POLITICAL SCIENCE PROJECT

TERRORISM : AN ANALYSIS

Arun baby Stephen Mithu Dharan Mohammed Ziyad r.v Pragnya vasishta Acknowledgement

We extend our sincere gratitude to our teacher Mr. S. Sudheesh for giving us an opportunity to work upon such an interesting topic. The moral support of our par ents and friends endowed us with the zeal to work on this project. We are also t hankful to the Librarians of the college library for being extremely supportive.

INTRODUCTION ______• Components of terrorism There are five crucial components of terrorism, an involvement of an act of viol ence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims, and politic al goals or motives. The threat of violence (in which the capacity and the will ingness to commit violence) is common to terrorism, where attacks on the undefen ded are not an unsought side effect, but a premeditated stratagem. Terrorists pl an and execute the murder and or maiming of unrelated innocent persons in a calc ulated and needless fashion. Terrorist groups generally seek maximum publicity f rom their actions; no terrorist group or organization commits acts randomly or s enselessly. They seek to frighten, and through fear, dominate and control. They want to impress; they play to and for an audience and solicit their participatio n. The goal of many terrorist organizations is to attract attention and intern ational sympathy for their cause. The current interest in terrorism focuses on the violence perpetrated by Islamic Fundamentalists (Islamists) Terrorism has been used as a tactic for centuries b ut has become more pervasive since the 1960s. After World War I and II, colonial powers redrew the maps in many parts of the world and gradually reduced their c olonies. This led to a rise in nationalist movements seeking selfdetermination, or seeking to replace rulers that had been imposed by the colonists. Many of th e resulting conflicts have involved revolutionary warfare strategy and guerrilla tactics. However, traditional guerrilla warfare is often inappropriate in urbanized count ries. For instance, rebels cannot gain and hold control over land when opposed b y superior forces and cannot employ overt hitandrun attacks effectively, witho ut large losses. What emerged was a new doctrine of urban guerrilla warfare, whi ch has evolved to include terrorist tactics. Typical Terrorist Objectives Include: 1. Attract public attention to the group’s grievances 2. Encourage empathy for their unfair/unjust situation and sympathy for th e cause 3. Demonstrate the inability of the state to provide security 4. Demonstrate the illegitimacy of the state’s institutions 5. Polarize the public to simplify the debates and arguments 6. Coerce the public into pressuring the state into compromise solutions 7. Force the state into repressive reactions that discredit the government

8. Force the state into repressive reactions that serve to recruit new mem bers and supporters 9. Demonstrate the economic consequences of continued violence 10. Highlight the potential political consequences of continued conflict 11. Attract international attention and encourage intervention 12. Provoke widespread civil uprising to change the government, or form a s eparate state • Views of Locke and Hobbes on the need for security in society Social security is an essential component for leading a peaceful life as a socie ty. Terrorism is a direct threat to this peace and security. The concept of soci al security can be found in the Social Contract Theory put forth by Locke, Hobbe s and Rousseau. For the sake of brevity, only the views of Locke and Hobbes are discussed. Social Contract denotes an implicit agreement within a state regarding the rig hts and responsibilities of the state and its citizens, or more generally a simi lar concord between a group and its members, or between individuals. All members within a society are assumed to agree to the terms of the social contract by th eir choice to stay within the society without violating the contract; such viola tion would signify a problematic attempt to return to the state of nature. It ha s been often noted, indeed, that social contract theories relied on a specific a nthropological conception of man as either "good" or "evil". Hobbes: Hobbes has a unique state of nature that leads him to a monarchy rule. H is state of nature is a state of war of all against all. “Hereby it is manifest, t hat during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, the y are in that condition that is called war; and such a war is of every man, agai nst every man. For war is consisteth not in battle only, or in the act of fighti ng; but in tract of time: wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.” (Hobbes P119) Hobbes then argues that when the people start to move out of the state of nature , they would choose Monarchy An absolute rule that will insure the safety of th e system. If you do as you are told, you have the right not to be killed, and yo u do not even have the right not to be killed, for no matter what the Sovereign does, it does not constitute violation of the contract. The concept of just use of force is meaningless or cannot be known. Just use of force is whatever force is authorized Locke: Locke comes with a different “State of Nature” than Hobbes’. He argues that the re is a law of nature that governs the state of nature. The law forbids us from harming each other’s life, health, liberty or property. Those rights are plural ra ther than singular. He proposes three arguments for the rights in the state of n ature. His arguments have a religious premise, however. He says in the first arg ument that we are God’s property, and because it is wrong to harm someone else’s pro perty, it is wrong to harm each other. We give up our right to ourselves exact r etribution for crimes in return for impartial justice backed by overwhelming for ce. We retain the right to life and liberty, and gain the right to just, imparti al protection of our property. Authorization is meaningless, except that the aut horization gives us reason to believe that the use of force is just. If authoriz ation does not give us such confidence, perhaps because the state itself is a pa rty to the dispute, or because of past lawless acts and abuses by the state, the n we are back in a state of nature. • Types of Terrorism The current interest in terrorism focuses on the violence perpetrated by Islamic Fundamentalists (Islamists) Terrorism has been used as a tactic for centuries b ut has become more pervasive since the 1960s. After World War I and II, colonial powers redrew the maps in many parts of the world and gradually reduced their c olonies. This led to a rise in nationalist movements seeking selfdetermination, or seeking to replace rulers that had been imposed by the colonists. Many of th e resulting conflicts have involved revolutionary warfare strategy and guerrilla tactics. However, traditional guerrilla warfare is often inappropriate in urbanized count ries. For instance, rebels cannot gain and hold control over land when opposed b y superior forces and cannot employ overt hitandrun attacks effectively, witho ut large losses. What emerged was a new doctrine of urban guerrilla warfare, whi ch has evolved to include terrorist tactics. Until recently, terrorism has been most closely associated with ethnic and minor ity group struggles for independence and selfdetermination. The primary area of conflict could usually be defined, as could the adversaries and their various a spirations. During the 1990s a new form of international terrorism emerged that appears less rational, less focused, more international and more deadly – Islamist Terrorism. In fact, many of the causes and motivations remain strikingly similar to what co uld be called traditional modern terrorism. What is different is the religious i deological foundation, the broad definition of adversaries, the evolution in ter rorist tactics and the desire and potential for devastating levels of destructio n. Islamist extremists appear willing to ignore taboos against killing innocents and able to rationalize their actions by distorting Islamic teachings. The pote ntial to use chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons of mass dest ruction has created a new level of terror that demands effective solutions. Unfortunately, states have had relatively poor results deterring, containing or eliminating political violence. Those that have been successful have used extrem e, repressive measures that have threatened the rule of law, personal freedoms a nd human rights. There must be a better answer. Terrorism doesn’t just happen. Terrorism is an advanced stage of a failed politica l process that begins with inequities and injustice, and moves from frustrated a ttempts at reform that breed fear and anger, to political confrontation that eru pts in violence, which can be exploited to rationalize the use of any form of vi olence against any target. It seems that solutions to terrorism could be found a t any stage of the evolving, or deteriorating political process. This suggests t hat we must start by understanding the historical context for today’s conflicts. DEFINITION______• Origin of the term terrorism The root of the word terrorism is taken from a Latin term that literally means " to frighten". It became part of the phrase "terror cimbricus", which was used by ancient Romans in 105BC to describe the panic that ensued as they prepared for an attack by a fierce warrior tribe. Many years later that fact was taken into a ccount during the bloody reign of Maximilien Robespierre during the French Revol ution. Terror is a feeling of intense and overwhelming fear, and that is exactly what R obespierre brought to the people of France. Following the execution of Louis XVI , Robespierre was made the de facto leader of the French government. He was a me mber of the Jacobins political party, and used his new found power to attack his political enemies, the Girondins. Thousands of people were executed at Robespie rre s request, and it became one of the bloodiest times in French history. Most of the victims were beheaded using the Guillotine, which was often referred to b y the title "The National Razor". Any opposition to the power of the Jacobins wa s immediately squashed, and people lived in fear of retribution. This period of time was referred to as the Reign of Terror, largely in homage to "terror cimbricus". After nearly a year, the Terror came to an end and Robespie rre was overthrown and executed. When it was over, people started to use the wor d terrorist to describe a person who abuses power through the threat of force. A journalist in the United Kingdom wrote about the Reign of Terror in The Times n ewspaper, and created the word terrorism as a way to describe the actions of Rob espierre. The word became so popular it was officially added to the Oxford Engli sh Dictionary three years later. Today the term terrorism has basically the same meaning, although it has become better defined over the years. Whatever the definition becomes, it will still be used to describe intentional acts of violence that are designed to harm or kill citizens in order to intimidate others. • Can terrorism be defined? The word terrorism is still often used interchangeably with the word terror, cau sing definitional confusion and blurring the boundaries between other types of v iolent behaviour and terrorism. Many activities, from wars to rampages by youth gangs to writing science fiction, are meant to strike terror into the enemy (or reader). In this context, the scope of potential definitions is limitless. Defin itions of terrorism are not immutable; they change over time. More than a hundre d definitions of terrorism exist. Proffered by government officials, scholars, t he media, and terrorists themselves, the varying definitions present a bewilderi ng array of approaches to defining terrorism. The difficulty of definition is no t new, however. Cooper notes that “there has never been, since the topic began to command serious attention, some golden age in which terrorism was easy to define .” Yet, no matter how difficult the task, defining terrorism is crucial. In some o ther areas of contemporary life, definitions and conceptualizations may be purel y theoretical and of interest primarily to academics. Terrorism is an ideological and political concept. Politics, by its nature, is a dversarial, and thus any definition evokes adversarial disagreement. The meaning given to terrorism is part of a person’s or nation’s philosophy. Thus, the determin ation of the “right” definition of terrorism is subjective and not likely to be reac hed by consensus. Therefore, if you disagree with my position, you are a terrori st; if you agree with my position, you are not a terrorist. Yet, the cliché that “on e man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” provides little help in achieving definitional precision. Terrorism is also difficult to define because “there are not one but many differen t terrorisms”. Separating the tactics of terror from the concept of terrorism is n ecessary but difficult. The distinction among terrorism, guerrilla warfare, conv entional warfare, civil wars, riots, and criminal activity is often blurry. Terr orists are not the only ones who use the tactics of terror. Violent and terrifyi ng acts are common to terrorism, but these tactics are also common elements in r apes, murders, and other violent crimes. Yet, despite the definitional difficult ies, distinctions must be made among the different forms of violent behaviour. • Different authorities on terrorism League of Nations: In the late 1930s, the International community made a first a ttempt at defining terrorism. Article 1.1 of the League of Nations 1937 Convent ion for the prevention and punishment of Terrorism, which never entered into for ce, defined "acts of terrorism" as "criminal acts directed against a State and i ntended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular per sons or a group of persons or the general public". Article 2 included as terrori st acts, if they were directed against another state and if they constituted act s of terrorism within the meaning of the definition contained in article 1, the following: "1. Any wilful act causing death or grievous bodily harm or loss of liberty to: a) Heads of State, persons exercising the prerogatives of the head of the State, their hereditary or designated successors; b) The wives or husbands or the abovementioned persons; c) Persons charged with public functions or holding public positions when the ac t is directed against them in their public capacity. 2. Wilful destruction of, or damage to, public property or property devoted to a public purpose belonging to or subject to the authority of another High Contrac ting Party. 3. Any wilful act calculated to endanger the lives of members of the public. 4. Any attempt to commit an offence falling within the foregoing provisions of t he present article. 5. The manufacture, obtaining, possession, or supplying of arms, ammunition, exp losives or harmful substances with the view to the commission in any country wha tsoever of an offence falling within the present article." UN General Assembly Resolutions: On December 17, 1996, the nonbinding United Na tions Declaration to Supplement the 1994 Declaration on Measures to Eliminate In ternational Terrorism, annexed to the UN General Assembly Resolution 51/210, con demned terrorist activities in the following terms: "1. The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and un justifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed, including those that jeopardi ze friendly relations among States and peoples and threaten the territorial inte grity and security of States; 2. The States Members of the United Nations reaffirm that acts, methods and prac tices of terrorism are contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nat ions; they declare that knowingly financing, planning and inciting terrorist act s are also contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations;" 3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the gene ral public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, p hilosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that ma y be invoked to justify them;" UN Security Council: In 2004, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 co ndemned terrorist acts as: "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provo ke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particula r persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international or ganization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences wit hin the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols r elating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations o f a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other si milar nature," European Union: The European Union defines terrorism for legal/official purposes in Article1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002). This provi des that terrorist offences are certain criminal offences set out in a list cons isting largely of serious offences against persons and property that; “...given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an internatio nal organisation where committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a popul ation; or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perfor m or abstain from performing any act; or seriously destabilising or destroying t he fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a cou ntry or an international organisation.” United Kingdom: The United Kingdom s Terrorism Act 2000 defined terrorism as fol lows: (1) In this Act "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where: (a) The action falls within subsection (2), (b) The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate t he public or a section of the public and (c) The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religiou s or ideological cause. (2) Action falls within this subsection if it: (a) involves serious violence against a person, (b) involves serious damage to property, (c) endangers a person s life, other than that of the person committing the acti on, (d) Creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public or (e) Is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electroni c system. The Terrorism Act 2000 defines terrorism so as to include not only violent offen ces against persons and physical damage to property, but also acts "designed ser iously to interfere with or to seriously disrupt an electronic system" if those acts are (a) designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and (b)be done for the purpose of advancing a politica l, religious or ideological cause. Section 34 of the Terrorism Act 2006 amended sections 1(1)(b) and 113(1)(c) of T errorism Act 2000 to include "international governmental organisations" in addit ion to "government". United States: United States Code (U.S.C.): Title 22, Chapter 38 of the United S tates Code (regarding the Department of State) contains a definition of terroris m in its requirement that annual country reports on terrorism be submitted by th

e Secretary of State to Congress every year. It reads:

"Definitions ... the term terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants targets by sub national groups or cl andestine agents;" Title 18 of the United States Code (regarding criminal acts and criminal procedu

re) defines international terrorism as:

