners in Obuasi. A ban was imposed on indigenous mining in 1905. This is conceptualised as an imposition of disarticulation. The inter-war period was marked by an economic crisis which had an impact on mining which also went through volatilities which persisted until independence in 1957. The historical memory of these processes had bearing on migration patterns, land use, livelihoods and entitlements ascribed to indigeneity and had also shaped the trajectory of independent Ghana. In spite of the violent nature of these processes, petty commodity production in mining persists with the emergence of petty capitalist operations in mining. Four years after independence, a state owned enterprise took over equity shares in LSM operations, as part of the state industrialisation strategy. This model of development was thrown into a deep crisis which had been building up over decades, escalating in the 1970s. The combined effects of austerity and structural adjustment and a shift to open cast mining in 1985 (reintroduced in the 2000s) displaced smallholder farmers surviving in Obuasi and deepened the livelihoods crisis. Post-independent Ghana shows how the state sought to intervene in LSM operations, to enable the development of a locally oriented capital as part of its own industrialisation strategy. This was intended to enable economic diversification and assert national sovereignty over natural resources. The emphasis of the strategy on large-scale operations drew policy away from a focus on support for petty commodity production and petty capitalism. In spite of this, small-scale producers in diamond mining did assert their own interests with the post independence state. Nevertheless, the LSM oriented model was thrown into a crisis precipitating reforms with an austerity budget and shift to structural adjustment in 1983.

The re-emergence and rapid growth of ASM took place against the context of liberalisation and mineral commodity price boom in 2000s. Structural adjustment not only excludes from the formal sector, but it pushes marginalised populations into gaps created by capital itself. It is within these conditions that petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining undergoes a process of evolution. These processes open new areas within which accumulation by petty commodity production and petty capitalism can occur. It is argued that galamsey, composed of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists, evolve within the gaps left by LSM operations and the state. This is understood as an occupation of space as illustrated in the nine- month occupation of Anglo Gold Ashanti mine shafts by galamsey operators (that is, ASM operators) in Obuasi. The state attempted to regulate the sector in 1989, but ASM largely remained criminalised and known as galamsey. The state’s overriding role is to criminalise galamsey operators. Nonetheless, this form of intervention by the state is understood as not being consistently hostile, but shifts to a position to negotiate with, concede to or contain petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Ghana. The contradictory nature of state interventions are conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. This lays a basis to address the core research problems of the study: Why does ASM persist? Why does ASM not become LSM? The study argues that petty commodity producers and petty capitalists hold a distinctive character which emerges from the interaction of three core elements. These elements are orientation, linkages and logic (See Chapter Seven and Eight which cover these). Linkages with the domestic economy highlight this. ASM, which has been producing 31% of gold produced in Ghana, has been oriented to supply local refineries and jewelleries (Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources, 2017). The direct contributions that ASM makes to the local economy has bearing on local consumption but also in provision of a form of ‘informal social welfare’. This appears to be an expression of how petty capitalism fillis the gap left by the state in ensuring access to social services. This expansion of ASM in the economy has gone alongside varied attempts by different regimes and governments to reform the mining sector. The liberalisation phase in 1985 marked a key moment oriented towards drawing in foreign direct investment, with a focus on LSM operations (Hilson and Hilson, 2017). Reforms sought to increase incentives and reduce risks to investors and later regulate ASM. Liberalisation led to the introduction of open cast mining which had devastating effects on livelihoods dependent on agriculture.

Mining, both large and small-scale, has been a central pole around which economic life revolves in Obuasi. In the absence of comparable alternative livelihoods (in terms of income), the combined shutting down of production in Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA) in Obuasi and moratorium on small-scale mining has deepened a crisis of social reproduction. Women carry the burden of supporting their families with livelihood strategies such as petty trading and have returned to farming food crops. The loss of income and impact in the circulation of value for consumption by AGA mineworkers and artisanal operations is being felt in communities struggling to survive. The occupation of AGA for nine months by about three thousand ASM miners in 2016, with the active involvement of the Obuasi branch of the Ghana National Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (GNASSM) presented a crisis to the state and transnational capital. The response was militarisation of the mining town, and later, the imposition of a moratorium on all forms of ASM in gold in Ghana. The dynamics underlying these tensions reveal a history of coexistence which can be traced to the colonial period when the farmers and small-scale gold miners were first dispossessed. It also has drawn closer focus to the impact of open cast mining (with devastation to small-scale agriculture) and the implications of continued dependence on mining. The emphasis is on the urgent need for industrial policy which enables a transition from mining, both large and small, which is a running theme emerging in Obuasi. It also speaks to the restraints placed on the emergence of local capital in the mining sector. This chapter will examine the mining regime and development strategy of the state, landed property relations, economic change for indigenous mining and agrarian communities, and the nature of intervention by the state in regulating petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. The chapter will also address the implications for production relations and highlights ASM’s potential to enable social mobility. Overall, this chapter will elaborate on the evolution of ASM in Obuasi and the implication of the moratorium which ended on August 16, 2018.

5.2 Mining Regime from Late Colonial to Post Independence Period

The 1920s and 1930s were characterised by volatilities in gold prices. A slump in the 1920s and a labour scarcity problem led to the near collapse or closure of mines. With agriculture and commerce undergoing recession at the time, this prioritised gold mining as a strategically important sub-sector. South African companies, Gold Fields and Anglo

American, sought to rationalise the operations of small mining firms which were linked to each other. It was at this stage that, Ashanti Gold Corporation was brought into the Chamber of Mines (Crisp, 1984: 56-57). However, scarcity of labour problems persisted while wage labour was needed in the mines, commercial agriculture, and construction sectors. The labour scarcity problem was not unique to the Gold Coast or West Africa for that matter in the colonial period. In the 1890s, when the colonial administration sought to pursue industrialisation in the colony, labour scarcity was temporarily addressed through informal recruitment networks (Lentz and Earlmann, 1989). The mine depended on ‘headmen’ to recruit migrant labour to the mines by negotiating the transfer of debt incurred in home villages and offer of advanced payment of wages. Maintaining the stability of wage labour was an ongoing challenge since mine work was considered hazardous. In as much as this attempted to resolve the labour scarcity problem, it also delayed the creation of a labour regime to simultaneously ‘empower’ and ‘police’ workers (Mark-Thiesen, 2012: 37-38; Crisp, 1984: 28). In the chieftaincy system, it also created contradictions within which women have been documented to either facilitate or undermine control over land and natural resources by the colonial administration (Akurang-Parry, 2006). Lentz and Erlman (1989: 74) describe how miners from the Northern Territories increased from 37% in I924 to 55% of the total labour force in that sector in I934. Wages for migrant labourers were quite low. In cases where workers were not coerced, they were not bound by any contractual obligations. Such workers could easily change employment in response to better wages and conditions of work (Crisp, 1984). This flexibility was the hallmark of the labour regime and the emerging labour force was made up largely of migrant workers who were employed in the mines, railways, and on cocoa farms. In the 1930s, rising costs with demands for improved working conditions, taxation, lower investments and stationary world market prices, had led to a decline in the gold mines. From September to November 1947, a worker strike in the mines, and the emergence of the Mine Workers Union and role of political agitators, had added to conditions of uncertainty for large-scale mining firms. It was in these circumstances that military presence was required at the mines to maintain control over labour (Crisp, 1984: 94-95).

This trend of decline in mining continued into the post independence period when in 1961, all equity shares in eleven operational mines in Ghana were acquired by the state, apart from Ashanti Gold Company (AGC). This led to the formation of the Ghana State Mining Corporation. In 1964, it was reincorporated as State Gold Mining Corporation. This entity had also bought shares in AGC. The State Gold Mining Corporation however ran at a loss with deterioration of infrastructure and equipment for the next two decades. This laid the basis for liberalisation of the mining regime and a concerted effort to draw in Foreign Direct Investment. In this respect, ‘geological terrain’ and state corporations were privatised to the benefit of foreign multinationals. (Hilson and Hilson, 2017: 263-265). The extractivist strategy of development with its enclave character became entrenched. By 1968, Lonhro had successfully won a bid for Ashanti Gold Corporation with a fifty year lease with the government getting 20% share of ownership of the new company while also being able to purchase 20% for £1 a share (Taylor, 2006: 121-122). This period ushered in the introduction of more rigorous labour control to increase productivity. This included cutbacks in labour support for work gangs and intensification of supervision. Prohibitions against workers underground were more extensive. They were subjected to anal examinations and prohibited from taking mercury underground or stealing gold or concentrates, among others (Crisp, 1984: 155). In Obuasi, a counter union to the Mines Employees’ Union (MEU) emerged as Ashanti Gold Corporation Employees Union (AGCEU). The overthrow of the Progress Party (PP) government4 and setting up of the National Redemption Council (NRC) further encouraged workers to demand higher wages and improved working conditions. The new government consolidated its goodwill from workers by re-establishing the Ghana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) (which had been banned by the previous liberal regime). Additionally, it also took over 55% of shares in Ashanti Gold Corporation. The MEU was reclaimed by workers who elected militant leaders. In the next three years, MEU pushed for reduced working hours, wage increases of about 40% and improved housing and recreational activities, and got the Chamber of Mines to agree to a five work- day regime (Crisp, 1984: 164-167). Meantime, a growing economic crisis placed MEU,

4 The Progress Party government held power in the Second Republic of Ghana. There was a transition of power from the military junta which overthrew the first post independence government led by the Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) and Nkrumah government.

AGC management and the government under further stress. Strikes resumed and the military was deployed again. These tensions continued to escalate through a period of tumult in Ghanaian politics with successive military interventions. These tensions escalated and came to a head when an austerity budget was pushed through parliament in 1983. As mentioned earlier, at this stage, 55% of Ashanti Gold Corporation was owned by the state. The reforms reduced the share of ownership to 19%, with the state having the option to increase it to about 20% (Twerefou et al 2007: 13). When LSM operations entered crisis, the state intervened in the immediate colonial period to take over their operations. This was also part of a strategy to rationalise the economy and enable a process of diversification on the basis of manufacturing. Surplus for mining was intended for social infrastructure and industrialisation. This strategy continued until 1983 when the scale of crises undermined state capacity to sustain these enterprises. The first wave of privatisation and closure of enterprises marked a shift from a development strategy centred on manufacturing and re-centred it around LSM mining dependent on foreign direct investment. Meanwhile, regulation of ASM in 1989 had not contained its rapid expansion. Until the mid 1990s, the state had adopted an aggressive stance towards criminalised forms of ASM. However, this did not limit the upsurge in galamsey operations which encroached on LSM concessions. In response to the failure of aggressive interventions, more conciliatory approaches were adopted as in the case of Abosso Gold Limited where there was an attempt at compromise which led to integration of some galamsey operations, while others who could not be integrated, ceased operations and dispersed (Aubynn, 2009: 64-69).

5.3 State Interventions in Galamsey Operations

In 2001, the entry of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) into government opened up policy space for reinvigorated criminalisation of ASM. In response to pressure from the Chamber of Mines, military intervention on ASM operations was coordinated in 2006 by the National Security Council. This was mandated to stop unlicensed ASM operations that were on the concessions of large-scale mining companies. This led to arrest, destruction of mine equipment and eventually a resettlement program. The initial sweep of ASM operations began in Prestea (Western Region), then to Obuasi (Ashanti Region) and finally Noyem and Ntronang (Eastern Region). The resettlement was to be

implemented in Prestea, where ASM miners were operating in the concession of Golden Star Resources Limited. The artisanal miners were promised to be relocated and reorganised in cooperatives in licensed operations (which implies titles to mine specific sites). About 6000 were to be relocated to three areas: Japa (Western Region), Adjumadium (Western Region) and Winneba (Central Region). They were to be organised in cooperatives composed of ten members each. The project failed due to many problems with implementation, including an inability to register Prestea based miners, lack of a detailed geological survey and pre-existence of ASM operations in the new sites (Hilson, Yakovleva and Banchiriga, 2007). This failed relocation project was preceded by another attempt in 2003 at a negotiated sharing arrangement in Prestea with Gold Star Limited which was taking over 90% of shares in Bogoso Gold Limited. The people of Prestea, Himan and Bondai were to be the sole operators within a site known as Number Four Bungalow. The numbers of people and pits to be worked were also limited. It was agreed that only 100 people and 100 pits can be worked on the site. Lastly, negotiations were to be key in any interventions especially with displacement. This agreement was not respected by Golden Star Resources Limited (Hilson, Yakovleva and Banchirigah, 2007). This points to strategies to displace or disrupt ASM operations, including regulation, criminalisation and negotiation, in the interests of large-scale mines operated by foreign direct investors. These challenges are also reflected in the Obuasi case where the operation of any legal ASM is precluded. After another transition of power, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) under former President John Mahama, also initiated arrests of galamsey miners in addition to destruction of equipment of galamsey operators. This was a controversial step since the same equipment could have been confiscated and redirected to other activities in local development. The harsh nature of this measure speaks sharply to the elimination of space for the further development of galamsey at all cost. Nonetheless, the NDC’s origins are in the military government, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which introduced the legalisation of ASM in Ghana. In spite of the interventions by the NDC government to intensify criminalisation of the galamsey, it was still considered a government more friendly to local capital due to its association with left-wing intellectuals and activists (Interview: Elimah, 2017). To recall, military protection which had been provided to LSM operations was suddenly withdrawn. In Obuasi, this is what preceded the nine month occupation by about 3000 galamsey miners (Interview: Elimah, 2017). It

is also after a transition of government from the NDC (under John Mahama) to NPP that a ban was placed on all forms of ASM. This was in the aftermath of a nationwide campaign in which the media played a leading role. The campaign was triggered by concerns over the environmental destruction caused by ASM operations which had expanded rapidly in scale. The following section focuses on AGC/AGA and the Obuasi Municipality, galamsey operations and the nature of state interventions in Obuasi.

5.4 Ashanti Gold Corporation and Obuasi Municipality

The Obuasi mine concession covers almost the entire Obuasi Municipality which is 220.7 square kilometres. Ashanti Goldfields Corporation (AGC), which was the first Africa- based LSM operation listed on the London Stock Exchange, was merged with Anglo American in 2004. This controversial deal came in the aftermath of volatilities in commodity prices and its character as an African corporation earned lower credit ratings compared to others. This has to do with perceptions of political instability (Akabzaa, Seyire and Afriyie, 2007: 28-29). See maps of Obuasi below.

Map 1 Obuasi Municipality showing settlements (from Medium Term Development Plan Report, 2015-2017).

The Obuasi Municipality concentrates the problems posed by ‘development’ based on a mining sector framed by an extractivist strategy. In the absence of a

comprehensive policy framework which can reap mineral rents redirected to the provision of public goods or reinvestment in other economic activities, the livelihoods of majority of the population remain precarious. According to the Ghana Statistical Service’s 2010 Population and Housing Census, more than half of the population is self-employed. Among them, 70.5% of women are self-employed without employees. The private informal sector is 74.3%, with 88.7% of women and 59.1% of men. Employment in mining had fallen from 22 000 in the 1990s to 4500 in 2010. The stoppage of production led to the retrenchment of more than 4000 workers. Mining and Quarrying accounts for 8700 employed, out of a total of a little more than 60 000. Twenty eight percent of men are located here, while there are only 1.2% of women. It remains unclear whether these statistics included the small-scale miners. It is highly unlikely since it is criminalised in the Obuasi Municipality which the AGA concession covers. Economic activities in the Obuasi Municipality (retail, trade, services, inputs for mine operations such as sacks, machinery and food) created a dynamic that encouraged the growth of other sectors. The largest sector in Obuasi is Wholesale Retail, Repair of Motor Vehicles and motor cycles. ASM in Obuasi, and nationally, expanded rapidly as an alternative livelihood option in the aftermath of structural adjustment in the 1980s and the first wave of regulation. At this point, the mining operations of large-scale mines were more extensive, especially with the use of open cast surface mining, and displaced smallholder farmers. In the case of Obuasi, communities in areas such as Sanso and Anyinam were particularly affected. A study by Akabzaa et al (2007) provided insights into the worsening livelihood situation which was set against a context of environmental and health deterioration. This is also the period in which ASM operations expanded and were being undertaken deeper underground and therefore required safety measures to ensure stability of the pits. There was also a gradual improvement in processing techniques. This period of expansion also deepened the tension with AGC/AGA and the state, and required interventions in ASM. Mr. Richard Elimah (Interview: 2017), Director of the Centre for Social Impact Studies (CSIS) in Obuasi, traces the present forms of artisanal mining in Obuasi historically.

Those doing the traditional or the real artisanal mining are indigenes, as I said it is …a family tradition passed on from generation to generation. Some

of them are Adansi and they come from the community where they reside like Sanso, they are indigenous Sanso people. The people from Anyinam, are indigenous Anyinam people and they trace their ancestry to those communities. But if you come down to those who are doing it for commercial purposes that is where you get a lot of these non- indigenes particularly northerners and they usually do not own the concession. They work for the owners of the concession. So you get a very rich person who is a Fante, or Ga, or Ewe [ethnicities migranting from the southern parts of Ghana] buying a concession in Obuasi and then employing these other people to come and work on the concession for them.

It is noteworthy that Mr. Zacharia Essiedu considers himself an indigene even though he can trace part of his family’s origins across three generations to the northern parts of Ghana. This was consistent with the miners and financiers with a similar history interviewed in this study. Mr. Essiedu explains that workers in ASM operations in Obuasi include recent migrants from Mali, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Togo and Nigeria. These galamsey mineworkers are not the subject of contestation. Instead Chinese investors who are engaging in galamsey operations have been the focus of hate campaigns as a response to their involvement in small-scale operations reserved for indigenes. Their presence in these operations are often ascribed to be the cause of the environmental destruction of water bodies. To some extent the integration of more sophisticated technology which enabled the expansion of ASM operations. Mr. Elimah (Interview, 2017) explains the manner that criminalisation has placed constraints on small scale investors and producers.

Instead of bastardizing the Chinese, instead of hounding them away, why don’t we have a certain kind of collaboration with them tell them that you can’t do mining - but then we’ll buy your technology because they are able to recover more of the gold than what our own indigenous people are able to do. So why don’t we buy their technology and then apply that to our own indigenous mining business so that they can recover more of the gold and then save our environment in some way…

If Chinese have money and they want to do mining, no law stops them from doing mining in Ghana. No law. The only thing they cannot do is to do small-scale mining because by law that is reserved for Ghanaians. So if Chinese can come together, raise enough capital and get a large-scale mining license, they can go ahead and

do large-scale mining. So the issue is not so much the involvement of Chinese but more about their involvement in small-scale mining. So we need to be attracting more Chinese into large-scale mining so that we reserve the small-scale mining for Ghanaians as the law seeks to do…I am talking about well-established Chinese companies dealing with the state and then acquiring the license through the normal processes we know and then doing mining like all other multinational companies are doing. That for me is a better option than the current chaotic approach, where every Chinese who gets a few dollars can move from Beijing to Accra, meet a Ghanaian middle man who gets them a concession and they move equipment in there, destroys the environment and leave the place as it is and move out.

This raises questions about the manner that criminalisation has been constructed in terms of identity. On one hand, there is an attempt to preserve space for local capital, while on the other, obstacles in the path of its evolution have being created by the state and LSM operations. The following section looks at landed property relations and traces aspects of the evolution of petty commodity production in Obuasi.

5.4.1 The Colonial State and Petty Commodity Production in Obuasi

Within gold mining areas in precolonial Ghana, there were varieties of mining practices which evolved out of a process ‘of centuries of experimentation’ which varied in different areas. Specialisations and technologies deployed evolved by integrating some European tools with traditional hoes. Gold mining centred on the surface deposits in soft oxides using pits as low as 5 to 20 feet. Families worked pits together and surface level mining was worthwhile. Once the surface level deposits were exhausted, some African miners would dig shafts 30 to 60 feet deep and 2 to 3 feet wide. The main threat was underground water seepage which could affect shafts 40 to 100 feet deep. This was overcome through the use of pumps in 1900. After digging, the rocks are crushed and the gold separated through a manual process of panning to separate the gold. This work was undertaken by women. Driven by an ethic of saving and reinvestment in other economic activities (Dumett, 1998: 42, 54- 65), this was a form of local capital that had its own character and dynamism within the domestic economy. This precolonial mining forms the core of indigenous knowledge that continues to shape small-scale mining in Obuasi, even after the entry of LSM operations. It also remains a part of the identity of the people of Obuasi.

The Crown Lands Bill was drafted in 1894 to enable transfer of ownership of unused or unoccupied lands. This was ostensibly to enable the entry of British plantation agriculture and secure control over gold production. Challenges to the legitimacy of this law led to the scrapping of the Crown Bill and the introduction of the 1897 Lands Bill to position colonial government as regulator of land, challenged on the basis that the British had not acquired land in the Gold Coast colony through ‘conquest, cession or treaty’ (Taylor, 2006: 162-165). The one hundred square mile concession in Obuasi was still acquired through the intervention by the colonial government in the Gold Coast. Bekwai and Adansi concessions were granted by the government but these were already British protectorates prior to the invasion of Kumasi, and therefore the indigenes could argue that they were not conquered by the British. Treaties with the British waived rights of conquest. They were to be treated as a protectorate, just as the rest of the Gold Coast colony. The nature of the AGC agreement however led to the concessions being categorised as unoccupied, even though when LSM operations began, Africans, a thousand of whom where gold miners, were evicted. The agreement also stipulated that the rights of AGC were subordinate to the rights of natives. AGC itself did not have the right to evict, and subsequently required government intervention. To control gold production, AGC licenses which were tied to the 1897 agreement. In 1923, a colonial secretary held the position that, as long as the areas being mined were not being operated on by AGC, Africans maintained rights to mine gold (Taylor, 2006: 167-170). This is the ambiguity surrounding the AGC concession from its very inception. The emergence of LSM operations did undermine indigenous mining but this did not eliminate petty commodity production in mining with its linkages to local gold smiths. Even though this covers a specific case of Obuasi, it does speak to the relatively frail legitimacy of private property in the colonial period. It does speak to the weaknesses in the colonial project itself as argued by Anne Phillips (1989: 156) who describes colonialism in West Africa as a ‘makeshift’ project. The Aborigines Rights Protection Society challenged the legality of the government granting concessions and the imposition of British property laws which undermined indigenous land rights based on a matrilineal system. Control of Ashanti lands, and Kumasi in particular, was contested even though the British had invaded those territories and unseated the paramount chief (Taylor, 2006: 166-169). This did not merely

have bearing in terms of political institutions and the imposition of colonial rule, but also had bearing on economic life. The 1936 Minerals Ordinance holds an important place in legislative measures that sought to control, limit and even undermine forms of local mining operations that were in areas considered to be the preserve of LSM operations. In Section 4 of the Ordinance, it states that it does not seek ‘to prevent natives of the Protectorate’ from ‘taking, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed…iron, salt, soda or potash’. It appears to keep an opening for forms of mining considered ‘customary forms’ of extraction, which is interestingly not referred to as mining in legislation but instead ‘taking’ the named mineral commodities (Gold Coast Gazette, 1936). The 1936 Ordinance also placed the governor in control of property and minerals in the Protectorate. This legislation covered Ashanti and Northern Territories which were considered protectorates of the British Empire. Prohibitions were placed on prospecting, mining, diverting of water or any kind of enclosure to store water for mining. Breaking these laws risked imprisonment for twelve months or a fine of 100 pounds. Even though the colonial government sought to restrain and criminalise indigenous mining, it still had to spell out forms of mining which would not be regulated in the same manner. Thus, while iron, salt and potash were recognised as customary forms of ‘taking’ (not referred to as mining in colonial legislation) minerals, indigenous gold mining had been banned in 1905. This ban was only lifted eight decades later in 1989 by a military government imposing liberalisation (Gibreh, Cobblah and Suglo, 2009: 5). The above provides a glimpse into the nature of state interventions which persisted in the post independence period until the 1980s. The regulations specifically for ASM in Ghana were implemented alongside continued criminalisation. In the midst of the rapid expansion in the 2000s, in the midst of a commodity boom, these contradictions are amplified. The nature of state interventions illustrates this in the next section.

5.4.2 State Interventions in Obuasi Galamsey

In the early 2000s, a mass arrest triggered the formation of the first committee formed by galamsey mineworkers in Obuasi. About 117 people were arrested. This also happened at a time when the surface mining had been undermined in the process of a reclamation exercise undertaken by AGA as a requirement by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The ASM miners therefore needed areas to operate.

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Obuasi Municipality is entirely within the concession of AGA. Any ASM activity is within the concession of mineral rights that have already been claimed and therefore, according to the Minerals and Mining Act 2006, cannot have a license issued. The law places the authority for determining where ASM can take place in the hands of the minister. However, areas which are mineral rich are usually not allocated as concessions for ASM operators. This places obstacles on ASM operations which attempt to operate within the legal framework. According to a sponsor in Obuasi:

There is different (sic) between license and concession so if you have a license, that alone does not [mean] you can enter someone’s concession and start mining. We also have some people with a concession, but they don’t have a license to mine, therefore if you have a license you need to also get your own concession before you can operate…

There was a time I went for a parcel of land at Asante Akyem to mine, even though concession belong to a mining company called ‘Golf Cost’, they had left it untouched for 25 years the moment they heard of our presence on the land they also came out to work, so I have to struggled with them but I had the backing of the community because I had employed 850 people as my workforce while the so called multinational company had only 9 workers with only three locals, so between me and such company who is helping build our nation?

Mr. Alhaji Ben Abdullah elaborates further on renovations he made to the local police station and the clinic.

When Police … came on swoop and arrested some my boys I presented myself at the police station and told them to release the boys because what I was doing wasn’t an illegal activity in the sensen that I have been given a license to operate as a small-scale miners just that I don’t have a concession. The community supported me to do the work because for 25 years the company had acquired the concession but they didn’t set foot on it again.

So when I went to the police station to write my statements, then they called the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) what he said was if I have been arrested then they need to arrest the chief of the area as well, then they brought the chief to the police station as we all know chiefs don’t do illegal mining (galamsey) so they

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should leave him alone and deal with me. So I told them I wasn’t an illegal miner, because if I were, I wouldn’t have done renovation at their police station and at the clinic. When I was renovating their station for them why didn’t they (the Police) questioned me on what basis was I doing it but looked on for me to do it for them only for them to come back and arrest my boys for mining illegally?

If the government had supported me, I would have gone far. The state should rather support the sector to thrive rather than kicking against it. It got to a point the company even told me they want to pay me off so I can leave their concession for them but I refused.

Around 2001, Mr. Mohammed Abubakar, former chairperson of the first galamsey committee, reports that a case of illegal mining in Obuasi was brought against 117 people. The judge stated that Ghanaian laws do permit small-scale mining so there is a need to avoid mass arrests for illegal mine work. A formal request was made by the judge to Mr Ankrah, then the mine inspector (Minerals Commission), and Mr Joseph Boampong, then the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE), to support the formation of a committee of small-scale mining. The judge also wrote a letter to the ‘mine instruction manager’ of AGC, Mr Y.B Amponsah. Mr Boampong (MCE) convened a roundtable discussion towards the formation of a committee for galamsey mineworkers. These actions were in accordance with the Small-Scale Gold Mining Law 1989 which made provisions for the formation of a committee of small-scale miners. An amendment to the law in 2006 also made provisions for a small-scale miners association. These were to be led by the District Chief Executive of the Minerals Commission or the representative. The first meeting for the formation of the Committee was held at the National Democratic Congress Party office at Tutuka which was located close to a police station. Only seven people turned up. During the meeting one of the miners declared his discomfort at the close location of the meeting to a police station. He said ‘a thief and a police does not live under one roof’. He explained that he cannot be part of such meeting and left along with others. The meeting had to be closed and a better venue selected. The next meeting was held at the more secure Boete School Park. The attendance was high and composed of only workers. No sponsors were present. Women were also at the meeting but solely as observers. The meeting covered the directive given by the judge and the need to elect leaders for the committee. The committee was to play a regulatory role over all galamsey

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operations in Obuasi. Any disagreements or conflicts were also to be resolved internally. The purpose of this approach was to avoid involving the police. A copy of these rules and the constitution were presented to the Municipal Assembly. The committee was then registered as a cooperative. Mr. Mohammed Abubakar was elected the chairperson and Mr. Kuma Moro (who is since deceased) was elected vice chairperson. The secretary was Mr. Harruna Aboagye and his deputy, the treasurer and his deputy as well. This was an all-male committee. Women were present at the first meeting, but were not actively involved in the discussions. Mr. Abubakar was chairperson from 2001 to 2009. It had been initially agreed with Mr. Amponsah (AGA Manager) and the then-MP, Mr. Ennin, that the committee would run for two-year terms.

During the negotiation with AGA, Mr. Y.B Amponsah and Hon. Ennin said they were going to get us a permanent place for us to work. If that happens then every two years we have to elect new executives so I was asked to steer the affairs of the committee untill they redeem that pledge but they never did, that is how come I was chairperson for eight years.

