Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Report of the 3rd Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

26 -27 April 2014 Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

1 2 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

The Impacts of Illicit Financial Flows on Peace and Security in Africa Bahir Dar, Ethiopia 26-27 April 2014

3 4 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa CONTENTS Preface 8 Purpose and Goals 8 Mission 9 Tana Board 10 Technical Committee 11 Secretariat 12 Programme 14 Introductory Speeches Opening Address: H.E Hailemariam Desalegn 18 State of Peace and Security in Africa: H. E Olusegun Obasanjo 22 Keynote Address: Dr. Carlos Lopes 28 Discussion Summary 36 Recomendations for Action 40 Tana Pre- Forum Events Ambassador’s Briefing 42 Public Lecture at Bahir Dar University: H.E. Pierre Buyoya 44 Meles Zenawi Annual Lecture Series: Tribute to Nelson Mandela 46 List of Participants 48 Acknowledgements 72 Annex Annex I: Summary of background paper on Illicit Financial Flows Annex II: Leadership in Africa: Some Reflections on the Legacy of Nelson Mandela

5 6 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

7 Preface

This report contains an overview of the important partners attended the Forum. speeches, remarks and main discussion The Forum is organized by the Institute topics from the 3rd Tana High-Level for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) of Forum on Security in Africa, held on 26 Addis Ababa University. IPSS is a premier & 27 April 2014 in Bahir Dar, Ethiopia. A institute of higher education for peace and summary of outcomes and the paper on security studies in the region. Its mission is illicit financial flows are also included in to promote peace and security in Ethiopia this report. The Forum sought to provide and Africa at large through education, African key stakeholders with a platform research and professional development. to work towards effective African- The Institute produces skilled professionals led solutions to the continent’s most in conflict prevention, management, and pressing security challenges. Current and resolution, as well as in peace building, and former Heads of State and Government, promotes the values of a democratic and distinguished leaders of regional and sub- peaceful society. regional bodies, representatives from the private sector, concerned civil society from Additional information about the Forum Africa, eminent personalities from politics and resource materials can be obtained at: and media, representatives of African and www.tanaforum.org. non-African multi-lateral bodies, and other

Purpose and Goals The Tana High-Level Forum on Security to contribute to stronger ownership of in Africa complements recurrent formal and a larger constituency for African-led meetings of African leaders in a collaborative solutions. manner. In the spirit of gatherings taking The unique opportunity given to place under the baobab, the Forum offers participants consists of the exchange of space for panel discussions, interaction experiences and insights set against a with the floor, and bilateral talks to share background of minimal formalities and views and experiences in a time efficient, a pragmatic limitation to an inclusive results-oriented and open manner. dialogue in a spirit of problem-solving. One of the main objectives of the Forum African political decision-makers interact is to work towards effective African-led and consult with key African and global solutions to the continent’s most pressing actors within a substantive open debate security challenges through agenda on peace and security issues of strategic setting and the provision of a platform importance to the continent, its regional for discussion. It promotes strategic and institutions and African Union member pro-active management of African peace states. and security issues, driven by the interest 8 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Mission

With a view to contributing to the African peace and security issues are implementation of the 2009 AU Tripoli normally discussed in formal meetings of Declaration on the Elimination of Conflicts appropriate institutional frameworks at in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable AU, RECs/RMs and national levels. The Peace, the Institute for Peace and Security Conference aims at: Studies (IPSS, Addis Ababa University) has • Providing opportunities to decision taken the initiative to convene a high level making leaders and institutions to forum on security in Africa. The initiative exchange experiences and insights is a response to the Tripoli Declaration that on peace and security issues among appeals for “African-centred solutions”, themselves in view of taking home and designates peace and security as a inspiration and practical lessons. collective “intellectual challenge”. • Giving opportunity to political decision The Tana High-Level Forum on Security makers to interact and consult with a in Africa is an annual Forum that brings broad-based African constituency as together African leaders and stakeholders well as key global actors. to engage and explore African-led security solutions. The inaugural Forum was held • Contributing to a substantive African in April, 2012 in Bahir Dar on the shores of open debate on peace and security Lake Tana, Ethiopia. issues that are of key and strategic importance to the continent and its The Forum is a response to the call by regional institutions. African Heads of State and Government for African-centred solutions in the prevention, • Communicating with, and listening management, and resolution of conflict. to, the various dimensions and It is a unique opportunity to exchange components of peace and security experiences, explore shared and alternative in the continent, thus facilitating an approaches to fostering the African voice in inclusive dialogue among governments regional and global security discourse. and other African security stakeholder groups. The Forum is an independent initiative with an advisory board and its Deputy • Sensitising and mobilising other Chairperson is Prof. Andreas Eshete, stakeholders, actors, and the overall Special Advisor to the Prime Minister African opinion for large ownership of in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Prof. Eshete Africa-owned solutions on peace and commissioned the Institute for Peace and security. Security Studies (IPSS) of Addis Ababa University to act as the Forum’s Secretariat.

9 Tana Board

The Board provides strategic oversight on the Forum as an institution, and decides on the current agenda and participation. It is comprised of eminent personalities who have demonstrated leadership, inspiration, and experience in their fields.

Chairperson: Olusegun Obasanjo is the former President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from 1999 until 2007. Mr. Obasanjo serves on NEPAD’s African Progress Panel to monitor and promote Africa’s development. In 2008, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon appointed Mr. Obasanjo as his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes region. Deputy Chairperson: Andreas Eshete is Professor of Law and Philosophy, UNESCO Chair for Human Rights, Peace and Democracy (AAU), and now Advisor to the Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia with the rank of a minister. Thabo Mbeki is the former President of the Republic of South Africa (June 1999-September 2008). Mr. Mbeki is patron of the Thabo Mbeki Leadership Institute (TMALI), a partnership between the Thabo Mbeki Foundation and the University of South Africa (UNISA). Pierre Buyoya is a two-term serving (from 1987 to 1993 and from 1996 to 2003) former President of the Republic of Burundi. Mr. Buyoya is the African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel. Betty Bigombe is currently Senior Director for Fragility, Conflict and Violence at the World Bank and former State Minister for Water Resources in Uganda. For over 20 years she has been involved in negotiation and mediation efforts to resolve the long-running conflict between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Ndioro Ndiaye is the President of Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development. She is also a Member of the Academy of Science and Technology of Senegal Chair of Dental Public Health of the Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy and Dentistry of the University Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar (UCAD). She is also former Minister for women and children in Senegal and has served as Deputy Executive Director of the Organisation for International Migration (OIM). Mahmood Mamdani is one of Africa’s leading academics specializing in the study of African and international politics, colonialism and post-colonialism and the politics of knowledge production. Professor Mamdani is Professor and Director of the Makerere Institute of Social Research, Kampala, and Herbert Lehman Professor of Government at Columbia University. Funmi Olonisakin is the founding Director of the African Leadership Centre, which

10 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

aims to build the next generation of African leaders in the field of peace, security and development. She is also the Director of the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at King’s College London. In this role she established the CSDG Knowledge Building and Mentoring Programme that comprises the Peace and Security Fellowships for African Women and the CSDG/ECOWAS MA Studentship and Mentoring programme.

Technical Committee

The Technical Committee advises the Tana Secretariat on the organization of the Forum. In particular, the Technical Committee aims to advise the Secretariat on process and content to strengthen the Forum’s capacity to generate fruitful discussions and give participants a meaningful experience.

Abdul Mohamed Chief of Staff and Senior Martha Cumbi Board Member, African Political Advisor of the African Union High Forum and Network on Debt and Level Implementation Panel for Sudan and Development, Mozambique. South Sudan, Ethiopia. Michelle Ndiaye-Ntab (ex-officio) Director Alex de Waal Executive Director of the of Africa Peace and Security Programme World Peace Foundation at the Fletcher (APSP/IPSS) and Head of Tana Secretariat, School, Tufts University, USA Senegal. Charles Akelyira Abugre Regional Sarjoh Bah Head,African Union Liaison Director for Africa at the UN Millennium Office to the Southern Africa Development Campaign, Ghana. Community, Botswana. Charles Ugochukwu Ukeje Reader in Sheila Bunwaree Professor, faculty of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo Social Sciences and Humanities, University University, Nigeria. of Mauritius, Mauritius. Khabele Matlosa Director of Political Affairs Department, African Union Commission, Lesotho. Markus Koerner Managing Partner, African Crossroads, Germany.

11 Secretariat

The Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), at Addis Ababa Univeristy, serves as the Forum’s Secretariat (www.ipss-addis.org) Coordinator, Helen Yosef Hailu Logistics Coordinator, Berhane Abera

Accommodation/ Catering/ Badge and Registration Conference Documentation and Facilities Management Communication +251-912 083840 +251-911 911 662896 +251-939 106228 Mr. Michael Admassu (Bahir Dar) Ms. Mercy Fekadu Ms. Nothando Maphalala Ms. Rediat Tesfaye (Bahir Dar) Mr. Yohannes Asfaw Ms. Rehema Maria Khimulu Ms. Tsegereda Abebe (Addis Ms. Rosebell Kagumire Ababa) Ms.Zeynya Shikor (Addis Ababa)

Delegation Handling Finance ICT Management +251-912 660832 +251-911 627075 +251-912 015206

Ms. Ferial Zoheb Mr. Dawit Yohannes Mr. Mikias Yitbarek Ms. Saba Kassa Ms. Sayayush Alemu Mr. Seid Negash Ms. Seble Tedesse Ms. Seble Mulugeta Ms. Sina Henke

Information Desk Immigration and Visa Protocol and Security +251-915 572254 +251-912 492776 +251-910 040603

Ms. Batseba Seifu Mr. Asrat Asele Comdr. Daniel G/Egzabhare Ms. Mekdes Mengistie Mr. Fana Gebresenbet Mr. Solomon Hassen

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Transport Rapporteurs Ticketing +251-911 964375 +251-933 682960 +251-927 727373

Mr. Getu Mohammed (Bahir Dar) Mr.Alemayehu Gurmu Mr. Beakal Yejotiwork Mr. Getachew Zeru (Bahir Dar) Ms. Esther Ikubaje Mr. Zewdie Belay (Addis Ababa) Prof. Habtamu Wondimu Mr. Haileyesus Muluken Mr. Justice Agbezuge

Liaison Officers

Ms. Aichatou Tamba Ms. Dalaya Ashenafi Mr. Frank Djan Owusu Ms. Ira Sereny Mr. Max Middeke Ms. Medhanit Kidanekal Mr. Nicola Forster Mr. Sunday Okello Ms. Sina Henke

13 Programme Master of Ceremony: Brian Kagoro, Regional Programme Advisor, Governance and Public Administration, UNDP Regional Service Center, Ethiopia

Chief Rapporteur: Prof. Habtamu Wondimu, assisted by Mrs. Esther Ikubaje, Mr. Justice Agbezuge and Alemayehu Gurmu and Haileyesus Muluken

TIME DAY ONE: SATURDAY 26TH April 2014

08.00 – 11.00 Arrival of participants and registration

11.00 – 12.30 Special Event: The Annual Meles Zenawi Lecture Series: Leadership in Africa: Reflections on Nelson Mandela ‘s Legacy By Prof. Adebayo Olukoshi, Executive Director, African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP)

12.30 – 13.30 Lunch

14.00 OPENING SESSION : Chair: Prof. Andreas Eshete, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister of Ethiopia with the rank of a Minister and Deputy Chairperson of the Tana Forum 14.00 – 14.10 Introductory video: Highlights of the 2nd edition of the Forum

14.10 – 14.30 Welcome address: by H.E. Hailemariam Desalegn, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

14.35 – 14.55 Introductory remarks: ‘’The State of Peace and Security Africa’: by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria and Chairperson of the Tana Forum Board 15.00 SESSION I: Illicit Financial Flows and Peace and Security Chair: By H.E Olusegun Obasanjo, Former President of Nigeria and Chairperson of the Tana Forum Board

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15.00 – 15.30 Keynote Address: By Dr. Carlos Lopes, Under-Secretary General, Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 15.35 – 16.05 Discussants: • Prof. Mamedou Diouf, Director, Institute of African Studies (IAS), Columbia University, USA • Dr. Tassew Woldehanna, Vice-President for Research and Technology Transfer, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia • Dr Attiya Waris, Senior Lecturer, University of Nairobi, Kenya

16.10 – 16.30 Break 16.35 – 17.15 Discussions

17.20 – 17.30 Summary of day one and setting the stage for the next sessions, by Charles Akelyira Abugre, Development Economist and Regional Director for Africa at the UN Millennium Campaign and Chair Person of the Tana Forum Technical Committee. End of day one 17.40 – 18.45 Networking, media interviews and meetings

19.00 Gala Dinner hosted by the Amhara National Regional State

15 TIME DAY TWO: SUNDAY 27TH April 2014

08.30 – 9.30 Networking Breakfasts

9.35 SESSION II : Illicit Financial Flows and Human Security Chair: H.E. Pierre Buyoya, AU Special Representative for Mali and the Sahel and member of the Tana Forum Board

09.35 – 10.05 Format: Panel Discussion Panelists: • H.E. Dr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, President of Puntland, Somalia • H.E. Anicet G. Dologuele, Former Prime Minister of Central Africa Republic • Alex Cobham, Researcher, Center for Global Development, UK 10.10 – 10.35 Discussions

10.45 SESSION III : Illicit Financial Flows and Natural Resources Governance Chair: Eleni Gabre-Madhin, Co-Founder and Chief Director of eleni LLC, Ethiopia

10.45 – 11.15 Format: Panel Discussion Panelists: • Alex de Waal, Director, World Peace Foundation, USA • Mr. Nuhu Ribadu, Former Chairperson, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nigeria • Kojo Busia, Ph. D., Snr. Mineral Sector Governance Advisor, African Mineral Development Centre/AMDC, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa/UNECA

11.15 – 11.30 Break 11.30 – 12.00 Discussions 16 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

12.05 – 12.15 Summary of day two by Dr. Funmi Olonisakin, Director, African Leadership Centre, King’s College, London

12.20 – 12.40 Reflections on the Forum and theme from an African Union Perspective: Chair: El Ghassim Wane, Director of Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission, Ethiopia Dr. Khabele Matlosa, Director of Political Affairs Department, African Union Comission, Ethiopia

12.45– 13.00 Closing Remarks by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo

13.00 End of the Forum 13.15 Lunch

16.00 Departure to Addis Ababa

17 Introductory Speeches

Opening Address By H.E Hailemariam Desalegn

Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Excellency Field Marshal Omar Hasan Ahmad Al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan Excellency Mr. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan Excellency Former President Olusegun Obassanjo, Board Chairman of the Tana High Level Forum Excellency Former President Pierre Buyoya Excellency Mr. Abdiweli Mohamed Ali President of Puntland Excellency Mr. Gedu Andargachew, President of the Amhara Regional State Distinguished Guests Ladies and Gentlemen, On behalf of the people and government of Ethiopia and myself, I would like to welcome you to the city of Bahir Dar. As you all know, Addis Ababa used to be the monopole host of platforms where however, is the ability of this Forum to African and global leaders congregate to remain a place where relevant and serious deliberate and decide on issues which are problems are interrogated with a view to closer and important to the peoples of the helping inform our quest for African-led continent and the world. The decision by solutions. The fact that it has continued the Tana High Level Forum on Security in attracting various stakeholders and leaders Africa to conduct its deliberations in the by addressing issues which are very central beautiful city of Bahir Dar was indeed a to peace and security in Africa is indeed welcome detour. encouraging. More important than breaking ground, 18 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

