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Public Contestation Practices in Russia in 2000–2020
https://doi.org/10.18778/1427-9657.09.06 EASTERN REVIEW 2020, T. 9 Roman Savenkov https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-2444 Voronezh State University, Voronezh, Russia Department of Sociology and Political Science e-mail: [email protected] Public contestation practices in Russia in 2000–2020 Abstract. The article analyzes the influence exerted by the limitation of legal opportunities for public contestation in the 2000s on the scope of mobilization and the repertoire of public contestation practices. The term ‘public contestation’ is used to describe forms of individual and collective political activity focused on criticizing, denying and resisting the current government project, including by introducing alternative projects. The public contestation includes constructive actions of political actors not related to causing damage or disposing of political opponents. The paper is based on political and legal analysis and on some elements of event analysis. In the 2000s, the scale of public contestation on discursive and protest platforms was smaller than over the next decade, which did not create any needs for detailed regulation of such activities. At the same time, changes in political and legal opportunities in the electoral and party field were quite intense throughout 2000–2020. The most popular forms of public contestation were public events (in 2011–2018), as well as discursive activity on the Internet and in mass media (after 2018). During the above mentioned period, we see the biggest changes in legal opportunities in this field and increasing penalties for respective violations. The electoral field shows the pendulum dynamics: decreasing and increasing opportunities in 2000–2011 and 2012–2019, respectively. -
Annual-Report-2018 Eng.Pdf
Russian International Affairs Council CONTENTS /01 GENERAL INFORMATION 4 /02 RIAC PROGRAM ACTIVITIES 16 /03 RIAC IN THE MEDIA 58 /04 RIAC WEBSITE 60 /05 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 62 3 Russian International ANNUAL REPORT 2018 Affairs Council The General Meeting of RIAC members is the The main task of the RIAC Scientific Council is to ABOUT THE COUNCIL supreme governing body of the Partnership. The formulate sound recommendations for strategic key function of the General Meeting is to ensure decisions in RIAC expert, research, and publishing The non-profit partnership Russian compliance with the goals of the Partnership. The activities. General Meeting includes 160 members of the International Affairs Council (NP RIAC) is Council. The Vice-Presidency was introduced to achieve 01 the goals of the Partnership in cooperation with a Russian membership-based non-profit The RIAC Board of Trustees is a supervisory body government bodies and local authorities of the organization. The partnership was established of the Partnership that monitors the activities of Russian Federation and foreign states, the Partnership and their compliance with the international organizations, and Russian and by the resolution of its founders pursuant statutory goals. foreign legal entities. The candidate for Vice- President is approved by the RIAC Presidium for a to Decree No. 59-rp of the President of the The Presidium of the Partnership is a permanent one-year term. Russian Federation “On the Establishment collegial governing body of the Partnership that consists of not less than five and no more than RIAC Corporate Members of the Non-Profit Partnership Russian fifteen members, including the President and According to the Charter, legal citizens of the the Director General of the Partnership, who Russian Federation or entities established in International Affairs Council” dated February 2, have a vote in the decision-making process. -
TI Georgia Advertising Market Report 2013
Transparency International Georgia Tbilisi, June 2013 http://transparency.ge/en The G-MEDIA program is made possible by the support from the American people through USAID. The content and opinions expressed herein are those of Transparency International Georgia and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government, USAID or IREX. Table of Contents Main findings ................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Recommendations ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 5 The distribution of advertising flows ............................................................................................................................. 5 Television .................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Radio ......................................................................................................................................................................... 8 The impact of the October 2012 elections .................................................................................................................... 8 Political -
The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections
Russia and Eurasia Programme Paper REP 2011/01 The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Andrew Monaghan Nato Defence College June 2011 The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication. REP Programme Paper. The Russian Vertikal: the Tandem, Power and the Elections Introduction From among many important potential questions about developments in Russian politics and in Russia more broadly, one has emerged to dominate public policy and media discussion: who will be Russian president in 2012? This is the central point from which a series of other questions and debates cascade – the extent of differences between President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and how long their ‘Tandem’ can last, whether the presidential election campaign has already begun and whether they will run against each other being only the most prominent. Such questions are typically debated against a wider conceptual canvas – the prospects for change in Russia. Some believe that 2012 offers a potential turning point for Russia and its relations with the international community: leading to either the return of a more ‘reactionary’ Putin to the Kremlin, and the maintenance of ‘stability’, or another term for the more ‘modernizing’ and ‘liberal’ Medvedev. -
Briefing European Parliamentary Research Service
