FM 100-2-2 Headquarters Department of the Army

THETHE SOVIETSOVIET ARMYARMY

SPECIALIZED WARFARE AND REAR AREA SUPPORT

T A TEMEN ELEASE, STA UBLIC R D FOR P PPROVE DISTRIBUTIONMITED RESTRICTIONS:” This publication contains technical or operational information that A ISU NLI IBUTIONis for official Government use only. Distribution is limited to US Government agencies. Requests DISTR 94 C from1 3 SEP outside the US Government for release of this publication under the Freedom of Information TRADO PER Act or the Foreign Military Sales Program must be made to HQ TRADOC, Fort Monroe, VA 23651. 'FM 100-2-2 Headquarters Field Manual Department of the Army No. 100-2-2 Washington. DC, 16 July 1984

THE SOVIET ARMY: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support

PREFACE

This field manual is pan of FM series 100-2,The Soviet Amy. The other volumes are FM 100-2-1The Soviet Amy: Operations and Tactics, and FM100-2-3. The Soviet Army: Troop, Organization and Equipment. These manuals cannot stand alone but should be used interchangeably. These field manuals serve as the definitive source of unclassifed information on Sovietground forces and their interaction with other servicesin combined arms warfare. These manuals represent the most current unclassified information and they will be updated periodically. More information would become available in the event of war or national emergency. Users of this publication are encouraged to recommend changes and submit comments for its improvement. Key comments to the specificpage and paragraph in which the change is recommended. Provide a reason for each comment to insure understanding and completeevaluatio n. Tosend suggestions or comments prepare DA Form 2028 ( Recommended Changes to Publicationsa and Blank Forms) and forward it

to- Deputy Commander USA CACDA, ATTN: ATZL-CATF, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027. The cover design is an adaptation of this patch which is worn by Soviet motorized rifle troops. whose organiza­ tion is representative of the Soviet combined arms theme. TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER TITLES NUMBER CHAPTER TITLES NUMBER INTRODUCTION 1 DESERT WARFARE 8 AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 2 COMBAT IN EXTREME COLD 9 HELIBORNE OPERATIONS 3 COMBAT IN CITIES 10 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 4 NIGHT COMBAT 11 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE REAR AREA COMMAND AND OPERATIONS 5 CONTROL 12 RIVER CROSSINGS 6 LOGISTICS 13 MOUNTAIN WARFARE 7 REAR AREA PROTECTION 14

PAGE PAGE 1 INTRODUCTION 1-1 Communications 3-3 AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 1-1 Loading 3-3 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 1-1 Landing Zones 3-3 SPECIAL OPERATIONS 1-1 The Objective 3-4

2 AIRBORNE OPERATIONS 2-1 4 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 4-1 DOCTRINE 2-1 DOCTRINE 4-1 MISSIONS 2-2 MISSIONS AND OPERATING FORCES . 4-1 Strategic 2-2 Amphibious Landings 4-1 Ooerational 2-2 Soviet Naval Infantry 4-1 Tactical 2-2 CONDUCT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS Special 2-3 ASSAULT 4-5 ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT 2-3 Phases of the Assault 4-6 AirborneUnits 2-3 Assault Formations 4-7 Air Delivery Capabilities 2-3 Weaknesses 4-8 TRAINING 2-4 CONDUCT OF AIRBORNE 5 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS 2-5 OPERATIONS 5-1 Planning and Preparation 2-5 DOCTRINE 5-1 Air Movement 2-6 MISSIONS 5-1 Airdrops 2-6 Strategic 5-1 Drop Zone Procedures 2-7 Operational 5-2 Movement to the Objective 2-7 Tactical 5-2 The Attack 2-8 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE The Defense 2-9 FORCES 5-2 Linkup 2-10 Agents 5-2 Personnel 5-3 3 HELIBORNEOPERATIONS 3-1 EQUIPMENT 5-3 DOCTRINE 3-1 TRAINING AND PREPARATION 5-3 MISSIONS 3-1 AN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE ORGANIZATION 3-1 SCENARIO 5-3 TRAINING 3-2 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 3-2 6 RIVER CROSSINGS 6-1 Planning Considerations 3-2 EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION 6-1 Command and Control 3-2 TACTICAL RIVER CROSSINGS 6-3 PAGE PAGE Assault Crossing From the March ... 6-3 Tactical 12-1 Prepared River Crossings 6-8 CHIEF OF THE REAR AND THEIR COMMANDS ...... 12-1 7 MOUNTAIN WARFARE 7-1 LEVELS OF COMMAND AND OFFENSIVE ACTION 7-1 CONTROL 12-2 DEFENSIVE ACTION 7-2 Strategic 12-2 ARTILLERY 7-2 Operational 12-2 HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT 7-3 Tactical 12-3 ENGINEER SUPPORT 7-3 LOGISTICS 7-3 13 LOGISTICS 13-1 COMMAND AND CONTROL 7-4 CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES 13-1 AIR DEFENSE 7-4 Centralized Planning 13-1 NBC EFFECTS 7-4 Tailoring of Logistic Units 13-1 MOVEMENT ...... 7-5 Fixed Supply Priorities 13-1 CONCLUSIONS 7-5 Delivery Forward...... 13-1 Continuous Supply Base Support ... 13-1 8 DESERT WARFARE 8-1 Standardization of Equipment 13-1 THE OFFENSE 8-1 Supply Accountability and Resource THE DEFENSE 8-2 Conservation 13-1 CAMOUFLAGE 8-2 Complete Use of Transportation .... 13-2 HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT 8-2 Complete Mobile Support 13-2 LOGISTICS 8-2 Forward Positioning of Support NBC EFFECTS 8-2 Elements 13-2 Use of All Possible Resources ...... 13-2 9 COMBAT IN EXTREME COLD 9-1 CENTRAL-LEVEL LOGISTICS 13-2 PLANNING AND PREPARATION 9-1 Organization 13-2 THE OFFENSE 9-1 Resource Management 13-2 THE DEFENSE 9-1 Logistic Stockpiles 13-4 LOGISTICS 9-2 OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS 13-4 FIRE SUPPORT 9-2 TACTICAL LOGISTICS 13-4 ENGINEER SUPPORT 9-2 SUPPLY 13-7 Ammunition 13-9 10 COMBAT IN CITIES 10-1 POL 13-10 DOCTRINE 10-1 Rations 13-11 THE OFFENSE 10-3 Clothing 13-11 THE DEFENSE 10-5 Vehicles 13-11 Water Supply 13-12 11 NIGHT COMBAT 11-1 Engineer. Signal. Chemical. and CONDITIONS AFFECTING NIGHT Medical Items 13-12 COMBAT 11-1 SupplyDistribution System 13-12 EQUIPMENT 11-2 TRANSPORTATION 13-13 THE MARCH 11-3 Traffic Management 13-13 THE OFFENSE 11-4 Rail Transport 13-13 THE DEFENSE 11-5 Motor Transport 13-14 TRAINING 11-6 Weaknesses 13-14 MAINTENANCE AND RECOVERY 13-15 12 REAR AREA COMMAND AND Maintenance Facilities 13-16 CONTROL 12-1 Vehicle Repair 13-16 THE REAR AREA 12-1 Technical Services 13-16 Strategic 12-1 Organizational Maintenance Operational 12-1 Capabilities 13-16 PAGE PAGE Maintenance Responsibilities ..... 13-16 Prisoners of War and Civilian Recovery and Repair During Detainees 13-23 Combat 13-17 DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS 13-23 Weaknesses 13-17 MEDICAL SUPPORT 13-17 14 REAR AREA PROTECTION 14-1 Doctrine 13-18 UNIT SECURITY 14-1 Company and Battalion Medical KGB TROOPS 14-1 Support 13-18 MVD TROOPS 14-1 Regimental Medical Support 13-20 MILITARY DISTRICTS 14-1 Division Medical Support 13-21 CIVIL DEFENSE 14-2 Army-Level Medical Support ...... 13-21 RESERVES 14-2 REAR AREA SERVICES ...... 13-22 INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL 14-2. Personnel Replacements ...... 13-22 DOSAAF ...... 14-3 Civil Affairs 13-23 GLOSSARY Glossary-1 Military Police 13-23 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

This field manual is pan of FM series 100-2. The amphibious assault operations like those conducted by Soviet Army. Itshould be used with the other manuals the US in the Pacific and the Allies in North Africa and in this series, FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations Europe during World War II. In recent years, the Soviet and Tactics, and FM 100-2-3. The Soviet Army Troops. naval infantry has been revitalized and reequipped. It currently has three independent regiments and one Organization and Equipment.. . understrengthdivision and is supported by a growing The term "specialized warfare," used in the title of fleet of amphibious ships and small aircraft carriers. this FM, is intended to be an abbreviated, collective This elite force trains in joint exercises with airborne description of combat actions which, in US termi- units, and it undoubtedly has an intervention or power nology, may be described as "special operations" or projection mission. "operations in special conditions." These are arbitrary The Soviets have a variety of special purposeunits categorizations used only to describe combatactions that are trained and equipped for unconventional other than those general forms of Soviet ground forces warfare (UW) missions. Because of their politcal sen­ operations and tactics discussed in FM 100-2-1. Use of sitivity, UW activities are managed at the highest level the term "special" does not imply that the combat of government authority. They are directed by the actions discussed in this FM represent abnormal forms Committee for State Security (KGB) and the General of operations or tactics. They are all an integral part of Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). Soviet military doctrine. Special operations include airborne, heliborne,and amphibious operations, and unconventional warfare in the enemy rear. SPECIAL OPERATIONS Special operations certainly will be conducted in AIRBORNE OPERATIONS wartime, and some of these will play important roles in During World War 11, the Soviets gained some peacetime intervention and power projection beyond experience with airborne operations in combat. Soviet borders. Because they lacked the transport aircraft required for Operations in special conditions include river large-scale operations. they employed the airborne crossings, mountain and desert warfare, and combat in troops mainly as infantry.Since the war, the Soviets extreme cold, in cities, and at night. have completely reequipped their large airborne force Soviet ground forces are well equipped and trained and built a large fleet of transport aircraft to support it. for river crossings. The Soviets consider the capability Airborne units played key roles in Soviet intervention to cross water barriers from the march on a broad in Czechoslovakia ( 1968) and Afghanistan ( 1979). front with minimal delays an essential element in The airborne force currently consists of seven maintaining a rapid rate of advance in an offensive. divisions. River crossings are a consistent feature of Soviet field Heliborne operations are relatively new to the exercises. Soviets. They have built an impressive fleet of transport While no particular Soviet divisions are identified as and gunship helicopters and have trained assault being tailored or trained specifically for mountain or troops. However, until the Afghanistan intervention, desert warfare,some divisions are suited for combat in they lacked actual combat experience with this type of these environments as a result of their base locations. operation. Motorized rifleor airborne troops or an air The Soviets undoubtedly are gaining more experience assault brigade assigned to a front, could conduct in mountain warfare from their increased use of heliborne opperations. military force in power projection, suchas in Afghanistan. Soviet ground forces also are well prepared for AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS combat in extreme cold. The majority of Soviet Amphibious operations are primarily the respon- divisions are located in areas with harsh winters. sibility of the Soviet naval infantry (marines), a small Based on their World War II experience and but growing force. During World War II, the Soviet recognition of the urbanizationof Europe. the Soviets Army and Navy conducted many amphibious opera- realize that combatin cities would be common to most tions, mainly on river and inland seaswithin the Soviet military operations. Their training reflects this Union. They have never conducted massive realization. One of the principles of Soviet operational art and Soviet "rear." Collectively, these elements provide tactics is the prosecution of combat relentlessly, under what, in US terminology, is called combat service all conditions of visiblity. With this principle, the support. Soviets strive to be capable of continuous combat, Soviet logistics have beeninaccurately described as during daylight, or at night. The Soviets conduct much a major weakness in Soviet millitary power. Soviet of their training during hours of darkness. forces do receive effective logistic support, but it is The last part of this FM deals with the organization different in concept and organization from US Army and functions of the elements w hich constitute the logistic support. CHAPTER 2 AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

Since the 1960s, the Soviets have given increased Solutions resulted primarily from the Soviet decision attention to the development of theirairborne capa­ to deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Nuclear bilities. Extensive reequipment of the Soviet airborne strikes wouldpermit large ground force formations to forces has given them increased mobility and fire- move rapidly into the enemy's depth. Today, the power. Ground assault tactics also have changed. Once Soviets' huge buildup of conventional weapons has landed, airborne units can operate as motorized alsomadepossible a massive conventional air, missile, rifle units. Soviet air transport capabilities have also and artillery strike to make linkup easier in a non­ been greatly improved. nuclear war. This modernization program is based on the Soviet The resolution of the linkup problem resulted in a principles of mobility, surprise, and combat activeness. major program to reequip airborne units. The 120-mm The Soviets view their airborne forces as a means to mortar, the 122-mm howitzer, modern antitank and air carry the battle into the depths of the enemy's position. defense weapons, rocket launchers, and the airborne They believe that airborne forces can and must be used amphibious infantry combat vehicle (BMD)were widely on the modern battlefield. added to equipment inventories. The BMD is of par- The Soviets have long recognized the value of an ticular importance.With its deployment in the 1970s, airborne force. Soviet military planners, such as airborne units made significant gains in mobility and General Tukhachevsky, foresaw the value of troops firepower. Today airborne units can conduct a broad who could be deployed by air as early as the 1920s. On . range of combat missions to include many normally August 2, 1930-the official "birthday"of the Soviet associated with motorized rifle or light armor units. Airborne-the first airborne exercise involving 12 The present Soviet airborne force is formidable. It men was conducted. Within 6 years, the Soviets were can be delivered to great distances. It is highly mobile, fielding independent airborne brigades which and can assault a prepared position or a well-armed included artillery, armor, antitank, reconnaissance, enemy force. It is also an excellent force to use for and air transport submits. By the beginning of World power projection. War II, the Soviets had 15 independent airborne brigades. The Soviets' use of their airborne troops during DOCTRINE World War II was severely restricted for lack of Soviet military doctrine calls for using airborne aviation assets. Nevertheless, more than 50 Soviet forces in both conventional and nuclear environments airborne operations were conducted during the war. Airborne units are an integral part of many operations Most of these operations were small in scale. The large- at army and front levels. Aerial envelopment of the scale operations that were conductcd were marked by enemy has become an important maneuver in modern poor planning and execution. Questions of theory and offensive operations. The primary theater warfare role execution concerned Soviet military planners for the of airborne units is to support the rapid advance of a next 1O years. Attention was centered on the problem large combined arms force deep into the enemy's of linkup between airborne units operating in rear operational or operational-strategic depth. Airborne areas and advancing ground force units. units may be used in conjunction with an operational In an effort to find solutions to the problems of maneuver group (OMG) during offensive operations employment, they switched control of the airborne The OMG is a combined arms formation employed in forces from one command organization to another and army-and front-level offensive operations to raid deep into the enemy's area. The Soviets conducted their increased the available firepower. In 1946, command rear of the air borne was switched from the Air Forces to the military exercise ZAPAD-81 to test "new concepts of Ministry of Defense, in 1956 to the Soviet Ground military science and art." During these exercises, Forces, and finally in 1946, back to the Ministry of airborne units were used extensively in support of an Defense. The. principal weapons added to the airborne operational maneuver group. inventory during the first 20 postwar years were the The Soviets also use airborneforces as a means of ASU-57 self-propelled assault gun (1955) and theASU­ projecting power. This was demonstrated by their 85 self-propelled assault gun (1960). invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1068 and Afghanistan in However, it was not until the 1960s that Soviet 1979. In both instances, a major portion of the Soviet military began to solve the problems of force linkup. invasion force consisted of airborne units. Airborne troops are well suited for such. roles. They train for Strategic missions are conducted against deep operations in a variety of geographical environments. targets by an airborne division or regiment. Forces They are specially trained to establish, defend and from other arms and services will most likely be expand an airhead. Their equipment is all air trans­ involved. Linkup with advancing ground forces may portable. Airborne troops also have high politcal not be achieved for several days. Because of the scope reliability. and depth of a strategic mission, substantial air combat To allow flexibility in employment, during wartime and transport is required. Supplies may be air-dropped Soviet airborne forces will be directly subordinate to or airlifted to troops on the ground. the Supreme High Command, with operational control Objectives of strategic missions could be national exercised by the Soviet General Staff. Some airborne capitals or other administrative-political centers, units would be allocated to Soviet theaters of military industrial or economic centers, ports or maritime operations (TVDs) for strategic operations. Also, units straits or air fields. Strategic missions also may be would be allocated temporarily to Soviet fronts and undertaken to establish a new theater of operations combined arms and tank armies for specific opera­ to neutralize one member of an enemy coalition. tional depth missions. Other airborne units would be retained under the control of the Soviet Supreme High Command for contingencies. Operational The present locations of four Soviet airborne Operational missions are controlled by fronts and divisions generally correspond to Soviet wartime armies. An airborne battalion, regiment, or division European and Near Eastern TVDs. A fifth divsion is conducts these missions in conjunction with front or stationed in the vicinity of Moscow and a sixth division army operations. Airborne units and aviation assets are serves as a training division. Additionally, and airborne allocated to the front or army from the TVD or division is operating in Afghanistan. Supreme High Command. Linkup with advancing Soviet military planners consider airborne units to ground forces would be expected within several days be an extremely valuable resource to be used or less. Operational mission objectives include: judiciously. Use of airborne forces in an operation Enemy tactical nuclear weapons and delivery depends upon whether that would enhance the likeli­ means hood of surprise, deep penetration, and rapid exploita­ Headquarters or command posts. tion. These criteria, together with the achievement of Logistic facilities. at least temporary local air superiority and the availa­ Communications facilities. bility of airborne and airlift assets, constitute the main Airfields. elements in a Soviet planner'sdecision to conduct an Ports. airborne operation. Bridges and other water or gap crossing sites Mountain passes. MISSIONS Operational missions also may be undertaken to block or to neutralize enemy reserves, or to block a The Soviets categorize airborne missions based on withdrawing enemy. the depth and importance of the objective and the size of forces involved. There are four categories of Tactical missions: Strategic. Tactical missions are controlled at division level. An airdrop of airborne troops may be used in a tactical Operational. mission, is preferred. A Tactical. but a heliborne assault heliborne force normally is comprised of troops from a Special. motorized rifle battalion of the division. However, airborne troops allocated from front or army may be Strategic used on rare occasions. Either a reinforced company or a battalion conducts tactical missions. S trategic missions are established in wartime by the Tactical objectives are: Soviet Supreme High Command an controlled by the General Staff. The outcome of a strategic mission is Nuclear weapons and delivery means. expected to have significant impact on a war or Command posts. c Logistic bases. ampaign. The use of airborne forces in a power projection role is also a strategic mission. Communication sites. 2-2 Airfields. The Airborne Division. Each airborne division has Key terrain such as high ground. bridges, gap three BMD-equipped airborne regiments. Division- crossings, road junctions, or passes. level support elements include an artillery regiment, Tactical missions also may be undertaken to block an air defense battalion, an assault gun battalion, an neutralize enemy reserves, to block a withdrawing engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a transportation enemy, or to attack enemy forces from the rear or tank. and maintenance battalion, a parachute rigging and resupply battalion, a medical battalion, a chemical defense company, and a reconnaissance company. Special Special missions, or unconventional warfare (UW) The Airborne Regiment. Each airborne regiment missions, are prohahly established by the Soviet consists of three BMD-equipped airborne battalions, a Supreme High Command and controlled by front and mortar battery, an antiaircraft battery, and an antitank army commanders. Company or smaller size units battery. Regimental support elements include an conduct such missions. Special (UW) missions engineer company, a signal company, a transport and include: maintenance company, a parachute rigging and Reconnaissance. resupply company, a medical platoon, and a chemical Neutralization of nuclear weapons and delivery defense platoon, and a supply and service platoon. means. Savotage. The Airborne Battalion. Each airborne battalion has Deception. three airborne companies. Equipping airborne Creation of panic in enemy rear. companies with BMDs has eliminated the need for a Not all airhorne units are designated and trained to battalion-level antitank battery. Furthermore, the wide carry out UW missions. Furthermore, not all UW distribution of man-portable, surface-to-air missiles missions are carried out by airborne units. The KGB, has eliminated the need for a battalion air defense the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Soviet section. Thr airborne battalion is designed to provide armed forces, the ground forces, and the naval forces command, control, and limited communication, all have "special purpose" troops trained to carry out supply, and medical support. UW missions. (UW is discussed in Chapter 5.) The Airborne Company. The airborne company consists of three platoons of BMDs. There are three ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT BMDs in each platoon (one per squad). Besides the The modernization program has transformed Soviet heavily-armed BMD, basic weapons of the airborne airborne divisions into mechanized infantry forces company include modern assault rifles, light machine capable of seizing defended objectives and of attacking guns, automatic grenade launchers, ATGMs, and well-around enemy forces deep in the enemy rear. All numerous RPGs and shoulder-fired surface-to-air combat equipment of an airborne division is air­ missiles. (For more information on organization and droppable.The BMD is responsible for the greatest equipment. see FM 100-2-3.) improvement in airborne combat capability, The BMD is an air-droppable, amphibious assault vehicle with armament similar to that of the HMY found in Air Delivery Capabilities motorized rifle units. However, some older The Soviet Air Forces Military Transport Aviation equipment, such as the ASU-57 assault gun and SD-44 (VTA) provides airlift service for Soviet airborne units antitank field gun. may still be found in some airhorne and air assault brigades. The VTA has a fleet of over 600 units. medium- and long-range cargo transport planes assigned full-time use. This fleet includes about 370 AN- 12/CUBs (similar to the US C-130/Hercules), over Airborne Units 170 IL-76/CANDIDs (similar to the US C-141/Star­ The Soviets perceive enemy tanks and aircraft to be lifter), and over 50 AN-22/COCKs (similar to the USC­ the two major threats to airborne units after landing. 5A). Accordingly, all airborne units contain numerous anti- The older, medium-range AN-12 is the main stay of tank and air defense weapons. The exceptional theVTA. This four-engine turbo-prop aircraft can airlift mobility and firepower of Soviet airborne units make 90 troops or can drop 60 paratroopers from two exits. them a formidable threat to an enemy's rear. It can carry up to 20 metric tons of cargo, but some large items such as engineer equipment will not fit in The personnel assigned to airborne units enhance its cargo area. Each AN-12 can carry two BMDs. the quality of training in those units. Airborne Transporting a BMD-equipped airborne regiment personnel are carefully selected. Most of them are two- requires 90 to 115 AN-12s. The AN-12 can operate onon year conscripts who are put through a rigorous unimproved runways. Its range with maximum screening process which emphasizes a high level of payload is 1400 kilometers. physical conditioning, education and training, and The AN-12 aircraft are being replaced by IL-76 long- political reliability. range, four-engine jet transports. The IL-76 can carry Because parachute jumping is a major sport in the 120 paratroopers who can jump from four exits, one Soviet Union, many new conscripts are already exit on each side and two exits in the rear. The IL-76, experienced parachutists at the time of induction. Pre- with a cargo capacity of 40 metric tons, can carry all induction parachute training is available through combat equipment normally assigned to airborne sports clubs and premilitary school programs forces. Each IL-76 can carry three BMDs. Transporting conducted throughout the Soviet Union by the Volun- a BMD equipped airborne regiment requires 50 to 65 tary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Aviation, IL-76s. The IL-76 can operate from unimproved and Navy (DOSAAF). .Most inductees selected for runways. Its range with maximum payload is 5300 service in the airborne forces are sent directly to the kilometers. regular airborne divisions. The AN-22 is a long-range, turbo-prop, heavy The majority of Soviet airborne officers are transport aircraft used mainly for airlandings, as graduates of the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command opposed to airdrops. The AN-22 can carry 175 troops School near Moscow. Junior officers are also provided or 80 metric tons of cargo, to a range of 4200 by other higher command (four-year) schools, higher kilometers. Each AN-22 can carry four BMDs. This technical (three-year) schools, and civilian univer- aircraft is used mainly to transport large items such as sities with reserve officer commissioning programs. self-propelled artillery, medium tanks, surface-to-air Commissioned graduates of the Ryazan Higher missile (SAM) launchers, or engineer equipment. It is Airborne Command School usually spend their entire well suited for strategic operations. service career in the airborne forces. Active duty Most VTA aircraft are based in the western USSR. service begins in September or October following Some AN- 12 units are based along the southern and far their summer graduation and commissioning. eastern borders of the Soviet Union. The concentration Like warrant officers throughout the Soviet armed of aircraft in the western USSR places the main VTA forces, warrant officers in the airborne forces are assets near the airborne divisions they would support, selected and sent to warrant officer training schools as well as positions the force opposite NATO. Never- after being trained and having served as noncom- theless, the VTA is capable of quickly concentrating its missioned officers. Warrant officers serve as platoon aircraft to support an operation anywhere along the leaders; company technicians, or company first Soviet borders. sergeants. During times of military emergency, aircraft of Virtually all airborne noncommissioned officers Soviet civil aviation, Aero flot can augment VTA capa­ began their service as two-year conscripts who demon- bilities. The civil fleet is equipped with about 1,100 strated high motivation and political reliability. Many medium- and long-range passenger transports, about are selectedfor noncommissioned officer training by 200 AN-12s and IL-76s, and severalthousand short- the district military registration office at the time of range transports and helicopters. Aero flot aircraft induction. They are then assigned directly to the could be used extensively for the airlanding of troops airborne training division for at least 6 months of once airheads are established. specialized training. Upon completion of this training, they are awardrd an NCO rank and are assigned to one of the regular airborne divisions. TRAINING All enlisted conscripts in airborne units (like almost Soviet airborne troops are among the best-trained all Soviets youths) have undergone at least 140 hours soldiers in the Soviet armed forces. The training that of DOSAAF-sponsored premilitary training either they receive is physically rigorous and mentally during their last 2 years of formal schooling, or at their demanding. It is conducted under conditions jobs. Most have undergone DOSAAF premilitary simulating actual combat, including extensive NBC parachute training, thus reducing the training that training. Airborne training integrates special airborne conscripts need. Conscripts receive 4 weeks of basic techniques with basic motorized rifle tactics. training after which they receive additional instruction in the use of weapons and military equipment, para- Intelligence information for an airborne operation is chuting techniques, equipment rigging for airdrops, obtained by aerial reconnaissance, clandestine agents, equipment derigging after airdrops, aircraft loading sympathizers, maps, SIGINT, long-range patrols, or air- techniques, and so on. dropped reconnaissance trams. Of major concern is the enemy armor, artillery, and air threat. Reconnais­ sance activities also may be performed outside the CONDUCT OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS projected objectivearea, as a deception measure. A Soviet decision to use the airborne forces is made A typical drop zone (DZ) is 3 kilometers by 4 after careful consideration. Many valuable assets are kilometers. A regiment normallyis allocated one or used in an airborne operation. The Soviets will not two DZs. If two DZs are used, battalion integrity will be place these assets in jeopardy unless they believe that maintained. A division uses four to six DZs. Alternate the mission has a reasonable chance of success. If other zones are designated for emergency use. Follow-on units are considered capable of fulfilling a given forces normally are dropped into the zones used by the mission, they would beused instead of airhorne units. initial assault wave. The success of an airhorne operation depends upon air superiority, even if achieved only temporarily. Also essential is a favorable combat force ratio in the Principles and Preparation landing zones and objective area. The more powerful the enemy force in the projected operations area, the I less likely the Soviets will be to conduct an airborne PRINCIPLES OF AIRBORNE OPERATIONS assault. Surprise is a principal advantage. Extensive The Soviets intend to employ airborne forces in security measures are used in all phases of the support of an army or front operation. The com­ operation to prevent early detection and to mander whose operations are to be supported estab­ minimize enemy reaction time. Night airborne lishes the airborne units' objectives and time of assaults are a primary means of achieving deployment. Control is decentralized to insure that the surprise. airborne objectives support the overall mission of the Landings are made in undefended areas or in army or front commander. areas where enemy defenses have been effec- Airborne assaults in support of army or front open - tively suppressed. tions can be conducted at distances of up to 500 km There must be effective air cover for the en from the FEBA. Many factors can affect the decision of route formation, and enemy ground air defense how far behind enemy lines an airborne force can be weapons along the flight route must be inserted: the size of the force the potential for rein- suppressed. forcement of the force, the anticipated enemy Airborne assaults are given fire support by air resistance, the rate of advance of friendly forces strikes, missile strikes, and the artillery accom- designated for linkup, etc. panying advancing ground forces as it comes The size of an airborne force used tosupport an within range. armyorfrontopcration could he up to a division in strength. A reinforced regiment would be the most common-sized force used to accomplish most PREPARATION FOR operational missions. AN AIRBORNE ASSAULT . Determination of the composition, strength, and capabilities of the enemy forces in the drop Planning and Preparation zone area (or those near enough to interfere An airborne operation requires extensive coordi­ with the landing operations and subsequent nation between the control headquarters, and the attack of objective). airborne force, supporting aviation, and ground Determination of the nature of the terrain and maneuver forces. condition of the road network. Planning considerations for Soviet airborne opera- Location of natural and man-made obstacles tions include: the mission, troops and support that would interfere with airdrop of men and available, terrain, the depth of the operation, flight equipment. routes, air superiority, drop zones, surprise, security. . Selection of suitable primary and alternate and the enemy situation. drop zones. Drop zones are as close to objectives as possible. The Loading is accomplished so that lead aircraft over a Soviets prefer that DZs be within 30 kilometers of the drop zone carry reconnaissance and security troops to final objective. If circumstances permit, drop zones are secure the DZ. The security force is armed to defend on the objective itself, against enemy air and armor attack. Main assault forces The first element is a security element and is respon­ are loaded so that platoons, companies, and battalions sible for eliminating enemy resistance in the DZ. The land with as much unit integrity as possible. Soviets try to complete the operation in one flight. For security reasons, airdrops are planned to take However, if more than one flight is used, the first place at night, whenever possible. Units normally move assault wave will contain forward command posts and to departure areas after nightfall. Radio silence is crew-served air defense and antitank weapons, as well observed in marshaling areasand while en route to and as maneuver units. The second wave will consist at departure airfields. primarily of support elements. Normally, more than one airfield will be used if more than one regiment is involved in an operation. Frontal aviation and front and army air defense weapons may Airborne Assault provide air defense for both the marshaling and departure areas. In an emergency, close-in air defense Assaults can conducted up to 500 km from be the could e provided the airborne unit's FEBA in support of Army or front operations. b by weapons. As a minimum, aviation, rockets and missiles, ground Preferreddrop zonesare within 30 km forces incursions, unconventional warfare, or naval fire support must gain local air superiority for the operation. Recognizing that local air superiority may Typicaldrop zones mea­ be achieved for only a short period of time, Soviets sure 3 km by 4 km. prefer to accomplish the airdrop in one flight.