The last two editions addressed issues government. We, in Ethiopia, have set a of managing diversity and state fragility very ambitious target of becoming a low as well as organized crime. For its third carbon middle income country by 2025. edition, it is rather fitting that the Forum Significant financial resources will be chose an equally, if not more, significant required to realize this. We estimate that African peace and security issue, that of our target requires an investment of about illicit financial flows. 150 billion USD, mainly on infrastructure, and social services. Much of the financial Africa and its people are bleeding. We are resources are needed in foreign currency. losing resources which could easily lift Now everybody agrees that this is a very out of poverty hundreds of millions of our ambitious target. people. Estimates vary. But many indicate that it is simply and massively intolerable. But when you consider this much needed- investment in light of the figures on illicit It is reported, for example, that the financial flows, one can get the sense of cumulative outflow between 1980 and the relative ease with which countries in 2009 range from $1.2 trillion to $1.4 trillion. Africa, including Ethiopia could have saved Even this excludes the loss through and improved lives. Excessive outflow drug trafficking and smuggling. It is an means much delayed realization of such amount which exceeds what Africa gets in development targets as child mortality development assistance and foreign direct reduction and poverty eradication. investment. Contrary to commonplace According to some estimates, it could delay perception, Africa is a net creditor to the the realization of some of the targets by world if you take account of illicit financial more than twenty years. flows. With such outflows in check, we will The outflow takes different routes and also be able to adequately self-finance forms. Again here the reality is that Africa and strengthen regional and continental is losing more through international trade organizations and processes that play and multinational companies than through important role in maintaining peace and bribery and embezzlement. Because of security. weak institutional and human capacities, companies could easily and without being The size of these resources which Africa recognized and taxed transfer much of is being robbed of also indicates how their profit originating from Africa. This national development gains could easily realization should not in any way diminish be reversed. The unfortunate truth is that our effort and determination to addressing there are people and organizations that state corruption. feed on and flourish in and as a result of conflicts and poverty in Africa. They get The amount we in Africa are losing powerful and entrenched as the size of and through these scams is staggering indeed. the ease with which financial resources To give you a sense of proportion, let me flow informally and illegally grow. point to one area we cherish most in my

19 What could be done as a way of rising to the countries including, of course, Ethiopia. challenge, among others, is what we will be Still much more can be done by improving deliberating today and tomorrow. By way collection of tax revenues. of a general statement, however, I should One of the difficulties for improving tax point out that the first step in controlling this collection comes from illegal transfer hemorrhaging that is threatening our peace of money from Africa to Europe, North and security is to recognize the push and America, and these days to the Middle East. pull factors at work. Individual countries There are those, mainly multinationals, in Africa can do a lot by identifying and who use all kinds of seemingly innocuous managing the push factors. instruments to avoid paying taxes. Despite We in Ethiopia very much recognize the the best of our efforts to stem the tide of urgency of totally replacing a rent-seeking this challenge however, we still continue political economy, of which this massive to lose billions of dollars that end up lining loss of resources is just a symptom, with the pockets of crooks of all shapes and a productive and developmental one. On colors. We need all the knowledge and a continuous basis we do audit processes institutional capacity to be able to address and practices for their vulnerability to this challenge. rent-seeking behavior. Accordingly, we The problem of Africa is not only tax have identified and prioritized sectors such avoidance, however. Equally, and in a as tax and land administration systems, number of countries where multinationals trading regimes and public expenditure are practically non-existent, there is the and procurement for corrective and additional problem of tax evasion, which preventative reforms. From year to year is, of course a criminal act. This particular we are improving on our tax collection problem is bleeding African economies and capacity. We will continue to work to needs to be tackled as resolutely as possible. strengthen our legal and institutional frameworks for the detection and control of Globally speaking, illicit financial flows illicit financial flows. are not just zero-sum activities. They are negative-sum. Significant resources are The problem has various manifestations wasted in the process of transfer; resources and some are more debilitating than others that could have been used productively. in terms of their effect on Africa’s efforts to That also forms part of the case for the extricate itself out of poverty. Let’s take one coordinated national and regional actions. example. Budget revenues have increased However much individual countries might significantly in many African countries in do, the fact is, it is not enough. The pull recent years. factors must be taken care of. That is where In our particular case, we have managed to regional and international coordinated increase our revenue significantly through a efforts are needed. A very transparent series of institutional reforms we undertook financial, corporate ownership and public over the last two decades. Tax collection procurement systems at country level will has increased significantly in many African not be effective when countries even in

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Africa are—wittingly or unwittingly— their jurisdictions particularly by people jostling to join the league of tax havens and who engage in tax fraud in Africa through offshore financial centers. That is where avoidance or otherwise—whether regional and international coordinated businessmen or politicians. It is my hope efforts are needed. Without coordination, and expectation that this debate that we are countries might resort to some kind of ‘race going to have will further inform our quest to the bottom’, compounding the problem. for a way out of this challenge. I believe there is no denying that at the heart In closing, I would like to take this of any lasting solution is the imperative to opportunity to express my gratitude to the put in place a transparent and accountable People and Government of the Amhara governance structure both at national and Regional State for the warm hospitality they global levels. The more transparent our have always extended to the participants workings are, the less the likelihood of our of the Forum. Once again I would like to much needed resources falling through the express my appreciation to the advisory cracks created by inefficient governance board and the secretariat which have made regimes will be. this edition possible. And I wish you fruitful deliberations and memorable weekend here I am also hopeful that, during our in Bahir Dar. Last but not least, I would like deliberations, we will be able to marshal to thank the Management and employees of the necessary force and informed position the Avanti Blue Nile Hotel for their warm required to tackle the problem. This welcome and excellent hospitality. will, among other things require that we somehow find a way to access and share I thank you. information of illicit transfer of money to foreign banks. For instance, African countries need access to information about foreign bank deposits of foreign or domestic companies at home—deposits that are made outside

21 The State of Peace and Security in Africa

By H.E. President Olusegun Obasanjo Chairperson of the Tana High-Level Forum

Excellencies, African Heads of States and Gov- ernment here present, Excellencies, African former Heads of States and Government, Representatives of the African Union, Representatives of the Regional Economic Com- munities Present Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Representatives of International Development Partners, Our friends from the Media and Civil Society Organisations Distinguished participants, Ladies and Gentlemen We are, once again, gathered here in Bahir Dar for the third time to celebrate the con- tinuity of the Tana Forum, one of the ideas closest to the heart of the late Prime Minis- ter of Ethiopia, H.E. Mr. Meles Zenawi. We are not only celebrating the achievement of we commonly call the endless conflicts in this young forum, but also to realistically Somalia and the Great Lakes, are alarming. examine the peace and security challenges The African Union at its 50th Anniversa- facing our continent. ry Solemn Declaration pledged not to be- Excellencies, queath to future generations of Africans a legacy of wars and conflicts by silencing the Distinguished participants, guns by 2020. But 2020 is around the cor- Recent developments and security threats ner. What is the way out of this situation? in Mali, Central African Republic, Nige- I’m asking this question to prompt your re- ria, not forgetting South Sudan and what sponse to a call for action.

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Let me begin with a brief overview of the Mountain area in 1963,the territorial current state of peace and security in the tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, continent. (1998-2000), Kenya-Somali war (1963- 1967), Somali-Ethiopian conflict (1964- Our continent has no doubt witnessed some 1978), Egypt-Libya conflict (1977), and transformations in the last decade or two, the Cameroon-Nigeria conflict over the ranging from advances in the use of com- disputed Bakassi Peninsula(1994)– the munication technology, to rapid economic settlement of which I was part of. growth triggered by expanding market for Africa’s commodities; and a burgeoning • Third: Conflicts linked to secessionist youth population able to innovate in this ambitions such as the case of Sudan environment. and South Sudan from 1983-2011, the age-long Cassamance rebellion in Sen- At the same time, our potential to translate egal, the Cabinda agitations in Angola; these transformations into stable peace and and the Biafra civil war in Nigeria 1967- development for African people is ham- 1970. pered by the continuing threat of armed conflict, along with its transmutations. • Fourth: Resource-based conflicts such Armed conflicts have become a recurrent as the Sudan and South Sudan conflict reality in Africa since independence. From over the Abyei region, Congo Brazza- 1960 till present, fifty percent of African ville conflict in 2007, the Angolan con- states have been ravaged by one form of flict,and the Senegal/Mauritania con- conflict or the other. The post-Cold War re- flict of 1989; surgence is particularly disturbing. • Fifth: Identity-based conflicts such as Peace and security scholars have attempted inter-ethnic or inter-tribal conflicts. Ex- to classify armed conflicts on the continent amples of these are the 1994 Rwandan into various categories – some of which un- Genocide, the Burundi massacre, the derstandably only feature in our discourses Tuareg uprising in Mali, clan fighting in a historical sense. Let me provide you in Somalia and Liberia,Algerian Ber- with some sense of this categorisation if bers fighting against the ruling Arab only as an indication of how far we have class in Algeria, and the ongoing South come as a continent: Sudan conflict; • First: Post-colonial conflicts arising • Sixth: Annexationist conflicts: such as from agitations for liberation from the the occupation of the Western Sahara control of colonial settlers in countries by Morocco in 1975, and British South- such as Namibia (1990), Zimbabwe ern Cameroons in 1961. (1980) and apartheid in South Africa • Seventh: Poverty, denial and perceived (1994); or real injustice induced conflicts like • Second: Boundary and territorial con- the militancy in the Niger Delta of Ni- flicts such as the Angolan Bush War in geria or the current Boko Haram insur- South Africa, from 1966 to 1989; and the gency. Algeria-Morocco conflict over the Atlas 23 Even though a substantial decline in the and security scholars might claim. For one, occurrence of inter-state conflicts including their root causes and triggers are not neces- many of those I just mentioned was experi- sarily new. We have long spoken about the enced in the 1990s, an alarming rise in the structural violence that underlines armed number of intra-state conflicts and what conflict. The Constitutive Act of the African some scholars refer to as new wars in their Union pays particular attention to this. various forms and shades is taking place. We have also noted that the triggers of By nature, these conflicts tend to be more these conflicts are numerous and interwo- intense and intractable. They range from ven. I highlight three major categories here large-scale warfare to low intensity con- just as an illustration: flicts; and of late we have seen how public • Politically, poor governance, state protests and people”s movements can set building processes such as struggle for off a chain of violent even if transformative control of power and unconstitutional events.Over the past years, countries such change of government remain key con- as Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Angola, flict drivers. Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, • Economically, corruption, struggle for Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, ownership, management and control South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda, Mali, Cen- of natural resources, as well as unequal tral African Republic and Nigeria have wit- distribution of these resources consti- nessed one form of escalating conflict or the tutes major factors that trigger conflicts other with their attendant consequences. across the continent. Some of these countries are still undergoing • Socially, inadequate capacity for diver- heart-wrenching episodes of violence, even sity management, the real or perceived as I speak. inequality and discrimination against The gory events of the last month of 2013 in minorities, marginalization along eth- South Sudan and the horror witnessed on nic and religious lines as well as the the streets of Bangui in Central African Re- alienation and consequent disillusion- public attest to this and in my view should ment of the youth are further additions. challenge our resolve as Africans to silence Internationally, colonial legacies, and for- the guns in these places forever. eign interference in political transition and Excellencies, governance have equally triggered con- flicts. Ladies and Gentlemen, But what is indeed new is the pattern of Further additions to these are growing mutation of old conflicts. As a result, we and menacing terrorist activities and in- sometimes see their manifestation in more surgencies taking place in Somalia, Mali, extreme forms of militancy. To be certain, Kenya and North Eastern Nigeria till date. this extreme expression of violence is not In some respects, these conflicts and forms the preserve of Africa. However, while it of insecurity are not as new as some peace is tempting to conclude that what we are 24 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

experiencing is copycat stealing of “narra- thereby undermining the integrity of the tives” from all over the world, we must re- state. Formal economies have collapsed flect on how deeply militant groups believe giving room for the rise of shadow states in those narratives. where warlordism, impunity, and criminal- ity thrive. Initial evidence suggests that despite a cop- ycat method of expression, these are reac- Socially, the humanitarian dilemma across tions to local rather than global conditions. the African continent is huge. The incalcu- We now know that we cannot ignore the lable loss of human lives, the damage to “power of Africa”s streets” both in its vi- material infrastructure and environmental olent and non-violent manifestations. The resources and the massive flows of refugees phenomenon in which largely young pop- and internally displaced persons is a scar ulations, take to the streets to voice their on our conscience. feelings of exclusion through mass non-vi- Economically, the loss of income and as- olent protests; and another phenomenon in sets, damage to infrastructure,diversion of which a form of socialisation causes young resources from socio-economic develop- people to throw bombs on themselves and ment to peacekeeping, collapse of trading are ready to kill deserves closer attention. systems, cuts in social spending and capital As a result, we see the threat landscape flight, are some of the negative consequenc- changing. We therefore must ask ourselves es of these armed conflicts. whether this threat landscape is changing Our actions as decision makers, private fundamentally and whether we are still stakeholders and civil society should com- looking at the right framework for address- plement the relentless efforts of National ing the breadth of security challenges con- governments, the African Union, Regional fronting the continent. Economic Communities and the interna- Excellencies, Distinguished participants, La- tional community on the prevention, man- dies and Gentlemen, agement and resolution of these conflicts. The consequences of conflicts in their var- National governments have adopted sever- ious manifestations on state, human and al measures, policies and initiatives to en- collective security are enormous and I hance peace and security in affected coun- therefore call on you to muster the neces- tries. sary resolve and determination to ensure At the regional level, the Economic Com- that these deadly conflicts and their nega- munity of West African States (ECOWAS) tive consequences on our citizens becomes have, in accordance with the Constitutive a thing of the past. Act of AU, consistently condemned uncon- Politically, Africa’s ability to establish se- stitutional changes of governments in the cure, democratic, and economically pros- region, imposed sanctions against default- perous states is being hampered. State in- ing member states and facilitated media- stitutions and infrastructures are eroded tion processes in these conflicts. They have

25 equally deployed peacekeepers and human various resolutions, which established var- rights observers to conflict affected coun- ious peacekeeping missions across the con- tries. tinent. These efforts have been supported by financial and technical support of var- The Inter-governmental Authority on De- ious development partners and non-state velopment”s (IGAD) also intervened in actors across the globe. resolving conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. Would these efforts be enough to eradicate conflict by 2020? Certainly not, we need to At the continental level, the African Un- do more. Much also depends on our ability ion since its transformation from the OAU to engage in hard collective thinking and to the AU in 2001, embarked on a para- “horizon scanning” in ways that enable us digm shift from its principle of non-inter- to inject flexibility when required, into our ference to a principle of non-indifference existing response frameworks. The Tana and the right to intervene. Guided by the Forum offers an important contribution to principle of „“African Solutions to African aprocess of collective thinking. problems”“ the AU has taken significant actions to enhance peace and security in Excellencies, Distinguished participants, La- the continent. The adoption of the Protocol dies and Gentlemen, Relating to the establishment of the Peace If we must achieve sustainable peace in Af- and Security Council in December 2003 rica, the following non-negotiable priorities and its framework for conflict prevention, to fast-track the implementation of already management and resolution in Africa: the existing mechanisms are of utmost impor- African Peace and Security Architecture tance: (APSA) are commendable. First– Democracy and good governance The AU has undertaken several peacekeep- must form the basis of management of af- ing missions in Burundi, Comoros, Soma- fairs of every country in Africa. Peace, se- lia, Darfur and Central African Republic curity and good governance are fellow pas- with significant results. I will not forget sengers. to mention the evolving AU Agenda 2063 which places balancing state and human Second-African leaders and decision-mak- security as one of its core priorities, The ers must re-affirm their commitment in African Common Position on the Post-2015 terms of resources and demonstrate the Development Agenda which explores the political will required to ensure the oper- interconnectedness between peace, secu- ationalization of an African-owned APSA. rity and sustainable development and the African Solutions will ring hollow if we fail African Governance Architecture (AGA) to fund our initiatives and programmes. which aims at promoting good governance Third- The implementation of the African for sustainable peace and security. Governance Architecture must be accorded At the global level, the United Nations have the needed priority as APSA and AGA are supported the restoration of peace and se- two sides of one coin. While AGA focuses curity in Africa through the adoption of on broader questions of governance, APSA 26 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

places emphasis on the mechanisms for is now upon us, the long-running debate conflict management, resolution and peace- on achieving sustainable peace and secu- building. These two must work together to rity in Africa is like running a marathon. bring about peace and security in the con- Implementing existing frameworks and tinent. initiatives will require resilience, dedica- tion, resources, and patience, perhaps more Fourth-All components of APSA should be patience than we would like. The Africa equally implemented for a more coherent that the Chairperson of the African Union and comprehensive approach to managing Commission, H.E. Dr Dlamini Zuma spoke peace and security in Africa. of so optimistically in her email of the fu- Fifth-African stakeholders; government, ture presented at this year”s African Union private sector, civil society must make Summit is achievable. And we must all set concerted efforts to support existing mech- our minds and put our hands together to anisms and initiatives, building strong in- achieve this imperative order for Africa. frastructure of government and viable in- I conclude with these words from the late stitutions. President Nelson Mandela: ‘It always seems Excellencies, Distinguished participants, La- impossible until it’s done.’ Let us press on dies and Gentlemen, in this conviction therefore strongly and consistently, towards our goal of achieving Your presence here today emphasizes once sustainable peace and human security in more Africa”s collaborative commitment our dear continent, Africa. to this course. This gives me confidence that we will succeed. A pivotal moment I thank you.