"[T]he term international terrorism means activities that . . . involve violen t acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; [and] ap pear to be intended . . . to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; . . . t o influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or . . . to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnap ping; and [which] occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Un ited States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which the y are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.” USA PATRIOT Act defines terrorism activities as "activities that (A) involve act s dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the U.S. or of any state, that (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a ci vilian population, (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping, and (C) occur primarily within the territorial ju risdiction of the U.S." FBI definition of terrorism: The unlawful use of force or violence against perso ns or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. U.S. Army Manual definition terrorism is the "calculated use of unlawful violenc e or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear. It is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies ... [to attain] political, religious, or ide ological goals." Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms defines ter rorism as: The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violenc e to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societie s in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideologica l. Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: It was adopted by the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice in Cairo, Egypt in 1998. Terrorism was defined in the convention as: Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to so w panic among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, libe rty or security in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or to p ublic or private installations or property or to occupying or seizing them, or s eeking to jeopardize national resources. • Academic consensus definition on terrorism In 1988, an Academic Consensus Definition, based on the responses of 50 experts in the field Terrorism Studies to a questionnaire, was formulated by Alex P. Sch mid; twentythree years later, it has been revised on the basis of another consu ltation round involving almost one hundred experts. “Terrorism refers on the one hand to a doctrine about the presumed effectiveness o f a special form or tactic of feargenerating, coercive political violence and, on the other hand, to a conspiratorial practice of calculated, demonstrative, di rect violent action without legal or moral restraints, targeting mainly civilian s and noncombatants, performed for its propagandistic and psychological effects on various audiences and conflict parties.” HISTORY OF TERRORISM______• History Scholars dispute whether the roots of terrorism date back to the 1st century and the Sicarii Zealots, to the 11th century and the AlHashshashin, to the 19th ce ntury and Narodnaya Volya, or to other eras. The Sicarii and Hashshashin are des cribed below, while the Narodnaya Volya is discussed in the 19th Century subsec tion. Other preReign of Terror historical events sometimes associated with terr orism are the Gunpowder Plot, an attempt to destroy the English Parliament in 16 05, and the Boston Tea Party, an attack on British property by the Sons of Liber ty in 1773, three years prior to the American Revolution. Sicarii: In the 1st century CE, the Jewish Zealots in Judaea Province rebelled, killing prominent collaborators with Roman rule. In 6 CE, according to contempor ary historian Josephus, Judas of Galilee formed a small and more extreme offshoo t of the Zealots, the Sicarii ("dagger men"). Their efforts also directed agains t Jewish "collaborators," including temple priests, Sadducees, Herodians, and ot her wealthy elites. According to Josephus, the Sicarii would hide short daggers under their cloaks, mingle with crowds at large festivals, murder their victims, and then disappear into the panicked crowds. Their most successful assassinatio n was of the high priest Jonathan. Hashshashin: In the late 11th century CE, the Hashshashin (a.k.a. the Assassins) arose, an offshoot of theIsmā īlī sect of Shia Muslims. Led by Hassani Sabbah and op posed to Fatimid rule, the Hashshashin militia seized Alamut and other fortress strongholds across Persia. Hashshashin forces were too small to challenge enemie s militarily, so they assassinated city governors and military commanders in ord er to create alliances with militarily powerful neighbours. For example, they ki lled Janah alDawla, ruler of Homs, to please Ridwan of Aleppo, and assassinated Mawdud, Seljuk emir of Mosul, as a favour to the regent of Damascus. The Hashsh ashin also carried out assassinations as retribution. Under some definitions of terrorism, such assassinations do not qualify as terrorism, since killing a poli tical leader does not intimidate political enemies or inspire revolt. Terrorism was associated with the Reign of Terror in France until the mid19th c entury, when the term began to be associated with nongovernmental groups. Anarc hism, often in league with rising nationalism, was the most prominent ideology l inked with terrorism. Attacks by various anarchist groups led to the assassinati on of a Russian Tsar and a U.S. President. The 19th century saw the development of powerful, stable, and affordable explosives, and the gap closed between the f irepower of the state and dissidents. Dynamite, in particular, inspired American and French anarchists and was central to their strategic thinking. Narodnaya Volya: In mid19th century Russia, many grew impatient with the slow p ace of Tsarist reforms, and anarchists such as Mikhail Bakunin maintained that p rogress was impossible without violence. Founded in 1878 and inspired by Bakunin and others, Narodnaya Volya used dynamitepacked bombs to kill Russian state of ficials, in an effort to incite state retribution and mobilize the populace agai nst the government. Inspired by Narodnaya Volya, several nationalist groups in t he ailing Ottoman Empire began using violence against public figures in the 1890 s. These included the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party; an early proponent was the Italian revolutionary Carlo Pisacane (1818–1857), who wrote in his "Political Tes tament" (1857) that "ideas spring from deeds and not the other way around." Anar chist Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876), in his "Letters to a Frenchman on the Present C risis" (1870) stated that "we must spread our principles, not with words but wit h deeds, for this is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistibl e form of propaganda.” The phrase itself was popularized by the French anarchist P aul Brousse (1844–1912), who in 1877 cited as examples the 1871 Paris Commune and a workers demonstration in Berne provocatively using the socialist red flag. By the 1880s, the slogan had begun to be used to refer to bombings, regicides and tyrannicides. Reflecting this new understanding of the term, Italian anarchist E rrico Malatesta in 1895 described "propaganda by the deed" (which he opposed the use of) as violent communal insurrections meant to ignite an imminent revolutio n. Founded in Russia in 1878, Narodnaya Volya (Нодня Воя in Russian; People s Will in Engli volutionary anarchist group inspired by Sergei Nechayev and "propaganda by the d

eed" theorist Pisacane. The group developed ideas—such as targeted killing of the

leaders of oppression —that were to become the hallmark of subsequent violence by small nonstate groups, and they were convinced that the developing technologie s of the age such as the invention of dynamite, which they were the first anarch ist group to make widespread use enabled them to strike directly and with discri mination. Individual Europeans also engaged in politically motivated violence. For example, in 1893, Auguste Vaillant, a French anarchist, threw a bomb in the French Chamber of Deputies in which one person was injured. In reaction to Vaill ant s bombing and other bombings and assassination attempts, the French governme nt passed a set of laws restricting freedom of the press that were pejoratively known as the lois scélérates ("villainous laws"). From 1894 to 1896, President of Fr ance Marie Francois Carnot, Prime Minister of Spain Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, and AustriaHungary Empress Elisabeth of Bavaria were killed by anarchists. Armenian Revolutionary Federation: Several nationalist groups used violence aga inst an Ottoman Empire in apparent decline. One was the Armenian Revolutionary F ederation (in Armenian Dashnaktsuthium, or "The Federation"), a revolutionary mo vement founded in Tiflis (Russian Transcaucasia) in 1890 by Christopher Mikaelia n. Many members had been part of Narodnaya Volya or the Hunchakian Revolutionary Party. The group unsuccessfully demanded the creation of an Armenian state, but backed down on a threat to blow up the bank. An ensuing security crackdown dest royed the group. Also inspired by Narodnaya Volya, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza tion (IMRO) was a revolutionary movement founded in 1893 by Hristo Tatarchev in the Ottomancontrolled Macedonian territories. Political assassinations continued into the 20th century, its first victim Umber to I of Italy, killed in July 1900. Political violence became especially widespr ead in Imperial Russia, and several ministers were killed in the opening years o f the century. The highest ranking was Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin, killed in 1911 by a leftist radical. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, heir to the AustroHungar ian throne, and his wife, Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, were shot and killed in Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by Gavrilo Princip, one of a group of six assassins. The assassinations produced widespread shock across Europe, se tting in motion a series of events which led to World War I. Irish Volunteers and Irish Citizen Army : In an action called the Easter Rising or Easter Rebellion, on April 24, 1916, members of the Irish Volunteers and Iris h Citizen Army seized the Dublin General Post Office and several other buildings , proclaiming an independent Irish Republic. The rebellion failed militarily but was a success for physical force Irish republicanism, leaders of the uprising b ecoming Irish heroes after their eventual execution by the British government. S hortly after the rebellion, Michael Collins and others founded the Irish Republi can Army (IRA), which from 1916 to 1923 carried out numerous attacks against sym bols of British power. IRA tactics were an inspiration to other groups, includin g the Palestine Mandate s Zionists, and to British special operations during Wor ld War II. Bedouins seized French planes during the 1920s. Haganah: Following the 1929 Hebron massacre of sixtyseven Jewish settlers in th e British Mandate of Palestine, the Zionist settlers’ militia Haganah transformed itself into a paramilitary force. In 1931, however, a more militant Irgun broke away from Haganah, objecting to Haganah s policy of restraint toward Arabs fight ing Jewish settlers. Founded by Avraham Tehomi, Irgun sought to end British rule by assassinating police, capturing British government buildings and arms, and s abotaging British railways. Some of the tactics of the guerrilla, partisan, and resistance movements organised and supplied by the Allies during World War II, a ccording to historian M. R. D. Foot, can be considered terrorist. Colin Gubbins, a key leader within the British Special Operations Executive(SOE), made sure th e organization drew much of its inspiration from the IRA. On the eve of DDay, t he SOE organised with the French resistance the complete destruction of the rail and communication infrastructure of western France perhaps the largest coordina ted attack of its kind in history. Allied supreme commander Dwight Eisenhower la ter wrote that "the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of Ge rman road moves and the continual and increasing strain placed on German securit y services throughout occupied Europe by the organised forces of Resistance, pla yed a very considerable part in our complete and final victory". After World War II, largely successful anticolonial campaigns were launched aga inst the collapsing European empires, as many World War II resistance groups bec ame militantly anticolonial. The Viet Minh, for example, which had fought again st the Japanese, now fought the returning French colonists. In the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood used bombings and assassinations against British rule in Egypt. Also during the 1950s, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Frenchcont rolled Algeria and the EOKA in Britishcontrolled Cyprus waged guerrilla and ope n war against colonial powers. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna : Founded in 1959 and still active, the Euskadi Ta Askatas una (or ETA (Basque for "Basque Homeland and Freedom") is an armed Basque nation alist separatist organization Formed in response to General Francisco Franco s s uppression of the Basque language and culture, ETA evolved from an advocacy grou p for traditional Basque culture into an armed Marxist group demanding Basque in dependence. Many ETA victims are government officials, the group s first known v

ictim a police chief killed in 1968.

In the 1960s, inspired by Mao s Chinese revolution of 1949 and Castro s Cuban re volution of 1959, national independence movements in formerly colonized countrie s often fused nationalist and socialist impulses in the 1960s. This was the case with Spain s ETA, the Front de libération du Québec, and the Palestine Liberation O rganization. Muslim Brotherhood: Founded in 1928 as a nationalist socialwelfare and politic al movement in Britishcontrolled Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1940 s began to attack British soldiers and police stations. Founded and led by Hassa n alBanna, it also assassinated politicians seen as collaborating with British rule, most prominently Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi in 1948. British rule wa s overthrown in a 1952 military coup, and shortly thereafter the Muslim Brotherh ood went underground in the face of a massive crackdown. Though sometimes banned or otherwise oppressed, the group continues to exist in presentday Egypt. Front de Libération Nationale: The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was a nationa list group founded in Frenchcontrolled Algeria in 1954. The group was a larges cale resistance movement against French occupation, with alleged terrorism only part of its operations. The FLN leadership was inspired by the Viet Minh rebels who had made French troops withdraw from Vietnam. The FLN was one of the first a nticolonial groups to use large scale compliance violence. The FLN would establ ish control over a rural village and coerce its peasants to execute any French l oyalists among them. Fatah: Fatah was organized as a Palestinian nationalist group in 1954, and exist s today as a political party in Palestine. In 1967 it joined the Palestine Liber ation Organization (PLO), an umbrella organization for secular Palestinian natio nalist groups formed in 1964. The PLO began its own armed operations in 1965. Th e PLO s membership is made up of separate and possibly contending paramilitary a nd political factions, the largest of which are Fatah, PFLP, and DFLP. Factions of the PLO have advocated or carried out acts of terrorism. Abu Iyad organized t he Fatah splinter group Black September in 1970; the group is best known for sei zing eleven Israeli athletes as hostages at the September 1972 Summer Olympics i n Munich. All the athletes and five Black September operatives died during a gun battle with the West German police, in what was later known as the Munich massa cre. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was founded in 196 7 by George Habash, and on September 6, 1970, the group hijacked three internati onal passenger planes, landing two of them in Jordan and blowing up the third. F atah leader and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat publicly renounced terrorism in Decem ber 1988 on behalf of the PLO, but Israel has stated it has proof that Arafat co ntinued to sponsor terrorism until his death in 2004. The People s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) or Mujahedine Khalq, is a socialist islamic group that has fought I ran s government since the Khomeini revolution. The group was originally founded to oppose capitalism and what it perceived as western exploitation of Iran unde r the Shah. The group would go on to play an important role in the Shah s overth row but was unable to capitalize on this in the following power vacuum. The grou p is suspected of having a membership of between 10,000 and 30,000. The group re nounced violence in 2001 but remains a proscribed terror organization in Iran an d the U.S. The EU, however, has removed the group from its terror list. The PMOI is accused of supporting other groups such as the Jundallah. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was founded in 19 75 in Beirut during the Lebanese Civil War by Hagop Tarakchian and Hagop Hagopia n with the help of sympathetic Palestinians. At the time, Turkey was in politica l turmoil, and Hagopian believed that the time was right to avenge the Armenians who died during the Armenian Genocide and to force the Turkish government to ce de the territory of Wilsonian Armenia to establish a nation state also incorpora ting the Armenian SSR. The "Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan" (Kurdistan Workers Party or PKK) was established