Regiment is allocated one or two drop zones- Air Movement If two drop zones are used. battalion integrity During the flight to the drop zone (DZ) or landing will be maintained. zone (LZ), aircraft fly in a formation that insures the proper jump sequence. Commanders and their chiefs Divisionuses 4 to 6 drop of staff at battalion level and above are in separate aircraft to insure that a unit's entire command structure would not be lost if one plane were shot Alternate zones designated for down. emergency use. The Soviets consider the air movement phase of an airborne operation to e its most phase. If circumstances permit, drop zones are on the b vulnerable objective itself. They emphasize the necessity for creating a threat-free ALTERNATE ZONES flight corridor from the departure area to the DZ or LZ. All along the flight path, fire support assets are targeted Flight routes are chosen to minimize flight time to against enemy air defenses. Fighters and fighter- the drop zone. They also are planned to minimize the bombers escort transport aircraft to protect them from threat of aerial intercept and ground air defense. enemy fighters and ground fires. Protection of the air Airborne unit marshaling areas are dispersed to movement phase will be carefully coordinated. prevent detection of an imminent operation and to Passive defense measures taken during the air reduce vulnerability to nuclear strikes. Conversely, movement phase include conducting movement marshaling areas must be close enough to departure during hours of darkness, using morethan one flight airfields to make loading on aircraft easier. Normally, route, maintaining radio silence, and flying at low no more than a company c an be expected in any one altitudes. The Soviets also may use electronic warfare area. measures during air movement. Airborne troops scheduled for an operation are strictly segregated from the surrounding population. Units receive their missions in the marshaling areas. Airdrops Having received their missions, unit commanders The Soviets attempt to complete their airdrops organize their units for loading on aircraft. before dawn. To simplify the airdrop, the Soviets probably employ only one type of aircraft for each DZ. areas. However, if the airdrop is conducted at night, The Soviets noramlly conduct combat airdrops at an personnel assemble before occupying predesignated altitude of 150 to 300 meters. They emphasize the attack positions. If tlie drop zone is not on the objec­ necessity to drop at low altitude to minimize the tive, personnel dropped during tlic hoursof darkness amount of time individuals are in the air. Low altitude assemble as companies and move to battalion assembly drops also increase the likelihood that a unit's areas. personnel and equipment will land close together. If the DZ is understrong enemy attack, personnel During some training exercises, the Soviets have assemble and move immediately to the DZ perimeter conducted personnel drops as low as 100 meters, but to establish defensive positions. Personnel use any there is no indication that such low altitudes are available BMD to reinforce defensive positions, and do standard. The Soviets also have used steerable not sort out the BMDs until after the enemy attack has parachutes in an effort to increase unit integrity during been repelled. airdrops. If the DZ is not on the objective and battalions The first element to be dropped is a small reconnais­ assemble first, they try to avoid combat with enemy sance and security force. The main assault force is units. They attempt to evade enemy ground forces and dropped at least 15 minutes later. The BMDs and crew- hide from an air threat. If required to actively defend served weapons precede their repective personnel against an air attack,at least oneentire platoon per during the airdrop. company or one compnay per battalion is assigned the The Sovietshave several methods for dropping cargo mission. by parachute. Equipment weighing less than 30 The Soviets consider an enemy air attack to be a kilograms (66 pounds) is dropped in padded serious threat to a landed airborne force. Besides the containers, Equipment weighing up to 1.000 regiment's crew-served and shoulder-fired air defense kilograms (2,200 pounds) is secured to standard cargo weapons, the Soviets would use small arms fire, and platforms. BMDs, motor vehicles, self-propelled guns, even RPGs, ATGMs, and the BMD's main gun against air and other heavy items may be secured to special shock­ attack. abosorbing platforms and dropped by a multi-parachute When an enemy threat against the DZ has been suc­ system. The Soviets also use nonshock-absorbing cessfully neutralized or suppressed units. move to platforms with a retro-rocket system, used extensively to battalion assembly areas located either at the DZ system. The retro-rocket system, used extensively to boundary or a few hundred meters outside the DZ. drop BMDs, is supposed to allow its cargo to descend If a follow-on air landing is planned, the regiment's five to six times faster than the multi parachute system. initial assault force leaves a rear detachment at the DZ Two ground probes, mounted on diagonal corners of to provide security and to assist inthelanding of the the cargo platform, electrically fire the retro-rocket follow-on force. system's explosive charge. The explosive charge The airdrop and reorganization phase at the DZ is detonates when the sensors touch the ground and considered to be the second-most vulnerable period in close the electrical circuit. an airborne operation following the air movement phase. All actions taken at the DZ are to clear the DZ before an enemy force arrives. Drop Zone Procedures The reconnaissance andsecurity force's immediate mission is to secure the DZ before the main body lands. Movement to the Objective This force, which could be up to a company for each A regimental-sized airborne operation uses three drop zone used in a regimental airdrop, takes up defen­ predesignated battalion assembly areas on or near the sive positions around theDZ's perimeter. Of special boundary of th DZ. Movement to the final objective concern are the main enemy avenues of approachinto most often is made in battalion march columns along the DZ. The force also establishes listening and obser­ parallel routes. Battalions may be assigned separate vation posts beyond the DZ to provide early warning of final objectivs. Companies and platoons are often an approaching enemy. Antitank and air defense assigned intermediate missions (raids) to be weapons ar e integrated into the perimeter defense. accomplished during their movement to the final If the main body is air-dropped during daylight objective. hours, personnel move directly to their predesignated Speed and security are the primary concerns during attack positions, but if the drop zone is not on the movement to the objective. Battalions move in a objective, personnel assemble in battalion assembly tactical march formation as long as possible. This 2-7 formation allows the battalion to move swiftly and still dedicated reconnaissance unit assigned to an airborne maintain security. A unit in tactical march formation force is the reconnaissance company at division level. establishes forward, flank, and rear security elements. Therefore, an airborne battalion deploys one of its A battalion advance guard could be up to a reinforced organic platoons as a reconnaissance patrol. This company in strength. In the main body of any march platoon may have engineer or chemical defense formation, attached artillery elements are located at elements attached. the head of the column to allow immediate The reconnaissance patrol investigates the traffica­ deployment. Antitank weapons are located behind the bility of routes, and possible ambush and river crossing artillery followed by any attached crew-served anti­ sites. In the objective area, the reconnaissance patrol aircraft weapons. tries to locate good battalion assembly areas. The The airborne force tries to maintain movement to reconnaissance patrol also attempts to gain the objective even if an enemy force is encountered information on enemy security outposts, foritifications, during the march. If possible, they evade enemy forces tank and antitank weapons disposition, and reserves during the march. If not, they attack the enemy force In general, the reconnaissance element moves with the forward security element of the advance under cover of darkness using the BMD's onboard guard, but not necessarily with the main body. The navigation equipment to assist its movement. It may decision to deploy the main body depends on the size operate up to 15 kilometers in front of the main body. of the enemy force. If the force is too large to be Reconnaissance patrols seek to avoid combat with the handled successfully by the advance guard but small enemy. If attacked by an enemy forrce, they attempt to enough to be destroyed quickly by the main body, then break contact andto continue to moveforward. the commander probably will use the main hody to Companies or platoons that have accomplished attack the enemy. However, if the enemy force is so intermediate missions (raids), march to battalion large that the commander believes the main body assembly areas near their battalion's final objective. would become decisively engaged in an attac, then he Therethey join their battalionsin the assault. would attempt to avoid contact and lead the main body on an alternate route to the objective. In this case, the advance guard would be let in contact with the The Attack enemy. Time spent in battalion assembly areas is kept to a If the airborne force is moving at night, established minimum. Battalion commanders confirm their unit road networks are used to reach the objective quickly strength after the road march and raids, and receive before dawn. If movement is during the day, the unit enemy situation reports from their reconnaissance moves cross-country using terrain features to provide patrols. Because airborne operations are conducted concealment whenever possible. During movement. within enemy territory and require speed and surprise, the airborne force keeps the radios in the"receive Soviet commanders plan to conduct operations only" mode until contact is made with the enemy. In without full personal reconnaissance. After com­ the "receive only" mode, only the commander manders have been updated on the situation, they transmits messages. refine the missions of their subordinate and attached During the march, the unit maintains 360-degree units. Plans of attack almost always involve an envelop­ aerial surveillance. BMD and antiaicraft (AA) gun ment or flank attack. crews are given an air sector to keep under constant Offensive tactics of airborne forces are similar to surveillance. Visual surveillance is required because those of Soviet motorized rifle forces. Unlike raids, the there is no air defense radar in Soviet airborne units. If a attack at the final objective usually is conducted to unit comes under a strong air attack, the commander overwhelm the enemy and to gain control of an enemy- deploys the AA guns. If the air attack is not repulsed held area or facility . Final objectives most common in immediately, then the AA element may be left in place Soviet airborne exercises are river crossing sites, air­ to provide coverage while the main body continues its fields, and mountain passes. movement to the objective. Before the attack, supporting units are deployed to Reconnaissance missions during the ground provide maximum support. Attached artillery supports movement phase are extremely important, since the the airborne unit as it closes in on an objective. information received before departure may be limited Engineer elements are positioned to move in quickly or perishable. For information on the routes of march and sweep the area of obstacles. Air defense sections and enemy forces in the area, the airborne commander are positioned where they can engage attacking enemy sends out his reconnaissance teams. However, the only aircraft or helicopters. 2-8 \vhere ccl~clon.

Battalions normally depart assembly areas in pre­ and reserve security elements aswell as anyair defense battle formation. This consists of three companies crews situated around the airfield. The engineer arrayed in a line, wedge, or echelon. Company attachment clears the airfield of enemy-emplaced prebattle formation consists of three platoon columns mines. During the attack, the main force takes the with 150 to 200 meters between columns. control tower and destroys the airfield security force. Attack formation normally is assumed within 1000 In securing a mountain pass, the airborne unit meters of the objective, but subunits try to get as close designates as its objective the key terrain surrounding as possible before deploying. About 200 meters is the the pass. Soviet commanders tailor their force size and minimum distance for deployment into attack composition to the size and availability of drop zones, formation as well as to the difficulty of movement on Platoons in a company attack formation deploy with mountains. If the DZs are not located near the a 50-meter interval between squad BMDs, and a 50- to battalion or smaller-sized unit on each DZ in the 100-meter interval between platoons. The maximum mountains. They also expect more injuries due to the attack frontage for an airborne company would be 500 ruggedness of the terrain. In some arras. BMDs will not meters. be used in the airborne operation. Also, the Soviets do Before receiving the signal to attack, BMD radios are not plan on using attached artillery in every mountain in the "receive only" mode. Only the company com­ operation. mander and platoon leader can transmit messages. Drop zones may be closer to the objective and Once the attack begins, all radios can transmit and located on several sides of an objective to compensate receivemessages. for the decreased speed of movement in the If the enemy is estimated to weak-especially in mountains. If the DZs are not located near the antitankweapons-the airborneforcemay attack in objective, the Soviets plan to move only on roads to one echelon with personnel mounted in their BMDs. reach the objective area. Finally, the Soviets rely more However, if the enmy is considered to be strong, the on radio communications in the mountains even airborne force most likely would attack in two though radios are less reliable in such regions. echelons with personnel dismounted. Dismounted personnel advance between the BMDs and could either precede or follow them. The BMDs fire from The Defense short halts. Once a Soviet airborne regiment or battalion has In a night attack, the company commander gives the seized an objective, its mission is to defend the platoon leaders an azimuth upon which to advance to objective until the arrival of Soviet forces advancing the objective. The azimuth will be set on the direc­ from thefront line. In almost all cases, they use a 360­ tional gyrocompass onboard the BMDs to guide each degree perimeter defense. Whether the defense is platoon on its direction of attack. established in depth or with all units forward,d epends Seizure of a river crossing site typically takes place in upon theenemy threat and the terrain. If the com­ the same manner. However, the commander adjusts mander puts maximum power forward, he maintains a his plans to account for the peculiarities of the mission. small mobile reserve. For a regiment, this reserve The reconnaissance patrol's mission is modified to would be no more than a company. A battalion defense include finding suitable crossing sites so that units can would keep no more than a platoon-sized element in be deployed to seize key terrain on both sides of the reserve. river. Combat engineers also scout the river to deter­ Defensive positions are built on a series of subunit mine its depth and width speedof , the current, river strong points. A company is assigned a strongpoint bottom characteristics, existence of floating obstacles within a battalion defensive position. The company and mines, riverbank composition and slope, and may establish a defense in depth or a defense with all approaches on the river's far bank. Subunits also are platoons forward. The company commander designs designated to prevent the enemy's destruction of the defensive position so that ground avenues of bridges or ferries during the attack. approach are heavily defended by anittank weapons. An airfield probably would be seized using two He places shoulder-fired airdefense weapons forward directions of attack. During. the attack, units remain of the perimeter. The air defense sections are located mounted in BMDs as long as possible. In the attack on high ground so that an enemy air threat can be plan, commanders designate units to seize the control challenged before it reaches the company's position, tower, POL storage areas, and any radio beacon towers. or in the case of helicopter gunships, while it is firing In addition, designated units attack the enemy's main from a distance. The company commander places obstacles and antitank weapons in intervals between During the defensive battle, enemy tanks are given platoons as well as between his company and adjacent target priority. The Soviets engage armor at maximum companies. ranges with all available antitank weapons. The Soviets A company's defense is built around a series of seek to avoid having a BMD engage a tank one-on one. platoon strongpoints. These strongpoints are approxi­ The individual Soviet soldier is trained to conduct mately 400 meters across. BMDs are placed 200 "hand-to-hand combat" against tanks. Firing from meters apart within each platoon position. For prone positions, soldiers use automatic weapons fire protection, they are placed in hull defilade on the to destroy an enemy tank's observation devices. When reverse side of hill slopes. Company commanders a tank comes within 8 to 10 meters, a soldier jumps up designate both primary and alternate platoon and throws a grenade at the tank. If the tank is defensive positions. In turn, platoon commanders damaged, he shoots the crew as they exit the vehicle. designate both primary and alternate positions for Ambush sites maybe created on primary avenues of their squads. approach approximately 5 kilometers from the main The company commander prepares a company fire defensive perimeter. Platoon-sized ambushes may be plan that insures the entire company defensive area is employed in a role similar to that of a covering force. covered by interlocking fires. Intervals between the The location of an ambush is chosen to facilitate company and flanking companies are also covered by attacking an enemy as it crosses a natural defile. The fire. The plan includes primary and alternate azimuths enemy route into the ambush is mined so that lead and of fire for the platoon's primary and alternate positions. rear elements of the enemy march formation are In the fire plan, squads are numbered from 1 through 9 destroyed so as to block exits from the defile. Mine so that the company commander can control his unit's explosions are the signal to open fire. Lead tanks are defensive fires down to squad level. the primary targets in the ambush. The company commander may specify on platoon The unit conducting an ambush avoids decisive to provied air defense coverage for the company. If engagement with the enemy. Once the commander platoon receives such a mission, it concentrates all of has made the decision to withdraw, the unit moves to its weapons on an air threat when directed to do so by its previously prepared defensive position on the the company commander. This platoon effort supple­ objective. ments the air defense fires of the the SAM section. Upon receiving the primary azimuths of fire from the company commander, platoon commanders lay each Linkup BMD using the onboard directional gyrocompass. The Airborne units either await a linkup with friendly platoon commander indicates terrain features to be forces or fight their way back to friendly lines. To used as the BMD's lateral limits. The BMDs are placed accomplish linkup, the airborne unit sends its recon­ in hull defilade approximately 200 meters apart and 50 naissance element to meet advancing ground force to 100 meters to the rear of squad personnel. Squad units. The reconnaissance element provides members prepare prone firing positions to make them- information on the best approaches into the area, the selves less vulnerable to enemy or friendly tire, The security situation on the objective, and the enemy platoon commander locates RPG antitank grenade situation. Once linkup has been completed, launchers between the BMDs. The RPG's are also operation control of the airborne unit returns to the assigned sectors of fire. front or TVD. CHAPTER 3 HELIBORNE OPERATIONS

Heliborne operations have been a part of Soviet objectives are mountain passes, beach exits, desert military doctrine since the 1960s. The US airmobile oases, crossroads, or other features whose denial to the experience in Vietnam increased Soviet interest in the enemy will make the overall maneuver plan easier. combat uses of the helicopter. Heliborne operations in Heliborne units also can block enemy attempts to Soviet ground force maneuvers increased during the break out of an encirclement or to reinforce a meeting 1970s. Such operationsnoware standard in military engagement. exercises. Since early 1980, Soviet forces in Heliborne units also can be inserted into the enemy Afghanistan have been conducting helihorne rear area for reconnaissance missions. Small reconnais- operations in combat. sance units may be inserted with light armored The Soviets appreciate the tactical advantage of vehicles. In the Soviet rear area, Heliborne units can heliborne operations-rapid maneuver of combat perform rear area security missions. They can screen, troops, unconstrained hy obstacles on the ground. delay, or defend against an enemy approach to a When compared to parachute drops as a means of vulnerable flank. inserting troops, heliborne operations require less Ambushes, raids, sabotage, and deception training and can penetrate enemy air space at a low operations are examples of other missions suited to level. On the other hand, availability and capabilities of heliborne operations. Heliborne units also can lay and helicopters limit the size, scope, and frequency of clear mines in the enemy rear. In World War II during heliborne operations. the forcing of the enemy Dnieper river defenses, Soviet forces inserted company-sized units by parachute into German division rear areas on the far side of the river. DOCTRINE On the Dnieper, the enemy was hard-pressed from the Theoretically, by day or night, Soviet heliborne units front and was unable to provide adequate rear area are inserted in enemy territory, 50 kilometers or more security. The result was that enemy combat support forward of the line of contact. However, Soviet descrip- activities were disrupted at small cost to the Soviets. tions of practice operations imply that the assault force On other occasions, a disproportionately large enemy is usually of battalion size or smaller, is assigned an force was diverted from the front to deal with a rear objective within range of Soviet divionsal artillery (i.e., area threat. In comparable situations today. within about 15 kilometers of the line of contact), helicopters could be used to insert combat units into operates in daylight, and links up with an advancing the enemy rear area rather than parachute drops. In friendly force within hours. support of deception operations, heliborne units can Battalions of motorized rifle regiments are trained be used to represent larger formations in feints, for helihorne operations employing helicopters from demonstrations, and ruses. army or front helicopter regiments. ORGANIZATION MISSIONS Motorized riflebattalions are tailored for heliborne Typical missions for a heliborne operation are operations and probably would be selected from a neutralization of enemy command, control, and division's second echelon or combined arms reserve. communications facilities; seizure of critical terrain The tailoring eliminates assets not mission-essential. such as an opposite shore of a river crossing site; The battalion antitank platoon may be augmented. A pursuit of a with drawing enemy; attack enemy defense sapper company, an antiaircraft battery, and a battery positions from the rear; neutralizaion or disruption of of towed artillery may be attached. Rear service enemy combat support or combat service support personnel may be attached to the force to deal with elements; or deception. The Soviets expect the supply of ammunition, medical supplies and treatment, heliborne force to be threatened by superior enemy and any special problems for a given operation, such as firepoower and mobility after landing in the enemy rear. supply of drinking water. Therefore, the assault force generally requires external Some light armored or wheeled vehicles can be fire support and early linkup if it is to be recovered. included in the force for use as missile carriers and A typical heliborne mission is the seizure of a bridge­ reconnaissance vehicles. An Mi-6/HOOK heavy head in support of a river crossing. Other possible transport helicopter is required to lift most of these vehicles. The . number of Mj-6 sorties available willlimit mission. The. lift capability is degraded seriously as the number of vehicles. With all augmentations and temperature or altitude increases. deletions considered (particularly deletion of APCs Weapons, supplies, and key personnel are spread and most other battalion vehicles), the battalion throughout the helicopter force so that the operation heliborne force could contain over 500 troops. will not fail because of a few unlucky losses among the Transport helicopters from either the assault helicopters. helicopter regiment or the transport helicopter An assault unit once on the ground in the enemy rear regiment can he used for heliborne operations. HIND area may be attacked from any direction by superior attack helicopters are capable of carrying some troops enemy forces. It is likely to require more external fire but are normally not used in that role. support than a motorized rifle unit of similar size in standard configuration. The ground force is in a tenuous situation concerning resupply. During heavy TRAINING engagement at close quarters, the basic load of Soviet motorized rifle troops require a minimum of ammunition can be exhausted very quickly. one day's training in preparation for heliborne operations. Individual companies require 2 to 4 hours to practice loading and unloading procedures. Six or Command and Control seven hours are required to rehearse the actions in the A division commander is the lowest ranking ground departure area before embarkation and those actions force officer likely to order a heliborne operation. required after landing. Training stresses antitank Front or army commanders may order a heliborne tactics and other pertinent aspects of dismounted operation drawing on the assets of a motorized rifle or combat as well as set routines for troops in and around airborne division. In any case, army and front will aircraft. Mockup helicopter fuselages may be used and know of and approve the operation in advace. certain individuals may receive additional specialized The commander of the heliborne force will be the training in the tasks of loading and securing bulky commander of the battalion, company or other units items in the helicopter. forming the basis for the assault force. The ground A battalion or company heliborne assault is a force commander is responsible for preparation and standard practice in field training exercises at division positioning the troops for loading. He shares with the level and above. In 1978, Exercise BEREZINA included aviation commander the decision to proceed with the a helihorne operation that employed a mix of Mi-8/HIP landing, based on their assessment of the situation at and Mi-6/HOOK helicopters to land a motorized rifle the landing zone. After the landing is made, the ground battalion in the enemy's rear. force commander is solely responsible for conducting the operation. While the ground force commander may be able to CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS refine the scheme of maneuver, most of the decisions required for the operation as a whole will have been Planning Considerations made by higher authority. The operations plan is Heliborne operations in the offense exploit fleeting followed as closely as possible. opportunities. In the defense, they counter threats Most heliborne operations require at least a which suddenly materialize. Heliborne planning has to squadron and possibly a regiment of transport be rapid, thorough, and flexible. Planning begins with helicopters. These units belong to either the army or the selection of the objective. The responsible com­ front. The aviation commander's responsibilities mander designates the objectives, one or more include proper loading of troops and cargo in the pick helicopter landing zones at or near the objective, and a up zone and navigation and tactics in the air. The departure area for the force. ground and air commander for the operation normally During the operations helicopters should spend ride in the same helicopter, while their respective only a minimum of time in any one place. They are par­ deputies ride in another helicpoter. Ground and air ticularly vulnerable when stationary either on the officers work out conflicts in the mission planning ground or hovering in the air. T he pickup and landing process by negotiation, with appeal to higher authority of the assault force must be accomplished quickly, in case of disputes. Air liaison officers in ground units without confusion. help the aviation commander to identify the best The lift capability of each helicopter is a variable approach and departure routes, and coordinate the depending on air density encountered during the helicopter activity with ground force air defenses. Communications The ground force radio net interlocks with the cargo is placed 10 to 15 meters from the expected aviation net. An airborne command post may be used position of thehelicopterreceiving door. Personnel to to relay communications from the assault unit on the he loaded formin a single column at asimialr distance. ground back to its parent unit. Minimal radio trans- The senior man present. normally a squad leader missions are a standard Soviet procedure. Prearranged sergeant,identifies himself and the cargo to he loaded. code words keep transmissions short and uninfor­ He provides a written manifest showing the helicopter mative to the enemy Color coded signal flares and number and the cargo weight by item. Helicopters smoke are used. designated for the most time-consuming loading operations land first. If the cargo consists of equipment or supplies, the Loading helicopter commander checks the manifest and The departure area is located approximately 20 orders, "Begin loading." When he has inspected and kilometers behind the line of contact to avoid enemy approved the positioning of the cargo inside the artillery fire. The departure area is large enough to aircraft, he orders, "Begin lashing." Personnel to he allow troop dispersal. It contains subareas for transported arc marched into the aircraft and are helicopter pickup, disposition of troops, and units checked forproper seating by the senior ground force preparing to embark. The departure area is located representative and the helicopter crew. While in the where it can he masked from enemy observation by helicopter, the groundforces personnel follow the protective features of the terrain, and hy camouflage instructions of the helicopter commander. and dispersal. Units which cannot be completely hidden from enemy reconnaissance should appear as small reserveor second echelon units. Landing Zones Thepickup zone is located as close as possibleto the The heliborneforce lands on its objective if possible. disposition area to minimize delay and confusion en If not on the objective, the landing zone should he as route to the helicopters. A unit may move from its close and as advantageously placed as possible, hut disposition area to a short-term waiting area closer to outside direct fire range of a defended objective. There the pickup zone. The waiting area also is camouflaged will be at least one alternate landing zone and possibly and allows fortroopdispersal. It can he used to multiple landing zones for subunits of the force. distribute special equipment and to receive specialist The helihorne force commander is limited in his personnel attached to the force for the operation. ability to reconnoiter landing zones and routes to the The force is prepared to load beforethe helicopters objective. Usually he must depend on maps, aerial arrive. While waiting for the helicopters, the com- reconnaissance, and human sources such as prisoners mander briefs his subordinates and joins the political or line crossers.The terrain in questionis likely to be deputy in exhorting the troops. The commander's final beyond reach of ground reconnaissance patrols. Too briefing includes recognition signals to he used obvious an air reconnaissance jeopardizes the chance between suhunits and the plan for linking up with of surprise. Minutes before the landing, an armed friendly forces. Staff officers responsible for communi- helicopter or other aircraft performs a final reconnais­ cations and other services brief the force chief of staff. sance of the landing site. The chief of staff has prepared and coordinated a In selecting the landing zone, there are hazards to detailed list, approved hy higher authority,of what will consider which may not be reflected on maps or aerial he loaded into each helicopter. photography. The greatest danger is that the enemy, The helicopter crew, having prepared the aircraft in either through advance knowledge of the mission or by advance to receive its assigned load, supervises the chance, will he in position to defeat the operation and loading process. For palletized cargo, the center of will exploit his advantage fully Another . hazard may be gravity is chalk-marked on the cabin floor. For bulky undetected changes in the NBC situation in the items such as artillery pieces, unnecessary obstruc­ landing zone and the objective. Loosely packed snow, tions are removed from the cabin of the helicopter. sand, or dust driven by rotor wash can obstruct pilot The helicopter crew provides the winches, hooms, vision. Snow can hide hazards such as boulders and ladders, ramps, chocks, lashing material, and any other crevassesin the landing tone. The firmness of the items required for loading. ground, on which the force artillery deployment may The ground forces provide the labor for loading depend, can change rapidly with precipitation or cargo into the helicopters. Specialists of the rear temperature changes.In thetundra, thawing creates a services attached for the mission mayhe used. The hog on top of the permafros where t rock-hard soil existed a short time before. If a shortage of suitable the launchers and guidance vehicles from ambush terrain for landing exists, troop s can be unloaded by without attackingthe enemy's garrison facility. The using rope ladders, by rappelling. or by simply jumping scheme of maneuver will be approved. if not dictated, from a hovering helicopter. by higherauthority Once . the operation begins, the While the operation as a whole may rely heavily on heliborne forcecommandermayrefine the scheme of air and artillery support, the assault force primarily maneuver if neccessary but makes as few changes as suppresses the enemy forces in the landing area. possible. In exercises, the mission endswith the arrival Helicopters at the landing zone cover the off-loading of a friendly ground force. Examples suggest that the operation with antitank guided missiles, free flight survival of the assault force may not be required for rockets (both antipersonnel and antiarmor), and successful accomplishmento for the mission. machine gun and small arms fire. While each phase of the operation is built on the Troops leave the helicopter on order of the success of the previous phase., the most critical helicopter crew commander. Procedures arc tightly moments occur in the movement from the landing regimented to get the troops and cargo away from the zone to the objective. In many situations, everything is aircraft and away from the landing zone without delay. staked on the success of the initial assaulton the objec­ tive, made before the enemy reacts to the presence of the heliborne force. The O bjective After seizing its objective, the assault force estab­ The objective normally is expressed in terms of lishes a perimeter defense to await linkup. .A motorized terrain to be secured or an enemy unit to be neutra­ riflebattalion in heliborne assault operations cannot lized. Ideally, it should be relatively small and lightly be self-sustaining. The planned time to linkup normally defended. and have easy access. For examply, an enemy is 2 to 3 hours. tactical missile unit may be neutralized by destroying CHAPTER 4 AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

DOCTRINE Soviet military strategy currently recognizes the inflicting loss or damage in enemy rear area facilities importance and complexity of amphibious operations. located near a coast, and for diversionary operations. During the 1950s, the Soviets denied the military value The naval infantry force employed normally would be a of amphibious assaults because of the potential effect battalion, company, or platoon. of nuclear weapons on an assault force. The Soviets re- evaluated their position in the early 1960s and re- activated the Soviet Naval Infantry in 1964, which now Soviet Naval Infantry consists of approximately 12,000 men. It has the capa- The Soviet Naval Infantry can be expanded quickly in bility to conduct tactical landings with highly mobile wartime by mobilizing trained reservists and reserve forces, air cushion vehicles, and landing ships. equipment. The Naval Infantry is organized into units which are subordinate operationally to fleet com- manders. The organization of naval infantry units is MISSIONS AND OPERATING FORCES similar to that of motorized rifleunits. There are cur- rently three naval infantry regiments and one division. Amphibious Landings The Soviets categorize amphibious landings depending on the scale of the landing. These Naval lnfantry categories are strategic, operational, tactical, and reconnaissance and sabotage landings. Secondary FLEET UNIT missions, such as coastal defense, may also be assigned. Northern 1 regiment Strategic Landings. Strategic landings support theater forces in opening up a new area of military Baltic 1 regiment operations. This landing would call for the employ- Black Sea 1 regiment ment of a multidivision force, with appropriate naval and air suppon. The Soviets have never conducted a Pacific Ocean 1 division strategic landing.

Operational Landings. Operational landings are Naval lnfantry Regiment. The naval infantry made to assist ground or naval forces in a coastal region regiment consists of three naval infantry battalions, a to surround and destroy enemy ground or naval units tank battalion, and several specialized support in that area. The Soviets call this a "maritime front." companies. It has a strength of about 2,000 men. Its Landings of this scale might entail the landing of a naval organization is similar to the motorized rifle regiment infantry regiment as the first echelon. Other missions except that the tank battalion has a mix of medium would include the seizure of major islands or a group tanks and F'T-76 amphibious light tanks. thenaval of islands, naval bases, and other important coastal infantry regiment does not have an organic artillery objectives. This is believed to be the primary role of the battalion, but does have a multiple rocket launcher Soviet Naval lnfantry today. battery. It also receives artillery support from the naval gunfire ships of the amphibious task force. Tactical Landings. Tactical landings are conducted to strike at the rear area or flank of any enemy force Naval lnfantry Battalion. The basic unit of the along a coastline, or for seizing islands, naval bases, naval infantry regiment is the naval infantry battalion. coastal airfields, ports, and other objectives on an The battalion is made up of three naval infantry enemy-held coastline. The naval infantry force companies, a mortar platoon, an antitank platoon, and employed could be a battalion or larger, operating supporting supply and maintenance, medical, and independently or with ground force units. communications units. In all, the battalion numbers about 400 men. This unit, reinforced, constitutes the Reconnaissance and Sabotage Landings. These basic amphibious attack force in the assault landing- landings are conducted for reconnaissance, for the battalion assault force (BAF). Soviet Naval Infantry Regiment

NAVAL INFANTRY REGIMENT

24 x AKM 60 x AKM

AIR CHEMICAL DEFENSE ENGINEER SIGNAL DEFENSE COMPANY COMPANY BATTERY COMPANY [ 10 57 36 4 x ZSU-23-4 3 x K-61 2 x BTR-60PA/B 3 x BRDM-2C8RRecon 4 x SA-9/GASKIN 63 x AKM 53 x AKM 3 x ARS-12UDecon 52 x AKM 34 x AKM I I TRANSPORTATION SUPPLY MAINTENANCE MEDICAL COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY COMPANY 39 57 27

60 x AKM 38 x AKM 34 x AKM 23 x AKM

"Total Personnel(Approximate)

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT Equipment Total Equipment Total T-54/55 Medium Tank.. .44 ARS-12UCBR Oecontamination Vehicle...... 3 PT-76 Amphibious Light Tank .44 82/120-mm Mortar .9 BTR-60PA/B Amphibious APC . 111 RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher. 90 BROM Reconnaissance Vehicle .9 SA-7/GRAlL SAM Launcher . 27 AT-3/SAGGER BROM ATGM Launcher. . 6 SPG-9 73-mm Recoilless Antitank Gun .9 BRDM-2CBR Reconnaissance Vehicle .3 AT-3/SAGGER Manpack ATGM Set.. .9 BM-21 122-mm Multiple Rocket Launcher.. 6 RPK 7.62-mm Light Machine Gun...... 90 ZSU-23-4 SP Quad23-mm AA Gun .4 AKM 7.62-mm Rifle ...... ,1521 SA-9/GASKIN SAM Launcher .4 SVD 7.62-mm Sniper Rifle ...... 27 K-61 Tracked Amphibian., .3

NOTE: The AKM rifles and the RPK light machine gunshave now been replaced by thenew AK-74 and RPK-74 5.45-mm weapons.

4-2 Soviet Naval Infantry Battalion

HEADOUARTERS

x STR GOPA/8 3 x AT-3 SAGGER Manpack 3 SA-7/GRAIL 1 9 x AKM 3 x SPG 9 9 x RPG 7 19 x AKM 3 x SVN 9 x RPK 66 x AKM

'Total Personnel (Approximate)

PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

Equipment Total Equipment Total BTR 6OPA/B Amphibious APC ...... 34 SPG-9 73-mmRecoilless Antitank Gun ...... 3 82/120-mm Mortar ...... 3 SVD 7.62-mm Sniper Rifle ...... 9 SA-7/GRAIL SAM Launcher ...... 9 RPK 7.62-mm Light Machine Gun ...... 27 RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher...... 27 AKM 7.62-mm Rifle ...... ,282 AT-3/SAGGE Manpack ATGM Set...... 3 NOTE: The AKM riflesand theRPK light machine gunshave nowbeen replaced by the new AK-74and RPK-74 5.45-mm weapons.