For that period, the chairperson was mandated to defend persons arrested for ASM operations in Obuasi. The purpose was to avoid court cases. The committee also negotiated with AGC on areas where their operations were allowed, and intervened when these agreements were violated. So, for instance, when some members had their loads seized by AGA security, the committee intervened to negotiate the release of their goods. The committee also negotiated areas where ASM operations could take place without intervention from AGA or the police. This included areas like Adansi, shaft Cut Three, Abompe and Gausu. There was also a pit that was dug that was not connected to the underground tunnels or shafts. It was called ‘Down Closed’ since it was a tunnel that leads to a dead-end. When members of the cooperative would also go beyond the agreed limits, this would put them in conflict with AGA operations. The Chairperson, Mr. Abubakar, would personally accompany the AGA security to evict the miners and later ‘deal with them accordingly’. A task team in charge of monitoring ASM activities was led by Mr. Zackaria Essiedu who reported to Mr. Abubakar, the chairperson of the committee. When miners were reported to have gone beyond their limit, Mr. Essiedu and his team (the taskforce)

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would ensure that they were arrested. Offenders are usually banned from operating ASM operations in Obuasi. In one accident at Cot Dor mine shaft (the same shaft that would come to be at the centre of the 9 month occupation about a decade later), three people died and four others were injured. The committee and a local radio station were at the scene. The Task Team did not only regulate mining operations that conflicted with AGA. They also ensured that the teams operating underground did not clash. At the Abompe shaft, for example, there were demarcations that guided the ASM miners. The task team also adopted these demarcations to determine areas of work underground for different groups or gangs. The leadership of each gang and the committee executives would deliberate to settle whatever disagreements may emerge. Leaders of the gangs do dominate decision making so this is in no way democratic. Workers in the team are not able to challenge decisions from gang leaders. In other cases, the Task Team intervenes to settle conflicts directly with AGA. In one incident, the General Manager of Sustainable Development of AGA, Mr.Yiadom Boakye Amponsah, reported a case to the chair of the committee. This involved 700 people who had taken over an AGA shaft called Adansi Shaft. The mine wanted access to that shaft so a meeting was held and they asked that miners were evicted from Adansi Shaft. An additional promise was made. AGA would give the ASM miners a contract. The committee was able to immediately disperse the miners. The basis of the eviction was their lack of any permit to mine in the shaft. Those working in Cot Dor could not challenge the fact that their operation had no legal backing. However, the promised contract was never delivered. Instead, there was a construction of an estate for the resettlement of the community in Dochiwaa. There is in a sense, betrayal by AGA. Nonetheless, there was also some degree of support from the District Assembly (the smallest unit of local government). Every two months, the membership got training from the National Board of Small-Scale Industries, which is a non-profit organisation linked to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. They have an office at the District Assembly. These sessions were on savings, investment and alternative sources of livelihoods. This section of the District Assembly was ready to provide support if a member was thinking of investing in other economic activities. They would also advise on loans that may be needed for other economic activities. The controls which were in place then have since ceased to maintain this relatively stable co-existence. Small-Scale miners were invading AGA underground

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concession regularly, culminating in an occupation by 3000 miners in 2016 to the point that there was a confrontation with a military task force and AGA officials (witnessed by some media persons). In one incident, in a process of escaping from ASM miners after they were confronted by the military, Mr. John Owusu, then the spokesperson of AGA. was killed when he was run over by an AGA company vehicle. The Obuasi branch of the GNASSM organized a demonstration against the evictions which directed anger at the AGA, both major political party offices, local government and the military. The demonstration coincided with a visit by Randgold which was exploring the possibility of a joint venture with AGA with the Obuasi concession. The protest held on October 23, 2016 was against the military assaulting galamsey miners, six days after an agreement had been reached on the movement of the miners to other areas. They held AGA and the Minerals Commission of the Government of Ghana accountable for the incident. They drew on their citizenship of Ghana and the Obuasi community to challenge this violence by the military. They asked rhetorically, ‘Is AGA bigger than Ghana? ... Is the current governing body helping AGA destroy the peace and harmony of Obuaseman?’ They sought an immediate response from the Ashanti Regional Minister and Municipal Chief Executive of Obuasi. Randgold then announced in December that it would no longer pursue the joint venture with AGA. The explanation given in a Financial Times article was that the US$1 billion dollar cost did not meet its ‘internal investment requirements’ (Wilson, 2015). Nana Ampofo-Bekoe, spokesperson of AGA, adds that Randgold (which partners in other projects with AGA in DRC and Mali) thought AGA did not have the social license to operate in Obuasi. Mr. Abubakar explains that when he was invited to the demonstration, he declined the invitation and had a debate with the organisers on live radio. The Association and the then municipal chief executive officer, Hon. Richard Ofori Agyemang Boadi (NDC official), were part of this debate. Mr. Abubakar had resigned in 2009 from his position as chairperson of the committee due to a conflict with an NDC activist. When the cooperative was formed, one of the principles was to avoid any form of sectarianism. With the cracks forming around political affiliation in the association, Mr. Abubakar could no longer lead as the Chairperson. Prior to this turn to partisan politics, conflicts were minor in comparison and related only to production on surface deposits.

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What was happening was that during the time of surface [mining] there were no police or military in the mine so after every blast we went there to collect some of the load and in the process of crumbling when someone is trying to be too smart obviously fights will break up - not to the level of what happened afterwards.

The shift to mining deeper in the underground mine shafts was a product of both the changing dynamics within the Obuasi galamsey committee and pressure for access to richer seams of gold deposits. There is also a likely link with the then ruling NDC government and its officials relating to the new committee leadership in a manner that further politicised ASM operations. When AGA attempted to act unilaterally to stop galamsey operations, the committee questioned these actions. In one instance, the military which was brought in for that operation were withdrawn. The initial agreement with the committee even went beyond control and included the provision of a concession where they could operate. This had been agreed with Mr. Y.B Amponsah (AGA manager) and Mr. Ennin (member of parliament). This was not followed through until a nine-month occupation of mine shafts by about 3000 galamsey miners occurred. Mr. Essiedu explains that the galamsey miners collaborated with mineworkers to explore shafts underground. Without this element, it would have been impossible for the galamsey miners to do so on their own. This factor also encouraged independent ASM miners to operate and were more difficult to regulate with the committee structure. The committee tended to rely on organised groups which were then part of the association, which is regulated. He elaborates:

…some of the AGA workers could take some the galamsey underground and show them where they can get gold but because they are workers of the mine, they can’t take those gold outside. They take the small-scale miners there and show them the gold so when the small-scale miners are able to come out with it, then they take their share. And those small-scale miners who didn’t join any group, once they are taken underground by the mineworkers today, the next day before you get there, they are already there mining, how do you complain?

As mentioned in an earlier section, mineworkers by 1945 were likely to have been supplying local goldsmiths in what AGC would have considered theft from the mine. The introduction of metal detectors undermined attempts at theft of gold by mineworkers

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(Crisp, 1984: 78). ASM appears to have created a different route to this, once again offering a linkage with the domestic economy. In 2009, Mr. Kuma Moro took over the position of chair of the committee, but he unfortunately died in 2016 in a motor vehicle accident. The second vicechair (co- incidentally both were named Kuma) was not aware of the negotiations between Mr. Abubakar, Mr. Moro and AGA. He therefore did not play an active role in regulating the ASM operations in Obuasi. AGA has offered to give away 60% of its concession. According to Nana Ampofo- Bekoe, AGA spokesperson, this process was already ongoing prior to the occupation, but had stalled when the NDC was in power (It was later voted out of government in December 2016). He rejected completely the assertion that there was some degree of coexistence, even if an informal agreement, between AGC/AGA and ASM operators in Obuasi. According to him, there was no such coexistence at any moment in the history of the firm. Any mining activity in the entire Obuasi Municipality has been illegal and therefore could not be negotiated with the AGA. Referring to the miners and the 60% concession offered, Nana Ampofo-Bekoe insists that:

The illegal miners are saying they want to be here with us. This is 100, we’ve relinquished 60, we’ve kept 40, outside the 40 we’ve reduced it to 20, fenced the 20, 20km stretched we’ve fenced it with concertina wires [barbed or razor wires] and other methods of fencing but the illegal miners wants (sic) to be here with us, these are not guys who are ready to talk, ready to negotiate, who are ready to coexist…what they want is, because of our underground reticulation, they’ve breached the fence and came all the way and dug pits from the surface, several hundreds of them and almost half of these places they dug linked directly to our underground operations so automatically they don’t even need to go to the shaft entrance because they’ve already accessed where they have to jump through the shaft and access. That is the sort of problem we encountered.

This highlights the persistent incursions on the AGA concession through the network of tunnels underground which span about eight kilometres. The abandoned sections seem to be the areas that the ASM miners were operating within being regulated by the Obuasi Galamsey committee. This process of self regulation was intended to contain the conflicts between mineworkers in AGA and the ASM operations. This fragile coexistence came to a head in 2008 with changes to the committee leadership, and again

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in 2013 when military personnel were removed from the AGA concession and other major mining companies. In response to this, with concern about the rise of ASM driven supposedly by foreign investors, the Ghana Mineworkers Union (GMWU) threatened to strike (Domfeh, 2013). There is still some pessimism whether the 60% concession offered, will really be profitable for ASM miners or if this transfer will occur to ASM operators in Obuasi. ASM miners are sceptical whether this transfer will really occur. Mr. Abubakar highlights this pessimism: That 60% that are talking for some of us, unless we see people working on those areas we will still consider it a mirage. I’m saying this because some of the areas you can’t mine there. The reason being that they are waterlogged areas.’ This pessimism has been validated with the attempt by the government to license Angel Group of Companies to set up an LSM operation on 60% ceded by AGA. The Obuasi Branch of the GNASSM condemned this in a press conference held on November 28, 2018 (Abeam, 2018). The chiefs, elders, opinion leaders, small-scale miners in the Obuasi Municipality and Amansie strongly object … to Angel Group of Companies, and warn the Minerals Commission to immediately stop processing particulars on the concession and avoid any conflict…We want AGA to have their peace to work without any problem with the Obuasi Community to ensure investor confidence for the progress of Obuasi and Mother Ghana.

Relations between AGC/AGA and the ASM miners in Obuasi shifted from outright criminalisation to negotiation, self-regulation and now near elimination with the moratorium. The committee itself played a crucial role in self-regulation while also acknowledging the exclusive property rights of the AGA over the concession. The committee actively sought to negotiate some meaningful limit on their operations and not to cease them completely. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of locally driven process of capital accumulation in mining remains valid, and the possibility of being directly involved in regulation of ASM, which is not being considered by the government, has pointed to how ASM miners’ interests are not integrated in policy making. The fact that the moratorium was implemented against all forms of ASM has drawn attention to a flawed policy approach. From the perspective of galamsey miners, this ban reveals an irrational state policy.

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John-Peter Amewu, the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources, announced the introduction of the 6-month moratorium in April 2017. This was in response to a nationwide campaign against the environmental effects of ASM operations in alluvial mining operations and pressure from the Chamber of Mines championed by the media based mainly in Accra. However, the moratorium also impacted ASM operations which process rock ore deposits. In effect, the moratorium is seeking to limit the continued development of - if not eliminate - local capital in the precious mineral gold mining sector. This is affirmed by the extension of the moratorium for three months, ending in January 2018, which was then extended indefinitely until the ‘illegal’ ASM is eradicated (Ghanaweb.com, 2018). As Alhaji Ben Abdullah, a financier explains:

…so if the state stops us just in the middle of it as it has done now and we’re unable to educate our children they will also have no other choice than the galamsey and the chain will continue, you can kill all of us today, tomorrow there will be another set of people doing the same work unless you allow the system to end itself.

The nature of the interventions also points to how they are designed to, at a minimum, hinder transformation, or at worst, eliminate it. In the Fundamentals of Political Economy Criticism (the Grundrisse), Karl Marx (1973: 192-193) outlines the process of circulation of capital where commodities are:

…constantly… thrown into it anew from the outside, like fuel into a fire. Otherwise it flickers out in indifference. It would die out with money, as the indifferent result which, in so far as it no longer stood in any connection with commodities, prices or circulation, would have ceased to be money, to express a relation of production; only its metallic existence would be left over, while its economic existence would be destroyed. Circulation, therefore, which appears as that which is immediately present on the surface of bourgeois society, exists only in so far as it is constantly mediated… not only in each of its moments, but as a whole of mediation, as a total process itself.

Following from this, one can view ASM, in its appearance as petty capitalism, ‘being’ in interaction with the global market. In terms of internal aspects of its evolution, petty

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capitalism emerges as local capital, with its own linkages with suppliers, sources of finance, technology and skilled labour (especially in processing rock ore). Improved technologies also present this continued improvement in production while depending on the national grid for inputs such as electricity. Even as these processes are in motion, and it comes into its own as capital being, it is only in terms of its appearance, but not its real form which is motion and best understood as becoming (Sanyal, 2009, 2007). However, this is not a neutral process that operates without mediation. Marx (1973: 30) first applies the concept of mediation in terms of how society determines how distribution occurs. However, in the quote above he goes on to conceptualise mediation not being bound to a single moment, as capital circulates, but in the entire process. It would be tempting to conclude that forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism are consigned to capital becoming by the contradictory state interventions. The moratorium reinforced the overriding role of the state to actively undermine the development of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. This interaction between the domestic economy in ASM and its rise in an economy dominated by transnational mining capital both in the domestic economy and in the global market, which determines the prices of commodities, is the wider environment within which ASM operates. Driven by impulses from the global and domestic economy, petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM present a form of resistance in relation to LSM operations within the economy. This is illustrated in the increased output of ASM total contribution to gold production. Furthermore, it is also possible for some LSM operations to integrate petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in their operations. In 2005, Newmont, a mining firm based in the United States, and the Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines initiated a process to collaborate, on regulating galamsey. This was seen as a necessary measure to legitimise LSM operations (GNA, 2005). Nonetheless, due to restraints placed on ASM’s further evolution, the extent to which this translates into an alternative pole of accumulation remains unclear. This is primarily because these forms of ASM fall outside of the framework set to entrench the dominance of LSM operations. The existing balance of power between the state and large-scale foreign direct investors is not designed to serve the needs of petty commodity producers’ and petty capitalists’ transformation. Marx (1973: 194) further elaborates on the nature of interaction between ‘domestic production’ and the circulation and exchange value under capital. First, the

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sphere of needs is expanded, to which the sphere of production responds. Local capital in production, however, is affected by the process of the expanding circulation and exchange value brought by external trade. This process begins to cause internal impulses of domestic production (that is, local capital) to be affected.

The organization of domestic production itself is already modified by circulation and exchange value; but it has not yet been completely invaded by them, either over the surface or in depth. This is what is called the civilizing influence of external trade. The degree to which the movement towards the establishment of exchange value then attacks the whole of production depends partly on the intensity of this external influence, and partly on the degree of development attained by the elements of domestic production - division of labour and so on.

According to Mr. Mohammed Abubakar:

Indigenous mining has been with Ghanaians since independence and for government to place a moratorium on it in such way that it was done, that’s cruelty. The government could have contacted we the small-scale miners and we would have policed the sector easily ourselves. In the sense that we know those whose activities pollute the environment like the alluvial miners, and trust me we would’ve flushed them out within some few days if the state had engaged us in this operation vanguard. Again, the fact some people are polluting the environment does not necessary mean the whole sector should be closed down, why don’t you look for those who are guilty and deal with them, so is the state telling us that if a driver drives carelessly and kills people in the process all drivers will have their licenses seized [sic]?

The possibility of ASM operators ‘policing’ alluvial mining is in reference to an existing practice of self regulation which became integrated in the Obuasi Galamsey Committee. The former Chairperson explains that in one incident 700 ASM miners had taken over AGC Adansi Shaft. A mine inspector connected to the Municipality Chief Executive then requested that the Obuasi Galamsey committee intervene by getting the miners to leave. The Committee Chairperson was able to do so easily by pointing to the miners’ inability to provide any legal basis for their operation in the shaft. This form of self regulation was undertaken regularly, with ASM miners being restrained from going into sections of the

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underground mine shafts that mining companies had an interest in working or when entrances to mine shafts were to be sealed. The committee’s task force assigned to this self-regulation worked with AGA mine security and would go to the extent of arresting and banning members who did not respect the agreements with the mine. The implication is that there were sections of the AGC/AGA concession where it was possible to operate without raising concerns. The measure appears to have enabled an unstable coexistence between AGA and ASM. Mohammed Abubakar further explains:

There was a time they went behind us to cover some of the pits we were working in , we went to them and asked why they did that because we had agreed that anything they will do which involves us, we have to be aware immediately the military they brought for that operation were withdrawn…There is a shaft called Cut Three you can use that to access Sanso and another called blackest anytime they want to cover those pits we were informed to before so we will drive all the small-scale miners away.

The arrangement has been contested by the Spokesperson of AGA, Nana Ampofo- Bekoe (Interview: 2017). According to a mine supervisor, at the New Abompe site, there were more than 3000 small-scale miners working the abandoned shafts. The entry into the shafts is through pits and a shaft which connects into the network of tunnels underground. The pits are 30 feet in width. The occupation of the AGA concession became an issue at the end of January 2016. This was almost two years after the mine had stopped production and shifted to ‘care and maintenance’ while continuing to process its existing stock of ore. In 2013, the military and police unit which had been stationed at the site ‘to maintain law and order’ were withdrawn (Nartey, 2016). A Movement Committee was set up in Obuasi to negotiate the miners’ departure from those shafts. This committee was composed of the Minerals Commission, Adansi Traditional Council, Obuasi Small Scale Miners’ Association, Ghana National Small-scale Miners Association, Obuasi Municipal Assembly and the Ghana Police Service. It was at this point that AGA drew attention to their ceding of 60% of their concession for ASM miners. This was to be transferred to the government of Ghana through the Minerals Commission to other parties and could be worked on by ASM miners once the moratorium is lifted. However, there is doubt that these areas will be profitable

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for ASM miners. A mapping exercise of the areas were conducted by the AGA on behalf of the Minerals Commission showing the areas which are profitable for ASM operators. As the movement committee sought to intervene to encourage the ASM miners to leave the AGA concession, there was a demonstration organised by ASM miners in Obuasi against this. They directed their anger at the police, the NDC party office and the government.

5.4.3 Social Mobility or Capital ‘Becoming’?

The layer of the sponsors, supervisors and other sections of workers engaged in transportation and digging tended not to have had access to education. This is a generation from the 1980s who were impacted by structural adjustment. Galamsey for them is therefore a transitional ‘enterprise’. As Mr. Zacharia Esiedu, a mine supervisor, put it: Yes, there is that feeling that once we are in Obuasi and there are no other economic activities in Obuasi apart from mining, why not? There are young people around with wives and children yet there is no job for them and they feel that the land on which AGA is working belongs to their ancestors, it is their birth right so why not.

ASM is a pathway to social mobility in the absence of access to education and training in higher skills. Entry into ASM was open to anyone (irrespective of level of experience) but segmented on gender lines. Women were either carriers or provided auxiliary services; they also supplied some inputs such as sacks used to reinforce pits. These economic activities were stimulated by the consumption needs of galamsey mineworkers. It also enabled the financiers and supervisors to support mineworkers when they had health problems or in cases of injuries. Mr Haruna Essiedu explains further.

There were those who [were] also selling items such as rice, cooking oil, tin tomato, fish, all these people were gainfully employed by the galamsey. Let me give you some examples, there were some Lebanese who moved to Obuasi to rent stores at Horsey Park and were selling the items I have mentioned above in large quantities. They are no more there because the galamsey has shut down. The

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sector really helped the local community in so many ways, as we speak I have…sponsored six people by paying for their medical bills for hernia operations.

Mr. Zacharia Essiedu (Interview: 2017), a supervisor of a galamsey operation in Obuasi before the moratorium, was previously a driver of a microbus in Accra known locally as a tro-tro.5 These privately-owned microbuses provide much of the local public transportation which is affordable. Mr. Essiedu (2017) had his own mini-bus and was thus a driver-owner. However, he found that his income as a tro-tro driver in Accra was not only low but unstable. In 1991, he therefore migrated back to Obuasi where he got work in ASM. He learned on the job. It took him almost a decade to dig his own pit. Mr Essiedu (2017) says, ‘I realised I could make it in there and take care of my family and again I didn’t go to school. So once I didn’t go to school I needed something beneficial to do so I settled on the galamsey.’ He was able to use his earnings to purchase a tipper truck and a cold store from which he distributes animal products. The latter continues to provide a source of income for his dependants with the imposition of the moratorium. Mr. Zacharia Essiedu (Interview, 2017) also got supplementary income from farm land on which he grows yam, cassava, plantain and maize. This is in addition to animal husbandry with poultry, goats and sheep. He considered his situation if he was depending on farming alone, in these circumstances, and concludes life would be even more precarious:

If I decide to depend solely on the farmland it will difficult because with the farming anything I grow takes not less than six months to mature. And if your child is in school you have to spend money on the child on daily basis so if you have to wait for at least six month before you can harvest your farm produce and sell before making money how are you going to cater for the child? As we speak, I have eight children. Can I farm alone to cater for the eight children? Obviously, not. I have seven boys and a girl, my first born is 17 years he is in Accra attending school and the last one is about three months.

5 Tro means ‘a bit’ hence tro tro bit by bit, referring to Pesewas (the smallest unit of the national currency, the Cedi) in Ga, one of the key local languages in Accra, the capital.

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In a situation where reproduction depends on wage labour, and structural adjustment reforms undermined efforts to ensure access to expanded social infrastructure, the ability to cover costs for education, health and daily expenses for running households becomes critical for survival. However, prior to the moratorium, decisions on spending were not necessarily directed to securing livelihoods. As Mr. Zacharia Essiedu (Interview, 2017) explains, it was not inevitable that he and other miners would reinvest in other activities; it is a product of a conscious process of accumulation. Referring to other economic activities, he says:

I did all these from the income I derived from … galamsey. You have some people who will spend theirs lavishly but if you’re someone with foresight you should be able to tell that the galamsey is not something your strength will allow you to do forever so you must plan for tomorrow…even people that I consider as my children within the gang, like about ten of those have their own houses now. Some also bought cars they are using for commercial purposes.

The shift from consumption to accumulation for the purposes of reinvestment in ASM and other economic activities is one aspect that has been observed in other galamsey cases. This tendency towards diversification is an important aspect of the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Obuasi. This is further emphasised in the form that an informal loans system has been created within galamsey operations. Alhaji Ben (Interview: 2017) elaborates:

When you are active in the galamsey and you don’t have money and you apply for loan it is easy for you because there is surety that you will pay. Even a worker can take as much [as] a 5000 Ghana Cedi loan. In some instances, some of the workers will fall sick and will need a huge sum of money for treatment, I give them knowing very well that when they recover they will work and pay back. Sometimes the workers also contribute to help their sick colleague. There was this man who was very old and he fell sick, we didn’t know where he came from but we probed and probed until we finally found his relatives then I took pen and paper and asked all the workers to contribute so we can send him home and trust me within 24 hours I was able to raise about 2400 Ghana Cedis. Then I sent one of the guys to take him home (in Mampong). When they got there, they

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were told he has left home for about four decades and they didn’t know his whereabouts, we further contributed money for the family to take care of him.

Credit is an important pillar of capitalism which ensures that it is possible to sustain and expand production. In this case, it also operates to provide an informal social protection for galamsey mineworkers who are exposed to great risks. This is particularly critical considering injuries from accidents in pits and abandoned mine shafts, but also diseases one is exposed to as a result of working as galamsey. This is not to imply that these measures are in any way comprehensive. It does not seem that women as carriers or those who are employed in the specialised task of amalgamation receive any protections or loans. Nonetheless, these initiatives within galamsey operations have the function of filling a gap left by the state in the provision of social and financial services. It also provides a sense of how production relations in galamsey operations have bearing on the distribution of surplus value. The next section addresses these aspects.

5.4.4 Galamsey Production Relations

Mr. Benjamin Annan, a former assembly member for Sanso district and a member of the national communications team of the Ghana National Association of Small-Scale Miners (GNASSM), traces the evolution of the galamsey in Obuasi. Indigenous mining utilised a honeycomb method and was combined with agriculture. Pits were dug on farmland with minimal damage to the surface area with an intricate network of tunnels underneath. The rock ore is then extracted and processed on the surface using a pounding technique, sluicing and amalgamation. In the precolonial period, the amalgamation process, which includes use of mercury or even arsenic, was not incorporated in extracting gold. Instead a laborious and highly skilled process of sifting was used. Women tended to perform this role (Ofei- Aboagye, 2001). The gold was supplied to local artisans and weighed for its value. This practice was ongoing alongside and within areas where subsistence agriculture was taking place. This method was suitable for shallow pits and was intended as a supplementary livelihood option. It did not disrupt the agrarian basis of the economy and is a clear instance of co-existence. Abubakar explains that in the Nkrumah era, in the rainy season, it was possible to ‘gather and sell’ (which then was pronounced galamsey) gold nuggets from drains. Mr Abubakar explains:

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When I came to Obuasi for the first time, after every heavy down pour when walk along the gutters you find gold in those gutters at the time and they used to call it nugget. So the expatriate (the white) will say ‘to gather to sell’ referring to the nugget. We pick from the gutters after it rained so this is how come we got the name galamsey. Actually, it is gather to sell but in those days we were unable to say it correctly as the white man will say ‘gather to sell’ we said galamsey.

In 1998, there was a shift to mechanised processing of the rock ore. A crusher to help process the rock ore was first introduced in the Central Region in Ayanfuri, a mining town 46.7km from Obuasi. On average, ten to twenty sacks were sent to the site for milling, relying on privately managed minibuses. At check points, police would usually charge galamsey depending on the quantity of sacks being transported (Interview: Mohammed Abubakar, 2017). Drawing on his knowledge based on 29 years in galamsey operations in Obuasi, Alhaji Ben Abdulai charts how prior to the introduction of a workshop in 1998, there was a low level of mechanisation that had an impact on how much they could process.

When we started the work, there were nothing like equipment. We were looking for visible gold. What I mean here is we were looking for rocks with the gold in it so in those days we didn’t collect enough load like we do these days. So we had an iron mortar with a pestle so when we get the load we pound it in the mortar and pound it but now someone can collect as many as 5000 sacks of load so we now have a machine we use. (Interview: Abubakar, 2017).

Alhaji Ben Abdulah also integrates the safety question into how the Obuasi galamsey have improved techniques and built a knowledge base of galamsey operations in Obuasi.

We’ve gained a lot (of knowledge) in the sense that when we started, there were a lot of casualties and deaths. When you dig the pit for say 30 feet, it collapses and kills people but now anybody who dies within galamsey did so because he went to steal. This normally happens when people are warned not to go to a particular place to mine because maybe the place is abandoned or there are maintenance works to be done, but you sneak out to that place and it collapse on you. That is your business, other than that ever since I entered this business I haven’t recorded even a single death for close to 29 years. This is so because

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we have safety guys who see to it that our pits are always in good shape and order. We have rules which stipulate every pit owner must ensure routine safety maintenance of the pit, failure to do so and the pit will be taken away from you (Interview: Abdulah, 2017).

The function of the safety team shows how the galamsey built the capacity to self regulate. Former AGA mineworkers were recruited to train safety teams. Mr. Haruna Seidu explains the techniques used to stabilise pits. They fill up sacks with sand and pack them along the sides of the pits across all four sides. This supports the pit and prevents it from collapsing. Every pit can take up about 1000 sacks a week. Women traders purchase the sacks in Accra and sell them for one Ghana Cedi. They are purchased in Accra for half the price. This capacity for securing safety gained greater scope with the formation of the galamsey committee in the form of the Task Team which was led by Mr. Zacharia Essiedu. The Task Team not only monitored safety of galamsey operations in Obuasi but also performed a broader scope of regulations. This included preventing galamsey from venturing into sections of underground shafts which were strategic for AGA. This is covered in the earlier section 5.6 of this chapter. Referring to a more recent operation with 850 miners in Asante Akyim Municipality in the Ashanti Region, Alhaji Ben Abdullah explains that they were organised in teams of fifty members each. These seventeen teams each had cooks and carriers as part of their operations. Each of the seventeen were organised in different ‘departments’. Mr. Haruna Seidu, a supervisor at the site, outlines the structure of galamsey operations in Obuasi. There were those who dig the pits for the access to the tunnels. Others were in charge of blasting the rock underground. Those who transport the rock to the surface from the pits are referred to as ‘loco boys’. There were those specialising in operating the crushing machine while others (also known as chiselers) use hammers to further breakdown stones into smaller bits. Others pack these into sacks while these sacks are moved to the carriers (who were women). These sacks would be taken to those who did the washing, desilting and application of mercury for amalgamation. The final stage is siltation to separate the gold on a washing board. The mills, where the rocks are crushed, can employ thirty people working with five or six machines. This latter stage of the processing is regarded as highly specialised work and requires a high level of skill. Usually team members can be tasked with this work and are

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paid as part of the team. However, due to the highly specialised nature of this part of the process, mineworkers can be brought on board specifically for this task. In these cases, they are paid in cash. This highly valued specialised task is also a high risk job since the mercury evaporates during amalgamation and is inhaled by the worker and anyone near the site. Sometimes this work is done in or near homes (villages or informal settlements) exposing the entire community, including children, to health risks.6 Mr. Seidu adds that women are often designated as carriers and are assigned to carry a number of head pans of crushed ore bearing rock per day. They start work from about 9am to 10am and close at about midday. This enables them to juggle other responsibilities in their homes. In a day, they are expected to carry about fifty head pans. He further states that women are paid a daily wage of GH₵ 30. Both men and women mineworkers are paid on a weekly basis. A carrier can earn about GH₵ 220. Others arrange to be paid at the end of the month. In Sanso, Madam Comfort Amoah, a carrier in a galamsey operation, explained the terms of her work. She earns 10 Ghana Pesewas per head pan of ore. In a day, she could carry about two hundred to three hundred head pans. With a rate of ten head pans for one Ghana Cedi, she earns twenty to thirty Ghana cedis in a day. Within a week, she can make 120 to 180 Ghana cedis. In her case, she has support for domestic work at home and therefore is able to work thoughout the day. The long term implications of such long hours carrying heavy pans of earth do not escape her. Nonetheless, as a carrier in galamsey operations, she has been able to exercise greater autonomy. For instance, there was a difficult period when she separated from her husband (who is also a mineworker in galamsey operations). In this period of separation, she was able to support herself and her children. According to her, every carrier can work for as many hours as she has the ability to bear. With the imposition of the moratorium, she was not able to find anything comparable as an alternative livelihood. She spends a lot of her days either fetching firewood or selling coconuts which give a lower return. It takes her four to five days to sell fifty to a hundred Ghana Cedis worth of coconuts. Male mineworkers in Sanso explained that a portion system can be used to pay team members. The sponsor or financier deducts his expenses on the galamsey

6 The Minamata Convention was crafted to address the health crisis generated by mercury use which intensified with the expansion in ASM in gold. It was signed and adopted in 2013 by 128 countries and was ratified by Ghana on 23rd March 2017. It is yet to be ratified by South Africa.

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operation and also takes a third of the rock ore. The male mineworkers, who tend to work directly in the pit or close to the surface, are paid by sharing ore rock. Mr. Zacharia Essiedu, a supervisor of galamsey operations, elaborates further. Mineworkers process the ore at a different location, sometimes at home, using the unpaid labour of the family members, especially women. Processing of the ore is understood as specialised work which is undertaken by gang members who are not paid for this task. However, if they are brought in to do the processing specifically, they are paid with portions. The women carriers who are paid weekly (depending on the agreement arrived at with the supervisors) are in a similar position to young men who are hired to undertake the work of processing the ore. This is regarded as skilled work but since these workers are not part of the gang, they are also paid a daily wage. This shows how women carriers are not regarded as integral to galamsey operations. This is a product of religious beliefs that have defined mining practices in the area. In a group discussion in Sanso, the men explain the rationale for the exclusion of women.

Ours is purely as a result of traditional beliefs, and we also grew up to meet those beliefs that, the rivers around and where we mine the gold forbid women. It is believed that when women are in their menses they’re not “clean” and these river gods don’t like it when such women come near it , but how would know that a particular women is in her menses or not so to avoid all the controversies of whether somebody visited the site or the riverside while in her menses they decided against women working directly in the mine.

Religious rites would have to be performed to cleanse the mine site if this happens. Yet at this point of exclusion, women still identify this work as an opportunity compared with lower incomes they earn from food crops. The cost and risks they bear are high due to their exposure to processing ore as unpaid family labour, exposure to dust, forced to bring their children to mine sites. Women provide auxiliary services such as food preparation, however, are paid with portions of the ore. This is either sold or processed at the mine site.