in Turkey in 1978 as a Kurdish nationalist party. Founder Abdullah Ocalan was in

spired by the Maoist theory of people s war, and like Algeria s FLN he advocated the use of compliance terror. The group seeks to create an independent Kurdish state consisting of parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeas tern Syria and northwestern Iran. Throughout the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union made extensive use o f violent nationalist organizations to carry on a war by proxy. For example, Sov iet and Chinese military advisers provided training and support to the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, while the U.S. funded groups such as the Contras in Nic aragua. Ironically, many violent Islamic militants of the late 20th and early 21 st century had been funded in the 1980s by the US and the UK because they were f ighting the USSR in Afghanistan. MODERN TERRORISM______Although it is difficult to say where and when ‘new terrorism’ exactly started, many point to the mid1990s, and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 as well as the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo underground by the Aum Shinri kyo cult in 1995. It is said, that this terrorism has a different set of new cha racteristics in comparison to the traditional or ‘old terrorism’ mentioned above. Many supporters of the concept ‘new terrorism’ point to the prominence of religion, mainly radical Islam, as one of its main characteristics. Whereas ‘old terrorism’ wa s primarily secular in its orientation and inspiration, terrorism linked to reli gious fanaticism is on the increase. According to Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole only two out of sixtyfour international terrorist organisations in 1980 could b e classified as religious. This figure has risen sharply to twentyfive out of f iftyeight by 1995. ‘New terrorism’ is often portrayed as a terrorism, which rejects all other ways and promotes an uncompromising view of the world in accordance w ith the belief of the religion. Bruce Hoffman believes that this religious motiv ation is the defining characteristic of ‘new terrorism’, which produces “radically dif ferent value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts o f morality and, world view”. Related to the religious motivation, many in the ‘new terrorism’ supporters point ou t that another of the main features of ‘new terrorism’ is the increasing willingness to use excessive indiscriminate violence. Laqueur argues that “the new terrorism is different in character, aiming not at clearly defined political demands but a t the destruction of society and the elimination of large sections of the popula tion.”Hoffman highlights that these groups have caused 60 per cent of all fataliti es while only being responsible for a quarter of the terrorist actions. It has b een argued that “[f]or the religious terrorist, violence is a divine duty … executed in direct response to some theological demand … and justified by scripture.”As Audr ey Cronin points out, religious terrorists see their struggle as good against ev il, therefore dehumanising their victims and considering nonmembers of their gr oup to be infidels or apostates. As a result indiscriminate violence may not be only morally acceptable, but amou nt to a righteous and necessary advancement of their religious cause. ‘Old terrori sts’ tended to strike only selected targets, while ‘new’ terrorism has become increasi ngly indiscriminate and tries to produce as many casualties as possible. Religio us terrorists are often their own constituency, not concerned about alienating t heir supporters with their acts of destruction, and holding themselves accountab le only to God. For the similar reasons ‘new terrorists’ do not always claim respons ibility and sometimes even deny responsibility for their actions. They see the a ction itself as important and not the claim to it. They are not interested in an y sort of negotiation. “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want t o destroy the table and everyone sitting at it”. Moreover, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler point out that ‘new terrorists’ are a lot more willing to engage in risky an d more complex acts. Whereas most actions by ‘old terrorists’ involved an escape pla n, ‘new terrorists’ seem more willing to give their own life while orchestrating a t errorist act. They believe that ‘new terrorists’ are more prepared to die because ma rtyrdom is seen as a way of reaching heaven. The threat of mass destruction by terrorists is a fundamental part of the concep t of ‘new terrorism’. Many theorists believe that due to their motivation to use ext reme violence, ‘new terrorists’ are likely to try to obtain and use biological, chem ical, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Hoffman warns that “ma ny of the constraints (both selfimposed and technical) which previously inhibit ed terrorist use of WMD are eroding.”With the collapse of the Soviet Union acquiri ng material which could be used for WMDs or even a complete WMD has become easie r and does not need the cooperation of a state sponsor anymore. Another of the characteristics of ‘new’ terrorism is precisely this inherent lack of state backers. Some believe that the willingness to use extreme violence shows that new terrorists no not have an organisation or state sponsor to protect, so they see no reason to limit their violence as they do not fear a backlash. There fore, the financing of ‘new terrorism’ is not based on money received from state spo nsors, but on other illegal sources such as drug trafficking, video piracy and c redit card fraud, as well as legal business investments, donations from wealthy individuals, charities and Diaspora. In addition to this the lack of state sponsorship ‘new terrorists’ are seen to be pr edominantly amateurs that operate on a part time basis and have not dropped out of society totally. The new amateur terrorists only come together to conduct the ir action and then disband. They predominantly not receive training or logistica l support from state sponsors but rely on the network of supporters and informat ion on the internet. Furthermore, the increasing use of information and communic ation technologies enables the new terrorists to communicate covertly and to bri dge distances more easily. Although new terrorists might be part time amateurs t hey show a higher degree of technological and operational competence. They use a vast range of communication equipment including mobile and satellite phones as well as email and websites to plan their next terrorist acts, communicate with other terrorist groups and spread their message around the world. Furthermore, ‘ne w terrorism’ also exploits the increase in intercontinental flight connections and the poor customs and immigration control in many countries to move around the w orld. Finally, one of the most emphasised aspects of ‘new terrorism’ is its loose networke d and less hierarchical organisational structure. Some authors believe that the amateur terrorist is a manifestation of a new network structure that is facilita ted by the emergence of new advanced telecommunications technology. Each group w ithin this network becomes relatively autonomous but are still linked by advance d communication and their common purpose. They thereby become a lot more flexibl e and can adapt and react more easily to different situations. Although members do communicate with their leadership, groups can, to a certain extent, operate selfsufficiently. Simon and Benjamin refer to this as a combina tion of “a ‘hub and spoke’ structure (where nodes communicate with the centre) with a ‘w heel’ structure (where nodes in the network communicate with each other without re ference to the centre).” John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini note tha t terrorist leadership is derived from a “set of principle [that] can set boundari es and provide guidelines for decisions and actions so that members do not have to resort to a hierarchy – ‘they know what they have to do.’” The authors describe the o rganizational designs that may “sometimes appear acephalous (headless), and at the other times polycephalous (Hydraheaded).” This type of integrated structure is a lot more difficult to identify and penetrate than a more traditional hierarchic al structure. It is far more resilient because each cell can still operate even if they lose the leadership of the organisation. To summarise, the proponents of ‘new terrorism’ believe that there is something inh erently new about the terrorism of today. This includes a fanatical religious mo tivation, excessive indiscriminate violence together with the possible use of WM Ds, an increasing independence from state sponsors as well as a new network stru cture helped by communications technology and new amateur terrorists who only co me together in ad hoc groupings. • Cyber terrorism Computer crime has hit mankind with unbelievable severity. Computer viruses, wor ms, Trojans, denial of service attacks, spoofing attacks and efrauds have taken the real and virtual worlds by storm. However, all these pale in the face of th e most dreaded threat – that of cyber terrorism. In1998, a 12yearold boy success fully hacked into the controls for the huge Roosevelt Dam on the Salt River in A rizona, USA. He might have released floodwaters that would have inundated Mesa a nd Tempe, endangering at least 1 million people. Two cyber terrorist groups—the Un ix Security Guards and the World Fantabulous Defacers—made 111 digital attacks on Indian educational and business sites recently. A pro Islamic cyberalliance now operates across the Internet against U.S., Israeli, and Indian targets. In ligh t of this disturbing scenario, it is prudent to distinguish between cyber crime, a domestic issue that may have international ramifications and cyber terrorism, an international issue that may have domestic ramifications. While a cyber crime can be described simply as an unlawful act wherein the compu ter is either a tool or a target or both, cyber terrorism merits a more detailed definition. "cyber terrorism": Cyber terrorism is the premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, in cyber space, with the intention5 to further social, ideological, rel igious, political or similar objectives. Cyber terrorism is the convergence of terrorism and cyberspace. It is generally understood to mean unlawful attacks and threats of attack against computers, ne tworks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a g overnment or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Furthe r, to qualify as cyber terrorism, an attack should result in violence against pe rsons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to death or bodily injury, explosions, plane crashes, water contamination, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks against critical infr astructures could be acts of cyber terrorism, depending on their impact or attac ks that disrupt nonessential services. There is no doubt that cyber technology has dramatically influenced how terroris ts may choose to organize, communicate amongst themselves and transmit their mes sages. Conway argues that there are five core terrorist uses of the Internet: in formation provision, financing, networking, recruitment, and information gatheri ng. Grabosky and Stohl cite intelligence, communications, propaganda, psychologi cal warfare, fund raising, recruitment and training. In short, terrorist groups increasingly use computer technology (as many political, commercial and criminal entities do) to secure many of their organizational goals. It is to be expected that organizations will adopt those aspects of digital technology that will ena ble them to operate and grow with a greater degree of efficiency. In this sense, terrorist groups are simply exploiting modern tools to accomplish the same goal s they sought in the past. Terrorist thus might employ digital technologies to e nhance ease of operations; information acquisition and distribution; and increas e the ease of anonymous communication. None of these activities are easily detec ted or countered (but as we shall see below, they do lead to other interesting c ounterterrorism and information gathering possibilities) and therefore terrorist groups may use digital technology to great advantage in furthering their tactic al and strategic goals on a more global as well as local basis. The Web thus enables sometimes previously anonymous groups to establish a presen ce and perhaps exploit their activities far beyond the impact of previous terror ist organizations with far less danger. Thomas argues that the Web thus empowers small groups and makes them appear much more capable than they might actually b e, even turning bluster into a type of virtual fear. The net allows terrorists t o amplify the consequences of their activities with followon messages and threa ts directly to the population at large, even though the terrorist group may be t otally impotent. In effect, the Internet allows a person or group to appear to b e larger or more important or threatening than they really are.” When mainstream n ews then incorporates the reporting of events via these web sites, they also oft en then repeat the major themes of their campaigns and thus increase the propaga nda message’s reach. Organizations employing terrorism have also brought materials which in the past could only be distributed clandestinely and often with much d anger to the attention of not only current members but future recruits and anyon e else who might “benefit” from the destructive capabilities which are taught. Thus, training videos featuring instructions on how to build explosive devices and pr epare gunpowder have recently appeared on several Web sites regularly used by mi litant Islamic groups. These sites also feature tips on money laundering and man y other organizational needs. Terrorist use of computers as a facilitator of their activities, whether for pro paganda, recruitment, data mining, communication, or other purposes, is simply n ot cyber terrorism.” Focusing upon the types of activities that the cited authors above would argue fall under the rubric of cyber terrorism, such as attacks on c ritical infrastructure it is important to investigate the conditions under which terrorists would choose to employ digital means to advance their cause over con ventional methods. Denning suggests that to understand the potential threat of c yber terrorism, two factors must be considered: first, whether there are targets that are vulnerable to attack that could lead to violence or severe harm, and s econd, whether there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry them out. To determine motivation we have to ask not simply if they desire to cause harm and exploit fear but also if the investments needed to create the event are more or less “costly” than traditional means of terror. An expected utility approach provides useful insights into the process of unders tanding why oppositional organizations might choose not only terrorism as a tact ic or strategy and which groups are more likely to do so as well as the conditio ns under which it would make sense (from their perspective) to employ digital ra ther than conventional tools to accomplish their ends. Duvall and Stohl argued t hat that an expected utility model is useful for understanding the choice of ter rorism as a tactic or strategy in domestic affairs and Stohl argued that it coul d be applied to behaviours in the international realm as well. Such an approach calculates the benefit thought possible from the desired outcom e, they believed probability with which the action will bring about the desired state of affairs and they believed probable cost of engaging in the action. Two kinds of costs, response costs and productions costs can be distinguished. Respo nse costs are those costs which might be imposed by the target group and/or symp athetic or offended bystanders. Cyber terrorism also has its drawbacks. Systems are complex, so it may be harder to control an attack and achieve a desired lev el of damage than using physical weapons. Unless people are injured, there is al so less drama and emotional appeal. Thus we must ask what else might be inhibiti ng terrorist groups from doing so beyond the simple cost benefit analysis. Part of the answer lies in their understanding of audience reactions. Many of these g roups, such as Al Qaeda, are quite sophisticated in terms of their understanding of audience reactions and use their resources with great calculation. • Media and Terrorism In order to spread fear and thus advance its political goals, a terrorist organi zation needs the media. In most cases, terrorist attacks are very localized, and affect only a few people. The goal, however, is to spread the message to more p eople than just those who were directly hit in the attack. The media play an imp ortant role in achieving this by spreading the news of the attacks or even by di rectly transferring the message of terrorist organizations. Bruce Hoffman argues on terrorist attacks that “without the media’s coverage the act’s impact is arguably wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victim(s) of the attack, ra ther than reaching the wider ‘target audience’ at whom the terrorists’ violence is act ually aimed.”Brigitte Nacos agrees: Without massive news coverage the terrorist ac t would resemble the proverbial tree falling in the forest: if no one learned of an incident, it would be as if it had not occurred. Boaz Ganor states it even stronger: Terrorists are not necessarily interested in the deaths of three, or thirty or even of three thousand people. Rather, th ey allow the imagination of the target population to do their work for them. In fact, it is conceivable that the terrorists could attain their aims without carr ying out a single attack; the desired panic could be produced by the continuous broadcast of threats and declarations – by radio and TV interviews, videos and all the familiar methods of psychological warfare. The media are very well suited f or the purposes of terrorists. Several theories concerning characteristics – or ca pabilities – of the media explain part of this phenomenon. Agenda setting is the t heory that the more attention a media outlet pays to a certain phenomenon, the m ore importance the public attributes to such an issue. The theory of framing sta tes that the way a news item is presented can have an influence on how it is int erpreted or understood by the audience. Obviously, terrorists like to be on thei r audiences’ minds, and preferably in a way that is as positive as possible. Some examples in which these media characteristics can be useful for terrorists will be discussed throughout this section. First, however, it is instructive to discu ss some objectives that terrorists may have in using the media. Yonah Alexander argues that terrorist groups have three purposes to interact with the media, nam ely attention, recognition and legitimacy. Robin Gerrits focuses more on the psychological interaction between terrorists and the media. According to him, Brigitte Nacos combines these aspects into one comprehensive framework, stating that terrorists have four general mediadepende nt objectives when they strike or threaten to commit violence. The first is to g ain attention and awareness of the audience, and thus to condition the target po pulation (and government) for intimidation: create fear. The second goal is reco gnition of the organization’s motives. They want people to think about why they ar e carrying out attacks. The third objective is to gain the respect and sympathy of those in whose name they claim to attack. The last objective is to gain a qua silegitimate status and a media treatment similar to that of legitimate politic al actors. For each terrorist organization the objectives in using the media may be differe nt. In some cases, one objective is more important than the other. For some orga nizations, one of the objectives may not be an issue at all, or another objectiv e should be added. An added caveat is that the first objective is not necessaril y the most important one. Nevertheless, most of the perceived important objectiv es fall under Nacos’ division. Gaining attention is strongly linked to agenda sett ing. Terrorists are trying to be in the media as often and as long as possible, in order to become well known to the public. They attempt to influence media out lets so that they, in turn, will influence the audience by spreading the word on the existence of the organization: the terrorists get attention, and people wil l be aware of the existence, methods, and targets of the group. In fact terrorists are thus carrying out propaganda by proxy. A major factor of this objective is to creating fear among the target population. In fact, it is a n essential factor in any terrorist’s agenda that the whole tactic of terrorism is based upon, and that is visible in all parts of terrorist activity. This is not different for terrorist use of the media. The strategy to gain attention is mea nt, to an important extent, to intimidate the audience and the target governmen t – so that even the threat of possibly becoming victim of terrorist violence is e nough to create fear, and thus to affect the policy making process. As Hoffman w rites: “Only by spreading the terror and outrage to a much larger audience can the terrorists gain the maximum potential leverage that they need to effect fundame ntal political change.” The second objective is related both to agenda setting and framing. Not only do terrorists want to be known to the audience, they also wan t to try to get their message across through the media. Sometimes this can be achieved merely by carrying out attacks: the audience may ask itself why people would do such things, especially, for example, if suicide bombers are involved. For many it is all but unfathomable that people would kill themselves in order to kill civilian bystanders. To get to know the cause they do this for would be a logical next step for them. The effects of this media str ategy can be increased by trying to make the media frame the issues in a certain way. In some cases, the media can even give a positive spin to the cause, or co mpare the means terrorists use to means that are used by others who are consider ed more legitimate than terrorists, thus lending some recognition to the terrori sts. By regularly appearing in the media, terrorists are trying to become a legi timate representative of their own cause. Whether or not the audience agrees, fo r this objective, is of less importance. The audience of terrorist attacks does not only include potential victims that h ave to be frightened, but potential supporters as well. These potential supporte rs– the people in whose name the terrorists claim to act – have to be impressed. Thi s is a third objective of terrorists using the media: they want to show potentia l supporters that they can “deliver”. When people who are perhaps mildly interested in the activities or ideas of a particular group see that that organization is a ctually able to have an impact on the legitimate political establishment, these people may become more respectful or sympathetic toward the terrorist cause or o rganization. Of course, this, again, requires agenda setting. Much like for the previous objective, if an organization succeeds in having the media frame its me ssage in a certain way, it may succeed in getting even more respect and sympathy than if it fails to do so. • War on terror Criticism of the War on Terror addresses the issues, morals, ethics, efficiency, economics, and other questions surrounding the War on Terror. Arguments are als o made against the phrase itself, calling it a misnomer. The notion of a "war" a gainst "terrorism" has proven highly contentious, with critics charging that it has been exploited by participating governments to pursue longstanding policy o bjectives, reduce civil liberties, and infringe upon human rights. Some argue th at the term war is not appropriate in this context (as in War on Drugs), since t hey believe there is no identifiable enemy, and that it is unlikely internationa l terrorism can be brought to an end by military means. Other critics, such as F rancis Fukuyama, note that "terrorism" is not an enemy, but a tactic; calling it a "war on terror", obscures differences between conflicts, for example, anti oc cupation insurgents and international mujahedeen. The billionaire activist investor George Soros has called "War on Terror" a "fal se metaphor." Linguist George Lakoff of the Rockridge Institute has argued that there cannot literally be a war on terror, since terror is an abstract noun. "Te rror cannot be destroyed by weapons or signing a peace treaty. A war on terror h as no end.” Jason Burke, a journalist who writes about radical Islamic activity, h as this to say on the terms "terrorism" and "war against terrorism":

There are multiple ways of defining terrorism, and all are subjective. Most defi

ne terrorism as an act that seeks to use or threat of serious violence to adva

nce some kind of cause . Some state clearly the kinds of group ( subnational ,

nonstate ) or cause (political, ideological, and religious) to which they ref er. Others merely rely on the instinct of most people when confronted with an ac t that involves innocent civilians being killed or maimed by men armed with expl osives, firearms or other weapons. None is satisfactory, and grave problems with

the use of the term persist.