Soviet Naval Infantry Company

NAVAL PRINCIPAL ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT INFANTRY Equipment Total COMPANY BTR-60PA/B Amphibious APC ...... 10 SA-7/GRAIL SAM Launcher ...... 3 RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher...... 9 NAVAL SVD 7.62-mm Sniper Rifle ...... 3 COMPANY INFANTRY RPK 7.62-mm Light Machine Gun ...... 9 HEADQUARTERS PLATOON AKM 7.62-mm Rifle ...... 68 x BTR60PA/B 3 x BTR 60PA/B 3 x SA-7/GRAIL 3 x RPG 7 MOTE: The AKM riflesand theRPK light machine guns havenowbeen replaced 5 x AKM 1 x SVD by the AK-74 andRPK-74 5.45-mm weapons. 3 x RPK 21 x AKM Naval Infantry Company. The naval infantry Antitank Battery. The naval infantry regiment's six company is made up of a small company headquarters BRDMs of its antitank battery are formidable antitank and three naval infantry platoons. The company head­ weapon systems. These weapons augment the man- quarters consists of the company commander, political pack antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) and SPG-9 officer, technical officer. first sergeant, mes­ recoilless guns employed at battalion level and senger/clerk, medic, three SA-7 gunners, and the generally constitute the regimental antitank reserve. driver and gunner of their BTR-60 armored personnel The ATGM/BRDMsnormally are employed to protect carrier. Each platoon consists of three squads of ten the flanksof the landing force from counterattacking men each. Each squad consists of the squad leader, a tanks and against enemyweapons emplacements. machine gunner, an RPG gunner, an assistant RPG gunner/rifleman, four riflemen, the APC machine Air Defense Battery. Besides the three SA-7s at gunner, and the APC driver. company level, air defense is provided to regimental units by the four ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft Tank Battalion. The naval infantry tank battalion has guns and four amphibious SA-9 surface-to-air missiles a mix of PT-76 light amphibious tanks and medium (SAMs) of the air defensebattery. Supporting naval tanks. Each of the tank companies has three platoons of ships provide air defensethroughout all phases of the four tanks each with the company commander's tank landing operation. bringing the total to 13 tanks. While the medium tanks are not amphibious, they can disembark in shallow Engineer Company. The engineer company water as a follow-on landing force behind the PT-76 contains three combat engineer platoons. Normally, a and BTR-60 first or second wave. I n task organizing a combat engineer platoon is provided to support each landing force, one platoon of tanks normally supports a battalion assault force. It clears obstacles and mine- naval infantry company. fields along the approaches to the shore, on the beaches, and on routes leading inland from the Reconnaissance Company. The reconnaissance beaches. company may be task organized toprovide a platoon of at least one PT-76 and three BRDMs to the battalion Signal Company. The signal company of the naval assault force for the amphibious landing. The Soviets infantry regiment consists of a headquarters and consider this platoon to be one of their amphibious servicesection, a radio platoon, and a wire/telephone assault advance teams. These teams also include platoon. The headquarters and service section combat engineers and hydrographic personnel who provides courier service and limited signal and vehicle report beach conditions. In certain instances, recon- maintenance support for the company The radio naissance vehicles may swim to shore under their own platoon provides vehicles, radios, and operators for the power. Conditions permitting, they may he landed by regimental commander and staff. The wire/telephone air cushion vehicles. Some reconnaissance teams also platoon installs and operates switchboards for com- may be airlanded by helicopter or dropped by para- mand posts and the message center, and lays wire chute behind defended positions. The reconnaissance whendirected. platoon has two objectives: To provide information to the main landing force Chemical Defense Company. The regimental about enemy defensive positions and enemy reinforce- chemical defense company consists of a company ments on the march toward the beach. headquarters, a decontamination platoon, and a To screen forward and to the flank of the amphib- chemical and radiological reconnaissance platoon. ious landingteams. The decontamination platoon is organized into three squads with one ARS decontamination vehicle each. Multiple Rocket Launcher Battery. With the The chemical and radiological reconnaissance platoon exception of the three mortars organic to each naval consists of three squads with one BRDM rkh in each infantry battalion, the regiment'ssix BM-21 multiple squad. rocket launchers constitute the sole organic artillery The chemical defense company of the regiment assets of the naval infantry regiment. BM-21s provide normally provides one reconnaissance squad to the fire support for amphibious landings and also may be battalion assault force to determine and report levels used by the naval infantry in a coastal defenserole. and types of contamination in the landing area and to Each launcher can deliver considerable firepowerwith mark cleared lanes for advance of the main force. If the its forry 122-mmhigh-explosive rockets. regiment is not conducting similar landings elsewhere, the remaining two reconnaissance squads also can be embarkation, sea passage, debaration, and shore employed to check alternate advance routes. Decon­ combat operations. Missile and artillery units strike tamination vehicles normally set up on the far side of beach defense forces and weapon systems. the contaminated areas to spray the advancing naval infantry vehicles on the march. One or more squads Soviet Ground Forces. The Soviets consider can be employed, depending on regimental motorized rifle troops of the ground forces to be requirements. potential participants in amphibious operations. Ground forces will probably conduct an amphibious Rear Service Units. Rear service units (trans­ operation with naval infantry troops. The naval portation, supply, maintenance, and medical) are small infantry's special skills are utilized to the maximum to in keeping with the limited scope and duration of insure success of the assault landing. mission assigned to naval infantry. Principal supply is Naval infantry landing teams probably lead the from the ships offshore. Service units may provide assault. They have responsibility for breaching anti- platoon-sizedunits to support battalion assault forces. landing obstacles in the water and on the shore, for Casualties are evacuated in returning empty supply seizing a beach head, and for securing the approach of trucks and otherservice vehicles. the main force to the landing are. The main body, With the Soviet Navy playing the dominant role, consisting largelyof motorized rifle troops, follows. units of all branches of the armed forces may provide Naval infantry personnel may be attached to motorized support for amphibious landings. The navy transports rifle subunits to assist in overcoming the special the naval infantry to the enemy-heldshore; provides problems of an assaultlanding. gunfire; sweeps offshore minefields; protects the landing with missile ships, gunboats, and anti- submarine warfare ships; and provides logistic CONDUCT OF THE .support.. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT Naval aviation and the Soviet Air Force provide air The Soviets maintain that amphihious assaults can be support on the beach. They alsoattack enemy ships conducted both day and night, in inclement weather, hindering the advance of the amphihious assault force, and under radio silence until successful landing. arid conduct aerial reconnaissance. Air defense units Airborne, heliborne, air, ground, and naval forces have protect the amphibious force against air attack during practiced jointly in such landings.

Soviet Amphibious Force Organization I AMPHIBIOUS FORCE COMMANDER

LANDING LANDING PARTY FORCE

INFANTRY FORCES GUNFIRE SHIPS

TRANSPORTS SECURITY SHIPS 1 4-5 Phases of the Assault The five phases in a Soviet amphibious assault are: A battalionassault force (BAF) commander usually Preparing of equipment and amphibious units. is assigned an immediate mission, a direction of attack, Loading of personnel and equipment on ships and and the overall landing objective. Normally the transports. immediate mission is to destroy personnel and Moving by sea to the objective area and weapons in the enemy'sfirst line of defense and to debarkation capture shore terrain for the landing and deployment Battle for the beachhead by the amphibious units. of follow-on ground forces.The depth of the BAF's Landing of ground forces and withdrawal of the immediate mission depends upon the strength and naval infantry. disposition of the enemy defenses. The naval infantry is trained to commence opera- A company landing as part of a BAF is given an imme­ tions either while at sea or from an alert status at their diate mission, normally to seize a strongpoint in the land bases. When alerted, an amphibious assault force enemy's defenses and to protect the landing and mans its equipment and moves out to its embarkation deployment of follow-on forces. The company also is points for loading aboard landing ships. The landing given a direction for further advance. A platoon is ships ideally arrive at the embarkation points shortly assigned an attack objective and a direction for further before or at the same time as the arrival of the assault advance. forces. This precludes congestion of the amphibious The battle for the beachhead begins with naval gun­ force at the embarkation point awaiting transport. fire on coastal targets. Fires are concentrated on The vehicles are loaded on in reverse order so that enemy artillery, obstacles, and troop concentrations. the assault vehicles can disembark first at the target An airborne or heliborne assault inland to block area. Vehicles are then tied down for the movement by enemy reserves heading to the beachhead may support sea. After loading, the ships form a convoy under the the amphibious assault forces. Naval infantry units may protection of combat ships and aircraft. conduct this type of airborne or heliborne operation. The amphibious landing may take place in conjunc- While naval gunfire and air strikes suppress enemy tion with a ground force battle underway near the sea- fire, minesweepers clear paths through offshore mine- coast. In this case, the supported ground force usually fields for passage of the landing ships. Destroyers and sends a reconnaissance party of up to a motorized rifle other antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships protect the company with engineers attached to reconnoiter the amphibious force from attacks by submarines and landing area. The information from this reconnais­ other warships. When approach lanes are cleared, the sance party is passed to the amphibious force and first wave of amphibious tanks disembarks and swims supporting air forces. The enemy defenses them may toward the shore. The amphibious tanks commence be fired upon by aircraft, naval gunships, and ground firing with their main guns at targets of opportunity force artillery. while in the surf.

Soviet Naval InfantryBattalion Assault Force (BAF)

BATTALION ASSAULT FORCE (BAF) I I I I NAVAL AMPHIBIOUS OTHER BAF INFANTRY LIGHTTANK REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS BATTALION COMPANY ELEMENTS' I

any or all of fhs following elements:medium tank,reconnaissance, multiple rocket launcher, defense, engineer. signal. chemical defense, transportation. supply, maintenance. medical 4-6 The following wave is made up of BTR-60s. Recent Amphibious Assault Landing amphibious exercises in the Baltic have employed air cushion vehicles to carry a portion of the assault forces to the shore. Troops do not dismount from their BTR-60s after reaching the shore unless the beach is defended. Normally, in the absence of defenses or in the face of lightly defended positions, combat vehicles continue forward to seize the objectives. They fire while on the move, maintaining the momentum of the attack, and pushing on to link up with an airborne or heliborne force or ground force to secure the beachhead for the follow-on forces. In the face of determined resistance, the naval infantry troops dismount to seize their objectives, to secure the beachhead, and to provide cover for the main force landing on the beachhead behind them. The follow-on ground force units disembar, move to shore, and continue the battle inland while the naval infantry unit is withdrawn. Withdrawal of the naval infantry terminates the amphibious assault phase of the operations. ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER Assault Formations a The formation of the battalion assault force is variable. A first wave force may contain an amphibious tank platoon as the lead element with one or two of the a naval infantry companies, supporting engineers, and a a AMPHIBIOUS chemical defense platoon. A second wave may consist TANK of the remaining naval infantry company or companies, led by a platoon of amphibious tanks. The entire naval infantry battalion could deploy in column, line, wedge, or other variation in a single wave. Ground force units such as a motorized rifle battalion deploy as a second wave. The diagram at the right shows the assault of a naval infantry battalion deployed in line in a single wave. Amphibious landing ships have launched the APCs and amphibious tanks. Tank tire is directed at antitank weapons, artillery, troop strongpoints, bunkers and troop concentrations. The Soviets train to fire their weapons while afloat. For a regimental operation, a naval infantry battalion attacking in line formation could constitute the first wave. The remaining battalions are held back for the second and possibly third waves or echelons. If offshore obstacles are present, the combat engineers clear three to six lanes for the battalion. On wide frontages with few or no obstacles, the battalion may adopt a line formation. Narrow. frontages may call A SOVIET NAVAL INFANTRY BATTALION, LINE FORMATION for company-sized assaults either on line or in column IN A SINGLE-WAVE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT LANDING WITH formation. SUPPORTING AMPHIBIOUS TANKS. 4-7 Weaknesses Surprise. If the ships of the amphibious force are Rates of Advance. If the first waves are prevented detected en route, the defenders have time to from moving inland from the beachhead, massing of reinforce likely landing areas with troops, artillery, and troops, vehicles, and weapons can occur. The Soviets air support. The amphibious force also may be attacked plan for rapid advance inland of the naval infantry to by enemy naval forces. follow up with a large ground force with supporting artillery and staying power. Upsetting the timetable by Air Cover. If the amphibious landing force does not forcing the naval infantry units to stop or slow down have tactical air superiority, the assault force would be would not only reduce the momentum of the attack vulnerable to air strikes at sea and on the beaches. SA- but would subject troop concentrations to enemy fire. 7s, ZSU-23-4S, and SA-9s can be fired from the decks of the landing ships and ashore. These weapons com- Marking of Lanes. The orderly procession of the plement naval antiaircraft fire, but might not be suf- assault columns depends on cleared lanes bring ficient to insure success of the assault. marked clearly with buoys or panels. If these were destroyed or moved, the columns might deviate from Weather. Fog, heavy rain, or other periods of the cleared lanes to the shore and could be destroyed reduced visibility could cause disorientation of the by obstacles or mines. assault force. Such disorientation could cause elements of the units to be dispersed beyond the Communications. The Soviets rely heavily on pyro- control of the unit commanders and even outside the technics, panels, and other forms of non-radio com- objective area altogether. munications before the assault. Rapidly changing tactical situations may make radio communications Sea Conditions. Heavy surf could capsize vehicles essential. Enemy jamming or interfering with radio and break up the assault formation. Troops inside the communications could seriously degrade the assault's vehicles would not have stable platforms from which success. to fire. Fire from amphibious tanks in the water would be useless in any but the calmest conditions. Sea- Airborne Landings. The Soviets often conduct sickness could become a problem and decrease the amphibious exercises in conjunction with airborne or effectiveness of assault troops. hrliborne Landings. The airborne or helihorne forces attempt to keep reinforcements from reaching the Enemy Obstacles. A well-prepared system of amphibious landing area. If these troops land in the obstacles and mines could slow or stop an assault wrong area or are otherwise prevented from landing landing. Air cushion vehicles may skim successfully successfully, the naval infantry could face stiffened over submerged obstacles, but passage of amphihious resistance. vehicles could be blocked. Beach Conditions. Not all shorelines are suitable Enemy Armor. Enemy tanks or guns could destroy for landing of amphibious vehicles or landing ships. If the assault force. Amphibious vehicles are lightly Soviet beach reconnaissance teams are prevented from armored and extremely vulnerable to most types of accurately ascertaining beach gradients, soil con- enemy fire. ditions, and other landing site factors, the amphibious assault could fail. CHAPTER 5 UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

Soviet unconventional warfare (UW) consists of a (GRU) of the General Staff arethe most likely agencies variety of military and paramilitary operations. UW to screen, recruit, select, and train UW personnel. includes partisan warfare, subversion, and sabotage, These agencies also can be assumed to plan and conducted during periods of peace and war. It also execute Soviet UW operations. UW activities are pro- includes other operations of a coven or clandestine tected by stringent security measures. nature. Soviet writings point out the effectiveness of UW units and boast of their accomplishments in World War Past Examples of Unconventional Warfare - II: During the war, the partisans killed, wounded. or took prisoner hundreds of thousands of Bolsheviks employed partisan guerrilla units German troops, collaborators, and officials of against the Czarists and other opponents during the occupation administration. They derailed the Russian Civil War of 1917-20. more than 18,000 trains. and destroyed or Soviet partisan forces were used extensively damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of against the Germans during World War II. thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The Special purpose troops were used to crush partisan war affected the morale of the German resistance to Soviet domination over Eastern Army, keeping the German troops in a constant Europe. state of fear. Soviet special purpose forces were used in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to Pospelov arrest Czech leadership and secure key objec- Great Patriotic War of the tives in Prague. Soviet Union 194 1 -1945. Soviet special purpose forces played an important role in the invasion of Afghanistan and the elimination of President Amin. MISSIONS Soviet unconventional warfare missions are divided into three basic categories: strategic, operational, and DOCTRINE tactical. The principal differences in the missions are Unconventional warfare (UW) is a key element of the level of command and control used and the nature Soviet doctrine. Soviet UW capabilities constitute a for- of the targets engaged. The overall objectives are midable threat. UW forces conduct reconnaissance, similar: espionage, sabotage, assassination, and interdiction of Weaken military capabilities of target country. lines of communications. Support follow-on conventional military Soviet unconventional warfare is designed primarily operations. to support a surprise attack Before the start of hostilities, clandestine operations in the target area increase the probability of destructionof key targets Strategic well before enemy rear area security measures are Strategic UW missions are controlled by the KGB. heightened. UW forces conduct strategic missions in the enemy's The Soviets also appreciate the important role that heartland to reduce the enemy'sability to continue the UW can play in support of a main offensive. Even if war. Strategic missions include efforts to: there is success in only part of the planned UW opera- Intimidate and demoralize the population. tions, it may be enough to disorganize the enemy and Create chaos and disrupt public services. to insure that Soviet forces can seize and maintain the Undermine national resistance. initiative. Selected regular airborne forces also may perform Soviet UW activities are managed at the highest level strategic UW missions. These are not normal airborne of government authority. The Committee for State missions which generally require coordination with Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Division front-line operations. Rather, small elite airborne groups operate at great depths behind enemy lines. sector. Their tasks would be to create general panic Their basic objectives are to weaken enemy opera- among the civilian population, to disrupt civil govern- tional readiness and combat effectiveness Their ment and public utilities, and to damage or destroy key missions could include: production facilities. Neutralization of major enemy headquarters. The regular Soviet Armed Forces maintain elite air- Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons. borne units, special sabotage and reconnaissance Sabotage to support disruption of enemy com­ units, and special long-range reconnaissance units for munications and key logistics. UW missions. The most powerful and numerous are the airborne troops under the direct control of the General Staffin Moscow. Some of these airborne units Operational are designated as "special purpose" troops. They Operational UW missions in support of the front and operate in small groups against key political, military, subordinate armies are carried out under the control command and control, and transportation and indus- of the fron commander. Airborne forces GRU special trial targets in the enemy rear area. purpose units, and army sabotage or reconnaissance The Soviet potential for UW is not limited to special units may perform these missions. their primary objec­ KGB and elite airborne units. Within the USSR the tive is to destroy or neutralize enemy nuclear means General Staff's GRU maintains a number of small within the front's area of operation, to a depth of 350 special purpose units. These units are concerned pri- to 1,000 kilometers. Additional missions include: marily with UW activities in direct support of combat Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons and operations. Their main tasks include preparing for the associated systems. landing of airborne units behind enemy lines, recon- Reparation and security of landing sites for naissance and intelligence reporting on nuclear regular airborne forces. delivery means and other vital military targets, Intelligence on location and strength of enemy sabotage, disruption, neutralization of keypolitical and forces. military personnel, and possibly the use of nuclear, Sabotage operations against airfields, railway lines, chemical and biological weapons. road and rail bridges, and communications systems. A Soviet special purpose brigade is assigned to and The use of terror to intimidate the population. controlled at front level. Soviet armies and divisions Organization of local guerrilla or partisan groups. also have groups within their reconnaissance units that Operating in the enemy rear areas, these units try to are capable of conducting long-range UW operations. prevent effective and timely employment of reserves. They generally disrupt the enemy offensive and defen­ sive capabilities. Agents Agent networks in the target countty support Soviet unconventional warfare operations. The KGB and GRU Tactical recruit agents in vital areas of the enemy's social Tactical UW missions are conducted in support of structure-in political circles, in his intelligence divisions and are similar to the operational missions services, at all levels of the military, within key described. Tactical missions are carried out on a industries, in a variety of academic institutions, and in smaller scale and directed at targets in the division's the media-press, radio, and television. Some of these area. The Soviet divisional reconnaissance battalion agents actively engage in subversion,while others are has a limited capability to perform raids to a depth of "sleepers,"prepared to act on call. Agents are trained 100 kilometers. to operate as political agitators, intelligence collectors, and saboteurs. The GRU recruits agents in the vicinity of military targets-airports, missile bases, arsenals, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE FORCES communication centers, tank dispersal centers, and The Soviet leadership has a variety of elite forces for also on routes used for troop movements. Just before conducting UW missions: special units of the KGB, the beginning of hostilities, Soviet special purpose air- GRU, airborne, and ground and naval forces. The KGB borne troops, GRU special purpose units, and special is probably responsible for the overall planning and long-range reconnaissance units could deploy and coordination of sabotage actions in peace and war. The link-up with KGB or GRU agents already operating in KGB specialpurpose units have a sabotaee mission and the target area. Also, local communist and other leftist are thought too b etargeted primarily against the civilian groups may provide support. 5-2 Personnel Soviet unconventional warfare personnel are Language and customs of target country. specially screened and selected. The specialized Survivalbehind enemy lines. nature of their missions requires individuals (both Identifyingand locating targets. officers and enlisted) to have the following qualities: To make training as realistic as possible, the Soviet youth, above average intelligence, ability to learn UW training centers are equipped with realistic foreign languages, excellent overall physical con- models of key targets such as enemy facilities and dition, and health. However, the paramount pre- weapon systems. requisite for selection is political reliability. Individual UW missions require intensive training and reliability is assessed in part based on a spotless record preparation. The Soviets emphasize the following of participation in young communist organizations, factors when preparing for special missions: such as the Young Pioneers, the komsomol and Absolute secrecy. DOSAAF. The final approval rests with the KGB. Detailed planning and coordination. Unity of command. Resupply from enemy stocks. EQUIPMENT Detailed target lists with alternate objectives. All varieties of Soviet and enemy weaponsand equip- Multiple destruction methods. ment are available to Soviet UW personnel depending Effective, secure communications. on their mission. Because of the clandestine nature of these missions and the distances behind enemy lines at which they plan to operate, UW forces normally do nott AN UNCONVENTIONAL use Soviet combat vehicles during a mission. Instead,, WARFARE SCENARIO their small teams are outfitted with the best man- The following hypothetical scenario illustrates the portable and airdrop and demolition or incendiary employment concept for the full exploitation of Soviet devices. Additional equipment can be air-dropped into UWassets. the area and retrieved later by means of homing In support of a coordinated attack, GRU special devices. purpose teams are airdropped or air-landed into their In most cases, these personnel wouldbe dressed in respective target areas some days before H-Hour. foreign uniforms or civilian clothes and equippped Special KGB sabotage teams have been infiltrated over with weapons of the target country. They could use a longer period of time by clahdestine methods to indigenous civilian or military vehicles for trans- include international commercial travel. These portation. Soviet UW teams could be infiltrated by sabotage teams could be prepared to begin their parachute, sea, or air landings, or penetrate borders operations well before the enemy's rear security disguised as civilians. apparatus can be fully alerted. In the prewar period, some KGB personnel seek to undermine national resistance through political measures, while sabotage TRAINING AND PREPARATION teams begin isolated acts of sabotage, such as Soviet unconventional warfare units receive inten- destroying a key bridge. KGB teams also attempt to sive training. Small groups of men are trained as teams. create chaos at major ports and to disrupt Each team has an officer in charge who speaks the communications. language of the target country fluently; a senior ser- Shortly before D-Day, additional sabotage teams are geant serves as second in command. Other members of inserted and the majority of "sleeper agents" are the group are trained as radio operators, and weapon activated. and demolition experts. Besides the normal military Sabotage equipment can be smuggled into a country training, the following special skills are emphasized: by any numher of secret methods and stored in hidden, Tactics of infiltrating and exfiltrating the target but easily accessible caches. Smuggling techniques area. ma) include dropping waterproof containers offshore Night operational linkups. from ships and submarines. On prearranged signals, Sabotage methods using explosives, incendiaries, the containers are recovered and stored by clandestine acids, and abrasives. support personnel. Parachute training. Sensitive or fragile equipment, such as detonators or Clandestine communications. electronics material, can be brought into the country Hand-to-hand comhat and silent killing by diplomatic pouch and made available to the teams techniques. through established procedures. 5-3 Teams attempt to place their explosives and At H-Hour, a wide spectrum of sabotage actions are incendiary devices on the targets and set them to initiated simultaneously to weaken the military capa- detonate at H-Hour. All efforts are made to prevent bilities of the enemy. This sudden coordinated assault association of these acts with the USSR and to maintain will have serious and immediate effects on enemy the element of surprise for the main attack. offensive capabilities. Special units of the regular air- Immediately before H-Hour, the UW teams locate home forces are tasked to destroy nuclear depots, targets and prepare to: installations, missile units, and nuclear-associated air- Destroy nuclear capable weaponry. fields. Also, GRU special purpose units and sabotage Jam radar installations. and reconnaissance units of fron, army, and division Disruptenemy command, control and communi- are fully operative behind enemy lines. Their primary cations (C3). missions aree to neutralize enemy nuclear systems. But Kidnap or assassinate key political-military secondary missions include disrupting communi- leadership. cations, sabotage of airfields, depots, air defense, key Seize or destroy rddio and TV broadcasting headquarters, and logistic centers. Destruction of facilities. these targets will greatly assist the main offensive, as the enemy will find it more difficultto organize his defenses, or to plan effective counterattacks. CHAPTER 6 RIVER CROSSINGS

Soviet military theorists place great emphasis on Extensive tank snorkeling training is conducted. high advance rates by armor-heavy columns in the Tank crews train for up to 2 months before their first offense. The Soviets stress that this high advance rate underwater crossing. Tanks cross underwater in first would be important in the European theater with its gear and follow a predetermined azimuth with the aid "relatively small" operational depth. Such an offensive of the on-hoard gyrocompass. This direction can be would be impossible without overcoming Europe's altered by instructions radioed to the tanks from the many north-south water obstacles. A 1965 Soviet study unit commander. lf a tank stalls on the bottom, it must revealed that in the European theater, forces would be flooded before crew members using their breathing encounter water obstacles up to 100 meters wide apparatus can open the hatches and escape. every 35 to 60 kilometers, between 100 and 300 A snorkeling tank cannot cross a water obstacle if meters wide every 100 to 150 kilometers, and greater the entry slope exceeds 47 percent (25 degrees), if the than 300 meters wide, every 250 to 300 kilometers. exit slope is greater than 27 percent (I5 degrees), or if In response to these challenges, Soviet planners have the current velocity is more than about 3 meters per devoted tremendous resources to improving the river second. Snorkeling is not feasible during winter, crossing capabilities of their combat equipment. They because drifting or unbroken ice could rip away the have provided their ground forces with large stocks of snorkel. It is also impossible if the water is deeper than specialized bridging and assault crossing equipment. 5.5 meters, if there are craters or large boulders on the River crossing figures prominently in most Soviet river bottom, or if the bottom is too soft. exercises. Unmanned tanks can be moved across a river by means of a winch system. This system permits a tank company of 10 tanks to be moved across a river up to Keys to successful river crossings 200 meters wide in about 35 minutes (excluding preparation). One pulley block and an anchoring unit Reconnaissance. are transported to the far bank in a tracked amphibian, Early planning and thorough organization. armored personnel carrier (APC), or power boat. It Destruction of the enemy in the area of the must be installed 30 to 45 meters from the water's water obstacles. edge if three tanks cross simultaneously or 10 to 15 Speed and surprise. meters for a single tank. After tanks are prepared for Broad front crossings. underwater crossing, they are pulled across by two Swift development of the attack on the far armored recovery vehicles whiletheir crews cross in bank. APCs or tracked amphibians. Continuation of the attack throughout the The soviets estimate that about 60 percent of all crossing. obstacles they would encounter in Europe are less Skillful and rapid engineer employment. than 20 meters wide. Accordingly, there are several Air defense. models of both tank- and truck-launched gap bridges for rapidly crossing ravines, partially blown bridges, antitank ditches, road craters, and similar obstacles. EQUIPMENT AND ORGANIZATION Gap bridging is used frequently in combination with To insure a rapid advance, the Soviets have built river ponton bridges to provide shore-connecting spans or crossing capabilities into numerous types of ground to extend the bridge to sufficient length. force equipment. All Soviet armored personnel Each Soviet motorized rifle and tank regiment has carriers, infantry and airborne fighting vehicles, and one tank-launched bridge (MTU) per tank battalion; scout vehicles produced since the 1960s are amphib- i.e., one MTU per motorized rifle regiment and three ious, as are some self-propelled (SP) artillery and per tank regiment. Mounted on a T - 54/55 tank chassis, tactical surface-to-air missile (SAM) carriers.Soviet the MTU assault bridge is 12.3 meters long. The folded medium tanks have been provided with - snorkels- for ramp sections of --the new MTU-20 (which has become crossing obstacles up to 5.5 meters in depth. As little as the Soviet standard) extend the bridges length 20 15 minutes are required to prepare some Soviet tanks meters. Both spans have a 50-ton carrying capacity and for underwater fording, although up to a half hour is can be launched in 3 to 5 minutes without crew required for older tanks. exposure. Some Soviet regiments may have received a Czech- If the water obstacle is wider than the unit's organic designed scissors bridge (MT-55) with an electro- bridging capability, or if the site is not secure enough hydraulic control system that permits bridge emplace- to build a bridge, a PMP company also can form either ment in 1.5 minutes. The MT-55 span is 17 meters long eight 40-ton rafts, five rafts of 60-ton capacity, four rafts and can support loads up to 50 tons. The launcher has a of 80-ton capacity, three 1 10-ton rafts, or two 170-ton gap-measuring device and infrared equipment for rafts. Configured as three 110-ton platforms, the PMP bridge laying at night. company can accomplish the simultaneous lift of nine Each motorized rifle and tank regiment also has a set medium tanks (three platoons). The PMP bridging of four truck- launched scissors spans (TMM). The company has six BMK power boats to assist in bridge TMM set, with its four 10.5-meter spans, can erect 42 emplacement or raft propulsion. Models ranging from meters of class 60 (capable of supporting 60 tons) 75 to 180 horsepower are in use, most of which are bridging in 20 to 40 mintues. transported on retractable wheeled struts. The newest The engineer battalion organic to each Soviet tank model, BMK-T, is transported and launched from the and motorized rikle division provides the division com- same truck that transports the PMP. All Soviet power mander with flexible river-crossing support. Equip- boats are compartmented for bouyancy. Even if two of ment organic to the battalion includes PMP ponton the BMK-T's four compartments areflooded, it will not bridging (frequently used to make ferries), power sink. boats, GSP self-propelled ferries, tracked amphibious A PMP bridge permits crossing by tanks at speeds up transporters, tank- and truck-launched gap bridging, to 30 kilometers per hour. Speeds for wheeled vehicles and limited stocks of fixed wooden bridges. are greater.The bridge can be built in water having a 'The assault crossing company of a Soviet division's current velocity up to 2 meters per second. By engineer battalion has GSP tracked ferries and K-61 or attaching how and stem shields to PMP sections, the PTStracked amphibians. PKP amphibious trailers may crew can emplace the bridge in currentsof up to 2.5 or be assigned to units equipped with PTS. Tracked 3 meters per second without loss of stability. amphibians are used primarily to transport artillery, air Army and front have river crossing capabilities in defense, or logistical elements across water barriers. their organic engineer regiments or brigade. Ponton (The Soviet 122-mm SP howitzer is amphibious.) brigade regiments and assault crossing battalions also The assault crossing company's GSP ferries are used provide river crossing support. to transport armor across water obstacles that are Each Soviet combined arms or tank army has one impossible to ford or snorkel. Missile units and other ponton brigade regiment, while two may be subor- organizations with heavy equipment also rely on the dinate to a front Most. PMP regiments are organized GSP. into two battalions of three companies each and have a The Soviet PMP ribbon bridge is revolutionary both total of 108 PMP pontons capable of bridging 681 in its simplicity and rapid emplacement time. Its meters. The regiment also has eight tracked accordion-like pontons are launched when the trucks amphibians (K-61 or PTS) or GSP ferries. on which they are transported are braked at the water's Assault crossing battalions that provide amphibious edge. They are opened automatically by a torsion bar transport and ferry support to army or front elements mechanism, rotated manually 90 degrees, and quickly can be allocated to divisions to speed up crossing joined to form a continuous strip of floating roadway. operations. There is one battalion in each army, with Soviet motorized rifle and tank divisions have a half set up to three in a front If equipped with the PTS and of 16 PMP and two end (ramp) sections in their PKP trailer, the battalion's two tracked amphibious engineer battalion. companies are able to transport two towed artillery The engineer battalion's PMP ponton bridge battalions simultaneously. Each GSP ferry can company can construct 119 meters of 60-ton bridging transport one Soviet medium tank. at a speed of 7 meters per minute. PMP pontons also To provide the logistic support necessary for may be split in half to form 281 meters of 3.27-meter- planned rapid offensives, the Soviets have expended wide, class 20 bridging. Bank preparation is the critical considerable resources to field a variety of line of com- factor for bridging operations. Erection times vary munications (LOC) hridging. LOC bridges are essen- depending on enemy resistance, crew training, and tial for the orderly introduction of divisions and conditions at each site. PMP pontons can be retrieved combat forces of successive echelons, as well as un- in about twice the time required to emplace them. interrupted resupply of combat units. They are Each ponton carrier has a jib, winch. and roller system emplaced by troops of the Military Transportation to accomplish this. Service. In anticipation of wartime interdiction of 6-2 existing bridges, the Soviets and their allies have stock- gence to determine the following: piled obsolescent bridging and prefabricated bridge River width, depth, and current. sections near strategic crossings. Entry and exit gradients. The NZhM-56, a combination railroad and vehicular Composition of river bottom. floating bridge, has an estimated carrying capacity of Bank composition and height. 120 tons. Soviet engineers have designed three new Obstacles on banks. types of sectional bridging: MARM, SARM. and BARM Approach and exit routes. (Soviet acronyms for small, medium, and large high- Critical terrain features overlooking both banks. way sectional bridge). The major disadvantage of sec­ Possible fording, ferrying, bridging,and snorkeling tional bridging is its slowerection process. The sites. average rate of construction is 20 meters per hour if Information on enemy defenses. the bridge is built from a single bank or30 to 35 meters The number of reconnaissance patrols depends on per hour if the engineers start from both banks. Sec­ the width of the river and the number of required tional bridging frees tactical bridging for further use by crossing sites; patrols can vary from squad to platoon combat forces. MARM is also used to create overpasses size. Reconnaissance patrols operate up to 50 over key road junctions, thus all wiating congestion. kilometers forward of a division's main body. River barges are also used for LOC bridging. Large Engineer reconnaissance units are equipped with numbers of 600-ton barges are available throughout tracked amphibians, scout cars, or APCs. They often central Europe. They are placed end to end and con- mount a profilograph (a device used to determine nected with special ramps to form a "ribbon" bridge. width and depth of rivers) or the newer echo depth Seven such barges would span a 400-meter-wide river finder. Although such equipment significantly reduces and would take about 24 hours to construct. (For exposure and reconnaissance time, it appears that more information on engineer organization and equip- most Soviet engineers use less sophisticated gear-a ment see FM 100-2-3.) variety of bottom probes, range finders, and hydro- metric propellers or simply floats of some type and a stopwatch for measuring velocity. A sapper platoon TACTICAL RIVER CROSSINGS assigned a reconnaissance mission would also typically There are two basic types of Soviet tactical river have six mine detectors, grapnels with cables. crossings, the assault crossing from the march and the radiation detectors, and light diving equipment. prepared river crossing. The Soviets prefer the Armored personnel carriers, preferably BMPs, make crossing from the march, which is often the expected a rapid amphibious crossing to seize a bridgehead on method. Normally, the Soviets only conduct the pre- the far shore. Their crossing normally is covered by pared crossing out of necessity within direct enemy smoke and supported from the rear shore by all avail- contact. able fires. Heliborne or, less probably, airborne forces, may be used to seize and hold a bridgehead on the far shore. Once the bridgehead is established, tanks cross Assault Crossing from the March by ferry, by fording, or by snorkeling. Artillery and An assault crossing from the march is conducted other combat support equipment crosses on tracked with forces moving toward the river in dispersed, amphihians. Later, tactical bridging is emplaced for normally march, formation, across a wide frontage, at follow-on forces. top speed. Forward detachments or airborne or heli- The Soviets consider units engaged in a river borne forces may seize Favorable crossing sites in crossing to be especially vulnerable to enemy aviation. advance. All measures are taken to insure that crossing They emphasize the need for tactical air defense at is conducted as swiftly as possible and that the offen- river crossing sites before a crossing is attempted. In sive is continued on the opposite shore. some tactical situations they may choose to move part A decision to conduct a crossing from the march is of their air defense assets across first to maximize the made as early as possible to allow maximum time for range of these weapons in protecting subsequent units appropriate organization of forces and crossing equip- making the crossing. Placement and movement ment, and for reconnaissance of crossing sites. sequence of air defense assets will vary as the Soviet The Soviets prefer crossing sites with gently sloping commander assesses each new tactical situation. banks, fords, and a bend towards the attackers. Soviet Subunits acting as forward detachments advance as commanders use maps, aerial photographs, engineer quickly as possible to the river, bypassing enemy forces and combat patrols, radar, signal, and human intelli- whenever possible, to seize near-shore crossing sites 6-3 or to swim the river to seize a far-shore bridgehead. A A motorized rifle battalion acting as a forward forward detachment differs from an advance guard, detachment usually is reinforced with a tank company, which has the responsibility of clearing a route for an artillery battalion,ferry and tracked amphibians, and advancement of its main force. Forward detachments air defense, antitank, and chemical defense subunits attempt to slip through enemy lines to force and hold ranging from squad to company size. When acting as a crossing sites. Advance guards follow and fight through forward detachment. a motorized rifle battalion would any enemy encountered to make way for the main be 2 or 3 hours in front of the main body. forces. Advance guards destroy enemy forces to insure Based on reconnaissance, the Soviet commander unhindered advance by the main force. As they organizes his unit to insure the most expedient approach the water barrier, advance guards exploit the crossing and continuation of the offense. The Soviets success of forward detachments or air landed stressthat tactical air support is more critical during elements, forcing the obstacle from the march and river crossing operations than during other types of developing the attack into the depth of enemy defenses ground operations. whenpossible.