27 Keynote Address

By Carlos Lopes UN Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary of UNECA

Excellencies, Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen I would like to thank the organizers for inviting me to participate in this forum. Allow me to start by acknowledging the Tana Forum’s initiator, the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, foresight, for making reflection an hallmark of his contribution. My congratulations go to the Addis Ababa University’s Institute for Peace and Security Studies and the distinguished Forum’s Board, for their mark in the area of peace and security studies in Africa. I am very grateful to be given the opportunity to contribute to this forum’s tradition of robust intellectual debate. This year’s gathering is particularly timely given that the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, chaired by President Thabo Mbeki, is just about to finish its report. The opportunity to hear the insights on the Panel’s work from its Chair would have enriched and deepen our discussions. Please patiently wait for the opportunity democratic transitions have had to when the report is unveiled in June. navigate the complexities and challenges of managing diversity in its various forms: the Excellencies, distribution of power and characteristics of Dear Participants political structures; issues of ethnicity and religion; definition of citizenship; or rights Since the early 1990s, most African and concerns of marginalized groups. countries have witnessed varied democratic transitions. Almost all Even where governments have reformed

28 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

their institutions, or put in place policies Lesson one is the fact that mismanagement and legislation to better manage diversity, of diversity is the nest of adversary attitudes unresolved conflicts linger. and contributes to fomenting conflict. Central elements to consolidate democratic Dear participants, transitions require analyzing and Evidence suggests that Africa is losing addressing issues related to the quality significant resources through illicit financial of elections, promoting diversity in flows. Annual estimates have ranged from constitutions, understanding how deeply US$20 billion before 2000 to US$50 billion embedded diversity should be in the in the last decade. Obviously, the hidden public space and institutions, as well as nature of these flows has a devastating ensuring state capacity to mediate and rise impact on tax revenues and public spending above sectarian interests. Conflict-ridden capacity. The continent is being deprived elections in many countries illustrate the of huge financial resources needed to distance that some African countries still boost investment on infrastructure and have to go in managing diversity and services delivery, undermining State’s the importance of improving electoral hopes for a distributive economic and processes to uphold fair, inclusive and social development agenda. Regulating democratic elections. However, the biggest such staggering sums of illicit outflows mistake of all is to believe elections are a has become one of the main challenges for silver bullet for resolving the challenges of structural transformation. national cohesion. Often the naive thought that one just needs to ask for a vote to Because illicit financial flows are solve all problems has contributed to the intentionally hidden from the plain view exacerbation of entrenched positions and of countries’ financial authorities, and their provoked polarized political tension. The records, their impact and consequences are lack of accompanying elements fomenting underestimated in many counts, namely social cohesion can have a vicious effect regarding peace and security. In fact, there on any stated will of inclusiveness. In is a strong nexus between illicit financial many African countries human insecurity flows and conflict. Illicit financial flows can certainly be linked to bad governance of all types are associated with either and lack of democratic practice. When ineffective state functioning or illegitimate democracy provides the means for conflict use of state authority. They present a resolution, by ensuring that points of view threat to governance, by undermining are given a fair hearing, it plays a stabilizing both political institutions and confidence role. The way this is done, though, is in them. They weaken safeguards when important. Like in any social construct tensions arise. Equally, conflict undermines the simplification of a blueprint is not the institutional resilience and governance appropriate answer. Groups should feel systems designed to address inequalities, that their rights are protected and that their or corruption hindering the incentives for economic interests can be fulfilled, so they long-term investments, over short-term do not resort to conflict to break or assert a rent-seeking activities. claim to self-determination. 29 Lesson two is that illegal and illicit deaths have diminished significantly. They economic transactions are contributing are exhibiting, nevertheless, cross-border greatly to brew conflicts. dimensions, while increasingly drawing their funding from illicit trade, banditry, Dear participants, and international terrorist networks. Fuelled by the geopolitics of the cold Despite the ongoing responses to the war, almost half of the Africa’s countries conflicts by continental and international experienced some form or level of violent organizations, Africa’s growing political conflict during the post independence space and influence has not always been era. That included civil wars, armed leveraged to quell its conflicts. Most insurgencies, coup d’états, regional internal conflicts in Africa can be traced rebellions and social unrest. Many of these to contestations over political legitimacy, had far reaching domestic and international national identity, state building and impact. The civil wars in Ethiopia, Sudan distributive justice, often interconnected. and Congo (Zaire) for example, led to In addition, natural resources have been strong challenges to the countries central at the forefront of provoking conflict for authority. Separatist movements shook the resources control. political and territorial integrity of countries such as Angola, Comoros, Congo (Zaire), The involvement of the external interests Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia, and has had serious consequences for domestic Uganda. and regional security. A plethora of initiatives have not necessarily provided According to the Uppsala Conflict Data adequate solutions to the quest for peace Programme (UCDP) there is a diminishing and security. It is true that some intractable trend of conflicts and wars in Africa, since conflicts are hard to resolve, because the 1990s, when the Rwanda genocide, the their underlying causes are often deeply Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute and the entrenched and complex. civil wars in Algeria, Angola, Chad, the Congos, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Conflict resolution strategies that fail to Leone provoked mass casualties. Yet, account for that complexity are likely to according to a IANSA/Oxfam/SaferWorld be ineffective. Quick wins have proven study, between 1990 and 2005, the cost of deceptive. The Rwanda and Somali wars conflicts in Africa has reached the staggering are credited to have contributed, together amount of $284 billion, or an average of $ 18 with the Bosnia conflict, for the overhaul billion a year. Since the turn of the century, of a faltering peace keeping doctrine. It with the exceptions of the 2004 Gatumba is fair to say these changes played a part massacre in Burundi, the Darfur conflict in the drastic reduction of wars. It is less and the perennial Somali war theatre, clear whether they reduced other forms of complex conflicts have not only been on the conflict that persist and demonstrate we are decline, but the very nature of warfare is facing a new moment of truth. also changing. Conflicts are now typically Over the last decade, Africa has begun smaller and the numbers of conflict related to reap the effects of a peace dividend. 30 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Fewer conflicts have generated growth in a war with minorities. Despite the and opportunities. For some countries the widespread nature of these conflicts that end of conflict has become synonymous region is not branded as unstable but rather with the availability of fresh resources, seen as a dynamic contributor to global previously devoted to military expenditure; growth. contributing to the stimulation of economic It is true that in Africa we have pervasive activity. conflicts such as the ones in the Great Lakes The challenges are shifting to human Region and Somalia, but these we hope security, the increase of intra-states conflicts are the remnants in a changing reality. In and emerging transnational threats. The other words, though the trend of conflict multiplication of domestic insecurities in Africa is downwards and the caseload is highlights new trends, such as radicalism, comparable to Asia, the global perception drugs and human trafficking, all with continues in many minds to be one of an trans-border dimensions. For instance, Africa beset by crisis and a risky place for Boko Haram networks with Al Qaeda making investments. It is due in no small in the Maghrib and Al-Shabab. Drugs’ part by the fact that the nature of African trafficking explains the vitality of Sahara- conflicts and their world exposure attracts based rebel groups. The Libya military a different perception. and political developments have created a These and other factors have made it space for the proliferation of trans-border more difficult for the continent to attract arms trafficking. foreign investment and mobilize adequate Despite relative stability across most of the and sustained levels of domestic resource continent, these trends do not help remove mobilization. It is as if the nature of Africa the longstanding negative perception of makes it more attractive to speculators. The Africa. vulnerabilities of African States and the widening size of illicit flows are increasing For instance, although we are aware of the incentives for criminal activities. individual conflicts in Asia we tend to look at them in isolation. Thus in the Philippines Lesson three is that unless we contribute we know of the insurgency in Mindanao, to change negative Africa’s brand and or the Aceh insurgency in Indonesia, while the reason for its persistence, Africans in Malaysia there is the Sabah province will consume other’s narrative about the conflict not to mention border clashes continent. between Thailand and Cambodia, and Dear participants, many others. Even rising India has the Naxalite insurgency and issues of Kashmir Not all conflicts are motivated or caused to attend to, while South Korea sits on the solely by economic imperatives. In some border of a belligerent sister state. The countries conflicts have been fuelled by Rohingya of Myanmar is one the many political or social exclusion. The Rwanda groups discriminated in a country engulfed genocide for example, was fomented by the

31 Tutsi alienation and exclusion for decades. Criminal enclaves have proliferated in In Uganda, Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army Myanmar, Afghanistan or Colombia. There rebellion was fuelled by ethnic retribution are networks operating a global value chain sentiment. The rise of the SPLM/A in 1983 of a criminal nature. The drivers both in was a result of marginalization of South terms of scope and need are international. Sudan. Addressing trans-border organized crime Some conflicts have been sparked by a requires a continental and international mix of factors. The conflict in Somalia for response. instance, was caused by a combination of Many individual countries in Africa internal power disputes and also economic victims of transnational criminal activities, stress provoked by the pillaging of its coast. such as Guinea-Bissau or Mali, do not have The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the adequate capacity to respond to illicit Congo involved seven neighboring nations activities. As a result, there is a need for fighting for influence and geo-strategic collective focus on drivers which can help concerns. establish regional and national security In North Africa, the ousting of governments enforcement strategies and mechanisms. in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, that precipitated Inflation of domestic currencies caused other conflicts in the Arab world, clearly by the inflow of illegal drugs, contraband, demonstrates the ripple effects of social under-invoicing of imports or outright unrest snowballed by youth frustrations. smuggling, stimulate booms in certain Lack of employment opportunities can economic sectors, such as construction or undermine social cohesion and political real estate. Overvalued local currencies stability. have other devastating economic effects Causes of conflict can be a complex mixture such as discouraging the production of of issues affecting different stakeholders. legal exports by making imports cheaper, The magnifying of tension points forcing local producers to compete against contributes to entrench conflict. Funding cheap imports. belligerent becomes attractive to many, Illicit flows can have the same effects as provided the logic of the dispute brings the so-called Dutch disease. Actually, economic gains. quite often, the natural resources richness Illicit financial flows and weak state is married to criminal activity, reinforcing capacity are symbiotic; and tend to the negative consequences of a “Dutch reinforce each other. Transnational cartels like disease”, impeding real economic operating as netwarriors are a threat to transformation and socially inclusive state sovereignty. In Mexico, criminal policies. networks have influenced change at the Gangs, terrorist and criminal agents like local and transnational levels imposing a an environment where they can move reconfiguration of power structures. financial assets to profitable investments

32 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

that hide their wealth. fortunes but also a contributor to some of our most violent conflicts. The money laundering operations of organized crime groups pose a serious The highest illicit financial flows were and growing threat to peace and security. recorded in African countries that are Ransoms collected by Somali pirates are resource and mineral rich mainly in oil, laundered through Khat exports or real precious metals and minerals. The policy estate business in neighboring metropolis. and legal frameworks for the mining sector Firearms trans-Saharan trafficking from have traditionally been designed to attract Libya to rebel movements is mixed with investment, and raise resources for rent- other trafficking, such as human and drugs seeking or unstrategic spending rather than related, that find their way into nice villas to encourage transformation. or quasi legitimate activities. Illegal ivory Moreover, the share of resource rents trade is rampant in many parts of Africa. In retained by African countries has often been fact, African countries are prone to criminal limited on the account of overgenerous supply chains that are resourcing conflicts. concessions that are always made in the For instance, according to UNODC, some race to the bottom for mining investment, $1.25bn in cocaine is trafficked from South as well as to the information asymmetries America to West Africa and on to Europe. which typically characterize the mining A policy response to these threats is very sector. It has also not worked in the light complex. A West Africa Commission on of tax leakages through transfer pricing Drugs, headed by President Obasanjo is and trade mispricing. It is estimated that busy looking into the intricacies of such between 1970 and 2008, illicit financial operations. flows linked to trade mispricing alone cost the continent $854 billion. Lesson four is that Africans can either choose to be victimized or act. Priorities The lost resources on the African continent have to change. are a clear indication that now, more than ever, governments need to enforce Dear participants, and implement principles and standard Allow me to offer a possible reading of direct operating procedures which could reduce and indirect impact of illicit financial flows the amount of leakages that incur through resulting from bad economic governance. illicit financial flows. Africa’s recent commodities boom has They also need to negotiate better! been a major source of public revenue, For starters, the setting up of financial contributing to economic growth. Ideally intelligence units to curtail, track and natural resources wealth should enable repatriate illicit financial flows will be Africa to power its economies and crucial in ensuring that resources lost can determine the quality, pace and extent of be tracked and eventually recovered. The its transformations. Natural resources have implementation of the Extractive Industries traditionally been one of the main driving Transparency International (EITI) forces behind our continent’s economic guidelines will ensure that negotiations 33 between companies working in the often drive the bulging youth to possible extractive industry and governments are alternatives of survival that include transparent. criminal entrepreneurship. Frameworks such as the Kimberley Improved governance and leadership Process will see to it that diamonds are not are vital in addressing these important illegally traded, while initiatives such as findings. We need to re-evaluate our “publish what you pay” will enforce more governance in order to discern whether or transparency in the industry. The blood not we are adequately equipped to provide diamonds syndrome still exists. Actually stability, while being flexible enough what happens with coltan or logging is no to address the variety of issues relating different. to illicit financial flows. Interestingly, promoting a developmental state provides Lesson five is that Africans economic both opportunities and limitations in leadership is the most important element pursuing these goals. A developmental for reversing the trends and make sure state facilitates coherence, drive and Africa addresses its problems. better allocation of resources. But, it also Dear participants, has the potential to limit dissent if proper organic forms of inclusion are not taken Despite slow global recovery, African into account, as we can learn from Asia. countries continue to record impressive For a developmental state, addressing economic growth. However, this growth illicit financial flows and strengthening has been unequal. It could also have been regulatory and governance institutions is higher if the high levels of illicit financial important. flows leaving the continent had been invested in the continent. But a more effective approach is needed in order to address these flows root causes. While the abundance of natural resources Long-term development visions and is considered the golden avenue to poverty strategies can promote better resources alleviation and economic growth, the management and less corruption. They will business environment in many African succeed when providing social cohesion countries has produced a conducive and respect for diversity. However, national environment for multinational companies efforts alone will not suffice. and local companies alike to illicitly transfer funds to offshore safe havens with little or Given the transnational ingredients of both no repercussions. illicit flows and conflict, it is necessary to take care of peace and security in the When revenue which should be paid neighbourhood. A holistic regional pact to governments is illicitly diverted to for security could unite African countries other sources abroad, social protection around their common interests in security and welfare programmes suffer. and development. Such a pact would lock Unemployment and lack of opportunities in or lock out any actor responding or not

34 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

to the collective imperatives. An African- When we say Africans need to write their owned agenda, devised and implemented own narrative, we do not mean writing a by Africans, tantamount to the principle of fiction. It means acknowledging whether African solutions to African problems, is a they did right or wrong, or will do right or good start. Africa has already made strong wrong. Africans should be accountable first commitments for its security, architecture to themselves. Africans cannot afford time in order to achieve the stated objective of for their transformation. They should be silencing the guns by 2020. The time to act impatient. Africans should jump and run is now! like a cheetah, the fastest in the world.

