ONE SHILLING NET

Authorof·'Hitlerand Itt Dr.orro STRASSER GERMANY · IN A DISUNITED WORLD

LIFESTREAM ,~ PUBLICATIONS Lifestream Controversy Pam hlets Edited by Bernard L. Calmus.

No 1.

ON L IV I NG IN A DISUNITED WORLD

Under prevailing conditions, it is of imperative impor­ tance to every citizen, man or woman, to achieve some idea in as objective a way as poss ible of the policy aimed at by the three World Powers in relation to Germany, the key to the whole complex situation in Europe and across the Seven Seas. Lifestream Cont roversy Series pre sent a first discus­ sion pamphlet of immediate topicality and importance. in­ viting opinion and comment fro m all readers.

This publication deals briefly wi th *Russian Policy. *\Vestern Policy. *Europe the Objective. *Coming Changes in the Balance of Pow er. "World Powers of T o-morr ow . *Strangled Germany. *French-German Rapprochement. *The European Federation and Afr ica. *Germany and the British Commonw ealth. GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

Power, Ilk. a d.sola'ing pes,il.nc., Pollutes whate '.,. i' touch••; and ob.di.nce, Bane of all genius , ..iTtu., freedom, ,ru,h. Makes.la.... of men, and of the human frame A mechanised automaton . Sheney

LIFESTREAM CONTROVERSY SERIES LIFESTR EAM PUBLICATIONS LTO . 13, Susans Road, Eastbourne. Lon don: 21Sa, Uxb ridge Road, W.I3 . FIRST PUBLISHED OCTOBER 1947

Also by Dr . Strasser: HI TLER AND I Boston HISTORY IN MY TBIE London MASARYK Zuerich DEUTSCHE BARTHOLOMAEUSNACHT Zuerich DEUTSCHLANDS ERNEUERUNG Buenos Aires LA ALEMANIA DE MANANA Santiago L'AJGLE PRUSSlEN SUR L'ALLEMAGNE Montreal Inquiries about the author's work may be addressed to Lifestream Publications Lrd., 13, Susans Road, Easrbourne, Sussex, England. GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