Briefing June 2016 Russia's 2016 elections More of the same? SUMMARY On 18 September, 2016 Russians will elect representatives at federal, regional and municipal level, including most importantly to the State Duma (lower house of parliament). President Vladimir Putin remains popular, with over 80% of Russians approving of his presidency. However, the country is undergoing a prolonged economic recession and a growing number of Russians feel it is going in the wrong direction. Support for Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and ruling party United Russia has declined in recent months. Nevertheless, United Russia is likely to hold onto, and even increase its parliamentary majority, given the lack of credible alternatives. Of the tame opposition parties currently represented in the State Duma, polls suggest the far-right Liberal Democrats will do well, overtaking the Communists to become the largest opposition party. Outside the State Duma, opposition to Putin's regime is led by liberal opposition parties Yabloko and PARNAS. Deeply unpopular and disunited, these parties have little chance of breaking through the 5% electoral threshold. To avoid a repeat of the 2011–2012 post-election protests, authorities may try to prevent the blatant vote-rigging which triggered them. Nevertheless, favourable media coverage, United Russia's deep pockets and changes to electoral legislation (for example, the re-introduction of single-member districts) will give the ruling party a strong head-start. In this briefing: What elections will be held in Russia? Which parties will take part? Will elections be transparent and credible? The State Duma – the lower house of Russia's parliament. -
TI Georgia Advertising Market Report 2013 (English) 0.Pdf
Transparency International Georgia Tbilisi, June 2013 http://transparency.ge/en The G-MEDIA program is made possible by the support from the American people through USAID. The content and opinions expressed herein are those of Transparency International Georgia and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government, USAID or IREX. Table of Contents Main findings ................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Recommendations ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................... 5 The distribution of advertising flows ............................................................................................................................. 5 Television .................................................................................................................................................................. 6 Radio ......................................................................................................................................................................... 8 The impact of the October 2012 elections .................................................................................................................... 8 Political -
Public Contestation Practices in Russia in 2000–2020
Eastern Review Volume 9 Article 6 December 2020 Public contestation practices in Russia in 2000–2020 Roman Savenkov Voronezh State University, Voronezh, Russia, Department of Sociology and Political Science, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digijournals.uni.lodz.pl/easternreview Recommended Citation Savenkov, Roman (2020) "Public contestation practices in Russia in 2000–2020," Eastern Review: Vol. 9 , Article 6. DOI: 10.18778/1427-9657.09.06 Available at: https://digijournals.uni.lodz.pl/easternreview/vol9/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Social Sciences Journals at University of Lodz Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Eastern Review by an authorized editor of University of Lodz Research Online. For more information, please contact [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.18778/1427-9657.09.06 EASTERN REVIEW 2020, T. 9 Roman Savenkov https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-2444 Voronezh State University, Voronezh, Russia Department of Sociology and Political Science e-mail: [email protected] Public contestation practices in Russia in 2000–2020 Abstract. The article analyzes the influence exerted by the limitation of legal opportunities for public contestation in the 2000s on the scope of mobilization and the repertoire of public contestation practices. The term ‘public contestation’ is used to describe forms of individual and collective political activity focused on criticizing, denying and resisting the current government project, including by introducing alternative projects. The public contestation includes constructive actions of political actors not related to causing damage or disposing of political opponents. The paper is based on political and legal analysis and on some elements of event analysis. -
Russia 2019 Human Rights Report
RUSSIA 2019 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Russian Federation has a highly centralized, authoritarian political system dominated by President Vladimir Putin. The bicameral Federal Assembly consists of a directly elected lower house (State Duma) and an appointed upper house (Federation Council), both of which lack independence from the executive. The 2016 State Duma elections and the 2018 presidential election were marked by accusations of government interference and manipulation of the electoral process, including the exclusion of meaningful opposition candidates. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Investigative Committee, the Office of the Prosecutor General, and the National Guard are responsible for law enforcement. The FSB is responsible for state security, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism as well as for fighting organized crime and corruption. The national police force, under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, is responsible for combating all crime. The National Guard assists the FSB Border Guard Service in securing borders, administers gun control, combats terrorism and organized crime, protects public order, and guards important state facilities. The National Guard also participates in armed defense of the country’s territory in coordination with Ministry of Defense forces. Except in rare cases, security forces generally reported to civilian authorities. National-level civilian authorities, however, had, at best, limited control over security forces in the Republic of Chechnya, which were accountable only to the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. The country’s occupation and purported annexation of Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula continued to affect the human rights situation there significantly and negatively. The Russian government continued to arm, train, lead, and fight alongside Russia-led forces in eastern Ukraine. -
The Surb Gevorg Church Complex Project Tbilisi Project Report 2016 Financial Year (July 2015 – June 2016)