Motorized Rifle Battalion Assault Crossing GSP ferry and PTS amphibian platoons have been Crossing times for a motorized rifle battalion vary attached to the motorized rifle battalion from depending on the width and velocity of the river, time regiment and division. The battalion deploys into required to prepare embankments, enemyactivity. company columns about5 kilometersfrom the water, visibility, and equipment available. Motorized rifle and the APCs of the motorized riflecompanies deploy battalion crossings have been described as lasting from on line in three separate sectors about 400 to 500 45 minutes to an hour and a half. The first figure meters from the bank. The attached tank company and probably considers only combat elements. excluding artillery support the crossing by fire. Few tanks are support and logistic elements. transported in the first wave. Artillery, ATGMs, anti- Tank unit crossings are more complicated than tank reserves, and mobile obstacle detachments motorized rifle assaults. Although tanks may be (possibly equipped with mechanized minelayers) attached to support motorized rifle assault crossings, a cross immediately after the first echelon. tank battalion usually crosses in the second echelon. Another variant is shown below which depicts an However, a tank battalion could cross in the first assault crossing by two motorized rifle companies echelon in a weakly defended sector. while the third company and support elements cross A tank battalion crosses a river by fording. hy going over a ponton bridge. Bridges are erected only after the over bridges, by being transported aboard ferries or on far shore has been secured to a depth precluding direct tactical ponton bridging, or by snorkeling. Although enemy fire on the crossing site. However, if the enemy Soviet tank crews receive periodic underwater defense has been neutralized by fire or the opposite training, snorkeling is the least-preferred option. Some bank has been seized by airborne or heliborneforces, elements snorkel across at one site while others cross bridge construction may begin along with the assault elsewhere by other means. Sealing arras arc selected crossing. near concealed routesabout 3 to 5 kilometers from the

Engineer Support of Motorized Rifle Battalion Crossing I UP TO 5 KM

Assistant CrossingCommander Assault Crossing[APCMounted]

@ EngineerRegualting Point GSP FerrySite

TrafficRegulators Tracked AmphibianSite

6-5 river. Snorkels are installed about 1 to 2 kilometers first echelon. Once PMP bridging has been erected, from the water barrier. second echelon motorized rifle or tank regiments Some tanks provide fire support for the crossing,and normally can cross in less than an hour. artillery is usedfor both direct and indirect fire. The far Depending on the tactical situation, a division bankmust be secured before tanksnorkeling starts. crosses a major waterbarrier withone, two, or three Efficient traffic controlis essential. If the traffic regiments in the first echelon in a zone 20 to 30 controller permits tank formations to mass, they kilometers wide. A division's combat elements can become a lucrative target for enemy aviation and cross a 200-meter-aide river in approximately 5 or 6 artillery. Tanks cross underwater in column formation hours, using equipment organic to the division. If at approximately 30 meter intervals. Theycross at low reconnaissance and site preparation time isincluded, a speeds without shifting gears or halting. The tank must division's total crossing time may approximate 9 hours. be halted to remove waterproofing beforethe turret A division might receive reinforcement from army or can traverseand the main gun can fire. front engineer units. Oncemotorized rifleand some tank elements have The Soviets believe river crossings can be managed crossed, artillery and air defense elements are crossed successfully with equipment presently organic to their on tracked amphibians. maneuver units. However, some Soviet theorists A typical regimental crossing sector would be 10 express concern thatpresent levels may prove inade- kilometers wide, with two to three battalions crossing quate to conduct successive crossingsof two or more in the first echelon. Regiments will be allocated major uater obstacles. One way to solve this problem tracked amphibians,GSP ferries, and ponton bridging is to leapfrog divisions. Army-and front-levelengineer from division, army, orfmnt organizations as mission units have augmentation potential sufficientto estab- and resources dictate. Tracked amphibians carry lish a significantnumber of ponton bridges. artillery, air defense, and support units, while GSP Combat bridging is further supplemented by LOC ferries transport tanks. With engineer support, a sectional bridging. According to Soviet estimates, LOC motorized rifleregiment can cross a river 200 meters bridging can be erected by road construction troops in wide with a current of 2 meters per second in 2 or 3 as little as 8 hours after the initial assault crossing. It is hours. A tank regiment normally doesnot cross in the left in place for subsequent useby front-levelunits.

Tank Underwater Crossing Site

Equipment Inspection Post Road Signs

Engineer Regulating Point Rescue Squad in Tracked Amphibian EvacuationSquad Alignment Signs Tank

Grossing Border Indicators Tank Retriever Tracked Amphibian Crossing Site UP TO 5 \ I

K-61/PTS Tracked Amphibians

Traffic Regulators Crossing Border Indicator

Engineer Regulating Point Road Signs

Assistant Crossing Commander

Ponton Bridge Crossing Site

PONTON VEHICLE PARKING AREA (WITHRESERVE PONTONS)

Engineer RegulatingPoint

RoadSigns Assistant Crossing Commander

ALTERNATE Bridge Team Share Guard Guard

Traffic Regulator 6-7 Prepared River Crossings Apparently because they expect to cross most rivers are assembly areas and artillery positions. Such work is from the march at lightly defended or unoccupied performed at night under the guise of improving the sites, the Soviets devote considerably less attention to defense. the enemy-opposed prepared crossing. Such a crossing Twice as many troops as had occupied defensive requires detailed planning and preparation, cen­ positions normally launched the initial assault in a pre­ tralized control, and massive suppression of enemy pared river crossing. It generally takes place either at fires. They conduct a prepared crossing from a position night or under a smoke screen. An artillery preparation in contact. The prepared crossing is used as a last is fired against enemy strongpoints. Airborne or resort, when an assault crossing from the march fails or heliborne forces may be used to block enemy is not possible. reinforcements. Some artillery is employed in the A prepared crossing requires intensive reconnais- direct fire role to neutralize enemy weapons sance. By day, troops observe enemy defensive remaining in the enemy defensive sector. positions and activity. Under cover of darkness The prepared crossing is conducted similarly to the engineer and reconnaissance patrols measure the assault crossing. Numerous APC's swim across on a river, inspect obstacles, and pinpoint crossing areas. broad frontage supported by all available direct and During preparation, troops make maximum use of indirect fires. Tanks and other heavy weapons and existing fortification as well as cover and concealment equipment follow. Bridging is emplaced only when of personnel and equipment. They prepare roads and bridge sites are secure from enemy observation and cross-country routes for movement to crossing sites, as direct fire. CHAPTER 7 MOUNTAIN WARFARE

Mountain environments vary widely according to Special training emphasis includes overcoming soil composition, surface configuration, altitude, obstacles, weapons firing in adverse weather, and the latitude, and climatic pattern. The Soviets consider any use of natural cover. relief feature rising 200 meters above the surrounding Drivers receive special instruction in ascending and area to be amountain. As a result, combat in mountains descending steep slopes and fording mountain rivers. is hampered by: Particular attention is paid to personnel being able to The number and condition of roads. orient themselves. The screening effect of mountains on electronic Special equipment necessary for mountain warfare equipment. includes blocks, spades, and towing cables for tracked Fluctuations in weather. vehicles and lighter indirect fire weapons, such as the Increased wear and tear on equipment, increased 76-mm mountain gun and the 160-mm mortar, for fuel consumption, and logistical requirements. division and regimental artillery. Reduced rates of advance. Tanks are used in the mountains mainly as mobile Slides and floods armored artillery. However, mountainous terrain difficulty of bypassing NBC contaminated zones. restricts tank use to roads and ridges. Tanks are vul- Limited maneuver space for troops and vehicles. nerable to mines and plunging fire in narrow defiles Masking of artillery fires. and may be unable to elevate their main guns suf- Requirement for special training and equipment. ficiently to engage targets above them. In narrow defiles, a single knocked-out tank is likely to block the entire defile. OFFENSIVE ACTION Use of tanks in the mountains also poses special The nature of the terrain governs offensive action in problems with regard to maintenance and logistics. the mountains. The goals of offensive actions are to Tracks are thrown and clutches burn more readily, and control passes, road junctions, built-up areas, and overheating may occur. Tanks operating in the adjacent high ground. mountains need 30 to 50 percent more fuel and addi- Soviet tactics in the mountains are planned to bypass tional coolant. enemy defensive positions, attack the enemy from the Extensive reconnaissance is required at all times to flanks and rear, and break up coordination between avoid enemy antitank ambushes. During mountain defending units. warfare, tanks may double their march and prebattle Specially tailored regimental and/or battalion formation intervals. groups launch attacks on several axes (mainly in Tanks may precede infantry attacks but more often valleys and along roads and bridges). Companies attack will support ground attacks by fire. Tanks may be on one axis, battalions usually on one, and regiments attached to platoon level, one tank per motorized rifle along two or three. Specially equipped helicopters are platoon. employed to assist in communications. Extensive use is Mountain warfare requires additional radios as well made of combat engineers,who may be attached down as numerous retransmissionsites. Troops may receive to platoon level. special clothing and rations. NBC equipment is No specific mountain divisions have been identitied increased, and each soldier receives a second decon- in the Soviet Army for many years. A few divisions tamination kit. located in or near mountainous areas do receive some Marksmanship and gunnery pose several problems mountain warfare training, but the majority do not. in the mountains; for example, firing uphill, downhill, Airborne forces are considered to be the best suited and on the slant. This is particularly important for tank troops to fight in the mountains. Since the invasion of gunnery, since accuracy is so dependent on flat tra- Afghanistan, Soviet military literature has devoted jectory firing. increased attention to mountain warfare problems Motorized rifle battalions often attack inde- and training for all combat arms. Recent open source pendently, in separate zones, because of the limited articles state that some military districts have estab- number of routes in mountainous terrain. Battalion lished mountain training centers to rotate combat commanders are assigned missions lasting longer than battalions and regiments, as well as combat support usual and receive attachments of artillery, mortars, units, for field training in mountain warfare. tanks, engineers, and NBC subunits. The amount and type of attachments vary depending on the motorized strongpoints cover avenues of approach and provide rifle battalion's mission. all-round security. Particular attention is placed on Motorized rifle companies may be employed to tank avenues of approach. With terrain permitting, maintain contact with a prepared enemy defensive regiments and divisions maintain strong, tank-heavy positions, to act as an enveloping force for a battalion counterattack forces as reserves. Battalions and or regiment, or to conduct heliborne operations. The companies maintain small reserves. maneuver of the motorized rifle company mentioned Natural obstacles in mountainous terrain generally most often by the Soviets is a flank attack or envelop­ permit rapid organization of a defense with relatively ment. Typical objectives include seizing critical small forces. Unit frontages probably would be wider heights, crossings, road junctions, and passes in the than normal. enemy rear and on his flanks. Motorized rifle Maximum use is made of the terrain, minefields, and companies normally are reinforced with light artillery, obstacles. Gaps between strong points must be mortars, and engineers. covered by organic and supporting fires, located in Whenever possible, the motorized rifle company impassable terrain, and patrolled regularly conducts a mounted attack and moves along roads. If the initial assault is unsuccessful because of enemy fire or the inability to attack mounted, troops dismount ARTILLERY and attempt to outflank the enemy while tankssupport Fire support frequently is decentralized to support by fire. maneuver forces on independent axes. Artillery is fired Attack frontage and formations depend on the by batteries or even platoons. Artillery and mortars terrain. In a narrow valley or canyon, the company locate forward, with flatter trajectory weapons placed usually attacks on a 100- to 300-meter frontage. On a on the flanks. This positioning supports extended and mountain plateau or broad valley, the frontage may uneven frontages and covers gaps and dead space. increase to 1,000 meters or more. Direct fire at maximum range is used as often as possible. Movement and deployment of fire support Mountain Attack Considerations equipment in the mountains is restricted. Firing positions normally are immediately adjacent to available roads. Helicopters can emplace mortars and Mountain attacks require more thorough light artillery. The 160-mm mortars often are coordination. employed instead of the 122-mm howitzers because of Evaluation and exploitation of the terrain is the mortar's higher angle of fire and greater mobility more important. due to decreased weight. The 76-mm mountaingun Artillery is more difficult to employ and has to M1966 is specially designed for rmountain operations. react quickly to unseen targets. Vehicles or animals can tow this weapon, or it can be Air or helicopter support is tasked to hit brokendown into several loads for pack animals. defenders on the far side terrain features. Chemical agents could be used to flush out a defender from strongholds such as caves, con- fined areas, etc. Mountain Artillery Considerations

Adjustment of fire is complicated by variations DEFENSIVE ACTION in atmospheric pressures and temperatures. Normal Soviet defensive principles are basically . Dead space and terrain masking limit fields of applicable to mountain warfare. Forces normally fire. deploy along roads, valleys, on flat mountain tops, and . Insufficient time for complete preparation of on forward and reverse slopes. Maximum use is made firing data may limit accuracy. Artillery may of ravines, trenches, narrow and deep gorges, tunnels, have to rely instead on the "meterological and passageways for protection of personnel and mean. equipment. I Sound and radar ranging are limited by dead The motorized rifle battalion defensive sector space, shielding of sound and electromagnetic consists of company and platoon strongpoints. These waves, and multiple reflection of echoes. 7-2 HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT Helicopters may be employed in the mountains for Helicopter target priorities include the following: the following missions: Enemy strongpoints on the axis of advance. Reconnaissance. Mortars, antitank weapons, and artillery Communications, command, and control. threatening the advance. Resupply. Counterattack forces and reserves. Air defense, particularly against enemy Targets on the reverse side of slopes screened helicopters. from attacking ground forces. Evacuation. Close air support in mountains is less rigidly Artillery adjustment. controlled than over flat battlefields. Roving search- Close air support. and-destroy missions are more common particularly Troop lift. on the reverse sides of slopes. This is a departure from Mountainous terrain degrades ground-to-air com- the more rigid control maintained at lower altitudes. munication. Also, evasive flight techniques are used to avoid radar and visual detection. This flight method often degrades FM transmissions and reinforces the ENGINEER SUPPORT requirement for radio relay or retransmission sites. Engineer support in the mountains will require a Mountain weather tends to change rapidly and greater than normal range of assets and will be more severely. Fog, frontal systems, wind, icing, and storms extensive and difficult to perform than over more can easily disrupt or delay helicopter operations. normal terrain: Changes in temperature, relative humidity, and air Mountain roads and trails may require extensive pressure, affect lift capability. Increases in any of these construction, improvement, maintenance, and repair factors plus higher altitudes mean decreased lift capa- to withstand military traffic and severe weather bility. For a given load, the helicopter must produce condition?. extra power, which requires more fuel and increases Landing strips and helipads must be cleared. engine strain. Preparation of cold weather shelters is necessary. Mountain winds are almost impossible to predict. Greater time and equipment are required to con- On the windward side of mountains, airflow normally struct anything in rock. is steady. But on the leeward side, winds are turbulent, Materials may be difficult to obtain in the with strong vertical currents. Turbulence, even from mountains, adding to the logistics burden. moderate winds (10 to 12 knots), can seriously Combat engineers (sappers) are attached to units hamper helicopter operations. Aircrews thus require attacking independently as well as to flanking detach­ special training to minimize the hazards of strong ments and heliborne assault forces. A motorized rifle winds. Turbulence may preclude helicopter usage or battalion employed as a flanking detachment receives require that helicopters be flown at greater altitudes, one or two engineer platoons. A motorized rifle increasing the risk of detection and enemy fire. company with a similar mission receives one or two Besides limited visibility, low clouds and fog may engineer squads. These engineers support reconnais­ cause helicopters to ice up. Ice on rotor blades results sance, obstacle clearance, and water and dry gap in significant loss of lift. And since ice does not break crossing. off rotor blades uniformly, severe rotor blade imbalance can occur. Mountain terrain complicates flight route selection. LOGISTICS Routes may not always be the most direct nor provide Mountainous terrain severely handicaps all logistic the best cover and concealment. Space for maneuver operations. Road networks normally are few and in may be very limited and formation flying impossible. poor condition and require extensive engineer Landing zones also may be limited both in number and support. Supply routes are major targets, and suitability. These factors can increase the amount of mountains afford excellent opportunities for time necessary for a helicopter operation, increasing ambushes and attacks. the chance for enemy observation and enemy fire. The combined problems of terrain, cold, ice, and Greater intervals between aircraft also mean an dampness make rapid and reliable communications additional navigational load on each aircrew and may extremely difficult in the mountains. Not only are reduce mutual support. Mountain flying puts a greater operational problems increased but so are problems of strain on helicopter crews, tiring them more and faster maintenance and supply of communication than usual. equipment. Mountain Logistics Considerations degree of decentralization. This affects fire control Rations. Caloric requirement increases due to down to section level. As a result, the importance of more strenuous activity. shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) is greatly Cold-weather gear. increased, as is the antiaircraft role of small arms fire. Fuel. While limited road nets and steep slopes Mobile air defense systems may be unable to probably reduce the number of vehicles accompany maneuver elements. Instead they move operating in the mountains, the vehicles that from high point to high point along the best available are employed use more fuel. Aviation fuel routes of advance to obtain the best radar coverage, requirements increase as the use of helicopters observation, and fields of fire. increases. Ammunition. Indirect fire expenditures increase, largely because of difficulty in NBC EFFECTS adjusting fire on steep slopes and because of the Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) effects are decreased bursting radius caused by firing in reduced significantly in mountain warfare because of snow or forested areas. Quantities of explosives terrain and the more rapid natural decontamination used in obstacle reduction may increase as caused by changing weather conditions and constant much as tenfold. winds. Terrain and winds hamper accurate prediction Spare parts. High consumption-rate spare of down wind toxic agent travel. Gernerally, cool parts include tires, tracks and pads, fuel pumps, daytime temperatures slow the evaporation process, brake shoes, tie rods, and transmissions. permitting a contamination hazard to remain longer. However, mountain winds may nullii this feature. Mountain winds and stable atmospheric conditions enhance downwind coverage of chemical and bio­ COMMAND AND CONTROL logical agents. Temperature and humidity also affect Since mountainous terrain restricts line-of-sight their survivability.Cool temperatures generally favor communication such as FM and multichannel radio, survival of chemical and biological agents,and higher extensive use is made of relay and retransmission sites. humidity increases effectiveness. Snow deposited on However, siting communication facilities on high top of a contaminated area can increase the hazard's ground has its own problems. These include duration. Sunlight, however, destroys most chemical difficulites in establishing the sites, loss of communi- and biological agents.With little protection from the cation mobility, and increased likelihood of locations sun available above the timberline, the effectiveness of being predicted or discovered and then destroyed chemical and biological agents is reduced at high Wire may be used extensively, but because of moun­ altitudes. tainous areas installation and maintenance effort is The following factors influence the effectiveness of greater than normal, especially in deep snow and nuclear strikes in the mountains. extreme cold. Mountain terrain reduces the casualty zone of a In general, Sovietcommand elements are echeloned nuclear weapon. in depth and dispersed over the entire frontage. They Shock wave propagation is intensified in narrow also locate as near as possible to the troops, nearer than valleys and defiles opening in the direction of the burst. they would be on flat terrain. For example, division Casualties may result from rockfalls, avalanches, main command posts may be as close as 3 kilometers and landslides, which may occur at considerable from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). They distances from ground zero. move, at least daily, with divisional forward command Reverse slopes greatly attenuate the shock wave elements moving every 2 hours. Division headquarters effect when the height of burst does not exceed the deploy on the main axis of advance. height of the ridge. A nuclear weapon may be used only when the burst will not impede the advance of friendly forces by AIR DEFENSE causing rockfalls, landslides, and destruction of roads. In mountains, air defense is more difficultbecause of Low-yield air bursts are considered to be the best problems in maintaining unit integrity of both maneu- choice of nuclear firepower. ver and air defense units. Comprehensive air surveil- Irregular terrain patterns reduce the accuracy of lance and air defense fire support is more difficult. Air collateral damage prediction, damage estimation, and defense units operate under a greater than normal vulnerability analysis. 7-4 Snow melted by thermal radiation may cause flash heavy air or artillery support if it is not supported by flooding. diversionary attacks. Thermal radiation also may be reflected by snow Attacking directly from the march is possible only and the thinner atmosphere of higher elevation, when routes and space permit combined arms deploy­ thereby amplifying its effects. ment. Since room for maneuver and fire support, and Fallout prediction is unreliable because of the detailed knowledge of the terrain and enemy defenses strong winds varying in speed and direction. are required, attacking directly from the march will Melting snow will contribute to the residual radia­ not occur often. tion pattern, possibly polluting water and bathing Attacking from positions in direct contact provides sources. the time for Soviet commanders to make personal reconnaissance, to develop fire support plans, and to plan flanking and enveloping attacks. However, the fact MOVEMENT that attacking forces are vulnerable to enemy fire while Mountain marches are always carried out along the in their static positions is a great disadvantage. most accessible routes into the area. The rate of advance in low mountains and hills may be halved, even without the additionally slowing effect of enemy CONCLUSIONS action, poor weather, or natural obstacles. Soviet military doctrine stresses speed, firepower, Terrain restrictions often make deploying from the and shock action at all levels. However, mountain march impossible. Security measures are of greater climate and terrain seldom permit even one of these concern, and surprise is more difficult to achieve. In offensive features, let alone all three. As a result, the the Soviet view, well-prepared defenders generally Soviets have had to adjust their offensive doctrine to have several advantages over attacking units: the mountain environment. These moditications The defender probably is more familiar with the include the following: terrain. Limiting the use of nuclear firepower. Since The defender can achieve surprise more readily. nuclear weapons create extra obstacles in the The defender is more mobile. mountains, the Soviets stress the use of small-yield air Attacks are more vulnerable. bursts. In the offense, Soviet forces attempt to locate breaks. Increasing the role of the helicopter for command, gaps, and breaches in the enemy's defenses and seek control, and communications, evacuation, resupply, dead space and covert approaches to the enemy's close air support, artillery adjustment, and troop lift, position. Approaches may be created by reducing one particularly for troop placement behind enemy lines. or two defensive strongpoints by the heaviest available Placing greater emphasis on initiative and self- fire support and following this with a smokescreen. sufficiency of units operating in the mountains. Flank attacks and envelopments take on even greater Combat actions are much more decentralized. Sub- importance in mountains. Frontal attacks rarely are units are reinforced and task organized at lower levels. conducted without coordinated diversionary attacks Placing artillery and mortars close to the FEBA on the flanks or rear. The frontal attack must have very since mountains considerably restrict their mobility. CHAPTER 8 DESERT WARFARE

Desert terrain and its environment have the The difficulty of orientation and navigation in open following characteristics: terrain with few landmarks, further complicated by Primarily sandy or rocky desert soil. reduced visibility, requires marking routes with stable A shortage or complete lack of water. signs that have good day and night visibility. Signs Extremely sparse vegetation. indicate the route and also warn of dangerous areas. A small population and poorly developed road Combat actions are characterized by: nets. Wide frontages. Less than 10 percent natural masking by relief, Wide gaps between units. with up to 75 percent of a given area observable from Frequent independent operations by regiments or heights. battalions. Sudden and extreme fluctuations of temperature. Increased logistic requirements. Absence of landmarks for orientation and land The need to control (in both offense and defense) navigation. water sources, inhabited areas, developed roads, Strong winds which blow sand and dust, resulting railways, and particularly junctions and airfields. in decreased visibility, communications degradation; and increased maintenance problems and require- ments for engines, running gear, and all types of THE OFFENSE weapons. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War impressed on the Soviets Lack of developed roads normallyforces military the need for full combined arms cooperation in desert movements onto open terrain. Trafficability depends warfare. They pay particular attention to suppression primarily on the nature and condition of the ground of enemy antitank and air defense weapons. and its use rate. While dry, loose, sandy soil can hinder Reconnaissance is conducted across a broad front, cross- country movement, it can be adequate-to-good on many axes, and in depth. It must identlfy gaps in when wet. Saline soil may be rock-hard when dry but enemy defenses, and the best directions of attack very difficult to negotiate when wet. Soil trafficable for Maintaining orientation in the desert is a special a few vehicles may not hold up for entire columns. problem. The basic method of off-road navigation is Columns may have to disperse over a 200- to 300- movement on an assigned azimuth. This is supple- meter width. Moving sands create the most unfavor- mented when possible by reference points, elevations, able movement conditions, as traction (even on foot), and rare identifiable features such as wells, canals, and is often almost impossible to obtain. Moving sands buildings. affect trafficability, visibility, navigation, and par- Control measures for movement normally include ticularly orientation. detailed designation of: Other factors influencing movement rates are Routes and marking methods. visibility, state of driver training, efficiency of route Available landmarks. marking, and greater need for maintenance halts. The Formations to insure security for flanks and rear. planning and preparation of movement and combat Added communications to support wide dispersal. under desert conditions are particularly critical. Location of water, fuel, and supply points , Movement planning includes reconnaissance, obstacle Axes of attack and march routes. identification, route marking, and grading of elevations Some Soviet vehicles are equipped with directional and descents. gyroscope systems that permit holding the required

Desert Movement

ESTIMATED SPEED OF MOVEMENT TERRAIN CHARACTERISTICS DAY NIGHT Sandy hills, loose sand, shale 7-8 kmph 5-6 krnph Sandy valleys 10-1 2 kmph 8-10 kmph Clav-surfaced desert 24-26 kmph 22-24 kmph CAMOUFLAGE direction for 1.5 hours with no greater than a 2 degree Due to sparse vegetation, deserts generally afford error. With careful adjustment, these systems can be little natural concealment and even less means for used up to 5 hours without orientation. camouflage. Forces are particularly vulnerable to Since the desert offers few handicaps to maneuver, observation, especially from aircraft, radar, and heat attacks normally are carried out from the march and at detection. As a result, camouflage in the desert is of high speed. In general, offensivetactics are the same as increased importance but is also much more difficult described in FM 100-2-1. However, frontages normally to accomplish. are wider, with gaps being accepted, and objectives are The Soviets use camouflage paint designed to blend at greater depth. Regiments attack on separate axes. equipment and vehicles in with their background and They are reinforced with sufficient support assets to to break up outlines. The following measures are used allow independent action. Motorized rifle battalions to screen movement and attacks: also may operate independently. Cover of darkness. Forward detachments are employed to penetrate Bad weather, especially sandstorms. gaps in enemy defenses and carry out harassing attacks Smoke. in enemy rear areas. Airborne or airmobile forces may Smoke also may be used to conceal firing positions. seize objectives in depth, normally at night. A supported unit sometimes uses smoke as reference Frontal attacks in the desert against prepared points in artillery adjustment and control of defenses historically have proven unsuccessful. There- movement. (For more information on smoke, see FM fore, the Soviets generally conduct mounted attacks 100-2.1.) against the flanks or rear of enemy defenses.When this is not possible, dismounted infantry may be used to create gaps, which then are exploited by tanks. HELICOPTER EMPLOYMENT Helicopter employment in the desert is hindered by Increased maintenance requirements. THE DEFENSE Lack of cover and concealment. Defense in the desert is difficult due to open terrain, Low air density. lack of cover and concealment, wide frontages, gaps Higher degree of pilot training required. between defending units, and reliance on local water Low-level navigation is more difficult in the desert sources. The attacker probably will probe constantly since reference points are few. and attack when visibility is reduced. Soviet defenses are organized in greater depth. Distances between echelons are greater and forces LOGISTICS more dispersed. Reserves, mainly tank-heavy, are held Desert operations place special strains on logistics in greater depth than usual and may be employed to due to: counter enemy enveloping and encircling movement. Great dispersion of supported units. Motorized rifle company and battalion frontages in the Greater maintenance requirements. forward area are similar to those in the normal defense. Limited concealment and cover,making logistic Motorized rifle companies normally organize in a facilities easier targets. single echelon. Divisions and regiments may defend Increased requirement for water and fuel. independently. Mined sectors, and areas of limited traf- Soviet commanden operate well forward and are ficability may be lightly defended. They may be highly mobile. Communications may be affected by covered only by mobile patrols or outposts. desert weather and atmospheric conditions. Artillery Since the possibility of a night attack isgreater in the units must be highly mobile to keep up with support desert, the night defense requires. units and to reduce their own vulnerability. Maximum use of night-vision devices and elec- tronic surveillance. Forward repositioning of tanks after dark, with NBC EFFECTS tank fires and antitank weapons fires concentrated on Desert terrain affects the behavior and influences roads and likely avenues of approach. the deployment of nuclear, biological, and chemical Intensive patrolling and many observation and weapons. Because of the relative flatness and lack of listening posts. vegetation, chemical and radiological effects are Carefully prepared counterattack plans and routes. comparatively even and steady in all directions. Nuclear weapons emplyment normally results in atmospheric disturbance caused, are particular threats considerable dust clouds which remain in upper air to helicopters. levels for many hours. High temperatures decrease air Nuclear radiation patternns vary widely depending on density, enabling nuclear blast waves to move faster. weapon yield, wind, and the magnesium, sodium, salt. Greater levels of perspiration may increase the effec- and silicon content of the terrain. Thermal radiation tiveness of some chemical agents. effects are greater than normal since there is usually Air instability (a result of temperature variations at less terrain masking in the desert than elsewhere. various levels of the air) greatly affects all NBC agents. High desert temperatures increase the incapaci- As a general rule, the air is more stable a nd more suit­ tating effects of liquid agents close to the target. Air able for NBC employment during the cool of desert instability, wind, and faster evaporation rates cause nighttime than during the heat of the afternoon. most chemical agents to dissipate relatively quickly During the afternoon, for example, the instability of and irregularly. High desert temperatures may kill the air may cause rapid and irregular dissipation of most biological agents chemical or radioactive clouds. High dessert winds may Individual protective clothing can be worn in high affect the distribution patterns of chemical and nuclear temperatures for only short periods of time without clouds as well as dissipate their effects. risking heat illnesses and dehydration. Wearing of indi­ Nuclear blasts, even from air bursts, raise con- vidualprotective clothing also results in less efficient siderable quantities of sand and dirt which inhibit physical activity. Rest breaks become more important. observation and maneuver. This effect and the and water consumption increases. CHAPTER 9 COMBAT IN EXTREME COLD