RUSSIAi\' POLICY

In order to form a reasonably reliable opinion of Russia's external aims and before an interpretation of more recent developments can be made it is necessary to consider the history of that country over many centuries. Stalin's astounding lucidity and candour while stating the aims of Russia's foreign policy render the task considerably easier than it might otherwise have been. The disclosure of these objectives was already made as far back as the summer of 1939, when negotiations between the Soviet Foreign Office and the Anglo-French mediators took place, and the Hitler-Stalin pact was in process of ratification at the same time. These aims were rehearsed again during November, 1940, 'in Berlin, and subsequently Molotov's proposals were referred to by Hitler in his proclamation of June 22, 1941; finally Stalin solemnly proclaimed similar aims between 1941 and 1944, and after. Roughly these claims (some of which have already been realised) cover the complete domination over the Baltic and Baltic States­ including the Finnish peninsula of Hangoe, and Aaland. In certain circumstances, the whole of Finland is to become a republic within the Soviet Union. Access to the Atlantic is to be rendered possible by the annexation of Northern Finland and, probably, Spitzbergen. A frontier on the western side of Russia, bordering on a weakened or communistic Germany by the incorporation of Eastern Poland, with the remainder of that country under Russian supervision, or the total absorbtion of Poland into the U.S.S.R. as one of the Soviet republics. Annexation of Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Danube estuary, tantamount to turning Rumania into a tributary state of Russia. The occupation of the western Black Sea shores by annexa­ tion of the Danubian delta and the Dobrudja or more indirectly by inaugurating a Soviet Republc of Bulgaria including those Greek territories that were given to Greece after the Balkan wars. Access to the Mediterranean to be achieved by annexing Constantinople and Turkish Thraee or, in a more roundabout way, by annexing Greek 1 hrace to Soviet Bulgaria, in which case, the Aegean coast from Salonika to Dedeagash would belong to the U.S.S.R. (via Bulgaria) without annexing Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The perfect solution of this problem in Russian eyes would- be to apportion Con­ stantinople and Turkish Thraee to 3 Soviet Bulg-aria. with Russian OTTO STRASSER military base~ in the Da.rdanelles. Expansi~n?f the Ru ssian sphere of influence . m the Mediterranean by estabhshmg a Sovi et Republic in Yugoslavia, ~hereby Greece would bec?me ultimately isola ted from the rest of continental Europe; the Adriatic and the waters round the ~~i~~~:~i~Su::s~~~:~~~~~si~~o~~:~~~1 :~~~:~::~:7t~;~:~g ::s~~:~:~~ elusion of Greece later on. The entire eastern Mediterranean would thus be governed on behalf of the Kremlin. Considered from the viewpoint of world politics, Ru ssia 's aims concerning Asia are even more far-reaching: Access to the Indi an Ocean by directly or indirectly annexing Iran. Annexation or do mina­ tion of Afghanistan and Beluchistan so as to expand Russia's position on the shores of the Indian Ocean and to gain a direct influence on Hindustan, The strengthening of Russian influence in Mongo lia and China by giving active support to the communist government in North China in its fight against Chungking. Extension of ancient clai ms in Manchuria, and the affiliation of the latter to the North Chinese Soviet Republic. A demand for participation in the political and econo mic reconstruction of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies which migh t be attained by Soviet propaganda against ., western imperialism." Th e annexation of the southern end of Sakhalin Island and the K uril Islands in order to strengthen Russia's maritime position in the P acific. In­ fluence on the future political and economic development of Kor ea and Japan by the inauguration or backing of a government with com" munistic trends. It is obvious that these aims conflict with the interests of the western democracies. Russia's proposed outlet to the Atlantic docs not aim primarily at continental Europe, but at the United Ki ngdom and at the U.S.A., whose domination of the Atlantic Region will be contested in days to come by a strong Russia to a far greater extent than it ever was in past epochs by Spain and Portugal, late r by the Netherlands and France and lastly by Germany. If Russia achieves her demands in the Eastern Mediterranea n, the British Empire will have waged war against Italy to no purpo se, since the Suez Canal, so vital to the welfare of Great Britain, will be increasingly endangered and more than ever it was by France, Italy or Germany. Russia as the strongest power in the Baltic, in the Tatra Moun­ tains of Poland, in the Carpathians, in the Danubian area, in Austria, and in the Balkans, means that all Europe may be satellite to a Russo­ Siberian world and that Anglo-Saxon influence on Europe will suffer a marked decline .

141 GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WOItLD

Should Russia get into the Persian Gulf, she would not only be mistress of the entire political and economic situation in the Near and Middle East, but would influence developments in the vast territories round the Indian Ocean and above all, Hindustan and the entire Arab world. In addition to these aims of Russian foreign policy, which are automatically directed against the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth, there are others which aim directly or indirectly at the U.S.A. Some of these aims emerge when we consider the pressure of Russia on China, Mongolia and Manchuria and, to a certain extent, on Korea and Japan. We cannot over-estimate the importance which the fulfilment of these aims would have on the political and economic development of such vast territories with their thousand million inhabitants. WESTERN POLICY

The foreign policies of Great Britain and the U.S.A., on the other hand, are by no means as clear-cut and methodical as those outlined by Stalin, who is following in the footsteps of Ivan IV, surnamed The Terrible, Peter the Great, General Skobeleff and Count Amur. The lack of any unmistakable Anglo-Saxon policy is partly due to the incomplete agreement between the interests of one country and the other, though, for the moment, both London and Washington are at pains to emphasise the close conjunction of their policies. But that there are differences of interests between the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. is undeniable, for economic rivalry certainly does exist to some degree, while the complex problem of preserving the British Empire intact occupies an even vaster field. We have to remember that American industry has undergone enormous expansion in recent ~:a~~a~n~i~~~~:~~~~n~~a¥~~e:~:~::i~vi~~~:r~~t:,Btr~;is~'~:;i::r::e~h~~ new markets for her industrial products may be acquired. Great Britain, on the other hand, as a consequence of economic difficulties at home, has a vital interest in keeping the Empire markets. Moreover, India and other British interests are not only identical with economic, hut also with political problems. Most Americans are disinclined to countenanae British imperialism in vast overseas territories, or at least anxious not to support it actively. This lack of harmony between Great Britain and the U.S.A. made itself felt during the war and has been evident in post-war days as regards. Germany and Europe in general. Apart from the non-committal stipulations of the Atlantic Charter, the Anglo-Saxon powers confined their political aims merely to the