Terrorism is after all, a tactic. The term war on terrorism is thus effectivel

y nonsensical. As there is no space here to explore this involved and difficult

debate, my preference is, on the whole, for the less militancy . This loaded te rm is not an attempt to condone such actions, merely to analyse them in a cleare r way. The justification given for the invasion of Iraq (prior to its happening) was to prevent terrorist or other attacks by Iraq on the United States or other nations. This can be viewed as a conventional warfare realization of the war on terror. A major criticism levelled at this justification is that, according to war oppon ents, it does not fulfil one of the requirements of a just war and that in wagin g a war preventively, the United States has undermined international law and the authority of the United Nations, particularly the United Nations Security Counc il. Some critics claim that the war on terror is truly a war on Islam itself. Af ter his release from Guantanamo in 2005, exdetainee Moazzam Begg appeared in th e Islamist propaganda video 21st Century CrUSAders and claimed the U.S. is engag ing in a new crusade: I think that history is definitely repeating itself and for the Muslim world, an d I think even a great part of the nonMuslim world now, are beginning to recogn ize that there are ambitions that the United States has on the lands and wealth of nations of Islam. ExUnited States Attorney General Ramsey Clark has described the war on terror a s a war against Islam. Some critics argue that some politicians supporting the " war on terror" are motivated by reasons other than those they publicly state, an d critics accuse those politicians of cynically misleading the public to achieve their own ends. For instance, in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, President Bush a nd members of his administration indicated that they possessed information which demonstrated a link between Saddam Hussein and alQaeda. Published reports of t he links began in late December, 1998. In January 1999, Newsweek magazine publis hed a story about Saddam and alQaeda joining forces to attack U.S. interests in the Gulf Region. ABC News broadcast a story of the link between the two soon af ter. Polls suggested that a majority of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein w as linked to the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, despite popular belief, the Bush Administration believed that there was the possibility of a potential collaboration between alQaeda and Saddam Hussein s Bath regime following the U. S. led invasion of Afghanistan. Amnesty International Irene Khan criticized the use of prohumanitarian argument s by Coalition countries prior to its 2003 invasion of Iraq, writing in an open letter: "This selective attention to human rights is nothing but a cold and calc ulated manipulation of the work of human rights activists. Let us not forget tha t these same governments turned a blind eye to Amnesty International s reports o f widespread human rights violations in Iraq before the Gulf War.” In 2002, strong majorities supported the U.S.led War on Terror in Britain, France, Germany, Ja pan, India, and Russia, according to a sample survey conducted by the Pew Resear ch Center. By 2006, supporters of the effort were in the minority in Britain (49 %), France (43%), Germany (47%), and Japan (26%). Although a majority of Russian s still supported the War on Terror, that majority had decreased by 21%. Whereas 63% of the Spanish population supported the War on Terror in 2003, only 19% of the population indicated support in 2006. 19% of the Chinese population supports the War on Terror, and less than a fifth of the populations of Turkey, Egypt, a nd Jordan support the effort. The report also indicates that Indian public suppo rt for the War on Terror has been stable. Andrew Kohut, speaking to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted tha t, and according to the Pew Research Center polls conducted in 2004, "the ongoin g conflict in Iraq continues to fuel antiAmerican sentiments. America’s global po pularity plummeted at the start of military action in Iraq, and the U.S. presenc e there remains widely unpopular. TERRORISM IN INDIA______• Overview of past Terrorist attacks in India In Mumbai include: 1. 12 March 1993 Series of 13 bombs go off, killing 257 2. 6 December 2002 Bomb goes off in a bus in Ghatkopar, killing 2 3. 27 January 2003 Bomb goes off on a bicycle in Vile Parle, killing 1 4. 14 March 2003 Bomb goes off in a train in Mulund, killing 10 5. 28 July 2003 Bomb goes off in a bus in Ghatkopar, killing 4 6. 25 August 2003 Two Bombs go off in cars near the Gateway of India and Zaveri Bazaar, killing 50 7. 11 July 2006 Series of seven bombs go off in trains, killing 209 8. 26 November 2008 to 29 November 2008 Coordinated series of attacks, ki lling at least 172. 9. 13 July 2011 13 July 2011 Mumbai bombings Terrorist attacks elsewhere in Maharashtra: 1. 13 February 2010 a bomb explosion at the German Bakery in Pune killed fourteen people, and injured at least 60 more o Terrorism in Delhi 2. Three explosions went off in the Indian capital of New Delhi on 29 Octob er 2005, which killed more than 60 people and injured at least 200 others. The h igh number of casualties made the bombings the deadliest attack in India in 2005 . It was followed by 5 bomb blasts on 13 September 2008 3. Attack on Indian parliament o Terrorists on 13 December 2001 attacked the Parliament of India, resulti ng in a 45minute gun battle in which 9 policemen and parliament staff were kill ed. All five terrorists were also killed by the security forces and were identif ied as Pakistani nationals. The attack took place around 11:40 am (IST), minutes after both Houses of Parliament had adjourned for the day. The suspected terror ists dressed in commando fatigues entered Parliament in a car through the VIP ga te of the building. Displaying Parliament and Home Ministry security stickers, t he vehicle entered the Parliament premises. The terrorists set off massive blast s and used AK47 rifles, explosives, and grenades for the attack. Senior Ministe rs and over 200 Members of Parliament were inside the Central Hall of Parliament when the attack took place. Security personnel sealed the entire premises, whic h saved many lives. 4. A series of blasts occurred across the Hindu holy city of Varanasi on 7 March 2006. Fifteen people are reported to have been killed and as many as 101 o thers were injured. No one has accepted responsibility for the attacks, but it i s speculated that the bombings were carried out in retaliation of the arrest of a LashkareToiba agent in Varanasi earlier in February 2006. 5. On 5 April 2006 the Indian police arrested six Islamic militants, includ ing a cleric who helped plan bomb blasts. The cleric is believed to be a command er of a banned Bangladeshi Islamic militant group, Harkatul Jihadal Islami, and is linked to the InterServices Intelligence, the Pakistani spy agency. 6. On 7 December 2010, another blast occurred in Varanasi (that killed imme diately a toddler) set off a stampede in which 20 people, including four foreign ers, were injured. The responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Islamist militant group Indian Mujahideen. Karnataka: Karnataka is considerably less affected by terrorism, despite having many places of historical importance and the IT hub of India, Bengaluru. However , recently Naxal activity has been increasing in the Western Ghats. Also, a few attacks have occurred, major ones including an attack on IISc on 28 December 200 5 and serial blasts in Bengaluru on 26 July 2008. Also, one of the major terrorist attacks was the 25 August 2007 Hyderabad Bombin g. Chief Justice of India Y.K. Sabharwal has said the country s approach to tacklin g terrorism was laudable. "India has tried to follow a path wherein the rule of law continues to be the fundamental benchmark, and the basic rights are ensured even to those who are suspected of involvement in terrorist crimes," he said at a recent IndoBritish Legal Forum in Edinburgh. "Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It is known to have existed, in one form or the other, at several stages in recorded history. It is only that in recent time s, it has turned into a critical issue of utmost importance, the issue of the ve ry survival of human civilisation. Terrorism, now it is universally accepted, ha s crossborder fingerprints." Mr. Justice Sabharwal said, "India does not subscribe to the radical view in cer tain quarters that torture should be available in extreme situation of terrorist acts. No civil society would concede such powers of torture (even limited ones) unto the police forces. This would be in total derogation of basic human rights guaranteed not only by the municipal laws but also under international treaty o bligations." Tamil Nadu also faced terrorist attacks orchestrated by Muslim fundamentalists. For more information, see 1998 Coimbatore bombings. • Legislations on terrorism and its effect The Terrorist And Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987: While AFSPA deal t with a targeted, troubled region within India, The Terrorist and Disruptive Ac tivities (Prevention) Act of 1987 [hereinafter TADA] was an antiterrorist legisl ation that was meant to apply throughout India. TADA allowed for the admission o f confessions of detainees, in police custody, in legal proceedings against them . While the Criminal Procedure Code required identification to be made at a test identification parade, TADA allowed identification to be based on a witness hav ing picked out the detainee s photograph. Section 2(1)(a)(ii) of TADA had define d Abetment as the passing on of "any information likely to assist . . . terroris ts." The Supreme Court struck down this broad definition as it had criminalized an as sociation with a terrorist even in situations where there was no criminal intent . Furthermore, TADA proscribed various "disruptive activities," which included n ot only acts that disrupt the sovereignty or territorial integrity of India, but also acts which "question" such sovereignty or territorial integrity, or "suppo rt any claim... directly or indirectly... for the cession of and part of India, or secession of any part of India from the Union." Any of these advocacy crimes were punishable by up to life imprisonment. TADA also provided for the creation of "Designated Courts" which had the exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of its provisions. These Courts were closed to the public, and provided significan tly diminished procedural protections for suspected terrorists. For example, whe re the potential punishment was not more than three years, the Court was authori zed to conduct a "summary trial," though it was free to recall witnesses or rehe ar a case where circumstances warranted. Finally, TADA created a presumption of guilt in situations where arms or explosi ves were found, in the possession of the accused, which were similar to those us ed in the terrorist act or in cases where the accused s fingerprints were found at the scene or vehicles used in the terrorist act, or where the accused rendere d any financial assistance to a person accused of or reasonably suspected of a t errorist act. Of the 52,998 people detained under TADA at the end of 1992, a mer e 434, or 0.81%, had been convicted. It is submitted that, the shadow of TADA co ntinues to loom as, even though TADA is no longer in effect, as the State retain s the power to charge suspected persons retroactively for crimes committed durin g its enactment. The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002: On the 13th of December 2001, five Pakist ani Terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament, killing seven people and placing the country into a heightened State of alert. In response to the domestic pressu res for the failure to crack down on terrorism, like its American counterpart, t he Indian central government in March 2002 passed the Prevention of Terrorism Ac t, through a joint session of parliament, to enhance India s ability to crack do wn on possible terrorist threats. The criminalization of "abetting" a terrorist, which had been struck down in TADA by the Indian Supreme Court, was revived und er POTA. It criminalizes the membership of an organization labelled "terrorist" by the Ce ntral Government, regardless of criminal intent or activity. The statute, howeve r, was silent as to how the State must prove that a person indeed is part of suc h a terrorist organization. Section 20 of POTA presumes that an individual charg ed with being a member of a terrorist organization is a terrorist unless that pe rson can show that he or she has not participated in terrorist activities and th at the organization itself was not declared illegal by the State at the time whe n the person joined. Hence by placing this type of onus on the individual, the S tate inevitably inhibits those peaceful persons who might wish to join a nonmai nstream association but fear that doing so could subject them to potential arres t, or at the very least to the hassle of having to prove their innocence. Furthermore, Section 57 of the Act gives governmental authorities immunity from prosecution under POTA, as long as the actions taken to combat terrorism are don e in good faith. POTA had also retained the admissibility of confessions, a prov ision that many had pointed to as one of the sources of the high incidences of t orture and brutality during TADA interrogations. Terrorist acts were placed outs ide the parameters of the criminal procedure code, which has been established to balance the rights of criminal defendants with the interests of the State. More over, POTA had established special Courts to handle cases of terrorism. These sp ecial Courts were vested with the discretion to hold trials in nonpublic places such as prisons and would have the power to withhold trial records from the pub lic. Under section 49(2), of POTA the police may place a suspected terrorist in jail for up to ninety days without any Court proceedings. The abovementioned period may be extended by another three months if the prosecution submits a repo rt to the Court explaining the State s need for additional time. When an individ ual is charged under POTA, section 49(7) permits the denial of bail to the accus ed for up to one year, as long as the prosecution s opposition to the bail reque st satisfies the Court. Section 52(4) States that the accused is not entitled to have a lawyer "present throughout the period of the police interrogation." Section 14 additionally Stat es that "any individual" (not excluding defence lawyers) is obligated to provide to the State information of anyone who may be in violation of POTA. These limit ations contravene the spirit of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers in two major ways. Firstly, Article 1 of the BPRL mandates that cli ents should have access to their lawyers during an entire police interrogation. Secondly, Article 22 of the BPRL emphasizes that the confidentiality between a l awyer and a client must be respected by the State; any effort to undermine this relationship is incompatible with international norms on the rights of the detai ned. On the 11th of July, 2002, in the State of Tamil Nadu, Vaiko, a leader of the op position political party, was arrested and charged for the violation of section 21 of POTA which prohibits the promotion of any terrorist group explicitly banne d by the statute. Viko had made remarks in support of the Liberation Tigers of T amil Eelam, an organization deemed terrorist by the central government. Accordin g to the State government, on the 29th of June, 2002, Vaiko in a speech allegedl y stated, "I was, I am, and I will continue to be a supporter of the LTTE. Two w eeks later, P. Nedumaran, another opposition leader in Tamil Nadu, was arrested under POTA for similar charges. In April 2003, Vaiko petitioned the Supreme Cour t to declare section 21 of POTA as unconstitutional. In December 2003, a twojud ge bench of the Court refused to grant his release and upheld the validity of se ction 21; however it opined that the Special Courts could not find an individual guilty of violating this section for expressing only a "moral support" to a ban ned terrorist group. A Special POTA Court in Delhi hearing the parliament attack case found Shaukat H ussain Guru, Geelani and Mohammad Afzal guilty of violating section 3(2) of POTA read along with section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to deat h. The Court also ruled that Afsan Guru was guilty of concealing knowledge of th e conspiracy and sentenced her to five years in prison and a fine of 10,000 rupe es. The Delhi High Court sustained the verdicts against Shaukat Hussain Guru and Mohammad Afzal, although in January 2004, the Supreme Court issued a temporary stay of the execution orders until it could more fully review the matter. The co nvictions of Professor Geelani and Afsan Guru, however, were set aside by the De lhi High Court. The Supreme Court reversed the Madras High Court s ruling that bail should be gr anted to journalist R.R. Gopal, who was arrested in April 2003, for possessing t errorist weapons and other materials prohibited by POTA. Gopal had contended tha t the State retaliated against him as he published stories critical and embarras