The Soviet Army is well prepared to operate under add to ovrr-the-snow capability. Tanks carry logs or extremely cold conditions. Because of Soviet beams for use as traction aids. Wheeled vehicle tire geography and climate, over 60 percent of Soviet pressure is reduced to aid mobility March columns divisions are located in and train in areas subject to include tanks with dozer blades, snow-moving equip- extreme cold at least part of the year. ment, and road graders. The Soviets recognize the following effects of No special organizations for winter or arctic warfare extreme cold on military operations: are known to exist in the Soviet Army. However, for at Tactics must be modified to accommodate restric- least part of the year, most Soviet divisions train in cold tions on movement. or extremely cold conditions. Individual training Human and mechanical effciency are reduced stresses ski-drawn movement behind tanks and APC's, considerably. cold injury prevention, equipment care and cleaning The importance of shelters is increased. (especially weapons), and camouflage. Skiing is par- Construction of defenses is hindered by frozen ticularly stressed. earth. Swamps and rivers become passable. Deep snow reduces the effectivenessof high- THE OFFENSE explosive shells, mines, and nonpersisent gas while Attack frontages are probably larger in snow increasing the thermal radiation effects of nuclear because of the difficulty in maneuvering. Reserves are explosions. also probably larger than normal. Vehicles are more difficult to operate and Troops may attack on skis or sleds towed behind maintain. tanks. On reaching the assault line, troops release tow Electromagnetic anomalies and storms disrupt cables or ropes and form an assault line, making a communications. coordinated attack with the tanks. When tracked Deep snow makes orientation difficult. vehicles are used to tow infantry on skis, tanks can tow The range of bullets and shells is reduced. two squads and APCscan tow one. Soldiers are Fluid medical supplies, such as plasma and expected to be able to fire their weapons while being morphine, will freeze if not well protected. towed. Air support is restricted. In deep snow (defined as 1.5 to 2 times the ground clearance of vehicles), troops may attack mounted on tanks. Pursuit may be conductcd hy tank-home PLANNING AND PREPARATION infantry (if snow conditions or lack of roads preclude Soviet preparations for operations in extreme cold use of APCs) or on skis. include: In cold wrather, attack assembly areas are located Special clothing and equipment, particularly heavy closerto the enemy than usual. This lessens approach winter overcoats, hats, fur-lined mittens,and felt boots. distances and therefore minimizes fatigue andcold- An enriched, high-calorie diet with hot food and injury exposure time. Second echelon and reserve drink providedas often as possible. forces follow closer than normal to reduce com- Warming tents and shelters provided whenever mitment time. possible. Specialoils and lubricants for vehicles and crew- sewed and individual weapons. THE DEFENSE In extremely cold weather, the Soviets use special The Soviets attempt to use adverse weather to their fuel mixtures, oils, and lubricants. Vehicles also are advantage. Theydelay the attacking enemy and deny fitted with special winterized couplings on fuel pumps, him shelter, thus prolonging hisexposure to the cold. engine heating and cooling systems, and rxhaust Populated areas and forests provide shelter and systems. Batteries also receive special attention. often are used as strongpoints. The strongest defensive Heaters and warming covers aid in starting vehicles. positions are located along most likely avenues of Wheeled vehicles carry chains and are positioned approach-roads and areas of light snow. Snow is used behind tracked vehicles in march columns whenever to conceal strongpoints as much as possible. Parapets possible. Sandbags, mats, cables, and pioneer tools also of packed snow are built around weapons and vehicles. Snow may also be packed on upper portion of combat during firing). Mortar base plates may crack or even vehicles to aid in concealment. break. Because deep snow greatly reduces the bursting Defense positions not under enemy attack may be radius of projectiles, the number of rounds required occupied by no more than a third of the fighting for target coverage increases. At the same time, the rate strength. The remaining troops occupy warming of fire decreases due to additional prcparation time of shelters. This permits the majority of troops to be at ammunition and maintenance of the weapons. Range peak efficiency in the event of an attack. estimation against a snowy background makes adjust- ment of fire more diffiicult. Many problems associated with fire support in extreme cold can be overcome or LOGISTICS significantly reduced by the use of high technology Limited mobility handicaps logistic effortsin very equipment. This includes land navigation systems, cold weather. Soviet doctrine calls for moving stores ground surveillance radars and laser range finders. The far forward in the offense and stockpiling in the Soviet Army most likely has or is developing this defense. It stresses proper road maintenance for both technology. the offense and defense. ENGINEER SUPPORT FIRESUPPORT Severe weather conditions complicate engineer Artillery support in extreme cold is affected by dif- activities and require greater effort and more assets ficulty of survey in deep snow and under conditions of than normal. Additional engineer tasks include: poor visibility Movement and firing site preparation Preparing routes and assembly areas. are also more difficult. Low temperatures increase the Preparing shelters, cover, and defensive positions. brittleness of metal and make grease and lubricants Preparing artillery firing positions. less viscous. These factors may cause damage to Clearing paths through obstacles. moving pans (particularly the recoil mechanism

Movement In Extreme Weather

MARCH RATES IN EXTREME COLD DISTANCES COVERED lnfantry (snow less than IN ONE DAY'S MARCH 30 cm deep) 3-4 kmph Infantry 12-24 kilometers lnfantry (snow over Ski Unit 32-40 kilometers 30 cmdeep) 1-2 kmph Tracked Vehicles.. 96-112 kilometers Soldier on skis.. 6-8 kmph Subunit on skis.. 3-6 kmph Tracked vehicles 18-24 kmph Tanks and APCs in: THICKNESS OF .Snow under ICE REQUIRED FOR PASSAGE 50 centimeters Employed as usual Infantry 10 centimeters .Snow 50-75 Medium Tanks.. 70 centimeters centimeters (short moves) 10 .Snow over 75 centimeters Restricted to roads or cleared routes CHAPTER 10 COMBAT IN CITIES

DOCTRINE Although their doctrine stresses speed and dynamic Soviet principles for offensive combat in cities at maneuver, the Soviets fully realize that movement division level are: through urban areas may result in greater ammunition Conduct initial attacks from the march, after expenditures and casualties and slower rates of reconnaissance. advance. The Soviets have long acknowledged that Launch attacks from positions in contact with the combat in cities will be unavoidable at times. Given enemy if initial operations fail to make progress. urbanization trends in Western Europe, combat in Decentralize command and control to the maxi- cities could be more the rule than the exception in that mum possible extent. area. Maintain continuous pressure on the enemy Soviet ground forces consider combat in cities to through day and night combat. consist of only those missions conducted in heavily Conceal movement through the use of smoke, populated cities and towns. Combat in isolated villages darkness, or low visibility. or groups of buildings along roads in agricultural or Integrate company-sized tank, motorized rifle, and open areas are considered actions in or against strong- combat engineer assault groups with the direct sup. points and are outside the scope of this chapter. port of antitank guns and the direct and indirect The Soviets classify towns and cities according to support of artillery and mortars. shape, population, and perimeter. The Soviets calcu- While combined arms assault groups provide the late that in Europe there are one or two small cities for main effort during combat in cities, heliborne assaults every 200 to 300 square kilometers of terrain. In a on key points may be used. Helicopters may lift European conflict, there is potential for involvement in motorized rifle troops to key points in the battle area. combat in cities on the average of every 40 to 60 During combat in cities, a Soviet division normally kilometers. attacksin two echelons at each level of command with The decision to attack a city or town may be politi- the following frontages: cally, strategically or tactically motivated and normally Division 4 to 6 kilometers is made at army level or above. Tactical reasons for Regiment 2 to 3 kilometers attack may include: Battalion 400 to 600 meters The city or town is key terrain. Company 200 to 300 meters The area encompasses vital communications Main axes are along major roads to capture key areas, crossings. to disrupt the defense, and to cross the area in the It is necessary to protect an exposed flank. shortest possible time. Division and regimental axes It serves as a diversionary operation. are major roads. A battalion might advance on two or It would tie down enemy troops and reserves. three parallel streets, with one company axis per The built-up area is unavoidable due to the extent street. of urbanization. Combat on such restricted frontages and axes of In the offense, the Soviets plan for their lead advance, results in the following significant control echelons to cut off and to destroy enemy forces before problems: they can occupy cities. If this is not possible, the Soviets Difficulty in coordinating attacks progressing at plan to bypass pockets of resistance with leading different rates with fire support. echelons and continue the advance. Bypassed enemy- Communications problems caused by a large held areas are sealed off and may be neutralized by number of VHF radios operating in close proximity and following echelons. being screened by building?.

Soviet Classification of Urban Areas I

POPULATION SIZE CLASSIFICATION ESTIMATED PERIMETER 100,000 or more Large More than 25 kilometers 50.000 to 100.000 Average 15 to 25 kilometers Less than 50,000 Small Less than 15 kilometers Identification of targets and coordination of fire street patterns as well as the strength of defending against targets in depth. forces. Attacking forces are not evenly distributed Logistic problems, particularly the resupply of around the built-up area. They are employed over the ammunition, which may be used at an extremely high most favorable avenues of approach. Because of the rate in intense combat. manpower-intensive, close-combat nature of combat The commander determines force size and compo- in cities, motorized riflerather than tank units are pre­ sitionbased on the area's size,shape, building type, and ferred. Normally, regimentscoordinate the attacks and

Tactics and Analysis

REPRESENTATIVE TACTICAL FEATURES OF CITYATTACK

(Main Force bypasses. Second echelon forces execute frontal holding attackand attack from rear.)

LEGEND: 1. Forward detachment operating in advance to seize critical bridges. junctions or installations. 2. "Reconnaissance by battle."Probing attacks to determine defensive positions. 3. Withdrawal routesblocked by tank elements or airlanded forces.

Mobile obstacle detachments block withdrawal routes and protect main force flanks.

SOVIET ANALYSIS battalions conduct them. Division and regimental counterbattery tasks. Preparatory fires are shorter than resources reinforce the battalions as required. Indi- normal, 5 to 20 minutes being the historical vidual battalions may have a variety of missions, precedent. depending on the situation. Reserves are created at The missions of engineer subunits accompanying regimental rather than division level. assault groups are engineer reconnaissance, destruc- Motorized rifle battalions may be employed in either tion of buildings, mine clearance, and clearing routes the first or second echelons of an assault on a city or of rubble to allow movement of tanks, APCs, and town. In either case, their organization, tasks, and artillery. assault tactics are probably the same. Antiaircraft weapons, both handheld and crew- In combat in cities, the Soviets call their assault served, are used to cover artillery firing positions and battalions "assault detachments." They are organized commanders' observation posts against low-flying into two echelons. Each company is formed into an aircraft and helicopters. When not engaged in this "assault group." A typical combat organization for an primary role, they suppress enemy ground fire. assault group is: Unlike combat in more open terrain, the Soviet A motorized rifle company. doctrine stresses decentralized control in combat in

One or two tank platoons. cities. This puts- a heavy burden on the battalion's com- Antitank guns. munication systems. However, only through decen­ An artillery battery, in the direct fire role. tralizationcan they cope with the tactical problems of A combat engineer platoon. controlling troops fighting in close quarters. Flamethrower and chemical specialists. It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used Besides the fire support on hand at company level, within a city. Extensive destruction and contamination the battalion commander normally has artillery and would only hinder offensive progress. They may, how­ mortar units under his control to give indirect fire ever, use nonpersistent chemical weaponsbecause of support to his assault groups. Indirect fire weapons are their potential for human destruction without employed to destroy enemy strong points and to neu- causing material damagae. tralize enemy reserves. The Soviets can be expected to use psychological Assault groups are task organized. A representative warfare, including threats, promises, misinformation. assault group may include: and rumors. These would be directed against both Attack or seizure groups consisting of a motorized military defenders and the civilian population. rifle platoon reinforced by tanks. A covering and holding group consisting of up to a motorized rifle platoon reinforced by antitank guns. THE OFFENSE A fire support group which includes attached Combat in the cities imposes demands for a slower artillery in the direct fire role and flamethrowers. pace and tempo of attacks; longer duration of commit- A group of combat engineers equipped with ment; shorter, intense preparatory fires; and specially bangalore torpedoes and mine clearing devices. tailored forces. Soviet tactics reflect these concepts. One or two motorized rifle squads may be used as a Initial reconnaissance of a target urban area is made reserve force to either strengthen attacking or holding following study of large-scale maps, aerial photo- groups or to carry out a contingency task. Tank units graphs, and background intelligence reports. Tactical are used to: intelligence will update such background data from Serve, with combined arms reinforcement, as an long-range reconnaissance patrols, agent reports, advance guard in the approach to the city. aerial reconnaissance, and signal intelligence. When Cut off or envelop the enemy before he reaches the required, task-organized reconnaissance groups built-up area. drawn from motorized rifleand tank units reinforce Envelop the city. divisional and regimental reconnaissance. Reinforce infantry in street fighting. The specific mission of reconnaissance units and Serve as a mobile reserve. groups from division and regiment is to identify: Artillery is decentralized during offensive combat in Enemy deployments outside the built-up area. cities. The commander may attach up to 50 percent of Strongpoints within the city. available artillery to assault groups to be used in the Command posts and communications centers. direct fire role. The remainder is organized into an Reserves. artillery group to provide on-call indirect and counter- Enemy withdrawal routes and successive defen- battery fire. Howitzers and mortars are used for sive positions. FM 100-2-2

Reinforced Motorized Rifle Battalion Attack Through a City I

LEGEND: I boundary Mortar battery (120mm) Minedbarracade boundary Truck-mounted bridge Portableobstacle

Mine-sweeping tank equipped with Blockhouse reinforcedby tanks in the attack mine-clearingroller

Motorizedrifle platoon inthe attack Battalion commander Destroyed bridge

Battalion commander's command post Control line Barbed wire barrier

minefield Mixed Antitank hedgehogs Company commander'scommand post (ant,-personnel and antitank) . - Buildings(mast structures Artillery battery in tiring position wire obstacle are of stone) On receiving his orders fromthe regimental com- artillery fire is shifted to the enemy rear. Smoke is used mander, a battalion commander clarifies his mission by to conceal approach routes. studying his superior's concept of attack. He imme- Canals and rivers that flow through cities pose diately gives his suhordinates a warning order con- significant obstacles to the attacker. Accordingly. taining the battalion's mission, with his guidelines for reconnaissance elements identify likely crossing its completion. The battalion commander then makes areas and standing bridges which are designated as his estimate of the situation. He assesses the enemy, the priority objectives. Assault crossing parties with need for reconnaissance missions, the battalion's tank-launched bridges may be positioned well forward combat organizations, tasks for his own troops, and in attack units. terrain. Using large-scale maps and aerial photographs, After destroying strongpoints at the edge of the city. the battalion commander studies the objective area assault groups mow forward on major roads toward and assigns tasks to individual assault groups. the center of the city. Smoke may be used to cover If time and situation allow, the battalion commander flanks or conceal forward movement. Infantrymen conducts a terrain reconnaissance of his objective, carry up to twice the normal allocation of ammunition from a suitable vantage point. The assault group com- to compensate for high intensity of fire. .If resistance is manders accompany him, and they coordinate on-the- light, the Soviets may move infantry forward by ground reference points and targets for supporting mounting them either in APCs or on tanks. Most weapons. During this reconnaissance, the commander common, however, is for infantry subunits to move on selects and defines departure lines and unit foot along streets, clearing buildings one by one. boundaries. Where necessary, they clear houses by simultaneous The battalion commander and his staff prepare the assaults from roof and ground floor. They also use attack order, which includes: automatic weapons and grenades extensively. Combat Objectives to be seized. engineers attached to assault groups make entry and Approach routes,lines of departure, and phases exit holes through masonry walls. They make (lines) for assault. maximum made of underground passages . Specially Method of assault of individual buildings and assigned teams follow up assault groups to destroy blocks. small enemy parties that survive the initial assaults. Actions of flanking units. Tanks are used to support infantry and to neutralize Method of destroying bypassed groups of enemy. enemy strongpoints. Soviet doctrine calls for strong Details of fire and movement. reserves of tanks at both battalion and regimental Details of smoke, chemical, and flamethrower use. levels. Locations of command posts and control points Tactics for fighting at night remain basically the and the procedure for moving them forward during same as those used by day. The Soviets try to maintain the attack. the same attack intensity at night. Illumination is used Control of battalion offensive tactics in cities differs both as an aid to their own troops as well as a means to significantly from combat in open terrain. Company- blind the enemy sized assault groups attack concurrently and inde- The battalion second echelon is used to exloit the pendently. A major reasonfor decentralization is the success of first echelon assault groups. Normally, the greatly restricted area of observation and radio trans- regimental commander gives the order to commit the mission range. The Soviets pay particular attention to battalion second echelon to the assault. It may leapfrog the difficulties of coordinating indirect artillery fire. through first echelon subunits already in contact with The battalion command observation post is located the memy. Occasionally,the second echelon must 200 to 300 meters behind the assault groups. The complete the task of first echelon subunits. battalion commander personally assigns indirect fire missions to the artillery commander, who is collocated with him, The Soviets believe that the battalion com- THE DEFENSE mander, by staying as far forward as possible, can The Soviets regard citiesas military, political, and personally influence the conduct of an attack. economic centers that are probable targets for an Preparatory indirect artillery fire against urban enemy nuclear strike. Accordingly, they plan to targets is intensive but short, normally lasting only 5to establish their defensive positions on the approaches 20 minutes. Tactical aircraft attack enemy reserve to the city whenever possible. This allows the Soviets positions, artillery emplacements, and communica- to use ordinary field defensive tactics, which are more tions centers. As assault units reach a safety line, economical in manpower and equipment. However, 10-5 there are circumstances that may dictate defense the built-up area. In the second echelon, its mission is within a city. They are: to contain an enemy penetration and restore first To stop an enemy offensive in which a city is the echelon positions. There is a degree of tactical flexi- objective. bility within these missions in that battalions may find To defend a port or naval base. that the direction of enemy assault has changed a To defend a key political or economic base. primary approach into a secondary one, or vice versa. Soviet troops in contact with the enemy are most Battalions positioned on primary approaches have likely to set up the defense of a city after an unsuc­ smaller frontages than those placed on secondary ones. cessful meeting engagement or attack, during a with- The mission of a reserve battalionis to reinforce or drawal, or when a tactical stalemate has been reached. replace battalions in the first or second echelons or to The Soviets regard such a forced defense as a critical cover gaps created in the defense by enemy use of point in combat that could cause the transition from nuclear weapons. nonnuclear to nuclear warfare. A motorized rifle battalion usually holds a number of Defense of a city when not in contact with the company strongpoints.It is reinforced by tanks, anti­ enemy gives time for reconnaissance and building of tank guns, and artillery employed in the direct fire role. fortifications. Units operating well beyond the out- Other artillery and mortar units also provide indirect skins of the city protect the preparations. A defense of fire support. this type may be setup to protect a military base, a port, The defense in both the first and second echelons or an economic, political, or transportation center. consists of a series of company-sized strongpoints. Rear echelon units or reserves usually accomplish the Each company is reinforced by tanks and artillery defense of such areas. according to its mission and the tactical situation. The Soviets consider the city's layout and types of Although the maximum frontage of a strongpoint is structures, the time of year, and the elimate important about200 meters, the exact frontage and depth of the in the planning of the defense. The Soviets experi- battalion depend on: enced these factors in World War II, and theyare a The echelon. pervasive influence in current Soviet military theory The combat strength of the battalion. and practice. The estimated strength of the enemy. The Soviet concept of defense in cities is to draw The layout of the city and the types of buildings. enemy manpower and equipment into kill zones and to A company of tanks normally is attached to a destroy them. The tactics and weaponsystems used motorized rifle battalion defending in a city. The depend on the situation and terrain. A key principle at company is employed either as platoons or as single the operational level is to include an urban area in a tanks set in ambushpositions. Tanks may be used in a larger zone of defense. In this way, the Soviets hope to mobile rolewith two or three alternate positions for give commanders sufficient maneuver room to each tank, or they may be employed in a stationary role maximize the delivery of firepower-especially that of to reinforce the antitank defense. On the outskirts of tanks-and so to inflict the heaviest possible casualties the city, tank units channel enemy forces into the kill on the enemy. zone or conduct counterattacksto slow the enemy The Soviets try to canalize enemy movement into the rate of advance. Tank ambush positions are set up in defended zone of a city by stronglyheld positions on tlie villagesbeyond the city limits as well as on the the flanks. The use of nuclear and chemical weapons to outskirts of thecityy proper. create contaminated areas on the flanks can achieve Motorized riflebattalions receive up to 50 percent the same ends as physically occupying positions and of divisional artilley, including heavy artillery, to be expending enormous amounts of conventional used in a direct fire role. Artillery pieces are emplaced firepower. Soviet doctrine calls for control of the rate either singly or as platoons and come under the com- of enemy advance by launching local counter attacks. mand of the motorized rifle companycommander. The enemy is to be defeated and repulsed on the Each gun has two or three positions. The artillery outskirts, if possible. The Soviets plan to allow the remaining under direct control of the regiment or enemy to engage in close combat in the center of the division is emplaced in covered positions outside the city only as a last resort. city and delivers indirect fire on request. Antitank guns A motorized rifle battalion normally defends as part are under the direct command of the motorized rifle of a regiment. The battalion may be placed in either the battalion commander. Smoke conceals the movement regimental first or second echelon of defense. In the of troops and equipment within strongpoints and the first echelon, its mission is to prevent penetraion of movement of reserves between them. n 10-6

engineer platoon to a A combat may beattached Boundaries and detail of flank protection. and remains under centralized battalion normally the Reserve reponsibilities. of the battalion c Engineer duties control ommander. Tasks of supporting tanks and artillery. are: Engineer duties. To lay mines and prepare obstacles. Security arrangements. To prepare for the demolition of buildings and Defense measures and warnings against nuclear clear fields of fire and chemical weapons. The battalion commander To create passages through buildings for covered ends his order with details of fire coordination. movement in and between strongpoints. In organizing the fire plan, the battalion commander To carry out emergency rescue work. positions his tanks and antitank weapons at the edge of Chemical defense specialists are attached to the the town. After the initial antitank battle, remaining battalion to monitor chemical and radiological weapons are withdrawn to prepared positions within hazards. They also preform decontamination after the built-up area. A few antitank guided missiles nuclear or chemical attack. (ATGMs) may be relocated to successive firing Aviation is used in ground attack to destroy enemy positions within the city. ATGMs are not suited for nuclear delivery systems, break up enemy attacks, and firing at close-range targets because of their minimum neutralize enemy forces attempting to bypass the city. range limitations. Tanks and antitank weapons cover In addition, aviation has the mission to destroy enemy major roads, parks, and squares. Artillery. and mortars aircraft used in close support of ground combat. cover possible enemy approaches . Selected artillery According to Soviet sources, tactical air defense alternate positions allow the guns to be used in the requirements for combat in cities include a much direct fire role. The guns cover lines or areas in natural more restricted use of air defense weapons due to the or engineer obstacles. Besides thefirepower under the close, confined nature of combat in a built-up area. direct command of the battalion commander, the Smaller, lighter antiaircraft artillery can be deployed in regiment also has an indirect fire support plan. The open spaces such as parks, major intersections and on weapons remaining under division and higher control flat roofed buildings. Manportable surface-to-air are located outside the city fo facilitate their redeploy- missiles (SAMs) can be used in a similar role. But the ment. Air strikes from tactical aviation, including both larger SAMs, which depend on their engagement fixed-wing and helicopters will also support ground radars, may find the built-up area highly restrictive or forces. impossible to operate in effectively. .Air defense assets A reinforced motorized rifle battalion deploys i n one may be deployed on the more open, peripheral areas of or two echelons, depending on the size and layout of cities along likely avenues of approach. . by hostile its assigned sector. A reserve of one or two platoons aircraft. normally is created when the battalion deploys in a Before establishing a battalion defense, the battalion single echelon. When the battalion deploys in two commander conducts an estimate of the situation echelons, the mission of its second echelon is to hold a including the following: position and to destroy by counterattack any pene­ Enemy maneuver areas and approaches to his tration of the battalion's first echelon. Such counter- position. attacks may be carried out in conjunction with either Probable enemy nuclear and conventional targets. battalion or regimental reserves. Length of projected stay in the defensive position. The company creates strong points in buildings and Support required from attached and flanking prepares for all-around defense. Doors and windows forces. that are not required for use are filled with bricks or Stockpiling ammunition, food, medical supplies. sandbags. Holes for firing hand held weapons are and water. knocked through walls. The troops mine, barricade, or The structure of buildings and likely areas of destroy stairways. Access between floors is achieved by defense. cutting holes through the floors and using ropes or The battalion commander then locates the ladders. Covered communication routes by under- defending companies' strongpoin ts and supporting ground passage connect the strongpoints. Food and detachments, observation posts, and kill zones. The water are stored in strongpoints in places where they battalion commander's order contains the following will be protected from nuclear or chemical contami­ basic elements: nation. weapon systemslocate on different floor levels The mission and reinforcement of each company. to cover dead space. Snipers are positioned on roofs Sectors of fire and areas of concentrated fire. and in attics. The gaps between strongpoints streets, and open A mobile covering force engages enemy reconnais­ areas are mined and obstacles set up. Bridges over sance and lead units before they reach the edge of the rivers and canals are either destroyed or prepared for built-up area. The covering force maneuvers to meet demolition. Buildings are blown down both to clear the enemy threat as it develops, while combat remains sectors of fire and to create obstacles for enemy armor. on the outskirts of the built-up area. Once enemy The Soviets stress the importance of fire fighting pressure intensifies, the covering force withdraws and during combat in cities. They point out that com- takes up a prepareddefensive position. bustible material should be removed from strong- Once the enemy reaches the edge of the built-up points, as it can lead to gaps being made in the physical area, the Soviets recognize that combat will break defense. Besides the fire hazard, continuous down to a series of small-unit engagements at the monitoring is kept of the chemical and biological company strongpoints. These engagements are fought hazard. Layers of warning systems encompass all means at close range with both heavy and handheld weapons. of communication within the company strongpoints. When enemy infantry and tanks attack together, Soviet Chemical specialists also accompany patrols forward defenders try to destroy the infantry first. This makes of the main defense. the unsupported tanks an easier target in the city. Battalions obtain intelligence from observation and If the enemy succeeds in penetrating a company listening posts, adjacent units, and the regimental staff. strongpoint, the Soviets plan immediately to call in a While in defensive positions on the outskirts of the heavy volume of artillery and mortar fire to prevent city, APC-mounted reconnaissance patrols are sent out enemy advancement into the sector. Battalion to maintain contact with the enemy.When combat resources-second echelon companies of the moves into the city, foot patrols remain in contact with battalion reserve-conduct the counterattack along the advancing enemy. Ambushes are prepared on the planned routes. If the battalion deploys in a single most likely enemy approaches to maintain security and echelon, the battalion reserve makes the to gain tactical information. counterattack. The defensive fire plan is designed to separate The Soviets pay considerable attention to the design enemy infantry and tanks. Artillery breaks up enemy and use of mock-ups and ranges for training in street formations approaching the built-up area. Fires are fighting. Much of the training is carried out to achieve used on the enemy's flanks to canalize movement into physical fitness. There are indications that motorized kill zones. rifle troops learn the skills of combat in built-up areas under simulated battle conditions. CHAPTER 11 NIGHT COMBAT