35 Discussion Summary

Session I: Illicit Financial Flows and Peace The drivers of IFFs are the lack of capacity and Security of state institutions in contract negotiations, lack of transparency in commercial transac- The theme of the impacts of IFFs on secu- tions, corruption and poor governance. A rity in Africa is timely in light of current case that readily comes to mind is Zambia‘s peace and security challenges confronting poorly negotiated copper trade deal with the continent. The key concern over IFFs is Switzerland in which Switzerland ended not only about their hidden nature or their up selling the same copper to China at a legal ambiguity that but also how they fuel higher price. Closely related to the issue of insecurity and foster negative security in poor negotiation is the illicit exploitation Africa. Manifested in various forms, IFFs of natural resources for which concessions include illicit funds from tax evasion, pro- were not given by multinational compa- ceeds from illegal exploitation of natural nies. Stating the example of Kenya, where resources, illegal transfers, money launder- companies were given concession to mine ing from criminal activities, trade mispric- titanium, but within the same area, urani- ing and corruption proceeds. um for which concession was not given is IFFs in Africa constitute a major concern for illegally exploited by these companies. As the African Union and other key stakehold- such, the companies pay tax only for tita- ers in the peace and security sector as evi- nium and get uranium for free. Kenya ends denced by the work currently being done up as the net loser. by the Thabo Mbeki led High-Level Panel Another factor responsible for IFFs is the on IFFs in Africa. behaviour of multinational companies who IFFs in and out of Africa stem from so- hide under the guise of corporate social re- cio-political and economic problems em- sponsibility to evade taxes. The Democrat- bedded in the African State structure. IFFs ic Republic of Congo’s poorly negotiated are more prevalent in fragile states, states coltan trade deal is a vivid example where undergoing conflict or post-conflict states intermediary companies end up with a such as South Sudan, Somalia, Mali and greater share of accrues from coltan sale. Central African Republic; they are not the IFFs have huge negative impacts on state, exclusive preserve of these states. Added to human and collective security. In countries the hidden, complex, and dynamic nature such as South Sudan, Central African Re- of IFFs is that accrues can be channelled into public, Mali, Nigeria IFFs have fuelled vi- other profitable ventures such as real estate olent conflicts, criminal activities and acts investment and the exportation of Khat by of terrorism. terrorist groups as evidenced by the actions This has not only undermined the achieve- of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group in Soma- ment of the MDGs but has hampered sus- lia. tainable development. The interconnect-

36 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

edness between IFFs, peace and security is and the stability of states. As the cases in that they are mutually reinforcing. While Somalia and Central African Republic in- IFFs thrive in situations of insecurity, the dicate, corruption and poor governance state of peace and security in a state equally are key factors for the violent conflicts in determines the inflow and outflow of IFFs. these states. The negative roles of extrem- ist groups, mercenaries and ethno-religious The likelihood of IFFs is very high particu- militia groups are also emphasized in this larly in the mining and extractive sectors connection. due, in part, to colonial legacies which en- couraged tax evasion. A call for rigorous Studies on IFFs have revealed that there are tax reforms to widen the tax base, transpar- intertwined linkages with human security ency in the award of contracts to multina- and organized crime. In addition to this tional companies particularly in the extrac- are immediate and long term impacts on tive sector to ensure effective monitoring people’s living standards. In light of this, by stakeholders are measures to tackle the encouraging legal financial flows through menace of IFFs. proper channels is an essential remedy for tackling IFFs. Tax evasion is considered as Session II: Illicit Financial Flows and another crucial problem facing Africa and Human Security the rest of the world. South Africa is con- African stakeholders have established that sidered as a model in tackling the challenge it is crucial to discuss IFFs and their impact of IFFs. In this regard government is able on human security. African leaders, equal- to track bank accounts and ascertain the ly share the view that IFFs are among the source of all monetary transactions. major factors endangering insecurity as Several international organizations have expressed by the Solemn Declaration on developed initiatives and networks to ad- a Common African Defense and Security dress the challenge of IFFs. These organiza- Policy adopted in 2004. Among the factors tions include Transparency International, facilitating IFFs are government bureaucra- the AU, UNECA and other UN agencies. cy and corruption within state institutions There is a widespread agreement that UN and systems. Human security encompasses resolutions against corruption will help wider aspects such environmental, nation- countries devise better means to address al, trans-national and trans-cultural securi- this challenge. Additionally, international ty and people have roles to play in ensuring networks whereby countries play active its achievement. However, human security roles in tackling IFFs are a necessary step is at stake in countries where poor gov- for the future. ernance, injustice and violation of human rights are prevalent. Session III: Illicit Financial Flows and Natural Resource Governance Across the African continent, IFFs have in- creased threats to human security such as There is a general consensus that Africa’s organized crime, terrorism, violence, and greatest wealth is in its natural resources. low infrastructural development. This has With a rich endowment in mineral resourc- undermined inclusive economic growth es such as oil, gold, diamonds, copper, iron, 37 cobalt, uranium, copper, bauxite, silver, pe- of civil society organizations in monitoring, troleum, cocoa beans and timber, the conti- implementation of open and transparent nent holds a huge proportion of the world’s budget processes and the encouragement natural resources of which only a fraction of initiatives such as the Open Budget In- is currently being exploited. However, a itiative, CABRI, and EITI are essential in sad rhetoric to this is that the continent is curbing IFFs in the natural resource sector. plagued by a phenomenon commonly re- The implementation of punitive legisla- ferred to as the “Dutch Disease”. Many of tion, building of financial institutions for the resource-rich countries in Africa have capacity building and price regulation, har- become a theatre of violent conflicts as the monization of policies on natural resource clamour for equitable distribution of these governance through the AU and ECOWAS resources has triggered instability. The as well as the continuation of public dis- blood diamonds in Angola and oil in South course on IFFs will equally go a long way Sudan are examples of this. in abating IFFs. Visionary leadership is also Studies have revealed that IFFs occur more instrumental. in the natural resource sector particularly While the recovery of stolen funds from in- in oil-rich countries. This has been facilitat- ternational financial institutions, diplomat- ed by technical incapacity of resource-rich ic law enforcement and leadership integrity states to monitor IFFs in this sector. This will help, special attention must be paid vulnerability is reflected by ineffective gov- to the linkage between national budgets, ernance structures and revenue monitoring shrinking economies and peace particu- systems. In addition to this, the political larly in the Horn of Africa. There is a close discretion in control and management of correlation between peace deals and ac- natural resources is characterized by secre- crues from natural resources to fund peace cy and a thin line between public and pri- deals. Scholars have established three mod- vate ownership. els in international peace agreements par- Most of the profits from resource exploita- ticularly in conflicts stemming from strug- tion leave the continent in the hands of for- gle over natural resources; power-sharing, eign-owned companies who pay low tax wealth-sharing and security arrangements. rates or evade taxes entirely. In the natural In this regard, some stakeholders have sug- resource sector, the main channels of IFFs gested that the notion of rental peace which are through proceeds of corruption, illegal is based on rent income should be recon- exploitation of natural resources, under-re- sidered in the resolution of conflicts in Af- porting, operating outside concession are- rica, particularly considering its influence as and non-compliance to environmental on IFFs. Further research on international standards. As a measure to address these, financing and IFFs has been advocated as several initiatives have been developed at well as unitary taxation, equitable distribu- the international level. They include the G8 tion of resources and imposition of mone- initiative, G20 initiative, and EU directive tary and financial sanctions on IFFs perpe- on mineral resources. Promotion of trans- trators. parency and accountability, strengthening 38 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

The case of South Sudan is an example on IFFs set up by UNECA when completed where on-going political crisis stemming will assist the AU through its organs RECs/ from the desire to control the state’s natural RMs to address the twin challenges of per- resources has destabilized the state. Anoth- vasive conflicts and IFFs. er factor fuelling the crisis is the scramble African leaders, inspired by the spirit of for South Sudan by investors. Investors are Pan-Africanism and African renaissance, contracted to implement various projects committed to silence the guns and end in the country but do not implement them. conflicts on the continent by 2020 through Similar to this, corruption and embezzle- the adoption of the 50th Anniversary Sol- ment of funds by government officials con- emn Declarations during the African Union stitutes a key source of IFFs in the young Summit of Heads of States and Govern- nation of South Sudan. In this regard, it is ment held in 2013. Going further in realiz- important that Africans must organize to ing this goal will be addressing underlying seek solutions to their own problems and structural roots of conflicts such as govern- not allow external actors to dominate issues ance deficits, including struggles for state that concern the continent. Furthermore, a power, contestation over distribution of balance between national and internation- resources and identity politics or misman- al efforts to address IFFs should be main- agement of diversity rather than treating tained as natural resources and financial the symptoms. Investment in preventive control are two sides of the same coin. diplomacy, early warning, early response, At the continental level, information shar- early recovery and the avoidance of ad hoc ing between organizations such as the AU, and reactive responses to conflicts cannot UNECA and implementation of existing be under-estimated. policies and frameworks on IFFs will go a In this light APSA effectiveness in synergy long way in addressing the challenge. with the AGA must be enhanced if all con- Frameworks such as the African Union’s flicts in Africa are to be ended by 2020. Agenda 2063, the CAP Post-2015 Develop- ment Agenda, and the AU Strategic Plan 2014-2017 will contribute to efforts in curb- ing IFFs. The report of the High Level Panel

39 Recommendations for Action

As key outcomes of the 2014 Tana • Unveiling the secrecy behind jurisdic- High-Level Forum, the following key rec- tions establishing industries facilitating ommendations for action on curbing IFFs IFFs; in Africa emerged: • Transforming Africa’s pervasive • Visionary leadership, political will and rent-seeking political economy through conscious commitment to fight IFFs the creation of democratic develop- both in states where fragility and ex- mental states where inclusiveness and tremity are present and where they are value addition is the core; not present across Africa; • Prioritizing taxation to address tax eva- • Positive utilization of political discre- sion by multinational companies; tion by the executive branch of govern- • Investment in empirical research by ment to curb systemic corruption; African think-tanks and research insti- • Enhancement of transparency through tutions to deepen understanding and legislation and law enforcement which sharpen policy responses to AU mem- will make the notion of extended con- ber states on IFFs; fiscation a reality; • Establishment of Financial Intelligence • Ensuring corporate transparency Units and harmonization of tax policies through a combination of domestic and across African countries; international processes; • Engagement of non-state actors such as • Utilization of law enforcement diplo- civil society in the fight against IFFs; macy to curb IFFs particularly in states • Development of common standards by that have to deal with fragility and ex- the African Union and Regional Eco- tremism; nomic Communities in combating IFFs.

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41 Tana Pre- Forum Events Ambassador’s Briefing

On the 2nd of April H.E Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairperson of Tana, met with ambassadors and dignitaries in Addis Ababa ahead of the Forum. At the briefing Mr. Mehreteab Mulugeta, Ethiopia’s Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, outlined the administrative procedures and preparations for the upcoming Forum. Prof. Andreas Eshete, Deputy Chairperson of the Tana Forum, reiterated its vision, “Tana is about free and critical conversations on the challenges facing Africa, unconstrued by agendas and always candid.”

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43 44 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Public Lecture at Bahir Dar Univeristy: H.E Pierre Buyoya

On the evening of the 3rd Tana Forum Bahir Dar University in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (the Tana Secretariat) hosted H.E Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and member of the Tana Board. H. E Buyoya presented a lecture titled The Successes and Challenges of Peaceful Conflict Resolution Initiatives in Africa on the university’s campus. The public dialogue was hailed by Bahir Dar University President Dr. Baylie Damtie as an inspiration to students providing them practical examples by hosting African leaders and discussion on current, relevant issues.

45 46 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Meles Zenawi Annual Lecture Series: Tribute to Nelson Mandela

The second Annual Meles Zenawi Lecture Series on Leadership in Africa was held on the 26th of April. In his tribute to late President Nelson Mandela, Prof. Olukoshi applauded his outstanding virtues describing him as a visionary leader who was ready to fight injustice at all costs. He highlighted three key exemplary elements of his life: the capacity as a leader to train and translate the hope and aspirations of the people he represented into reality; local embbededness in leadership; and willingness to be controversial when faced with challenging choices.