sing about the members of the Tamil Nadu government. In overturning the Madras H igh Court s ruling, the Supreme Court deferred to POTA s provisions on bail: tha t when the prosecution opposes a bail request, a Court may grant bail only when there has been an abuse of discretion on the part of the government. It is rever ently submitted that the Supreme Court s ruling, that a prima facie case had ind eed existed, and that the Madras High Court should not have allowed its sympathy for the defendant s argument to cloud what was an obviously an easy call to den y bail is erroneous. In Uttar Pradesh, twentyfive Dalits were arrested under POTA between April and July 2002. Tribals in the area claim that POTA has been used to characterize the ir struggle for worker s rights as membership in the banned, extreme leftist Mao istLeninist groups known collectively as Naxalites. In one district, "nine out of twelve people arrested were bonded labourers who refused to return to work be cause of the physical abuse of their employer." POTA has been used in a similar way in the State of Jharkhand. On the 19th of February 2003, almost 200 people w ere arrested under POTA, including "a twelveyearold boy and an eightyoneyear old man." After the Gujarat communal riots, the Gujarat police arrested hundreds of Muslim s and charged them with violating POTA, not a single Hindu has been charged unde r POTA. Article 14 of the Constitution of India reads, "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws." Fur thermore, Article 15 reiterates this tenet more specifically by prohibiting the State from discriminating against any citizen on the basis of "religion, race, c aste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Although much of the litigation involv ing these two Articles has predominantly dealt with promoting affirmative action type policies on behalf of lower castes and women, the preeminent Indian consti tutional law scholar, S.P. Sathe, has noted that the Indian Supreme Court has ex plicitly held that the right to equal protection extends to all State policies. • History of antiterrorism laws in India Terrorism has immensely affected India. The reasons for terrorism in India may v ary vastly from religious to geographical to caste to history. The Indian Suprem e Court took a note of it in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab , where it observed that the country has been in the firm grip of spiralling terrorist violence and is caught between deadly pangs of disruptive activities. Apart from many skirmi shes in various parts of the country, there were countless serious and horrendou s events engulfing many cities with bloodbath, firing, looting, mad killing eve n without sparing women and children and reducing those areas into a graveyard, which brutal atrocities have rocked and shocked the whole nation Deplorably, det ermined youths lured by hardcore criminals and underground extremists and attra cted by the ideology of terrorism are indulging in committing serious crimes aga inst the humanity. Antiterrorism laws in India have always been a subject of much controversy. One of the arguments is that these laws stand in the way of fundamental rights of c itizens guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. The antiterrorist laws have been enacted before by the legislature and upheld by the judiciary though not w ithout reluctance. The intention was to enact these statutes and bring them in f orce till the situation improves. The intention was not to make these drastic me asures a permanent feature of law of the land. But because of continuing terrori st activities, the statutes have been reintroduced with requisite modifications. At present, the legislations in force to check terrorism in India are the Nation al Security Act, 1980 and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. There have been other antiterrorism laws in force in this country a different points in time. Earlier, the following laws had been in force to counter and curb terro rism. The first law made in independent India to deal with terrorism and terrori st activities that came into force on 30 Dec 1967 was Unlawful Activities (Preve ntion) Act, 1967. • Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2004 It would however be simplistic to suggest, as some critics did, that the new law has retained all the operational teeth of POTA or it has made only cosmetic cha nges. The difference between POTA and UAPA is substantial even as a lot of provi sions are in common. A brief outline of the amended act: The Act does not define the word terrorist in its definition clause but defines a terrorist act. The word terrorist is to b e construed according the definition of the terrorist act. Terrorist act is defi ned in the Act as Whoever, with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, secur ity or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country, does any act by using bombs, dyna mite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or othe r lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature, in such a ma nner as to cause, or likely to cause, death of, or injuries to any person or per sons or loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any f oreign country or causes damage or destruction of any property or equipment used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agenc ies, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government in India or the Government of a foreign country or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act (Secti on 15). The above definition did not exist in the 1967 Act. The previous Act only define d and dealt with unlawful activity. An unlawful activity includes an activity wh ich intends to bring about cession of a part of the territory of India or the se cession of a part of the territory of India from the Union, or which incites any individual or group of individuals to bring about such cession or secession; or which disclaims, questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, or which causes or is intended to cause disa ffection against India Section 2(o). Whether an association is unlawful is to be declared by the Central government b y giving the grounds for such a declaration. Section 3 Thereafter; it is referre d to the Tribunal Section 4. A notice is issued by the Tribunal to the associati on concerned to showcause why it should not be declared unlawful. To ascertain whether there is sufficient cause for declaring the association unlawful. For taking cognizance of any offence under this Act prior sanction of the Centra l or the State government, as the case may be, is necessary. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, is made applicable in matters of arrest, bail, confessions and burde n of proof. Those arrested are to be brought before a magistrate within 24 hours , confessions are no longer admissible before police officers and bail need not be denied for the first three months. The presumption of innocence leaving the b urden of proof on the prosecution has also been restored. The evidence collected through interception of wireless, electronic or oral comm unication under the provisions of the Indian Telegraph Act or the Information Te chnology Act or any law being in force has been made admissible as evidence agai nst the accused in the court Section 46.The amended Act provides for following p enalties: Offence Includes Penalty Being a member of an unlawful association A person who is and continues to be a member of such association, takes part in me etings, contributes to, or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose s of the association or in any way assists the operations of such association. I f such person is in possession of unlicensed firearms, ammunition, explosive, et c, capable of causing mass destruction and commits any act resulting in loss of human life or grievous injury to any person or causes significant damage to any property, and if such act has resulted in the death of any person. In any other case Imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years and fine. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008: The salient features of the A ct are as followsThe legislation will be applicable to the whole of India, citi zens of India, outside India, in service of the Government, wherever they may be and for persons on ships and aircrafts registered in India. The officers of the NIA will have all the powers, privileges and liabilities which the police offic ers have in connection with the investigation of any offence. The superintendenc e of the NIA shall vest in the Government of India and the administration will v est in the officer designated on this behalf by it. The police officer in charge of the police station on receipt of the report of the offence shall forward it to the state government which in turn will forward the same to the Central Gover nment. If the Central Government is of the opinion that the offence is a Schedul ed Offence, it shall direct the agency for investigation of such offence. The NI A may also investigate other offences connected with the Scheduled Offence The Government of India shall constitute Special Courts for the trial of Schedul ed Offences. The Special Courts shall try the offences committed within its loca l Jurisdiction. For the purpose of having a fair or speedy trial or in the inter est of justice, the Supreme Court of India may transfer any case pending with th e Special Court to another Special Court in the same state or any other state an d the High Court may transfer such cases to any other Special Court within the s tate. Clause 16 of the NIA Bill seeks to provide for procedure to be adopted and powers to be exercised by the Special Court for trial of the Scheduled Offences . It seeks to provide that offences punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years or with fine or with both may be tried summarily. The Special Court will have all the powers of the Court of Sessions under the Co de of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the purpose of trial of any offence under thi s Act. The trial under this Act by the Special Court shall be held on a daytod ay basis on all working days and shall have precedence over the trial of other o ffences. NIA is a police force created and administered by the Government of Ind ia which endows all personnel above the rank of subInspector of police with pow ers throughout the Indian Territory. The Act empowers the police stations of the state to register first information as to the commission of the offence and the n forwarded it to Central Government. The State Government shall then forward th is information to the Centre which would on basis of inputs decide within 15 day s by invoking the power of NIA. Once the NIA enters the investigation, the authority of state government agencie s would stand extinguished and all the relevant materials and records shall be t ransferred to NIA. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) investigates the acts of terrorism and offences related to atomic energy, aviation, maritime transpor t sedition, weapons of mass destruction and left wing extremism but excluded the Hindu right wing extremism which is more destructive than the Naxal or left win g extremism. The establishment of NIA is no doubt a positive step in fighting terrorismrelat ed crimes, but it is unlikely to be a panacea to prevent terrorist attacks. For, it will be an agency that investigates and prosecutes only after terrorist atta cks take place. Though the NIA no doubt would contribute to a better understandi ng of how the attacks were planned and carried out, the linkages between terrori st cells within the country as well as outside, the modus operandi of terrorist cells and groups, etc., it is unlikely to prevent terrorist attacks. One criticism against the Act is that it has so many features giving power to th e Centre, and that it undermines the federal character of our country and the su premacy given to the Centre as per the Act will encroach upon the powers of the State Governments. A counter argument against this can be that terrorism is a me nace that affects the whole country and not a single state and therefore the Cen tre should be given more powers in the execution of such an antiterrorism legis lation.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM______Today, both the world at large and India in particular, face daunting challenges in the task of protecting human rights of common people regardless of the count ry they belong to. No country in world can be said to be free from the deadly sc ourge of terrorism. With the grim spectre of terrorism continuing to target inno cent and defenceless people, the task has been ever challenging for the institut ions around the world. These are turbulent times in many parts of world. It has become apparent that in many ways, the world has become complicated, to say the least. The destinies and the interests of the nations and their citizens have be come interlinked to such an extent that, invariably, the action of one has adver sely affected the other, leading to strife and suffering. In all such tragic sit uations, it has been mostly the common people, men, women and children whose rig hts have been violated. In fact people from all walks of life, irrespective of t heir caste, creed, colour or religion have been equally affected by violation of their Human Rights. Coming back to the national level, India has had its fair share of terror attack s and it seems we, as a nation, have learnt to live with it. Serial blasts in lo cal trains in Mumbai and crowded market places in Delhi shook the nation. But, e mergence of terror in cities like Bangalore and Hyderabad, known as the IT and h igh tech hubs, has come as an eye opener. The newer generation of terrorists is home grown, intelligent, well educated and sophisticated. Knowing that India is an emerging global economy, it has been intelligent of them to target the financ ial centres and centres of economic significance and it is not an act of amateur s. For instance, bombing the local trains in Mumbai which are called as the life line of the city and crowded commercial market places in Delhi have shown that t he terrorists do their home work well and know where the maximum damage could be uncured. It has been unfortunate for a country like India, where the principle of ‘Nonviol ence’ emerged, to witness emergence of five kinds of terrorism or terrorism on fiv e fronts in the last two decades. The most important and strategically significa nt terrorism is of course the cross border infiltration in the Jammu and Kashmir state from PakistanOccupiedKashmir or directly from Pakistan. Another front w here fortunately we have been able to be successful was in Punjab in the 1980’s. B ut, still India is being tried to be crippled on the remaining three fronts whic h include the problems in the NorthEast involving insurgency primarily in Assam and Manipur states and the threat to the territorial integrity in Arunachal Pra desh from China. The latest to join these terrorism activities is the rise of Na xalites and Maoists in the very heart of the country having their influence in U ttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh. However, we can say that the LTTE conflict in Sri Lanka may have to a l arger extend been resolved. The Government of India has spent around Rs. 45,000 crores on relief and rehabil itation and paramilitary forces, which do not include the military and the army , since independence. Still, the no. of civilians killed in the terror attacks h as been far more than the total number of deaths of the security personnel in th e four conventional wars we have fought, including the Kargil War. It is not the cost that hurts, but the lack of funds to be spent on rural development and pro blems involving electricity, education, sanity and infrastructure. Section 2(d) defines as the right relating to life, liberty, equality and dignit y of the individual guaranteed by the constitution or embodied in the internatio nal covenants and enforceable by the courts in India. Since there has been an in crease in number of cases of terrorist activities, communal riots, activities of naxalism the role of security forces have become paramount and necessary. These forces although play an important role in protecting the borders their requirem ent is even more necessary in controlling civil unrest, enhancing the security a t the important places and also control and maintain law and order whenever requ ired. The United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution on December 17, 1979 th at all security personnel shall respect and protect human dignity and uphold the human rights of all persons as well it applies to the armed forces, they have t o abide by the international conventions against torture and other cruel punishm ents, principles of international cooperation in the detention, arrest, extradit ions and punishment against humanity. Implementation of security legislations led to a gross violation of human rights in several states. Widespread abuses of Armed Forces Special Power Act in the N orth East states drew a lot of criticism for ignoring impunity issues and recomm ending use of the Unlawful Activity Prevention Act. At least 400 people remained in jails under the repealed POTA and several continued to face special trials o f proceedings of which failed to meet fair trial standards. The project deems to cover various issues relating to the violation of the Human rights by the secur ity forces whether armed or unarmed. In the Guise of security cover violations a re taking place. The painful issue of how to protect human rights in times of terrorism and insur gency confronted the National Human Rights Commission within days of its establi shment with the tragic death of civilians in Bijbehara, in the state of Jammu an d Kashmir, in the course of a firing by the Para military force. The commissio n took suo muto cognizance of the incident and after examining the reports, fo r which it had asked, concluded that excessive force had been used. There has be en a strict vigilance by the commission on such kinds of violations. To cover mo re on the violations by the security forces and the kinds of complaints the NHRC has been receiving and also the measures taken by the commissions on such compl aints we will make a brief study of the NHRC reports. Our political thinkers, academics, and the media have to girdle them to examine rationally all the steps being taken to see how far they impinge on the Human Ri ghts of the people. How far in the name of challenging terrorism from across the borders we are fanning communalism at home. How far are we creating an environm ent of intolerance by exhorting the people against one religion or the other and calling upon the people to be vigilant against one minority or the other are a question that merits serious consideration. The socioeconomic and cultural emancipation of the people at the grass root lev el achieved through wellplanned developmental planning process through democrat ic norms and principles would remove the local support base of the terrorists an d it is a proven fact that terrorists cannot function without a local base and a lso without a misguided support from the locals. • Vienna world conference on human rights On 25 June 1993, representatives of 171 States adopted by consensus the Vienna D eclaration and Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights, thus successfully closing the twoweek World conference and presenting to the intern ational community a common plan for the strengthening of human rights work aroun d the world. The conference was marked by an unprecedented degree of participation by governm ent delegates and the international human rights community. Some 7,000 participa nts, including academics, treaty bodies, national institutions and representativ es of more than 800 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) two thirds of them at the grassroots level gathered in Vienna to review and profit from their s hared experiences. United Nations SecretaryGeneral Boutros BoutrosGhali, in a message to the Conf erence, told the delegates that by adopting the Vienna Declaration and Plan of A ction they had renewed the international community s commitment to the promotion and protection of human rights. He saluted the meeting for having forged "a new vision for global action for human rights into the next century". The Vienna Declaration and Program of Action mark the culmination of a long proc ess of review and debate over the current status of human rights machinery in th e world. It also marks the beginning of a renewed effort to strengthen and furth er implement the body of human rights instruments that have been painstakingly c onstructed on the foundation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since 1948. In his presentation of the document to the final plenary session, Mr. Ibrahima F all, the SecretaryGeneral of the Conference, said that the Vienna Declaration p rovides the international community with a new "framework of planning, dialogue and cooperation" that will enable a holistic approach to promoting human rights and involve actors at all levels international, national and local. In 1989 the General Assembly called for the convening of a world meeting that wo uld review and assess progress made in the field of human rights since the adopt ion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and identify obstacles and way s in which they might be overcome. The first global meeting on human rights had taken place in Teheran in 1968. The Conference agenda, as set by the fortyseventh session of the General Assemb ly in 1992, also included the examination of the link between development, democ racy and economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, and the evaluat ion of the effectiveness of United Nations methods an mechanisms with the aim of recommending ways to ensure adequate financial and other resources for United N ations human rights activities. From the first of four Preparatory Committee meetings in Geneva in September 199 1, it was clear that these were tasks that raised many difficult, sometimes divi sive, issues regarding national sovereignty, universality, the role of nongover nmental organizations and questions concerning the feasibility, viability and im partiality of new or strengthened human rights instruments. The search for common ground on these and many other issues was characterized by intense dialogue among governments and dozens of United Nations bodies, special ized agencies and other intergovernmental organizations and thousands of human r ights and development NGOs from around the world. The preparatory process included three key regional meetings, in Tunis, San J osé and Bangkok which produced declarations outlining particular concerns and p erspectives of the African, the Latin American and Caribbean and the Asian and P acific regions. In addition, informal meetings in Europe and North America and t he scores of satellite meetings throughout the world involved broad spectrums of society made extremely valuable contributions. At the final meeting in May, whi ch ended after an extended session, the Preparatory Committee prepared a draft f inal document with which the conference, hosted by the Austrian Government in Vi enna, began its work and final negotiations. The final document agreed to in Vienna, which was endorsed by the fortyeighth s ession of the General Assembly (resolution 48/121, of 1993), reaffirms the princ iples that have evolved during the past 45 years and further strengthens the fou ndation for additional progress in the area of human rights. The recognition of interdependence between democracy, development and human rights, for example, pr epares the way for future cooperation by international organizations and nationa l agencies in the promotion of all human rights, including the right to developm ent. Similarly, the Conference took historic new steps to promote and protect the rig hts of women, children and indigenous peoples by, respectively, support the crea tion of a new mechanism, a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women; calling for the universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child by the year 1995; and recommending the proclamation by the General Assembly of an i nternational decade of the world s indigenous peoples. Subsequently, the General Assembly carried out that recommendation. The Vienna Declaration also makes concrete recommendations for strengthening and harmonizing the monitoring capacity of the United Nations system. In this regar d, it called for the establishment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights by th e General Assembly, which subsequently created the post on 20 December 1993 (res olution 48/141). Mr. José Ayala Lasso was nominated by the SecretaryGeneral as th e first High Commissioner and assumed office on 5 April 1994. The Vienna Declaration further emphasizes the need for speedy ratification of ot her human rights instruments and for additional resources for the Centre for Hum an Rights, which served as the secretariat of the World Conference. "In adopting this Declaration", Mr. Fall concluded in his final address to the c onference, "the Member States of the United Nations have solemnly pledged to res pect human rights and fundamental freedoms and to undertake individually and col lectively actions and programmes to make the enjoyment of human rights a reality for every human being." COUNTER TERRORISM______Counterterrorism is the practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies that gov ernments, militaries, police departments and corporations adopt to prevent or in response to terrorist threats and/or acts, both real and imputed. The tactic of terrorism (used by terrorists) is available to insurgents and gove rnments. Not all insurgents use terror as a tactic, and some choose not to use i t because other tactics work better for them in a particular context. Individual s, such as Timothy McVeigh, may also engage in terrorist acts such as the Oklaho ma City bombing. If the terrorism is part of a broader insurgency, counterterrorism may also for m a part of a counterinsurgency doctrine, but political, economic, and other me asures may focus more on the insurgency than the specific acts of terror. Foreig n internal defence (FID) is a term used by several countries for programs either to suppress insurgency, or reduce the conditions under which insurgency could d evelop. Counterterrorism includes both the detection of potential acts and the response to related events. • Anti terrorism The concept of antiterrorism emerges from a thorough examining of the concept o f terrorism as well as an attempt to understand and articulate what constitutes terrorism in Western terms. In military contexts, terrorism is a tactic, not an ideology. Terrorism may be a tactic in a war between nationstates, in a civil w ar, or in an insurgency. Counterterrorism refers to offensive strategies intended to prevent a belligere nt, in a broader conflict, from successfully using the tactic of terrorism. The US military definition, compatible with the definitions used by NATO and many ot her militaries, is "Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prev ent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism." In other words, counterterrori sm is a set of techniques for denying an opponent the use of terrorismbased tac tics, just as counterair is a set of techniques for denying the opponent the us e of attack aircraft. Antiterrorism is defensive, intended to reduce the chance of an attack using te rrorist tactics at specific points, or to reduce the vulnerability of possible t argets to such tactics. "Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and cont ainment by local military and civilian forces." United States Customs and Border Protection officers fully armed and armoured fo r a counterterrorism operation. To continue the analogy between air and terrori st capability, offensive antiair missions attack the airfields of the opponent, while defensive antiair uses antiaircraft missiles to protect a point on one s own territory. The ongoing IsraeliPalestinian conflict, Sri Lankan Civil War, and Colombian Civil War are examples of conflicts where terrorism is present, a

long with other tactics, so that participants use counter and antiterrorism to

limit the opponent s use of terror tactics. The only unit s that are counterte rrorism are the Us Navy Seals and Delta force they work alongside with NATO. Misreporting Lord Justice Campbell spoke on the relationship between the judiciary and media.