5.5 Conclusion

Capital accumulation, if harnessed, can enable the further evolution of the sector, greater specialisation, and access to improved technology. It creates the possibility of improved

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options for livelihood (agrarian escape for women and petty trading). It also presents risks and costs but in the immediate term appears to be less of a priority when people are faced with low incomes and exclusion from public goods such as education, clean water, electricity and healthcare. The cases investigated in Obuasi are of petty commodity production which evolved into petty capitalism. It shows a process of becoming capital that culminated in the occupation of the strategic spaces for AGA which had ceased production. The conceptual framework draws on an understanding of forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in motion. The nature of state interventions and LSM operations show that the form that petty capitalism in mining takes is also the outcome of design. This is a product of the intersection of the legal framework, the nature of economic policies, hierarchies of power (both horizontal and vertical), which have created conditions where small-scale mining remains constrained in its evolution. Historically, Obuasi presents a case where the transition to capitalism occurs with the feudal class not being able to fully act as a landlord class, and are not directly engaged in production. Excluded in this form, artisanal mining continued in the shadow of Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, with the main driver being smallholder farmers and migrant labour. Class struggles over distribution of surplus value shifts from between labour and capital in the formal sector in the late colonial to post-independence periods until structural adjustment in the 1980s. This turning point marks a gradual shift to the informal sector and builds a new space for local capital, and therefore new areas where contradictions sharpen. Conflicts between sponsors, supervisors and carriers appear not to centre on appropriation of surplus value, unlike the case of the agrarian transition in Europe where peasants conflicted with land lords and capitalist farmers over surplus extraction and control of communal land. In Obuasi, with the transition to capitalist production relations, the market reigns supreme and is not a visible space of contestation. Additionally there was no concern over what surplus is generated once the middle men purchase their gold. The property rights of AGA are also not questioned, but drawing on indigeneity for the right to mine is still strong as a source of legitimation of galamsey operations. This is a contradictory positioning found consistently in the interviews. However, the process of the growth of small-scale mining which has converged with neoliberal reforms and the commodity boom in the 2000s has led to increased conflict of two forms of capital in the

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same commodity space. Galamsey have occupied the gaps left by the state and LSM operations as a means of accumulation and livelihood alternatives. There is a parallel existence which becomes more visible in the early 1990s. The impacts of structural adjustment had ripple effects on livelihoods and migration patterns, enabling the further expansion of artisanal and small-scale mining. This also entailed integration of workshops to process rock ore. Transportation relies on women’s labour and road networks. Even though state interventions have so far ensured that ASM is by design constrained, the Obuasi galamsey committee played a self-regulatory role. This committee later became integrated into GNASSM and was drawn into sectarianism. In the absence of alternative livelihood options and limited social services and space for local capital to also accumulate, petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining fill the gap left by the state and LSM operations. Any form of stimulus that enables the further evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism is met with further interventions by the state and LSM operations (in concert with sections of civil society) to undermine this process. A mass based campaign to intensify criminalisation was needed to legitimise the state to amplify the repression of galamsey. Such overt violence, as expressed in the deployment of the military to implement a ban, is an expression of weakness in state capacity in Ghana. This contrasts with the South African case which is one of a strong state capacity. Both cases highlight state interventions which attempt to support or integrate the sector but consistently criminalise these operations. This contradictory character is conceptualised as mediating disarticulation, thereby drawing limitations on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in both cases.

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Chapter 6: Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism in Gauteng Province

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on selected cases of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining in the Gauteng province. These illustrate the process of evolution of zama zama operations in mine tailings in Vlakfontein. This highlights the degree of mechanisation, its production relations and its function as a livelihood strategy. The chapter also draws on cases of zama zama operations within an informal settlement, Khutsong, and a workshop in Brakpan. Brakpan offers a clearer case of petty capitalism, while the other cases are categorised as petty commodity production. As the chapter will show, these forms of production are all dynamic in their own ways and shaped by the broader processes of dispossession and the dominance of LSM operations. The history of South Africa is marked deeply by the intersection of the contemporary mining regime, the construction of the state and the ‘nation building’ project with entitlements attached to citizenship. Prior to 1994, race was a primary determinant of formal exclusion and inclusion in citizenship. This has shaped the manner in which the zama zama have been able to legitimise their operations and in turn had bearing on the construction of the criminalisation of zama zama. This is also reflected in the policy space dominated by LSM operations which are contested by civil society groups leading a decriminalization campaign. Zama zama, by challenging their exclusion, destabilise this status quo and possibly contribute to ‘denaturalisation’ (Hart, 2006) through a strategy of occupation. Occupation is conceptualised as a question of contesting space in a geographical sense understood as ‘nodal points of interaction…conceived as space-time that is socially produced’ (Hart, 2006: 995-996). In relation to this, the chapter attempts to extend this understanding to production relations in ASM, thereby providing insights into capital understood as heterogenous. Petty commodity production and petty capitalism are understood as being located at the lower end of the ASM spectrum, as a form of economic activity dominated by capital even when it exists outside of it. These are constantly in motion in a process of becoming capital, but never being. The cases of petty commodity production in

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Khutsong and Vlakfontein, and petty capitalism in Brakpan, illustrate a dynamic and distinct character. The study argues that petty commodity producers’ and petty capitalists’ distinctive character emerges from the interaction of three core elements. These elements are orientation, linkages and logic. Chapter Seven and Eight elaborate on these. ASM emerges in the aftermath of liberalisation in 1994 and a decade long commodity boom in the 2000s. Attempts to reform the mining sector to redress historical injustice included mandating local government to integrate ASM. This period is also marked by a decline in mining and manufacturing, which has fed an unemployment crisis and a trend towards precarious work. Gauteng Province is littered with abandoned gold mines, with some active mines being centres of occupation by the zama zama. It is within these circumstances that ASM operations have emerged not only in abandoned mines, but also in mine tailings and within informal settlements. Facing these conditions, Ekurhuleni7, a municipality in the East Rand of Gauteng, has prioritised improving infrastructure in a manner that ensures economic activities operate with some degree of synergy, spurring the development of the local economy. ASM was mooted to contribute to this process. This was intended to reverse the trend of deindustrialisation. The East Rand is historically a gold mining and manufacturing hub of South Africa. Khutsong informal settlement is located in the West Rand, another mining hub in South Africa, also in decline. These mines have been abandoned, while manufacturing has also been on the decline. The casualisation of work which was a product of liberalisation created insecure and impoverished conditions for the working class (Barchiesi, 2010). High unemployment and precarious work characterise the labour market placing greater pressure on livelihood strategies of households struggling to cope. In practice, the main instrument for intervention to redress historically racialised injustice has been Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and its reformed version, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBEE). The LSM operations with more marginal assets have revived profit making by reprocessing mine tailings which offer the

7 In 2000, Ekurhuleni was one of six new municipalities established through the most significant local government reforms since the end of apartheid. Unlike the other municipalities, such as Johannesburg and Tshwane, it is more of a cluster of urban settlements instead of urban spaces interconnected with their own dynamism. Instead, infrastructure for transport is inadequate. The municipality remains fragmented, environmentally degraded mainly due to mining, and characterised by informal settlements with poor service delivery (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012: 197-198).

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advantage of low cost production. DRDGOLD shows how a corporate entity which can be traced to the very beginnings of large-scale mining (LSM) in South Africa is encroaching on reprocessing of mine tailings undertaken by zama zama. Vlakfontein Tailing Storage Facility (TSF) shows how the entry of Benoni Gold, an LSM operation, onto the terrain of work being undertaken by zama zama in reprocessing mine tailings has undermined their survival. BEE/BBEE as an instrument for integration of a black bourgeoisie has effectively undermined ASM as a livelihood strategy in conditions of high unemployment and precarity. The criminalisation of ASM has enabled this to continue with police harassment and intensification of armed conflicts, which are at times lethal. Vlakfontein provides insights into reprocessing of mine tailings by zama zama alongside LSM operations also undertaking reprocessing on a large- scale. Brakpan is a case of mechanisation in zama zama operations, and illustrates the limits they face. Khutsong draws attention to mining undertaken within informal settlement space. In exploring these cases, this chapter seeks to explain why the zama zama persist in spite of the harsh conditions created by criminalisation and dominance of LSM operations. To answer this, the chapter reflects on the historical evolution of the mining regime, contextualises the contemporary period and outlines and draws threads between zama zama operations conceptualised as ‘community mining’, reprocessing of mine tailings in Vlakfontein, and underground mining in Langlaagte. Community mining as a concept provides a view into informal settlements as sites of production where the entire process of extraction, as in Khutsong, takes place within the informal settlement. This chapter examines production relations in ASM operations, their extent of organisation, criminalisation, citizenship and policy alternatives. The chapter not only focuses on zama zama in gold and LSM operations, but also includes preliminary analysis of diamonds in Kimberley, which has gained prominence with the setting up of a committee and two cooperatives for zama zama miners.

6.2 Dispossession and the Rise of Large-scale Mining in South Africa

South Africa makes a compelling case about extreme dispossession and an attempt to undermine African petty commodity production (Laning and Mueller, 1979). African resistance to appropriation remained resilient even after the establishment of the Cape

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Colony, and the emergence of Transvaal as a separate Afrikaner colony. African petty commodity producers sought to protect their land and cattle from appropriation. Charles Feinstein (2005: 51, 55-59) outlines how dispossession itself was insufficient to ‘free labour’ for exploitation in the mines. This dispossession had to uproot them from ‘the soil’. So long as Africans could secure their livelihoods through agriculture, there was a need for more aggressive measures to ensure that labour was available. This included the use of slave labour, taxation and restrictions on movement. Laning and Mueller (1979) trace how the discovery of diamonds changed the situation. The elimination of Africans’ independent basis of production was in the interest of white-dominated mining interests. State intervention was utilised to coax the white rural petite bourgeoisie, to accept modernisation of agriculture which included dispensing with sharecropping. The pivotal nature of this moment is captured by Lanning and Mueller (1979: 52):

During the first centuries of contact with Europe, Africa had defended her resources from outsiders, and her minerals were exploited at a rate commensurate with the continent’s economic development. But fifty years after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, the picture had completely changed. Through a combination of force and trickery, the mining companies had broken down the earlier resistance of African rulers to the foreign exploitation of African minerals. The intensive exploitation of African mineral deposits by the mining companies perpetuated and increased the differential in wealth and power between Europe and Africa, established by the slave trade (my emphasis).

Financiers with links to the metropoles emerged, and a process of merging of claims began. The cost of mining was high since claims were close together. Nonetheless, there was a concerted attempt to ensure small claims as units of production were protected. No more than three claims per digger were allowed. Taxes were raised to support the new colony of Griqualand West while there was also an attempt to regulate claims to secure the protection of small diggers from proprietors (Laning and Mueller, 1979: 34). For instance, in Kimberley, more than half of the workforce were African diggers. The diamond mines of Kimberley alone had 3600 claims (Laning and Mueller, 1979: 33). Referring to Innes (1984), Ashman, Fine and Newman (2013: 250) who explain that it was at this point that legislation was passed to ‘limit claims per (white) miner’. These

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limits were intended to prevent larger players from dominating the small diggers. This protectionism was eroded over three decades and by 1902, conglomerates had emerged in the mining industry. In this period, the British colonial government considered the small diggers to be ‘enemies of private properties’ and the ‘fragmented and chaotic’ nature of the industry to be an obstacle for raising taxes and creating a stable environment for future investments. Mismanagement of the colonial administration of Griqualand West, in addition to other factors, fuelled a financial crisis which worsened and put at risk protections for small diggers. The latter organised under the Kimberley Defence League and became an armed threat to the Griqualand West colony (Laning and Mueller, 1979: 33-39). These desperate conditions were manipulated by the large claim owners, financiers and company representatives. The latter swiftly took advantage to further escalate the situation and ensured the Griqualand West colony capitulated to British control. The transformation of the diamond industry was consolidated by barring Africans from becoming skilled workers, holding claims or even ‘washing debris’. A pass system was also introduced and was later entrenched with the construction of the mine compounds (Laning and Mueller, 1979: 38-39). This laid the basis for the future of the mining industry and South Africa. Wolpe (1972) contends that the ultimate creation of reserves laid the basis for entrenching a system of cheap wage labour, where women played an important role in reproduction, to primarily supply the labour needs of the white mining capital. However, this is contested by Lipton (2007: 43) who instead points to how the reserves served the interests of plantation farmers, while mining companies shifted more to migrant labour from beyond the borders of South Africa. It is also crucial to note that this counter position also refers to how African agency to resist dispossession and purchase land, informed legislative interventions to restrain Africans. Beinart and Delius (2015) provide a useful exploration of the 1913 Land Act and the contestations that preceded it. These shifts lay a basis for the emerging mining industry, and provide some explanation for the ways in which Africans became specific targets in a segregated society, entrenched under apartheid by the National Party. It also shows how ASM was very quickly crushed by large-scale financiers and mining firms, with the support of the state, as part of a broader push to dispossess Africans and create a cheap wage labour system. It also speaks to the ore deposits which required increasingly capital intensive

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methods of extraction and therefore laid the basis for financiers and large-scale mining firms to control the mining industry at this nascent stage. This consolidation of ASM operations within conglomerates laid the basis for the dominant role of LSM operations. Large-scale mines required the use of deliberate coercion with state support to undermine ASM producers and relegate Africans to cheap wage labour. It is against this backdrop that ASM in the contemporary period is largely criminalised or categorised as non-legal. Ledwaba (2017: 34) and Mutemeri and Petersen (2002: 288-289) highlight how policy shifts after 1994 marked an attempt to support the entry of historically disadvantaged South Africans. The obstacles to the ASM operations identified centred on access to markets, finance, deposits, and mineral and land rights. The Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act initially enabled permits to be issued for operations not exceeding one and a half hectares (Department of Mineral Resources, 2002, 2008). By 2011, about 1030 small-scale miners were registered in South Africa (according to the Mine and Health Safety Council cited in Ledwaba and Mutemeri, 2017: 3, 35). Beneficiation has also been identified as a key area for building stronger linkages with the domestic economy and ensuring integration in value chains. Previous legislation depended on the National Small Business Amendment Act (Department of Trade and Industry, 2003), which defined operations under Mining and Quarrying as medium, small, very small and micro level categories, with employment categorised by total full-time paid workers at two hundred, fifty, twenty and five workers respectively. In terms of expected turn over, they were pegged at R39 million, R10 million, R4 million and R200 000 respectively. Total asset values (with the exclusion of fixed property) was pegged at a value of R23 million, R6 million, R2 million and R100 000 respectively. Section 2.8 of the Mining Charter (Department of Mineral Resources, 2017) makes provisions for micro or small-scale players in mining. It categorises mining firms operating on a micro scale as having a turnover of less than R1 million. These micro and small-scale actors are excluded from mining sector transformation targets such as mine community development, employment equity, ownership and procurement. This shows how ASM is understood as a range of operations based on turn over, number of workers and asset values. These approaches present a focus on employment, revenue and scale of operations but do not speak to mechanisation, specialisation of skills, methods of production or linkages within the domestic economy. Elements such as

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this would provide a fuller picture of ASM operations along the range outlined above and enable a better sense of the kind of support that is needed. Moreover, the emphasis on Historically Disadvantaged South Africans, and now with the new Mining Charter (Department of Mineral Resources, 2018), on Black South Africans, speaks to an attempt to redress historical injustice. However, in practice, zama zama operations in South Africa depend on the labour of citizens of other African countries who have migrated to South Africa alongside citizens from (all races of) South Africa, European countries and China. Teams organising to undertake work in abandoned and active mine shafts tend to form around nationalities and ethnicities in underground mining operations. Petty commodity production and petty capitalist operations, in precious minerals, need to also be understood in terms of their vertical linkages that directly or indirectly connect them to local refineries and distribution networks that can be supplying global markets. The structure of ASM operations includes South African men, who are middle men who sell to buyers of diverse nationalities and races, including those who have access to permits. Munakamwe (2014: 11), in an ethnographic study in Johannesburg, describes how white buyers or those from overseas are preferred buyers. These actors benefit from the cheap wage labour of artisanal and small-scale miners who bear significant risks both for their safety and health, and also the uncertainty of making a find in their operations. Sponsors also play a crucial role in supporting operations with the acquisition of equipment such as pumps, torch lights, batteries and food, and also tend to be South Africans. With specific reference to gold, ASM miners track seams of deposits which run along underground mine shafts below four kilometres. They follow narrow tunnels, much like their predecessors in the early period of LSM operations. Especially in gold mines in South Africa however, these shafts tend to be more unstable and prone to rock falls. Poisonous gas and flooding also pose grave dangers. When accidents do occur, the challenges faced by paramedics in accessing the mine shafts exposes the risks taken everyday by the zama zama miners. There are cases of zama zama miners being abandoned underground by emergency services, leaving the miners and relatives to undertake rescue operations themselves. The latter rescue attempts expose them to arrest if they are caught by police when they re-emerge from mine shafts. This was the case in an accident in Langlaagte mine in Johannesburg where about eight miners were

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trapped underground. Rescue attempts included relatives and other zama zama miners (ENCA News, 2016). The history of dispossession of Africans and the creation of cheap wage labour in the 19th century, and the process of displacing small white diggers, laid the basis of the current challenges of zama zama. The zama zama raise the problem of access to and control over land and natural resources, and who has the right to mine and where. It also speaks to the re-emergence of locally based production, processing and distribution of natural resources which also creates and addes value to the domestic market. The challenges are technical in the first instance. Nonetheless, zama zama raise political and economic questions about the nature of the state in relation to large-scale mining and how this determined the legal framework which continues to largely exclude ASM through criminalisation. The nature of vertical integration in the global market has also facilitated profit making based on cheap wage labour in mining in an extreme way. State interventions have had strong bearing on the evolution of zama zama in South Africa. Even though there are moments when the state attempts to intervene in a progressive manner, the overriding interest is to contain and even eliminate the zama zama. This is conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. The contradictory nature of these interventions are addressed in the next section.

6.3 Locating ASM in the Mining Regime

Contemporary mining history in South Africa has been marked by conflicts between ‘small diggers’ or artisanal miners, large-scale firms and land owners (Mostert, 2012: 26). The Transvaal government sought to protect small diggers in the first instance, but this soon gave way to conglomerates which offered to rationalise production. Sourcing the finance and technology required to undertake mining underground and extract increasingly more difficult ores, and sourcing water supply, led to the dominance of emerging nascent LSM operations. A symbiotic relation between the emerging state and LSM operations was written into the fabric of the present day South Africa, as in Ghana. The process of dispossession was more extreme in the case of South Africa (Amanor-Wilks, 2007). This balance of power set the stage for the displacement of artisanal miners. In the midst of this, Africans were sourced as cheap wage labour and policed with invasive forms of surveillance, restrictions and corporal punishment used against African miners. Surveillance also

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included controls on movement, which was a precursor to pass laws (Laning and Mueller, 1979). The mining industry, at its very beginning, was founded on the exclusion of Africans. Mine laws at this phase were introduced on an ad hoc basis presenting a chaotic legal framework with a series of laws. Gold laws were based on the existing framework for regulating diamond mining. The laws sought to regulate prospecting and ownership of precious stones, which was used as a model to regulate gold and base metals in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Benoni was the site of an important discovery of gold in Ekurhuleni that brought attention to the rich nature of gold deposits in the area. Benoni and Vlakfontein were some of the key farms which were marked out for prospecting in May and August of1886. Modderfontein, which was near Benoni, was purchased and developed by the Rand Mine Group. Initially, the gold mines tended to fail due to mismanagement and most had to shut down. Drought in 1890 and an inadequate supply of electricity also undermined operations. The discovery of coal in Springs and Brakpan addressed the energy problem (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012: 4-6). Land owners and the state shared control over areas where claims were set up. While the state held ownership of precious stones and metals and issued permits for these, landowners issued permission for prospecting and mining. This later turned into an exclusive right of the state. As a form of compensation for landowners, they were allowed prospecting rights on their own land. Land owners were permitted to merely notify the Mining Commissioner to undertake prospecting. If there was a discovery of minerals considered significant by the state, the landowner was allowed to keep up to one quarter of the total area within which minerals are discovered. This area was known as minjnpacht, translated literally from Dutch as ‘mine lease’ or ‘mine farm’. This could exist as an independent operation, even if on a smaller scale, next to the LSM operation. A court case between Cohn and Consoldated Main Reef Mines and Estate limited on September 6, 1897, in a dispute over water access, highlights how the minjnpacht arrangement was a legally binding arrangement which could be renewed (Barber, 1904: 110-111). After 1964, the minjnpacht was no longer included in mining legislation. Landowners’ right to the minjnpacht was considered irrational since it was considered economically inefficient to create space for smaller mining operations to coexist alongside LSM operations (Mostert, 2012: 26-27). It is contended that this was in fact a political

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concession to landowners who were being displaced by mining capital. This relation was racialized, with landowners, in Transvaal and Orange Free State, being white Afrikaners who benefited from rights secured in legislation. Africans, alongside indentured labour from Asia, were integrated into the farms and mines as a source of cheap wage labour. The surface workings which had hitherto required simple methods of mining, were inadequate when operations went below forty meters. A depression ensued with the collapse of the stock market. The situation improved in 1892 with the introduction of potassium cyanide based extraction, developed by MacArthur and Forrest in Scotland. This required 2009 litres of water to process a ton of ore, for which dams were constructed. The shift to mining deeper underground was also dependent on advances in technology, finance, a stable work force and expertise. These circumstances made it necessary for agglomerations to occur leading to the emergence of the group system. Further developments saw mining operations emerging in areas such as Boksburg, Springs and Van Dyk. A railway line from Vereeniging to Germiston was completed in 1892. By 1898, a railway line linked Springs to Johannesburg (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012: 6-8). This draws focus to how the South African state in formation, not only excluded Africans, but actively sought to ensure the coexistence of Afrikaans capital and British- dominated LSM operations, therefore securing racialised provisions for smaller scale mining operations to occur alongside emerging LSM. The former would enable a form of locally driven capitalist enterprise while the latter could deploy international finance. The landowners in the Transvaal and Orange Free State were more likely white Afrikaans- speakers. At its very beginnings, the exclusion and marginalisation of Africans was written into the fabric of the minerals economy and the foundations of state formation in what became the Union of South Africa in 1910. This segregation became more formalised under apartheid. The next decades were shaped by a rising nascent working class, with both black workers and white workers acting separately but shaping the labour-capital relation. The turn to Apartheid entrenched further barriers to Africans. The growth of Afrikaans capital through the state established conglomerates in manufacturing which were linked with mining within what would be understood as the Minerals Energy Complex (MEC) (Ashman, Fine and Newman, 2013). This policy orientation explicitly sought the exclusion and suppression of an African bourgeoisie and African working class.

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The 1920s and 1930s witnessed the influx of women into Ekurhuleni. Black women were being pushed out of farms due to ‘tightening restrictions on farm labourer families’. The attempts to regulate the black urban population were not only racial segregation but included location regulations through the (Natives) Urban Act of 1923. The regulations not only sought to control influx of populations, but in the case of locations regulations, were intended for ‘surveillance and control.’ Urban women launched legal challenges which made the laws difficult to implement in Ekurhuleni. In 1930, the Women’s League of Justice was formed not only to resist a permit system for lodgers but also regulations seeking to stop ‘illegal’ liquor production. Benoni, Brakpan, Springs and Germiston were key towns where women organised protests. Municipalities amplified surveillance in response by introducing ‘pick-up vans’ (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012: 47-49). During World War II, South Africa had built up its manufacturing base, supplying consumer goods for local demand and the war effort. This led to a shift to import substitution industrialisation. Manufacturing eventually overtook mining in 1943. The Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging complex was at the centre of this industrial revolution, with the East Rand also building on it to launch itself as a manufacturing hub. Benoni municipality planned an industrial park. Mining also expanded after South Africa delinked its currency from the gold standard. Springs produced 25% of South Africa’s total gold production, while Daggafontein became the single largest gold mine in the world, towards the end of the 1940s. South Africa had rapidly become the leading capitalist economy in Africa (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012: 51-53, 80). In the meantime, there was a concerted effort on the part of the state to restrain black small-scale enterprises in the reserves (informal or backyard production) with discriminatory measures. Favouring large-scale enterprise, the state did not enable the development of a black industrial class. Industrial parks were set up for black owned small sale enterprises in the reserves, but these still faced bureaucratic obstacles and did not receive backing such as large-scale enterprises did. From vocational training institutions to active undermining of production through lack of incentives and other restrictions, African industries were not to compete with European trades in urban areas (Da Silva, 1987: 39-44, 47-48, 171). The East Rand in the 1970s remained an important base for the labour movement, and migrant labour drawn into the emerging manufacturing hub of South Africa (Barchiesi, 2010: 73). Mining, however, had begun a decline in the 1950s and

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1960s, leading to closure of mines in Benoni. The rather volatile and unstable nature of the mining industry in Ekurhuleni still provided a basis to diversify into manufacturing. The isolation that Apartheid South Africa experienced from the global economy due to a successful boycott campaign shielded the local market from global competition and enabled protection from import commodities. Liberalisation after the end of Apartheid lifted the veil and exposed the manufacturing sector to intense competition from newly industrialising countries and challenges with exporting to developed markets. As a result, manufacturing also went into decline in the 1990s leading to a period of crisis in the municipality (Bonner and Nieftagodien, 2012: 204-205). These are the historical processes of racialised exclusion which undermined the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism and set the stage for policy interventions after 1994. ASM re-emerges in this context, and converges with the policy shift to liberalisation of the economy. These converging trends have led to fragmentation of the working class under the dual impacts of casualisation of labour and deindustrialisation. The latter is the result of the decline of mining and manufacturing which has had a combined devastating effect on employment.

6.3.1 Deindustrualisation in Ekurhuleni

In 2015, employment in Ekurhuleni formal sector was 1.03 million (or 86.71% of the workorce). The Finance sector accounted for 261 000 jobs (representing 22%). The second highest employer is trade, which employs 259 000 (or 21.8%). Mining, on the other hand, had 7190 (or 0.6%) employed. The informal sector accounted for 158 000 or 13.29%. Unemployment in Ekurhuleni rose from 26.6% in 2006 to 29.7% in 2015. About 30 000 jobs were lost between the second quarter of 2015 and the second quarter of 2016 (City of Ekurhuleni, 2017: 22-23). Statistics South Africa had initially categorised employment in the informal sector using enterprise characteristics. Therefore, if an enterprise is not registered and not paying taxes, it is categorised as informal. This tended to capture mainly the self- employed as informal sector workers. In 2008, the definition was expanded to include whether a worker is paying income tax and whether the enterprise is composed of five or fewer workers. This approach towards a focus on worker characteristics can be further extended to enterprises characterised as formal sector, where job conditions have been

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so eroded that workers conditions can be categorised as informalized (Essop and Yu, 2008: 6-8). Barchiesi (2010: 72-75) explains that the informal sector, in African economies, grew rapidly as a ‘response to adjustment’. Informality in South Africa, on the other hand, speaks to the expansion of precarious work as a product of the creation of a ‘business friendly environment’ after 1994, like the situation in developed countries. Casualisation, which undermined the conditions of permanent workers, did not also guarantee stability and positioned the informal sector as offering an alternative. In these conditions, formal sector wage workers would see the possibilities of pursuing other options outside of wage work by setting up small enterprises. Some held second jobs in individual enterprises as self-employed. The conditions of precarity and inability to provide for household needs had among other things also encouraged women to seek work outside of unpaid care work. The City of Ekurhuleni (2010) notes the decline of the mining sector and the current focus on rehabilitation of abandoned mines which is part of a broader program of spatial restructuring. Currently, mining is being undertaken in four major areas: Rygerpark, Boksburg, Benoni, Springs and Kwatsaduza complex. By 2025, as part of its economic diversification strategy, it aims to ensure sustainable development that is oriented to local needs. This is expected to respond to ‘global demands and shifts’. As part of this, it includes, among other things, ‘the promotion of small-scale mining opportunities’ which is understood as being inclusive of artisanal mining. Its broader economic transformation strategy, which aims to achieve an inclusive and wealth generating economy by 2025, also includes support for the informal sector. A mining forum on 28th January 2003, hosted by the Ekurhuleni Municipality, brought together the Department of Minerals and Natural Resources, Water and Forestry, mining companies in the municipality, owners of private dumps and a committee of small- scale miners. The forum aimed to explore potential offered by the ‘expansion and formalising’ of artisanal and small-scale mining as part of a broader program of linking national programs to local needs. This was a space created for government and the mining industry to assess social plans, environmental impacts and the decline of large- scale mines, in addition to support for small-scale mining (Czernowalow, 2003). According to the executive director of Local Economic Development (LED) of the Ekurhuleni Council, Karuna Mohan, this will transform a criminalised activity into a livelihood option. In an optimistic reading of the then proposed mining law, legislation provided the

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possibility of minerals and the mineral rights to be inclusive of ‘historically disadvantaged people and women’. There was also optimism about widening the tax net for the municipality (for land that the state was custodian of). A coordinating company was also proposed to support the development of small-scale mining and also to manage broader resource management. Some of the activities proposed include ensuring access to finance and training and to monitor rehabilitation of areas destroyed by mining. Importantly, this entity was also intended to support upstream and downstream linkages that respond to how artisanal and small-scale mining operations function within the local economy. The coordinating company was also intended to provide technical support in the form of geological information (Czernowalow, 2003).

6.3.2 Reprocessing of Mine Tailings

The Vlakfontein TSF is located close to townships, posing an immediate health hazard. (See Benchmarks’ 2017 report making the case against DRDGOLD for health hazards posed by mine tailings.) The townships include Langaville, Langaville extension 6, Phelendaba, KwaThema Phase 2, KwaThema Phase 3, Sharon Park, Dunnottar, Duduza and Tsakane. In the 1950s, residential areas were usually about 3 to 4kms from TSFs in the veldt. With forced removals imposed by the Group Areas Act, black South Africans were forced to live closer to TSFs. These conditions continued to worsen after the end of Apartheid resulting in buffer zones being limited to a minimum of 500m (Kneen, Ojelede and Annegam, 2017: 1-2). Map 3 below shows the Vlakfontein TSF and the townships located close to it and Map 4 shows that the closest residences are about 86.75 meters from the TSF.

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Map 2: Vlakfontein TSF and surrounding townships. (Google Satellite Maps, 12th July 2018)

Map 3: Proximity of residences to the TSF. Goodle Satellite Maps 12th July 2018.

Zama zama have been active in the Vlakfontein TSF since 1994. They work in situ to reprocess and extract gold from the TSF. Mr. Mangaliso Mbatha, a zama zama miner in

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Vlakfontein, who has been reprocessing mine tailings since 1994, describes how he learned how to undertake reprocessing. At this stage, the work was not as laborious as it is now.

As you come here you can see how it’s done. It’s like seeing someone doing it and getting something to help them go to bed on a full stomach, and when you also do it you will get something to eat…no one really taught me, I saw others do it. I noticed that if someone does this they get something. I started to think that if I do this I will get something to eat before I go to sleep (Interview: Mbatha, 2018).8

He further explains that there were more women active in the TSF at this early stage.