47 Participants

Ababi Demissie Acting Director General Public Diplomacy and Communication Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ethiopia

Abdelrahman Sirelkhatim Ambassador of Sudan to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Abdiweli Ali President of Puntland, Somalia

Adebayo Olukoshi Executive Director, African Institute for Economic Development and Planning (IDEP), Senegal

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Alex Cobham Researcher, Center for Global Development, UK

Alex de Waal Director, World Peace Foundation (WPF), and Member of Technical Committee, USA

Ali Mohamed Waranade Minister of Interior, Somaliland, Somalia

Ali Haji Warsame Minister of Health, Puntland, Somalia

49 Andrea Semadeni Ambassador of Switzerland to Ethiopia, Djibouti, South Sudan, AU and IGAD, Ethiopia

Andreas Eshete Special Advisor to the Prime Minister Office of the Prime Minister and Deputy Chairperson of Tana Forum, Ethiopia

Andreas Proksch Director General, Africa Department, GIZ, Germany

Anicet Georges Dologuele Former Prime Minister of Central Africa Republic (CAR), CAR

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Anne Goldfield Associate Director of Outreach, Harvard Medical School, USA

Anne-Sophie Legge First Secretary of Political Affairs, Embassy of Germany in Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Attiya Waris Senior Lecturer, University of Nairobi, Kenya

Awan Guol Riak Minister, Office of the President of South Sudan, South Sudan

51 Baylie Damtie President, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia

Betty Bigombe Senior Director, Fragility, Conflict and Violence, WorldBank and Member of Tana Forum Board, USA

Brian Kagoro Regional Programme Advisor, Governance and Public Administration, UNDP Regional Service Centre, Ethiopia

Bulus Paul Lolo Ambassador of Nigeria to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

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Carlos Lopes Under Secretary-General and Executive Secretary, UNECA, Ethiopia

Charles Abugre Regional Director, UN Millennium Campaign and Member of Technical Committee, Kenya

Charles Ukeje Reader in International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University and Member of Technical Committee, Nigeria

Christopher Clapham Professor, Centre of African Studies, University of Cambridge, UK

53 Chuol Luth Senior Commander, South Sudan, South Sudan

David Usher Ambassador of Canada to Ethiopia, Djibouti and AU, Ethiopia

Dina Mufti Spokesperson, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

Edward Chileka-Banda National Coordinator, Youth Consultative Forum (YCF), Malawi

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Egon Kochanke Regional Director for Sub- Saharan Africa and the Sahel, Federal Foreign Office, Germany

Eleni Gabre-Madhin Co-Founder and Chief Director of eleni LLC, Ethiopia

El Ghassim Wane Director, Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission, Ethiopia

Elissa Jobson Addis Ababa Correspondent, The Africa Report, Ethiopia

55 Eugene Owusu UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP, Ethiopia

Fombah Sirleaf Director, National Security Agency, Liberia

Funmi Olonisakin Director, African Leadership Centre, and Member of Tana Board, UK

Gamal Ibrahim Economic Affairs Officer, UNECA, Ethiopia

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Gebrekziabher Alemseged IGAD Representative, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ethiopia

Gedu Andargachew President, Amhara Regional State, Ethiopia

Getachew Reda Press and Publicity State Minister, Office of the Prime Minister, Ethiopia

Giuseppe Mistretta Ambassador of Italy to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

57 Gregory Mills Director, Brenthurst Foundation, South Africa

Hailemariam Desalegn Prime Minister, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

Hakim Edward Charge D’Affaires, South Sudan Mission to Addis Ababa, AU and ECA, South Sudan

Hassan Osman Mohamud Minister of Security and DDR, Puntland, Somalia

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Hesphina Rukato Development Consultant, Zimbabwe

Isidore Ojukwu Nwankwo President and Chairman, Governing Council Institute for Fraud Management and Control, Nigeria

John Rwangombwa Governor, Central Bank of Rwanda , Rwanda

Joseph Nsengimana Ambassador of Rwanda to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

59 Jules Rutaremara Director, Rwanda Peace Academy, Rwanda

Kamal Ismail State Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan

Kassa Tekleberhan Speaker of the House of Federation, Ethiopia

Kassahun Berhanu Alemu Chairperson, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

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Kefale Esubalew Ayalew Senior Expert, Legal and Justice Issues, Amhara Regional Administration, Ethiopia

Khabele Matlosa Director, Political Affairs Department, African Union Comission and Member of Technical Committee, Ethiopia

Kidane Kiros Director, Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa Univeristy, Ethiopia

Kojo Busia Senior Advisor, African Mineral Development Centre, UNECA, Ethiopia

61 Konjit Sinegiorgis Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Ethiopia to the AU and UNECA, Ethiopia

Lake Ayalew Mayor, Bahir Dar City, Ethiopia

Lisa Filipetto Ambassador of Australia to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Mamadou Diouf Director, Institute of African Studies, Columbia University, USA

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Manfred Stracher Defense Attaché, Austrian Embassy, Ethiopia

Marial Benjamin Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, South Sudan

Markus Koerner Managing Partner, African Crossroads, and Member of Technical Committee, Germany

Martha Cumbi Board Member, African Forum and Network on Debt and Development and Member of Technical Committee, Mozambique

63 Maurice Engueleguele Acting Director, African Governance Institute (AGI), Senegal

Merhatsidk Mekonnen Legal Advisor, to the Regional President of Bahir Dar, Ethiopia

Mehreteab Mulugeta Chief of Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

Michelle Ndiaye Ntab Director, Africa Peace and Security Programme (APSP/IPSS) and Tana Head of Secretariat, Ethiopia

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Mohamed Atta Director-General, Sudan National Intelligence Service (NISS), Sudan

Mohamed Yonis Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Somaliland, Somalia

Mulie Tarekegen Chief of Cabinet Office, Ethiopia

Mulu Solomon President, Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Association, Ethiopia

65 Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe Associate Professor, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

Nami Aziz Ambassador of Tanzania to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Ndioro Ndiaye President, Alliance for Migration, Leadership and Development and Member of Tana Board, Senegal

Nuhu Ribadu Former Chairman, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria

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Omar Al Bashir President of the Republic of the Sudan

Olusegun Obasanjo Former President of Nigeria and Chairperson of Tana Forum Board, Nigeria

Peter Kagwanja Executive Director, Africa Policy Institute, Kenya

Pierre Buyoya Former President, Republic of Burundi and Member of Board, Burundi

67 Rachid Benlounes Ambassador of Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Sahle-Work Zewde Under Secretary-General and Director- General, United Nations Office in Nairobi, Kenya

Sarjoh Bah Head, African Union Liaison Office to the Southern African Development Community, (SADC) and Member of Technical Committee, Botswana

Sebehat Nega Executive Director, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, Ethiopia

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Sindiso Ngwenya Secretary-General, Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), Zambia

Taha Osman Minister to the Presidency, Sudan

Tassew Woldehana Vice President, Research and Technology Transfer, Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia

Thomas Guet Director-General, External Security, South Sudan

69 Tsegy Berhe National Security Advisor, Ethiopia

Uwe Kievelitz Director, GIZ African Union Office, Ethiopia

Vivienne Titi Wreh Ambassador of Liberia to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Vusi Gumede Professor and Head, Thabo Mbeki Leadership Institute, South Africa

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Xie Xiaoyan Ambassador of the People’s Republic of China to Ethiopia, Ethiopia

Yinager Dessie State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ethiopia

Yohannes Mezgebe Founder, Ubuntu Leadership Institute (ULI), Ethiopia

Zegeye Mulaye Vice President, Administration and Student Services, Addis Ababa University (AAU), Ethiopia

71 Acknowledgements

Partners

We would like to thank the Government of Ethiopia, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Intelligence and Security Service, the Federal Police, Addis Ababa Traffic Police, The Amhara Regional Government and Bahir Dar City Administration. We would also like to thank the governments of Federal Republic of Germany and the Kingdom of Norway.

Government of Government of Ethiopia Germany

We would like to thank the African Union Commission for its continued and invaluable contributions. We would also like to thank our private sector partners for their support and generosity.

African Union Commission

Austrian Development Cooperation

The Brenthurst Foundation

The Sheraton Addis Ababa Amhara Avanti Blue Addis University Regional State Nile Hotel

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Host City: Bahir Dar Bahir Dar is one of the leading tourist attractions in Ethiopia, situated along the shores of Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest lake and the source of the Blue Nile. In addition to the breathtaking view of Lake Tana, the city gets its beauty from avenues lined with palm trees and a variety of colourful flowers. With an origin dating back to the sixteenth century, Bahir Dar is rich in historical sites. Bahir Dar was awarded an honourable mention from the UNESCO Cities of Peace Prize 2002 for its performance in addressing the challenges of rapid urbanization.

73 Tana Online

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74 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

Annex I Summary of background papers and leading questions The Impacts of Illicit Financial Flows on Peace and Security in Africa 1. Growing political recognition of the need to curtail IFFs for Africa’s development. African governments and institutions have started to give serious consideration to the scale and impact of IFFs on Africa’s development. Recent investments in research by lead- ing institutions in Africa and the establishment of the African High Panel on Illicit Fi- nancial Flows from Africa, chaired by H.E. President Mbeki, Former President of South Africa, testify to the commitment at the highest levels to understand and act on this issue. This conference complements this process by seeking better understanding of how the IFFs phenomenon affects human security, vice ver-sa. 2. The magnitude of IFFs A range of estimates of illicit financial flows confirm that the problem facing Africa is large, and has grown substantially. Annual losses in recent years range as high as $100 billion, and for many countries the long-term average has exceeded 10% of recorded GDP. Even allowing for substantial uncertainty in estimates of flows whose defining character- istic is that they are hidden the order of magnitude is dramatic. Moreover, when we compare exposure in relation to GDP, sub-Saharan Africa emerg- es as the most ex-posed region to illicit outflows. On average, in 2002-2011, sub-Sa- haran Africa saw outflows of 5.7% compared to an average for all other developing

75 countries below 4%. In other words, for cerned is one of hidden flows, where either the most re-cent ten-year period for which the illicit origin of capital or the illicit nature consistent estimates are available, sub-Sa- of transactions undertaken is deliberately haran Africa saw estimated illicit outflows obscured. The most well-known classifica- nearly 50% higher than the average for all tion stems from Baker (2005) and disaggre- other developing countries. This relates to gates IFF into three ele-ments: commercial the level of exposure to commodity trade tax evasion (estimated at up to two thirds of and FDI. Mauritania, Tunisia, Zambia and the total), the laundering of the proceeds of Nigeria, being the most exposed in terms crime (up to a third), and corrupt payments of commodity dependency risks, and the and the theft of state assets (3-5% of the Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, total). The major addition that has some- Angola and Mozambique being the most times been suggested is that of illegitimate exposed to FDI risks. debt – where an illegitimate state creates a (binding) public liability by using its power 3. Defining IFFs to borrow internationally. There is no single, agreed definition of illicit 4. Motivating factors behind IFFs financial flows (IFFs). This is, in large part, due to the breadth of the term ‘illicit’. The Of the four main components of IFFs de- (Oxford) dictionary definition is: “forbid- scribed above, two of these involve hid- den by law, rules or custom.” The first three den transactions with illegal capital: the words alone would define ‘illegal’, and this laundering of the proceeds of crime; and highlights an important feature of any defi- corruption and the theft of state assets. The nition: illicit financial flows are not neces- other two involve illicit (and often illegal) sarily illegal. Flows forbidden by “rules or transactions, but with legally-obtained cap- custom” may encompass those which are ital. These are tax abuse (both corporate socially and/or morally unacceptable, and and individual); and hidden ownership to not necessarily legally so. hide conflicts of interest and to facilitate market abuse. To take a specific example, commercial tax evasion affecting a low-income country The range of potential illicit motivations is where the tax and authorities have limited wide indeed; but nonetheless demonstrates administrative capacity is much less like- the breadth of IFFs phenomena. We can ly to be either uncov-ered or successfully cluster the main motivations into 4, which challenged in a court of law, than would be also relate to IFF-type described above– the same exact behaviour in a high-income market/regulatory abuse, 2 - tax abuse, 3 – country with relatively empowered author- abuse of power, includ-ing the theft of state ities. A strictly legal definition of IFFs is funds and assets, 4 – proceeds of crime. All therefore likely to result in systematically – four IFF types are likely to re-sult in reduc- and wrongly – understating the scale of the tions in both state funds and institutional problem in lower-income, lower-capacity strength. states. There is substantial overlap in the mech- The phenomenon with which we are con- anisms used for IFFs, regardless of moti- 76 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

vation. The op-portunity to hide, where it • criminal groups (a term used here to indi- exists, is likely to be exploited for multiple cate both those motivated primarily by the purposes. For example then, the legal use by pro-ceeds of crime, and those using crime a multinational of highly secretive jurisdic- to fund political and social agenda) – the tions may both provide cover for illegal use leading actors in IFFs type 4. of the same secrecy, and also inadvertently 6. Typology of impacts of IFFs on state legitimize such behaviour. Identifying illic- and human security it flows in a particular mechanism will tend to be insufficient to specify the type of IFF The literature on the links between IFFs in action. IFFs can take place with capital and security (defined broadly as Human which is anywhere on a spectrum of legal- and State Security combined) is limited, ity. At one end are criminal proceeds and and where this exists, greater attention is stolen public funds, with legitimate income paid to the more “nega-tive” aspects, i.e. and company profits at the other. the failure of states to negate or prevent in- security, rather than the “positive” i.e. the A second spectrum exists in relation not to ability of states to provide, or to positively the capital but rather the transaction itself. construct, secure conditions in which rapid At one end there are clearly illegal trans- human development can take place. actions, such as bribery of public officials by commercial inter-ests; at the other end, The key assumption is that human and state transactions which are likely to be legal (at security are strongly linked to the strength least in the sense of not having been chal- of states and government performance: lenged successfully in a court of law) but Strong and accountable states with the tech- may well be illicit; in this category would nical and institutional capacity, the resourc- be, for example, some of the more aggres- es and the will to provide services and wel- sive transfer pricing behaviour of multina- fare to the population are better positioned tional compa-nies. to build stable societies, and can engage constructively with neighbours and other 5. Main actors in IFFs political actors. They also, in theory, have The major actors in IFFs can be categorized the capacity to manage conflicts peaceful- as follows: ly, be it with those within that feel exclud- ed and thus claim resources, services and • private actors (individuals, domestic busi- rights or with outside po-litical competitors nesses and multinational company groups in the quest for power and economic might. committing tax and regulatory abuse, and The key assumption is that state actors – the related professional advisers – tax, le- elected, appointed or imposed – are driven gal, banking and accounting) – these are the principally by public interest motivations leading actors in IFFs types 1, 2 and 3; rather than self-seeking and unproductive • public officeholders (both elected and rent-seeking use of power. Conversely, employed) – these are important actors in weak and unaccountable states by nature IFF types 3 and 4, and may be involved in perpetuate instability, create an environ- type 1; and ment of insecurity for their citizens, and are

77 Figure 1: Overview of IFFs and security linkages

Source: Alex Cobham1 vulnerable to political pressure from inside This is the area in which IFF linkages have and outside, to the point that they are una- been most commonly asserted, although ble to avoid or contain violence. there are reasons to be cautious about some of these. A vicious cycle can be hypothe- In the typology of the links between IFFs sised between negative (in)security and and security in the figure above, the key illegal capital IFF in particular (that is, IFF driver of IFFs is financial opacity. This is ex- associated with abuse of power and laun- ploited by both “illegal” capital IFF as well dering criminal proceeds - similar though as “legal” capital IFF, generating risks and probably weaker arguments may exist for threats of “negative” and “positive” secu- legal capital IFF but we do not focus on rity issues. these here). 7. Negative security Consider the possible starting point of an “Negative security” refers to the ability of increase in illegal capital IFF. Where this states to prevent, or to negate, insecurity at derives from abuse of power say, for ex- the per-sonal, community, environmental ample, the extreme behaviour of a klep- and political levels: more specifically, the tocratic leader, the cycle follows almost ability and willingness of states to act to tautologically. The nature of the IFF itself reduce the risk of violence against the per- undermines the state legitimacy and direct- son, the risk of insecurity due to tensions ly reflects the state’s capacity and interest to between groups, the risk of environmental provide security, or indeed to act to curtail degradation and the risk of political rights IFF. violations. When the rise in IFF reflects laundering 1. Alex Cobham is a research fellow at the Center for Global Development ([email protected]). Research assistance from Alice Lépissier and Alex Marriage is gratefully acknowledged, as are comments on earlier drafts of material from the Tana Forum Technical Committee, members of the UNECA High-Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows out of Africa, anonymous reviewers at the African Development Bank’s regional integration blog and CGD seminar participants; and the financial support of GIZ and the Tana Forum. 78 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

of the proceeds of crime, it is the underly- firms the widespread citizen recognition in ing crimes where the linkages are likely to the region of importance of tax for coun- emerge. Drug and human trafficking is a tries to develop (66%), and of states’ right major area of underly-ing criminality, and to levy tax (70%, and on a rising trend since to these can be added piracy, environmen- 2002). At the same time, however, more tal crime and arms dealing. than a third of those surveyed think most or all tax officials are corrupt, and these 8. “Positive security” views are correlated with lower self-report- “Positive security” relates to the ability of ed tax compliance. There is a clear region- states to provide, to positively construct, al aspect to the issue: while West Africans secure conditions in which rapid human ex-pressed the greatest commitment to tax development can take place. This relates to in principle, they confirmed a much higher economic opportunity and freedom from level of avoidance. extreme economic inequality; and to the There is a potential vicious cycle that could security of basic human development out- arise with respect to legal capital IFF and comes related to health and nutrition. positive (in)security. If the starting point is In terms of IFF and the role of the state taken as an increase in legal capital IFF, the here, it is tax (and its abuse) which is fun- risks are of undermining both the available damental. Effective taxation provides 4 Rs: revenues to provide positive security, but not only revenue, and the opportunity to also the political responsiveness to be will- reprice social goods and bads, but redistri- ing to do so. The resulting insecurity and bution and political representation. Taxa- inequalities have the potential to further tion should provide both the funds and the weaken both the capacity and the willing- means to redistribute in order to address ness of the state to fight IFF, reinforcing the important deficits in positive security. In cycle. addition, however, taxation provides a crit- The simplest way of conceiving health ical link to effective political representation and nutritional security in relation to IFFs and wider standards of governance. draws on a recent paper by O’Hare et al The act of paying tax provides an important (2013), who consider under-five mortality accountability link. Empirical studies sug- in sub-Saharan Africa. It shows the poten- gest the higher the share of tax in govern- tial pathways from IFF to mortality: lost ment spending, the stronger the process of revenue and lost national resources (GDP), improving governance and representation combined with losses in state capacity, re- (Ross, 2004); while direct tax – taxes on in- sult in worse household access to basic ne- come, profits and capital gains – appears cessities, and this – mediated through the to play a particularly strong role (Mahon, resource allocation within the household – 2005). gives rise to worse child health outcomes, including higher mortality rates. The most recent Afrobarometer survey con-