"The speed with which a piece of misreporting can spread is alarming, and once t he damage occurs, little can be done to dislodge the initial version from the mi nd of the listener or the reader." Chief Justice of the Madras High Court A.P. Shah, who spoke on ¡Judges and media interrelationship, said, "Trial by media has created a problem because it inv olves a tugofwar between two conflicting principles — free press and free trial, in both of which the public are vitally interested." Trial by the press, electronic media or public agitation was "the very antithesi s of the rule of law and could lead to miscarriage of justice." He said: "The freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary are two of the most important indices of democracy and it is essential to preserve both . A pliable press and a subservient judiciary are the first steps in the process of extinguishment of democratic rights." Myths in the perception of terrorism There are certain myths about terrorism that have existed for quite some time a n d before any argument can be made in favour of the enactment of such a law it is imperative to explode those myths. The First myth is that there is no definition for terrorism or terrorist activit

y. The adage now discarded by serious analysts, is still paraded in forums i.e.

"One man s terrorist is another man s freedom fighter". That this no longer stan ds up as an argument is obvious. The ideological terrorists who targeted the sy mbols of oppressive regimes or authorities who were contrary to their belief sys tems have been replaced by terrorists who target innocent civilian population fo r a nebulous cause: the bomb in the market place, kidnapping busloads of school children, killing families in theatres, shopping malls and amusement parks. How anyone can even for a moment label them as freedom fighters confounds the logica l mind. Any discussion on terrorism is not a matter of semantics but a grave co ncern of the safety of civilians and the security of society which is the duty o f a state to protect. Over and over again one has to listen to persons smugly st ate that terrorism defies definition; therefore, what cannot be defined cannot b e identified. It is imperative to understand that even though an all –encompassin g definition for terrorism does not exist there are a number of working definiti ons that underline what terrorism is and how an act of terrorism can be identifi ed. What entails a terrorist activity may defy specific definition but it certai nly is possible for anyone to recognise such a violent act against society. Any act that deliberately and systematically aims the murder, maiming and menacing o f the innocent civilians to inspire fear for political, religious or any other i deological end is an act of terrorism. The lack of discrimination in choosing th e target by the terrorist organisations spreads fear: if no one is a target then no one can be safe. The Second myth is that terrorism is the result of marginalisation of certain se ctions of society by the state and its machinery which has lead to great dissati sfaction resulting in the group turning to violence to address their grievances. Therefore, addressing their problems and removing these causes will eliminate t errorism. This argument advocates a soft approach to counter terrorism. Good gov ernance is identified as the panacea of all ills. Therefore the argument is: an y law formulated to curb terrorism will only exacerbate the existing problems. G ood governance and addressing the ills of marginalisation is a welcome social co nversion but it does not deal with the menace of terrorist violence against citi zens. There is also no doubt that terrorist organisations seek to their recruit s from those who have economic disadvantage. They use them as foot soldiers to c arry out their orders and commit the final violent act but those who run these o rganisations or master mind the terror campaigns are educated, urbanised intelle ctuals as well as those motivated by their own brand of warped ideology. Those w ho preach violence are different from those who put it into practice. Therefore, laws are required to deal with the main organisations suspected of spreading an d spearheading the terrorist activities and not just the perpetrators of the act s. The Third myth is when an incident occurs the state and the intelligence have fa iled miserably ( as the cub reporter on the scene of every bythehour news cha nnel often surmises) .The media immediately faults the intelligence agencies an d state machinery for not anticipating the attack yet balks at any attempt to en act a law to deal which would ensure otherwise . It is not possible for the sta te machinery anywhere to recognise and identify the every lowly recruit of the o rganisation who may have been entrusted with a specific act to be committed at a specific time on a given date. A pragmatic approach needs to be adopted instead of emotional reaction. If a law were to permit the state to monitor constantly an organisation suspected to be capable of subversive activity and to enquire in to its activities, it is possible to preempt such occurrences. It is not suffi cient to seek the suspects of the violence after it has resulted in the deaths o f the innocent; laws are required to ferret out the leaders of such organisation s capable of suspicious activities before the incidents occur. The strategist a nd the fund raisers of such organisation should be dealt with severely under the law before the occurrence of an act of violence. Identifying these organisatio ns would not be a major task as these organisations are known to preach and publ ish their intentions. Organisations and outfits that espouse causes seek media a ttention to justify their existence and often advertise their intentions through public statements to the media or at rallies and meetings. The success of an organisation lies often in the inability of the authorities to pay heed to them and take suitable action against these organisations. The Aum Shinrokyo movement in Japan began its public campaign of terror in 1994 with t he release of sarin gas in a residential neighbourhood .It had published pamp hlets and openly stated their intention of using sarin gas and had moved truckl oads of chemical agents into their compounds. These apparent signs went unheeded .Had their movements been sufficiently monitored , such large consignment of ch emicals moving into their compound would not have passed unnoticed and the 1995 Tokyo attack on the subway system would not have occurred. The police and int elligence, therefore, need to be further empowered under law to maintain a const ant vigil concerning all organisations with a capability of turning into terrori st organisations. Communications, recruitment of members and movements of consig nments have to be monitored to prevent stocking of chemicals, explosives and arm s and ammunitions. The Fourth myth is that it is not possible to judge at what point of time a poli tical, social or religious organisation becomes a terrorist organisation. Theref ore monitoring organisations would impinge on their rights to carry out lawful a ctivities. This of course is an extension of the first myth that an organisation may be genuinely fighting a repressive regime and therefore has had to resort t o violence to achieve its end. This again a conceptual misinterpretation – no orga nisation or person belonging to them can justify violence against the innocent c ivilian population. The moment violence is directed at society at large , there can be no doubt that the persons committing such acts are terrorists and the org anisation that logistically supports, trains or provides funds for them or acc epts and endorses their acts as being part of their greater cause is a terrori st organisation. Several organisations acting with impunity in India would fall within the ambit of the new law. Counter terrorist laws should be viewed as safeguards for collective safety and there should have no partisan or parochial considerations. It should be understo od that measured infringement of individual freedom is not violation of fundamen tal right. No longer do we question additional security measures at airports, pu blic places and other sensitive areas as violating privacy being well aware that safety supersedes discomfort. It is the duty of the state to prevent the existe nce of destructive forces within its territorial jurisdiction which endanger the life and liberty of its citizens and the safety and security of other states. Terrorism is not a passing phenomenon and a new counter terrorism law is urgentl y required to deal with it effectively. The new laws must, however, incorporate certain features that ensure that there can be no misuse by the enforcement mach inery. I. The primary concern is the rule of law. Laws are not to be enacted that in any manner operate outside the realm of rule of law. II. The definition of terrorism has to be sufficiently narrowed to exclude criminal activities: if intention to terrorise is missing, mere crimi nal activity should not fall within the purview of the special law. Similarly, a n act that would not be criminal but would be permissible under freedom of speec h and expression should be deemed an act supporting terrorism if the intention i s to garner support or is supportive of a proscribed organisation. III. Witness protection would have to be incorporated under the ne w law to ensure greater co operation from fringe elements and sections of societ y aware of such organisations and their activities. IV. Another important aspect to be considered would be the uniform and consistent application of such law by the enforcement authority throughout I ndia. V. Transparency and review procedures would have to be clearly s et out in the newly enacted law. VI. There should be a centralised system to prevent inconsistent ap plication and interpretation of the law throughout the territory. Establishment of a central judicial agency for even application and uniform interpretation sho uld be set up. VII. Special agencies should be set up so that the overburdened enfor cement agency in the state is not required to handle the activities under the sp ecial law. Such agencies should also be sufficiently trained and sensitised abou t the application of the law. VIII. Specific fund allocation by the government for the agencies that a pply the law has to be made as part of the states serious intention to cub terro rism. No agency can function without proper infrastructure, manpower or technolo gy. This will address the fears that any law dealing with terrorism will abrogate hu man rights and will place all organisations with genuine concern for addressing social issues under the purview of the state agencies who will then use the laws to curb opponents and settle political scores. There are no minor forms of terrorism and if there has been concrete evidence of earlier abuse of counter terrorism laws, it is the implementation of the law th at should be scrutinised and rectified; the need for counter terrorism law shoul d not be questioned. Antiterrorism legislation designs various types of laws passed in the aim of fi ghting terrorism. They usually, if not always, follow specific bombings or assas sinations. Antiterrorism legislation usually includes specific amendments allow ing the state to bypass its own legislation when fighting terrorismrelated crim es, under the grounds of necessity. Because of this suspension of regular procedure, such legislation is sometimes c riticized as a form of lois scélérates which may unjustly repress all kinds of popul ar protests. Critics often allege that antiterrorism legislation endangers demo cracy by creating a state of exception that allows authoritarian style of govern ment. Governments often state that they are necessary temporary measures that wi ll be dispelled when the danger finally vanish. However, most antiterrorist legislation remains in activity even after the init ial target of it has been eliminated. A good example of this is the "War on Terr or" which officially was to end in 2003, however it persists to this day. With n o clear end in sight it violates the laws of reason, facilitating its own brand of circular reasoning and a pseudo straw man ("Terror" as the straw man). Perpet uating its own existence as it were this presents an unusual case as a logical f allacy Measures which may be included by antiterrorism legislation include prev entive detention (that is, detention without trial), control orders in the UK an d Australia, warrantless searches in the United States. Radicalization is the process in which an individual changes from passiveness or activism to become more revolutionary, militant or extremist. Radicalization is often associated with youth, adversity, alienation, social exclusion, poverty, or the perception of injustice to self or others. The NYPD and NCTC experience The U.S. Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007 defines "Violent Radicalization" as the process of adopting or promoting an extr emist belief system for the purpose of facilitating ideologically based violence to advance political, religious, or social change. The term is used in the context of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, but the ter m can, and has, been used to refer to radicalization within the context of a wid e number of militant movements with a wide variety of ideologies. Radicalization is an important factor in the development of militant movements, including those involved in terrorism. According to the U.S. National Counterter rorism Center, The grievances that fuel radicalization are diverse and vary acro ss locations and groups. Radicalization frequently is driven by personal concern s at the local level in addition tofrustration with international events. According to the NCTC, the association between radicalization and poverty is a m yth. Many terrorists come from middleclass backgrounds and have universityleve l educations, particularly in the technical sciences and engineering. There is n o statistical association between poverty and militant radicalization. The NCTC also states that there are no visible outward signs of radicalization. Changes in appearance during different stages of radicalization often are the sa me changes seen in individualswho are not being radicalized, making it difficult to identify visible markers. In 2007 The New York Police Department Intelligence Division released a document that focused on the radicalization process entitled, Radicalization in the West : the Homegrown Threat. The report was coauthored by Mitchell D. Sibler and Arv in Bhatt, who are both Senior Intelligence Analysts for the NYPD. The report res earched and analyzed several famous case studies from abroad as well as from the United States to collect the needed data to create their step by step explanati on of radicalization. The cases examined included: the London, England 7/7 attac k, 2004 Madrid, Spain terrorist attack, the Toronto 18 case, Herald Square Bomb Plot, the Lackawana Six plot, and the Al Muhajiroun Two plot. The NYPD report br eaks down the radicalization process into four steps with each step including it s’ own key indicators and triggers. The four steps to radicalization are their key indicators are: • Preradicalization: Individuals ordinary life prior to radicalization o Key indicators: Individuals background and current environment. Other in dicators from the study included being a 2nd or 3rd generation immigrant to the U.S., having a college or even advanced degree, and being a recent convert to Is lam • Selfidentification: The individual comes to identify with radical movements o Key indicators: 1) A crisis event occurs progressing the individual towa rds Salafi Islam. 2) Regular attendance at a Salafi mosque 3) Change in personal behavior that may include: giving up vices such as gambling, drinking alcoholic beverages, and smoking, as well as becoming involved in social activism pertain ing to Islam • Indoctrination: Individual intensify and focus their beliefs o Key indicators: 1) Individual takes on political worldview and relating all things back to Salafi Islam and its teachings 2) Withdrawal from mosque and movement towards a small group or “cluster” where radical ideas are espoused and sha red 3) Politicalization of new Salafi beliefs • Jihadization: Individual start to take actions based on their beliefs o Key indicators: 1) Decision to travel abroad to countries involved in co nflict for training 2) Preparation for an “act of furtherance” by way of internet re search, physical surveillance of possible targets, and visiting jihadi websites for words of encouragement prior to an attack 3) Acquiring materials needed for explosives or other means of attack i.e. guns, vehicles, bomb components Similar to other radicalization reports that have been created the NYPD report a lso includes several key assumptions: • There is no single pathway to extremism. All cases take very different paths of radicalization • If an individual goes through all or even some of the steps of radicalization th at does not mean that they will commit an act of terrorism. Several cases exist where an individual radicalized (wholly or partially) and never committed any ac ts of terrorism • The NYPD report also cites that the Internet as a key driver of radicalization a nd includes it in several sections of the report. An MI5 report, Understanding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in the UK, mad e public by The Guardian newspaper, emphasized the diverse possible routes that can lead to an individual being radicalized. The MI5 report is dated June 12, 20 08 and drew its analysis from case studies and input of those who were closely a ssociated with the counterterrorism mission in the UK. They key findings of the report are: • There is no single pathway to extremism. All cases take very different paths of radicalization • The timeframe of the radicalization process can take months or even years but is always driven by contact with others who share extremism views • Individuals who seem to be the most receptive to extremist ideologies were: 1. those who had recently migrated to Britain 2. individuals who had faced marginalization and racism from their peers 3. persons who had achieved little in their professional career despite own ing a university level degree 4. individuals with a serious criminal past 5. persons who had traveled abroad for more than 6 months and come in conta ct with extremists networks overseas 6. those who would be considered religiously naive and vulnerable to prosel ytization • Extremist groups often act as "fictive kin" for dislocated individuals who have lost ties to their family or community • Not enough substantial research exist on disengagement from Islamist terrorist o rganization but using other historical records from other terrorist organization MI5 believes that disengagement does occur in Islamic terrorist organizations f or varying reasons such as the birth of a son or daughter, a new job offer, or n ew personal relationship • Strong religious faith can protect individuals from the effects of extremism The MI5 report closes by saying that no single measure will reduce radicalizatio n in the UK and that the only way to combat it is by targeting at risk vulnerabl e groups and trying to assimilate them into society. This may include helping yo ung people find jobs, better integrating immigrant populations into the local cu lture, and effectively reintegrating exprisoners into society. In 2010, the British government launched a controversial antiradicalization cam paign called Prevent, led by the Home Office, that seeks among other things to i dentify persons that would be the most vulnerable to recruitment by al Qaedaali gned groups, to wean them away from an extremist path. Social desirability bias is the tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favourably by others. It can take the form of overr eporting good behaviour or underreporting bad behaviour. The tendency poses a s erious problem with conducting research with selfreports, especially questionna ires. This bias interferes with the interpretation of interpreting average tende ncies as well as individual differences. Topics where SDR is of special concern are selfreports of abilities, personalit y, sexual behaviour, and drug use. Respondents may be pressured by the societal taboo, and either underreport the frequency or avoid answering the question. Wh en confronted with the question, the respondent may be influenced by the fact th at controlled substances, including the more commonlyused marijuana, are genera lly illegal. Respondents may feel pressured to deny any drug use or rationalize it. The bias can also influence reports of number of sexual partners. In fact, t he bias may operate in opposite directions for different subgroups: Whereas men tend to inflate the numbers, women tend to underestimate theirs. In either case, the mean reports from both groups are likely to be distorted by social desirabi lity bias. Other topics that is sensitive to social desirability bias: • Personal income and earnings often inflated when low and deflated when high. • Feelings of low selfworth and/or powerlessness, often denied. • Excretory functions often approached uncomfortably, if discussed at all. • Compliance with medicinal dosing schedules, often inflated. • Religion, often either avoided or uncomfortably approached. • Patriotism, either overstated or, if denied, done so with a fear of other party s judgement. • Bigotry and intolerance, often denied, even if it exists within the responder. • Intellectual achievements, often inflated. • Physical appearance, either inflated or played down • Acts of real or imagined physical violence, often denied. • Indicators of charity or "benevolence," often exaggerated. • Illegal acts, often denied. Racial profiling Racial profiling refers to the use of an individual’s race or ethnicity by law enf orcement personnel as a key factor in deciding whether to engage in enforcement (e.g. make a traffic stop or arrest). The practice is controversial and is illeg al in some nations. The concept of racial profiling has been defined in many ways, including: • "Any policeinitiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national ori gin rather than the behaviour of an individual or information that leads the pol ice to a particular individual who has been identified as being, or having been, engaged in criminal activity." Deborah Ramirez, Jack McDevitt, Amy Farrell for US DoJ. • "Raciallybiased policing occurs when law enforcement inappropriately considers race or ethnicity in deciding with whom and how to intervene in an enforcement c apacity."Lorie Fridell, Robert Lunney, Drew Diamond and Bruce Kubu. • "Using race as a key factor in deciding whether to make a traffic stop." Genera l Accounting Office.