The Surb Gevorg Church Complex Project TBILISI PROJECT REPORT 2016 Financial Year (JulY 2015 – June 2016) 1 Misson INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT ear Friends, We would like to present you with report for the Surb Gevorg DChurch Complex project for the 2015-2016 financial year (from 1 July 2015 to 20 June 2016) – one of the IDeA (Initiatives for the Development of Armenia) Foundation’s marquee projects. The report details which elements of the project were implemented over the period, what still needs to be done and information on the events that have taken place at the cathedral complex. The key achievement highlighted in the report for this period is the completion of the restoration of Surb Gevorg Church, as well as the opening ceremony which took place with the participation of the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, the First Hierarch of the Armenian Apostolic Church Garegin II, President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan and Bidzina Ivanishvili as well as other dignitaries. The main objective of the second phase of our project is to establish a cultural and educational complex, which would focus the cultural and spiritual life of the Armenian community in The second phase of the Surb Gevorg Church Complex project Georgia. Some important steps have been taken in the past year will last until 2020. In order to successfully complete all our plans to achieve this goal including the acquisition of new premises in and to revive the former importance of the unique Tiflis church, neighbouring buildings and reaching agreements for the use of make it a jewel of Tbilisi Old Town and a centre of cultural and other adjacent areas. -
2018-05-25 Top 10.Pdf
NCSEJ WEEKLY TOP 10 Washington, D.C. May 25, 2018 Secretary of State promises appointment of special envoy to monitor anti-Semitism Jewish News Syndicate, May 24, 2018 https://www.jns.org/secretary-of-state-promises-appointment-of-special-envoy-to-monitor-anti-semitism/ At a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo promised that he would work towards an appointment of a Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. During testimony in front of the House committee, Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.H.), a senior member of the committee, had asked the Pompeo to act on the appointment of the vacant Special Envoy position. “And in 2004, I authored the Anti-Semitism Special Envoy. That, too, has not been filled,” Smith said to Pompeo of the vacancy. “And I know that you care deeply about combating the scourge of anti-Semitism, which is rising all over the globe. Please move on that as well.” “You have my word,” Pompeo told Smith in response. The Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism heads the State Department office responsible for leading U.S. efforts to counter anti-Semitism around the globe. The exchange in Congress came after a letter, spearheaded by the leaders of the Bipartisan Taskforce for Combating Anti-Semitism—Reps. Eliot Engel (D-N.Y.), Chris Smith (R-N.J.), Nita Lowey (D-N.Y.), Ileana Ros- Lehtinen (R-Fl.), Ted Deutch (D-Fl.), Marc Veasey (D-Texas) and Kay Granger (R-Texas)—was sent to Pompeo and signed by 120 members of Congress. -
Russia Presidential Pre-Election Assessment Report March 20, 2000
I R I Advancing Democracy Worldwide RUSSIA PRESIDENTIAL PRE-ELECTION ASSESSMENT REPORT MARCH 20, 2000 INTRODUCTION For the second time in just over three months, the Russian electorate will go to the polls in a national election. On March 26, 2000, Russia will hold its third democratic election for president and complete an election cycle that began with the State Duma election of December 19, 1999. This election is being held earlier than was initially scheduled (June 2000) due to the surprise resignation of then-President Boris Yeltsin on December 31, 1999. In preparation for the post-Yeltsin era, the Kremlin has undertaken a well-orchestrated campaign to ensure the transfer of power to its own hand-picked candidate. The State Duma election was used by the Kremlin as a means to remove all serious opponents for the presidential election. Prior to the start of the campaign for the State Duma in August 1999, presidential aspirants former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov were polling 22 percent and 9 percent respectively (polls by Public Opinion Foundation.) Considering both potential candidates were leaders of the broad-based Fatherland-All Russia alliance and had no intention of running against each other, either of their candidacies was considered extremely formidable. Now eight months later, neither Primakov nor Luzhkov is running and the Kremlin’s candidate of choice – acting President Vladimir Putin – sits atop the polls with an approval rating around 59 percent (VCIOM -- All Russia Center for Public Opinion.) If nothing else has been proven in this campaign cycle, it is that the Kremlin is still the most formidable campaign organization in Russia. -
The Russian Federation Country Report 2009: Situation for Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Idps in the Russian Federation
The Russian Federation Country report 2009: Situation for refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in the Russian Federation Country Report 2009 Russian Federation Introduction In 2009 there were no substantial changes in relation to the asylum system or realising the rights of migrants. However, we need to mention one very important event that gives hope for other positive tendencies in this field. In April 2009 the first meeting of the Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights Council under the President of the Russian Federation took place with President Dmitry Medvedev, who had been elected a year previously. The President supported proposals at the meeting to create a discussion forum on issues relating to the lack of a migration policy and problems caused by this at once. At his initiative a Governmental Commission on Migration Policy was formed. As well as representatives from various ministries and agencies, Ella Pamfilova, Lidia Grafova and Svetlana Gannushkina became members of the Commission too. The work plans of the Commission encompassed a wide range of migration issues, including drawing up a draft migration policy. The first thing on the agenda was the question of legalising former citizens of the USSR living in Russia for a long period of time – an issue that is extremely important for thousands of our former compatriots. The Commission started its work in September 2009. A working group was started at the first meeting that included different academics working in the field of migration and the law, which again increased the opportunities for civil society to influence the situation relating to migration.