When she [a woman zama zama miner] sees that things are not going well at home she comes here and asks that we show her how to do the work...they [the women] were there around ‘94/’95 going into ’96 because they used to sweep outside on the surface in places like this. It was so much easy (Interview: Mbatha, 2018).9

There was also less harassment, even though others were present at the mine tailing to move gravel stones, while others would extract part of the tailings for construction. This did not disrupt zama zama who were operating at the mine tailing. The situation changed with the entry of LSM operations into reprocessing, which began to encroach onto the spaces occupied by zama zama. Referring to LSMs, he explains: ‘…because they are now here they take

8 Translated from isiZulu: Nawe ungathi ungena kanje ubone ukuthi kwenziwa kanjani. Kufana nokuthi mawubona omunye umuntu enza lento uthola something alale adlile nawe mawenza kanje uzothola okokuthi ulale udlile… Ongifundisile kahle-kahle akekho ngangena ngokubona abanye abantu bekwenza. Ukuthi mekenza into enjena uthola something. Ngaqala ngabheka ukuthi mangenza into eyenziwa yiloya ngizolala ngidlile. 9 Translated from isiZulu: Omunye makabona ukuthi kuyambhedela endlini ulala angadlalnga abone ukuthi abuye la esigangeni bengicela ningifundise ukwenza lento… Bebekhona ngaleso sikhathi ngabo ‘94/’95 ukuyongena kubo 96 ngoba ibithanyelwa phandle phezulu ezindaweni ezifana nalezi. Bekulula kakhulu/

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all the soil, it makes it even harder because they carry it in trucks and that leaves us with nothing’.10 Mrs. Lucy Zwane, who had been working as a zama zama miner reprocessing mine tailings for six months in Vlakfontein emphasises the labour intensive nature of the work. Like most of the men at the site, she independently operates reprocessing of the mine tailing. With the sole exception of the final stage of amalgamation, which she is yet to master, she has control over the production process in mine tailings. The absence of alternatives in the formal sector, such as cleaning and retail (which she considers worthwhile), is what has pushed her to setting up a zama zama operation. Her income is also unpredictable. Sometimes after labouring at the mine tailing, she can get nothing at all.

Sifting gold is a problem. Digging the soil is difficult. I work because I don’t have other options. If you sit, you will steal or become a prostitute. I don’t want that. Zama zama is better… the problem is that I’m not finding the right job. If I can find the right job I would leave because it’s difficult… I don’t know, I would be able to move forward [that is to improve her livelihood situation] or not. It’s tough because with the R400 [that is the minimum she makes in a week], I have to give children pocket money and pay for creche (Interview: Zwane, 2018).11

In May, 2018, Benoni Gold Mine deployed an excavator and two other pieces of equipment on the Vlakfontein TSF site, along with trucks which are sourcing mine tailings for reprocessing to extract gold. Women zama zama at the site were promised work and waited for two to three weeks to be engaged, but they were never employed. Instead, women from outside the neighbouring community were employed on the project. This all- woman team was hired to move the rocks. They are casual workers who are paid R200 for each ‘large sized’ bin they can fill up. They are not paid according to the time they spend at work. It has been reported that this project is covered by a tender awarded to a

10 Translated from isiZulu: Ya njengoba sebelapha bathatha yonke inhlabathi abashiyi nix, sekunzima kakhulu ke manje ngoba lapha bayishaya ngama truck ayikho into esalayo 11 Translated from isiZulu: Ukusefa igolide kuyahlupha. Ukugubha umnhlabathi kuyahlupha. Ngiyasebenza ngoba ngizothini, ukuhlala akusizi. Mawufuna ukuhlala uzontshontsha or ube yisifebe manje yinkinga leyo. Angikufuni lokho ingcono izama-zama. Inkinga ukuthi umsebenzi o-right angiwutholi. Umangingathola umsebenzi o-right ngingawuyeka ngoba unzima… Kunzima, kule R400 kumele nginike abantwana imali yokudla eskoleni bese ngibhadala e-creche.

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woman entrepreneur who has made it a point to hire an all-woman team to transport the rocks in bins. It remains to be established if this is an outsourced contract by Benoni. Interviews with the women workers hired to move the rocks and enquiries on the tender ought to be conduted to better understand how precarious work is being integrated in reprocessing projects. Further details on the companies undertaking reprocessing, as in this case, can also shed further insights on the form that mining operations are taking in the midst of the decline in gold production.

Photo 1 showing an excavator and trucks to transport mine tailings and gravel stones at Vlakfontein TSF.

The closest structures to the site are in KwaThema Phase 2, according to Google Satellite Maps from 2010, 690.38 metres and 500 meters away from the TSF, as mentioned already (See Map 3 above). A private security officer, armed with a rifle, was at the site guarding the excavator and other equipment of Benoni Gold Mine. He asserted that his presence was not to confront the zama zama operating in the area. According to him, he had even been offered the use of a shack by the zama zama for his night shifts. Four zama zama (three

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young men and an older man) confirmed the report from the private security officer and asserted that they had no confrontations with him.

Photo 2 of mine private security positioned on top of a large heap of rocks, 10 July 2018. Photo by author.

The zama zama have been displaced from the original selected sites of work due to the activities of Benoni Gold. They were not only physically evicted by private security and other Benoni Gold workers, but also heaps of gravel rocks were dumped on sites where they were working. As a result, the zama zama had to move to other spots in the Vlakfontein TSF which are less lucrative for them. They all confirmed that they are the only breadwinners in their households, and therefore have no other options than to continue to do this work. About 30 people had been displaced by the Benoni Gold project. This is not the first time that a company has arrived at the Vlakfontein TSF; others have been similarly chased away by zama zama operating there. Mr. Mangaliso Mbatha (2018), a zama zama miner who has been working in Vlakfontein for fifteen years shares his perspectives on the project:

If they find us working here they will come and close the place. You’re not supposed to work there because they have the certificate to work here…they find a stone [heaps of gravel stones] they will put it in the place that we work

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in, so obviously you can’t work because you can’t take out that stone by yourself so that you can continue to work. So that’s my problem. They found me working and they took stones and put them there, in other words…they chased me. I was not supposed to work there...You see all those people working there, they don’t work for this contract…They don’t want to hire those people… These people with this project they are taking over now. Those people who are working there they chased … all that people was working there but now they are no longer working there, they chased them… nobody got injured or died, the only thing that happens is that when they find you working they remove you so that they can take over.

In another case, Ekurhuleni Environmental Organisation (EEO)12 highlights how the Fraser Alexandra tailings dam in Brakpan (50 kms from Johannesburg) is being reprocessed by Ergo Mine Property Limited. The plant in Brakpan, in addition to another facility in Germiston, is reprocessing mine tailings. According to Ergo, it is the world’s largest gold surface treatment plant. This complex includes Crown Mines and City Deep, which were decommissioned, and now only operate milling and pumping stations. The diagram below illustrates the extent of this facility.

Figure 1 of Ergo Plant. DRDGOLD. Ergo, 2018.

The Ergo plant was established in Brakpan by Anglo America in 1977 and subsumed under Anglo Gold Ashanti in 1998, and was closed seven years later

12 A community based organisation which advocates against the social, economic and environmental impacts of mining.

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(DRDGOLD, 2018). In 2007, it was reopened as a joint venture between DRDGOLD’s South Africa operations and Mintails Limited. DRDGOLD brands itself as a South African enterprise which runs surface operations, with reprocessing of mine tailings and underground mines in South Africa and Zimbabwe. It was formerly known as Durban Roodeport Deep Mining Company which was established in 1895. Its annual gold production was 1.1 million ounces with reserves of 18 million ounces. It had five mines in South Africa, two in Papua New Guinea and one in Fiji (Murray, 2004). In 1994, DRDGOLD was considered a defunct entity. It was resuscitated in a merger with Rand Leases and managed by Randgold and Exploration. The latter was formed in 1992 to take over Rand Mines assets, one of the oldest mining firms in South Africa set up in 1893 (Lee, 2016). Randgold and Exploration had the reputation of turning marginal mines into profitable assets. It was delisted from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for corruption that took place from 1999 to 2004 (Randgold, n.d.).13 In 1993, Randgold and Exploration listed another firm in England, Randgold Resources, which was the same firm that competed with Anglo Gold in a bid to operate a joint venture with Ashanti Gold Corporation in Ghana (Fin24, 2003) as already mentioned in Chapter Five. By 2016, DRDGOLD claims to have provided jobs for 2484 people, out of which 924 were directly employed. Specialist service providers were contracted to support reprocessing of tailings and dam management. (DRDGOLD, n.d.-b) The new enterprise, Ergo, was set up to process about 186 metric tonnes of surface tailings in Elsburg over twelve years. It was expected that these tailings could produce about 1.7 million ounces of gold. Ergo’s current assets include access to up to 900 metric tonnes of tailings with an annual capacity of 25.2 metric tonnes. These facilities are connected by a 50km pipeline. Ergo processes about two metric tonnes of mine tailings a month. Production is expected to take place over twenty years, but this can be extended with technological improvements. Currently, such advancements have increased output to 300 000 tonnes per month. In 2016, 143 457 ounces of gold were produced. Expenditure on physical assets was R99.8 million. It is estimated that Ergo has access to 1.84 million ounces of mineral reserves. On 30th November, 2017, Witwatersrand School of Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering signed an agreement with DRDGOLD to reduce the cost of gold extraction

13 Also see Randgold and Exploration Litigation Statement, Annexure 9, https://www.randgoldexp.co.za/investor_centre/announcements/company_news/legal_report.pdf

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and improve plant level operations. Marek Dworzanowski, the adjunct professor responsible for coordinating research, also highlighted that long-term research will be on ‘…new ways on how to treat lower and lower grade material and still be profitable’ (Witswatersrand University, 2016). This shows how ASM operations which are more likely to operate in lower grade ore and reprocessing are very quickly being undermined by the encroachment of corporations. This process has been able to comply with the government-driven BEE program. It is important to consider whether this has created room for the emergence of local capital through a process of integrating black enterprises in the ownership of mining companies. What is the room for petty commodity production in the South African mining sector? In July 2012, Ergo was restructured. Initially, 74% stake was held by DRDGOLD and 20% by Khumo Gold (the BEE partner) and 6% by DRD SA Empowerment Trust. Ergo was a subsidiary of Ergo Mining Operations (EMO), which in turn is a subsidiary of DRDGOLD. Khumo Gold SPV Proprietary Limited and DRDGOLD SA Empowerment Trust, which are the black economic empowerment partners, have direct holdings in DRDGOLD, comprising 8.1% and 2.4% respectively. After restructuring, EMO, a subsidiary of DRDGOLD, held total ownership of Ergo (DRDGOLD, n.d-c). According to DRDGOLD (2012), this was to consolidate the operations, simplify its structure and ensure compliance with Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). The latter is a product of reorientation away from a narrow black economic empowerment program to one that focuses on building black entrepreneurs in productive areas through enterprise and supplier development (Department of Trade and Industry, 2014). This creates avenues to ensure that black entrepreneurs are integrated in the existing LSM operations by strategically plugging into upstream linkages to mining capital goods and through direct production. With regards to this, in spite of the focus on redressing historical injustices through BBBEE, ASM and more broadly petty commodity production has not found policy space to be supported to develop along these lines in a process of better integrating petty commodity production within this agenda. Ergo operations are also expanding into Roodeport. A consulting firm, Digby Wells Environmental, was contracted by Ergo to undertake an environmental and heritage impact assessment and an environmental management programme report on mine tailings in Roodepoort, Vlakfontein and Vogelstruisfontein. This was part of a Mining Rights Application (MRA) to be completed and submitted to the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) in February 2014. The MRA is in fulfilment of a requirement in Section

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22 of the Mineral Petroleum Resources and Development Act of 2002. This will make use of the Crown Gold Recoveries infrastructure, but also will include a new plant and equipment by deploying a combination of hydraulic monitoring and mechanical means (Digby Wells Environmental, 2014). New pipelines will be constructed through the Crown Gold Recoveries infrastructure for processing in the Brakpan Ergo plant. The Soweto cluster in and around Dobsonville, Bram Fisherville and Meadowlands covers a total area of about 887.5 hectares linked to areas used as mine tailings by Durban Roodepoort Deep (which was renamed DRDGOLD) and Rand Leases Mines. Thus, DRDGOLD through EMO is reprocessing tailings that were a product of its own earlier iteration as Durban Roodeport Deep set up in 1895. This shows how the mining entities which formed out of a process of agglomeration that eliminated artisanal miners, and excluded African petty commodity producers, have re-established themselves by reclaiming waste from their mining operations over a century later and reaping profits, once again displacing ASM operators. EEO, when undertaking an assessment in Boksburg, reported the following on working conditions and the environmental and health impacts at the Brakpan Ergo plant.

As we were monitoring, we observed that only black people do the hard cheap labour as per our interview with Mxolisi and Rendani; they mentioned that they work two weeks a month, 7 [am] to 4 [pm] and they earn R800 a month. The supply pipes go across the communities of Geluksdal, Langaville and Brakpan. Sometimes the pipes burst, and people inhale the toxins from the chemicals used for re-mining [which also means reprocessing] (Tunatazama, 2017).

On 8th October, 2013, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) led a protected one day strike in Ergo Johannesburg operations; 600 workers went on strike. The wage offer was a basic increase of 8% for job categories four and five and for categories six to fifteen, an increase of 7.5%. The living out allowances were increased by 10% in 2013 and 2014. DRDGOLD claimed this would increase its wage bill by 8.9%. NUM was demanding all workers at entry level and in category four be promoted to category six jobs. They also demanded that all foremen should receive a skills retention increase, as had be done for engineering foremen (DRDGOLD, 2013). These contestations from workers within Ergo are not unique, however, when considered against the context of the history of mine labour in South Africa, drawing attention to the ongoing attempts to redress inequality in wages. This is a core part of

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attempts to more equitably redistribute surplus value and improve benefits that workers receive. The strike led by NUM and observations from EEO speak to the ongoing tensions. In the meantime, ASM is entirely an attempt at capital accumulation whose impulses in the first instance emerge from the conditions of precarity and high unemployment. The narrative below draws out these threads.

6.4 Zama zama Production Relations

At the mine tailing in Vlakfontein, workers do not have supervisors or group leaders. They work as individuals and only meet as a group on the site. Most miners speak isiZulu and have an informal mode of organizing work. They sometimes collectively sell their products or do so directly in town without the involvement of middle men/women. The soil is not rich and therefore it does not draw the attention of gangs which operate in the area. Where the soil is rich, it is more likely that fights break out which turn violent. Gangs also operate in these areas, creating greater risks. Besides security or police, people carry guns to work whether it is around mine tailings or underground. The insecure conditions the zama zama face emerge not only from harassment from the police and mine private security but also out of tense relations within mine sites. This was observed even on a mine tailing site in Vlakfontein where a misunderstanding concerning the presence of a research team led to a verbal spat. In one moment, a woman who was playing more of a leading role in the mine tailing, expressed her anguish:

…he told those Pedi and Sotho people that are used to killing people in the hole. He said, hey this woman, I’ll show her, he thinks that I don’t know Sotho, speaking it, but I know right. I’ll show him14. I’ll find him, alone, he will cry this one. I will finish him completely (Interview: Khumalo, 2015).

This statement showed how she also needed to use threats to preserve her safety in the mine tailing. The ‘hole’ she refers to are the abandoned mine shafts in which it is possible to be disposed of. This shows the extreme conditions of insecurity which worsen in the case of zama zama in underground operations.

14 isiZulu pronouns do not distinguish him or her, so people who speak it sometimes use him and her interchangeably when speaking English.

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At the same time, women are not just engaging in the direct work itself in ASM operations, but also in providing auxiliary services. They are related to ASM operations that link them more to other economic activities and embed ASM more in the local economy. In playing reproductive roles in households, women also bear the cost of the risk of zama zama operations. These responsibilities are not only material in terms of providing supplementary or primary income, since the rhythm of production does not guarantee a regular stream of income. There is also emotional work to deal with the intense risks and uncertainties faced from police harassment and arrest to accidents and battles between rival gangs. Moses, who operates in Roodeport, explains he leaves his home for weeks to work underground in abandoned mines late at night from 1am to 4am. It is not easy for him to do this in active mines due to the presence of security. Nonetheless, there is greater immediate danger in underground mines due to the operations of gangs and the conditions in the underground tunnels which they use to access unstable areas. But it is also the case that the incomes earned from these areas are higher. The uncertainty of his situation is also felt by his wife Azande, who expressed her anxiety over the risks taken in his work as a zama zama. When Moses is working, he can be away for up to two weeks during which Azande hears nothing from him. When he is away, Azande does not know exactly where he is or how he is faring. This is very stressful due to the high risk nature of the work. Moreover, Moses is also keenly aware of how much the mine tailings are full of toxins such as cyanide and uranium. Azande also described how Moses hid his work from her when they first met. It was hard for her to accept that he did this work because his earnings were so little. He took her to the mine site once to show her how he does the work, so she may be more accepting of him. Initially, she did not like the work he did. He worked very hard but earned little money. However, she understood that he had to do this because his problem with acquiring documentation undermined his search for better paying work. In 2003, Moses recounts a sting operation by an undercover police officer who also owns a jewellery store. The police officer pretended to be a buyer and offered good deals on separate occasions. After he had won the trust of the zama zama, he offered to organize a braai at which everyone working in the Roodeport area could gather and also sell their gold. Police officers came on the scene backed by a helicopter and everyone at the scene was arrested and their gold taken from them. They were all let go on bail.

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On 26th September, 2013, in a police operation in Roodeport, Susan Shabangu, then the Mineral Resources minister, reported progress with the arrest of 135 persons related to non-legal mining. A pick-up truck was confiscated when it was found transporting sand believed to be related ASM operations. The minister stated that helicopters and horses were being deployed by the police to enable them access difficult areas (News 24, 2013). Ms. Susan Shabangu directly threatened women in ASM operations. She said ‘We will arrest you and hand your child to welfare’. This shows the violent manner in which ASM operations are being undermined by the state through the police, and how women are specifically being targeted (News 24, 2013). The visibility of the state in tackling zama zama operations contrasts with its absence from protecting zama zama from crimes such as theft, murder, sexual assault, kidnappings and forced labour. Mr. Sandile Nombeni (Interview, 2018), who is an activist with Mining Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA), was interviewed amid ongoing consultations on a Mining Charter bill. Since July 2nd, 2018 MACUA has held workshops assessing the bill. The network was rejecting the bill because it ignores inclusion of communities and artisanal miners. With ASM, it specifically ignores how it can be regulated, and does not attempt to figure out how artisanal miners are willing to work with the government. Mr. Alfred Tshabalala, a zama zama miner who previously worked underground in an abandoned mine in Carletonville, explains why he shifted to ‘community mining’ in Khutsong informal settlement. Community mining usually refers to mining on land that is within the control of a defined community group. In a sense, this is an ambiguous term which can be a contemporary attempt to create space for a similar arrangement for black South Africans as was entrenched historically under the minjnpacht for Afrikaner landowners. (See Section 6.7). He was not deterred by the lower rate of returns in community mining; he prefers community mining where he ekes a living earning, on average. R1000 to R1500 per month.

Underground, you could make 800 to 100 thousand in three months. Depending on how many of you are working together, five to eight ot you could walk away with a minimum of half a million…I went underground and found that it is difficult to work when the zama zamas were in conflict more than when we were above…there were a lot of fights.

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It is still the issue of finding bigger gold than them [other gangs] then they try to force you to give it to them, and you will refuse because that is your work, and that is when they might kill you… the reason [for joining a gang] was for protection so that we are able to work because the other groups that existed did not want us to work… It became very difficult as a result of shootings, killings and I saw it fit to rather come struggle on the surface than to turn my children into orphans…(Interview: Tshabalala, 2018).15

Currently, artisanal miners experience harassment at the hands of the police who are reported to torture them, extort money, seize their tools and victimise them. Zama zama cite instances of how police either threaten arrest and demand bribes or confiscate their work tools and resell them, creating a rotating system of trade in zama zama work tools. Some also do not have South African Identity Documents, and therefore face the added threat of deportation. As criminalised persons, they are unable to have any space to negotiate with the South African government. One demand has to be that Home Affairs ensures they are able to acquire working permits:

… when they [the police] come they take everything that you have … the generators … they burn your clothes … and towels … if you changed into your working outfit they burn them … they [the police] say that the zama- zama is not allowed (Group discussion in KwaThema, 2018).16

I can’t talk about a lot of things that happened here because a lot has happened. There are people who have died, fights, shootings, a lot of things happen. There are times when we are chased by the police and get injuries,

15 Translated from Sesotho: Ai, underground, bo ma 3 months…bo ma R8 to 100 and something thousand, o na le ho ba le ona…nako engwe ha e ba le sebetse le le bangata…ha ngata le sebeste le le bo ma 5-8. Bonyana bo ma half a million e ne e tla ba teng…ke le kaya mo fatshe ka thola ho re ho boema ho kena batho ba ko fatshe, diZama zama di ne di sa otlwane ho feta ha re ne re le modimo. So, ha ke tsebe o kae tlhalose jwang…Ho na le dintwa Eya, le baka ene e le ho re re kgone ho tsherelletsana, re kgone ho sebetsa ho bane di-group tse tse ne di le teng…’ne di sa bata ho re re sebetse…Ho ba tlile ho ba boema ha golo ka baka la ho thunyana, la ho bolayana ka mo fatshe, ka bona ho re ho betere ho re ke tlo sokola ka mo dimo ho fapana le ho re bana ba ka ke ba di kgotsana. 16 Translated from isiZulu: Mawafika akuthathela yonke into onayo… Ama generator… Nemphahla yakho bayayishisa… Namathawula… Mangabe ushintshile ufake le osebenza ngayo bayayishisa… bathi akuvumelekanga ukuthi kube nama zama-zama

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and next thing, I don’t even get help. There are a lot of people who get injured (Interview: Mangaliso, 2018).

In describing his understanding of what freedom could look like for him as a zama zama, he describes it as the absence of harassment. The question was posed in the context of his own childhood experiences in the township, where he joined in protests during the anti-apartheid struggle. In that period, he understood the struggle as motivated against abuse by whites against black people. His expectation after the fall of Apartheid was securing a decent job, provision of free public services and, more generally, the ability to do whatever he wished without any barriers. Facing exclusion from formal sector work, since he does not hold a matric qualification (and neither is he considered literate), he narrowly interprets freedom as the absence of obstacles in his pursuit of the only form of employment he has had in his lifetime. He explained that it had been a year since the police had raided the site. In his own words, freedom ‘…meant that I would be free to do whatever I want. You see even now I’m hustling in the mountains, when I’m tired I’m not bothered by anyone. When I’m done here, I go downhill and no one bothers me’.17 Johannesburg is strewn with abandoned mines and Tailing Storage Facilities (TSFs). The neighbourhoods located close to these sites are also excluded from service delivery and are also struggling with high unemployment. This creates a link between the community members and zama zama. Attention tends to be on gang battles in the underground mines. Nombeni (Interview, 2018) is of the view that the dominance of gangs in zama zama operations is ultimately enabled by law enforcement which is absent from providing protections for the zama zama. Syndicates therefore fill a gap created by the state to take over artisanal mining by exposing zama zama to theft, at times forcing some miners to provide free labour for gangs or to pay for security. In another vein, it raises a question about beneficiation and the extent of community control over value chains. For instance, in the Northern Cape, the production of the semi-precious gem tiger’s eye is being organised within cooperatives with a view to taking greater control of value chains and ensuring beneficiation for the local economy. In 2003, there was a report

17 Translated from isiZulu: Beyisho ukuthi ngibe free ngenze yonke into engiyithandayo. Yabona namanje ngizibambelele phezu kwentaba, umangikhathele akuna ongihlukumezayo. Mangiqeda nje lana ngiyehla akukho muntu ongihluphayo.

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that white farm owners who had surface rights were extracting the uncut gem and exporting to China. Workers were paid as low as R300 to R500 a month (Spicer, 2003). Mintek set up a gemmological centre in Ethembeni, Prieska to train learners in partnership with the National Youth Development Agency. They receive training in pottery and glass bead manufacturing (Matchdeck, 2014; Rasmeni, Chetty, Sebola and Seripe, 2016: 591-592). Facing a decline of mining and agriculture, the Premier of the Northern Cape announced the formation of five primary cooperatives in Prieska (which belong to a secondary cooperative, CBZ Tiger Eye). There were also other primary cooperatives in Niekerkshoop (which also formed a secondary cooperative). White farmers were also trying to secure mining licenses (Mere, 2016). The extent to which these cooperatives are being provided support to ensure beneficiation remains to be established. In the gold sector, there are some cases where processing is becoming more sophisticated. In one case in an informal settlement in Brakpan, Springs, about 30 young men and two women were operating milling machines known as phenduka to break up rock ore extracted from underground sites. About fifteen phenduka were being used to process the ore. (See photographs 3 and 4 below). These machines are cylinders with metal balls. Water is added along with the rock ore and the phenduka are turned to crush the ore. Tartaric, vinegar and salt are used to purify the gold dust. The next stage is amalgamation which relies on mercury. The final product is sold to buyers to sell the grams of gold in Johannesburg.

Photo 3 shows zama zamas operating a phenduka. From SABC Documentary Lehile La Sechaba, ‘Zama zamas’

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Photo 4 shows the metal balls which crush the ore in the phenduka. From SABC Documentary Lehile La Sechaba, ‘Zama zamas’

This particular operation was started in 2000 by Mr. Mashaba, who is originally from Zimbabwe. Facing unemployment at the height of crises in Zimbabwe, he came to Gauteng and learned about underground mining as a zama zama. He saw the potential in milling and brought together young men keen to also work as zama zama. He saw this as a form of preliminary training. After acquiring finance, he set up the operation in Brakpan.

6.5 Zama zama as a Livelihood Strategy in Conditions of Precarity

Zama zama have been undertaking reprocessing of the mine tailing in Vlakfontein TSF since 1994. Retrenched mineworkers, casual workers, women and unemployed youth have been working as zama zama in the mine tailing. This can be traced to the early 1990s as a strategy adopted by households coping with hardship. Beyond this, the zama zama interviewed mentioned the main goals they intend to achieve in the long run. Some explained they were only doing this form of work until they could complete houses they are building. They therefore viewed the job as a transitional period in their own working lives. The process of production deploys a siltation device which is constructed at the site and ends with amalgamation (See images below of zama zama work tools). The

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main innovation so far has been the introduction of generators and pipes which have made the labour intensive work moderately easy. Most zama zama operate independently, but there are small teams which have been formed to support each other and reduce the burden of work. Below is an image of a team of three zama zama working together in Vlakfontein. Zama zama in Vlakfontein include both South Africans and undocumented migrants, drawing the focus to citizenship and how it has a bearing on ASM operations. The interviewees highlighted below provide vital insights and perspectives on zama zama.

Photo 5 shows a Zama Zama miner working with silting implement

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Photo 6 shows a silting implement used by Zama Zamas.

In one case, Mr. Mangaliso Mbatha, was employed on the surface operations of Western Platinum from where he was retrenched due to illness. He had platinosis which is an allergic reaction to soluble salts of platinum. He was later employed as a merchandiser and in customer care at the Trade Centre, where he was retrenched again. Due to this unstable employment situation, his marriage broke down. He started working as a zama zama in Vlakfontein in 2003. He has three children for whom he is able to provide basic needs. His son is studying at the University of the Witwatersrand, but he is unable to support him as he would have wished. On average, when there is a good turnover, he can make R1500 but sometimes he does not even make a R1000. Moses18, an artisanal miner from Lesotho, has been in South Africa for more than two decades. His father was a mineworker in Florida who was injured and later retrenched with no benefits. He only received R2300 as compensation, and a watch. His father never wanted him to become a mineworker, especially in underground gold mines. The risk of being injured or killed in the gold mines was too high. He was adamant that

18 This is not his real name, which is being withheld for safety reasons.

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the costs outweighed the benefits. Gold mines are notorious for being unstable and more dangerous than other mines. From 2003 to 2010, Mr. Moses Khoza worked as a casual construction worker. The fact that he did not have documentation as an immigrant from Lesotho worked against him in his search for employment. He worked mainly in Johannesburg in small construction companies which were the only ones which were willing to hire him for a very low wage. He was paid R40 per day. Some of the projects he worked on are government subsidy houses. In the mid 1990s, Moses got into contact with one of the first groups of ASM miners in Roodeport. This was a layer of zama zama who were retrenched mine workers mainly from other countries in Southern Africa, many of whom have since passed on from causes which were unknown to the interviewees. Moses explains that retrenched mine workers were the ones who taught him and others to do the work independently. Moses learned how to mine from a retrenched mine worker who became his boss. His boss left for other areas which were sources of richer ore in Florida and Carletonville. Moses was then able to start working on his own. In 1996, he could earn as little as R25 per gram. In 2000, it had increased to only R35. By 2015, he could earn R380 to R400. In late 2014, due to the fall in gold prices, it fell to R320. He works for about two weeks to earn this much. To gain a fuller view of the livelihood strategies in their household, Mrs. Azande Khoza who is Moses’ wife, explains that they also rely on her pension. She also sells second hand clothes during winter. In between what her partner manages to bring in and her work, they support her family and his other family in Lesotho. He has spent about 20 years in South Africa during which he regularly visited Lesotho. His parents remained in Lesotho. However, his grandfather was a South African. For his father to get a South African ID, he had to remain married to a South African woman for three years. This would have enabled Moses to then claim South African citizenship. However, in 2010 and 2011, his mother and father passed away consecutively. It has therefore made it difficult for him to gain citizenship. In a question about citizenship and what it means to be zama zama, one miner with South African citizenship explains that it does not make a difference between the miners. ‘You’ve got African citizen, you haven’t got African citizen, it doesn’t help me. We’re the same thing, there’s no difference’ (Interview: Mbatha, 2018). Mr. Mbatha uses the identity marker African and South African interchangeably. In the same vein, he

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admits there is an advantage that citizenship confers on him. He acknowledges that while undocumented migrants are compelled to sell to agents in the location for lesser value for their gold, as a South African citizen he can trade directly with dealers in Johannesburg.

No, according to my side it’s a better place [that is to sell directly in Johannesburg] because plenty people are selling and buying. Even in my location most people are buying the gold, you see. I’m going to sell it at Joburg... Most people are working here they haven’t got South African citizenship. So, that’s why there’s people selling in location they sell the gold with the other people, he’s buying there…Let’s say a buyer from here said to you I’ll buy your gold with R400 and then you go at Joburg you find the buyer said I’ll give you R460 maybe R480. There’s differ, the other one says it’s R500 a gram and the other one says R480 just like that, they are not the same price.

He elaborates further:

I sell this gold at Joburg. Why? I’ve got that African citizenship. I can go at the market, they want the ID if I go there then I produce the ID. There’s plenty people there they’ve got different prices at Diamond Centre, they are not the same price even there at Joburg if you get there at the Diamond Centre. They want your ID, you produce your ID then you get inside, so you can choose there when you get there which buyer you get, he satisfies you then you sell it to him. (Interview: Mbatha, 2018).

Mr. Alfred Tshabalala, another male zama zama miner in Khutsong who is an undocumented migrant originally from Lesotho, concurs. He emphasises the difference between the world market prices and the value he is able to retain when he sells to agents in the location.

Yes, the wish is there because the money would be better, at times if one has worked well and you realise that your ball [that is the gold nugget] is of quality, we do go to Joburg directly, and bypass the local buyers… I do have a wish [to sell directly in Johannesburg] because these people are cheating us, when you watch TV you see the price of gold but they give us peanuts… [the world

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market price for a gram is about] R800, R700 per gram, because when I go to Joburg, I can even get R608, even then they are still robbing us.