In the Soviet view, night cannot be a reason for The lack of convection (vertical streams of air) also decreasing activity. On the contrary, they use the dark affects night combat, since the persistence of gas, fog, of night to achieve surprise, to increase the rate of or smoke is considerably increased in the absence of advance, and to win time. The Soviets consider vertical air streams. darkness to be more of an advantage and an oppor- Night combat also is affected by the physical and tunity than a reason for interruption of combat. psychological conditions of the troops. Darkness Combat at night is normally an extension of combat stimulates the imagination and a feeling of insecurity actions begun during the day. The battle may be carried on into the night to retain the initiative with a high offensive tempo. The Soviets recognize that darkness favors the per- Night Factors formance of marches and maneuvers; makes it easier to concentrate men and materiel in a decisive direction; I hampers enemy use of most weapons, airborne troops, DISTANCES AT WHICH LIGHT SOURCES and aviation; and provides favorable conditions for CAN BE OBSERVED AT NIGHT WITH THE NAKED EYE achieving surprise. By skillfully employing the advan- SOURCE DISTANCES tages of night conditions, attacking units can fullfill Vehicle headlights 4-8 km their mission with smaller losses in personnel and Muzzle flashes from single cannons 4-5 km equipment. Muzzle flashes from small arms 1.5-2 km Night also presents problems. It is more difficult to Bonfire 6-8 km orient oneself at night and to maintain direction of Flashlight up to 1.5-2 krn movement. Effectiveness of aimed fire is reduced, and Lighted match up to 1.5 km reconnaissance and selection of targets become more Lighted cigarette .5-.8 km difficult. The Soviets feel, however, that these negative factors can be successfully overcome through frequent NOTE: For observation from the air, these distancesare increased 2 to 3 and careful training. times. Soviet doctrine states that the difficulty inherent in a DISTANCES AT WHICH SOUNDS ARE MAN night attack aids the soldier in the defense and that the AUDIBLE TO AT NIGHT IN OPEN AREAS defender is more confident. However, they also recog- nizes that a well-organized surprise attack has a strong SOURCE DISTANCES negative psychological effect on the defender. Cannon shot up to 15 km Single shot from a rifle 2-3 km Automatic weapons fire 3-4 km CONDITIONS Tank movement AFFECTING NIGHT COMBAT -on a dirt road up to 1.2 km Darkness modifies the outline, shape, and coloring -on a highway 3-4 km of local objects and distorts separation distances. Dark Motor vehicle movement objects seem farther away than they really are, while -on a dirt road up to 500 m lighter ones appear to be closer. According to the -on a highway up to 1 km Soviets, on a clear night one can recognize land relief Movement of troops on foot and coloration up to 400 meters with the naked eye. -on a dirt road up to 300 m Under a high moon, one can spot a moving man at 240 -on a highway up to 600 m meters, and using binoculars, at 700 meters. Small arms loading up to 500 m Sound is another factor that changes at night and Metal on metal up to 300 m leads to both physical and psychological distortion. At Conversation of a few men up to 300 m night, sounds seem louder and carry farther. Direc- Steps of a single man up to 40 m tions from which sounds originate cannot always be Axe blow, sound of a saw up to 500 m determined. Weather conditions such as rain can affect Blows of shovels and pickaxes up to 1,000 m both audibility and visibility and serve as a definite Screams up to 1,500 m advantage for the attacker. Oars on water up to 2,000 m that might eventually lead to panic. Nights normally are resistance or fortified areas or for repulsing reserved for rest. Fatigue and sypmtoms of exhaustion counterattacks. may affectthose who have to stay awake. The basic principles in the employment of illumi­ Darkness reduces the effectiveness of all types of nation devices are surprise and massing. Massing is fires. Effective fires are almost impossible without achieved through a consecutive concentration of night-vision equipment or illumination. Soviet artillery illumination equipment. The Soviets consider radius, and aviation make wide use of illumination but still intensity, and duration important in determining encounter difficulties in spotting rounds and in con- which particular device to use. ducting artillery reconnaissance. Darkness severely Aerial flares producing one million candle power of hampers visual identification and acquisition of enemy illumination burn 3 to 6 minutes and provide a circle of aircraft by regimental air defense elements. Night illumination .5 to 4 kilometers in diameter, depending conditions can increase the morale of tank troops by on their height above the ground. An artillery star shell lessening the possibility of their tanks being destroyed illuminates the ground for 30 seconds over acircle 500 by antitank artillery. However, orientation, location, to 1,500 meters in diameter. Illuminating cartridges maintaining direction of movement. and the general with a range of 200 to 250 meters burn for 7 seconds difficulty of operating vehicles in darkness can com- and illuminate an areawith a diameter of 200 to 240 plicate the employment of tanks. Coordinationwith meters. other units is also difficult. On flat terrain or terrain sloping upwards toward the First echelon engineer support is more important enemy, targets are illuminated from behind. Targets on during combat at night. Soviet engineers are trained to terrain slanting downhill toward the attackers are use illuminating signs and markers to designate direc- illuminated from the front. Illuminating devices are tion of movement, destroyed arras, and passages employed so as not to reveal the location and dispo- through obstacles. sition of friendly troops, to blind them, or to impair Chemical weapons have a greater effect on man- their night vision. power at night due to atmospheric conditions. Con- Illumination of the terrain usually is effected sequently, Soviet commanders are urged to increase according to the senior commander's plan. He defines chemical and radiation reconnaissance at night. illumination support missions, including the general However, monitoring devices are difficult to read and order for terrain illumination, intensity and duration of NBC reconnaissance is considerably complicated. the mission, disposition of the enemy's defense and key Notifying the troops of contaminated arras' is more objectives, measures for disorienting and blinding the difficult in darkness, and commanders are advised to enemy, and measures for countering the enemy's appoint more observers than during the day to provide illumination and night vision devices. The commander a timely warning of the contaminated area. Voice also decides how illumination willbe used to control signals are used to warn personnel.Signal flashes are and maintain coordination among his subunits. He not used as a warning because they reveal friendly defines signals for target designation and specifies locations. combat illumination equipment reserves and how they will be used. Illumination support also may be used in other ways EQUIPMENT in the conduct of night combat. Searchlights can be Illumination devices include illuminating used to blind the enemy, thus making it difficult for cartridges, rockets, shells, aerial bombs, searchlights, him to deliver aimed fires. During the march, illumi- mines, mortars, tracer shells, and flares. nation orients subunits advancing to deployment lines. They are employed to: This prevents confusion in combat formations, and Improve visibility of the ground and of enemy insures precise coordination. Luminous markers along targets. the routes of advance facilitate the rapid advancement Observe the battlearea. of second echelon units and reserve forces. Such Orient troops during the course of battle. markers are used to identify concentration areas. Support the conduct of aimed fire. Luminous distance indicators also are attached to a Blind the enemy and to combat his illumination vehicle's rear light. The driver can determine the support equipment. distance to the vehicle in front of him basedon the Issue commands. number of red stripes he can see (e.g.,one continuous Illumination may be periodic orcontinuous. The red stripe is visible at 50 meters, two red rectangles latter is reserved for a major attack against centers of can be seen at 30 meters). Knowing these distances, 11-2 the driver can adjust his spacing and speed tronic transmitters, and do not require space on the accordingly. radio wave band. They are not susceptible to intercept, Infrared night vision sighting devices include infra­ jamming, or other electronic measures. red binoculars, drivers' indirect vision devices, and The GPK-48 and GPK-59 navigation systems are searchlights installed on vehicles. Radar could be installed in some T-55 and T-62 tanks. The driver only included in this grouping since it is used to conduct has to switch the instrument on, give it time to warm reconnaissance and to adjust fire. Reportedly the up, and set his heading. The GPK-48 was designed to Soviets also have passive infrared vision devices. give direction in snorkeling operations but has no While these instruments permit better observation, built-in compensation to allow for the earth'srotation. they do have range limitations. At longer ranges they The instrument is accurate only for periods of 15 are limited to defining the form, silhouette, and degree minutes without resetting. The more recently of contrast of an obiect. Active infrared devices operate developed GPK-59has a compensatingmechanism on the principle of "illuminating" the ground object by and can operate accurately for up to 90minutes. means of infrared rays and converting the reflection of A computer and display navigation system known as targets into a visible image. The enemy can detect the "the coordinator" is installed insome command tanks. emissions of active devices easily and for that reason The system consists of six components, three of which they are used sparingly. Passive devices do not emit require no access by the crew except for inspection. rays and therefore cannot be detected. The infrared The system displays map coordinates in northings and night observation system, NSP-2, and the infrared eastings rounded off to the nearest 10 meters. The night-driving device, TVN-2, can be used either vehicle heading displayed is in Soviet mils on coarse actively or passively. In complete darkness, it is and fine scales. Theinstrument is 90 percentaccurate. possible with these devices to identify local features Once set, it can be used to navigate within a 100­ and engineer construction, to maintain observation of kilometer grid square. activities, to conduct aimed fire, and to drive vehicles Another Soviet navigation system has a map plotter. without headlights. However, night vision devices are This is not installed in tanks but may be used by some not effective in heavy fog or during heavy rains. motorized rifle units. Tanks also have infrared (IR)sighting equipment for There is also evidence of a new navigation system. It the main armament and searchlights that can be appears to be an improved version of "the coordi- equipped withan IR filter. Targets canbeidentified up nator." The newer .system permits operation within a to 800 meters. Nevertheless, active IR can betray the 100-kilometer grid square without resetting. The exact position of the user if f the enemy is using IR instrument displays plus and minus coordinates on 1­ sensors This hazard is readily appreciated by the kilometer and 200-meter scales from the present Soviets in their night combat. Tank drivers use IR location. Bearing. to the destination is shown on a binoculars regularly in night training. Tank com- seperate dial. manders use binocular-type passive IR sensors. Sound-monitoring devices can provide observation of the enemy when night vision devices are ineffective THE MARCH or cannot be usedfor security reasons.The monitoring The night march is an essential element of night devices can pick up noises made by the movement of combat. The Soviets learned the importance of night personnel and vehicles and by the firing of various marches during World War II when many of their types of weapons. Enemy activities can be determined important operations began with long night marches. based on the sound detected. Heat detection devices Regardless of their difficulty, night marches are a also are used in defining the direction to a target. In the necessity. Their preparation, organization, security, future, the Soviets expect to be able to use heat and execution require a great deal of attention.The detection instruments to determine not only the successful execution of a night march depends to a location of arms and equipment but also the location of large degree on the general maintenance, organi- personnel. zation, concealment, and rapid movement of all units. There are three types of land navigation systems The commander must identify arras that will used in the Soviet ground forces. All three systems present difficulties for concealment and provide depend on a directional gyroscope, an instrument instructions for the use of night vision devices, illumi- designed to accurately preserve an initial reference nation instruments, and communications. Extensive bearing during movement.The three systems are self. use is made of light-signaling equipment (flashlights, contained, do not depend on emissions from elec- signal lights, etc.). By means of thesedevices, signals may be transmitted indicating the start or finish of any without a break so that the enemy will not have time to activity, changes in direction of movement, positions. bring up his reserve or to regroup. An artillery prepara­ requests for fire support, and other tasks. tion usually precedes the night attack. However, to Strict light and sound discipline is paramount and avhieve surprise, an attack may be launched without must be maintained at all times, particularly when preparatory fires, tanks, or the use of illumination. passing through open areas. Active infrared night Night attacks are most often launched 2 or 3 hours vision devices are used when approved by the march before dawn to permit daylight exploitation of success. commander. The success of a night attack ultimately depends on Communications between platoons and companies precise organization, concealment of preparations, can be conducted by messengers or between surprise, control and coordination of combat and sup­ battalions by messengers using motorcycles. Short porting units, fire support, and illuminating and night radio transmissions can be employed for communi- vision devices. cations between regiments. During the night march, 'The commander plans illumination of the objective, security elements are located closer to the main body light signals for coordination, boundary lines for than during the day. attacking units, the means of destroying enemy illumi­ Reconnaissance is conducted before and during the nating devices, and the assignment of reference points. night march. Reconnaissance elements do not range The battalion commander locates himself where he out as far during the night as they do during the day. can observe both enemy and friendly forces. The com­ Besides enemy information. Soviet reconnaissance mander of supporting artillery usually is located with units collect information on the condition of the the battalion commander. march route, existence of bypasses, favorable locations Another control measure is the assignment of for water crossings, and obstacles. The number and azimu ths to each unit. The Soviets depend on the use of strength of reconnaissance units are increased at night azimuths and consider them a valuablesupplement to on both the flanks and the head of the column. reference points. Chemical radiation reconnaissance patrols are Control is exercised further by designating guide provided with infrared devices, illuminating markers, units. Each battalion designates a guide company; each contaminated sector boundary markers, and signs to company, a guide platoon; and each platoon, a guide define contaminated sectors. squad. Guide. subunits are centrally located and Concealment from enemy radar is aided by traveling provided with night vision devices and illumination near population centers, near railroads, and on roads in means. forests. In an attack from a position in direct contact with Normally, long halts are not made at night because the enemy, subunit directions of attack and passages the hours of darkness must be used to the maximum through mine fields or obstacles may be designated by extent for movement. During short summer nights, one-way glowing markers emplaced in the ground. troops are given only a 5- to 10-minute rest at each rest Markers for different subunits may have distinctive stop. Rest stops are taken at sources of water or fuel. shapes or colors. Rest stops must not be made near large population If the attack is made form the march, subunits may centers, railroad stations, bridges, and other objects of be assigned an azimuth of attack. Locations for deploy­ possible enemy interest. Rest stops are never taken in ment from march formation to prebattle formation and open areas or near ravines or defiles. Strict blackout then to attack formation may be designated by ground and noise discipline are maintained. The use of light markers, signal lights, or flares. The depths of subunit and the buildingof fires are prohibited. objectives in a nightt attack would probably be reduced Senior commanders organize traffic control service. from daytime depths Subordinate commanders are informed as to how Complicated maneuvers are avoided because of dif­ traffic control is organized, where traffic control posts line may be ordered to orient suhunits and to clarify have been set up, and how bypasses and difficult the missions. The most common attack formation at sectors of the route are marked. night is the line formation Motorized rifle subunits usually attack dismounted at night. They may conduct a mounted attack if the THE OFFENSE terrain is very open, if enemy defenses have been A night attack may be the continuation of daytime successfully neutralized by combat support means, and combat, or it may be the start of a new attack. A con­ if illumination is abundant. tinuation of a daytime attack must be carried through Within the attack formation, distances between recognition signals. The commander plans the number tanks, dismounted riflemen, and APCs is reduced. and location of illumination posts, the amount and type Riflemen probably attack on line with or immediately of illuminating equipment to allocate to units, the behind the tanks. APCs probably follow at a distance of reserve to be retained for his own disposal, target approximately 100 meters. indication procedures, and illumination readiness If illumination is abundant, subunit attack frontages time. Incendiary shells may be employed to start fires are probably the same as those for an attack in daylight. to blind or illuminate the enemy. If little or no illumination is available or used, or if dif­ Planning for a counterattack begins with the ficult terrain must be crossed, attack frontages prob­ preparation and organization of a night defense. The ably arc reduced. As in a daylight attack, theSoviet night counterattack must be simple and carried out commander tailors his forces and tactics to the quickly. A determined surprise night counterattack, situation. even by a small force, could have considerable impact It is difficult to pinpoint the exact location of on the enemy's night attack because of its psycho- artillery bursts and to conduct artillery reconnaissance logical impact. during periods of artificial illumination and when night Artillery, mortars, and tanks are given preparatory vision devices are used. Consequently,maneuver sub­ fire missions against any enemy penetration and in units are assigned more supporting direct fire weapons support of the counterattack. The unit commander at night. Supporting weapons either move separately allocates tasks t o the artillery and mortars to prepare from the maneuver subunits, move several hundred concentrated fire in the area of probable enemy meters to their rear. or move directly on line with penetration. them. Some artillery may remainat the line of depar- A night counterattack usually is conducted in one ture to support the attack when subunits moveout to echelon. With a single-echelon combat formation, the attack. combined arms cooperation and control are con­ Illumination assures effective artillery fire to siderablysimplified. distances of not more than 3,000 meters. The closest line ofillumination ( when illuminating shells are used in windless weather) is fixed at no less than 500 THE DEFENSE meters from the guns detailed to carry out direct fire. Night creates many difficulties for the attacking The targets to be destroyedby direct fire should be forces hut offers considerable advantage to the located approximately in the center of the illuminated defender.Darkness reduces the effectiveness of an zone. attacker's reconnaissance. observation, and aimed lllumination by searchlight is periodic. Searchlights tires. Darknessalso providesthedefender with better are turned on for 10 or 15 seconds and then switched concealment than the attacker. It is more difficult at off for the same period of time. Illumination is night for the attacker to maneuver and control his employed in a manner to hinder the enemy's activity forces.The defender, on the other hand, can move but not disclose the objective of Soviet activity. forces under thecover of darkness from the FEHA or Each artillery battalion designates one platoon for from areasthreatenedbytheenemy beforethe attack illumination missions. Illumination can be either begins, thus conserving his forces and causing the periodic or continuous. In the latter case, illuminating enemy to attack areas of little value. rounds are fired every 20 to 30 seconds, 5 to 10 Thedifficulties in organizing a night defense require seconds less than the full burningtime of one round. a comprehensivedefense operation order. The more The most important tasks of reconnaissance important items of an order are: elements in a night defense are timely detection of Possible enemy night activities. enemy preparation for a night attack, location of Reference points. enemy illumination equipment, and detection of Tasks for reconnaissance. enemy engineers penetrating obstacles. Ambushes Raids. may be set up, and friendly patrols may be sent out at Location of observation and listening posts. night to reconnoiter gaps between strongpoints or on Security. exposed flanks. Utilizationof nightvision devices. One of the most important measures in night The fireplan. defense is illumination support. This includes Anillumination plan. illuminating the ground area, blinding the enemy, Signals for warning, control, and identification. setting up marker lights, and determining mutual Camouflage. In a night defense, the command observation post is and to develop initiative and resourcefulness. The located near the FEBA so the commander can conduct problems are based as much as possible on actual his own battle surveillance using night vision devices combat conditions. Psychological training is expected and illumination equipment. Additional observation to develop confidence and a feeling of superiority. posts can be established in the forward area if required. Some physical training is conducted at night. It may be necessary to reinforce night defenses and Soldiers run through a conventional 200-meter to increase the density of fire in front of the forward obstacle course at night, crossing obstacles such as area as well as in sectors not occupied by friendly units. ditches, bomb craters, fences, palisades, walls, Reserves or second echelon forces may be moved up to trenches, pits, streams, and ravines under combat the forward area for the night. conditions. Although the Soviets devote a great deal of time to TRAINING night training, indications are that for the most part the Since the Soviets consider night operations to be a training is stereotyped, unrealistic, and frequently normal activity, their training patterns reflect this noncomhat-related. Soviet night training reflects the attitude. The Soviets claim to devote about 50 percent fact that they plan to move a lot at night. Thus, night of training time to night training. marches and related activities (reorganization, mainte- The Soviets begin their training for night combat nance, and preparations for a daylight attack) compose with the individual soldier and then progress to unit the bulk of Soviet night training. training. The soldier learns to select and recognize Training for movement at night also indicates a orientation points that may escape his attention during discrepancy between doctrine and practice. Despite a the daytime. He is trained to recognize different variety of available night vision devices, vehicular head- sounds and to estimate their range and direction. He lights and flashlights are used often to help maintain also learns to use night vision devices and aritifical control and orientation. illumination. He is taught night firing techniques. A great deal of night movement and training takes Special training is set aside for night tank and truck place only after thorough reconnaissance, planning, driving. and rehearsal are conducted during daylight hours. The Soviet soldier is given a number of training Soviet night training is directed more at movemmt, problems that he must solve in total darkness, without preparation for daylight attacks, construction of field the aid of night vision or illumination devices. This is fortifications, and resupply than at preparation for done to prepare him psychologically for night combat large-scale night combat. CHAPTER 12 REAR AREA COMMAND AND CONTROL

THE REAR AREA The Soviet concept of the "rear area" visualizes Soviet rear area support has a dual task: peacetime modern war in an unprecedented spatial scope. This support and wartime support. In peacetime, rear area rear area concept stretches from the forward edge of support maintains the Soviet armed forces in a high the battle area (FEBA) back to the national capital. state of preparedness for commitment on short notice. To the Soviets, there are two aspects of the rear area Soviet military doctrine requires that the armed forces concept: broad and narrow.The broadaspect includes and the entire population constantly be prepared for the entire country, its population, economy, govern­ the sudden outbreak of a major war. In wartime, rear ment,and its political structure. It is the production area support provides technical, materiel, and medical base for necessary war materiel, the mobilization base support to forces engaged in combat. The Soviets think for personnel replacements, and the control center for a major war in Europe is likely to be a short. highly the complete war effort. The narrow aspect includes intense conflictwith conventional or nuclear weapons the activities of all military units that supply technical, disrupting the flow of service support. They expect materiel, and medical support to combat forces in logistic requirements to be quite large when their established theaters of military operations (TVD). offensive is in the initial stage. After the penetration. Soviet rear area support is organized on three logistic requirements will lessen because attacking different levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. forces will encounter less organized resistance deep in the enemy's rear. The Soviets also recognize the need to prepare for a Strategic long conflict and to support combat forces that attain Strategic rear area operations are conducted at the and hold deep objectives. Service support units in the national level by the Ministry of Defense. They extend operational (army and front) rear and the Soviet into the theater of combat operations during wartime. central logistic system provide this in-depth, follow-on Strategic rear area operations procure personnel, support. Service support is organized to keep pace materiel, and services needed by the military. These with rapidly advancing frontal forces (mechanized operations prepare the Soviet economy and the Soviet and armored units supported by aviation). The central people to provide sustained support in case of war. logistic system may deploy to theaters of military Also, central rear services,which is the highest logistic operations (TVDs) and directly support operational organization of the armed forces, serve both to link the forces if required. national economy and the armed forces and to directly support operational forces. CHIEFS OF THE REAR AND THEIR COMMANDS Operational The overall system of rear area support is the respon- Operational rear area functions are conducted by sibility of the Chief of the Rear of the Soviet Armed front and army rear area support elements. Military Forces. He is also one of the Deputy Ministers of districts, groups of forces, and army support elements Defense. He is the principal controller and coordinator are the principal points of delivery for materiel and of the many logistic organizations and assets which equipment contracted by the Ministry of Defense. make up the central rear services. However, the organi- Most items are received, stored, and prepared for zation of specificrear area operations is the respon- release to combat units directly from industry. Support sibility of each individual unit commander. activities in the operational rear area are conducted The Soviets emphasize the commander's respon- mainly from fixed or semifixed installations. sibility to organize his own rear area operations at every level of command. The commander delegates this responsibility to his deputy commander of the rear Tactical also known as the chief of the rear. The tactical rear is at division and lower. Tactical The Soviets stress the important role played by the rear area operations meet the immediate combat chief of the rear. He is a rear services officer who is needs of supported units. Divisions carry about 3 to 5 directly subordinate to his commander. There is a rear days of supplies. services officer at every level of command down to regiment. He assumes responsibility for rear area maintain continuous rear area command and control details, which permits the commander to devote his during redeployment of the main rear area CP. The full energies to combat operations. operations group consists of a few rear area staff The rear area command and control is based on the officers with limited communications who tem- commander's operational decisions. The commander porarily can maintain command and control of rear may make these decisions or delegate this respon- area operations while the command post relocates. sibility to his chief of the rear. Specific rear area decisions include designating deployment areas and direction of movement for rear service elements; LEVELS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL determining supply and evacuation points, size of Soviet rear area support is controlled at three levels: necessary reserve units, and the periods of their forma- strategic, operational, and tactical. tion; specifying medical and technical support; estab- lishing rear area security measures; and designating initial and subsequent locations of the rear area Strategic command post. At the strategic level, the Ministry of Defense is Each chief of the rear has a staff to assist in planning responsible for all rear area activities of the armed and providing rear area support. The staff coordinates forces. Within the Ministry of Defense, the Chief of the with arms and services tasked with logistic functions Rear of the Soviet Armed Forces accomplishes central and responsibilities. The chief of the rear, together coordination of all support activities. He and the rear with arms and services representatives, develops both services staff coordinate support operations of the a rear area support plan based on the commander's deputy commanders for the rear of the service decision and any instructions from the chief of the rear components and troop branches, the sixteen military of the next-higher level.This plan contains specific districts within the USSR, and the groups of Soviet deployment and movement schedules for rear area forces deployed outside the USSR. elements, control and coordination measures for their Directly subordinate to the Chief of the Rear are the activities, and measures for rear area security. support directorates common to all services and The chief of the rear coordinates basic rear support branchese (food, clothing, POL, medical, and veterinary matters with the unit's chief of staff and arms and services). The Chief heof the Rear coordinates with the services representatives. He keeps them updated on service branch directorates as well as with special the equipment status, the availability of reserves, and troop directorates on matters falling within their the medical support. The chief of staff, in turn, provides jurisdiction. the chief of the rear with timely information regarding In wartime, central logistics units, resources, and the mission and the commander's decisions. command and control elements may deploy to a Rear area command posts (CPs) are established at theater of military operations (TVD). The functions of all echelons from front to regiment. A rear CP must be these elements would be to support operational able to communicate with the parent unit and with formations and to organize the use of theater subordinate, adjacent, and higher rear area command resources. posts. CP personnel include the chief of the rear, his staff, and the communications, transportation, security, and traffic control troops. Operational Rear area communications are guided by the same The highest level administrative headquarters in basic principles that are applied to all Soviet communi- peacetime are the military districts in the USSR and cations: continuity, mobility, and redundancy. Com- groups of forces outside the country. In wartime, both munication means include messengers, wire, and radio have sufficient communications and staff elements to (single-channel, multi-channel, tropospheric scatter). form fronts.There are no fronts as such in peacetime. Radio links are supported by airborne, ground-based, The military district is a high-level military territorial and satellite relays. Data links extend from the Ministry administrative command. It includes military areas, of Defense to at least front rear area command posts. recruiting districts, military schools, installations, and Secure voice communications are established down to garrisons. When units in a military district are formed regimental rear. into a wartime front, elements of the military district The rear area command post's mobility and surviva- staff may provide the basis for the front rear area staff. bility are improved by employing an "operations The military district continues to provide command group."The functions of the operations group are to and control for assigned central rear services missions 12-2 and other support functions. The peacetime rear area weapons and associated equipment is the respon- support organization of a group of forces can quickly sibility of the deputy commander for armaments. assume command and control of front rear area These activities are coordinated with the chief of the operations. rear. The wartime operational combined arms formations Chiefs of the rear at regiment and division have small are fronts and armies. The rear area operations for staffs to coordinate the activities of all combat service these formations is accomplished by a chief of the rear, support elements at their respective levels. However, (also called the deputy commander for the rear)and their basic command responsibility changes for rear his support units. area security. If requirements dictate, tactical units can Command and control of rear area operations are be assigned rear area security missions under the conducted from rear area command posts. The front operational control of the chief of the rear. establishes its rear area command post 150 to 200 km Division and regiment rear area command posts are behind the FEBA. The army locates its rear area com- equipped with fully mobile communications facilities. mand post about 100km behind the FEBA. In high Division rear area command posts will be about 30 km tempo offensive operations, rear area command posts behind the line of contact; regiment rear area com- move frequently. mand posts will he about I5 km behind the line of At front and army, the chief of the rear hasvarying contact. degrees of authority for accomplishing the following There is no chief of the rear (deputy commander for rear area functions: the rear) lower than regiment. The unit commander Controlling rear area security, including control of below regiment is his own manager of rear area combat elements tasked to provide rear area security. operations. Tasking directorates with specific support At tank and motorized rifle battalion level, the com­ missions. mander is assisted by the following personnel: Assigning deployment areas to support units in the Chief of battalion staff (similar to US battalion rear area. executive officer) is the principal assistant for Coordinating with chiefs of serrvice troops, tank, organizing and administering battalion rear area rocket troops and artillery, and the Central Military operations. Transportation Directorate (VOSO) for rear area sup­ Battalion technical officer is responsible for port in their respective areas. organization and control of maintenance, repair, and Issuing instructions to subordinate chiefs of the salvage of both combat and noncombat vehicles. rear about the administration of support activities. Battalion supply platoon commander orders, stores, and distributes all supplies and equipment. He commands a supply platoon consisting of a supply Tactical section and an ammunition and motor transport At regiment and division, the chief of the rear section. The ammunition and motor transport section (deputy commander for the rear) supervises a staff operates the battalion's cargo and POL trucks. which includes deputies for food; petroleum, oils, and At company level, a company technical officer assists lubricants (POL); and clothing. Coordination is made the commander in logistics. The company technical with engineer, signal, transportation, chemical, and officer supervises weapons crews in field maintenance ammunition directorates. Vehicle maintenance, and light repair. He also is assisted by a company first repair, and recovery is the responsibility of the deputy sergeant who is accountable for company-level supply. commander for technical affairs. The repair of on board CHAPTER 13 LOGISTICS

CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES Delivery Forward Comparison of US and Soviet military elements has Higher headquarters handle supply requirements led to the incorrect view that the Soviet logistic struc­ for their subordinate units. Supplies and services are tureis austere and inadequate to support their combat delivered directly to subordinate units using the forces. Because of differences in concept and organi- organic transportation assets of the higher head- zation, Soviet logistic operations have been falsely quarters. For example, an army headquarters uses its referred to as the "Achilles' heel" of Soviet military own trucks to deliver supplies to its subordinate power. However, Soviet military forces do receive divisions. In emergencies, one level may be bypassed in effective logistic support. The Soviets have spent supply delivery. A division may deliver supplies directly enormous sums of money to develop a modern and to subordinate battalions, or a regiment may deliver highly mechanized logistic support system. Materiel- directly to subordinate companies. This concept does handling equipment is increasing in both quantity and not prevent a subordinate unit from using its assets to quality. The use of pallets, containers,and packages has obtain supplies from its superior headquarters, greatly improved the efficiency of Soviet logistic especially in critical situations. efforts. The Soviets have increased the depth and range of forward service areas and increased the mobility and range of logistic formations in support of frontline Continuous Supply Base Support forces. They have developed a tactical pipeline Supply bases and repair facilities are established as capability and introduced improved transportation far forward as possible to insure the flow of supplies assets in great numbers. Also, Soviet capabilities for air from the central logistics level directly to combat delivery to forward areas and the use of helicopters for units. These echelons of bases from the homeland to resupply have shown marked improvements. deployed battalions assure continuous support for tactical elements. Centralized Planning This principle requires concurrent tactical and Standardization of Equipment logistical planning as well as coordination with civilian The Soviet system of standardization is both exten- industry and transportation. Centralized planning sive and effective. For example, of the 3,544 parts that insures coordination of civilian war production with make up the ZIL-131 3 1/2-ton truck, 45 percent may military requirements. be used on other ZIL-produced vehicles, and 23 percent may be used on other trucks of the same weight class. A T-62 tank and the MAZ537 tank trans­ Tailoring of Logistic Units porter share a common power plant. The chassis used' This principle allows allocation of logistic resources for the amphibious PT-76 light tank has been adapted to the combat elements most essential to the success for BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, SA-6and of the mission. Tailoring allows the Soviet military to FROG-2,-3, -4 and -5 TEIs, the GSP amphibious ferry, assign priorities for logistic support. the GT-T amphibious tractor, the ASU-85 airborne SP gun, and the ZSU-23-4 SP AA gun. Extensive standardi- zation has reduced the volume of repair parts and Fixed Supply Priorities improved the Soviets' ability to repair forward through The Soviet logistic system operates on the following cannibalization. Also, obsolete vehicles and weapons sequence of priorities: can be retained for training purposes without having to 1. Ammunition of all types. keep a large stockpile of repair parts. 2. POL. 3. Technical supplies. 4. Rations and clothing. Supply Accountability However, these priorities can change with the and Resource Conservation combat situation. For example, a unit advancing The Soviet system is stringent in these areas, and rapidly with no opposition has a greater need for POL penalties for unnecessary waste generally are severe. than for ammunition. Soviet military publications continually stress resource 13-1 consenation and honor personnel who effectively Supply and service functions common to all military conserve supplies. units and personnel for which the Chief of the Rear has responsibility include: food, clothing, personal equipment, fuel and lubricants, medical and veterinary Complete Use of Transportation services, post exchange, transportation planning, and The Soviet logistic system uses rail transport when- research and development, procurement, storage, ever possible to move supplies from the Soviet Union issue, and maintenance of common-use items. While to front or army level depots. Other transportation these areas are the direct responsibility of the Chief of assets, primarily motor assets, are used from that point the Rear, other troop component items are the respon- forward. The Soviet military has three separate groups sibilities of other directorates and troop commands. of transportation personnel- railroad troops, motor Force components, troop commands, and military transport troops, and pipeline troops. Soviet doctrine districts have rear service directorates. The deputy calls for using tactical combat vehicles to move addi- commander for the rear is responsible for movement tional POL and ammunition stocks, especially in the of supplies and troop units, and evacuation of preparation phase before offensive action. casualties and materiel. Under his control, motor transport assets are centralized for operational employment, especially in a preoffensive buildup and Complete Mobile Support for resupply of advancing elements. Centralized From division to company, materiel and servicing control allows use of motor transport assets from facilities operate from wheeled vehicles. Critical second echelon units in frontline operations. supplies such as ammunition are boxed and uploaded on support and combat vehicles. These measures support a continuous, rapid offensive. Resources Management The total amount of resources allocated to the military is a political decision. The Politburo of the Forward Positioning of Support Elements Central Committee of the Communist Party probably Soviet maintenance and medical facilities operate determines the amount of yearly production allocated under similar procedures. Both attempt to locate in to the armed forces for current consumption, and the areas of greatest need with emphasis on quickly allocation to be held in reserve. The Council of returning lightly wounded personnel and repairable Ministers (of which the Minister of Defense is a equipment to the combat elements. Personnel and primary participant), and its subordinate agencies equipment requiring additional attention are work out the details of the allocation plans. evacuated to the next-level facility. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) prepares its budget proposal in conjunction with other agencies of the state. The General Staff prepares preliminary estimates Use of All Possible Resources of armed forces requirements. The State Planning Soviet troops are taught to forage for food in local Commission reviews and modifies these estimates in areas and to use captured stocks of food, ammunition, the light of priorities assigned to other government and equipment. While food preparation and clothing agencies and the resources available. The MOD then supply procedures have improved, the supply submits the estimates to the Council of Ministers for priorities discussed above may require the use of approval as a part of the annual state budget. The enemy materiel. General Staff, with the State Planning Commission, furher defines the military requirements and directs its various headquarters and directorates to prepare a CENTRAL-LEVEL LOGISTICS detailed procurement program. This program then provides the data needed for the armsand services and Organization the subordinate elements of the Chief of the Rear to The joint policy and control agency in charge of prepare their own specific procurement programs. logistics support for the armed forces is the Office of Other agencies of the MOD have specialized the Chief of the Rear within Ministry of Defense procurement responsibilities that are not delegated to (MOD). The Chief of the Rear, a deputy Minister of the Chief of the Rear. The Main Rocket and Artillery Defense, provides logistical input to plans developed at Directorate is responsible for development and the highest levels of Soviet government. procurement of self-propelled and towed artillery, mortars, tank guns, antitank guided missiles, air Preparation and placement of orders require close defense guns, small arms, and all typesof ammunition, coordination between the MOD, the StatePlanning lubricants, and cleaning materials for weapon Commission, and theeconomic ministriesresponsible maintenance. The Main Armor Directorate is respon- for executing the military requirements. Representa- sible for development and procurement of tanks, tives of the major force components and of the direc- infantry fighting vehicles, and certain other armored torates and troop commands perform the function for combat vehicles. The Central Auto-Tractor Direc- the MOD under the supervisionof the Chief of the torate is responsible for developing and procuring Rear. wheeledand trackedprime movers, military trucks Accountability is extremely important in the and trailers, adverse-terrain vehicles, fuels and lubri­ procurement process. The Communist Partyand the cants, and for repair andmaintenance of vehicles, Military Industrial Commission oversee the entire except for tanks and otherarmored combat vehicles. research, development, and acquisition process. MOD Agencies of the Ministry of Defense have special Central Finance Directorate maintains fiscalcontrol. troop resource management responsibilitiesfor the Representatives of MOD main technical directorates armed forces. The Chief of Engineer Troops is respon- are stationed at factories to inspect finished materiel. sible for supply, storage, and maintenance of engineer The MOD directly tasks military industry research equipment and materiel. The Chief of Chemical institutes, munitions plants, shipyards, and other Troops is responsible for supply, storage, and mainte- production facilities, as well as non-military research nance of chemical equipment and materiel. The Chief institutes, and design and production facilities of other of Signal troops is responsible for supply, storage, and industrial ministries to develop and produce military maintenance of signal equipment and materiel. items.