[5] OTTO STRASSER idea of" unconditional surrender" unless we are to consider Brendan Bracken's pronouncement at the Quebec Conference in A ugu ~t, 1943, as a denial of this aim when he said: .. We must bomb a nd burn and ruthlessly destroy in every way available to us the people re spo nsible for this war." Already, in the case of Italy, the phrase a bout un­ conditional surrender proved both ineffectual and eve n dangerous. Because of persisting in the use of this slogan, the Anglo-Saxon powers lost precious weeks and missed the opportunity of contacting in time the non-fascist majority of the Italian people. As early as November 1945, London and \\rashington, when the armistice ter ms w et~ announced, had to admit that the conditions which shou ld have led to unconditional surrender had never actually existed, and that in the interlude between the Atlantic Charter and the end of the war these conditions had become legally invalid. As to Germany a nd the German people, the lack of a constructive foreign policy on the part of the Anglo-Saxon powers proved even more disastrous tha n in th e case of Italy. It is not an exaggeration to say that the abse nce of any constructive policy prolonged the conflict for one or two yea rs , and has deferred a real peace for as many decades. Naturally, both London and Washington have ideas of their own a to what form the future policy in relation to Germany an d Europe will assume; but the conceptions differ from one another, are ofte n dia­ metrically opposite, or even contradictory within the mse lve s. The intrinsic incongruity of the policy adopted by the Anglo-Saxon powers in relation to Germany cannot better be illustrated than com par ing the Atlantic Charter with the Potsdam declaration. Everything, from th e policy of annihilation of Morgenthau and Vansittart to that of reco ncilia­ tion advocated by Hoover, and Beveridge, seems to emerge. Though the policies of the two Anglo-Saxon powers are no t th e same, we can draw some inferences as to their aims from a st udy of prevailing opinion, the histories of the two countries, and the inter ests which both have at heart. Great Britain is aware that her political power has bee n co n­ siderably shaken by the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, that he r influen ce on the world at large has diminished enormously, in spite of th e fact that in both wars she emerged victorious. It is quite comprehensi ble that this and the enormous sacrifices she made in both confl ict s have left a feeling of bitterness towards Germany and a determina tion to make impossible a repetition of such d trial. Another wa r on the sa me scale would weaken Britain's position as a world power to a n even greater degree. Moreover, the United Kingdom wishes to seek com­ pensafion for the losses she has sustained, especially in the P acific and Indian Oceans; furthermore, she has suffered both politically and GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

economically in North and South America, and naturally wants to im­ prove her political and economic position in Europe. If these assumptions prove true, which they are very likely to be, then the objective Great Britain has in mind is to prostrate Germany to such an extent that she will never again be a menace to the United Kingdom whilst not destroying her completely as a political, economic and cultural unit. In relation to the other two Great Powers, Britain is in a relatively weak position and she will, therefore, deem it ex­ pedient to establish the closest bonds of friendship between herself and those countries whose economic and political interests run parallel with her own. The South African Prime Minister, General Smuts, has gone so far as to suggest the incorporation of certain western European states into the British Commonwealth, and London is endeavouring to create friendly relations with all countries who arc likely to accept British leadership in Europe. But these feelers on the part of Great Britain encounter fierce opposition from Moscow and toa certain extent from other quarters; there is Franco's Hispanidad idea and even de Gaulle's dream of a great French power in the Orient and on the Rhine. Great Britain is to-day more interested in Europe than she has ever been before. She cannot permit the extension of Soviet influence farther than the Elbe, though had America given timely support, the Russian boundary would have been fixed more to the east, on the banks of the Oder or the Vistula. As to the policies of the United Slates of America, the two world wars having enormously augmented her power, her ambitions have increased concommitantly and will continue on the same lines in decades to come. Since American imperialistic aims lie almost ex­ clusively in the Pacific Ocean, European affairs are not of quite the same interest to her. America certainly regards Europe as a potential economic rival and storm centre, but otherwise the continent is con­ sidered just a nuisance. We need but read Bernard Baruch's report of June 22, Hl45, on the economic situation in Europe to perceive that Germany in particular, and Europe as a whole, are of no concern to the United States except insofar as either might become economic rivals or danger areas. As the national and imperialistic tendencies of America make themselves increasingly felt, the deeper her indifference [0 internal European problems becomes. The U.S.A. engages in the struggles between Great Britain and the Soviet Union for economic spheres of interest in Europe indirectly and almost reluctantly, and it goes without saying that the extent of America's participation in this duel largely depends on her general attitude towards Russia. The Marshall Plan, in this connection, is much more 13 step egainst Russia. than a step for Europe.