Gold is sold directly to buyers (who are in the location) who in turn resell in Johannesburg for a higher rate. For instance, a gram of gold sold in Langaville for R420 can be resold in Johannesburg for R460 or R500. There is no negotiation over the prices of the gold. The only option is to search for an alternative buyer who may offer a better price. Zama zama who are undocumented migrants rely on buyers to access the market. Without them, they cannot sell directly to buyers in Johannesburg. A requirement is documentation before anyone trades with you. There are different prices offered in Johannesburg at the ‘Diamond Centre’. There are more options to select a buyer. Without an Identity Document, it is not possible to access these markets in Johannesburg.

6.6 State Interventions the Zama zama Want

An immediate trigger of entry into zama zama in mining is the problem of chronic high unemployment and precarious work. Low wages in the construction industry, and gardening or retrenchment from the LSM operations forced workers into ASM.

We want work, you see if we can find work… I would leave this thing… They say that they don’t want us but if they can give us work. if you don’t have work you end stealing…If they can’t [work as zama zama] then they must give them jobs (Group discussion in KwaThema, 2018).

An immediate concern is for the state to decriminalise zama zama operations. In the first instance, this will provide a legal basis to challenge police harassment and undermine syndicates. The issue of permits in Kimberley is in the first instance an important example of the possibilities that exist to ensure access to the open market, in a manner that undermines agents who purchase gold below the market value. A male zama zama miner, who was retrenched from LSM operations in Carletonville, takes a pragmatic perspective:

The government should give us permission to work for ourselves because there are no jobs, do you understand? And you can wait for companies for years waiting to hear whether they will hire you or not, you see? Government must

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give people jobs and let them work for themselves with this gold, not that they must hire us because as you can see nothing is working out (Interview: Phanyeko, 2018).19

Furthermore, he anticipates security challenges with issuing permits to run abandoned mine shafts. This is to a greater extent a product of the proliferation of armed syndicates which operate within a vacuum left by law enforcement. This has created harsh conditions for zama zama miners.

To get permission to a place where we know that who works with this gold also gets a permit, and everything is well. This thing causes conflict in the mines, we cannot gather a group from here and go seek a permit from the mine, we will get killed there, we kill each other over this thing ... so now in that way the government must just give us an opportunity to work with this thing (Phanyeko, 2018). 20

In Gauteng, MACUA has participated in a workshop organised by DMR on how to transform artisanal mining, without including artisanal miners. The workshop was held on 24th March 2017 and was titled ‘Combatting illegal mining and promoting small-scale mining in South Africa’. This workshop included the National Union of Mineworkers, the police and intelligence services. The Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources announced that the Industrial Development Cooperation would provide finance for small-scale operations (Mining Review Africa, 2017). Even though this shows recognition of the potential of small-scale mining, the position remained not to engage on the situation of zama zama operations and activities and persons categorised as ‘illegal’. The posture adopted by the current Minister of Mineral Resources, Mr. Samson Gwede Mantashe, is to support a push to regulate the

19 Translated from Sesotho: U-government makasinikeze imvume thina sizisebenzele thina ngokwethu, ngoba imisebenzi awukho, uyang’thola? And manje ama-company uhlala iminyaka la ubhekile ukuthi bazokuqasha or abazokuqasha na, uyayibona daai ding? U-government makanikeze abatu umsebenzi, sizisebenzele thina igold, hai ukuthi siqashwe nguye ngoba khona manje uyabone ayikho into ehlanganayo. 20 Translated from Sesotho: Sithole like,,imvume ukuthi sithole indawo esazi ukuthi umunti ozosebenza igold uthola imvume,wonk’ umuntu usharp, akunani, ngoba lento iyalwanisa yona le-gold mos ezi-mine, ngeke sisuke la siyi-group sihambe siyelena e-mine as a group yethi sithi sifuna ipermit, siyofika sife daar, siyabulalana sodwa vaya die ding, so manje leyondlela nje ugovernment makasinikeze ichance ukthi sikwazi ukusebenza ngalento.

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sector as a way to curb the networks of buyers who purchase from the zama zama and profit significantly from it (Radio 702 News, 2018). The push to license operations is explicitly laying the basis for continued criminalisation. There was also no space to further engage on the forms of operations and the potential they offered as part of a livelihood strategy. The rationale behind this is a fairly consistent policy posture of criminalisation alongside an attempt to provide further support for small-scale operators (Ntombeni, 2018). In effect, it affirms existing policy. With criminalisation of artisanal miners, it makes it more difficult to directly involve them in policy discussions. The problem of representation also emerged in interviews conducted with Ms. Sabatini Mngadi, an activist with Community Empowerment Committee and Womxn Challenge It Movement. During her attempt to mobilise zama zama in Vlakfontein, a first concern raised by a zama zama miner had to do with representation and how difficult it would be for zama zama to engage directly with the state. In the first instance is the problem of exclusion from formal education and the fact that most of his colleagues do not speak English fluently. This also raises the problem of whether the most marginalised and oppressed can be entitled enough for the state to engage them on their own terms. Spivak (1985), in Can the Subaltern Speak?, draws attention to tensions in representation within the state and political economy and the question of subject-making and problematises the role of the intellectual in this process. Mamdani (1996: 7-9, 27-28) elaborates on the nature of the ‘bifurcated state’ which in its formation, during indirect rule in British colonial territories in West Africa for instance, and segregation, turned into Apartheid in South Africa. In both iterations, the state is structured to separate rural and urban populations, ethnicities and races. This is understood as primarily a product of the institutions of the local authorities in the form of chiefs and headmen, who are placed in positions of authority in a strategy of ‘bifurcation of power’. In this case, instead of being citizens able to hold the state accountable, the zama zama in Gauteng as part of the urban poor are invisible in terms of their rights as people and visible as elements to be undermined or unsupported, contained and even eliminated.

Here we don’t have someone who is going to stand up for us, even if me, my brother and others unite. Who is going to stand up for us if we go to Pretoria (the seat of government)? Because when we go to Pretoria they will be

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speaking in English and for us… we’re going to start mumbling “I think, I think” and end up speaking an African language (Interview: Monoleng, 2018).

He goes on to explain the challenge of organising zama zama in conditions of criminalisation.

We could give you our phone numbers, as we are here, we don’t trust anyone because I can give you my phone numbers now then you turn out to be a police officer. You will call and say you are coming so that we can get the gold only to find the police van open from the back when I arrive and then you ask me to go inside (Interview: Monoleng, 2018).

Nonetheless, in conditions of criminalisation, zama zama in Northwest Province’s Kimberley diamond mines have been able to form and sustain a committee. This structure in turn facilitated the formation of two cooperatives. These structures have enabled negotiations between government agencies, multinationals, civil society organisations and zama zama in Kimberley. The mining firms are De Beers, Super Stone, Ekapa Mineral, Crown Resources and Petra Diamond. Ekapa and Petra Diamond are in a joint venture, the Kimberley Ekapa Joint Venture. These negotiations resulted in two cooperatives receiving a permit each. The cooperatives have provided a structure for the miners to sell diamonds and thereby receive fairer rates for their diamonds by undermining buyers who usually impose below- market rates and in turn resell to the mining firms for super profits. Buyers were able to do this before since, as licensed agents, they could purchase diamonds while the zama zama as criminalised producers could not negotiate for fairer rates reflective of world market prices (Rutledge, 2018). The members of the cooperatives are only documented persons, and almost entirely, if not exclusively, composed of South African citizens. The structure nonetheless is supporting undocumented persons who can still sell their diamonds through it. During negotiations, zama zama miners were still being evicted from the mine sites and subjected to police harassment, assault and arrest. In 2016, the Office of the Premier of Northwest Province called a meeting between the mining firms and DMR where an agreement was made to provide a site for the zama zama to operate legally. Within a year, negotiations, in addition to protests in the streets, placed pressure on the local government to recognise the zama zama as ‘the rightful owners of small-scale

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mining’ (Interview: Mbangula, 2018). This asserted the right to livelihood, governmentality and citizenship. (The support of Black First Land First (BLF) is also noted but the extent to which they were influential in the campaign has not been investigated in this study due to time and resource constraints). The cost for licensing the sale of diamonds costs R250 000 while a mining right would cost R1 million. The cooperatives were issued two permits and the DMR agreed to pay for the permit. There was no other application for the 500 hectares of land that the zama zama work on. Prior to this agreement, plots of land offered to the zama zama were unviable. For instance, they were offered grave sites and mined-out areas. The Office of the Premier, MACUA and zama zama miners representative went on a site visit to show them the areas the zama zama wanted to mine, and demarcate this to enable an official agreement (Mbangula, 2018). Kimberley diamond miners have been operating for more than fourteen years. During this time, they set up temporary shelters which have grown into informal settlements from where they have demanded supply of water and decent sanitation from local government. The committee was formed in 2014 and the first major protest held in 2015. After receiving an eviction notice, a joint statement on 3rd April 2017 from zama zama in Kimberley and MACUA emphasised how political parties are only visible during elections, but absent to respond to their demands as citizens, while they also affirm the rights of migrants to basic services. In the elections phase, the zama zama became visible as legitimate actors and citizens, but this contrasts with criminalisation which persisted after elections. In the statement, this criminalisation was challenged by affirming the right to work. The statement draws on regional and international instruments that South Africa is a signatory after 1994. One is a binding treaty signed under the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in addition to the African Union Charter on Human and People’s Rights. A context of high unemployment, harassment from private mine security and police who, among other things, confiscate their work equipment undermines zama zama livelihoods and right to work. This harassment undermines their operations, which depend on their ability to invest in equipment. Mr. Meshack Mabangula is quoted at the protest, saying ‘"Today our minerals are owned by the by so-called investors. They want to leave us poor… When they started they were zama-zamas, now they call themselves Lonmin. We do the same thing and they call us illegal (Daily Sun News, 2017). “

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These responses from the state did not recognise them as legitimate actors with rights, but instead positioned them as ‘enemies’ of the state. In their concluding statement, they assert that: ‘We are the sons and daughters of this land and for that reason we don’t need anyone to come and tell us how to do mining in our land’ (See full statement in Appendix III). Soon after this protest, nine zama zama miners were arrested. The spokesperson of the zama zama, Mr. Patrick Masilo, remained resolute, and affirmed: ‘We are from this continent. The person who wants to evict us is not even from this continent and we will continue mining in our land.’ (SABC News, 2018a). Since they received their permits covering 500 hectares, they continue to expand their operations (SABC News, 2018b).

Photo 7 of a march by Kimberley Zama Zama and MACUA on April 3 2017. Photo by Mr. Christopher Rutledge.

Mr. Seekoei adds: ‘We’re just taking what belongs to black people. We opened cases of theft of mining equipment against known companies but the police are doing nothing.’ (My emphasis; Machakela, 2017). Obakeng Monyera, who has been working for more than a decade as a zama zama in Kimberley, said: ‘Today the Deputy Minister said we are free to sell and we will be recognised as legal miners. This is history in the making’ (Machakela, 2017). Mr. Godfrey Oliphant, Deputy Minister of Mineral Resources, who was part of this process, confirmed this kind of process would be allowed only where

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it was safe to do so (Thabanelo, 2018). As already stated, the current minister of Mineral Resources, Mr. Gwede Mantashe, has however had the last word on this pilot measure, highlighting that it is another route to creating barriers for the continued growth of the sector. This is still an advance won by the zama zama in Kimberley and is the first step in a continued struggle for petty commodity producers and petty capitalists to go beyond occupation of gaps left by LSM operations to redefine the character of mining in South Africa.

6.7 Conclusion

The chapter shows the racialised manner in which LSM has crowded out space for the development of petty commodity producers and petty capitalism, but also more broadly that the state, hand in hand with narrow nationalistic corporations, has sought to limit the space for African petty commodity production. In the contemporary period, attempts to redress historical injustice in the form of BEE/BBBEE have reinforced the status quo which continues to undermine the further growth of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining. The Ekurhuleni Municipality has shown how their policy was not instinctively hostile to ASM which was initially thought of as being part of reviving the local economy amid reversing deindustrialisation. There was a clear, sharp shift from open support for a coordinating body to support ASM to a corporate-driven process in reprocessing mine tailings. The former approach had the potential to support ASM by providing a space to rationalise the economy of the municipality. For instance, it had potential to ensure linkages operate in a manner that ensures beneficiation. This would have mediated ASM in manner that ensures its articulation. This emphasises that the overriding interest of the state remains to enable LSM operations, and in effect actively undermine zama zama, affirming the historical imposition of disarticulation. The contradictory nature of the state is conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. DRDGOLD’s history itself encompasses the contradictions with this process which revived a firm which had its roots in the early phase of LSM in South Africa, and has benefited from historical forms of accumulation. This can be similarly said of Benoni Gold. The process of displacement of ASM miners that has been taking place has also closed the policy space in the Ekurhuleni Municipality. This affirms a posture of criminalisation that further undermines the potential of ensuring ASM operations are also

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supported to organise, potentially as cooperatives in gold. The legitimacy of petty commodity production is shown to be relatively weak by the manner that ASM in gold is being treated. The cases in other commodities such as tiger’s eye and Kimberley diamonds, however point to some space for cooperatives, but the extent to which they can also claim the space for beneficiation is yet to be determined. In this regard, the extent to which they can be conceptualised as a form of petty commodity production attempting to evolve into petty capitalists is key. The case of tiger’s eye in the Northern Cape can be instructive of the limitations faced even with the provision of technological support by the state. As in the Obuasi case in Ghana, petty commodity producers and petty capitalists have filled the gaps left by LSM operations and the state. Even though this gap appears to be more constrained in South Africa, these operations still thrive. The Ekurhuleni case shows how constrained the space is with the encroachment of LSM operators into reprocessing and petty commodity producers being criminalised. A consistent thread among the interviews with zama zama is how their survival depends on this form of work and the need to protect their right to work. Vlakfontein poses sharply the need to secure the safety of miners who are exposed to extreme conditions from the mine tailing itself and police harassment but also the operations of gangs among the zama zama. Underground mining by zama zama still poses great risks due to rock falls, poisonous gas and explosions. Kimberley, on the other hand, offers an example of organising and a broad based campaign that asserted zama zama and pressed the state to license operations. Creating a more open and safer process to trade in gold can undermine syndicates and middle men while strengthening the hand of miners in ASM. Nevertheless, the aim of the state is to use this to close down these operations in the long run. This traps the zama zama and their counterparts in Ghana, the galamsey, in a process of evolution which at times shifts from petty commodity production to petty capitalism. These are largely driven by endogenous processes. The combination of the elements logic, orientation and linkages infuse a distinctive character in these processes. In spite of this dynamism, the process of becoming capital is actively undermined by the state and LSM operations. The state in particular has moments when it appears to intervene in a supportive manner, but its overriding role remains to undermine the zama zama and galamsey. The next chapter, which compares both cases, elaborates on these aspects.

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Chapter 7: Comparison of Obuasi and Gauteng: Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism, Capital becoming

7.1 Introduction

This chapter compares the process of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) in Obuasi and Gauteng. It lays the basis to address the core problems of the study. Why does ASM persist? Why does ASM not become LSM? To answer these questions, this chapter will reflect on the cases covered in the empirical Chapters Four, Five and Six. This chapter analyses the forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold in terms of the mining regimes, linkages, technology and degree of mechanisation, organisation of mining, livelihood strategies, the domestic market, orientation and nature of the state. The forms of state intervention are analysed in terms of how it shapes the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining. This will reveal aspects of the character of the state. Altogether these concrete aspects enable a comparison. The core argument is that petty commodity production and petty capitalism hold a distinctive character. The latter is understood as a combination of three core elements: logic, orientation and linkages. These inter-related processes are more clearly distinctive in petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. This chapter focuses on orientation and linkages, which are more concrete elements. By comparing both countries, the study provides an explanation for the persistence of ASM in the contemporary period in spite of criminalisation which continues to hinder its further evolution. Even though petty commodity production in Obuasi can be traced from the pre-colonial period, it manifests in the post-independence period as the galamsey. Galamsey is a formulation of ‘gather them and sell’ of gold in and around LSM operations. The process of evolution of petty commodity production in mining is shaped within the broader process of economic change. The initial emphasis of development strategy on state-led development gives an understanding of the subordinate position of local capital. This sets the stage for interpreting its rapid growth within the disruptions

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created by structural adjustment reforms, volatilities in commodity prices and further neoliberalisation. On the other hand, zama zama in cases studied in Gauteng can be traced from the post apartheid period. They emerged in the early 1990s, in and around LSM operations. They also reprocess marginal assets in mine tailings. Even though the zama zama appear to be a post apartheid presence, they appear as the galamsey at the moment of ‘freedom’. The cases studied in Gauteng do not trace zama zama directly to indigenous mining traditions. Nonetheless, they emerge in the shadow of LSM dominated mining at the end of Apartheid and the implementation of neoliberal reforms. This study therefore focuses on the particular configuration of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in the phase of African or black nationalist control of mineral resources and the contradictions that have emerged from these processes. By interpreting ASM as a space that can potentially enable the development of local capital, the limitations and potential of these processes has significance in contributing to an understanding of capitalism in the global south. Ghana introduced explicit ASM regulation in 1989, in the midst of structural adjustment, while South Africa does not have explicit laws. Nonetheless, criminalisation of zama zama and galamsey persist. This distinction and commonality is important to keep in mind in relation to the comparison between the two country cases. Selected micro cases in Gauteng of petty commodity production in Vlakfontein and Khutsong, and petty capitalism in Brakpan, illustrate the tensions between these operations and dominant Large-scale Mining (LSM). The zama zama emerge in the post Apartheid period and operate under the shadow of LSM operations. The latter, facing a decline in gold mining, re-strategise to rework marginal assets, shrinking the gap for the zama zama. The history of Obuasi traces the displacement of indigenous mining, repression by the colonial government, and its resurgence in the post structural adjustment period. The occupation of AGA Obuasi mine marks a key crisis moment in what is an unstable coexistence between ASM and LSM. ASM, which rapidly expanded globally during a minerals commodity boom and in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms, is understood as fitting within livelihood strategies deployed by the excluded (Awumbila and Tsikata, 2010; Lahiri-Dutt, 2012a). Survival itself is at risk. The response from marginalised and excluded groups is to encroach onto the terrain of big capital, but in doing so (in the first instance) they occupy gaps left by big capital. Descriptive approaches to analysing ASM provide an understanding of

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production relations, techniques, characteristics of the miners, buyers and transformations ongoing within ASM sites (Yakovleva, 2007; Bryceson and Geenen, 2016; Botchwey and Crawford, 2016). This does not yet provide a framework within which to interpret ASM as an economic formation emerging as a result of the logic of capital. In real terms, ASM is the outcome of the gaps left by big capital being filled by petty commodity producers and petty capitalist operations. Petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining are both dynamic and embody a process that is within capital and in relation to LSM-dominated mining. This is a zone for capital accumulation that arises out of gaps left by LSM operations. At the lowest end of the spectrum of ASM, petty commodity production is characterised by self- exploitation and viewed as providing support to households and achieving concrete targets to improve living conditions. This chapter outlines aspects of what makes ASM the nesting ground for local capital. This lays the basis to respond to the central questions of the study (Why does ASM persist? Why does ASM not become LSM?) To answer this, this chapter will focus on the elements of linkages and orientation. These aspects are found to be more concrete expressions of the character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. The logic, which is local capital in its essence, is elaborated in the final Chapter Eight. State interventions have direct and indirect bearing on the process of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. In the neoliberal period, this takes the form of aiding the market to push the social fabric of society to its limits. State interventions also attempt to inject supportive interventions on behalf of zama zama and galamsey. With regards to this, the contradictory nature of state intervention is conceptualised as a form of mediated disarticulation. The everyday process of production and reproduction, as shown in the cases in Gauteng and Obuasi, offer insights into the process of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining in the contemporary period. The present form(s) of petty commodity production and petty capitalism are traced historically showing how the state, in both country cases, has bearing on this.

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7.2 Locating ASM in the Mining Regimes

The formation of the mining regime and construction of the state and the ‘nation building’ project, with entitlements attached to citizenship, has had bearing on how ASM operators have been able (and unable) to legitimise themselves. LSM operations enter as normalised partners of the state in the process of development, which in real terms naturalises dispossession, as outlined by Hart (2006). The contestation from ASM miners, by challenging their exclusion, destabilises this status quo and possibly contributes to ‘denaturalisation’ (Hart, 2006). This contestation emerges from more overt forms of articulation, such as political statements, as well as from more indirect forms by the very existence and expansion in ASM. The criminalised variations of ASM, in the form of galamsey and zama zama, are integral to this and provide a better understanding of the conditions facing petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. Unlike Hart (2006), this author argues that this destabilisation emerges not just from capitals outside, but from both within capital and outside of big capital. The focus of the study on petty commodity production and petty capitalism is to lay a basis to better understand the specifities of the heterogenous economies in Ghana and South Africa. Mining history in South Africa shows tensions between ‘small diggers’ or artisanal miners, large-scale firms and land owners (Mostert, 2012: 26). This has led to the displacement of artisanal miners as a result of the emergence of conglomerates which could secure finance and technology needed for deeper level mining. At this early stage, Africans were sourced as cheap wage labour and were policed with invasive forms of surveillance, restrictions and punitive actions against African miners. Surveillance also included controls on movement, which was a precursor to pass laws. With large-scale farms also requiring cheap labour and with coercion having limited gains, the creation of the labour bureau was deemed necessary to secure labour for mines. A series of mine laws were introduced to regulate prospecting and ownership of precious stones, and this was used as a model for precious metals in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. As discussed previously, ownership of precious stones and metals was vested in the state, which had the authority to license operations. On the other hand, landowners were allowed to permit prospecting and mining. Later, while the state took exclusive rights, landowners were still allowed to prospect for minerals on their own land. They were only required to notify the Mining Commissioner. The landowner

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reserved a right to one quarter of the portion of land if there was any significant discoveries of deposits of precious stones and metals. This arrangement is referred to as minjnpacht. Minjnpacht existed as an independent operation next to the LSM operation. In further mining legislation after 1964, the minjnpacht was set aside (Mostert, 2012: 26- 27). This draws focus onto how the South African state in formation also made provisions for smaller scale mining operations to occur alongside emerging LSM. The former would enable a form of locally driven capitalist enterprise while the latter could deploy international finance. The landowners in the Transvaal and Orange Free State were more likely white Afrikaans-speakers. At its very beginnings, the exclusion and marginalisation of Africans was written into the minerals economy and the foundations of state formation in what became the Union of South Africa in 1910. The next decades were largely marked by a rising nascent working class in mining and manufacturing. White workers and black workers would both make a mark on shaping the labour-capital relation. In the context of Apartheid, which formalised the segregation of society and created further barriers to Africans, the National Party undertook concerted efforts to spur the growth of Afrikaans capital through the setting up of conglomerates. This further entrenched the exclusion of an African petty commodity production and a nascent bourgeoisie and limited political space for the black working class. It is this central problem which policies ought to redress in the mining regime after 1994. African ASM re-emerges in this moment, in the context of liberalisation of the economy, which has meant casualisation of labour and deindustrialisation. The decline of gold mining and manufacturing has had a combined devastating effect on employment. In the meantime, in precolonial Ghana, artisanal miners had been engaged in mining as a supplementary activity to agriculture (Dumett, 1998). They were later displaced with the setting up of AGC which was formed out of Cot D’ Or which was set up by Fante entrepreneurs prior to the invasion of the Asante Empire by the British. The entry of LSM operations into the then Gold Coast and its protectorates was spurred by the end of the Ashanti war and the Anglo Boer war in South Africa (Taylor, 2006). At the point of dispossession some areas were declared unoccupied, a thousand artisanal miners were displaced. The operations also required labour intensive mining, but quickly needed more capital intensive techniques. This in turn required improved road networks and mechanisation, which ultimately laid the basis for the displacement of artisanal miners. Women were mainly engaged as carriers, until road networks improved and displaced them. Labour reserves were mainly from Northern Ghana, while labour pool

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reserves for mines in South Africa were drawn from other colonies in the Southern African region. The 1936 Minerals Ordinance in the then British Protectorates sought to control local mining operations. It also sought not to prevent the continued customary forms of mineral extraction. In Section 4, it explicitly states that it does not seek ‘to prevent natives of the Protectorate’ from ‘taking, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed…iron, salt, soda or potash’. In this reading, it still keeps an opening for so called ‘customary forms’ of extraction, which are interestingly not referred to as mining but just ‘taking’ the named mineral commodities. The governor was put in control of the entire property of and all minerals in the Protectorate (this covered Ashanti and Northern Territories). The ordinance also prohibited prospecting, mining or diverting of water or creation of any kind of enclosure to store water for mining. The penalty for contravening the ordinance was a twelve month imprisonment or a fine of 100 pounds. This piece of legislation illustrates how the colonial government, even as it restricted local mining operations, still had to provide some appearance of policy space for indigenous mining. It is instructive that indigenous gold mining was not provided similar treatment. Instead, indigenous gold mining had been outlawed decades earlier, in 1905. In these circumstances, indigenous gold miners were criminalised until 1989, when ASM was legalised (Gibreh et al, 2009: 5). After independence, Ghana went through a period of experimentation to industrialise and diversify production in an economy dependent on the export of a few commodities, mainly cocoa and gold. By 1961, nationalisation of the economy was at the centre of development policy. The State Gold Mining Corporation (SGMC) was created to own and manage all mining firms, with Ashanti Gold Corporation being the sole exception. Until then, investments were entirely by private actors. The SGMC took over all mining firms from 1961 to 1986. In 1972, a military government increased its shares in AGC (Gibreh et al, 2009: 1). This nationalisation phase ended with the turn to an austerity budget in 1983 and implementation of structural adjustment. The crisis had been marked by falling commodity prices, deteriorating infrastructure, high inflation, and foreign currency shortage, while mining firms were also operating at a loss. The mine facilities were deteriorating and required upgrading in a time when the state’s capacity to secure needed finance investments was constrained. Mining was a key sector marked for liberalisation. Backed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, reforms were introduced to withdraw the state from direct

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management and control of corporations. Ostensibly, this was to reduce overall state expenditure, while creating favourable conditions for foreign direct investment. A focus of the reforms was to shed state enterprises. Privatisation and closure of state enterprises with consequent retrenchment, casualisation and informalisation of work undermined mining and manufacturing, led to a fragmentation of the working class which was re- centred in the public sector, with the excluded absorbed in the informal economy (Britwum and Martens, 2008). These circumstances implied a disintegration of protections and intensified insecurity for formal sector workers in both countries, albeit in different decades. These processes unfolded in Ghana in the early 1980s, while in South Africa, they unfolded in the next decade. A common thread is market liberalisation, which strips away state enterprises in Ghana, while the decline of manufacturing and gold mining in South Africa undermines formal sector employment. (See Table 2 below which summarises key moments in both cases, highlighting the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in both cases). These circumstances gradually compelled a layer of the working class to rethink livelihood strategies and reoccupy zones of exclusion both in spatial terms (in active and abandoned mine shafts) and in mine tailings (in South Africa), and within capital itself. In terms of occupation of capital, this takes the form of gaps left by LSM (as a form of big capital). In this reconfiguration, labour takes the form of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists, evolving with the potential to erode the dominance of LSM operations. This real threat comes to light when zama zama and galamsey occupy active mines, with the Obuasi occupation being an extreme case. At the lower end of ASM spectrum, petty commodity production and petty capitalist operations provide an understanding of the distinctive aspects of these forms of mining operations. It is also possible to more clearly see the forms of state interventions and their impact on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. The following sub section elaborates on the nature of the linkages that form in and around ASM in both countries, and analyses key similarities and differences.

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Table 2 showing the logics of LSM and ASM in Ghana and South Africa

Case State interventions LSM Evolution ASM evolution Ghana Colonial period Colonial period Colonial period 1894 Crown Lands Bill Initial extraction on the Honeycomb method drafted basis of indigenous traditional form. Initially mining technology. extracted surface 1897 Lands Bill Gradual integration of deposits 5-20 feet. mechanised extraction 1905 ban on artisanal technology Extended to 30 to 60 gold mining feet deep in tunnels 2 1890 license for to 3 feet wide. 1923 colonial secretary 100 square mile affirmed African rights to concession acquired Supply local artisans, lands not being operated by AGC local goldsmiths and by AGC jewellers 1897 Lands Bill 1936 Minerals Ordinance empowers AGC to specifically bans artisanal register the land as gold mining unoccupied and evict 1000 gold miners among others

Introduction of pumps in 1900s enables miners to dig deeper pits

1920s and 1930s volatilities gold prices and labour shortage

Increased resort to migrant labour from Northern Territories

LSMs from South Africa in 1920s rationalise small mining firms

AGC brought into Chamber of Mines 1930s agitations Structural Adjustment Structural Adjustment intensify in the mines Phase under Military Phase under Military rule rule 1947 strike and 1989 first explicit ASM formation of MEU, Local financiers of regulation lifts ban on military protection galamsey operations artisanal gold mining introduced also act as buyers.

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Agents granted 1961 state acquires licenses to purchase operations in 11 mines from galamsey and middle men. 1964 mines are reincorporated in the State Gold Mining Corporation No information on the networks from this 1968 Lonhro wins bid point. for AGC Supply local artisans, local goldsmiths and jewellers

Liberal Democratic Liberal Democratic Liberal Democratic Phase Phase Phase 2003 failed relocation 2004 Ashanti Gold Local financiers of project Corporation merges galamsey operations with Anglo America also act as buyers. 2006 National Security Agents with licenses Council coordinated 2016 occupation by purchase from clampdown on galamsey galamsey in miners financiers.

2006 Minerals and Mining October 2016 No information on the Act Occupation ends and networks from this military unit under point. Destruction of mine Operation Vanguard equipment, arrest, failed occupy Obuasi Supply local artisans, resettlement programs local goldsmiths and AGA makes public jewellers Chamber of Mines 2006 process to transfer National Security Council 60% of its concession Mineral commodity to government boom fuels ASM 2006 CHRAJ verification expansion in 2000s mission October Responds to crisis in 2013 withdrawal of social reproduction military and police Potential of small-scale security in mines mining investment from China playing a productive role in ASM

Draws on indigeneity to legitimise artisanal mining. Migrants from Northern parts of Ghana associated with commercial operations.

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Chinese investors blamed for environmental damage in water bodies and farms. Also closing space for Ghanaian nationals.