79 A vicious cycle will involve taxation sup- sa, with institutional state weakness as both porting both rule-making and violence, and cause and effect. violence underpinning rule-making. The 10. Legal capital IFFs and security main IFF types which threaten each layer of the pyramid are also shown, as is the broad Only recently has more policy and research role of different layers in curtailing each attention been paid to legal capital IFFs, type of IFF. The overall picture is complex resulting in a growing base of evidence on but clear. It is one of multiple overlapping linkages to ‘positive security’ (the ability and largely reinforcing linkages, creating a of states to provide se-cure conditions in powerful circularity in the relationship be- which rapid human development can take tween statehood and IFFs. place). 9. Legal, capital IFFs and security Extrapolating from GDP losses to one ma- jor dimension of human security, it is esti- Research, policy analysis and formulation mated that illicit flows are responsible for have thus far often focused on the potential major delays in regional achievement in linkages between IFFs and ‘negative secu- child mortality reduc-tion. A two-thirds rity’ (that is, the ability of states to prevent reduction in under-five mortality from the insecurity at the personal, community and 1990 baseline (the target of the fourth Mil- political levels). A number of important lennium Development Goal), in a sample of linkages exist here. 34 sub-Saharan countries, could on this ba- First, IFF in general, and crime and corrup- sis have been achieved by 2016 rather than tion in particular, tend to undermine both the current estimate of 2029 – implying mil- the immediate effectiveness of institutions, lions of lives may be lost unnecessarily. and confidence in them to provide fair and Again, a vicious cycle is possible: IFFs un- effective rules for markets and for politics dermine the resources available to states, – peeling away the layers of institutional re- and their effectiveness (and often willing- silience that can provide a bulwark against ness) to use resources for broad-based de- violent conflict when pressures arise. Sec- velopment, undermining human develop- ond, competition for illegal money gained ment outcomes; while weak institutions from crime and corruption tends to use il- and a lack of confidence in fair political legal means and is, therefore, prone to be- representation encourage further IFFs. coming violent. 11. Policy responses In the other direction, conflict undermines the institutions which can curtail IFFs. It Table 1 sets out a range of measures ac- also exacer-bates uncertainty which in turn cording to whether they are applicable at increases the expected returns to rent-seek- the national level in order to meet interna- ing relative to that of long-term economic tional responsibilities; at the national lev- investment. These linkages together create el out of self-interest; at the regional (and the possibility of a vicious cycle, in which sub-regional level); and at level of region- illegal IFFs exacerbate conflict and vice ver- al priorities to influence global pro-cesses.

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The measures reflect five areas of concern. collation and joint analysis, with the scope for real-time detec-tion of mispricing that • Beneficial ownership. The scope for anon- could exert a powerful deterrent effect. Re- ymous ownership of companies, trusts gional groupings such as the East African and foun-dations should be curtailed – in Community should pilot such efforts. At keeping with the developing international the regional-global level, ‘follow the mon- norm, and in the national interest – through ey partnerships’ including major trading publication of this information, possibly co- partners (e.g. the EU) have the potential to ordinated at the re-gional level. With active protect the integrity of trade pricing. More regional efforts to meet this standard, there assertive interventions, which could po- will be scope to consid-er counter-meas- tentially be led by the African Union or the ures against jurisdictions elsewhere that follow-up process of the UNECA IFF panel, continue to maintain secrecy. The prima- include the possibility of bringing a WTO ry responsibility sits with national policy- case against a particularly opaque trading makers: and most pressingly in countries partner such as Switzerland; and the devel- such as Mauritius which are responsible for opment of a common African position on large cross-border transactions, since a lack the extent of commodi-ty trade transparen- of transparency here has the greatest poten- cy. tial to cause damage elsewhere. • Corporate tax. In respect to transparency, • International information exchange. Im- national authorities should require coun- provements in respect of beneficial owner- try-by-country reporting from multina- ship in-formation are also necessary to fa- tional groups to allow easy identification cilitate the automatic exchange of financial of possible profit shifting. At the sub-re- information for tax and other IFF purposes. gional level, pooling of such data would Regional (and sub-regional) agreements on allow both more effective analysis and also information ex-change can not only pro- the possibility of publication to support ex- vide direct benefits but also demonstrate ternal research and to build citi-zen confi- that systems are in place so that African dence in fair and effective taxation. countries are not barred from joining the emerging global exchange instru-ment that Given the extent to which African eco- has the potential to end much ‘tax haven’ nomic ac-tivity may be generating profit secrecy. The African Tax Administra-tion elsewhere, however, the question arises Forum (ATAF) should be tasked with lead- of whether policy-makers should consider ing the process, and resourced to do so and taking a common African position in fa- to help member countries as necessary. vour of unitary taxation – which aims to align profits with real economic activity, • Trade. The majority of illicit flows is es- with potentially dramatic impacts on the timated to occur through trade mispricing corporate tax base. Supporting analysis for many countries, so counter-measures could be lead by the follow-up process of here are a clear priority. At the national and the UNECA IFFs panel, with technical sup- regional levels there is scope for better data

81 port from UNECA, the African Development Bank and ATAF. • International data. Finally, reflecting that illicit financial flows are driven by a lack of transparency about cross-border economic and financial stocks and flows, there are op-portunities at both national and regional levels to improve substantially the collation

Table 1: Overview of policy responses to IFFs

Level of policy: Area of National (minimum National (own priorities) Regional and sub-regional Regional-global (own policy: standards) (own priorities) priorities)

Beneficial ownership Legislate (and allocate resources) to ensure all Support all countries to Promote global minimum company and legal structures require collection of reach minimum standards standard for publication of ownership information ownership information Develop shared public Publish same (online) in timely fashion portal to access ownership Consider counter- information measures for non- compliant jurisdictions

International information Work towards Promote and adopt Develop and enact Advocate to ensure exchange compatibility with simple applications to regional mechanisms for immediate reciprocity is international standards flag high-risk data (e.g. automatic information not entry requirement to where inconsistent with exchange global instruments, i.e. domestic tax returns) that countries can begin Support best practice in receiving data as long as use of data to identify risk committed to eventual full reciprocity

Consider/supporting counter-measures for non- compliant jurisdictions Trade Own data collation, Real-time analysis of Pooled real-time data Pilot ‘follow the money’ publication (e.g. via UN own data analysis (more efficient partnerships to curtail Comtrade) use of resources and trade mispricing globally broader dataset to improve quality of Consider counter- assessment and ability to measures, including identify abnormal pricing potential WTO challenges, in real time) for highly opaque trading partners

Develop a common African position on international trade transparency, starting with commodities

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Corporate tax Require combined Publish combined and Call for OECD to publish and country-by- country-by-country Africa-specific assessment country reporting from reporting from of individual BEPS multinationals multinationals proposals

Combine resources for Support assessment of regional assessment alternatives, including of multinational tax profit allocation methods; positions and if warranted, develop a common African position Assess potential for profit in support of unitary allocation methods taxation International data As far as practical, work Use global datasets to Support all countries Promote global towards supplying data assess and manage risk to contribute data, and cooperation and more to international bodies (exposure to secrecy to use timely production of on bilateral trade and jurisdictions) in own bilateral trade and investment stocks and bilateral relationships investment statistics, flows including cooperation of secrecy jurisdictions of information, and the IFF analysis of the 12. Critical issues for discussion resulting data. National policymakers must a) How can the obvious linkages between take the lead, with appropriate regional co- IFFs and Human Security be brought into ordination and support. the national, sub-regional and continental African policymakers have the power to policy debate? take significant steps against IFFs domesti- b) How can African states combat the con- cally, which can also strengthen greatly their tinent’s vulnerability to financial secrecy? ability to ensure that global arrangements reflect African prior-ities. Decisive action c) What steps need to be taken to minimize within the next twelve months can ensure all forms of IFFs, and their the negative im- that permanent benefits are ob-tained from pacts on human security in Africa: the current window of opportunity. Miss- • At National level ing the chance will impose long-term costs on states and citizens through unnecessary • At Regional level insecurity. • At Global level

83 Military Expenditure, IFFs, Governance and Security 1. Governance and security sets benchmarks for the quality of process- es and decisions in the public sector. As discussed above, the quality of govern- ance – especially in terms of accountability 3. The corrupting power of the military and institutional strength is a key driver to sector for human and state security. And a lot of Military affairs require secrecy, but this has change is hap-pening: While at the aggre- to be balanced with the quest for transpar- gate level the indicator “Accountability, ency and accountability in public affairs. Transparency & Corruption in the Public How this trade-off is being handled is an Sector” has remained about unchanged important indicator for the quality of dem- for Africa as a whole in the last 12 years ocratic governance. (around an index value of 50 according to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2014), there are Suffice to say that the military is often the significant movements on record for indi- first point of call for those who shun pub- vidual countries: seven countries improved licity in their affairs – from dealers in illegal by more than 14 points, and nine worsened arms and drugs through companies that their ratings by more than 14 points. want to strike “lucrative” deals for arms and services to members of the political 2. Governance and the military elite who seek access to and shelter for ille- Within these general dynamics, the gov- gally gained monies and assets. ernance of armies and, generally, the mil- 4. Military finance and IFFs itary sector presents significant additional opportunities and risks. Where military in- Military expenditures and Illicit Financial stitutions are transparent and accountable, Flows often go hand-in-glove: stability and peaceful conflict management • Where contracts and their values are kept can be achieved. Where the military is al- secret it is easy to inflate prices and pay lowed to establish “a state within a state” kick-backs or other bribes (some 15% of all or is being misused by power, crisis looms. the total money spent on weapons may be In many African states, the military is at diverted for corrupt purposes; a global fig- the heart of statehood: it controls the state’s ure2) ca-pacity for violence and it provides phys- 2 It would be important to get data on the ical safety for the political elites. Where military expenditure as compared to the patronage plays an important role in the public budget governance system, the military provides significant means for distributing jobs, sta- 3 See Cobham study 1 tus, and money to favoured individuals and • Military cooperation – the delivery of 1 groups. In many countries, the military is arms, assistance in arms procurement, also a perceived as a model institution that training and travel – often provides access 1 It would be important to get data on the military to money and other benefits which may be expenditure as compared to the public budget 2. See Cobham study

84 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa used illicitly (check data on US-Uganda-So- circulated in illicit ways, and more and malia; …..) more political terrain is left to the corrupt. In the worst case, the military becomes a • Stealing from the state – taking cash, or corrupted political actor in its own right in selling arms, or recruiting “ghost soldiers”, the national political theatre and will even etc. – may be comparatively easier to organ- construe security threats in order to gain le- ise within the military The military may set gitimacy for more growth. Some countries up businesses which then create huge un- in Africa may have gone beyond this point, controlled flows of money, from operating with bleak prospects regarding governance profits through procurement budgets to in- development as well as human and state and outflows of currency security. • There is an increasing practice of barter 6. Questions for discussion trade in arms, i.e. where weapons are being paid for with mineral resources (which of a) Is it useful and realistic for Africa to es- course generate some cash, somewhere) tablish common standards (e.g. via AU) with regard to transparency in military ex- • Complex supply lines and financial flows penditures, military procurements and mil- that in turn are often protected from pub- itary operations? lic scrutiny – now purportedly for reasons of “national security” of the suppliers and b) Is the democratic control of armed forc- markets – make it easy to divert money. es – with a focus on financial flows – suf- ficiently accounted for on the governance Whereas IFFs in trade and extraction of agenda (APRM, AGA, ….)? natural resources are mostly linked to out- flows (through underpricing), the military c) How can the debate on governance de- sector also creates significant illicit inflows velopment co-opt the security sector, in or- and an illicit internal circulation of money. der to find a common language regarding the trade-off between military secrecy and 5. Military corruption – contagious for the transparency of public finances? public sector? d) Should Africa call for more transparency It is important to situate the linkage between on the global supply lines of arms? (… mir- military expenditures and IFFs within the roring the transparency on its supply lines wider setting of governance development. for minerals and timber). It is easy to spread corrupt practices, and very difficult to contain them. The struc- tural drivers towards financial secrecy and illicit flows related to military expenditure are apparently so strong that there may be a “point of no return” beyond which dem- ocrats will fight an uphill battle against an entrenched politico-military clique that bases its power on illicit practices. More and more economic resources are

85 Annex II

Leadership in Africa: Some Reflections on the Legacy of Nelson Mandela By Adebayo Olukoshi

Introduction animate the 2014 dialogue of which the Meles Zenawi Lecture Series has become an Allow me to begin this lecture by thanking integral part. I wish to extend a collective the Chairperson of the Tana High-Level salute to all the other distinguished guests Forum on Security in Africa, His Excellency present in the room, knowing that I cannot former President Olusegun Obasanjo, and possibly greet them all individually the leadership and management of the but certain that I can count on their Forum for the kind invitation extended to understanding. me to deliver the 2014 edition of the Annual Lecture Series dedicated to the memory Although coming at very short notice of the late Ethiopian Prime Minister, Mr. for reasons that I fully understood were Meles Zenawi, himself a founder and prime beyond the officials of the Forum to redress mover of the Forum before his premature in good time, I still decided to honour the passing in August 2012. I would also like to invitation to stand this morning before acknowledge the presence at the lecture of this august assembly of frontline African His Excellency President Omar El-Bashir of policy and political actors as much as a the Sudan, His Excellency Prime Minister statement of my strong endorsement of the Haile Mariam Desalegn of Ethiopia, His principles underpinning the establishment Excellency former President Pierre Buyoya of the Tana security dialogue initiative as of Burundi, His Excellency Mr. Carlos for the enduring personal esteem which Lopes, Under Secretary-General of the I have for the Forum’s Chairperson. The United Nations and Executive Secretary of Tana dialogue initiative is unique in many the United Nations Economic Commission ways and must be celebrated for emerging for Africa, and His Excellency Mr. Sindiso speedily as easily the most credible site in Ngwenya, Secretary-General of Common Africa for sustained multi-party and multi- Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. sectoral conversations about pertinent These eminent personalities are but a few security issues of immediate interest to among the many prominent figures from the continent. As to the Forum’s current the public, private, inter-governmental, Chairperson, it has been Mr. Obasanjo’s diplomatic, and non-governmental sectors unique fate for the better part of the last of our continent who have been convened 45 years or so to be thrust repeatedly – by the Tana Forum leadership to help and often dramatically - into the frontline

