Weekly Bond Fund Flows ($Bn) 40.00

April 23, 2020

Dear Investor:

SkyBridge Multi-Adviser Hedge Fund Portfolios LLC - Series G (“Series G” or the “Fund”) suffered an estimated loss of -23.29% in the month of March. We are embarrassed by this performance. Since the Fund’s inception, it has suffered a loss of greater than 4% in only one year. Suffice to say, we are carefully evaluating our investment processes, risk management and personnel, and we are going to make necessary changes.

That said, while the portfolio suffered from the extraordinary events and brutal market conditions of the last month, it is, in our judgment, positioned to generate attractive returns in the coming months. We believe the weaknesses in the portfolio have become its strengths. Further, the vast percentage of the losses suffered in March are unrealized. The portfolio is heavily weighted in structured credit, the most beaten down sector in the market. Structured credit is trading at 2009 levels despite stronger fundamentals and unprecedented government support. As a point of interest, SkyBridge’s best years were 2009 to 2012 when the portfolio compounded at 14.57% (net of fees and expenses) although we are mindful that past performance does not guarantee future results.

What Happened in the Credit Markets

On March 18, 2020, Series G reported a mid-month estimate of -5.45% (net of fees and expenses) as fixed income markets performed largely in-line with our expectations. However, in response to concerns about the economic damage caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, retail and corporate investors redeemed holdings in daily and weekly fixed income funds at a staggering and hugely disruptive rate.

Weekly Bond Fund Flows ($bn) 40.00

20.00

0.00

-20.00

-40.00

-60.00

-80.00

-100.00

-120.00

Source: EPFR

The dumping of fixed income securities, including higher-quality liquid sectors, into a fragile market produced extraordinary price declines. For example, 2018 CMBS BBBs declined from $94 to $54 in two weeks.

The aforementioned wholesale selling combined with unprecedented U.S. Treasury market volatility to create a perfect storm for mortgage REITs. On Sunday, March 22nd, facing substantial margin calls, mortgage REITs were forced to make bulk sales of agency and non-agency residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities and other structured credit products. These sales, which largely took place over a weekend, traded at shockingly low levels. Publicly traded mortgage REITs, which are largely owned by retail investors, plunged in price. For example, MFA Financial, Inc., (NYSE: MFA) declined from $7.60 on March 2nd to $.36 on March 24th and AG Mortgage Investment Trust (NYSE: MITT) declined from $15.84 on March 2nd to $2.81 on March 23rd.

On Monday, March 23rd, bank lending repo desks re-marked collateral for all borrowers at Sunday’s distressed trading levels. This produced another round of both forced and proactive selling by credit market participants including hedge funds. The state of the credit markets is best illustrated by the following graph.

Agency CRT M2 Spreads Over 24 Months 1,800 1,600 1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0 1-Jan-18 1-Apr-18 1-Jul-18 1-Oct-18 1-Jan-19 1-Apr-19 1-Jul-19 1-Oct-19 1-Jan-20 1-Apr-20

Source: BofA Global Research, ICE Data Indices, LLC, Galton

What Happened to Series G

Series G’s portfolio is heavily weighted toward structured credit, particularly mortgage-backed securities, which suffered violent price declines associated with the aforementioned events. The velocity of the decline in these securities was breathtaking. For example, mortgage backed securities collapsed to price levels last seen in the 2008 Financial Crisis. However, while last month’s decline occurred over a couple weeks, the 2008 decline transpired over approximately 61 weeks.

Non-Agency RMBS Senior Spreads during the 2008 GFC vs 2020 COVID 1,000 900 800 700 600 500 2020 COVID 400 Spread Spread (bps) 2008 GFC 300 200 100 - 1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 Weeks since start of the Crisis

Source: JP Morgan Dataquery, CQS as of 31 March 2020

No risk management system, including SkyBridge’s, effectively modeled the effect of a constructive shutdown of the U.S. economy combined with non-functioning fixed income markets. Moreover, our underlying credit managers were unable to sufficiently de-risk given the velocity of price declines and trading illiquidity.

That said, the large allocation of Series G’s portfolio to structured credit explains approximately 90% of the Fund’s terrible performance. Our attribution data also reveals that Series G’s larger managers outperformed the smaller managers by approximately 6% in March. While smaller managers are more nimble and can exploit attractive niche opportunities, we will be re-evaluating the optimal mix between large, medium, and small managers.

The following three funds had the greatest negative impact on Series G’s performance: Angelo Gordon Mortgage Value Partners funds, Medalist Partners Harvest funds, and Axonic Credit Opportunities funds. These funds were insufficiently hedged relative to their peers.