MOD Logistics Organizations

MINISTER OF DEFENSE

Deputy Minister I of Armaments CHIEF OF REAR (DeputyMinister of Defense) I I TECHNICAL DIRECTORATES DIRECT SUBORDINATES TO BRANCHES AND SPECIAL ChiefMain Rocket and CHIEF OF REAR TROOPS Artillery Directorate Main Trade Directorate Chief of Rocket and Chief Main Armor Directorate CentralFinance Directorate Artillery Troops Chief Central Auto-Tractor Administrative Management Chief of Armored Troops Directorate Directorate Chief of Engineer Troops Personnel Directorate Chief of Chemical Troops Central Food Directorate Chief of Signal Troops Military Tourism Department Chief of Highway Construction Clothing Supply Directorate Troops Fuel Supply Directorate CentralMilitary TransportationDirectorate Central Military Medical Directorate Chief of Railroad Troops Billeting Directorate Veterinary Service

LEGEND: Subordination Coordination

13-3 Logistic Stockpiles The logistic storage of war materials consists of four The fmnt is not a fixed organization but is tailored major categories: state, strategic, mobilization, and to meet specificobjectives based on forces available, mobile reserves. mission requirements, enemy forces, and the physical geography of the area of operations. Tailoring affects State Reserves. Foodstuffs, petroleum products, the number and type of subordinate combat elements manufactured goods, and other strategic raw materials and the number and type of assigned logistic units. The are stored in special government warehouses. These logistic operation of the front is extensive and items can be issued only with the express permission complex, and it serves as the major connecting link of the State. While these stocks are considered to be between the industrial base of the Soviet Union and separate from the military items held in strategic forces engaged in combat. reserve, military use of at least part of these items is Generally Located between 150 to 200 kilometers anticipated. from the FEBA, thefrontrear area is servedby air, high. way, rail, and pipeline from the USSR. Rail transport Strategic Reserves. These reserves are stocks of bears the burden of movement requirements to the supplies and equipment controlled by the MOD. These front. Despite improvements in motor transport, rail stocksare similar to stocks in State reserves and are not transport is used to carry the majority of Soviet war planned for early use in a conflict. materiel as far forward as possible. The frontsupply complex has awide range of fixed Mobilization Reserves. Thesematerialsareheldfor and mobile depots and other facilities such as major issue to newly activated, large military units and for hospitals and capital maintenance facilities. At this resupply to combat units in the early stages of a level, depots are administered by each service, special conflict. One directorate in the MOD determines the troop directorates, and the various subordinate level and configuration of these stocks. It also is elements under the chief of the rear. When the responsible for their accountabilityand maintenance. distance between front and army rear areas is great, a The military districts coordinate mobilization front logistic base may be formed and located in the measures between military and civilian sectors. forward portion of the front area. This logistic base is situated along a railroad line when possible and also is Mobile Reserves. Ammunition, fuel, rations, and supported by highway, air, and pipeline. equipment are located with deployed ground units The army is the highest-level peace time combined and transported by the unit's organic transport. arms formation. It has a permanent staff plus assigned Ground forces maintain these supplies for use in combat support and combat service support elements. immediate conduct of ground operations. These With the exception of its reduced size, the army supplies are distributed throughout the ground forces logistic base is similar to that of the front. Logistic in both tactical and support elements. Quantities of elements are basically the same for both tank and com­ these supplies are established by published norms. bined arms armies. Theyare constantly checked and keptat proper levels. The army logistic base normally is located within An emergency reserve of supplies is maintained within 100 kilometers of the forward edge of the battle area these stocks. It can be used only on order of the unit (FEBA). Like the front, the armyrear area is served by commander. rail, highway, air, and pipeline when possible. If distances between the army and its subordinate divisions' rear area become great, or the number of OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS units to be supported changes, a forward army logistic Within the Soviet logistic system, the bulk oflogistic base is established. Multiple transport modes service units are concentrated at two levels, frontand army. this forward base as much as possible. From this base This concentration supports the Soviet philosophy of forward, motor transport is used for the bul of streamlined, highly mobile combat elements at materiel movement. division and below. The responsibility and the primary means for logistic support are maintained at these higher levels. Tactical units are free to engage the TACTICAL LOGISTICS enemy in high-speed and highlymobile action. This At the tactical level, Soviet logistic support is fully reduction of logistic personnel at the tactical level mobile. Streamlined logistic elements support the explains how Soviet divisions can he smaller than US respective tactical units with ammunition, POL, and divisions but have more firepower. rations to insure continuous combat operations. Supply elements deliver materials to the rear of combat supply actions. There are no branch depot chiefs at this elements deployed on the FEBA. Medical and mainte- level to assist him. Maintenance functions are the nance elements deploy as far forward as possible to responsibility of the deputy commander for technical accomplish rapid return of lightly wounded personnel matters. Located up to 20 kilometersfrom the FEBA, and lightly damaged equipment to the combat units. these logistic elements directly supply subordinate Personnel and equipment requiring additional atten- battalions, and also may supply line companies when tion are evacuated from the battlefield. required. Divisional combat service support elements are Battalion logistic support is self-contained.Supplies completely mobile. The division mobile logistic base are maintained with the supply and maintenance normally is located approximately 25 to 40 kilometers platoon and transported on battalion vehicles. Pre- from the FEBAin the offense,and up to 50 kilometers scribed norms of supply are maintained for all classes in the defense. Logisticelements are organized similar of materiel, with replenishment provided directly by to logistic elements at army level. The logistic base is regiment or division logistic elements. The battalion headed by a logistics officer, assisted by branch depot chief of staff is the organizer of rear servicefunctions. chiefs, and subordinate to the deputy commander for The deputy commander for technical matters is in the rear. Maintenance operations are the responsibility charge of maintenance support. The supply platoon of the deputy commander for technical matters. Motor commander is responsible for receipt, storage, and transport, medical, and field bakery facilities are delivery of supplies to companies. He also deploys and organic to the division. Supplies are delivered to operates battalion ammunition, fuel, and rationpoints. regiments and battalions. The battalion fel'dsher (a physician's assistant) is chief At regimental level, supplies are loaded on vehicles of the battalion medical section. He is responsible for to maintain equal mobility combat elements. The gathering and evacuating wounded personnel from the regimental chief of rear servicesis responsible for all companies and the battlefield.

Locations of Tactical Logistic Elements I UNIT LOGISTICELEMENT DISTANCE FROM DISTANCE FROM FEBA (INTHE FEBA (IN THE OFFENSE) DEFENSE) COMPANY Ammunition Supply Point 100-150 M Rations Supply Point UP TO 1 KM Medical Point 100 M BATTALION Ammunition Supply Point 4 KM 2-3 KM Repair Point 5 KM 3-5 KM Rations Supply Point 5 KM 3-5 KM Medical Point 1.5-3KM 1.5-3 KM REGIMENT Ammunition Supply Point 10-15 KM 10-20 KM Repair Point UP TO 15 KM UP TO 20 KM POL Supply Point 10-15 KM 10-20 KM Rations Supply Point 10-15 KM 10-20 KM Medical Point 5-7 KM 6-10 KM Damaged Motor Vehicle 5-7 KM 6-10 KM Collecting Point DIVISION Supply Dump (Ammunition. 25-30 KM 35-50 KM POL Rations) Repair Point (Tanks, 20-40 KM 35-50 KM Weapons) Repair Point (Wheeled 10-14 KM UP TO 20 KM Motor Vehicles) Medical Point 10.14 KM UP TO 20 KM IFRONT COMMANDER

DEPUTYCOMMANDER CHIEF. OF STAFF I I CHEF DEPUTYCOMMANDER CHIEF CHIEF CHIEF OF THE REAR CHIEF WHEELED/TRACTOR MISSILE ARTILLERY SIGNALTROOPS ENGINEER TROOPS CHEMICAL STAFF TROOPS TROOPS STAFF 6 STAFF STAFF & STAFF ...... I . SIGNALEQUIPMENT MAINTENANCEBASE HO . REPAIR BATTALION . SUPPORT COMPANY FORWARD REAR REPAIRBATTALION . PARTS/EQUIPDEPOT . ARTILLERY/ORDNANCE . MAINTENANCE BATTALION AMMUNITION DEPORTS . PARTSDEPOT BRIDGE ROAD . TRAFFICCONTROL CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCTION . • BATTALION BATTALION BRIGADE • WHEELED/TRACTOR SAM MOBILEMISSILE DEPOT TECHNICALBASE REAR SECURITY MILITARY TRADE DIVISION STAFF DETACHMENT MOBILE VEHICLE SSMMOBILEMISSILE RECOVERYBATTALION TECHNICALBASE

REPAIRDEPOT CLOTHINGEQUIPMENT MOTORTRANSPORT ARMOREDVEHICLE REPAIR COMPANY DETACHMENT ...... MISSILETRANSPORT

MEDICAL MEDICAL MISSILEFUEL DETACHMENT MOTOR TRANSPORT FIELDBAKERIES TRANSPORTBATTALION BATTALION clinicalchannel km and channel TANK RECOVERY FIELD POST OFFICE MILITARYBANK en delivery distances become excessive, the s may be displacedforward,or Front Supply e Sections maybe established, or displacedto rear, or Front Base Rear. When necessary, MOBILETAYK REPAIR bile Army Advance Supply Bases will be WORKSHOP ablishedimmediatelybehind dvisionsectors The company commander is responsible for organi- elements, warehouses, shops, and other facilities. zation of his rear services. The deputy commander for Military districts and groups of forces are the principal technical matters is responsible for organization of points of delivery for material and equipment con- company-level maintenance. The company first tracted for by the MOD and delivered by industry. The sergeant, who is a warrant officer or a senior non- weapons, ammunition, and other manufactured goods commissioned officer, is responsiblefor accountability are shipped directly to the military district or group of and maintenance of the unit's weapons, ammunition, forces. They assume fullresponsibility for storage and fuel, food, etc. Medical and sanitary matters are super- eventual release of the material to units. vised by the unit commander and the battalion Below the military district or group of forces, army fel'dsher. and division staffs reflect the organization of the higher unit in logistic matters. Supply elements at army and division are subordinate operationally to their SUPPLY counterparts at the next higher headquarters. Supply is an operational function of MOD subor­ To simplify logistic planning and to standardize dinate directorates, of other directorates, and of troop ordering and issuing procedures,the Soviets divide the commands at MOD level that handle special-purpose major classes of supplies into specificquantities or equipment and supply. The Organizational and Mobili­ distribution lots. Thesequantities are called "units of zation Directorate of the General Staff is reponsibile Generalfire" for ammunition, "refills"for POL, "daily ration" for management of the uninterrupted supply of all for fwd, and "set" for spare pans and accessories. forces in the initial phases of conflict. These amounts originally are computed based on Military district commanders have immediate direc- physical conditions or limitations. However, once a tive and administrative authority for supply matters. specific quantity has been prescribed as the unit of They exercise these responsibilities through a deputy issue, the quantity itself is no longer referred to, and all commander for rear services.The deputy commander future references are given in multiples of the unit of directs the operations of the subordinate logistic issue.

Motorized Rifle Battalion Rear Service Support Elements During the March I MEDICAL POINT SUPPLY PLATOON

REPAIR SHOP

LEGEND: Motorized rifle banalion. with reinforced Fueltruck Field kitchen tanks and artilleryin march column (vanpak 1701200)

Battalionambulance with trailer Fuel truck with trailer Truck with water trailer

Battalionammunition truck Truck with field kitchen trailer Repairworkshop with trailer MOTES: 1. Whenthere isno enemythreat. fuel trucks am oftenplaced at theheadof the rearserviceelements. 2. Distances betweenrearservicievehicles in the march arenormally the same as those separating other vehicles. Rear Service Support ......

DURING THE ATTACK

/

IN THE DEFENSE

AND

LEGEND: Motorized riflecompany reinforced MRC rifle 4 Companymedical point Motorized company by tanksin the attack

Battaliontechnical observationpoint Regimental commander'scommand Company ammunition supplypoint observation post

Battalionmedicalpoint Battalioncommander'scommand observationpost Depress or Battalionrefuelingpoint Mixedmine field Regimentalboundary (antipersonneland antitank) Battalionfood supply point

Battalionboundary Mortar (120mm)in firing position Battalion ammunitionsupply Ammunition The chief of rocket troops and artillery plans priate amounts by type and keeps a running account the supplies and estimates the expenditure of all of the amounts on hand in units and in depot stocks. types of ammunition. The ammunition officer or his The chief of rear services integrates the ammuni- staff calculates expected usage. He orders appro- tion order into his supply transport plan. He allocates

StandardUnits of Fire for Soviet Weapons NO. OF ROUNDS PER WT. PER UNIT WEAPONS UNITOF FIRE OF FIRE(METRICTONS)

AT-5 25 ,270 BMP (Troop Carrier Version) 1X 73-mm Gun 40 ,325 1X 7.62-mm MG 2,000 ,060 BTR-60P 1X 14.5 MG 500 ,145 1X 7.62-mm MG 2,500 ,075 transportation assets to move ammunition between trailers (4,200 liters), 200-liter drums, and 20-liter depots and user units. cans for supply. Motorized rifle and tank divisions Planning is based on the unit of fire for each weapon. normally carry sufficient reserves to refuel their units Soviet planners use the unit of fire to compute twice. ammunition and transportation requirements. Computation of fuel requirements is based on A Soviet unit's basic load is a multiple of the unit of "refills." A unit's refill is the total requirement for all fire. It includes the amounts hauled in the unit trains vehicles in the unit. For tracked vehicles, one "refill" is and stored in the depot at the next higher head- that amount carried aboard in integral fuel tanks. For quarters. It varies with the unit's mission, degree of wheeled vehicles, one refill is equivalent to that enemy resistance, etc. A multiple of the unit of fire is required for a 500-kilometer range. assigned for weapons before each major operation or Tactical pipelines may deliver fuel as far forward as phase. The multiple assigned changes with the situa- division rear area.. Pipeline brigades or battalions may tion. Assignment is based on the mission, the enemy, be found at front and army levels. and the availability of ammunition. A brigade can lay about 45 miles of 4-inch pipeline The chief of rocket troops and artillery computes per day, while a special pipeline battalion can lay up to the number of rounds by type of weapon needed to 19 miles per day A recently developed pipelaying support the commander's operations. The chief of rear machine requires only two operators to lay and couple services then calculates the weight to determine pipe. Tactical pipelines normally are connected to transport requirements. portable fuel tanks. When the pipeline extends over flat terrain, mobile pumping stations are located at approximately 9 mile intervals. In rough or moun- POL tainous terrain, the stations would be closer together. Fuels and lubricants are second only to ammunition A refueling point in rear areas may contain several to resupply Soviet forces. Rail, pipeline, and waterways rubberized-clothfuel containers capable of refueling move POL to front and army. At front, depots are numerous vehicles simultaneously. It may be estab- maintained with a 12-day supply. At army level, POL lished along a specific route to refuel all passing depots maintain a 2- to 3-day supply. Advance bases are vehicles. established near division rear boundaries when the Army,division, or regimental fuel servicetrucks may distance between army depots and first echelon deliver fuel to battalion refueling points or, possibly, divisions exceeds 100 kilometers.Divisions carry a 3- directly to vehicles. to 5-day stock of mobile fuel. Units on the move refuel their vehicles during rest At front and army POL depots, fuel is stored in tanks. halts, probably from tanker trucks and trailers. Oil and lubricants are stored in 150- to 500-liter Wheeled vehicles may refuel from cans carried on dmms. Divisions use fuel tankers (5,000 liters), fuel board.

IN VEHICLES IN UNITLOGISTICBASE UNIT (METRIC TONS) OR TRAIN METRIC TONS Combined Arms Army 5,000 17.500 Tank Army 4.000 11.000 Motorized Rifle Division 700 1,450 Motorized Rifle Regiment 90 160 Motorized Rifle Battalion 9 1 1 Tank Division 800 1,700 Tank Regiment 120 240 Tank Battalions 25 40 POL Refill

NOTE: A unit's refill is the total requirement forall vehiclesin the unit.

Rations Rations are issued based on meals per man per day. have arrived at their unit assignment. Subsequent The Directorate of Rations Supply of the Ministry of reissues occur at specifiedintervals. Personnel equip- Defense develops norms for a day's supply of rations. ment is issued from the unit depot. The depot stamps Norms are based primarily on expenditure of energy clothing articles with the month and year that the item for caloric requirements of military personnel. The was issued for wear. Accountable items for group use Council of Ministers approve these norms and the (tents, coveralls, sports equipment) are the personal norms are announced by orders of the Minister of responsibility of the individual who signs the hand Defense. Basic ration norms determine the amount of receipt. food products that are issued to feed one man for a 24­ hour period. Supplemental norms determine the amount of products to be issued in excess of the basic Vehicles ration norms based on conditions under which the Procurement and resupply ofvehicles and end items men are serving or the nature of their service.Dry are the responsiblity of the variouschiefs of service rations are issued on the basis of 1 kilogram per man arms or technical services. The Soviet system does not per day while fresh rations are based on 2 kilograms have a resupply procedure for unit end items whilethe per man per day. Divisions carry a 5-day food supply. If unit is engaged tactically. The unit in combat is possible, at least one hot meal is served per day. replaced by another unit when attrition reaches a The chief of the rear is responsible for all ration certain level. support. He must provide a timely and uninterrupted Mobile contact teams fixrepairable equipment and supply of rations and technical equipment for the return it to action as soonas possible. Thisis the only preparation of food and for baking bread under field way to replace equipment end items. Damaged equip- conditions. ment is not repaired in the field if it requires more than a few hours work. (See Maintenance and Recovery.) A certain number of wheeled and tracked vehicles Clothing are kept in storage in peacetime to preserve them. A Enlisted personnel and officers receive military minimum number of vehicles are kept for normal clothing at the time of induction. Supplementary training and administrative uses, generally from 15 to clothing including field clothing is issued after they 35 percent of the vehicles authorized. Repair pans and subassemblies are stocked at eliminates use of water for washing, laundry, and maintenance units from frontthrough battalion levels. bathing. The absolute minimum allowance of water is Repair parts supply is accomplished by routine, 3 liters which is for drinking only and normally is not medium, and capital maintenance units. Repair parts maintained for more than 3 days that are stocked and used according to the following system: Routine repairs. These include replacement of Engineer, Signal, tires, windshields, and common fuel and electric items Chemical, and Medical Items such as fuel pumps and carburetors. These repairs Items peculiar to these services are procured usually are done by units at regimental or division through separate channels under the supervision of levels. the chiefs of the services from front to regimental Medium repairs. These repairs involve replace- levels. Medical supplies are handled through inde- ment or overhaul of engines or transmissions, usually pendent channels, as a separate function of the chief of are accomplished by a division, army, or front. the rear. Capital repairs.These repairsinvolve major over- haul and reassembly of major subcomponents and repair parts. Thisactivity takes place only at armyand Supply Distribution System above, including evacuation to the industrial base. The peacetime military district, or the wartime Under this system, the users submit their requests to front, receives its supplies from the national storage the next higher maintenance unit which supplies the depots or in some cases directly from the industrial item from stocks on hand. Mobile reserve supplies are production line. Front delivers the items directly to maintained on trucksfrom frontto regimental levels. army depots. In turn, army delivers equipment to sup- They are replenished as soon as possible after being ported divisions, and the divisions deliver to the expended. regiments. If necessary, intermediate echelons may be bypassed to deliver items directly to the user. Water Supply Supply InstallationsSchematic The water supply in the fieldisplanned by engineers I in cooperation with the medical service.When time permits, a water supply plan is drawn up to include a MINISTRY OF DEFENSE survey, a water supply chart, and a work schedule. The location of existing water resources in the expected zone of operations is established for the survey. The FRONT REAR water supply chartindicates which water wells to use, SUPPLY BASE where to dig new wells, and how to deploy water FRONT FORWARD supply stations. The work schedule designates water SUPPLY BASE(S) points and the soldiersassigned to them. The schedule also shows daily water requirements, transportation requirementsfor hauling the water, andequipment for ARMY MOBILE handling it. Engineers organize water supply points in the rear of ADVANCE ARMY fronts and armies. Water supply points for all lower echelons are organized by organic engineer units or by the soldiers themselves under the direction of the local PPLY BASE commander. The daily requirements for areas where water points are widely scattered are carefully NOTE: When deliverydistances computed to determine the amount oftransportation become excessive, the base may needed. be displaced forward. or Front The normal rate of water consumption per man is Supply Bare Sections may be about 10 liters per day. This includes water for established. When necessary. drinking, food preparation, washing, laundry, and mobile Army Advance Supply Bares will be established am- bathing. Under restricted water conditions, the daily mediately behind division COMPANY allowance is reduced to about 5 liters per day which sectors Rail Transport The fmnt and army logistic bases are large com- The Soviet Union has over 83,000 miles of railway plexes providing combat service support needs. At track, of which over 20,000 miles are electric. This division level, supply bases are as close to the ongoing system handles from 66 to 85 percent of the freight battle as possible. Critical ammunition and POL are traffic and 50 percent of the passenger traffic in the uploaded and sent forward as required. Soviet Union. Railroads are the principal means of Supplies are moved in bulk mainly by rail and pipe- transporting military hardware from the USSR Rail line but also by road from the strategic rear into the transport also may be used to carry fuel from rear areas operational rear where dumps are established or to the fmnt. replenished. Fuel is sent to the tactical rear by tanker Rail transport in peacetime falls under the super- or pipeline, or is held in fuel dumps to replenish vision of the Ministry of Railways. This agency is a second echelon forces before they are committed. uniformed servicewith ranks similar to the military. It The conditions of the ongoing battle dictate the also operates all civilian railway serviceswithin the location of dumps and stockpiles. Beinghighly mobile, USSR Military rail forces work with civilians in every- divisions do not create stockpiles but maintain mobile day operations, but in wartime, the railway system stocks as far forward as possible. reverts to military control. At division level, replenishment depots are set up at A Railroad Troops Directorate handles rail construc- a convenient road junction, but supplies remain tion and maintenance of the MOD-controlled tracks. It uploaded whenever possible. The replenishment operates trains carrying sensitive military cargosuch as depot is under the command of a deputy commander missiles over the civilian rail system. Also, military for resupply, who is subordinate to the division chief of railroad troops participate in construction projects in the rear. Usually, divisional s upply points are well the civilian sector. dispersed. In time of war, the military rail transport staff of the Air resupply may be considered on a small or front chief of the rear plans and directs rail shipments moderate scale when other methods have failed or and movements. Front logistic bases probably would when extreme speed is essential. High-value cargo, be located near large rail centers. The chief of rail such as nuclear warheads or NBC protective clothing, have high priority for air supply. Rail System TRANSPORTATION Soviet Union has 83,000 miles of railway track The various transportation services under MOD are traffic management, railroad operations, railroad of which over 20,000 miles are electric. maintenance and construction, highway construction Railroads are the principal means of trans- and maintenance, highway regulation, and operation porting military hardware from the USSR. of all transport modes including pipelines. 66-86% FREIGHT TRAFFIC Traffic Management Traffic management for the MOD is the respon- sibility of the Central Military TransportationDirec­ torate(VOSO). The VOSO is subordinate at MOD level 60% PASSENGER to the Chid of the Rear. They are responsible for management of defensetransportationrequirements 1 TRAFFIC using military and civilian resources. The VOSO has Railwav system staffelements down to armylevel.These elements handles from 66 to advise chiefs of the rear serviceson transportation 85 percent of the planning requirements. The VOSO elements collocate freight traffic and 50 with civil transport authorities at rail, water, and air percent of the facilities and assist them in developing transportation I passenger traffic. plans. The VOSO officers at various transport terminals, stations, and installations are assigned as In time of war the military rail transport staff of "military commandants."They exercise garrison com- the front chief of the rear plans and directs rail manders' functions for the facility. shipments and movements. transport at front level is responsible, through yard does not have to support itself. The frontor army has and regulating elements, for dispatch of supplies from the support mission for the divisions. rail stations to army logistic bases. Besides military transportation, the Soviets intend to use motor transport vehicles from the civilian sector. They also mobilize reserve transportation units called Motor Transport autokolonnas. The autokolonnas are drawn from the Extensive use of motor transport begins at fmnt civilian economy to make up for shortages in military level. If rail transport facilities are available at front, units. The individuals in the autokolonnas are they are used with motor transport used at army level. experienced drivers with their own trucks and tool Motor transport units are organic to Soviet ground kits. They drive their own trucks in the armed forces forces fromfmnt to battalion levels. The normal sizes and return to civilian life following demobilization. of motor transport units are as follows: Second echelon unit logistic elements support first Front.Motor transport brigade. echelon units. This practice increases the transport Army.Motor transport regiment. capability for logistic support to the first echelon Division. Motor transport battalion. regiments and divisions. Logistic bases can be located Regiment. Motor transport company. deeper in the frontor armyrear areas. This placement Battalion. Motor transport section with the supply reduces congestion in the main combat area, hut platoon. requires long lines of communication that could be Company. No specific motor transport section. likely targets for enemy air interdiction strikes. The primary means of delivery below army level is by To, assist in control of their huge numbers of truck. The priority given to the movement of ammuni- vehicles, the Soviets have special traffic control tion is shown by the two ammunition transport elements. The personnel of these units are trained companies in the motor transport battalion at division traffic regulators equipped with black uniforms, white level. These companies have 60 URAL-375 trucks with belts, gauntlets, helmets, signal flags, and wands. They each having a 4.5-ton carrying capacity and 60 cargo are positioned along march routes at critical points to trailers with a similar carrying capacity. These trucks direct column movement. Because maps are sensitive, have all-wheel drive (6 X 6), giving them an off-road restricted documents in the Soviet military, traffic capability that is well suited for frontline ammunition regulators are critical to vehicular movements. delivery. Demand for POL will not diminish in the future,and The petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) transport Soviet development of tactical pipeline construction company has the same basic truck as the ammunition units is designed to meet this need. Construction of company. The POL version of the URAL-375has a pipelines as far forward as possible will allow the 5,550-liter tank with a 4,200-liter tank mounted on a Soviets to decrease their reliance on motor transport trailer. The POL company has 80trucks and 80 trailers. of POL. The other company in the battalion is the cargo transport company. This company has about 60 medium and light cargo trucks. Its mission is to deliver Weaknesses items of supply other than ammunition and bulk fuel. The Soviet transportation system is not without A major strength of Soviet motor transport is the weaknesses. Due to differences in rail gauges between great quantity and extensive use of trailers. Loaded the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Soviets have to trans- trailers are pulled forward to fighting units and load at the border. They have organized the necessary exchanged for empty trailers. The empty trailers are equipment and personnel to conduct transloading returned to rear logistic bases for reloading. In this operations. However, it is still highly likely that during manner, fighting units maintain maximum quantities peak traffficperiods delays will be experienced at these of critical supplies such as ammunition and fuel. border locations. At army level, the Soviets have one or more motor Trafficcongestion also would be intense in the rear transport regiments, with perhaps 1,000 plus trucks since masses of wheeled vehicles move supplies to the per regiment that can be used to support subordinate frontline units. Overtasking of vehicles is normal under divisions. This massive amount of transport at army and certain conditions. During the offensive, vehicles front levels upholds the Soviet concept of "delivery might be overloaded 75 percent for cross-country forward."This concept allows the chief of the rear at movement and 100 percent on hard-surface roads. these levels the flexibility to mass logistic support This overtasking leads to rapid vehicle malfunction and assets to the engaged divisions. As a result, the division breakdown. 13-14 Maintenance Facilities Organizational

Maintenance facilities in the fieldare provided for Maintenance Capabilities the following items of equipment: Company Level. Only driver and crew preventive Tracked vehicles. maintenance and routine inspections are conducted at Wheeled vehicles. company level. Artillery and ordnance. Engineer equipment. Battalion Level. The repair workshop contains a Signal equipment. shop truck and four mechanics who make routine Chemical equipment. repairs on tracked and wheeled vehicles. In combat, Service for these items is provided by fixed and this repair workshop can be reinforced with a vehicle mobile repair facilities that extend repair capabilities recovery section. forward into the battle area. Regimental Level. The maintenance company per- forms routine and some medium repair functions. Vehicle Repair Motorized rifle and tank regiments have both wheeled The Soviets classify repairs as routine, medium, or and tracked vehicle workshops. Each of these elements capital. may form repair and evacuation groups (REGs)to provide support to subordinate battalions. Routine Repairs. Replacement, adjustment, or repair of individual components that can be made Division Level. The maintenance battalion is within a short time. Major components are not dis- composed of a headquarters company; tracked vehicle assembled. This category is performed at levels below maintenance company; wheeled vehicle maintenance division. company; ordnance maintenance company; and special task, recovery, and supply and serviceplatoons. Medium Repairs. Major overhaul of at least two Within the companies, there are shop vans, supply basic assemlies. This category of maintenance is trucks, tank retrievers, and tow trucks. Both routine performed at regimental or division level. and medium repairs may be performed. In combat, these companies establish damaged vehicle repair and Capital Repairs. Major overhaul or complete dis­ collection points that are similar to regimental REGs. assembly of a piece of equipment. This is the most extensive category of maintenance and can be Army Level. Combined arms and tank armies have performedat army and front levels. their maintenance capabilities augmented by front as In wartime, the types of repair that are performed at required. Army units can providemobile detachments each level depend on the tactical situation. Generally, for forward operations if necessary. they are of a lesser degree than in peacetime. Front Level. Front maintenance units are manned and equipped for capital repairs. These units operate Technical Services from fixed facilities or mobile detachments. The Soviets also use periodic checks of equipment known as technical services. Examples of a technical Maintenance Reponsibilities service for a tank are: The chief of missile and artillery armament at Routine inspection. Conducted before tank regiment and above is responsible for the maintenance movement as a preoperational check and takes 40 of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, artillery, minutes. and missiles. Motorized rifle and tank regiments Preventive maintenance service number 1. Con­ usually have two or three armorers to perform light ducted after tank movement and at 100- to 150­ repair on small arms and on some automatic weapons. kilometer intervals during a long road march. This Armorers in artillery regiments can do routine mainte- service takes between nine-to-twelve hours. nance on artillery pieces as well as on small arms. Preventive maintenance service number 2. A six­ Artillery repair in tank regiments is done by the tank to-seven-hour thorough inspection performed every workshop. At division level, routine-to-medium repairs 1000 kilometers. are made in the artillery maintenance company of the Preventive maintenance service number 3. A nin­ maintenance and repair battalion. Artillery repairs at to-twelve-hour comprehensive inspection of all regiment and division consist primarily of replacing vehicle systems performed every 2,000 kilometers. parts from available stocks. At army level, there is a VE3i '011 IPI!Yqr(l lo lo ID lp3fuq3a8 10 IeYUqlsl 10 iopuemuldr llndlo iapvevuo~wag npueunuo9 llndro rlrdll uoli~ueg iapuruuol hOa0 rapv~lvlvolllnd.0