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of national, regional, continental, and Mr. Zenawi confronted these tasks with international service at critical moments - admirable aplomb, vigour, and a single- and mostly against his own wishes – when minded determination even if his efforts key leadership skills and experience are and methods were, as might be expected, urgently called for. His has been a truly considered by some to be controversial remarkable story which still remains to be and, therefore, contestable. I will return to told properly and in all its fullness. It is a the theme of controversy in the exercise of story that has made him a major figure of leadership later in the lecture. our contemporary history whose imprint Historians, and especially those among cannot be missed and whose example them who are masters in the identification carries important lessons of its own on of interconnected patterns in actions leadership in Africa and beyond. and events that are scattered over a Remembering Meles Zenawi long duree, will no doubt bring their unique interpretative tools to bear on the Permit me to also state from the outset Zenawi era in the history of the ancient that the institution of an Annual Meles civilization that is Ethiopia, and deliver Zenawi Lecture Series is one which, in their considered verdict on what the former my estimation, is both highly merited by Ethiopian Prime Minister truly meant for the former Ethiopian Prime Minister and his country, the African continent, and the justified as a fitting tribute by the Tana continent’s place in the world. While we Forum leadership to his memory. In the await their verdict, and fully mindful of recent history of the African continent, the animated but generally healthy debates the late Mr. Zenawi towered as one of the that his policies and politics stirred within bright lights of his generation of leaders and outside Africa even whilst he was who had the duty not only of continuing still alive, I dare to say today with some the unfinished business of nation-building confidence that, all things considered, but also taking on the challenges of state Mr. Zenawi will, among other things, be reconstruction in the face of multiple and remembered as a singularly gifted figure multi-layered domestic and international whose undoubted astuteness was matched change. The tasks of nation and state by his sharp intellect, his masterful ability building remain key items on the agenda to synthesis complex debates, and the clear of African countries - as, indeed, for sense of purpose, direction, and consensus- many countries in other regions of the crafting he routinely brought to bear on world. They lie at the heart of efforts to his assignments. His role in the rapid post- frame workable arrangements that will conflict reconstruction and recovery of his allow for a more enduring basis for the country after the fall in 1991 of the regime governability of African countries and the of Mengistu Haile Mariam has been amply redressing of long-standing problems of documented and debated. As a foremost citizenship, legitimacy, underdevelopment, leader of the contemporary Ethiopian and dependence. In his own unique ways, renaissance, he immersed himself in the

87 task of establishing the foundations for appeal transcended different generations, a developmental state that could drive regions, genders, sexualities, and races. a project of structural transformation Not surprisingly, he united peoples from anchored, inter alia, on a robust policy of different domains and across different industrialization. His grand ambitions for boundaries with his remarkable and very his country and the continent placed him personal story of fortitude, hope, faith, and in the frontline of the quest to redefine rebirth in the face of prolonged adversity, the terms of Africa’s engagement with the pain, and loss. In doing so, he emerged as world. Many have lamented, rightly, that one of the few truly global titans of our age - his premature passing robbed the continent and, perhaps, even of all time. His example of one of its most articulate, forthright, will continue to inspire for generations to and courageous voices in global affairs, come. Nelson Mandela was the Madiba for qualities which he displayed to generalized all seasons. admiration at the numerous international Speaking on the legacy of a great historical fora where his peers entrusted him with the figure such as Nelson R. Mandela is task of representing and speaking for them. clearly a gargantuan task in and of itself, Defining and Contextualising the a testament to the largeness of the man Mandela Leadership Challenge and the richness of the multi-dimensional nature of his experience. Fortunately, If the naming of a leadership lecture series however, an opportunity to considerably after Meles Zenewi is to be welcome and trim down the topic of this lecture and celebrated for the positive attributes of focus on a much more manageable slice a transformative leadership which he of the Mandela legacy is provided by the embodied, the decision to devote the 2014 specific accent which the 2014 edition of edition of the lecture to the legacy of the late the Zenawi Lecture Series is placing on Nelson R. Mandela can only be applauded leadership in Africa. This focus offers a as one worthy of our unalloyed support. For, disciplined scope for a contextualized few are the personalities who, in the recent reflection to be undertaken on some of history of our world, were able to leave the lessons in leadership which Mandela their mark in the sands of time as visionary especially represented for us in Africa. It is leaders driven by a sheer determination to an appropriate, even urgent and necessary fight oppression and injustice no matter the reflection to undertake at this point in the cost to them personally. So dramatic was his history of the continent when its constituent life and so powerful were his experiences countries are in the throes of some the most that in his travails and triumphs, we all radical and rapid changes that have been saw in him a little of ourselves and of seen in a long time. The changes - economic, what we could both endure and become. social, political, cultural, technological, In this way, even more than many others, demographic, and spatial - demand the Mandela was an inspirational figure whose deployment of the best leadership acumen

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possible if the continent is to derive an all- capacity is within us in Africa to produce round continental renewal from them. This the leadership resources that are required to is all the more so as the changes are also meet the challenges of the changing times. occurring as part - and in the midst - of The key issue which is posed, therefore, is some of the most far-reaching geo-political to tap those resources and enable them to and socio-economic realignments in the flower and bloom. international system since the end of the Mandela as a Quintessential Leader Second World War. Much has been written and said about In drawing leadership lessons for today’s the leadership qualities and attributes Africa from the life and times of Nelson that the late President Mandela embodied Mandela, we will do well to remind and exemplified. These are legion and ourselves that previous realignments they have been remarked upon in many during the last five hundred years in world different ways and forms, much more than history left Africa, to say the least, at the can ever be fully captured in this lecture. receiving end of changes that signaled They range, to cite only a few of them, the emergence of some of today’s leading from his unyielding personal commitment global powers. The history of enslavement, to the pursuit of a just cause, the sacrifices exploitation, the scramble and partition, - personal and familial - he made for his colonization, poverty, underdevelopment, convictions, and his readiness to pay the neocolonial dependence, and generalized supreme price for his beliefs to his espousal domination that became an essential stuff of a gospel of tolerance, his dogged loyalty of the African story cannot be allowed to to a collective cause, and his sense of duty repeat itself or continue under new guises. to his fellow human beings. Attention Leadership at different levels and layers of has also been drawn to his insistence on African state and society will certainly have the centrality of political organization, the to be consciously nurtured, intelligently imperatives of organizational discipline, mobilized, and strategically deployed if the importance of personal responsibility the continent is not only to turn the table and accountability, his essential faith in the of underdevelopment and dependence but basic fairness of people, and his abiding also seize the plethora of opportunities belief in the common humanity which we provided by the contemporary conjuncture all share regardless of our station in life or to drive a programme of all-round the pigmentation of our skins. Mandela’s rebirth and transformation. Yet, not a humaneness at all times and the uncommon few commentators have noted, with generosity of spirit he displayed towards understandable - indeed justified - concern his traducers earned him considerable that in the face of the changes taking place admiration and acclaim, making him a hero within and around the continent, a multiple and model across a world that has grown and multi-layered crisis of leadership accustomed to sledgehammer revenge and appears to be in evidence which must be narrow retribution in the governance of speedily redressed. Mandela’s life and global affairs. legacy provide ample evidence that the

89 Who could have expected that a person humankind. He forgave even though who had been so systematically ill-treated he did not - and could not have been would emerge from over 27 years of prison expected to forget. And yet, he stoically to preach reconciliation and extend a right refused to be locked in a trap of bitterness, hand of fellowship to his former oppressors, lest he be booked into another round of both low and high? How could a person imprisonment, this time an imprisonment who had been the victim of much racial that would be self-imposed. hatred that separated him from his family The historic defense statement which and actively sought to dehumanize him Mandela made on 20 April, 1964 at the emerge from prolonged confinement to kangaroo Rivonia trials he and his key eschew bitterness and become an apostle of comrades were subjected to and whose Ubuntu? Who among us was not amazed to 50th anniversary is being commemorated note that on the day of his inauguration in this year summarized his vision of a 1994 as the first South African President to world founded on justice and dignity, and be democratically elected by his compatriots his uncompromising abhorrence of the of all races, he reserved a seat in the front institutionalized racism which the apartheid row at the Union Buildings for his former authorities had erected. He reiterated his prison guard? And the positive surprises dream of a non-racial democratic society that flowed so effortlessly out of Mandela in the speech he delivered on 11 February, continued throughout his presidential years 1990 following his release from 27 and half into his retirement and his death, leaving years of prison and at his inauguration on us in no doubt that his was not a case of 10 May 1994 as the first elected president a politician opportunistically playing to a of a post-apartheid South Africa. Following stage-managed gallery but of a leader who his death on 5 December, 2014, much of was so completely at ease with himself and the world, unsurprisingly, was united in his fellow humans that his natural actions genuine mourning over the passing of a and gestures helped to re-write important truly great person the like of whom we had chapters in history - and in the theory not seen in a long while and may not easily and practice of leadership. For even in his come across again anytime soon. For many personal will, read out after his death, he Africans and the children of the continent remembered to honour his domestic staff in different parts of the Diaspora, there and carers whom he treated as intimate was a sense of pride and satisfaction that parts of his enlarged family. In acting Mandela was not just one of them but also directly contrary to what many had taken emerged from among them to become an for granted would be an unquenchable African gift to humankind. It was a sense of thirst for revenge and retribution, Nelson pride that pervaded even if the irony was Mandela showed himself to be a rare breed also not lost that some of those who only of forward-looking leaders who proved yesterday had loosely dismissed the icon able to put their personal pains and travails as a self-serving terrorist queued up one aside for the greater good of country and after the other to sing his praises in what

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was partly a genuine effort to correct the that have been marshaled and which misjudgments of yesteryears and partly continue to be deployed with regard to an opportunistic push at an historical the man, we are witnesses to the many revisionism and Mandela re-appropriation. competing uses, abuses, and meanings of the Mandela name and persona. Three Leadership Lessons for Africa from the Mandela Legacy It is partly because of this that it becomes imperative for us to try to return to basics Mandela’s life offers many lessons in about the Mandela legacy and infuse doses leadership. Those which have mainly been of sobriety into the narratives that have diffused through various media are the predominated about the icon, doing so with ones that focus primarily on him as a global a view to reminding ourselves, if nothing colossus and a virtual saint worthy of our else, that leadership is not an abstract joy unreserved and enduring admiration and ride of saints or a unidirectional march adulation. towards sainthood but the result of active There is certainly plenty to celebrate about engagements forged in various theatres of the life of Mandela and many reasons struggle that test us as human beings in all not just to salute his legacy but also to ways imaginable. perpetuate it. This is all the more so when In this connection, three key aspects of the his example is set against the generally Mandela story that have not always been uninspiring performance of different levels prominent in most narratives have been and categories of office holders in Africa fascinating and instructive for me and it is and across much of the rest of the world, to these that I would now like to pay some a mediocrity that has led knowledgeable attention. observers to remark on a contemporary global leadership deficit that has also A Capacity to Dream and Envision played out on our continent. On account The first aspect of the leadership example of this and more, exercises in drawing which Mandela represented resided in his lessons and inspiration from Mandela’s emergence, once he joined in the struggle contributions and example will, no doubt, for the liberation of South Africa, as the continue for a long time to come. charismatic voice and face of a dream. It is important, nevertheless, to remember The ability which he demonstrated from the that, for many reasons which are not neces- outset to draw inspiration from the daily sarily laudable, charitable, or altruistic, var- travails of the times in order to encapsulate ious investments are also being consciously them and envision a new societal order is a made by different interests in a cult of Man- gift of leadership which is not given to all. dela with the purpose of serving narrow Out of the vision of a new society which ends. he and his comrades forged came ideas In life as in death, amidst all the superlatives for the prosecution of a struggle that was

91 bound, given its historic justness, to end in and achieve a better future. victory, no matter how long it would take. John F. Kennedy’s example as the 35th That vision of a new society also produced President of the United States demonstrates an audacity and a conviction of purpose this amply. On 25 May, 1961, before a joint and action. In this regard, Mandela came session of the United States Congress, he in the mold of great 20th century world mobilized a weary American populace leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Martin discouraged by the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Luther King Junior, Kwame Nkrumah, the Soviet head start in space around his Julius Nyerere, and Amilcar Cabral, to cite dream of landing a human being on the a few of them who are very familiar to us moon. in Africa. His dream was part of a broader effort Many of these leaders drew their inspiration aimed at rebuilding national confidence from an earlier generation of pan-Africanists and a sense of all-round renewal among like Henry Sylvester Williams and Marcus Americans. He succeeded post-humously Garvey to articulate dreams of a free, in his efforts when on 20 July 1969, almost independent, and united Africa at a time six years after his assassination, Apollo 11 when the idea of independence looked like Commander Neil Armstrong became the a mere fantasy whose possible prospects first human to walk on the moon, to the im- European political giants like Charles De mense pride of Americans and the admira- Gaulle and Winston Churchill publicly tion of the world. Dreams and the visions told the world they would never ever they yield are as integral to nation- and countenance. Dreams are the foundation state-building as they are to the nurturing for the visions that yield projects of societal of national identity, dignity, purpose, and transformation. pride. Indeed, they represent the first step in Dreams are critical to the enhancement of the march of human progress and were it the can-do spirit in people that galvanizes not for the courage of those who dared to them to individual and collective action and dream even at the risk of being dismissed helps them to walk the extra mile until they with contempt and ignominy, our world attain their ultimate goal. So convinced was would not have known some of the major Mandela of his dream of the imperatives of a advances it has seen over the ages. non-racial society that through almost three We know from experiences around the decades of prison, he could neither be bent world that a people who lose their ability to nor broken to compromise for anything less dream and whose leaders are incapable of than his ideal of a new society. building visions of a greater tomorrow lose Nelson Mandela’s capacity and willingness the capacity to strive towards loftier and to dream, and his tenacity in holding on nobler heights with collective purpose and to his vision and ideals bear important endurance in order to reinvent themselves lessons for a contemporary generation of

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Africans, leaders and followers alike, who, Having a capacity to dream and forging in the guise of an excessive realism, have a vision of, for, and with society out of a cast dreaming and visioning for higher broad-based dream of a much better future public ideals aside, and reduced the entire is not to guarantee that the leader who essence of governance to the perpetual emerges at whatever level to embody the management of under-achievement clothed collective aspiration will necessarily live to in a poverty of foresight and mediocrity of see the dream fulfilled. Martin Luther King policy. Leadership without a well thought Junior had a dream of an America where out and articulated project of society is people would be judged by the content of easily reduced to an exercise in power- their character and not the colour of their mongering, self-aggrandizement, and skin. egotism of the types that have mired Africa Although he did not live to see the day in repeated cycles of corruption, conflict, in January 2009 when Barack Obama was and instability which really need not be the inaugurated as the 44th President of the perpetual lot of the continent. United States, and although his country For much of the post-independence period, is still not completely deracialized, his we have been witnesses to the huge costs leadership helped to lay the foundation for in mal-governance which the lack of vision the remaking of American society in ways has exacted. These costs have manifested which, among other outcomes, paved the themselves in abuses of office, privilege, and path for the emergence of Obama into the trust; narrow ethnicity; religious bigotry; highest political office of the country. History nepotism; ego-mania; violent conflicts; is full of other examples of personalities wanton wastes of lives and resources; and who stirred millions by articulating, generalized systemic under-performance embodying, and/or galvanizing dreams and/or outright collapse. of societal transformation but who did not have the fortune of living to witness their Failing to embody the collective dreams vision - or a version of it - fulfilled. of their peoples and to translate them into visions and strategies, too many office It was Mandela’s luck that he lived, against bearers have sought instead to dominate, all the odds, to be part of the dream of the subordinate, manipulate, and repress them post-apartheid South African society he so under different personalized diktats of eloquently spelt out at his trial in 1964 and “one nation, one destiny, one leader” that on other occasions during the long walk wear thin and lose credibility over time towards 1994. because they are underpinned only by It is all the more remarkable that he outlined the desire of rulers to self-perpetuate and his vision fearlessly, courageously, and self-reproduce at whatever cost. Slogans unambiguously even in the face of the may serve a purpose but they cannot be a certainty that he was going to be sentenced substitute for carefully articulated dreams to long-term imprisonment and possibly and visions of a greater tomorrow. death. Once in a position to drive the