[71 OTTO STRASSER

, EUROPE THE OBJECTIVE

From this discussion of the position, it becomes ext remely clear that, in consequence of the attitude adopted by the thre e Great Powers continental Europe has ceased to be an active polit ical force an~ is, for the time being, no more than a political objective for the U.S.A. the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth. Th is is due in a large degree to their contending with one another for decisiv e positions in the world and especially in the Pacific and Indian Ocea ns, and not because of their immediate intentions with regard to Euro pe's difficulties as such! As already stated, the policy of the u.s.A. is not directly concerned with the solution of European questions. Her interests are more ex­ tensive and more momentous in 'cha racter. Besides gaini ng a n incon­ testable preponderance in the Americas, she is concerned with the Pacific so that even the Atlantic plays but a subordinate part in her schemes. Rivalry in the Pacific does not touch upon European problems proper-apart from those connected with the sometime Fre nch, Dutch and Portuguese possessions there. Even so, these possessions serve merely as objects for compensation to the three world powe rs in their struggle of interests in the Pacific. The important and strong position of the British Commonwealth in and around the shores of the Pacific and above all in India, Australia and New Zealand, makes it highly probable that, desp ite all rivalries, the United States will continue to lend her support to Gre at Britain while pursuing her own political aims. The relationship bet ween the Anglo-Saxon powers is altogether different from their con nections with Russia. Ever since the conquest of Bokhara, Khiva and K hokand in 1873-76, and her intrusions into Mongolia and Manchuria which were stopped in 1\105 by the battles of Port Arthur and Mukden, Ru ssia has never concealed the fact that she considers herself the predominant Great Power in Asia and intends to push her way to the India n Ocean and play an appropriate part in Pacific affairs. In pursuance of this old-time policy, the Soviet Union strives to strengthen her position in the Pacific by developing the far-eastern regions of Russ ia . from Vladivostok to Kamchatka and to the Baikal Sea, and has thereby created effective preliminary conditions for making further claims. It is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to stimulate confidence in her anti-capitalist policy on the part of the Asiatic peoples, who are likely to trust her more than they do the Anglo-Saxon power s repre­ senting old-time imperialism. Communist propaganda is, th erefore, rife throughout Asia. But Russia's most mighty instrument in the Far East is the communist government in North China, which she herself has set up and which she supports with a view to ga ining her

[8] GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD ~::t i~a:he:e:a~r;:fJ~ons~:ren~~~e:e~r~yC~~::i:,~o;if~u~~st~:;::~:~ weapons and by leavmg behind the heavy armament of the RUSSian army of occupation there. The Anglo-Saxon powers, led by the U.S.A., rely upon that part ~f i;~::t~h~~n~~e~~:~r~:~h';C~~:;::~~i~~p~~:~nt~e~a:~S:e:e~a~;~ communist faction strongly opposed to the government. This, natural!y, creates more difficulties than are experienced in the homo­ geneous Yenan government of the North Chinese communists. Apart from the loyalty of the Christian Philippines, Chiang Kai-Shelc's China is the sole asset which the Anglo-Saxon powers possess in the Far East. For the rest, their position depends entirely on the effective­ ness of their foreign policy, and, in the final analysis, their military power in that part of the world. As was shown by the resolutions of the Cairo conference in 1943, both the United States and Great Britain are resolved to reinstate the status quo in the Pacific and Indian Oceans which was favourable to themselves and the Chinese, probably with some rectifications, such as the incorporation of Dutch East India and French Indo-China into the Anglo-Saxon sphere of interest and power, by bringing back North China and Manchuria into Chiang Kai-Shek's government, and by strengthening America's strategical position in the Pacific in taking over Japanese, and perhaps other, naval bases in that ocean. On the other hand, Russia will take all precautions to frustrate these designs. Moscow will, of course, try to achieve this aim without recourse to arms; she has merely to profit by the strength of her position which is in the main due to the North China government and .. independent" Manchuria. Even more effective than her strategical and economic resources in Asia and the Far East, is the psychological effect of her propaganda on the Asiatic peoples who at present come within the sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence. India offers a fertile soil for such propaganda. Nehru, as is wel! known, is sympathetic to the Soviet Union, and Moscow has been very clever in her propaganda and political tactics ',with regard to the iIndian problem jshe has succeeded in making even the non-communist elements friendly towards her. As soon as self-government throughout India has had time to develop, this friendship will be fostered by economic and political relations between the two countries. Should a pro-Zionist policy materialise in Palestine, the Arabs and the Mohammedans of India would automatical!y throw in their lot with Moscow and Russian influence in Hindustan and throughout the whole Arab world would be speeded up and intensified. If communist propaganda among the masses of Indonesia' and above all among the populations of the \ ' [9] I\II OTTO STRASSER