April 2017 New government imposes moratorium amid anti- ASM campaign

August 16 2018 Ban lifted on ASM

South Colonial and apartheid Colonial and apartheid Post apartheid and Africa phase phase Liberalisation Phase State licenses for 1886 Benoni and Vlakfontein TSF ownership of precious Vlakfontein farms set Absence of state in stones and metals, while aside for gold mining providing security and landowners permit Mooderfontein limited social services prospecting and mining purchased by Rand and unemployment Mine Group altogether fuel zama Landowners only notify New mines ran at a zama operations Mining Commissioner for loss prospecting Zama zama working in Below 40 feet, more Vlakfontein TSF since Landowner allowed to efficient technology 1994. Roodeport zama hold one quarter of total needed zama mid 1990s area when significant initially with retrenched discoveries are made 1890 Drought and poor mineworkers. electricity supply 1892 Railway line to link undermined operations Reprocessing, Vereeniging to Germiston excluding 1898 railway line from Discovery of coal in amalgamation of gold, Springs to Johannesburg Springs and Brakpan is done on site. reduces overhead World War II costs Process has become establishment of more labour intensive manufacturing base Brakpan provided and requires use of supplying consumer alternative source of pumps goods in domestic market energy which lowered (import substitution operational costs More hours at work and industrialisation) labour intensive nature 1893 Rand Mines has reduced the Restrictions placed on established number of women black small enterprises in visible on the site reserves Women undertook reprocessing as an

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Industrial parks for black 1895 Durban additional source of small enterprises set up Roodeport Deep income alongside with limited support established social grants or other lower income 1920s and 1930s Black MacArthur and Forrest employment such as Women restrictions on potassium cyanide construction farm labour families expel based extraction 2009 women absorbed in litres to process a Zama zama expanding mine tonne of ore interviewed were either communities former construction 1977 Ergo Plant workers or former 1923 (Natives) Urban Act established by Anglo mineworkers surveillance and control America on locations Relatively unstructured operations in mine tailings contrast with groups that operate Transition from underground. apartheid and liberalisation Middle men in locations 1992 DRDGOLD taken near mine tailings are over by Rand Leases the first buyers of gold and managed by ore. Lesser returns Randgold and discourage direct sale Exploration in Johannesburg

1992 Randgold and Miners occasionally Post apartheid and Exploration take over collectively sale their Liberalisation Phase Rand Mines products

Mineral Petroleum Undocumented Resources Development Post apartheid and migrants are not able to Act 2002 Liberalisation Phase sell directly on the market and rely on 2016 Office of the 1994 DRDGOLD middle men Premier of Northwest defunct Province meet with Gangs are not mining firms and DMR 1993, Randgold and interested in surface where an agreement was Exploration list workings and are made to provide a site for Randgold Resources focused on the zamamzama to underground workings operate legally. 1993-2004 Randgold and Exploration Harassment from delisted from police and robbers both Johannesburg Stock pose risks Exchange Khutsong zama zama July 2012 Ergo operate within informal Restructured with settlement EMO, subsidiary of DRDGOLD holding

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total shares of Ergo and ensure compliance with BBBEE

February 2014 Digby Wells Environmental produce report on reworking mine tailings

Crown Gold Recoveries infrastructure to further expand DRDGOLD

2016 Randgold bids Ghana government to takeover of Obuasi mine

2017 November 30 Witwatersrand School of Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering and DRDGOLD sign research and development agreement

7.2.1 The nature of state interventions in ASM

In both countries, government responses to ASM have brought to light the centrality of the state in how it limits local capital in gold mining searching for space to develop. Petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining develop within gaps left by LSM operations, and to some extent by the state itself. To recall, petty capitalism exists alongside petty commodity production which are both in motion, in a process of becoming capital. State interventions tend to be contradictory in nature with galamsey and zama zama criminalised on one hand, and the state attempting to support and even integrate their operations, on the other. This contradictory character of state interventions with regards to petty commodity production is conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. Mediation is a process that lubricates the extraction of surplus value within a system of

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generalised production (Saad-Filho, 2003: 30; Banaji, 2010: 62). Mediated disarticulation is the summation of exogenous forces which shape the process of evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining. External forces impinging on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining tends to be the over-riding influence. In 1994, South Africa located ASM within its initial interventions to redress historical injustices of dispossession and exclusion from the mining sector. This included a local government strategy to integrate ASM within the local economy. The requirements placed on ASM are in the first instance the same as on LSM operations in terms of environmental and safety requirements. UNECA (2002) recognised this as not an example of best practice. Later mining reforms removed these requirements. In a context of decline in mining and manufacturing, and consequent retrenchments, these measures were part of attempts to rebuild the local economy. This was soon overtaken by a law enforcement strategy that focused on LSM operations, even in the cases of abandoned mine shafts. Due to poor implementation of reclamation by LSM operations, and the state’s weakness in ensuring this, abandoned shafts have become areas of reoccupation by zama zama. Ghana legalised ASM in 1989, also in a context of liberalisation of the economy. These reforms included attempts to expand the tax base by better regulating the informal sector. This forms part of interventions informed by the IMF and World Bank. The government intervened in a series of strategies to contain galamsey. In the first instance, a wave of arrests were implemented in the late 1990s. Later strategies also included a relocation project which failed. AGA also negotiated with a committee formed by galamsey mineworkers. This was set up to self regulate galamsey operations within AGA Obuasi concession. This structure played a dual role of policing galamsey and holding it to account for its agreements with the committee. The nine-month occupation represented the complete disintegration of this arrangement. Ghana offers insights into a country case where regulation created an open market in which sponsors and supervisors alike value gold based on the world market prices - agents licensed by the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, who supply the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC). The latter is a state-owned refinery that processes, and therefore adds value to, precious minerals and trades directly on the world market. The dominance of the world market is taken as a natural process which can either present increased profits or loss. The ability of LSM operations to dominate

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the global market through their ability to control more of the supply of commodities, and volatilities amplified by financialisation, implies that the livelihoods of galamsey and zama zama alike remain vulnerable since they are subject to forces over which they are unable to play a dominating role. This vulnerability is itself a product of the liberalisation of the labour regime, the expansion of mining (especially the use of open cast mining) and undermining provisioning of public social services. Nonetheless, the creation of a regulated environment has enabled the galamsey to sell their ore at world market prices as compared to the zama zama. Zama zama, as cited in Chapter Six on Vlakfontein, trade with agents who are stationed close to mine tailings, and as traced further in the work of Munakamwe (2017), agents are also close to underground operations. They sell the product over to other traders in Johannesburg before being integrated in the formal market. In both cases, there is a re-entry of the excluded from the formal sector into the space of LSM as big capital. This is a re-entry of small-scale players within terrains of private property. Obuasi offered a more overt form of occupation with continuous presence in the space of production in what was a partially active mine. In this regard, it embodies a form of reoccupation of space in the process of production. In a much broader sense, ASM also captures a less overt form of reoccupation within capital itself, reclaiming a form of production oriented to local production. Petty commodity production understood as constantly in motion and evolving as a form of economic activity dominated by capital, transforms partly by expanding in scale, getting financing and advancing in mechanisation. This process has varied gendered outcomes, with women being excluded or included depending on how women’s labour is valued and integrated in production. In relation to this, women become excluded from mechanised processing in Brakpan, while the introduction of a crusher in Obuasi increased the scale of production and need for more carriers. In other cases in Ghana, the use of mechanised forms of processing alluvial gold increased women’s participation in ASM. After the lifting of the ban on ASM operations in August, 2018, the government of Ghana has supported the galamsey by providing training to 1350 operations, described as registered operations. These operations were provided training in environmentally safe and sustainable forms of production. This excludes the vast majority of forms of galamsey who have been unable to be licensed or to operate within the conditions attached to them. Prior to this, and even before the recent moratorium, there was

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emphasis on supporting medium scale mining as opposed to small-scale mining or galamsey. This shows that there is greater interest in supporting operations more likely to be integrated within the existing LSM operations, as junior miners. The weak response in supporting smaller scale producers, and petty commodity production in particular, emerges from a bias against producers whose base and orientation is locally centred. In South Africa, BEE/BBEE is a key policy tool to redress historical injustice in mining, and also presents a strategy of integration within LSM operations. On one level, this creates a space for an African bourgeoisie to emerge, but this remains unable to resolve the crisis of livelihoods facing the marginalised and excluded from the formal sector. The latter turn to zama zama in mining and thereby create a space for a locally embedded form of ASM to emerge which is integrated in the formal sector, but in real terms operates outside of the framework set by the state and LSM operations. In the meantime, BEE/BBEE integrates the black bourgeoisie within LSM operations, at the margins of lesser profitable enterprises, placing them in a position to displace petty commodity producers as illustrated in the Vlakfontein case with Benoni Gold, alongside other firms like DRDGOLD.

7.2.2 The Implications for the Zama zama and Galamsey

The absence of an explicit legal framework to effectively integrate ASM in South Africa has created harsh conditions of criminalisation. The licenses for zama zama in Kimberley have opened the policy space for further thinking on how to regulate the sector. Tiger’s eye gems also presents an important example where the state has intervened by supporting zama zama to support beneficiation. However, Nombeni (2018) explains that the zama zama were keen to retain control over the enterprise and link with buyers of their final processed gems. Even though legislation did provide specific requirements for ASM operators, it put particular emphasis on maintaining environmental and safety requirements on the same level as LSM operators (UNECA, 2002). There was a shift with regards to this in the new Mining Charter (South Africa, 2017) which attempted to make distinctions between micro operators and medium scale operations, excluding them from environmental and safety requirements. However, the turn over of R1 million rand for micro scale operators was too high and excludes the more diverse range of ASM operations, especially petty commodity producers. Also, there is no intervention on the part of the state outside of its research institute, Mintek, to provide support to ASM

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operators. Mintek has so far set up training centres, one of which caters specifically for Tiger’s Eye. Mintek also has advanced safer forms of extracting gold. In conditions of criminalisation, it is not operating in a manner that improved technology which can reach out to zama zama as found in other cases like Guyana, Zimbabwe and Ghana. Ghana went from legalisation in the late 1980s, to intensification of criminalisation, a complete moratorium, and then lifting the ban. Unable to completely eliminate ASM, in the first instance, legalisation enabled more direct intervention from the state to license ASM operations and also ensure licensed agents could buy directly from ASM operators and supply its state-owned company, PMMC. This arrangement implied that the agents were expected to purchase from licensed ASM operators, but in practice, it was still the case that unlicensed ASM operators could be sellers. In this case, Obuasi did illustrate this case where sponsors confirmed they were licensed to operate and purchase gold, but their operations were not licensed. There was also not enough clarity on where buyers could sell off gold. Ghana also has a University for Mines and Technology (UoMAT), which historically has served LSM by providing technical training needed in LSM operations. This has more recently sought to provide technical support to enable the further development of ASM operations. This form of intervention has provided some support to certain sectors of ASM operations. Decisions about who was included in these workshops was determined by party affiliation. The effect is to deepen factionalising along party political lines which would include and exclude ASM operators based on affiliation. On a superficial level, this can be assumed to merely be neo- patrimonial networks undermining the provision of state services and resources. The later emergence of the Adansi Association, pressing for an alternative approach to addressing LSM and ASM as a whole and envisioning a more holistic vision for transforming and diversifying the economy, is key. The absence of such a concrete intervention and the consistent thread across the political parties works to restrain, undermine or enable ASM, with ASM remaining a subordinate actor. For instance, even though the National Democratic Congress (NDC) under former President John Mahama withdrew military protection for LSM operations across the country, opening up AGA to a nine month occupation, it is also the same regime that initiated destruction of equipment of galamsey operators. The NDC also took over the military government, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which implemented reforms to regulate ASM. After the NDC government handed over to the New Patriotic Party (NPP), it was this government that implemented harsher policing to

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control ASM operations, at the behest of LSM operations (Interview: Elimah, 2017). It is also after NDC (under John Mahama) handed over to the NPP in another transition of power that the moratorium was imposed on galamsey, after a nationwide media-led campaign triggered by concerns to protect the environment, especially water bodies. The response of the NPP, after extending the moratorium indefinitely at the end of six months, was to provide a long term intervention in the sector. The lifting of the moratorium on ASM operations on 16th August 2018 was on the basis of a verification process for 1350 registered ASM miners who will be vetted and verified (Adams, 2018). This implies formalised operations will be put through a process of further re-examination. In the first instance, this enables the state to strengthen its monitoring mechanisms. This fits with the Ghanaian government’s emphasis on supporting the further development of medium scale mining, instead of small-scale mining which exists parallel to, and often equated with, so-called illegal galamsey operations. These are at best unregistered operations which either cannot afford the cost to license their operations, or are frustrated by bureaucratic red tape and also are unable to access concessions that they are interested in working. This is similar to the South African emphasis on small- scale operations, which are equated with more established and mechanised firms which are more likely junior miners and tend to be Black Economic Empowerment/Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBE/BBEE) supported enterprises. This creates some space for ASM operations which have the best potential to be inserted neatly into the LSM dominated economy. The unregulated operations, which operate outside of this, are likely to play a more disruptive role. In their process of becoming capital, by expanding their operations without restraint, they could threaten the continued dominance by LSM. In the meantime, South Africa has no explicit regulatory framework on ASM, and approaches this largely as a law enforcement issue. It attempts to integrate civil society in Gauteng provincial discussions on ASM, but this is in a generally hostile posture towards zama zama. On the other hand, South Africa is being lobbied to decriminalise zama zama by a network of Mining Affected Communities United in Action (MACUA). This network supported the formation of cooperatives in Kimberley and campaigned to press for licensing of zama zama operations in diamonds to be legalised. These zama zama are exploring and extracting diamonds from mine tailings and floors which are found to be profitable to them. Without the cooperatives, they are compelled to sell diamonds to licensed agents (who are linked to De Beers, Petra and Ekapa mining firms)

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below the market value. With the permits being issued, they can now get the market value. As mentioned in Chapter 6, the zama zama who have been operating in Kimberley for more than fourteen years, during which time they set up temporary shelters which have grown into informal settlements, have demanded the provision of social services. The committee which was formed in 2014 has emphasised how political parties have drawn on their settlements for votes during elections but do not attend to their demands as citizens, while affirming the rights of immigrants to basic services. In making their case for decriminalization, the manner in which the zama zama in South Africa positioned themselves in relation to the galamsey is instructive. Both cases highlight indigeneity as a basis for legitimising criminalised operations. However, while the zama zama emphasise the manner in which LSM operations have undermined their operations, the galamsey emphasise a ‘symbiotic’ relation that has been violated by AGA. There is a distinct line of difference in the approaches of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists which draws into focus a differential balance of interests between them and the state and LSM operations as big capital. This also draws a focus to how citizenship is used to legitimise (and delegitimise) galamsey. This worked against the galamsey with investment in mechanised forms of processing from China in alluvial mining, triggering xenophobic reactions against galamsey. In the meantime, zama zama have not necessarily been able to claim citizenship in the same way to legitimise their livelihoods. They also draw on the need to survive and their collective identity as Africans and as blacks, drawing attention to the foreign character of LSM operations and big capital’s historical role in dispossession. It is particularly striking that the xenophobic responses to Chinese investors in ASM operations are not extended to non-Ghanaians working in galamsey operations. Obuasi interviews cited Ivorians, Nigerians and Togolese also working in galamsey operations. This directs focus to the trigger of this xenophobia as a reactionary defence of local indigenous capital, but not an inherent ‘hate’ for the other. What does this mean for South Africa where citizens also working as zama zama view their citizenship as meaningless? These South Africans work alongside undocumented migrants who are deeply aware of the added layer of precarity with the threat of deportation. Citizenship therefore plays a critical role in legitimising and delegitimising ASM in both cases. The contrasting positioning of environmental organisations in South Africa and Ghana is also noteworthy. The former, through MACUA and the Women in Mining

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Affected Communities United in Action (WAMUA), are advancing a decriminalization campaign which enables them to deepen their critique of LSM operations in South Africa. They are open to thinking through forms of mining which maybe be understood as transitional forms of economic activity with the ultimate aim of phasing out mining completely. The legitimacy of zama zama as a livelihood strategy is strongly affirmed. There is emphasis on understanding the place, roles and experiences of women zama zama. The challenges posed by the participation of undocumented migrants in these operations are also grappled with, as well as the affirmation of their right to livelihoods and service delivery from the state. In Ghana, however, such a positioning has been difficult for the Centre for Social Impact Studies in Obuasi. The environmental damage to water bodies and farms by large-scale galamsey operations and xenophobic reactions to small-scale foreign investors means a progressive intervention has been extremely difficult. The extent to which galamsey have been criminalised, with the involvement of the media and other civil society actors with little or no background in mining, has undermined alliance building and solidarity. As an entitlement, Black South Africans were able to claim South African citizenship after 1994, while in Ghana, this was after independence in 1957. The time gap is fortuitous as it enables an understanding of citizenship constructed in different epochs of development policy making. In the first instance, Black South Africans claim citizenship in a period that converges with liberalisation, which brought in its wake market attacks on labour rights and retrenchments. Ghanaians, on the other hand, hold the memory of citizenship in a period of nationalisation under the first government under Kwame Nkrumah. ASM in both countries enters a phase of rapid expansion with liberalisation and volatilities in mineral commodity prices. The above provides a view into the centrality of the state in creating the conditions within which ASM operations, with petty commodity producers and petty capitalists within them, evolve. This lays a foundation to turn to the actual workings of zama zama and galamsey operations. Aspects of this are addressed in terms of the forms that linkages have taken, which, by comparing both cases, provide an explanation.

7.3 Livelihood, Social Mobility or Capital Becoming?

It is important to consider how contradictions in ASM operations are expressed in terms of being vertical and horizontal. Vertical hierarchical relations focus on petty commodity

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producers and petty capitalists in mining and their relations with buyers, the state and LSM operations. In terms of horizontal contradictions, this refers to those that emanate from the operations themselves. It is to these horizontal aspects that this subsection addresses itself more explicitly. In the first instance, miners undertaking ASM as a form of work, either independently or supported by sponsors, tend to hold a survivalist orientation. This includes petty commodity producers. They understand ASM as a livelihood strategy to cope with immediate needs. Nonetheless, they also see it as holding the potential to go beyond survival and ensure reinvestment or diversification of livelihoods to ensure stable income and even social mobility, which is inherently a gendered process. In mine tailings in Vlakfontein and community mining in Khutsong, where returns are significantly lower than ore extracted from underground shafts, the miners view this work as necessary to support households. In one case, a male former LSM miner who is employed through labour brokers uses zama zama to support his household in periods when he is retrenched. He works right next to his shack located in the Khutsong informal settlement and describes how he finds it shameful to work in poor conditions of work. Petty commodity production in this case plays an important supporting role for the miner as the sole breadwinner of his family to help him cope with the impact of casualisation which has imposed flexibility on labour relations in mining. He preferred being employed in LSMs than in ASM, as he found the latter to be a degrading form of work. This speaks to the limits of petty commodity production in mining, which in this case has low returns, as a viable alternative to employment in LSM operations. In Vlakfontein mine tailing, ASM as a livelihood strategy is organised with the aim of taking care of specific expenses in households and a supplementary income. In cases where there is no other breadwinner nor access to social grants, this is a sole form of income. ASM also supplements social grants which are not sufficient to cover the cost of living for households. With mine tailings, where returns are low, miners interviewed were not able to go beyond basic costs. For instance, as one miner highlighted, he is not in a position to support his son studying in a higher education institution, but he is able to cover minor expenses for his children. For young people, retrenched workers, unemployed youth and women who are excluded from the formal sector or hired as casual labour on low incomes such as gardeners and construction workers, ASM becomes an important route to earn a comparatively better income.

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ASM is understood as a transitory form of work to achieve, in the best circumstances, clear goals like building a house or supporting the family in rural and urban homesteads in Mozambique, for instance. This is not oriented to accumulation. It is therefore not understood as a form of capital, but instead a form of petty commodity production that is integrated into capital through the market where the final product is sold. Nonetheless, ASM maintains a certain degree of separation from capital by not itself being caught within the process of becoming capital. Instead, this form of petty commodity production is subordinated to capital through the global market and LSM which still determine the price of gold, and is mediated by a series of agents who sell the gold directly to refineries or transnationally. At the bottom of these exchange relationships, the zama zama miners gain the least value out of gold that is traded in the formal market. The moratorium in Obuasi has shown how women in Obuasi are mainly engaged in ASM to transport rock ore for processing and earn the least incomes. As carriers in galamsey operations, they are paid according to how many sacks of ore bearing rock they can carry. As a result, they work for long hours starting at about 4am and closing late at night. The terms are flexible and they can arrange with supervisors of galamsey operations to be paid daily or at the end of the month. The latter option is preferred because it encourages saving. Working for long hours is only possible if women have support with unpaid domestic work in their households and can therefore focus on this form of paid work. The long term health implications of undertaking this form of work regularly include accidents and injuries which they face while undertaking their tasks. Alternative livelihood options include informal work in petty trading or small holder farming. The returns remain low. In the meantime, men who have been able to save and reinvest their earnings use farming and larger scale retail enterprises to support their families. This shows how men have a greater opportunity to save, reinvest, expand and diversify their earnings. The price of the gold does not include the costs to health and safety from exposure to rock falls, poisonous gases or underground drainage. This is more extreme in Tailing Storage Facilities (TSF); the mine tailings are full of toxins and therefore pose dangers to the health of miners. Townships located close to the TSF are also exposed to dust from the toxic mounds of waste and stone. Children and livestock are also exposed to the to the risks of rock falls, soil, plants, ponds and dams that also contain toxic substances. The zama zama, especially women, who work in these mine tailings are all

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exposed to these toxins. They rely on toxic ponds for water to mix with the mine waste to extract the gold, which poses an even greater hazard than mercury alone, which is also inhaled during amalgamation and burning. This places even greater cost in the long run on the bodies of the zama zama. There are normally allergic reactions which become apparent to first time miners; however these do fade away, with more debilitating symptoms becoming apparent at a later stage, when treatment and daily care will be costly. Since zama zama miners do not maintain close relations outside of the workspace, as a result of its clandestine nature, they are unlikely to even know of colleagues who suffer from long term impacts of exposure to working in TSFs. These are the invisiblised impacts on zama zama which are a product of the limitations placed on petty commodity producers and petty capitalists to evolve in spaces of accumulation which are not hindered by LSM operations and the state. The limitations have pushed zama zama to the margins of precarity, while the galamsey were able to expand operations, organise and encroach more boldly with an occupation by 3000 miners. The next section outlines elements that can explain its evolution and the manner in which that injects a distinctive character into the economy. Table 1 below summarises the key findings.

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Table 3 showing the cases highlighting linkages, mechanisation and key moments of alliance building Cases Linkages and mechanisation Key moments in forming organisations (orientation) Obuasi Initial extraction on the basis of 2001 Mass arrest of 117 galamsey Municipality indigenous mining techniques miners triggers formation of Obuasi (Sanso Galamsey committee Task Team galamsey Mechanised processing of gold mediates Adansi shaft occupation miners) ore. Crusher introduced in 1998. October 17 2016 agreement facilitated by Movement Committee reached

October 23 2016 protest against human rights violations by military and police unit against the occupation

John Owusu AGA spokesperson dies when he is runover by AGA company car

Gauteng Pretoria-Witswatersrand- March 24 2018, MACUA attends Municipality Vereeniging centre industrial workshop on ASM organised by revolution with East Rand building DMR on this momentum

Benoni Municipality planned as industrial park

1950s Mining decline and 1970s East Rand a hub for labour, migrant labour presence strong.

Liberalisation after 1994 accelerates manufacturing decline

Mining no longer main employer, with finance, trade and informal sector taking significant job providers

28 January 2003 mining forum strategizes on small-scale mining moots coordinating company

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2010 City of Ekurhuleni outlines development strategy inclusive of small-scale mining with participation of ASM committee

Northern 2003 report white farm owners April 3, 2017 zama zama in Cape exporting uncut gem to China. Kimberley and MACUA emphasise Workers were paid as low as R300 how political parties only visible to R500 a month during elections, but absent to deliver social services 2014 Mintek set up a gemmological centre in Ethembeni, Prieska to Statement draws on United Nations train learners in pottery and glass International Covenant on Economic, bead manufacturing Social and Cultural Rights, in addition to, the African Union Charter 2016 Northern Cape announced on Human and Peoples Rights. the formation of five primary cooperatives in Prieska. White June 2018, Kimberley zama zama farmers seeking licensing of their permitted official channels to sell operations diamonds. Landmark victory.

Brakpan 2016 about 30 young men and two (micro women operate milling machines case) known as phenduka. These are manually operated

About 15 phenduka were being used to process the ore. Tartaric, vinegar and salt is used to purify the gold dust.

Police have knowledge of operation and conduct regular raids

7.4 Linkages: the known, the unknown and the possibilities

On one hand, linkages as they emerge in the study draw out aspects of what petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining inject into the economy. On the other, linkages capture the LSM-dominated conditions within which petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining have to evolve. As mentioned in Chapter One, linkages have been categorised into downstream, upstream and side stream linkages.

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Downstream linkages refer to manufacturing and mineral beneficiation. Firstly, this relates to further processing of gold ore and the extent to which it is refined or integrated into another cycle of production. It also speaks to value addition. In relation to this, the miners in Vlakfontein and Khutsong refer to selling directly to gold buyers in Johannesburg central or to middle men who have links in Johannesburg. There was one reference to the Diamond Centre in Vlakfontein. (It was not possible to verify further exactly where this is since the miner interviewed was reluctant to give further details). What it does show is the manner in which petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining are connected to the formal sector and the way this could be supplying smaller scale entities with capacity to integrate the gold in refinery processes and add value within the South African economy. Outside of the direct control of LSM operations such as the Rand Refinery (Munakamwe, 2014), this is another point of integration with the formal sector. It is also a conduit through which gold is refined and used by small-scale jewellery and artisans under the Ekurhuleni Jewellery Project which started in 2009. The Rand Refinery provides this platform as part of its socio-economic development initiatives. It appears that this is marginal to the wider operations of Rand Refinery and is in response to demands for transformation extending to the mining sector. This aspect is more significant when viewed through the lens of Ghana, where a state- led marketing company plays a more strategic role in its interactions with ASM operations, including galamsey. In real terms, ASM in Ghana supplies local artisans and jewellers. This can be traced to the precolonial era, and remained as a link to LSM operations in the early 1940s by mineworkers providing an additional linkage. The 1989 small-scale mining legislation also laid the basis for the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC) to offer a structure to which the galamsey sell the gold and diamonds to a registered agent. Whether these agents only purchase from registered ASM operations has remained an open question. The miners interviewed in Obuasi did operate unlicensed operations in the mining town, with financiers who were also licensed buyers. This is a clear case of beneficiation and retaining value in the domestic economy. Second, upstream linkages into mining capital goods (such as work tools, other equipment deployed in workshops and plants) refers to the integration of the ore or mineral in another cycle of production as an input. This can be as an input in production of devices such as computers, considering gold is an excellent conductor. Interviews conducted in Obuasi did not reveal knowledge of how the gold extracted in galamsey

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operations is integrated into local manufacturing, for instance. Financiers of operations in Obuasi who are also buyers resell to licensed agents. Beyond this point, galamsey in Obuasi did not have further information to share. Future studies ought to pay attention to these upstream linkages and trace how the extracted precious metals in Gauteng are integrated into production. This will better elaborate on the forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining and examine the forms of these linkages. This will help respond to questions such as: how do networks which add value or retain gold extracted from galamsey operations function? To what extent is the gold extracted utilised in other forms of production such as manufacturing? It will be useful to trace these networks of exchange and trade. Munakamwe (2017) has traced the trading networks from buyers at the mine sites in the Durban Deep to international buyers. She also shows how the gold is also sold to the Rand Refinery. This is critical as it provides a sense of how the gold is retained as a final product or its potential to be integrated into other products as an input. Lastly, side stream linkages refer to infrastructure (which includes energy, water and transport), skills and technology (African Mining Vision, 2009: v). This addresses the extent to which ASM operations are supported by the state. This can include provision of services by the state to improve production techniques, training in environmental protection and safety, and access to safer and more affordable equipment, alongside inputs such as water, electricity and efficient transport networks. The overall purpose of these forms of linkages is to improve productivity and ensure there is a rationalised usage of natural resources. In real terms, ASM rides on the infrastructure built around the formal economy, which in both cases is dominated by LSM operations. Even though LSM operations and manufacturing in Ekurhuleni are in decline, the existing infrastructure was built in response to the needs of LSM operations and manufacturing firms on the then East Rand. The need to rationalise the existing infrastructure and ensure linkages between cities and towns in Ekurhuleni is key. Nonetheless, in both cases there remains a gap in state investment in infrastructure to meet the needs of mining communities and informal settlements and the overriding goal of reversing deindustrialisation. Obuasi remains a mining town with limited social infrastructure outside of what has been constructed under the sponsorship of AGC/AGA. As the Adansi Association in Obuasi, cited in Chapter Five, and the

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Ekurhuleni Environmental Organisation, cited in Chapter Six, would emphasise, state responses to the needs of mining communities has been relatively weak. This is what makes the attempt to intervene by the Ekurhuleni Municipality to the decline in mining and manufacturing significant. The initiative entailed questions of rationalising infrastructure and also creating an enabling environment for small-scale operations, with the inclusion of an ASM committee and the proposal to form a coordinating company (Czernowalow, 2003). Aspects of the distinctive character of petty commodity production are revealed in upstream and downstream linkages, while side stream linkages reveal more about state interventions. Side stream linkages covered thus far in this chapter focused on state investment in infrastructure but also include the state’s role in skills building, research and technology. The manner that LSM operations have dominance in relation to this, especially in operations in Gauteng that limit the space for petty commodity producers, has been highlighted in Chapter Four and Chapter Six. The next subsection draws out these aspects, while comparing the degree of mechanisation of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in both countries, and identifies the state’s capacity in relation to this.