Importantly, the Series G portfolio has approximately 1% of exposure to the energy sector and approximately 1% of exposure to the aviation sector. Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) represent the most fundamentally challenged sector in the portfolio, and this allocation has been scaled back to 4.5% of the long book.

Six of Series G’s fund investments, namely Bayview Liquid Credit Strategies, EJF Debt Opportunities, Metacapital Mortgage Opportunities, Medalist Partners Harvest, Tempo Volatility, and Prophet Opportunity Partners suspended redemptions, and Hildene Opportunities constructively suspended redemptions. Based on conversations with these managers, we expect most suspensions will be short-term in duration. For example, EJF anticipates paying redemptions for the quarter ending September 30, 2020.

SkyBridge Redemptions

The quarterly tender period for Series G closed on April 17, 2020. Redemptions were approximately 9.3% of assets as of March 31, 2020. By contrast, our normal quarterly tender rate is approximately 2%. While we expected an elevated tender number given the bad performance, we are pleased with the outcome. We submitted redemptions to our underlying managers for over $1 billion to meet redemptions and to facilitate portfolio re-allocation decisions. As a point of reference, Series G experienced quarterly tenders of 9% in the third and fourth quarters of 2016 after a period of relative underperformance, although, admittedly, the underperformance was mild by comparison to March.

The Path Back

The U.S. Federal Reserve and the U.S. Government are providing an unprecedented amount of liquidity to the markets and stimulus to the economy. Both the scale and speed of government action dwarfs the measures taken during the 2008 Financial Crisis. As a consequence, equity markets have rebounded nicely, and fixed income markets have stabilized as we write this letter. As referenced above, the credit markets lagged the equity markets on the way down, as evidenced by Series G’s mid-March estimate of -5.45%, and we anticipate credit markets will lag on the way back up. The equity market is presently pricing in an economic upturn fueled by government stimulus and informed by Covid-19 recovery rates in China and South Korea. Thus, we believe structured credit is positioned for a substantial “catch-up” move over the coming months and quarters.

Presently, Series G’s biggest portfolio allocation is to mortgage-backed securities, primarily residential, which are trading at 2008 Financial Crisis levels. Unlike 2008, consumers entered this crisis with solid household balance sheets and substantial home equity. Massive spread widening and an associated spike in bond yields has produced an extraordinary buying opportunity in our opinion. Thus, like in 2009 and 2010, we expect mortgage-backed securities to generate equity-like returns over the next nine to twelve months.

We have confidence in Series G’s path to recovery through a combination of cash flow and asset price appreciation. Series G’s portfolio is presently yielding approximately 10.6% which will generate approximately 8% in cash flow over the next nine months, assuming a static allocation and no impairments. Further, given the portfolio’s net exposure of 130%, a 10% price move in the assets will produce a 13% gain (or loss). As a point of reference, after our decline of -20.67% in 2008, it took 15 months to fully recover our losses, although of course past performance does not guarantee future results.

New Investments

Series G made an approximately $170 million investment in the Canyon Balanced Fund for April 1, 2020, making it one of the top 10 positions in the Fund. Canyon is an approximately $22 billion hedge fund manager that specializes in high yield, convertible arbitrage, risk arbitrage, and special situations. We have been waiting for a distressed credit cycle to make an allocation to Canyon, and recent events produced such an opportunity. We have great confidence in Canyon Co-Chief Executive Officers Josh Friedman and Mitch Julis, and the fund’s de minimis use of leverage is appealing. The Canyon Balanced Fund experienced a substantial drawdown in March. While existing Canyon investors were certainly displeased with this performance, we welcomed the opportunity to invest with Canyon at an attractive entry point. We believe that Series G, after our terrible March, likewise offers a compelling opportunity for investors to purchase quality assets at distressed prices. 4

SkyBridge Update

As many of you know, my partner, Ray Nolte, has been working on a multi-year glide path into an advisory role. We are pleased that Ray has decided to return to full-time duty for, at least, the next two years. He is energized by the opportunity to lead the investment team and, once again, produce the attractive returns that marked the past fifteen years. Further, our Risk Management and Operational Due Diligence Departments will hereinafter report to Brett Messing, SkyBridge’s President and Chief Operating Officer. As many of you know, it is common in the investment management industry for these functions to report to a senior business person. Lastly, while my commitment to SkyBridge has never wavered, I have, at times, enjoyed my involvement in politics. Suffice to say, there have also been times when I wished I stayed on the sidelines. That said, my political activities going forward will be limited to voting. I will continue to make occasional media appearance on behalf of SkyBridge, but my public comments will be focused on financial markets and economics-related issues.