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The higher unit's A signal company is found at regimental level. The team will remain to complete repairs as the lower units operators repair signal equipment, when possible. move forward in support of continuing combat opera- Radio, telephone, and radar units generally have some tions. A major goal of the evacuation process is to clear testing equipment and spare parts for'routine repairs. damaged equipment from avenues of approach of Medium repairs are doneat division level. Signal repair follow-on combat units. units performcapital repairs at army level and higher. Engineer and chemical equipment maintenance and repair are accomplished in the same manner as signal Weaknesses equipment at division a nd higher echelons. Analysis of the Soviet maintenance concept reveals some possible weaknesses. First, their centralized controlmay be a substitute for poor low-level repair Recovery and Repair During Combat capability. During battle, a technical observationpoint (TOP) Second, divisions are heavily dependent on backup is established in the forward area of each combat maintenance support from higher levels. During battalion The purpose is to monitor the battlefield for extended combat engagements, division maintenance damage, to assist crews, and to call repair and recovery units could not keep up with repair requirements units forward. without backup suppon from army or front level. The TOP is composed of several vehicle operators, Therefore, it is critical to keep the evacuation routes one or more mechanics, a medic, the battalion NBC and lines of communication open from division to instructor, and at least one combat engineer. It is higher Levels. supervised by the deputy commander for technical Third there are no dedicated mechanics at company matters. The entire group is mounted in an APC with level. Should a damaged vehicle's operator or crew be radios and night vision devices. The TOP maintains incapacitated, the company must rely totally on radio contact with the battalion commander and with maintenance support from battalion or higher level. recovery and repair elements. Company TOPsmay be established if the battle area is beyond observation range of the main TOP. MEDICAL SUPPORT The chief of the TOP will assess the nature of The Sovietmilitary medical system provides support damage and status of the crew of an out-of-senice to the ground forces under the directionof the Central vehicle and initiate action to recover the vehicle and Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of accomplish repairs. If repairs can be made in 5hours or Defense. The Central Directorate supervises the less, the battalion repair and evacuationgroup (REG) supplying of medical equipment and the training of repairs the vehicle on site or evacuates it to the REG medical personnel. Besides the peace and wartime repair and evacuation site. A REG usually is composed programs directly related to the active armed forces, of one tracked recovery vehicle, a tank repair work- the system ties in with the civil sector in screening shop van, and a partstruck. Regimental REGs may be health records of draft-age youth and in performing used to support a specific battalion if required.Repair natural disaster relief functions. priorities are based on the required repair time, with The two principal missions of the military medical equipment requiring the least time for repairs being service in combatare the evacuation and treatmentof completed first. casualties,andthe preventionof disease inthe area of Equipment that requires more than 5 hours to repair operations. Other missions of the military medical is taken along an ewcuation route to the regimental service plans for and provides medical suppon to the REG. The division evacuates vehicles or equipment armed forces, and supervises troop unit medical damaged beyond the repair capability or capacity of training programs. They organize and direct military the regiment to the division's damaged vehicle collec- medical research, and publish articles on military tion point. If the division is unable to repair the medical subjects. The military medical servicealso has 13-17 responsibility for monitoring and maintaining medical supportunits of battalions and regiments that adequate health conditions within the area of combat may redeploy several times during a 24-hour period. operations. The primary concern of this activity in the Repeated forward redeployment of medical units and field is the prevention of epidemic disease within the continuous rearward evacuation of casualties demand ranks. The medical service is further responsible for close coordination between medical levels and the combat readinessof the military medical staff of the medical and combat commanders. armed forces. The staff is divided into the following Soviet combat medical doctrine stresses the timely categories: military physicians, fel'dsher (physicians' return of recuperated sick and wounded to their units. assistants), pharmacists (technical medical staff), and Consequently, at each stage of evacuation medical per- medical corpsmen (company medical staff). sonnel detain and accommodate those casualties In wartime, each command level of the Soviet Army whose expected recovery period falls within pre­ from company to front has organic medical support scribed limits. Only casualties whose prognoses units or personnel. At each level,medical support units indicate extended recovery periods reach a front or are subordinate to both the combat unit commander, home-country hospital. Medical personnel also super- or his deputy commander for the rear, and to the next vise the selectionand preparation of grave sites to pre­ higher level of the military medical service. For clude health hazards. Responsibilities for burial, example, the battalion fel'dsher is subordinate to both however, fall on other rear services personnel. the battalion commander and to the regimental senior The basic principle of Soviet combat medical physician. However, the senior physician at the next support is multistage evacuation with minimum higher level advises only on questions of medical treatment at each level.From company through front, support and organization. This system responds to the each level has specificresponsibilities for the care of needs of combatunits and allows close coordination the sick and wounded. Besides treating the wounded, between medical levels for the treatment and evacua­ medicalpersonnel handle virtuallyall of their own tionof casualties. administration, especially at the lower levels. As casualties move through the combat evacuation system, medical personnelat each levelmakeeffective Doctrine use of medical facilities by repeated sorting of the Soviet doctrine divides the range of medical treat. wounded (triage). They treat the lightly wounded ment into three categories. The first category of pro- who can be returned to combat and those casualties cedures includes only mandatory lifesaving measures. who would not survivefurther evacuation without The second category includes procedures to prevent immediate medical attention. The Soviets emphasize severe complications of wounds or injuries. The final that major medical treatment should be performed at category of treatment includes procedures that willbe an army-level mobile field hospital. accomplished only when there is a low casualty load In combat operations, the military medical service and reduced enemy activity. recognizes four levels of administration and medical In anticipation of an overtaxed combat medical care below front level: company and battalion, support system. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the regiment, division, and army. importance of "self-help" and mutual aid among indi- vidual soldiers. Each soldier is equipped with a packet of field dressings and an NBC protection kit. He also Company and Battalion Medical Support receives a required number of hours of first-aid Company and battalion medical personnel make up trainingeach year. The concept of self-help and mutual the immediate battlefield support. Their primary aid extends beyond the battlefield to the casualty concerns are locating and collecting casualties and collection points and the battalion medical point. It is providing first aid before evacuationto the regimental intended to reduce the demands made on trained medical point. Each company or battery normally has medical personnel, particularly when the use of NBC one medical corpsman. A fle'dsher may be attached to weapons results in a sudden and massive influx of the company when heavy casualties are anticipated. casualties. The company commander or platoon leaders, with the The focus of Soviet combat doctrine on high-speed assistance of the medical corpsman, select and train offensive operations calls for a highly mobile medical enlisted personnel to serve as orderlies or stretcher support system.Its component units must be capable bearers. Each platoon has a minimum of twoorderlies. of repeated forwarddeployment with a minimum loss Medical personnel accompany the combat units in a of efficiency. Mobility is particularly important for combat vehicle or other available transport. Ifseparate Regimental Medical Support At regimental medical points, the seriously fel'dsher may also check dressings and administer wounded are examined and provisionally treated by a analgesics. physician. The regimental senior physician is a Each regimental medical point also has an isolation member of the commander's staffand serves as the section and a decontamination section. The isolation administrative medical officer for the regiment. He section, staffed by an orderly, accommodates those usually does not practice as a physician at the regi­ suspected of having contracted contagious diseases. mental medical point.The chief of the medical point is Such casualties remain in isolation at the medical point subordinate directly to the regimental senior until they can be evacuated to a specialized field physician. He directs and participates in the medical hospital or a higher-level isolation facility. treatment of casualties. There are two additional officers,a junior physician and a dentist. Additional metdical personnel assigned to the regimental medical Regimental Medical Treatment point include two fel'dshers, two medical corpsmen, a pharmacist, seven orderlies, and four ambulance TREATMENT OF drivers. Support personnel serving the medical point PHYSICAL WOUNDS: include an electrical mechanic, a radio operator, and a field kitchen staff. Arrest of external bleeding. The duties of the regimental senior physician before Treatment for shock, including injections. enemy contact are extensive. He must know the Performance of tracheotomy. regiment'sobjective and the desired organization of Closed heart massage and/or intracardial the rear services. He receives instructions from the injection. division senior physician with regard to augmentation Catheterization. and the replenishment of medical supplies. Emergency amputation. The major elements of the regimental medical point Primary dressing of burns. are reception and sorting, dressing, and evacuation. Removal of radioactive substances from gastrointestinal tract. other elements are a disinfection/decontamination nd an isolation area. area a TREATMENT OF The physician at the receiving and sorting element is CHEMICAL AGENT CASUALTIES: usuallythe chief of the medical point. Medical order- lies and a registrar are selected from the lightly Injection of antidotes. wounded to assist him. As the chief of the medical Artificial respiration and oxygen therapy. point receives casualties who have passed through the Treatment for pulmonary edema. point, he divides them into four categories: lnjection of gastric lavage. those who require immediate medical attention at the Administration of absorbents. medical point; those who are be regimental to TREATMENT OF acuated to the next medical echelon with no ev little or BACTERIOLOGICAL CASUALTIES: treatment;those who are lightly wounded who will remain at the medicalpoint and return to dutywithin 3 Isolation. 5 days; and those for whom medical treatment is Placement of protective mask on each to infected soldier. futile. Within the receiving and sorting element, anti­ Administration of antibiotics and sul- biotics, antitoxins, and antidotes are provided only to fanilamide. casualties with NBC injuries. The major part of the medical treatment provided in TREATMENT OF the regimental medical point takes place in the LOWEST PRIORITY: area under the direction of the junior regi- dr essing Splint improvement. physician and dentist. mental Treatment of extensive soft-tissue wounds The evacuation element of the regimental medical and injuries to large joints or nerve trunks. point occupies an area of 15 to 20 square meters. It Provision of novacaine blocks for shock. consists of separate holding areas for the stretcher- lnjection of analgesics. and for the ambulatory wounded. A borne fel'dsher Transfusion therapy for second- and third- supervises the evacuation element according to degree shock. instructions from the medical point chief concerning lnjection of antibiotics and antitoxins. evacuation priorities and modes of transportation. The 1-20 medical transportis not available,the medial corps­ first aid and the use of their individual medical transport vehicles assigned, several driver and orderly evacuation of wounded fromthe company. . collection man accompanies the command element. The soldiers equipment. teams also may serve the battalion. points. trained as orderlies travel with their squads or crews. If Before a combat operation, the battalion fel'dsher Battalion medical personnel collect casualties from The battalion medical corpsman's duties aredemand- the regimental seniorphysician hasallocated addi- informs the corpsmen of arrangements for the evacua- the companies and provide minimum treatment ing. He provides medical treatment to the wounded tional person immediate evacuation transport to a tion of the wounded.This informationincludes the before evacuation to the regimental medical point. and supervises the orderliesat the battalionmedical battalion the battalion commander may in turn locationof casualtycollectionpointsand the coordi­ Casualties remainat the battalion medical point for a point. He alsoparticipates in medical reconnaissance augment company medicalpersonneland transport nation of availablemedicalevacuation transport. very short time. The battalion fel'dsher serves as the for the battalion, assists in removing the wounded from Duties of the companymedical corpsman include A fel'dsher, a medical corpsman, an orderly, and a chief of thebattalionmedical point and organizes and the battlefield and monitors radiation levels at the monitoring personal hygiene,inspectingthecompany driver form the nucleus of the battalion medical point. supervises battlefield medical operations. Besides battalionmedical point. he directs decontamination area for health hazards, and supervising sanitary and The point is located 1.5 to 3KM behind the FEBA. monitoringthe health conditions in the battalion, he operations, carries outanti -epidemic measures, and antiepidemicmeasures. He also instructs thetroops in Depending on the number of additional medical directs ambulance teamsmanned by orderlies in the distributes supplies under the fel'dsher's direction. 1119 Division Medical Support The primary combat mission of the medical point deploys approximately 12 kilometers from the battalion is the deployment and operation of the FEBA during offensive operations or some 20 division medical point. Before reaching this level, kilometerswhen in defense. It normally deploys along casualties receive only the most basic medical treat- the main supply route and uses existing structures ment. Even at division level, only minor surgical opera- when possible. Full deployment of the division medical tions can be performed due to limited personnel and point requires an area 150 meters square. The facilities. Any major operations must be deferred until receiving and sorting facilities deploy first,closely the casualty reaches an army-level mobile field followed by the disinfection and decontamination hospital. facilities and the operating area The dressing station The division senior physician commands the and hospital accommodations receive the next medical battalion of each combat division. As with the priority. The evacuation section, the medical supply regimental physician, the division senior physician point, and the medical personnel accommodations occupies a primarily administrative post, assuming make up the finalstage of deployment. Fulldeploy- responsibility for the overall supervision of division ment requires approximately 2 to 3 hours. medical support. He also serves on the division com- The initial steps of division sorting remain the same mander's staff. His immediate subordinate, the chief of as at the regimental level. Casualties who present a the division medical point, serves on the staff ofthe hazard to others because of NBC contamination are deputy commander for the rear. sent to the decontamination or isolation area. The The division medical battalion contains the physician at the receiving and sorting area divides the following elements: patients into the same four general categories as was Headquarters. done at regimental level. Though the majority of Medical company, which contains a surgical wounded continue evacuation through the medical platoon, an internal medicine platoon, a receiving and point with only minimal treatment, more casualties evacuation platoon, a resuscitation section, a dental remain for treatment and/or convalescence than isthe section, a pharmacy section, a morgue. case at the regimental medical point. The larger staff Collection and evacuation company. and facilities permit a broader range of medical Disinfection and decontamination platoon. treatment, but the rate of casualties and the battle Transport platoon. conditions determine the extent. Supply and service platoon. The Soviets stress the need for rapid and efficient The medical company forms the operational core of performance of battlefield medicine in the event of the division medical point. The medical company has mass NBC casualties. Thefacilities and organizational at least three surgeons, a therapist, and astomatologist arrangements for the treatment of NBC casualties that (mouth specialist) on its staff. The disinfection and exist at every command level indicate Soviet antici- decontamination platoon is staffed with an epi- pation and preparation for combat in an NBC demiologist and a toxicologist. It supervises the treat- environment. ment of casualties who have infectious diseases and- As with the battalion and regimental medical points, with the fieldlaboratory facilities-monitors the bio- the division medical point maintains close contact logical environment. The personnel of the collection with advancing combat units. Sovietdoctrine calls for and evacuation company are used to augment both movement by echelon to accomplish the necessary regiment and battalion casualty collection efforts. The forward deployment while still providing an accept- primary mission of the transport platoon is evacuation able level of care for the incoming wounded and non- of casualties from the regiment to the division. At the transportable casualties. As many of the personnel and discretion of the division senior physician, personnel as much equipment as can be spared are moved to the and vehicles from this section may assistin battlefield next deployment area. The division senior physician casualty collection and evacuation. The supply and coordinates with the army chief of medical service in service platoon has responsibility for the reception, arranging for the transfer of the casualty flow to storage, distribution, and replenishment of medical another division medical point or an independent and food supplies for the division and subordinate medical detachment. medical units. The division medical point is designed to handle up to 400 casualties per 24-hour period. Casualties are Army-Level Medical Support expected to reach the division medical point from the At army level, there are two types of medical support battlefieldwithin 12 to 18 hours. Thedivision medical elements: the independent medical detachment and 13-21 the mobile field hospital. Independent medical forward of the hospital base. Here physicians examine detachments are medical battalions under the com- casualties aboard each ambulance and, if the nature of mand of the army chief of medical service. He uses their injuries permits, routes the ambulancedirectlyto these units to augment the division medical battalions the appropriate mobile field hospital. in the event of mass-casualty situations. Independent The evacuation hospital deploys in the rear of the medical detachments also ease the burden on division hospital base to treat casualties awaiting evacuation to medical points during forward deployment. When an homecountry hospitals and to receive casualties from independent medical detachment deploys, the army the other mobile field hospitals. Aeromedical evacua- chief of medical serviceinforms the regimental and tion, particularly by helicopter, will probably play an division senior physicians of the deployment so that important role. Helicopters can evacuate seriously casualty evacuationcan be diverted when necessary. wounded troops directly from the battlefield to the The primarymedical support unit at armylevelis armyhospital base, the lowest level capable of per- the mobile field hospital. The army-level mobile field forming major surgery. hospitals form the fourthadministrativelevel of the Soviet doctrine does not call for the frequent military medical service. This is the first level of the redeployment of hospitals established at the front combat evaucation system capable of doing major level. These hospitals often are established in existing surgery and giving extended care. These hospitals are military and civilian medical institutions. They receive mobile and capable of forward deployment. They con­ those casualties whose recuperation period exceeds stitute the largest and most extensive military medical acceptable limits for the mobile field hospital. facility with this capability. These and other army-level hospitals generally are organized into a hospital base that deploys along the major evacuation route from the REAR AREA SERVICES division medical points and independent medical Data available on rear area services are limited. The detachments. This base may include any or all of the Soviets consider these topics sensitive, and as a result followingtypes of hospitals: little information is available in open sources. Mobile field hospitals: infection and disease, specialized surgical, neurological, therapeutic. Sorting hospital. Personnel Replacements Hospital for the lightly wounded. The personnel replacement system is significantto Evacuation hospital. the Soviets because of the size of their forces. Per- The hospital base deploys close to the FEBA to allow sonnel replacement during intensive combat opera- casualties to arrive from the battlefield within 24 tions in both conventional and nuclear environments hours. The individual mobile field hospitals deploy no has been the subject of much study by the Soviets. closer than 5 kilometers to one another to reduce the Soviet personnel replacement procedures are struc­ effect of nuclear attack. Deployment of a specialized tured on four levels: individual, incremental, mobilefield hospital is accomplished within 2 to 4 composite unit, and whole unit. hours afterarrivalat the deployment area. It is in these hospitals that the majority of casualties, having passed Individual Replacements. This system is used in through subordinate echelons with minimum treat- both peacetime and wartime. It appearsto be most ment, receive specialized and intensive care. To make applicable in the officer, some NCO, and specialist such care easier, there are teams of medical specialists assignments. The sources of replacement personnel with support personnel and equipment that can are school graduates, reserve assignments, medical augment the normal staff of a mobile field hospital. returnees, and normalreassignments. These teams usually consist of surgical specialistssuch as opthalmologists,neurosurgeons, and ear, nose, and Incremental Replacements. This system, dating throat specialists. from World WarII, replaces entire small units such as In extreme circumstances, direct evacuation of weapon crews, squads, and platoons. Replacements casualties is made from regiment, or even battalion, to can be obtained from training units or from follow-on the hospital base. In this situation, the sorting hospital forces. deploys in the forward area of the hospital base to receive, diagnose, and dispatch incoming wounded to Composite Unit Formations. When continuity of the appropriate mobile field hospital. The sorting the mission is of paramount importance, composite hospital establishes a medical distribution point units may be formed from other units reduced by 13-22 combat operations. Composite units may be con police. KGB and MVD elements provide some security stituted up to division or corps level. functions. An element known as the Commandant's Service, or Komendatura, possesses some military Whole Unit Replacement. Since Soviet planners police-related functions. These functions include first considered the mass casualties associated with traffic control, enforcement of military discipline, and nuclear war, this particular method has received some civil affairs actions. almost continuous study. Within this concept, entire armies can be brought forward from second echelon or reserve forces to replace first echelon forces Prisoners of War and Civilian Detainees rendered ineffective. Passage of large units through This subject is among the most sensitive issuesto the other forces to forward positions is a complex Soviets. Involvement of KGB, MVD, and political operation that requires detailed planning and effective organs is probable. control. The Soviets are aware of the problems associated with such a maneuver. Soviet plannersrealize that personnel replacement DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS requirements will encompass all of the above pro- The main direction of improvementsin theSoviet cedures. The Soviets receive semiannual experience in service support system over the pastdecade has been both individual and bulk replacement operations. In to increasemobility, efficiency, and standardization. their troop rotation exercises, thousands of troops are TheSoviets have tried to bring new technology and moved by both air and rail transport. The Soviet Union improved management techniques into their service devotes manpower and money to the retention of a support operations. These measures have led to large large reserve base that is updated constantly by troops increases in the "logistical tail." released from active duty. The Soviet reserve pool Prepackaging and containerization of supplies into consists of several million men with relatively recent standard units of issue have been initiated to reduce training. Finally,the Soviet Army maintains a system of handling and delivery time. Computers have been training units throughout its forces to train new introduced to allow the chief of the rear at operational recruits, some reservists,and some specialists. Per- and strategic levels to evaluate his resources and assets sonnel services and replacement procedures are exer- quickly for a proposed operation. He can formulate cised and evaluated frequently. support plans which optimally support the com­ mander's concept of operations and respond to the support requirements generated by rapid changes in Civil Affairs the battlefield situation. It is likely that activities involving Soviet forces and Railway facilities have been improved. Also, citizens of other nations, in particular other Warsaw increasing emphasis is being placed on the use of Pact countries, are administered in wartime by Com- aerial, automotive, and pipeline delivery. munist Party and Soviet governmental organs, political Some apparent disparities exist between rear area sections of Soviet military elements, and sections of theory and practice. Soviet doctrine calls for the con- both the KGB (Committee of State Security) and the tinuation of combat operations at night. It also pre- MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). scribes nighttime as the primary time for combat units to replenish their ammunition, fuel, food, and other supplies. However, Soviet writers frequently note the Military Police difficulties in accomplishing nighttime link-up The Soviet armed forces do not have a precise between support and advancing supported units in military element that would equate to the US military field exercises. CHAPTER 14 REAR AREA PROTECTION

In the Soviet view, rear area protection and security Emergency use of weapons and equipment under- comprise the comprehensive coordination of more going repair (crews generally remain with equipment than just the rear of military forces in contact with the during repair). enemy. The Soviets also believe that general war will Use of convalescent sickand wounded for defense involve more than the armed forces fighting along during critical situations. established front lines. A future large-scale war, At army and front level, electronic warfare and air whether conventional or nuclear,will include wide- defense elements are located to provide thorough spread espionage, sabotage, infiltration,airborne and coverage of the entire area of operations. Combat amphibious operations, and massive destructionthat support and combat servicesupport elements also will occur throughout the nation. So total war w ill have rear area security responsibilities from the rear involve the total population. area of units in contact to the rear boundary. The Soviets have established an extensive and encompassing program of organizations and pro- cedures to conduct rear area security. Security and KGB TROOPS protection of the rear area is critical. It includes Besides its major role in intelligence activities, the vital installations, airfields, communications and Committee for State Security (KGB) is responsible for transportation nets, critical industries, strategic border security and special communications. In the weapons, and large troop formations. In the event event of an enemy invasion, the KGB border guard of a large-scale general war, this program would detachments would fight delaying actions until immediately go into operation insuring, among other relieved by ground forces units. Conversely, during a things, the following: Soviet offensive, border guard missions would include Rear area security and protection of combat, securing the operational armies' rear, conducting combat support, and combat service support units and counterespionage, forestalling desertions, thwarting areas of operation. deep enemy penetrations, and conducting mop-up Security and protection of lines of communication. operations in the rear area. Security and protection of borders and coastlines. Mobilization of reserves. Civil defense. MVD TROOPS Suppression of local insurgents. Interior troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Defense against airborne attack. (MVD)are primarily responsible for maintaining Defense against unconventional warfare domestic security. Missions in the civilian sector (including saboteurs, partisans, and propaganda). include criminal investigation, motor vehicle inspec­ Damage conrtol. tionand control, and issuance of visas. In wartime, they also have the missions to suppress insurrection, to conduct counterespionage, and to transport prisoners. UNITSECURITY KGB and MVD troops are organized, equipped, and All units, from the smallest through front level, trained much the same as Soviet ground forces, but are responsible for-the security of their own rear special attention is given to security functions. In areas. In larger organizations (regiment and up), general, KGB and MVD troops are considered to be elements of the second echelon have most of the extremely reliable and are very well trained. responsibility for security. Organic personnel and equipment carry out basic security and damage con- trol in the rear area. Appropriate measures include MILITARY DISTRICTS the following: The 16 Soviet military districts are administrative Comprehensive security plans. commands which do not correspond to the political Locating support units near combat troops for boundaries of the Soviet Union's 15 republics. In added protection. wartime, the assets of many military districts probably Temporary assignment of combat units to security would be organized into fronts,providing both the missions (usually second echelon elements). command and control structure and units for combat Employment of guards, sentries, and patrols. operations. Military activity within a military district continues, Civilian civil defense formations insure a potentially however, even when troop units are deployed else- valuable laborforce for the Soviets. They are also a where. Military installations such as schools and source for intelligence gathering, particularly in areas garrisons, and operations such as logistics and com­ threatened by airborne or seabome attack, guerrilla or munications would continue to function, and in partisan activity, or large-scale invasion. certain instances, even be augmented. Civil defense receives extensive propaganda treat- Military district mobilization plans cover not only ment in the Soviet media. There is civil defense training units, installations, and activities ofthedistrict, but also in schools, for housewives, and for retirees besides the the call-up of reserves.Reserve call-up is selective to training given in factories and civil defense formations. permit orderly activation and to insure an adequate However, Soviet civil defense programs have been labor force for critical civilian occupations. Civil criticized for their lack of imagination, heavy ideolo- defense activities also are conducted through the gical (rather than practical) emphasis, lack of realism, military district command structure. poor quality instruction, inadequate planning, and poor coordination. Many mass evacuation plans have not been rehearsed for years, if at all. Nevertheless, the CIVILDEFENSE Soviet civil defense program reaches virtually every Overall civil defense of the Soviet Union is directed citizen in the nation with at least minimal instruction by a Deputy Ministerof Defense. Civil defense troops, and indoctrination. Despite widespread cynicism and numbering approximately 40,000,are a branch of the apathy, the program is large andgrowing It is probably Soviet military under the command of the Chief ofCivil the most highly developed civil defense effort in the Defense. They are subordinate to deputy commanders world. for civil defense in the 16 military districts. Most civil defense efforts involve organization and training for survival,rescue, repair, and restoration. RESERVES The intent is to involve the Soviet population. Civil Soviet conscripts have a reserve obligation until age defense is one of several means of involvingthe popu- 50. The total Soviet potential reserve manpower pool lation in disciplinedactivitvand of keepingthem aware is estimated to be twenty fivemillion men. About 6.8 of the ever-present"threat" posed by the enemies of o million of these men are young, recently-trained the Soviet Union. veterans. Perhaps 70 percent of workers engaged in vital Soviet reservists are not organized in specific reserve industry belong to civil defense organizations.- Their units. Instead, reservists called up for training report to principal objectives are: existing active units. In the event of a large-scale To prevent panic. mobilization, reservists will be assigned where To maintain law and order. required. Many would fill out low-strength divisions To maintain agricultural and industrial and other units. production. The Soviet reserve system provides a vast resource of To insure organized decontamination. former servicemen. Younger and more recently Civil defense activities involve over thirty million trained personnel probably would be mobilized for people and are closely tied to the overall war and sur- combat service. Older reservistseasily could take over vival effort. Organized and trained personnel, con- numerous garrison, guard, and rear area trolled by the government, will be capable of at least responsibilities. the following activities: Given such vast numbers of men with prior military Fire fighting. service plus a citizenry which has received consider- First aid. able exposure to civil defense indoctrination and Camouflageof industrial targets. training, the Soviets can count on a population that is Chemical defense and decontamination. potentially more aware and prepared, and that is used Damage control. to discipline. (For more information on Soviet Rescue. reserves, see FM 100-2-3). Public order and safety. Communication and warning. Evacuation. INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL Reconnaissance. The Soviets expect to survive and to win any future Radiological monitoring and decontamination. war.To do this, special attention has been devoted to 14-2 protecting the industrial and technological base. Pro- over 14 and the Soviets claim about eighty million tective measures include dispersion of industrial members. DOSAAF stresseseach citizen's obligation to facilities, physical hardening of factories, stockpiling defend the Soviet Union. Its basic propaganda themes materials and parts, constructing shelters for workers, are patriotism and the external threat. and creating evacuation plans. Dispersion reduces Major DOSAAF activities include sports, preinduc- vulnerability but it also increases the transportation tion military training, and technical specialist training. problem and the security burden. Many reservists join DOSAAF to take advantage of the latter activity, as it is a good way to acquire or improve technical skills. DOSAAF activities are coordinated DOSAAF with the Komsomol(Young Communist League) and The Voluntary Society of Assistance to the Army, with civil defense organizations. Aviation, and the Navy (DOSAAF) is yet another Soviet In practice, the DOSAAF program sometimes fails to organizationthatcould play a role in rear areasecurity achieve its goals. It has a Large, cumbersome bureau- and protection. DOSAAF isaparamilitaryorganization. cracy. DOSAAF has been critizedin the Soviet press for Its primary goals are producing a military-conscious inefficiency, inadequate coordination, and poor society, preparing the civilian population for military quality instruction. The premilitarytraining program emergencies, and preparing preinduction-age youth sometimes is criticized forits lack of quality.(For more for military service. Membership is open to anyone information on DOSAAF, see PM 100-2-3.) GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS AAA ...... antiaircraft artillery EMP ...... electromagnetic pulse AAG ...... army artillery group ESM ...... electronic warfare support AAlCV ...... airborne amphibious infantry measures (US term) combat vehicle FAC...... forward air controller ACRV ...... artillery command and FEBA ...... forward edge of the battle area reconnaissance vehicle (US acronym used in this manual ACV ...... armored command vehicle as the equivalent of the Soviet AGI ...... auxiliary intelligence gatherers term "forward edge") AICV ...... amphibious infantry combat FOP...... forward observation post vehicle Frag-HE ...... fragmentation high-explosive AMRP...... artillery mobile reconnaissance round post FROG ...... free rocket over ground An-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft FS ...... fin-stabilized round from Antonov design bureau FSE ...... forward security element APC-T...... armor piercing capped (of the Advance Guard) tracer round GAZ-(no.) ....medium truck produced by API-T ...... armor piercing incendiary Gorkiy Motor Vehicle Plant tracer round GRU ...... g eneral staff's main intelligence AP-T ...... armor piercing tracer round directorate APVO ...... Aviation of National Air Defense HE ...... high-explosive round AS-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet HEAT ...... high-explosive antitank round air-to-surface missile HEI ...... high-explosive incendiary round ASC ..armored scout car HEP...... high-explosive plastic round ASM air-to-surface missile HVAP ...... hyper-velocity armor piercing ASW ...... antisubmarine warfare round AT-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet HVAPFSDS . . hyper-velocity armor piercing antitank guided missile fin-stabilized discarding Sabot ATGM .antitank guided missile round BAF .battalion assault force IFV.. .infantry fighting vehicle (naval infantry) Il-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft BVR beyond-visual-range from llyushindesign bureau CBU ...... cluster bomb unit INA ...... information not available at the CES...... chief of engineer services UNCLASSIFIED level CINC...... commander-in-chief IR...... infrared COMINT.....communications intelligence IRBM ...... intermediate-range ballistic (US term) missile COP ...... command observation post I-T ...... incendiary tracer round CRP...... combat reconnaissance patrol KamAZ-(no.).medium truck produced by CRTA ...... chief of rocket troops and Kama River Motor Vehicle Plant artillery KGB ...... Committee for State Security DAG ...... division artillery group KrAZ-(no.)....heavy truck produced by DF ...... direction finding Kremenchug Motor Vehicle Plant DOI...... date of introduction LMG ...... light machinegun DOSAAF .....Voluntary Society of Assistance LOC...... line of communications to the Army, Aviation, and Navy LOP ...... lateral observation post (premilitary training organization) LRA ...... long range aviation DZ ...... drop zone LuAZ-(no.)....light truck produced by ECM ...... electronic countermeasures LutskMotor Vehicle Plant ELINT...... electronic intelligence (US term) LZ...... landing zone MAZ-(no.) ....heavy truck produced by SACLOS .....semiautomatic-command-to-line- Minsk Motor Vehicle Plant of-sight guidance MCLOS ...... manual-command-to-line-of­ SAM ...... surface-to-air missile sight guidance shp...... Shah horsepower Mi-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for helicopter SLAR ...... side-looking airborne radar from Mil design bureau SP ...... self-propelled MiG-(no.).....Soviet designation for aircraft SPAAG ...... self-propelled antiaircraft gun from Mikoyan-Gurevich design SRBM...... short-range ballistic missile bureau SRF ...... strategic rocket forces MOD...... Ministry of Defense; Minister SS ...... spin-stabilized round of Defense SS-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet MOD...... Mobile Obstacle Detachment surface-to-surface missile (Engineer Element) SSM ...... surface-to-surface missile MOP ...... mobile observation post STOL...... short takeoff and landing aircraft MPA ...... Main Political Directorate Su-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft MRBM ...... medium-range ballistic missile from Sukhoi design bureau MRD ...... motorized rifle division TASM ...... tact~calair -to-surface missile MRL ...... multiple rocket launcher TD ...... tank division MRR ...... motorized rifle regiment TEL ...... transporter-erector-launcher MSD ...... movement support detachment TELAR ...... transporter-erector-launcher- (engineer element) and-Radar MVD ...... Ministry of Internal Affairs TOP...... technical observation point OMG ...... operational maneuver group TR ...... tank regiment POL...... petroleum, oils, lubricants Tu-(no.) ...... Soviet designation for aircraft PPO ...... primary party organization from Tupolev design bureau PGM ...... precision-guided munitions TVD...... theater of military operations PVO...... air defense UAZ-(no.). ....light truck produced by PWP ...... plasticized white phosphorus Ulyanovsk Motor Vehicle Plant RAG ...... regimental artillery group Ural-(no.) .....medium truck produced by RAP...... rocket-assisted projectile Ural Motor Vehicle Plant (not an RDF...... radio directionfinding acronym) REC...... radioelectronic combat UW ...... unconventional warfare REG ...... repair and evacuation group VOSO ...... Central Military Transportation rkh .Russian abbreviation (literally: Directorate radio-chemical) used as suffix in VTA ...... military transport aviation Soviet designations for NBC VTOL...... vertical takeoff and landing reconnaissance vehicles VVS...... Soviet Air Force RVGK ...... Reserve of the Supreme WP...... white phosphorus High Command Yak-(no.) .....Soviet designation for aircraft SA-(no.) ...... US designation for Soviet from Yakovlev design bureau surface-to-air missile ZIL-(no.) ...... medium truck from Likhachev Motor Vehicle Plant NATO NICKNAMES Air-To-Surface Antitank Guided Surfact-To-Air Missiles Missiles Missiles KANGAROO, AS-3 SAGGER, AT-3 GAINFUL, SA-6 KELT, AS-5 SPANDREL, AT-5 GAMMON, SA-5 KERRY, AS-7 SPIGOT. AT-4 GANEF, SA-4 KINGFISH. AS-6 SPIRAL; AT-6 GASKIN,SA-9 KIPPER, AS-2 SWATTER, AT-2 GECKO, SA-8 KITCHEN. AS-4 GOA. SA-3 GRAIL, SA-7 GUIDELINE, SA-2 Aircraft Helicopters BACKFIRE, Tu-26 HALO A, MI-26 BADGER, Tu-1 6 HARE, Ml-1 Surface-To-Surface BEAR, Tu-95 HARKE, MI-10, M1-10K Missiles BLACKJACK, Tu-? HIND, MI-24 SCALEBOARD, SS-12 BLINDER, Tu-22 HIP, MI-8 SCUD A, SS-lb BREWER, Yak-28 HOMER, MI-12 SCUD B, SS-1c CAMBER, 11-86 HOOK, MI-6 CANDID, 11-76 HOPLITE, MI-2 CLINE, An-32 HOUND, MI-4 COALER, An-72 COCK, An-22 COOT, 11-18 Radars CUB, An-1 2 BIG FRED, MT-SON CURL, An-26 END TRAY. RMS-1 FARMER, MiG-19 FIRECAN, SON-9. SON-9A FENCER, Su-24 FLAP WHEEL FIREBARB, Yak-2BP FLAT FACE, P-15 FISHED,MiG-21 GUN DISH FITTERA, Su-7B LONG TROUGH FITTER C, Su-17 PORK TROUGH FLANKER. Su-27 PORK TROUGH 2, SNAR-6 FLOGGER B, MiG-23 SMALL FRED, BMP-SON FLOGGER D.MiG-27 SMALL YAWN FOXBAT,MiG-25 FOXHOUND, MiG-31 FRESCO. MiG-17 FULCRUM, MiG-29 FM 100-2-2

16 JULY 1984

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 0

JOHN A. WICKHAM,JR. General. United States Army Chiefof Staff

Official:

ROBERT M.JOYCE MajorGeneral. United States Army The Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION:

Active Army, ARNG, and USAR: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form12-1 1B.Require- ments for Handbook on Agressor Military Forces (Qty rqr block no. 287); Agressor Order of Battle Book (Qtyrqr block no. 288) and Operations of Army Forces in the Field (Qty rqr block no. 405). Additional copies maybe requisitioned from the USArmy AdjutantGeneral PublicationsCenter, 2800Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore,MD 21 220.