7.4.1 Degree of Mechanisation

The conditions that shape the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism provide insights into the nature of big capital and the state. Petty commodity producers and petty capitalists slip into the gaps left by big capital and the state. These are aspects of the conditions within which the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in LSM-dominated mining is shaped. The form this takes in Ghana and South Africa shows the different ways that petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining have space to evolve, and the bearing this has on operations. The extent to which LSM-dominated mining has expanded into reprocessing of mine tailings, as shown in Gauteng, illustrates the limited space for petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining. It is critical to highlight how LSM operations, as shown in the case of DRDGOLD, encroached onto spaces being reworked by zama zama. This was part of its own re-strategizing to revive profits as a transnational entity that was in crisis. It also has been able to more effectively draw on research capacity of public institutions such as the University of Witwatersrand’s School of Chemical and

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Metallurgical Engineering which signed an agreement with DRDGOLD to reduce the cost of gold extraction and improve plant level operations. The cases in Vlakfontein draw attention to reprocessing of mine tailings which depend on self-exploitation both individually and in teams. The sluicing method is deployed, which extracts the gold at the same site. The amalgamation can be undertaken elsewhere. Miners make use of toxic water from dams and ponds close to their operation. Water is pumped to the specific areas being worked by use of generators. This form of production makes use of simple implements, but due to increased labour required to work the existing tailing facility, some degree of mechanisation has been introduced. Since zama zama miners were working in these areas for the last two decades, the labour required to dig in the tailings has become more intensive. Prior to this period, women were able to work in the tailings with greater ease, but the challenge with the labour intensive nature of the work has discouraged them from continuing. The women who do work the tailings are able to undertake the entire process of gold extraction on their own. This enables a degree of autonomy. In Brakpan, the zama zama workshop is a case of improved mechanisation of processing of gold ore. The ore is extracted and crushed in manual or gas powered mills with metal balls in cylinders known as phenduka that enable breaking down the rock into finer grains. After grinding the rock, the workshop also undertakes amalgamation to extract the gold ore using mercury, vinegar and salt. The process of amalgamation is a point where considerable health and safety risks are faced by young men who are hired as workers. Women appear not to be directly engaged as workers or as clients of this plant. Clients tended to be miners working underground shafts, which are male dominated groups. The amalgamation process exposes workers and others nearby to evaporated mercury, which is used in the extraction. Access to a retort tool, for instance, can improve the process of extraction (while also retaining mercury for reuse) and make it safer for workers. The condition of criminalisation hinders any ability for them to receive training or ensure that the devices are accessible. This is only a partial explanation. Even in the case of Ghana, where regulations have been in place and attempts made to register and integrate the galamsey, access to appropriate technologies have also been limited. The lifting of the moratorium on ASM operations on 16th August 2018 was on the basis of a verification process for 1350 registered ASM miners. This also included training on health and environmental precautions to be taken in ASM operations. As useful as this must be, it barely captures the vast majority of operators who fall outside

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of the regulations. Revising existing regulations to be more inclusive of the galamsey appears to be the appropriate response. At its core, the law also needs to open up space for the evolution of the sector, even if it is at the expense of LSM operations. This is not to argue that integration within some forms of LSM operations is not possible. It is to emphasise that this does not guarantee that galamsey and zama zama can have space to exert more control over production and expand to refining further and adding value to the gold. The provision of relevant research and development, including access to appropriate technology by a state that prioritises this, is crucial. In relation to this, the importance of the Brakpan workshop cannot be over emphasised. The processing unit in Brakpan is a case of a petty capitalist operation more clearly oriented to reinvestment, expansion and employment of full-time workers. The focus is on providing a service to clients who depend on the processing unit to extract gold from ores mined from underground mine shafts. It is an enterprise that offers a route to improve on the gold extraction and enable further development of the sector. The use of younger, less experienced men for processing the ore as workers makes the case for an expanding sector. However, the reliance on manual mechanised forms of crushing in Brakpan (or gas in other cases) indicates limits faced by processing in South Africa, which itself supplies electric mills to Zimbabwe (UNECA, 2011). The criminalisation of the sector in South Africa can partly explain the reliance on manual or gas powered phenduka. It is presumed they are unable to connect to the electrical grid as this will make their operations more visible to the security agencies. This is not to imply that there is no support for technological development of ASM operations in South Africa - take Mintek, for instance, in the Northern Cape. The production of the precious gem tiger’s eye is being organised within cooperatives with a view to taking greater control of value chains and ensuring beneficiation for the local economy. As mentioned in Chapter 6, in 2003, there was a report that white farm owners who had surface rights were extracting the uncut gem and exporting to China. Workers were paid as little as R300 to R500 a month (Spicer, 2003). The state owned minerals’ research organisation, Mintek, set up a gemmological centre in Ethembeni, Prieska, to train learners in pottery and glass bead manufacturing (Matchdeck, 2014; Rasmeni, Chetty, Sebola, and Seripe, 2016: 591-592). To build on this in the midst of deindustrialisation, the Premier of the Northern Cape set up five primary cooperatives in Prieska and Niekerkshoop (which both formed a secondary cooperative). White farmers with tiger eye gems on their farms were also seeking mining licenses (Mere, 2016). The

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extent to which these cooperatives are being provided support to ensure beneficiation remains to be established. This shows how commodities are treated differently by the state. This can partly stem from the private property arrangements that surround the commodity. Commodities which have had LSM operations’ interests more directly vested in them are more likely to be difficult to intervene on behalf of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists. Zama zama in Kimberley who are working on mine tailings of diamonds recently won permits to sell to agents, and thereby gain a fairer share of world market prices. The zama zama, with support from MACUA and lawyers, were able to win this in the midst of severe police harassment. It was possible for the zama zama in Kimberley to make the case that their mining operations were not dangerous and relatively safe. This can, in part explain the extremely challenging case of zama zama in gold mining in South Africa. Part of the criticism of the state by civil society has to do with its weak enforcement of LSM operations obligations to carry out mine closures, and exposing the general public to uranium laden natural occurring and extracted minewaste in TSFs (Benchmarks, 2017). Tracing the history of ASM in Obuasi in the precolonial (and pre-AGA era), it was a form of livelihood which persisted alongside LSM by farming communities which integrated gold mining alongside agriculture as a supplementary income. The honeycomb method was used at this stage and was not as invasive and could be organised on farms. They were able to dig deep underground, reaching depths of 100 feet. The form of ASM in Obuasi which was being undertaken within the concession of AGA, oriented to access underground shafts, points to a shift to ASM emerging as an outcome of LSM operations. This not a general condition of ASM throughout the country. ASM in Ghana also emerges around areas previously not mined by LSM, or in forest areas, farms, rivers and streams. This differs from South Africa to the extent that gold deposits tend to be underground. Zama zama in gold tend to depend on historical, inactive and active workings of LSM operations. This is what makes the Obuasi case useful to draw into a comparison since the galamsey are also operating in and around AGC/AGA mine shafts. On the other hand, Khutsong is an exceptional case where zama zama undertake the entire process of gold extraction from surface to trace minerals within the informal settlement space. It may be tempting to presume the zama zama in South Africa tend to utilise rudimentary methods in extracting gold. To a greater extent, at the sites where fieldwork

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was conducted, this was a predominant observation. However, the setting up of workshops as cited in Brakpan is a critical example of a step forward in more mechanised extraction methods. The extent to which this form of mechanisation is proliferating and enabling further evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining remains limited. An explanation for this outcome can be drawn from the extent to which there is limited space for petty commodity producers and petty capitalists to fill gaps left by LSM operations and the state itself. The limited space left to the zama zama contrasts with Obuasi where honeycomb methods of mining associated with indigenous or precolonial mining has evolved with the introduction of mechanised forms of processing the gold ore bearing rocks. These gaps are understood in terms of big capital and the manner that the state’s regulatory role provides an understanding of its character. This is discussed in earlier sections and is conceptualised as a form of mediated disarticulation. On this basis, the state interventions in South Africa appear to enforce this mediated disarticulation with greater efficiency. This is an expression of its capacity in relation to the Ghanaian state which has played a more enabling role for galamsey operations. The manner that mechanised forms of processing in Obuasi were integrated in production reveals a process of evolution of petty commodity production in mining. In 1998, a mill, which was normally used for construction, was deployed to service galamsey operations in Obuasi. The first mill in Ayanfuri (which is in the Central Region) was still far from other galamsey sites and therefore women carriers were relied upon to transport the rock ore to main roads. The mill increased the scale of production. Access to electricity further included supply of power for underground galamsey operations which have been supplied through a vague arrangement with local officials. The galamsey were able to plug into the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) to power mills and ensure ventilation for mine workers underground (Adom, 2014). The significance of this cannot be underestimated. The space for petty capitalism to evolve is created by a state whose capacity to protect LSM-dominated mining interests is weak, and therefore, opened gaps for local capital. Improved techniques in production through mechanisation can either require the use of women’s labour (as cheap and flexible labour) or increase their exclusion. The case in Brakpan points to continuing marginalisation in production, while generators offered to reduce the burden of labour in Vlakfontein. Obuasi also shows how a lower level of mechanisation and distance (poor road network linking Sanso to the crusher in

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the Central region in Ayanfuri) created work for women as carriers. This is similar to the early phase of LSM operations which also utilised women’s labour (Crisp, 1984). Due to traditional beliefs that women’s bodies can cause the disappearance of gold, they are not allowed onto the site of gold digging. This limits the scope of women’s participation in galamsey to carrying the ore, only from a distance from the site of digging. The Khutsong case in Carletonville provides insights into mining within an informal settlement space. Framed as ‘community mining’, the source of gold ore is within the informal settlement yards and top soil from between houses and in roads. Digging for soil containing gold can be undertaken within yards owned by the miner or just beside the informal settlement. This form of mining is embedded within the informal settlement space and turns homes into temporary spaces for the extraction of gold. Home owners are either compensated or also join in the work and share profits. The miner is self employed and is able to retain the majority of earnings. In this instance, there is greater value placed on labour and skill of the miner than the property owner. This is in sharp contrast with the foundation of capitalist production which depends on security of private property, or attempts to mould communally owned properties to the needs and priorities of big capital. On the other hand, the miner could in this case be replicating the similar relation between the ‘land owner’ and LSM operation which pays compensation. This historically was the rights white Afrikaans could hold as individuals and farm owners who were compensated when lands were taken over for mining by LSM operations. This was a right that black South Africans did not have, given the Group Areas system in which the state was the custodian of the lands that were allocated to them. This is the primary tension which underlies the continued operations of LSM operations. Questioning these arrangements in both cases arises out of the need to also support the development or evolution of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining. This underlying drive also implies that the role and place of LSM operations does not give space to a different form of capital. In both cases, the zama zama and galamsey in political statements in Kimberley and Obuasi speak of a distinctive national character of their operations that legitimise their operations. These aspects are elaborated below.

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7.5 Orientation

Orientation builds on how linkages and the nature of state interventions shape the interests among petty commodity producers and petty capitalists. By focusing on the orientation of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists, this enables an examination of points of contradiction within units of production, and the perspectives that emanate from this. This section will draw out common lines of consensus and tensions within units of production and how this positioning shapes the relation with the state and LSM operations. The extent to which historical and cultural factors shape these outcomes is also analysed. The manner in which citizenship and indigeneity are deployed to legitimise or delegitimise ASM is integrated in this analysis. Altogether, this sets the stage to assess similarities and differences in the kind of organising that has taken place on the ASM question in both countries. To this extent, section 7.4.2 addresses the degree of organising and the kind of political alliances or tendencies that exist. It also highlights the formation of associations, cooperatives amongst petty commodity producers, and petty capitalists in mining.

7.5.1 Limits on the Zama zama and Galamsey Operations

A central limitation within which the zama zama and galamsey operate is the layers of criminalisation. Zama zama who are either undocumented and work in TSFs or in the informal settlement space as in Khutsong, where there are lower returns, remain very disturbed about how vulnerable they are to robbers and police. During interviews in 2015, women zama zama were asked how these insecure conditions also have bearing on their sense of safety. It was a difficult question to raise even though they would acknowledge that it was unsafe for them. They noted threats emerging also from some zama zama who were men due to the conflcts that break out between rival gangs working underground. By 2018, when follow-up interviews were held, their responses were less tense. It is likely the reduced police harassment had lifted the sense of insecurity at the mine site. The threat of having their equipment and processed gold confiscated by the police, from whom they can later purchase their equipment back, increases their cost of running their operations.

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To reduce risks created within these circumstances, zama zama prefer to deal with agents located closest to the mine shaft or TSF. This applies in the case of zama zama who hold South African citizenship. Even if they could arrange to sell directly in Johannesburg Central Business District (CBD), the cost of transport is too much to bear. They only cut out this first layer of middle men when they have gold ore that is of higher value making additional transport costs worthwhile. These agents based in the townships or close to TSFs compensate them for almost half of, or even less than half of, the global market price. In these circumstances, the conditions of insecurity and lack of transparency, and undocumented status of some of the zama zama, combine to undermine their ability to earn enough to cover their living expenses, let alone to save, accumulate and diversify their range of activities. These conditions have not created an environment where the market prices are what determines the value of the gold they extract from mine tailings. Instead, it is the condition of extreme precarity and criminalisation of the zama zama which deepens the level of exploitation. According to the zama zama interviewed, South African citizenship is meaningless for those who can claim it. They do acknowledge there are some privileges they have over their undocumented colleagues. This includes claims they can make to the state to provide social services and jobs and their ability to sell the gold they extract. Nonetheless, they insist, they still do not see its meaning in their lives. South African citizenship appears superficial to the zama zama. When asked directly if they are South African citizens, some zama zama would grudgingly acknowledge holding South African citizenship but quickly clarify that this does not mean anything. The clarification was always important for them. For the zama zama miner in Vlakfontein who remembers his childhood marked by protesting apartheid in Soweto, the meaning of freedom for him is his ability to move and work without being prevented from accessing TSFs and other mine facilities. Considering one of the key pillars of apartheid was to control movement on the basis of race, this is important. Phadi (2017: 225), in a study on what it means to be black in post apartheid South Africa, finds that subjectivities, as conveyed in the biographies of working people, are infused with a fluid articulation of blackness. To a greater extent, this is informed by ‘immediate tasks and needs’ to ensure livelihoods are secure. On this basis, it stands to reason that the response from zama zama in Vlakfontein and Khutsong on citizenship is a reflection of their view on the state and how it has not provided them the means to

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accomplish tasks from which they can secure a meaningful existence. The meaninglessness of citizenship emanates from how it does not ascribe entitlement, employment and social services. The ‘deep pain’ speaks to the realities of continued exclusion. This is further emphasied by the manner in which zama zama in Kimberley have legitimised their operations on the basis of indigeneity. Instead of being narrowly defined, as in Obuasi, to the mining town, the zama zama in Kimberley identify with the entire continent. They emphasise their blackness in relation to the LSM operations, which to them are foreign. It is noteworthy that Black First Land First (BLF), which advocates that black people are the rightful owners of land, has had a presence in Kimberley mines. They have argued the zama zama are the only legitimate miners in South Africa (BLF, 2018). It will be useful to further consider the implications for BEE/BBEE partners which also participate in firms such as the Petra mining firm. The contradictions pit them directly against petty commodity producers and petty capitalists. The zama zama miner in Khutsong who was retrenched from operations in Carletonville thinks his neighbours feel ‘deep pain’ for the work he is undertaking because he has no options. There is also shame that comes from being seen in the township and informal settlement covered with dirt and with filthy clothing. This cannot be avoided given the manner the zama zama operations are conducted. For the miners in Khutsong, they are not able to change their appearance as other zama zama are able to do, since they live where they work. These interviews were based on operations with lower levels of return as compared to the underground mines, so they cannot be generalised as a common perspective of most zama zama. It would be useful to examine these aspects of the experiences of zama zama operating in abandoned and active gold mines. This should not only include underground gold mines, but also be done in relation to other commodities such as diamonds and tiger’s eye mining. The perspectives of zama zama across these commodities will be useful. For miners who are undocumented, they have added layers of criminalisation. Undocumented migrants, who work as zama zama in the mines, also face other threats from law enforcement agencies. There is a threat of deportation and a possibility that police will demand bribes of at least R40 to R60. Irrespective of the nationality of zama zama in South Africa, as a zama zama, police officers can demand bribes and confiscate

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their equipment (including siltation devices, generators and pipes) to resell them, therefore creating a local criminal network trading in zama zama equipment. This is a point of grievance for the zama zama who feel their livelihoods are being deeply undermined by the actions of police officers who take advantage of their precarious and criminalised position. The zama zama in Vlakfontein also suffer from encroachment by LSM operations such as Benoni Gold which reprocess TSF facilities and thereby close up the gaps for petty commodity producers. The sense of being constantly under onslaught from the state and LSM operations with no room to breathe while undertaking an already risky job from a health and safety stand point, runs deep. The study interprets this as the limited space for the zama zama to occupy gaps left by LSM operations. Their ability to undertake what is a labour intensive and high risk job is further undermined by LSM operations. The latter, facing a crisis of profitability, re- strategized their extraction methods and opted for reprocessing mine tailings as a route to guarantee profits at low turnover. DRDGOLD developed its reprocessing methods and rebranded this as a form of reclamation of land used as dumps in previous cycles of accumulation. The real implication has been the displacement of zama zama in TSFs, whose livelihoods on the margins are being encroached upon. AGA in Obuasi was also facing a profitability problem which informed the decision to shut down its main operations and revert to care and maintenance. This enabled AGA to upgrade its infrastructure and consider other options to resume operations. In the meantime, it also turned to processing its reserves and reprocessing mine tailings. An AGA spokesperson explained that reprocessing is part of its responsibilities towards environmental management, which is monitored by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This amounted to the loss of 4000 jobs which had direct impact on livelihoods in Obuasi which depended on providing services to mineworkers. The dip in consumption amplified a crisis of livelihoods in the mining town. The withdrawal of the military and police units deployed by the state to ensure integrity of AGA concessions are protected, created an opportunity for the galamsey to expand their operations. This converged with a change of guard in the Obuasi Galamsey committee and new management in AGA, without an official record of this arrangement, which is unequivocally denied by AGA, to contain galamsey operations. This period opened a new terrain for the expansion of operations, which culminated in a nine month occupation of AGA. These aspects are discussed in the section below.

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In the midst of the above, galamsey interviewed in Sanso did not express any interest in reworking mine tailings. Obuasi is surrounded by waste dumps from earlier cycles of mining when less efficient methods of gold extraction are likely to have left gold residue which can be reprocessed. Apart from the fact that any activity resembling galamsey operations would risk the potentially lethal wrath of the military unit patrolling the mining town, they also rejected this on health grounds. An awareness in Obuasi about exposure to toxic chemicals from mine tailings deters them. Instead, there is a focus on extracting gold bearing ore from the abandoned shafts of AGA concession. As the history of the Obuasi Galamsey Committee shows, the galamsey had a system of self-regulation to ensure they did not encroach on sections of the mine shafts that were strategic for AGA. This arrangement developed cracks on the side of AGA management and Obuasi Galamsey Committee. The galamsey, in expanding operations in Obuasi and latter being expelled with the imposition of a moratorium, find (in their own words) a ‘symbiotic’ relation between them and AGA being undermined by the transnational firm. This undermines not just their own interests as petty capitalists, but also the national interests. In Obuasi, the property rights of Anglo Gold Ashanti (AGA) are unanimously uncontested. ASM miners who had participated in the nine month occupation of AGA reiterated their recognition of the property rights of the transnational firm. Nonetheless, their livelihoods and indigeneity become key means of legitimising galamsey on the company’s concession and abandoned active shafts. The stripping of their livelihoods, in the midst of high unemployment, undermines social mobility that they hope will benefit their children. Financiers and supervisors of operations tend to envision this more clearly, with these possibilities being less likely for diggers, chisellers and carriers. The shedding of 60% of AGA concession, though welcome, is still insufficient. The miners are keen to enter the active and abandoned shafts of the corporation. The symbiotic co-existence which had been in place since the independence period, and with the traditional method of mining, has come into a crisis since the livelihoods were under threat with the shift to open cast mining (which displaced farmers and destroyed the environment) alongside shedding of public sector jobs and shrinking social infrastructure. In the absence of alternatives that improve their circumstances beyond low earnings from small holder farming of food crops and petty trading, the opportunity for the galamsey in Obuasi to enter the terrain of AGA’s strategic operations underground is an expression of the gap they were positioned to fill. The state capacity to regulate ASM

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operations being limited, as cited earlier with respect to energy sources, laid the basis for the evolution of petty commodity production to petty capitalist operations. The withdrawal of military and police units and the exposure of AGA staff to insecure conditions was an extreme example of a state absconding from its role in securing the dominance of LSM operations. The moratorium, which also is an extreme response to contain galamsey operations nationwide, is an attempt to restore the status quo. In spite of this, the galamsey persisted with a lifting of the ban on 18th August 2018. Even though the government of Ghana has focused on the 1350 registered operations that will be supported to continue operations, this once again reopens the gap for the petty commodity producers and petty capitalists who remain unregistered and largely criminalised, to resume operations. In South Africa, zama zama in Kimberley diamond mines similarly condemn harassment by private security and police, which harm their operations. They highlight the importance of stability to enable them to invest in equipment - a direct emphasis on the impetus to evolve into petty capitalists. These responses from the state did not recognise them as legitimate actors with entitlements but instead positioned them as ‘enemies’ of the state. The response of the state to issue licenses has since been clarified by the current Minister of Mineral Resources, Samson Gwede Mantashe, as being a means to curb zama zama operations. By regulating their operations, the intention is to cut off financiers and buyers with direct links to international markets. Regulating also has had the implication of excluding undocumented miners as has been found in the manner in which the Kimberley licenses are operating. In both countries, the question of the place of the galamsey and zama zama is ultimately a national question. Petty commodity producers and petty capitalists in mining both draw on their origins and being part of an indigenous population with rights over natural resources. Zama zama and galamsey responses to the state and LSM operations therefore deepen our understanding of how the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism is mediated. The form this takes with the state is contradictory in nature and seeks to sever the attempts of petty commodity producers and petty capitalists to occupy gaps and expand to undermine the dominance of LSM operations. The everyday operations of galamsey and zama zama, discussed above in section 7.3 on linkages, speaks to how integrated these operations are and their potential to expand, coexist and eventually erode (if not undermine) the dominance of LSM operations. This is the process of articulation.

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Instead, state interventions seek to impose, affirm and maintain disarticulation, but within boundaries that do not eliminate petty commodity producers and petty capitalists. The political and social consequences of eliminating a form of livelihood will be heavy for the state to bear. The moratorium in Ghana was possible to implement by piggybacking on a mass campaign against galamsey operations. On this basis, the nature of state interventions are conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. The zama zama and galamsey, facing these conditions, have responded with forms of organising that confront the contradictory nature of the state.

7.5.2 Degree of Organising by Zama zama and Galamsey

The forms that organisation take in ASM vary according to the nature of geomorphology, nature of the commodity, history, gendered segmentation, degree of criminalisation, socially constructed source of legitimation through identity, and the legal framework. Vlakfontein provides a view into zama zama miners who operate autonomously (from financiers) and relatively anonymously. They undertake their independent operations and control the entire production process with the use of a siltation device which also integrates a generator and pipes. There are a few cases of collaborative work with teams of three finding it cost effective to operate in groups. This, at a superficial level, appears to be unorganised reprocessing of gold. However, as the interviews in 2015 reveal, hierarchies do guide their operations, with security being a primary common interest. At times they collectively put together their gold product and sell together to a common agent and share proceeds equally, between women and men. In 2018, small teams were observed undertaking the entire process of working the tailings as a unit. Another team was also interviewed in Khutsong, who also cited that this collaborative work reduced the burden of work on them. This could be a product of how over time the work has become more difficult to undertake, requiring more labour than earlier. As cited in Chapter Six, mine tailings in the mid 1990s were less labour intensive. The entry of mining companies also undertaking reprocessing has further displaced the zama zama. Langlaagte underground mines offer insights into teams organised around nationality or ethnicity, who attempt to self regulate by sharing knowledge and insights into safety. An interview with a former underground miner in Carletonville, however, points to how the underground mines were also organised along language and other identities; however they also worked underground independently. It

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was most striking that security was considered an individual matter. This implies that the specific groups he worked with in Carletonville did not achieve a level of organising similar to that observed in Langlaagte. The context of Ghana is that of an existing regulatory framework which has been oriented to creating conditions within which organisations have emerged. In the Obuasi case, the legal framework placed the judiciary in a position to intervene to affirm the rights of Ghanaian nationals to undertaking mining. The legal framework recognised located committees for ASM miners with the direct participation of local government. In Obuasi, this translated into a judge mandating the formation of a committee instead of prosecuting a case of 117 arrested persons. This meant the state was able to step in to ensure an artisanal miners committee was formed. In this case, even though the law had mandated it be led by the District Officer in the local government, it was led by the galamsey miners themselves. This was critical in that it created a space which could better reflect the agency of the galamsey, and at the same time bring to the fore their internal contradictions. To this extent, in the first instance, the committee was led mainly by ASM miners themselves. It was formed to create a space for dialogue between local government, the galamsey and AGA, with committee members representing the galamsey miners in Obuasi. A series of meetings were held to guide a process of negotiation for the galamsey to self regulate their activities. The committee therefore became a space for the policing of the galamsey to contain their activities to a point agreed with the then management of AGA. AGA officially denies this arrangement. This early phase contrasts with the current branch which was not only shaped by the strengthening of an opposing political party faction among the galamsey; it also now reflects greater control of the structure by sponsors of ASM operations. The committee no longer played a regulatory role in favour of an agreed limit with AGA. The transnational had a change of management that did not have any recognition of the existing arrangement with the galamsey. It was with this current character of leadership of the Obuasi branch of the Small-Scale Miners Association, the AGA stoppage of production and the withdrawal of the military that the nine-month occupation occurred. The committee played a role of simultaneously policing and providing a vehicle for empowerment for galamsey operators. They negotiated with AGA management, private security and the police when miners were arrested. This is a position similar to trade unions which often adopt a contradictory role in relation to members.

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Another structure similar to this in South Africa was formed in Kimberley diamond mines. This structure was able to negotiate with the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR), De Beers and Ekapa mining firms and win the issuing of two permits to sell diamonds, offering them an open market. The DMR covered the cost of acquiring their permits. The committee led the formation of cooperatives to which the two permits have been issued. Registered members of the cooperative are documented persons, and therefore more likely to be South African. Undocumented migrants working in Kimberley operate through the cooperatives and the committee to get a fair price in the diamond market.

7.6 Conclusion

By examining forms of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in gold mining in both countries, this chapter draws out the elements that shape the distinctive character of these forms of mining. These interrelated elements are the logic, orientation and linkages. Out of these, the logic embodies the essence of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. It is challenging to draw a neat line between petty commodity production and petty capitalism. Both are found to be operating in a dynamic process of evolution but restrained by structural factors. In the first instance, competition from other units of local capital can undermine its progress. Market conditions can also become harsh, creating obstacles to its further evolution. The dominance of LSM operations plays a significant role in shaping these outcomes. Regardless, state intervention is found to be central in setting the stage for the restraints placed on petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. This is in spite of clear instances where the state agencies attempt to intervene in supportive interventions. In both countries, the conditions have created a space for capital to reproduce itself and expand, with an indigenous basis inserting itself into the national economy dominated by LSM through the global market. This process of insertion itself entails evolution of small-scale activities, which at the very base consist of petty commodity production. The forms of micro scale production depend on self-exploitation and transformations with advancements in technology. Altogether these illustrate the evolution of the sector. Petty commodity production offers a conceptual tool to focus on

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forms of ASM that clearly mark a distinctive character. This chapter focuses on linkages and orientation, which are interpreted as more concrete. This is understood in relation to LSM operations. A key actor which has shaped the terrain within which LSM and ASM have coexisted is the state. To recall, colonial states in West Africa have been understood as makeshift operations that did not undertake an explicit resolution to the place of smallholder producers, opting for coexistence. This tension is illustrated in mining laws. This foundation for the Ghanaian state, which after independence would focus on the state increasing control over LSM operations and restraining labour, unravels in the aftermath of economic crisis of the 1970s and later structural adjustment. In South Africa, while there is no structural adjustment, there was instead a process of liberalisation. These reforms were implemented alongside attempts to redress the historical injustice of dispossession and exclusion from the mining sector. These measures are complementary in terms of the interests of a small section of an emerging black bourgeoisie, but nonetheless is still limited. Their entry into mining is restrained and tended to concentrate in marginal assets, such as reprocessing of mine tailings. This latter form of mining places them in direct conflict with petty commodity producers. As a livelihood strategy, in both cases, ASM offers a route to achieve tangible improvements in livelihoods as a transitionary form of work. This is similar to the position of women carriers in Obuasi for whom ASM offers a better livelihood option in relation to subsistence farming. On the other hand, the men in Obuasi are in a better position to reinvest, expand and diversify their economic activities. In relation to this, the local government in Ghana has provided training to galamsey on saving and options for reinvestment. This captures the similar contradictory positions the state has adopted in relation to ASM in Ghana and South Africa. Petty commodity production is at the bottom of this hierarchy of capital. It exists both within and without capital since it is in motion in a process of becoming petty capitalism. This process is undermined by the interventions of the state with ongoing criminalisation and other limitations in regulations. Micro scale operations, as cited in Vlakfontein and Khutsong, remain suspended and unable to accumulate towards expanding and diversifying production. In the meantime, as the Ghana case has shown, the galamsey were able to expand and mechanise their operations in the late 1990s. Attempts at improvements in mechanisation as in Brakpan remain restrained since they are unable to plug into the electrical grid and upgrade from manual milling machines to

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electrical milling machines. (This is in spite of the fact that South Africa supplies such machinery to Zimbabwe). Meanwhile, in Ghana underground operations and workshops are plugged directly into the national electrical grid (Adom, 2014). The condition of criminalisation and effectiveness of the state bureaucracy to trace and close down their operations is an ever present threat. This contrasts with Ghana, where the weakness of the capacity of the state creates a gap that is filled by the galamsey.

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Chapter 8: Conclusions: The Essence of Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism

8.1 Introduction

This final chapter outlines processes that have shaped the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining in Ghana and South Africa. The previous chapter compares specificities of the selected case(s), while this chapter draws out generalities which are situated within the context of the mining regime in both cases. The selected cases of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) in both countries demanded an approach that conveyed the processes of motion and dynamism which are implicit in the conditions within which they evolve. ASM encompasses a broad range of mining operations, including junior miners. On one end of the spectrum, ASM operations have the potential to be integrated within LSM operations and are visible in the formal sector. Junior miners therefore provide a better understanding of the nature of LSM operations. On the other end of the spectrum, petty commodity producers and petty capitalists operate on the fringe of the mining industry. The cases studied are not integrated in LSM, but their operations still feed into the formal economy. In order to analyse these forms of mining, an approach is required that can grapple with their dynamic and complex nature. Petty commodity production is constantly in motion in a process of becoming petty capital, but not necessarily being capital. Saad-Filho (2003) explains that capital is not to be assumed as a ‘universal truth’ to be found in all commodities and production relations across space and time. Instead, the direct and indirect employment of wage labour is what distinguishes a form of production as capital. The market operates with the dominance of capitalist forms of production in a system of generalised commodity production (Saad-Filho, 2003: 30). The logic of petty commodity production and petty capitalism emerges in the interaction between linkages and orientation. By comparing Ghana and South Africa, this chapter draws out the essence of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. As a livelihood, social mobility, and capital becoming, it offers a route for forms outside the LSM framework to find expression.

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Petty commodity production and petty capitalism provide a conceptual framing to answer the core research questions of the study. Why does ASM persist? Why does ASM not become LSM? The character of their motion is defined by three elements: linkages, orientation and logic. The combination of these elements shape the distinctive character of their operations. These elements also enable the study to analyse the broader process of evolution. The aspects of these elements which address endogenous factors provide an understanding of their internal dynamism and an explanation for the persistence of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM. The perspectives and degree of organisation of zama zama in South Africa and galamsey in Obuasi highlight important aspects of their operations. The aspects covered in previous chapters are production relations, degree of mechanisation, the role of the state and LSM operations in shaping the terrain within which the zama zama and galamsey resist containment or elimination. It also shows instances of integration through state interventions. Altogether this has illustrated the manner the state and LSM operations interact with zama zama and galamsey. Even though there are instances or moments when the state intervenes in a manner that enables petty commodity production and petty capitalism, the overriding ethos of state interventions is nevertheless to undermine the further evolution of these operations. This process of undermining is conceptualised as imposing disarticulation. The contradictory character is conceptualised as a form of mediated disarticulation and explains the nature of the limits on the further evolution of ASM. The strategy of negotiation in Obuasi, and the formation of a galamsey committee, emerges almost a decade after legalisation. Intensified criminalisation compels the judiciary to trigger the creation of structures to facilitate negotiations with LSM operations and the police. This is on the basis that Ghanaians have the right to mine. In the meantime, the galamsey assert their indigeneity to legitimise their operations even though they recognise the property rights of Anglo Gold Ashanti. Petty commodity production and petty capitalism are dominated by LSM operations directly though criminalisation, and indirectly through the market, but not in relation to their labour time, cost of production and risks in undertaking work. Forms of petty capitalist production have emerged (from petty commodity production) with the potential to become more mechanised forms of production expanding in scale and integrating wage labour.