• "In the literature to date, there appear to be at least two clearly distinguisha

ble definitions of the term racial profiling : a narrow definition and a broad definition... Under the narrow definition, racial profiling occurs when a police officer stops, questions, arrests, and/or searches someone solely on the basis of the person s race or ethnicity... Under the broader definition, racial profil ing occurs whenever police routinely use race as a factor that, along with an ac cumulation of other factors, causes an officer to react with suspicion and take action."Jim Clear. • "Use by law enforcement personnel of an individual’s race or ethnicity as a factor in articulating reasonable suspicion to stop, question or arrest an individual, unless race or ethnicity is part of an identifying description of a specific su spect for a specific crime." Office of the Arizona Attorney General. In the United States Legality At a Federal level, racial profiling is challenged by the Fourth Amendment of th e U.S. Constitution which guarantees the right to be safe from unreasonable sear ch and seizure without probable cause and the Fourteenth Amendment which require s that all citizens be treated equally under the law. In his February 27, 2001, address to a Joint Session of Congress, President Geor ge W. Bush declared, Racial Profiling is "wrong, and we will end it in America. In so doing, we will not hinder the work of our nation s brave police officers. They protect us every day often at great risk. But by stopping the abuses of a few, we will add to the public confidence our police officers earn and deserve ." On February 28, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft said "This administration.. . has been opposed to racial profiling and has done more to indicate its opposit ion than ever in history. The President said it’s wrong and we’ll end it in America, and I subscribe to that. Using race… as a proxy for potential criminal behaviour is unconstitutional, and it undermines law enforcement undermining the confidenc e that people can have in law enforcement." In June 2003, the Department of Justice issued its Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Agencies forbidding racial profiling by federal law enforcement officials. In June 2001, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, a component of the Office of Jus tice Programs, United States Department of Justice, awarded the Northeastern re search team a grant to create this webbased Racial Profiling Data Collection Re source Center. It now maintains a website designed to be a central clearinghouse for police agencies, legislators, community leaders, social scientists, legal r esearchers, and journalists to access information about current data collection efforts, legislation and model policies, policecommunity initiatives, and metho dological tools that can be used to collect and analyze racial profiling data. T he website contains information on the background of data collection, jurisdicti ons currently collecting data, community groups, legislation that is pending and enacted in states across the country, and has information on planning and imple menting data collection procedures, training officers in to implement these syst ems, and analyzing and reporting the data and results. Several U.S. states now have reporting requirements. Texas, for example requires all agencies to provide annual reports to its Law Enforcement Commission. The r equirement began on September 1, 2001, when the State of Texas passed a law to r equire all law enforcement agencies in the State to begin collecting certain dat a in connection to traffic or pedestrian stops beginning on January 1, 2002. Bas ed on that data, the law mandated law enforcement agencies to submit a report to the law enforcement agencies governing body beginning March 1, 2003 and each y ear thereafter no later than March 1. The law is found in the Texas Code of Crim inal Procedure beginning with Article 2.131. Additionally, on January 1, 2011, a ll law enforcement agencies began submitting annual reports to the Texas State L aw Enforcement Officers Standards and Education Commission. The submitted report s can be accessed on the Commission s website for public review. Support Many in the law enforcement community argue that although unfortunate, the use o f ethnic and racial profiling is both effective and necessary. The argument is m ade that due to socioeconomic and demographic factors as unfortunate and undesi rable as it might be, crime is simply higher in some communities that have a lar ge minority population and that to ignore that fact due to a sense of moral inte grity would be both morally and professionally wrong. As an example, an airport interdiction task force at Los Angeles International Airport compiled a report o f those arrested based solely on officer observations, and when that report was compared to one of those arrested based on alerts driven by the airline passenge r alert computer system the percentages were almost identical. Examples such as these support the conclusion that although factors such as race may be taken int o account, it does not necessarily indicate that a prejudicial bias is present. If the success of law enforcement is defined as identifying and taking action ag ainst violators, then racial profiling would allow officers to be more effective . Criticism Critics of racial profiling argue that the individual rights of a suspect are vi olated if race is used as a factor in that suspicion. Notably, civil liberties o rganizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) have stated that racial profiling is a form of discrimination, stating, "Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, nationality or on any other particular identity under mines the basic human rights and freedoms to which every person is entitled." Critics argue that individuals should not be more or less likely to encounter la w enforcement officers or other government agents based on racial or ethnic trai ts. Responding to such criticisms are local community groups who seek to collect dat a, analyze trends and how they might correspond to public perceptions of profili ng, and solicit ideas aimed at diminishing cultural and racial biases. In practice • Despite promises to the contrary before the September 11 attacks in 2001, racial profiling surged during the presidency of George W. Bush, coinciding with the i nitiation of the War on Terror. Claims of profiling have been particularly focus ed on Naturalization, Customs, and Border Patrol agents accused of making Muslim s entry or reentry into the United States more difficult and pressureladen th an that of their peers. According to a 2011 report from Brown University, this s ort of profiling has been encouraged in public discourse by political TV persona lities like Bill O Reilly. • The airline ticketing agent who checked in Mohamed Atta, the leader of the Septe mber 11 attacks, and a companion, would afterwards say that looking at the pair his first reaction was to think, "If this doesn t look like two Arab terrorists, I ve never seen two Arab terrorists." But he immediately felt guilty, and had n o legal grounds to search on the basis of their suspicious appearance had he wis hed to. • In December 2001, an American citizen of Middle Eastern descent named Assem Baya a cleared all the security checks at Los Angeles airport and attempted to board a flight to New York. Upon boarding, he was told that he made the passengers unc omfortable by being on board the plane and was asked to leave. Once off the plan e, he wasn t searched or questioned any further and the only consolation he was given was a boarding pass for the next flight. He filed a lawsuit on the basis o f discrimination against United Airlines. United Airlines filed a counter motion which was dismissed by a district judge on October 11, 2002. In June 2005, the ACLU announced a settlement between Bayaa and United Airlines who still disputed Bayaa s allegations, but noted that the settlement "was in the best interest of all". Empirical evidence For motor vehicle searches academic research showed that the probability of a su ccessful search is very similar across races. This suggests that police officers are not motivated by racial preferences but by the desire to maximize the proba bility of a successful search. Similar evidence has been found for pedestrian st ops, with identical ratios of stops to arrests for different races. In other countries Canada Accusations of racial profiling of visible minorities who accuse police of targe ting them due to their ethnic background is a growing concern in Canada. In 2005 , the Kingston Police Service released the first study ever in Canada which pert ains to racial profiling. The study focused on in the city of Kingston, a small city where most of the inhabitants are white. The study showed that black skinne d people were 3.7 times more likely to be pulled over by police than white skinn ed people, while Asian people were less likely to be pulled over than whites or blacks. Several police organizations condemned this study and suggested more stu dies like this would make them hesitant to pull over visible minorities. Although aboriginal persons make up 3.6% of Canada s population, they account fo r 20% of Canada s prison population. This may show how racial profiling increase s effectiveness of police, or be a result of racial profiling, as they are watch ed more intensely than others. In February 2010, an investigation of the Toronto Star daily newspaper found tha t black people across Toronto were three times more likely to be stopped and doc umented by police than white people. To a lesser extent, the same seemed true fo r people described by police as having "brown" skin. This was the result of an a nalysis of 1.7 million contact cards filled out by Toronto police officers in th e period 2003 – 2008. TERRORISM: CAUSE, EFFECT AND SOLUTION Introduction Following the tragedy of 9/11, history’s most deadly terrorist attacks, the U.S. d eclared War on Terror. As a result, terrorism has become a source of pervasive f ear and loathing across America. On September 12th the nation awakened to a real ity already known throughout much of the world and the first question Americans asked was, “Why do they hate us?” But few waited to hear the answers. Perhaps some t hought it was a rhetorical question, while others waited for the government and media to provide answers. The first rule of war is to know your enemy. Terrorists are not a simple enemy t o know. They have a myriad of complex motivations as individuals and as groups. In fact, few people can even agree on a definition of terrorism. Many people agr ee that terrorism is a despicable crime, but others argue that one person’s terror ist is another’s freedom fighter. This series of Issue Briefings attempts to present some alternative viewpoints, not to justify or condone terrorism (mandatory disclaimer), but to shed some lig ht on what motivates people to kill and die for a political purpose and to sugge st some different perspectives and ways to approach the problem of political vio lence. In 2001, the U.S. State Department had officially designated 22 foreign terroris t organizations. By 2003 the list had grown to 36 organizations with dozens more groups listed as unofficial terrorist organizations. Either terrorism is a trem endous growth industry, or the definition of terrorism has become increasingly l iberal in its designations. Terrorism is not a mysterious phenomena; it’s simply a form of political violence. It’s a tactic, not a movement. Terrorism represents the final escalation in the p rocess of political violence. Arguably, terrorism or less deadly forms of politi cal violence would not exist if other nonviolent methods of reform and conflict resolution were available to the dissidents. View on Terrorism by the US State Department Virtually every book on terrorism begins with a discussion of the problem in agr eeing on a definition and no single definition has universal acceptance. For the purposes of this report, however, we have chosen the definition of terrorism us ed by the U.S. State Department, contained in Title 22 of the United States Code , Section 2656f (d). That statute contains the following definitions: “The term ‘terrorism’ means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated a gainst noncombatants targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usua lly intended to influence an audience. The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving citizens or the territo ry of more than one country. The term "terrorist group" means any group practici ng, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism.” Noncombatant is interpreted to include civilians and military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty (a point of dispute). At tacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of m ilitary hostilities does not exist at the site (such as bombings against US base s in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or elsewhere) are also considered terrorism. The U.S. also recognizes that, “terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of poli tically inspired violence, and at times the line between the two can become diff icult to draw.” This definition, like most others, raises more questions than it answers. Is air line hijacking, or kidnapping violence? Is a government building a noncombatant ? If innocent civilians are casualties of violence directed against a legitimate target (collateral damage) is the act terrorism, or a tragic mistake? If violen ce against noncombatants is perpetrated by a state, is that not terrorism? If n ot, what is? And, why does it matter? Applying the “terrorist” label to an organization immediately demonizes that group, invalidates their objectives and disqualifies its followers from any voice in th e political process. Ironically, such consequences reinforce the situation that motivated the group to resort to violence in the first place. Many states assert that they will make no deals with, or concessions to terrorists. It is standard practice to also deny dissidents access to the public media and airwaves to exp lain or advance their causes. Governments that refuse to talk to, or negotiate w ith terrorists foreclose opportunities for early resolution. Meanwhile some coun tries have been considerably more willing to negotiate, often paying ransoms, ar ranging prisoner releases, or agreeing to other demands. Terrorism Today Some of the reactions to terrorism play into the hands of the perpetrators and h elp further their goals and objectives. For example: A fundamental goal of any o pposition movement is publicity, denying access to media, or censoring news can force extremists to blast their way into the news. Before reacting to political violence, it’s important to identify the dissident’s goals and objectives. The follo wing list identifies a number of possible objectives, not all of which may apply to any specific group. Publicity has traditionally been a major dissident objective, as Brian Jenkins o f the Rand Corp. has commented that, “terrorist don’t want a lot of people dead; the y want a lot of people watching.” Jenkins has also described terrorism as a form o f political theater. This may be true of national liberation movements, but toda y’s Islamist extremists now want a lot of people dead. Terrorism has been described, correctly, as a tactic of the weak. It’s adopted by groups of dissenters who lack the resources to attack the state and its forces. Clearly a rebel force that had the capacity to attack and defeat the government’s forces would do so to achieve their goals as quickly as possible. Such opportuni ties rarely, if ever, exist in strong states. The alternative is to wage a war o f attrition, gradually wearing down the state’s and public’s resolve. Terrorists see k to instill a climate of fear that erodes the public psyche, and to impose esca lating economic costs, draining the state’s financial resources and the collective will. Many of these objectives could be pursued without resorting to terrorism against innocent civilians. However, States recognize that their forces and facilities are the primary targets of political violence and they adopt security and force protection measures that deny insurgents the ability to strike at these priority targets. By hardening priority targets, states encourage insurgents to attack s ofter targets in the civil sector. When the insurgents comply, the inevitable co nsequence is civilian casualties, whether intentional, or accidental. Insurgents have now become terrorists for perpetrating violence against noncombatant targ ets. In fact, the “targets” may not have been noncombatants, but such distinctions are rarely considered. Once dissidents have crossed the threshold to terrorism the rules change the cos ts and risks escalate and the challenge to maintain and build public support inc reases. For dissidents terrorism is the tactic of last resort, when all else has failed. One can argue that for weak regimes, lacking broad public support and legitimacy state terrorism is also a tactic of the weak, but the tactic of first resort. The international community has often demonstrated a willingness to tolerate pol itical violence against civilians perpetrated by states – state terrorism. Repress ive states have been responsible for far greater terrorism than any socalled te rrorist organization, yet they are allowed to continue their participation in th e world’s political and economic community. Only in the most enduring and grievous cases does the international community sanction, or exclude a repressive state. In addition, countries and arms merchants sell arms, provide military training and economic support to repressive, even terrorist regimes, seemingly oblivious to the fact that state repression breeds international terrorism and that terror ists will target those who lend support to their adversaries. It’s little wonder t hat terrorism has emerged as a major threat to world security and peace. One aspect of political violence and terrorism that’s rarely discussed in depth is the economic impacts, both negative and positive. The direct costs incurred to defend against and counter terrorism is enormous, worse still are the incalculab le social and human costs. But terrorism has its upside too, creating an economi c boom for defencerelated industries and private contractors. Repairing and reb uilding cities like Beirut, or London’s financial district and Lower Manhattan are a windfall for those who profit from the efforts. Constructing forts and securi ty installations, or erecting Berlinstyle peace walls and security fences throu gh Belfast, or around Israel’s Occupied Territories, shift limited state funds fro m more socially useful services, but create business opportunity and profits. Th e unspoken issue is that these expenditures create a new constituency that benef its from continued violence. The beneficiaries can become influential, if confli cted, advocates of hard line policies that suit their business objectives. Motivations for Political Violence Karl von Clausewitz described “war as politics by other means.” One might describe t errorism in the same way, or as “war by other means.” There are two types of terrori sm: rational and irrational. Rational terrorism has a political goal and a purpo se. Irrational terror might be described as mindless violence that serves some d ark psychological imbalance and is as difficult to understand as the motives of serial killers. As such this is the realm of psychologists and psychiatrists, no t political scientists, politicians, statesmen, and security specialists. This b riefing deals only with “rational terrorism.” Rational terrorism is an outgrowth of public dissatisfaction and political disse nt and a form of revolt against the established order, or regime. Few, if any, d issident movements willingly adopt terror as a conscious tactic, namely because such tactics provoke public revulsion and condemnation. Dissident movements will usually begin as reform movements that fail to achieve their demands and procee d through stages of escalating fear, frustration, anger and hardening attitudes: • Identifying inequities • Frustrated Attempts at Reform • Organized Dissent • Civil Disobedience • Reactionary Counter Attack • Political Violence • Terrorism Violent political conflict can be categorized in terms of the motivation and asp irations of the combatants. 1. Political – In some cases the dissidents have what may best described as politi cal motivations. It’s said that war is diplomacy by other means; violent political conflict could be described as politics by other means. The motivation may be t o affect a political reform, or overthrow a regime perceived as illegitimate or lacking public trust and support. Terrorism may be used as to demonstrate the we akness and vulnerability of the regime, to reveal its inability to provide secur ity, to provoke government repression to help recruit followers, and ultimately to force leaders from power. This motivation has been most common in Latin Ameri ca, and would be typical where there is an oppressed majority population that is denied political influence. 2. Cultural – This motivation is most common in situations where an ethnic or reli gious group fears extermination, or loss of their common identity, language or c ulture. It may also be combined with political motives, where the rulers discrim inate against the ethnic group in terms of jobs, economic opportunity or access to the political process. In the case of oppressed minorities, opposed by a stro ng, entrenched regime, terrorism may be seen as the only available option. This is especially true where demands for political reform are ignored, where there a re few, if any, external allies, and where the regime resorts to collective puni shment for what are seen as reasonable and justified demands. 3. Psychological – A surprising number of progovernment analysts favour this expl anation, which asserts that some terrorists are unbalanced, violent individuals suffering some form of psychosis. Others may be egomaniacs driven to achieve rec ognition through violence, and who attract a following of other dysfunctional in dividuals. This characterization may be accurate in cases where terrorist appear to have no logical goal, or motivation, or a purpose that makes little sense to normal people. This can include cases where the goal is the psychological benef it achieved by vengeance (Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City bombing). Psycho logically motivated terrorism is simply a criminal act, like serial killing, and doesn’t qualify for analysis as political violence. Cultural motivations can be further classified into three broad, but nonexclusi ve categories. Separatism – (let’s separate) In situation where the ruling group is seen to be unfa ir and unjust in its government administration, dissident groups fight to form a separate state. Example would include the aspirations of Tamils in Sri Lanka, o r Basques in Spain to establish a separate state for their people. Cohesion – (aka Irredentism – let’s get back together) The objective is to reunite an ethnopolitical group that has been divided and separated by an arbitrary state border. An example is the conflict in Northern Ireland where Irish Republicans (typically Catholics) aspire to unify the 6 northern counties with the Republic of Ireland. Nationalism – (let’s organize ourselves) The aspiration of a national group (people related by ethnicity, religion, language or culture) to create a formal state fo r their nation. An example is the aspiration to establish Kurdistan as a homelan d for the Kurdish people. This entails elements of both separatism and irredenti sm of Kurds living in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. In today’s world there are any number of intractable conflicts, some active, other s dormant but unresolved. Some of the most enduring are the divisions in Ireland , Korea and Cyprus, each one dividing people by artificial borders. Many are des cribed in Flashpoints Country Briefings. Most of these can be classified as trad itional forms of political violence, including terrorism. Many analysts and scholars draw distinctions between traditional terrorism and t he new international terrorism, represented by alQaeda and the militant Islamis t movement. But is this really new, or just a different manifestation of politic al unrest, with a violent twist and more deadly potential? Up until 2001, the number of terrorist incidents had been declining, but the att acks were becoming more deadly, culminating with 9/11. Since invading Afghanista n and Iraq that trend has clearly been reversed. Day in and day out, the news re ports attacks against occupying coalition forces (as insurgency) and escalating attacks against civilian targets to deter collaborators.