I began my career as a financial advisor at Goldman Sachs. From experience, I understand how our poor March performance generates problems for our investors, financial advisors, and distribution partners. We have to do better, and we will.

Sincerely,

Anthony Scaramucci p.s. performance data, including April mid-month estimate, are presented in the following pages

Preliminary Performance Estimates

March Month-End March 2020 2020 YTD Series G (net of fees and expenses) -23.29% -22.79% S&P 500 Total Return Index -12.35% -19.60% Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate Bond Index -0.59% +3.15% HFRI Fund of Funds Composite Index (est.) -4.94% -6.01% HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index (Monthly) -8.31% -9.63%

April Mid-Month (as of April 21, 2020) April 2020 2020 YTD Series G (net of fees and expenses) +1.62% -21.54% S&P 500 Total Return Index +5.98% -14.79% Bloomberg Barclays Aggregate Bond Index +1.76% +4.96% HFRX Global Hedge Fund Index (Daily) +1.92% -5.06%

Preliminary Top 10 Positions (by percentage, based on the preliminary March 2020 estimated fund net asset value)

Approximate Position Top 10 Portfolio Positions1 Strategy Group2 Strategy2 Size 400 Capital Credit Opportunities Event Driven Credit Sensitive MBS3,4 9.07%

EJF Debt Opportunities Relative Value Relative Value Credit 8.73%

Seer Capital Partners Event Driven Diversified Structured Credit4 8.65%

AG Mortgage Value Partners Event Driven Diversified Structured Credit4 7.57%

Linden Relative Value Convertible Arbitrage 7.28%

Marathon Securitized Credit Event Driven Credit Sensitive MBS3,4 6.61%

Hildene Opportunities Relative Value Relative Value Credit 5.88%

Axonic Credit Opportunities Event Driven Credit Sensitive MBS3,4 5.88%

Waterfall Eden Event Driven Diversified Structured Credit4 5.15%

Galton Mortgage Strategies Event Driven Credit Sensitive MBS3,4 4.10%

1) Top 10 Portfolio Positions of Series G can change at any time; allocation sizes may change, investments may be added or removed at the Adviser’s discretion. The Top 10 Portfolio Positions listed above may not be the Top 10 Positions at the time of investment. 2) Portfolio strategy allocations and strategy classifications are subject to change at any time at the Adviser’s discretion. 3) MBS is defined as Mortgage Backed Securities. 4) As of June 2015, assets previously classified as distressed securities will now be classified as Credit Sensitive MBS & Diversified Structured Credit, which are sub-strategies of the Event Driven theme. 6

Preliminary Statistical Analysis (based on the preliminary March 2020 estimated fund net asset value)

As of 3/31/20:

Bloomberg HFRI Fund of (Series G Inception – January S&P 500 Barclays Series G Funds Composite 2003) Total Return Aggregate Index Bond Index 1 Year Compound Rate of Return -20.66% -3.94% -6.98% 8.94%

3 Year Compound Rate of Return -3.99% 0.50% 5.10% 4.83% (annualized)

5 Year Compound Rate of Return -3.35% 0.33% 6.73% 3.37% (annualized) 7 Year Compound Rate of Return -0.33% 1.83% 9.62% 3.19% (annualized) 10 Year Compound Rate of Return 3.35% 1.91% 10.53% 3.89% (annualized) Compound Annualized Rate of Return 4.35% 3.04% 8.64% 4.29% Since Inception (1/03)

Standard Deviation (annualized)1 8.08% 5.05% 13.84% 3.37%

Beta (Index = S&P 500)2 0.31 0.27 1.00 0.00 1) A measure of the variation of returns around the mean return. Standard deviation is the most widely used approximation of the risk of an individual investment or portfolio. 2) A quantitative measure of volatility of a security or strategy relative to a market index. An investment with a beta less than 1.0 is less volatile than the market while an investment with a beta greater than 1.0 is more volatile than the market.

Please let us know if you have any questions.

SkyBridge is affiliated with Hastings Capital Group LLC ("Hastings"), a registered broker-dealer and a member of both the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). Series G is a limited liability company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended, as a closed-end, non-diversified management investment company.