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8.2 Logic

The assumptions underlying the historical movement of capitalist development can lead to the persistence of petty commodity production being interpreted as a sign of under development. The perceived failure of capitalism in the periphery to eliminate petty commodity production and petty capitalism was an obstacle to a holistic understanding of capital. Advancement under capitalism tends to be presumed to be equated with large- scale production. This also closed off space to understand processes outside big capital. For instance, in Ekurhuleni, the emergence of zama zama operations in reprocessing mine tailings are undermined by LSM operators. This is in spite of the Ekurhuleni Municipality’s attempt to create a corporate body to rationalise and coordinate ASM operations with the participation of a committee. The nature of these kinds of measures is a reflection of the logic of big capital. Underlying this is an assumption that large-scale production has created capital and productive forces on a scale that revolutionises society. The capitalist mode of production has a transformative impact on social relations and enables the emergence of the bourgeoisie as the dominant class in society. Critically, the concentration of the means of production under control of the bourgeoisie maintains the social order. The dominance of the bourgeoisie remains as long as the productive forces are not only able to produce surplus enough for the needs of all, but also on the basis of further advancement of the productive forces, build the necessary ‘social capital’. Social mobility therefore has its relevance with regards to this. Importantly, the further development of productive forces creates a rupture in property relations, and thereby a rupture in social relations and the domination by the bourgeoisie. As a result, the core contradiction is class struggle (Callinicos, 1999: 114-117). At the inception of cooperatives in England in 1844, it was assumed that cooperatives which do not distinguish work from ownership of the means of production, could produce a transformative outcome within capitalism. There was even a tendency that assumed cooperatives could resolve contradictions between labour and capital. The extent to which such an approach could be emancipatory under capitalism was a point of debate in the labour movement (Bhowmik, 2007: 71-72). In more recent years, in the period of crisis in Brazil, some cooperatives have also been found to be able to embed within capitalism, thereby reproducing asymmetries created within capitalism (Singer,

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2007: 5). Cooperative Jackson (2019), a contemporary movement in Mississippi (in the United States) weighs in acknowledging that even though ‘most cooperatives in the US are firmly embedded within capitalist supply chains, they can and should function as a bridge towards the development of economic democracy in our view which will help usher in social transformations that will end the capitalist logic that creates the economic crises in question here.’ These debates are a useful prism with which to approach an analysis of the character, and potential, of petty commodity production and petty capitalism.

8.2.1 Character of Petty Commodity Production and Petty Capitalism

By outlining the form that linkages, orientation and ultimately logic takes in the cases examined, it becomes possible to analyse the distinctive character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. As mentioned in Chapter Three, the study adopted an approach that juxtaposed small capital and non-capital in mining. After fieldwork was conducted in the second phase, these were found to be inadequate to examine the dynamic and complex nature of the selected cases. In the first instance, the phenomenal aspects of ASM appear as part of a survivalist strategy. It is fuelled by a decline in smallholder agriculture and high unemployment. These crises amplified in the liberalisation phase. This is more so in the case of petty commodity production which responds to these crises. For instance, in Vlakfontein mine tailings, the returns from zama zama operations are mainly directed towards consumption with a low level of reinvestment, and therefore accumulation. It can be tempting to view these forms of mining as static operations. On the other hand, by taking a perspective that petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining are in motion, and therefore undergoing a process of evolution, other aspects come into view. It is possible to take cognisance of the value of the introduction of pumps which shows a shift to mechanisation when required to overcome challenges in production. In addition, the formation of teams to collaborate in the entire production process on the Vlakfontein mine tailings or Khutsong informal settlements shows a potential for cooperation. The organisation of joint sales of gold ore in Johannesburg Central Business District, when considered necessary, is also important. These aspects speak to a practice of cooperation which is articulated in the movement for cooperatives (Singer, 2007: 4-6). The forms of petty capitalism investigated in Obuasi bring into view the possibility for social mobility created by galamsey operations. The emphasis placed on social

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mobility by galamsey financiers and supervisors in Obuasi centred on their aspirations for their children to have opportunities outside of galamsey operations by accessing higher education. The increased autonomy which Madam Comfort Amoah (in Chapter five and Seven) explains is a product of her work in galamsey operations. This is in contrast with her current line of work which is not a stable income and can be as low as half of her previous earnings. In the context of Ghana, petty capitalism in mining is directly addressing the dislocations of livelihoods, with expansion of LSM operations and undermining of public services created by structural adjustment reforms. In the present moment, galamsey operations create new possibilities for the excluded, but not necessarily an alternative. Instead, it is filling a gap left by the state and, in this case, created by LSM operations. Petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM could potentially be a source of counter movement to LSM, but these are largely subsumed within capital. Ultimately, this draws attention to the tension between the logic of capital, which appears to be more fragmentation from below (Harvey, 2001), while LSM operations tend towards consolidating operations. The study shows that petty commodity producers and petty captialists in mining are occupying gaps left by LSM operations, and in effect create multiple spaces where their dynamic process of evolution is trapped in a moment of becoming but never being. This is a product of the state and LSM-dominated mining to resist the process of evolution. This draws attention to the significance of the zama zama and galamsey as petty commodity producers or petty capitalists who occupy gaps within capital. It is therefore more useful to interpret petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining as a source of tension or even a counter movement within capital or under the dominance of LSM mining. Petty commodity producers provide the nesting ground for petty capitalist formations to emerge. Both forms are in a process of becoming, as a response to endogenous factors, but remain contained, limited or bound by dominant exogenous forces. Other exogeneous forces include finance from transnational investors, technology and mineworkers. In spite of these energies, the dominant exogeneous forces are state interventions and LSM operations. On this basis, the counter hegemonic movement is not to manifest as a neat movement towards the domestic market without being shaped by exogenous forces. That is, the logic of its movement leans towards domestic impulses even though it expands in response to transnational links in the global economy within limits drawn by the state. In

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part this is evident during the decade long mineral commodity boom in the 2000s which fuelled an expansion in ASM. The global markets remain dominated by LSM. In a sense this demands a perspective that is within capital but without big capital. Furthermore, integration of investments from non-indigenous sources is key to ensure further development of ASM (UNECA, 2011). However, the sector is reserved for citizens in both countries, creating barriers for further development of the sector. In Ghana, this criminalises the participation of non-Ghanaians as investors. Chinese who have introduced further mechanisation of ASM operations are criminalised, even triggering xenophobic attacks. Equipment such as excavators are destroyed during raids triggering condemnation. A key criticism is that this machinery can instead be redirected to other activities in local areas. Others point to a missed opportunity to further develop the sector (Interview: Elimah, 2017). The issue of permits in Kimberley presents an important moment in ASM policy making in South Africa, where the state has sought to integrate zama zama in diamond mining by securing their right to sell at fairer prices. Current Minister of Mineral Resources Gwede Mantashe clarified the purpose of this measure, by stipulating it is intended to eliminate the operations by cutting out criminal syndicates. This implies a continuation of criminalisation. On one level this cuts off the international links which have enabled the development of the sector. It is acknowledged that exposing and regulating the networks are important to eliminate the super exploitation of zama zama. In real terms in Kimberley, it is strengthening the zama zama to demand fairer prices for diamonds. Nevertheless, in implementing this, undocumented migrants are unable to register under two cooperatives set up as umbrella structures for the zama zama in Kimberley. Instead, the committee set up by the zama zama is ensuring the integration of all zama zama as a way of evading exclusion (Interview: Mabangula, 2018). The distinctive character of petty commodity production and petty capitalism emanate from the above interactions. These are embodied in elements in the form of linkages, orientation and logic. The distinctive character created by these elements is more clearly established in petty commodity production and petty capitalism. The counter-hegemonic character particularly finds expression in the orientation of galamsey and zama zama practices, perspectives, forms of organisation and identity. These manifest not only how they are responding to the manner that LSM operations take up space, dislocate and dispose of the environment and labour. These elements also embody how petty commodity producers and petty capitalists can lay the basis for other

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possibilities. This emanates from how petty commodity producers and petty capitalists fill the gap left by LSM operations.

8.3 Way Forward: The Conditions within which the Zama zama, Galamsey and Allies Organise

In the long run, the possibilities generated could take on other forms if the means of production are taken over by the broader working class. This is more likely to be the case in organisational forms such as the Self Employed Women’s Association, a union which organised waste pickers in India. With such a structure in place which also integrates democratic praxis such as voting, there is a possibility for workers to build on this to control the means of production, maintaining some aspects of egalitarian praxis (Bhowmik, 2007). Regardless, this is not to be presumed to be an inevitable outcome of organisations rooted within or formed by the zama zama and galamsey. As Chapter Five has shown, the Obuasi committee, in its origins, functioned with a praxis of self regulation, to prevent court appearances and confiscation of goods by private security and police, but also to ensure AGA strategic areas were not encroached upon. This is in effect a negotiation between petty commodity production or petty capitalism, on one hand, and big capital on the other. A coexistence which has been unstable in more recent years has gone through a crisis with the nine month occupation. The cooperatives set up in Kimberley also appear to be playing an even more overt form of integration within the formal economy. The racialised character of the mining regime and migration system emerges strongly in South Africa. Migration is also an important theme with the zama zama, with the situation of undocumented workers being deployed to delegitimise operations, even though their situation is a reflection of the labour regime based on precarious cheap wage labour. In Ghana, the mining regime is also marked by a convergence of migration and communal custodianship over land. This has in turn amplified and weaponised citizenship and indigeneity as important themes in both cases. ASM operators in both countries deploy them in resistance to LSM operations, while the state and LSM operations also used them to delegitimise ASM operations. Nationalism in this sense is deeply embedded and shaped by the historical and material realities which are largely shaped by the colonial encounter. This has bearing on the form that criminalisation takes in both

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contexts, and elaborates on how this intersects with the construction of citizenship and state formation. The post-independence period in Ghana draws the focus to attempts to exercise national control over mineral resources with the deployment of state ownership and management of mines, initially with the exclusion of Ashanti Gold Corporation (AGC). This is comparable with the period after 1994, when the first post-apartheid government sought to address historical exclusion of minorities from the mining sector. The emphasis on Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), and later, Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) focused on integration within LSM operations. This is similar to post independence Ghana, which centred its strategy on state ownership and control of LSM mining operations. The difference in the focus on building a black bourgeoisie within LSM operations emerges with the intersection of this mining reform process with liberalisation in South Africa. The constrained conditions for state intervention under liberalisation opened up a terrain for local capital, but it was restrained within LSM dominated operations. This was a strategy for integration of excluded minorities but was on the basis of a broader-based exclusion of workers from the formal sector, especially immigrants. Harsher conditions of living across borders, such as expanding unemployment, also fuelled migration to South Africa. It is within this context that ASM operations of varied forms came into existence. In Gauteng, these operations can be traced to 1994. Thus, liberalisation shapes the contemporary conditions within which petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining (post 1994 in South Africa, and 1980s in Ghana) re-emerge in SA and grow in Ghana. ASM in the contemporary period, in both countries, needs to be traced to this moment. Both speak to state strategy oriented to LSM operations but a strategy of containment, repression and elimination of ASM as local capital which emerges outside of the direct control of LSM operations. This comes to the heart of a contradiction between the logic of capital, which is to integrate galamsey and zama zama operations in the broader formal economy, and the structures of the state in the form of the legal framework and mining policies, which resist this process. The study also shows the manner in which ASM develops in South Africa and Ghana and explores how this relates to how state capacity shaped the space for the evolution of ASM in both contexts. The case of access to electricity supply and its role in mechanisation is useful. In both cases, state-managed infrastructure is key for electrical forms of milling of the rock ore. In Brakpan, it is noted that the ASM operators use manual

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forms of milling. This is even though South Africa is known as a source of electrical milling machines (UNECA, 2011), the miners’ inability to source electrical milling machines can be attributed to the context of criminalisation within which they operate. A documentary shot by SABC with the aide of Sandile Nombeni was immediately followed by a police raid (Interview: Nombeni, 2018). In the case of Ghana, galamsey were reported to have connected to the electrical grid controlled and managed by a state-owned entity, ECG, and was reported as a scandal (Adom, 2014). The South African state’s role as regulator and its capacity to fulfil this is not only a mark of ‘strength’ but also its orientation and priorities, which are not in favour of ASM. On another level, the posture of local government in both countries, in Ghana and South Africa, highlights contradictions in public policy with attempts to provide support for ASM being undermined by the dominance of LSM in Ekurhuleni. Obuasi municipality showed attempts to indirectly support diversification of investments from ASM operators. Nonetheless, criminalisation remained a consistent approach to address ASM operations directly with the pattern intensifying in certain phases. Lastly, the trend towards a decriminalization campaign in South Africa, though nascent compared to Ghana, remains sharp in terms of their support for zama zama. This is understood as part of a direct critique of LSM operations’ dominance and historical role in environmental damage and dispossession. This is the extent to which environmental groups have been leading civil society dialogues on zama zama. Instead in Ghana, interest groups which do not have specific expertise on mining have been leading the campaigns against galamsey. This tension is more visible between media based in Obuasi, who have a holistic understanding of the mining sector, and Accra- based media houses which dominated the national campaign. However, the nuanced analysis remains missing within MACUA in South Africa. Petty commodity producers in mining, and even petty capitalists, emerge as presenting a radical opposition to the status quo. The nature of exclusions, criminalisation and the way their operations enable them to critique LSM dominance remain relevant. Affirming the organising of the zama zama and creation of an open market for fair prices, though not necessarily transformative, still offers a way to improve current conditions of zama zama. On the otherhand in Ghana, the Centre for Social Impact Studies (CSIS) in Obuasi and journalists based in mining towns were unable to have their nuanced understanding (in the heat of the criminalisation campaign) find a place in the national

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debate (Elimah, 2017; Mensah, 2017). The result of this was the nationwide ban on all forms of ASM. This campaign was fuelled by the build up of environmental damage due to expansion in scale of galamsey operations in Ghana, which needed a response. Alongside this also were xenophobic reactions to small-scale foreign investors who were depicted as less responsible actors than LSM operations. This is a reflection of the weakness in state capacity as a regulator through agencies such as the Minerals Commission and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which is also reflected in LSM operations, but the criminalisation campaign narrowly focused on ASM. This campaign against galamsey marks a significant shift from a phase in the early 2000s, when LSM operations required state intervention to eliminate ASM operations on mining concessions. In this period, the mining companies were not only without broad based support for intensifying criminalisation of ASM, they also tended to be the focus of criticism regarding environmental damage, health impacts on mining communities, excluding locals and women from employment, undermining livelihoods and benefiting from tax holidays and corrupt deals with chiefs - in some cases, with nothing significant invested in communities close to mining operations. The shift from this broad critique of LSM operations to one of outright criminalisation, culminating in the ban on all forms of ASM, is a significant indicator of the strengthened position of LSM operations.

8.4 Recommendations for Further Research

The study provides a framework with which to analyse petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining. The interactions between orientation, linkages and logic have been found to be core elements. This is useful to trace the direction of movement within these forms of mining, at the bottom of the ASM spectrum. This reveals the distinctive character they inject into LSM dominated mining. It is possible to go beyond this conceptual framework to develop precise categories for the forms of ASM found at the lower end of the spectrum. A broader study which integrates more precise measures of turnover, reinvestment, degree of mechanisation, labour intensity, sources of finance, and diversification of investments, among others, can enable such a mapping initiative. Further study can also focus on tracing how gold produced by the zama zama is integrated in the formal economy. Munakamwe’s (2014) finding that the zama zama sell

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gold to the Rand Refinery is most instructive. Tracing other routes into the formal sector will be revealing in terms of their contribution to the domestic economy. Beyond this, it is also critical to build on this study to develop a relational comparison approach (Hart, 2006) using AGA in South Africa and Obuasi as case studies. This can trace how the zama zama and galamsey in AGA concessions in both countries have been able or unable to engage with the multinational corporations. This will build on the earlier initiative of the galamsey in Obuasi to investigate this. As stated in Chapter Three, at the inception of this study there was an intention to focus the study on women in ASM. The selected cases in both countries were limiting in terms of being male dominated and therefore not enabling the study to explore the contestations around gender in ASM operations. The hope was to find cases that will explore flux in gendered identities. The difficulties in terms of access limited what could be done in studying the selected cases and also delayed fieldwork considerably. The context of criminalisation and the researcher’s own limitations in terms of even basic knowledge of local languages was a serious challenge. Also the inability to deploy the appropriate methodologies (due to time and resource constraints) to interview women in groups and conduct follow up interviews in the selected cases, which are male dominated, limited how in-depth the study could be on gender. Further research into reprocessing of minewaste in Tailing Storage Facilities (TSF) can provide insights into the manner that LSM operations are deploying in the midst of decline in gold production. Interviews with workers and further enquiries on the companies undertaking the work on the sites ought to be conducted to better understand how precarious work is being integrated. It is hoped that future research can focus on this and expand a perspective on gender that can also take on board the construction of masculinities. The initial study did touch on these aspects but not in a focused in-depth manner. Such a study will be of use. By comparing both countries, it will also enable building a bridge to understand the setting of the construction/reconstruction of gender in mining regimes of both countries, by drawing similarities and differences with a case like Ghana. It is hoped that this study contributes to overcoming an existing assumption of South African exceptionalism which can encourage similar comparative works. Further investigations into how gold extracted from mine tailings, abandoned and active mine shafts is integrated in other forms of production is required to explore the linkage to the domestic economy. This will be useful to assess whether state

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interventions, seeking not only to decriminalise but also to rationalise the sector, have the potential to enable the further development of ASM. With regards to this, extending the data gathered on South Africa with case studies on ASM in tiger’s eye gems and Kimberley diamonds will be useful.

8.5 Original Contribution

As already mentioned in Section 1.3, Amin (2014: 118) argues that the character of the state can be revealed by how it intervenes in petty commodity production. The study contributes to literature by focusing on the evolution of petty commodity production and petty capitalism. This shows the manner that capital accumulation is mediated has bearing on the state and the contestation over citizenship, which in turn shapes resistance. The original contribution of this study is to compare two countries’ cases of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in Africa, conceptualises elements and forces that shape their evolution. The ASM spectrum is diverse and includes large-scale operations such as Junior Miners who are integrated in LSM (as big capital). Petty commodity production operates at the lower end of the spectrum, and in its ideal state, it is assumed to be in a process of evolution to potentially become petty capitalism. On the basis of empirical evidence in Chapter 5 and 6, there is no neat delineation between petty commodity production and petty capitalism. Instead, these operations are constantly in motion and in a process of evolution - but within set limits. Underlying this is an understanding that these economic processes are constantly in motion where some cases show potential to become petty capitalism, while those that do not may remain stagnant. These outcomes are shaped by external factors such as competition but the role of the state remains dominant. On the basis of this, the central argument is that petty commodity production and petty capitalism in mining hold a distinctive character which shapes its evolution. The character is composed of the logic, orientation and linkages of units of production. These elements are interacting with exogenous forces such as the state and LSM-dominated mining. The context within which ASM evolves is shaped by intersections between the mining regime, state interventions and construction of citizenship, the latter to which entitlements are ascribed. This is a terrain of contestation over the legitimacy of petty commodity production and petty capitalism in ASM. The contradictory character of state interventions, which tend to impose limits on petty commodity production and petty

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capitalism but also have moments when they appear to play an enabling role, is conceptualised as mediated disarticulation. The above can guide an understanding of why ASM persists, and also why ASM does not become LSM. It also provides insights into why forms of petty commodity production in mining are not integrated completely in capital, but instead consigned to becoming, and nothing more. Orientation, which speaks to contestations over these outcomes and the manner the zama zama and galamsey articulate their demands, highlight competing visions for the role of the state. Linkages draw attention to the manner that petty commodity producers and petty captialists are embedded within the domestic economy. Ultimately drawing out how orientation and linkages fuse within the overarching element of logic to give a sense of their trajectory within capitalism. This lays the basis for the possibility of advancing alternatives to LSM-dominated mining to take centre stage. Cooperatives appear to present this possibility, but remain constrained under LSM-dominated mining, and capitalism more broadly. At a bare minimum, a vision for socialising the means of production will have to go beyond nationalisation ‘from above’ to grapple with socialisation ‘from below’. This is not just to create space for petty commodity producers and petty capitalists, but to see how they operate as a map to rationalise our economies. This in itself will not provide all the answers to the hydraheaded problems created by LSM-dominated mining which is inherently destructive of the environment. Nonetheless, the self activitiy of working people, in the conditions they find themselves, provides a critique of the state and LSM- dominated mining. It is an essential starting point to unravel it.

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Appendix I: Check list for Interviews in Obuasi

General Checklist for ASM operations Background

1. Can you tell us a bit about yourself? (What part of Ghana or other country are you from, where else have you lived outside of Obuasi and place of origin, age, schooling, languages spoken, mother tongue, household: how many dependents and sources of income) 2. Before ASM, what work did you do? What kind of skills did you have before doing ASM? What kind of skills do you have now?

Labour in ASM 3. What are the skills that workers have developed on site? What forms of work are women usually developing specialisation in? Are there examples of women doing work that is regarded as male work? How did you learn mining work? How long ago did you start? 4. Where do mine workers come from? How are workers recruited (especially migrants)? How are migrant women also recruited ASM operations? 5. If you were to give an estimate, how many workers are/were employed in galamsey (or on site)? 6. What work did women do on site? Are a few women also doing ‘men’s’ work? How do they manage with household responsibilities and galamsey work? Is their time more flexible? Are they able to bring children to sites? 7. How are workers also catered for in case of injury? What happens when there is an accident? 8. After the moratorium, how are they managing?

ASM operations 9. In Obuasi, what are the ways that galamsey is/was done? Is there competition between small-scale operators and artisanal miners? 10. How is the gold valued? What is the range of the rate for the gold produced? What do workers on average earn? How is this calculated? What about

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supervisors? Are there any women supervisors? What do sponsors also make from operations? 11. What kinds of tools are used in galamsey? What about machinery? How efficient are ASM operators in producing gold? What are the constraints? 12. How much do they cost? How many are used on a site? What are the sizes of the smallest galamsey operations? What about the largest?

Checklist for Interview with Anglo Gold Ashanti (Obuasi)

Closure of Obuasi mine 1. Challenges AGA faced in Obuasi mine, and what led to the decision of closing the mine, beyond the fall in commodity prices? 2. Considering reserves are estimated to last for the next twenty years, what is the plan for that phase? Which operations are likely to continue? 3. What services do junior miners provide to AGA? To what extent are these locally owned? How has AGA responded to calls for greater local content or building linkages with the domestic economy? 4. How has AGA addressed the question of sustainability? How have inequalities (especially gender) been factored into this? 5. Have public private partnerships come into these discussions? What potential does this have to respond to some of the concerns being raised? 6. What informed the decision to resume operations and how far has this process gone? ASM operations 1. To what extent is indigenous mining considered to be legitimate in Obuasi? 2. How effective was the regulatory framework on ASM in Ghana? What aspects were useful or problematic for AGA? 3. When did artisanal mining in Obuasi become an issue of concern for AGA? Was there a period when there was relatively healthy coexistence between ASM and AGA? 4. What were some of the problems and how did AGA attempt to resolve them? 5. Has customary law posed an obstacle or been an enabling with supporting AGA operations? How has AGA related with Chiefs in Obuasi and its environs when it comes to ASM?

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6. When did AGA become aware that ASM operations were ongoing in the abandoned shaft? How extensive were these operations by the ASM miners? How did AGA seek to address this? 7. 60% concession has been transferred to GoG, with the expectation that this will be transferred to ASM operators. Which areas does this concession include? 8. Have there been studies on how viable the concessions are for ASM operators? To what extent is the National Association of Small-Scale miners involved in this process? 9. How effective is the current moratorium been in Obuasi? How about other areas in Ghana? 10. Has the focus on alluvial mining and Chinese role in this been problematic for AGA? 11. The current government is developing an inter-ministerial policy on ASM in Ghana. To what extent has AGA/ Chamber of Mines been involved in this? What does AGA expect from this reform process? 12. How has AGAs experiences with ASM in other countries especially in South Africa informed its policy in Obuasi?

Checklist for ASM in Gauteng

General Questions for ASM operations in Gauteng 1. How prevalent has ASM been in the province? Can you describe different types of ASM in the areas you operate within?

2. How are operations organised? For instance, sources of finance. One can also consider labour, gender division of work, scale of operations, capital intensity and technology. How are smaller mining firms also engaged in small-scale mining in ASM in Ekhuruleni or other areas you are aware of? Would you say there is a form of competition between formal small-scale operators and artisanal miners?

3. What are the specialisations of work that ASM miners have developed? What forms of work are women usually developing specialisation in? Are there examples of women doing work that is regarded as male work?

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4. What are the sources of knowledge that the ASM miners turn to in their work? To what extent are cultural and religious norms shaping how work is organised?

5. How is the surplus generated distributed between mine owners or sponsors and mine workers? What do workers on average earn? What about supervisors? Have you ever come across women supervisors? What do sponsors also make from operations? Do you know of women sponsors? How efficient are ASM operators in producing gold or other minerals? What are the constraints their techniques face?

6. To what extent is migrant labour drawn to ASM operations from neighbouring countries? How are migrant women also drawn into ASM operations? How are locals also involved?

Interview Questions for Vlakfontein in KwaThema, Gauteng

1. In Vlakfontein, what are the ways that zama zama is/was done? Is there competition with Ergo? Does Ergo also engage you sometimes? What about the workers of Ergo? Does the Municipality engage you? How do the police treat you? What about private security?

2. How is the gold valued? What is the range of the rate for the gold produced? What do workers on average earn? How is this calculated? What about supervisors? Are there any women supervisors? What do sponsors also make from operations?

3. What kinds of tools are used in galamsey? What about machinery? How efficient are ASM operators in producing gold? What are the constraints?

4. How much do they cost? How many are used on a site? What are the sizes of the smallest galamsey operations? What about the largest?

Checklist of Questions for Ekurhuleni Environmental Organisation

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Background

1. How long has EEO been operating? 2. What inspired its establishment? 3. What is the structure of the organisation? 4. Which geographical areas does it cover? 5. Which communities do you organise? 6. What are the major projects which have been undertaken? 7. Which networks and alliances is EEO a part of?

Mining reforms

1. In your view, what are the key policy interventions that has had an impact on the communities that you organise?

2. Which ones have had an impact on ASM operators?

Regulation

1. How has the state responded to ASM operations in precious minerals such as gold? How have the police treated zama zama? What about other non-precious minerals (where women tend to dominate) such as clay and sand?

2. How has Ergo and other mining companies responded? Have they attempted to integrate ASM operations or negotiate with ASM miners? Are there examples where this has worked or not worked?

3. Who is likely to benefit from the Kimberley licenses? Please elaborate.

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Appendix II: Consent form

My name is Hibist Kassa, a PhD student at the University of Johannesburg (UJ). I am conducting a research project as part of the fulfilment of my PhD at the Department of Sociology in UJ. The title of my research is ‘Petty Commodity Production in Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining: A Comparative Study of Ghana and South Africa’. The study seeks to build a better understanding of artisanal and small mining (ASM). I am therefore formally asking your permission to participate in interviews that will be held at a convenient venue.

Even as we start the interview, you will not be obliged to continue when you feel you want to terminate the session. Participation is voluntary and therefore you can decide not to be involved. Anonymity can be assured in that your real name and identity will not be revealed during and after the research, and I will use pseudonyms to protect your identity. The interview records will only be accessible to me, my research supervisors and the Department of Sociology. Transcripts will be stored in a storage device for 10 years for legal and ethical reasons.

If you agree to participate in this study, I would like to request that you please sign the consent form in the space allocated below. The interview proceedings will be recorded on both a note pad and a recording device. The duration of the recorded interview will be approximately 60 minutes.

Dissemination of research results: The results will be used to complete a PhD degree. Furthermore, the results of this study will be disseminated at relevant meetings/conferences and the research results could also by published in relevant academic journals. If you have any questions about any aspect of this research (now, or in the course of this study or later) please do not hesitate to contact me on +27846374229 (also available on WhatsApp). I will be glad to answer all questions.

Thank you

Hibist Kassa ([email protected])

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Supervisors: Prof Peter Alexander ([email protected]) Prof Akua O. Britwum ([email protected])

Formal acknowledgement of consent

I ……………………………………………… on this……… day of …………….2017, agree to participate in the interview for the PhD research project on Petty Commodity Production in Artisanal Small-scale Mining: A Comparative Study of Ghana and South Africa. I understand that I will be asked questions regarding my knowledge of the mining regime.

Signature…………………………. Date………………………………

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Appendix III: Statement from Kimberley Artisanal Mine Workers (zama zamas)

228

229

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List of Interviews

Obuasi Interviews

Alhaji Ben Abdullah and Haruna Seidu Aboagye. Interview with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 23 November 2017. Annan, Benjamin. Interview in with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 20 November, 2017. Amoah, Comfort. Interview with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 25 November, 2017. Elimah, Richard. Interview with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 23 November, 2017. Abubakar, Mohammed. Interview with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 24 November, 2017 Ampofo-Bekoe, Nana. Interview in with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 23 November, 2017 Essiedu, Zacharia. Interview with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 25 November 2017. Mensah, Justice Dzivon. Interview with author on 25 November 2017. Sanso Group Discussion. Interview with author and Justice Dzivon Mensah in Obuasi on 25 November 2017

Gauteng Interviews

EEO, Consultative Meeting on ASM in KwaThema, 21 April, 2017 Khumalo, Tshepiso. Interview in Kwa-Thema, 15 August, 2015. Tshabalala, Alfred. Interview in Khutsong, 12 July, 2018. Mbangula, Meshack. Interview in Parktown, 8 July, 2018. Mngadi, Sabatini. Discussion in Kwa-Thema, 20 July, 2018. Nombeni, Sandile. Interview in Parktown, 8 July 2018. Phanyeko, Issac, Interview in KwaThema, 20 July, 2018. Khutsong Community Organisation, 20 July, 2018 Mangaliso, Mbatha. Interview in KwaThema, 11 July, 2018 Khoza, Azande. Interview in Lenasia, 12 November, 2014.

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Khoza, Moses. Interview in Lenasia, 12 November, 2014 Group Dicussion in KwaThema, 11 July, 2018. Moyo, Daniel, Interview in KwaThema, 20 July, 2018. Zwane, Lucy, Interview in KwaThema, 20 July, 2018. Rutledge, Christopher. Personal Communication in Johannesburg, 7 July, 2018.

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