93 operationalization of the dream from the are first personalized, then trivialized, vantage point of the highest political office and finally abused to create various in his country, he went about his work with monstrosities of power. purpose and compassion. Key figures who start off embodying a Yet, he never once claimed to be the only collective vision come to assume that they person whose ideas for the making of - and their families or clans - are the only the post-apartheid ideal mattered. This ones capable of bearing the dream going was so in spite of the enormous sacrifices forward. Among the many pathologies he made along with the many sung and of power that result and which we have unsung heroes and heroines of the South seen and continue to witness across our African struggle, sacrifices which conferred continent is the syndrome among many a paramount leadership status on him in office bearers to cling on to office as part of the emerging post-apartheid South African de facto or de jure life presidencies. political equation of the 1990s. In doing so, the collective dream is lost, In stating his case and standing by his the vision becomes blurred, and ideals ideals, Mandela was sure that his dream are forgotten. The consequence? Society was the dream of all South Africans and flounders and citizens are alienated. peoples around the world who believed in Institutions of governance are thrashed. justice, equity, and freedom. Politics becomes a game of self-preservation and survival at any cost. Mandela tells It was for this reason that he was equally us it need not be so. In teaching us, he assured that even if he was locked away demonstrated repeatedly that he was or put to death, the ideal for which he neither infallible nor indispensable. fought would never be killed for as long as apartheid endured. It was also because More than this, he recognized his own of this that he felt able to leave office after mortality. one term, certain that his successors would The Mandela life story also teaches us either have to hold the dream or be called to that individuals who aspire to leadership order by the citizenry. He was right. but who do not have any ideals by which And in his rightness, we draw many they organize their lives and discipline lessons for contemporary leadership in themselves whilst being accountable to the Africa, including the important distinction collective are not worthy of popular trust that must be made between rulership or emulation. and leadership. All too often, people in Leaders must be known to stand for and positions of authority in Africa arrogate represent some things which speak to the to themselves an exclusivity of wisdom best in us as citizens and humans as to derived from the assumption that to be motivate us to feel able to entrust some of in office and/or to exercise authority is our hopes in them. They stand in contrast to confirmation of their omniscience - and shabby deal-makers and footloose wheeler- omnipotence. In consequence, dreams of dealers who, in the name of realism, trade a better society that are collective in origin 94 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

away anything and everything on the altar which is germane to reflections about of personal survival, luxury, expedience, leadership in Africa is another straight and convenience. forward one which is often missed in assessments of his contributions or in any Having established his credentials as a case minimized. visionary leader disciplined within an organizational structure and paid a huge It centres on the fact that every leadership, personal price for his beliefs and principles, even the greatest and most global or Mandela became worthy of our basic trust internationalist of them, begins from a in some of the hard and difficult choices he domestic context where local questions pre- and his comrades made because we were occupy and predominate. No outstanding certain that, fundamentally, he did not leader achieves greatness ab initio by failing embark on any course of action out of a to be embedded in local contexts or opting thirst for personal vainglory - even if there to treat such contexts in their multiple was reason to be cautious and even skeptical layers as little more than a collection of on occasions about some of his moves on peripheral nuisances. the complex chessboard of politics. It is in articulating a leadership response to Too many are today’s African rulers who, the local challenges confronted by defined by contrast, carry on as though to be a political communities that the seeds of visionary leader and to embody a collective the greatness which the world eventually dream is to be trapped in grandiose notices and celebrates about a leader are adventurism or be disconnected from first sown. And it is by local performance the hard realities lived by their citizenry standards that a truly great leader is and or to function outside of and above all must be evaluated in the first instance. In institutions, structures and rules. matters of leadership, charity must truly first begin at home. Scholarly commentaries about the travails of post-colonial Africa have repeatedly A leader who has honour only abroad remarked that part of the reasons for the and not at home must ask hard questions failings that have characterized the last half- about his or her credentials. This point also century of the continent’s history centre on broaches upon the organic connections that the disconnect between state and society must always exist between leaders and as rulers occupied make-believe Olympian the governed, connections which generate heights that resulted in an irretrievable loss reciprocal and socially anchored balances of vision and purpose - sometimes without that allow for mandate to be derived and those rulers being even conscious of the fact which offer important reality checks for that communication between them and the those who are entrusted with high office. citizenry had long been broken. Furthermore, it speaks to the ability of a Local Embeddness leader to listen to local voices in their di- versity and tap into local wisdom in order The second aspect of the Mandela legacy to guide behaviour and action. Embedded

95 leadership understands the chemistry, soci- that was to become a lifelong home for ology and psychology of society. him. It should not be surprising that at the different stages of his leadership trajectory, It does so not in order to cynically or Mandela did not exhibit any innate fear opportunistically ride populist tides but of the people and he demonstrated this at mainly to be positioned to help make various times, including whilst in office as tough choices about the overall direction of President of South Africa and found time to society. undertake his meet-the-people walkabouts. Nelson Mandela may have grown to acquire Embeddness taught him that although global fame of immeasurable proportions he may have symbolized a struggle, his but, as a close reading of his autobiography efforts were a part of a broader collective tells us, even if not in so many words, he fight for change. This humbled him to began his leadership trajectory by being the point where although we all sang consummately local. songs of his heroism, he never cultivated From his native Qunu, that ancestral land to nor succumbed to a cult of personality. which he was fondly attached all of his life, Embeddness enabled him to keep all things, to his community level engagements before great and small, in perspective. prison and after, including participation When Mandela emerged first as a leader in clan affairs and chiefly duties, as well of the ANC and then as President of South his attention to immediate family matters, Africans of all races to engage the world, right down to the names of his grand- he did so fully anchored on local ground children, we gained glimpses of a person and on the basis of clear principles and who was an engaged and active part of his values derived from the history of that local local environment. context. Beyond his life in Qunu, we also saw the There was no question of any world powers connectedness he established with people either dictating direction to him or imposing in different places in South Africa where friends on him by the threat of coercion or professional work as a lawyer and political through the kinds of flattery reserved for activism as a dogged fighter against legitimacy-hungry rulers who, having been apartheid took him. alienated from their home base, reach out in Out of his life of active local engagement, desperation for any and all “international” he forged values of integrity and dignity endorsement, no matter the price they have which blended with ethos of hardwork to pay. Indeed, many are the rulers in post- and discipline that flowed from his colonial Africa who, having lost the trust internalization of the stories he heard from of their people, proceed to expend scarce village elders about the proud and heroic national resources to purchase meaningless past of his people. accolades and trophies abroad from dubious indexers of performance who have He was able as he became politicized to perfected the professional art of feeding fat extend his local embeddness to his work on desperate office bearers. For those who in the African National Congress (ANC) 96 Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa

tested Mandela by, to cite one example, hate and violence or perpetuating divide seeking to advise him against the warmth and rule policies in order to win or hold on he showed to Fidel Castro, he wasted to power. no time in putting them in their place, To be embedded in the home environment reminding them that when the majority of is not to be bigoted or parochial, or to South Africans needed solidarity from the court cheap and ultimately meaningless world and they opted to cast their lot with popularity through irresponsible actions the apartheid government and the minority or gestures. The legitimacy conferred by a interests it so crudely and violently served, credible and balanced local connectedness Cuba under Castro did not hesitate to can also never be matched by the best extend solidarity to the popular struggle skills and reach of high-flying public against institutionalized racism even relations consultants and money-guzzling though the country was itself also under a international lobbyists specialized in prolonged big power boycott and siege. laundering the image of discredited rulers Local embeddness comes with a sense for a fee. of history and memory that allows for Mandela, that man who had been a prisoner confidence and self-assuredness in the of conscience for a significant portion of conduct of public affairs. In the end, it was his active life and whom some countries the world that had to stop and learn lessons had classified as a terrorist to be excluded from the local boy from Qunu. from their shores, had no need of image There is an especially important message launderers to clean him up after his release. for the peoples Africa, particularly those Rather, it was publicists who competed who claim or aspire to hold leadership with one another, alongside celebrities and positions, from Mandela’s life of local political figures of various hues, to be seen embeddedness. with him, in his presence, or in his light, complete with imitations of the trademark In a world that has all too often sought to shirt he adopted as president. reserve the right to itself to define who is a “good” African leader, and on a continent Once out of prison, embeddness also where leaders have always given much meant that he was not going to become greater value to foreign endorsement a prisoner to any local cabals or puppet whilst actively riding roughshod over to any pay masters. Mandela did not just local opinion, Mandela teaches us that claim leadership. He earned it. And we all international honour begins at home and respected him for it because in his local with doing right with integrity and vision embeddness, we recognized ourselves. by the citizenry. Leadership and Controversy A leader properly embedded locally is able The third aspect of the Mandela example to embody the complexities of community which is not often mentioned but which is without being reduced to the headship of critical to draw attention to is the issue of exclusionary clan, ethnic, racial, or sectarian controversy. Lord Acton it was who stated interests who thrive on stoking domestic 97 in one of his famous letters written in April saints in leaders and would often discard 1887 that great men (it was not yet the age or discount potential leaders only because of gender awareness among philosophers they have been labeled “controversial”, and politicians) are almost always bad especially by powerful external forces. men. I would modify that statement to say Controversy is not, however, a bad thing that great leaders are almost invariably in and of itself and should be distinguished controversial people for various reasons. from the kinds of divisive pettiness in power which too many leaders easily fall At one level, their projects of society into. are not, as can be expected, always the objects of a unanimity of opinion and they All great leaders of note in world history generally tend to be forceful personalities have had their own share of controversy who, in some ways, are ahead of their time - precisely because they were on to and their generation. At another level, their something great. Even Jesus Christ was methods and choices are similarly open to considered controversial and for this his questioning and contestation both by those opponents crucified him just as the Prophet who genuinely see things differently or Mohammed was seen as controversial by have completely different temperaments his critics and rivals who relentlessly went and those who are little more than petty after him at every opportunity. spoilers with motivations that are less than The founders of the pan-African ideal which noble. we celebrate to this day were considered by Furthermore, in making hard and tough many to be bearers of controversial ideas decisions about the paths open to society, and world views. From Abraham Lincoln leaders worthy of their name cease to aspire to Kemal Attaturk, Mahatma Ghandi to to be all things to all people at all times and Martin Luther King Junior, Mao Tse Tung instead set their sights on a clearly-defined to Amilcar Cabral, Otto Von Bismarck to cause and course that inevitably means Amilcar Cabral, Vladimir Lenin to Kwame losing some and winning some. Leadership Nkrumah, Olof Palme to Julius Nyerere, carries a price and s/he cannot be great if Shaka the Zulu to Amina of Zazzau - the s/he is not prepared to be controversial. list can go on and on -, controversy has never be far from the doorsteps of leaders. The bigger challenge then for a leader is the ability to manage controversy with the kind Mandela himself lived his fair share of of tolerance and openness of spirit that controversy, whether viewed from aspects allows for learning and the mobilization of his private social affairs, including his of more converts to his/her proposed or marital experiences, or with regard to his preferred course of action. political life and choices. It was, however, a big measure of just how great he was All too often, in Africa perhaps more than that controversy could not halt his long anywhere else in the world, we have been march and during the course of that march, schooled to look for infallible prophets and he always left a door open for reaching

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out to his opponents, including those like their league, both dead and alive, past and Mangsotho Gatsha Buthelezi whom, whilst present who made plunder and blatant fiercely disagreeing with him, he still thievery the directive principle of their regularly referred to as a comrade. policies and actions. Mandela’s type of controversy was not Bold, courageous, and visionary leadership the poisonous one that asphyxiates all will always attract controversy of the types conversation. It was a controversy that that help society to advance in a forward mainly flowed from a politics of ideas, march. Such controversy is healthy and ideals, and visions, not a controversy welcome. Controversy generated by rulers emanating from or fed by a moral turpitude. who abuse of office, power, privilege and trust only ends up setting society backwards The lessons for the contemporary generation and dividing it. It is the kind of controversy of Africans are clear: If leadership cannot be that has diminished the African world and exercised without a dose of controversy, it its hopes of a renaissance. must also be understood that controversy that is not about a larger cause or cherished Concluding Reflections principles which strike at the heart and The three dimensions of leadership soul of society is not worthy of the energies which I have tried to pull out of the life dispensed on it. and experience of Nelson Mandela are Regrettably, and to the chagrin of many especially important to highlight on among us, the types of controversy that account of the contemporary conjuncture in envelope many of those who have presided Africa when, on the back of a new round of over our commonwealth or are presently natural resource boom, a veritable scramble at the helm of power is of the most for the continent is taking place which calls ignoble and banal type, centering around for a leadership which is organically rooted mal-governance, absentee governance, and able out of that rootedness to drive bold and offshore governance manifested in visions of transformation for the continent. abuses perpetrated by some first families, The Mandela generation was the generation an acquisitive and spendthrift culture, a of liberation and out of that generation systematic insensitivity to the plight of the we saw the likes of Nkrumah, Nyerere, working poor, prolonged excursions abroad Cabral, Machel, and Mandela himself who in foreign hotels, and/or equally prolonged bequeathed to us political freedom and the stretches of seclusion in native villages that restoration of our collective dignity. increasingly substitute for the official seat of power and grind government to a halt. Ours is now the generation of a new phase of the pan-African renaissance which must Mandela was controversial but his drive the project of a progressive structural controversy was not, by any stretch of transformation for the continent and its the imagination, in the same league as peoples, doing so with attention to the the controversy that enveloped the rule imperatives of building a solid production of Mobutu Sese Seko, Jean Bedel Bokassa, base for our countries, and enthroning social or Sani Abacha and the many others in 99 justice and democratic governance as part ultimately, is the principal challenge of the of the prerequisites for unity and progress. Mandela legacy. For the sake of the sacrifice It is a project which needs audacious he and his generation of liberation leaders visionaries who, drawing on the rich history made, we cannot afford to fail. And if we of the continent and the example of the likes succeed, then Madiba can rest in peace of Mandela, can embody and articulate our satisfied that he and his fellow travellers collective aspiration for an Africa that fully did not labour in vain. rediscovers itself and takes its rightful place I thank you for your kind attention. at the rendez-vous of human progress. This

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List of Acronyms and abbreviations

AAU Addis Ababa University AGA African Governance Architecture AMDC African Minerals Development Center APSA African Peace and Security Architecture APSP African Peace and Security Programme AU African Union CABRI Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative CAP Common Africa Position CSDG Conflict, Security and Development Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative EU European Union IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms IAS Institute for African Studies IDEP Institute for Economic Development and Planning IFFs- Illicit Financial Flows IGAD Inter-Governmental Authority on Development IPSS Institute for Peace and Security Studies MDGs Millennium Development Goals NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development OAU Organization of African Unity OIM International Organization for Migration PWYP Publish What You Pay RECs/RMs Regional Economic Communities/ Regional Mechanisms SADC Southern African Development Community SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army

101 SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement TMALI Thabo Mbeki Leadership Institute UCAD Cheikh Anta Diop University UCPD Uppsala Conflict Data Program UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa UNESCO United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture UNISA University of South Africa UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime USD United States Dollar

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105 INSTITUTE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY P.O. Box 1176 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Tana High-level Forum on Security in Africa April 2014 [email protected] www.tanaforum.org www.facebook.com/3rdtanaforum www.twitter.com/tanaforum 106This publication has been supported by Deutsche Gesellschaft Gesellschaft fÜr international Zuusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH on behalf of the German Government