Conclusion______Conventional Wisdom Much of the conventional wisdom is highly politicized and may be better characte rized as propaganda, myth and misperception. One current theme is that terrorism is not the result of poverty and economic de privation. "Research shows that terrorists are never poor and uneducated. “While s ome on the left urge policymakers to address the root causes of terrorism, Laque ur says that such an approach won t yield the desired results, since the commonl y identified wellsprings of terrorism poverty and political oppression fai l to account for the terrorism that most threatens the United States. According to Laqueur: 1. Almost no terrorism occurs in the world s poorest 49 countries, and of course

the Sept. 11 terrorists all came from middle and uppermiddleclass families.

2. Similarly, the 20th century s most repressive regimes (Stalin s Soviet Union and Hitler s Germany) were free of terrorism, while in South America in the 1970 s terrorism first broke out not in the harshest dictatorships, but in Uruguay, t he most democratic state. 3. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, then, terrorism flourishes in countries that are "democratic in character, or alternatively, in a wholly inefficient dic tatorship," Lacquer writes.” Lacqueur s tortured logic implies that harsh repressive measures, such as those used by Russia and Germany will eliminate terrorism. Between them Stalin and Hit ler are responsible for killing as many as 30 million people. The obvious counte r argument is that with state terror at such a level, there’s little opportunity f or dissent and citizen s terrorism. It begs two questions; would people resistin g such regimes have been labeled as terrorists or freedom fighters? And, is extr eme state repression the kind of solution appropriate for modern Western democra cies? If terrorists are not poor, the unspoken idea is that their grievances are unfou nded and they don’t deserve consideration. Hence their mindless violence justifies the harshest responses. Although it seems obvious that the “might is right” approach is ethically wrong, imp ractical and counterproductive, many security analysts and policy makers advocat e this approach. Arguably, the strongest advocates are hard line Israelis, like Netanyahu and Sharon. Their strategy is simply to crush terrorists in any way po ssible. Since 9/11, this strategy has found new advocates in the U.S. Richard Pearl, a m ember of the Bush administration’s Defense Policy Board coauthored a new book sug gesting the “kill ‘em all, and let God sort it out” strategy. When asked about the use of a carrot and a stick, Pearl responded that, “the carrot is that we won’t use the stick.” Other analysts take a different view. According to Alan Krueger, “No other factor besides a lack of civil liberties including the literacy rate, infant mortali ty rate, terrain, ethnic divisions and religious fractionalization could pred ict whether people from that country were more or less likely to take part in in ternational terrorism. Thus economically well off countries that lack civil liberties have spawned rela tively many terrorists. Poor countries with a tradition of protecting civil libe rties are unlikely to spawn terrorists.” Another common theme is that terrorist organizations are Marxist in ideology. Th is view is more a remnant of the cold war perspective than a reality. Virtually every dissident group seeks to define an ideological foundation for their cause. Since most repressed and disadvantaged people seek to share in their countries wealth, the inevitable call is for redistribution of that wealth through land re form, private ownership or expropriation of foreignowned business. To their adv ersaries this sounds like, and can be condemned as communism. History shows that few revolutionary movements result in communist governments ( China and Cuba being exceptions) Today, with communism discredited, it’s even less realistic to fear the onset of Marxist, or communist states. Different Perspectives It’s doubtful that terrorism is any sane person’s first choice. Most disgruntled peo ple would start with a petition stating their grievances and setting forth their demands for reform. If denied, they might organize to demonstrate, or protest a nd might engage in civil disobedience – all design to attract public attention and broaden their support. If denied again, they might attempt legal action, if suc h avenues are open to them. And what if the denial involves being attacked and b eaten by authorities, or being arrested and imprisoned? The reactions of the sta te government can directly influence the course of future events. Oftentimes, counterdemonstrators who fear that the government will give in to d issident’s demands confront demonstrators. These clashes can lead to violence and destroy hope for resolution of the problems. A classic example comes from Northe rn Ireland. Northern Ireland In 1969, disadvantaged Irish Catholics demanding reforms in housing, employment, civil rights staged a protest march. Counter demonstrators attacked them, while the police first stood by, and then joined in the attack. Later, the government appeared willing to address the Catholic grievances, so Protestants mobs attack ed Catholic homes with firebombs, forcing terrorized residents to flee as entire streets were burned, while police failed to protect the Catholic communities an d/or joined in the attacks. Thus emerged the Irish Republican Army with the aim to protect catholic communities under attack. The Catholic communities were unarmed and unprotected by the police, yet Protest ant attacks continued and escalated, including a series of bombings, until Catho lics were killed. The purpose of these “loyalist” attacks was to convince the govern ment to ignore catholic demands. Unable to quell the intercommunity violence th e government brought in British troops. This was a temporary improvement until t he soldiers also took sides against Catholics. The IRA was weak, essentially unarmed and outgunned by the police and British a rmy, while the citizens remained under threat from loyalist bombs, firebombs and personal attacks. But Ireland is an agricultural country with plenty of fertili zer and diesel fuel and the IRA soon developed skills at bomb making and soon su rpassed the skills of their loyalist adversaries. Although the IRA’s initial targe ts were the security forces, it wasn’t long before plans went awry and civilians w ere killed – once that happened the terrorist label was applied, never to be remov ed. And once a person is condemned and vilified as a terrorist, the response bec omes “I might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb,” and violence escalates. Israel & Palestine The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians had a very different beginning (See: IsraelPalestine Country Briefing). The U.N. voted to create the state of Israel on the land where the Palestinians lived, under British authority, but wi thout selfgovernment. The Jews attacked immediately to claim their land. As the British exited, neighbouring Arab states also claimed the land. The fledgling U N never did intervene to establish two governments as decreed in the UN resoluti on. Palestinians lost out, but never accepted defeat. Once Egypt and Jordan reno unced their claims to Palestine, the Palestinians opted to fight for their own f uture. By this time Israel was a substantial military power with American warpla nes, attack helicopters, tanks and their dreaded bulldozers, used to demolish Pa lestinian homes and orchards. The outgunned PLO had two choices, ignore the injustice and surrender their asp irations, or continue the struggle by whatever means possible. They chose the la tter and defined a new form of highprofile international terrorism: highjackin g airliners, kidnappings, bombings and hostage taking. Their goal was to shock t he world, attract attention to their cause and encourage international intervent ion. Perhaps, as a result of their highvisibility terrorism, states, namely U.S. pre sidents, accepted the need to negotiate a solution to the Middle East conflict. From the Palestinian perspective, however, the result has been to isolate Palest ine, subverting their Arab allies and providing little action to address the mos t enduring grievances. An essential part of Israel’s grand nationbuilding plan is to encourage immigrati on of Jews from other countries to Israel. As millions of Jews move to Israel, t he state must provide jobs and housing settlements. With over 300,000 settlers n ow living in the Occupied Territories, claimed by Palestine, it’s difficult to acc ept that Israel will ever withdraw. But Palestinian extremists have a plan. The current rash of terrorist suicide bombings are intended to exacerbate the cl imate of fear and increase security costs for a nation that is financially vulne rable. The terrorist’s goals are to discourage Jewish immigration, motivates other s to leave Israel, and thereby force the government to ultimately agree to Pales tinian demands. The violence may be unconscionable, but it is not mindless. Sure ly, there are also extreme factions that somehow envision the destruction of Isr ael, but the radical fringe exists in every conflict and it is counterproductiv e to act as if the extremists speak for all the people, or to allow them to scut tle solutions. Fundamentalist Islam It’s essential to note that Islam is a worldwide religion, not just an Arab religi on. The foundations of Islam lie in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, but Muslims number in the hundreds of millions around the globe. Recent public opinion polls indicate that only 15 percent of Indonesians, 7 percent of Saudis and 15 percent of Turk s have a favourable image of America. The fact that the governments of these sta tes have friendly relations with Washington suggests the different perspectives of those who benefit and those who suffer from US policy. It is those who contin ue to languish without prosperity and hope that are the targets of the Islamist dissidents. Like secular revolutionaries, Islamic Fundamentalists (Islamists) seek to establ ish an ideological foundation for their struggles. To do so, they distort the te achings of Islam to define a common enemy. That enemy is portrayed as the Wester n culture of democracy (scorned as unIslamic by ideologues of Islamic terrorism ), capitalism (decried as Imperialist exploitation), and individualism (opposed by Islamists who believe in a new Caliphate to lead the community of Muslims wor ldwide. Again, there are conflicting viewpoints. Michael Radu writes, “We are told, the Is lamic states are poor and undemocratic, which justifies rebellion against their tyrannical rulers. Why is that so, and what can be done about it by Muslims and others? Perhaps most Muslim countries are undemocratic because they are Muslim. When given an electoral choice in 1992 in the first and last democratic election s in the Arab world, most Algerians preferred the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) over the secular (and corrupt) ruling socialist party — although perfectly aware t hat FIS s ideology meant not just "one man, one vote" but "one man, one vote, on e time." Which raises a very uncomfortable question for both conservatives in th e U.S., who routinely blast the lack of democracy in the Arab world, and the hum an rights fundamentalists such as Amnesty International on the left, who support absolute democracy and at the same time condemn the Islamist disregard of all f reedoms, as in Iran. This line of thought suggests that Islam is inherently defective and leads to th e clash of civilizations viewpoint that is then twisted to argue for holy war ag ainst Islam. In his report “Islam and Democracy” published by the U.S. Institute of Peace, David Smock writes that, “The explanation of why so many Muslim countries a re not democratic has more to do with historical, political, cultural and econom ic factors than with religious ones.” There is much to support this view. Democracy is a Western concept, barely 200 y ears old. It has been slow to take root not only in the Muslim world, but also i n Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Each of these regions is home to ancient civi lizations, cultures and traditions. Like Islam that embraces shura, or “consultati ve decisionmaking,” other religions and cultures have accepted methods of governa nce. Is democracy the answer? Democracy is inherently unfair; it provides for majority rule. If the majority i s unfair and unjust, the minority will eventually rebel, as they so often do. Th roughout the colonial era, democratic Western powers often granted power to rule to minorities, as a means to divide and conquer large masses of people. Given t he inconsistencies associated with Western democratic principles and the way the y’ve been applied, it’s not surprising that democracy is not always seen as the solu tion to life’s political problems. As Western powers continue attempts to establish democracies in Muslim countries , or in states like Haiti, Cuba, North Korea or Rwanda and Angola, one predictab le consequence will be a continuation of political violence and terrorism.

Bibliography______1. Books • Richard Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the War on Terror, Cambridge University Pr ess, 2008 • Arvinder Sambei, Anton Du Plessis, Martin Polaine, Counter Terrorism Law & Pract ise: An International Handbook, Oxford University Press, 2009 • Michael I. Gnatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terrorism, O xford University Press, 2007 • The 9/11 Commission Report • Human RightsII : Cases and Materials 2. Online sources • www.wikipedia.org • www.legalservicesindia.com • www.legalsutra.org