Legal Disclaimer: The foregoing is provided for informational purposes only and is not to be relied upon. Estimated performance and attribution numbers have not been verified by the Fund administrator. The results for the 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 year periods are based on the respective 12, 36 60, 84 or 120 month period estimated as of date above and are subject to change. Upon publication, the month’s finalized Fact Card will contain final performance and statistics and is available upon request. The above results are unaudited, subject to change and net of fees and expenses. All statistical analysis is based on SkyBridge Multi-Adviser Hedge Fund Portfolios LLC’s (“Series G” or the “Portfolio” or the “Fund”) inception of January 2003. Performance results are based on the foregoing rolling 1, 3 and 5 year periods while Series G’s fiscal year end is March 31. Performance results through March 31, 2019 7

are based on audited financial statements and are presented net of Series G fees and expenses. Performance results after March 31, 2019 are net of Series G fees and expenses based on unaudited financials. Unless otherwise noted, the performance information shows actual returns of Series G since inception in January 2003. The results shown above do not reflect the effects of any placement fees and would be lower if they did.

The indices are presented merely to show the general trends in the markets for the period and are not intended to imply that the Portfolio is comparable to the indices either in composition or element of risk. The indices do not reflect the deductions of any fees. Index data is provided for comparison purposes only and a variety of factors may cause an index to be an accurate benchmark for a particular fund. Comparisons to indexes have limitations because indexes have volatility and other material characteristics and risks that may differ from a particular hedge fund. The indexes are for illustrative purposes only and should not be relied upon as an accurate measure of comparison.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Actual results may vary.

This document is offered for informational purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell any securities. An offer or solicitation will be made through the Prospectus and Subscription Agreement, and is qualified in its entirety by the terms and conditions contained in such documents. The Prospectus contains additional information needed to evaluate the potential investment and provide important disclosures regarding the investment objective, risks, fees and expenses of Series G. The information contained herein is confidential and is not to be reproduced or distributed except with the permission of SkyBridge Capital II, LLC (“SkyBridge” or “Adviser”), the Investment Adviser of the Fund, as successor to Citigroup Alternative Investments LLC.

On June 30, 2010, SkyBridge Capital acquired the Citigroup Alternative Investments LLC (“CAI”) Hedge Fund Management Group, and replaced CAI as the Investment Manager to the portfolio. Accordingly, the results of the Portfolio through June 30, 2010 were not generated when SkyBridge acted as the Investment Manager. Raymond Nolte, Co-Chief Investment Officer of SkyBridge, was the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Investment Officer, and Chairman of the Investment Committee at CAI’s Hedge Fund Management Group prior to June 30, 2010. There were no changes in the investment process or strategy following the change in the Fund’s Investment Manager.

There were changes in the senior management and investment personnel and investment process of the previous Adviser in September 2005 when the tenure of the current portfolio management team commenced. It is not possible to know to what extent performance returns were impacted by such changes.

An investor should consider carefully the investment objectives, risks, and charges and expenses of the Fund before investing. The Prospectus contains this and other important information and is available upon request to SkyBridge or your Placement Agent. Read the Prospectus carefully before investing. An investor may obtain the Prospectus by contacting their professional advisor.

Performance data represents past performance. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor’s shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. For the most recent month-end performance data, subject to a lag of approximately 30 calendar days, investors can call 1-888-759-2730.

All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice.

Opinions expressed herein are intended solely as general market commentary and do not constitute investment advice or a guarantee of returns.

Past performance does not guarantee future results. Actual results may vary. Investors cannot invest in an index. This document does not constitute an offering. Before making an investment, all investors must obtain and carefully read the applicable Confidential Offering Memorandum or Prospectus, which contains the information needed to evaluate the investment and provides important disclosures regarding risks, fees, and expenses. As described in the applicable Confidential Offering Memorandum or Prospectus, investing in the Portfolio is speculative, not suitable for all investors, and intended for experienced and sophisticated investors who are willing to bear the high economic risks of the investment, which can include:

– loss of all or a substantial portion of the investment due to leveraging, short-selling, or other speculative practices; – lack of liquidity in that there may be no secondary market for the Fund and none is expected to develop; – volatility of returns; – restrictions on transferring interests in the Fund; – potential lack of diversification and resulting higher risk due to concentration of trading authority when a single advisor is utilized; – absence of information regarding valuations and pricing; – complex tax structures and delays in tax reporting; – less regulation and higher fees than mutual funds; and – risks associated with operations, personnel, and processes of the manager.

Individual funds will have specific risks related to their investment programs that will vary from fund to fund.

This document contains certain forward-looking statements as defined within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, and is subject to the safe harbors created therein. Actual results could differ materially from those projected in the forward looking statements, as a result of risks and other factors discussed in the applicable Confidential Offering Memorandum or Prospectus.