Malayan peninsula and the D utc h Eas t Indie s pr oves successful, the Russians will certainly ma ke the Angl o-S a xon positi on intolerable in these regions. May not Ja pan, too, in the end , yield to Russian communist tendencies rather than to th e dem ocr ati c trends of the Anglo-Saxon world ? From all these considerations and reflec tions we may draw the conclusion that the Sov iet Union has so many trump ca rds to play in the Far East that she will always be ab le to enforce her will on the Anglo-Saxon powers, who may have to make concess ions in Europe in exchange for a more lenient policy in Asia. In add itio n, there exist so many pro -Russian undercurrents in the territories wh ich com e under Anglo-Saxon influence that these powers wou ld find it extremely difficult to sile nce R ussian objections by force of ar ms. From all this there emerges quite clearly the fact that Europe will be treated as an objective for haggling betwee n the Anglo-Saxon powers and the Soviet Union, and that R ussi a's positi on is and will remain for many years to come, so strong that she will play a more promi nent part in Eu rope than her actua l pote ntial on the continent and the Atlantic warrant. Consequently, all of eastern Europe as far as a line from Lubeck to Trieste will stay, direc tly or indirectly, under Russian influence if not mandate, an d this mean s, to all intents and purposes, 60 per cent. of European territo ry and 40 per cent. of her population . It is only natural that the Anglo -Sa xo n powers will in these cir­ cumstances try to secure for themselves an ap propriate portion of interests in Europe, but the extent must de pe nd on the degree of collaboration between the two governments and on th eir respective attitudes towards Russia. The border-line between th e Russian and Anglo-Saxon spheres of interest will not on ly depend on the efficiency of Anglo-Saxon collaboration, but also whether the re will be an Anglo­ Saxon zone or whether Great Britain and the U nite d S tates will act separately, and whether there will be an additional Fr ench sub-sphere of interest. The situation is a co mplicated one an d is not in th e least clarified by the French political attitude. It is truly ext rao rd inary to see how France overestimates her strength and still considers he rself to be one of the Great Powers. She is continually interfering betw een the Anglo­ Saxon powers and Russia in the expectation of gaining distinct national advantages. It is tragically comic to imagine that a count ry like France, which is militari ly and economically ba nkr upt and politically undermined, should in these days try to assume the ma ntle of a Great Power by wrenching away portions of the Belgia n and Germ an body in order to bolster up her own debility. Neither Russ ians nor Americans take these presumptuous endeavours on the part of F rance seriously, GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD though the Great Powers are willing to concede little gifts to win the favour of Paris. A sober analysis of Europe's political position during this post­ war epoch, leads to the conclusion that she has lost her position as a significant item in the political world and that she will remam divided into two or perhaps three separate spheres of influence until a new international struggle upsets this uneasy equilibrium. Eastern Europe, partly annexed by Russia, and the Balkans will form the zone of Soviet influence. Western Europe will come under Anglo-Saxon influence. Germany and also Austria will figure as a kind of condominion, under the a-gls of the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia, each of which will continually endeavour to g-ain the upper hand both economically and politically. A NEW DIVISION OF THE GLOBE

The most revolutionary result of this last war which centred not only in Europe but also in eastern Asia, is that only three great powers have survived it: the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and the British Common­ wealth. A careful estimate of their respective strength shows a ratio of approximately 2: 2: 1. The features which characterise the second world war and its sequel are: Europe is no longer a continent of world significance in the political field; the Mediterranean and the Atlantic have forfeited their importance; the three surviving Great Powers have their eyes fixed on the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The intrinsic factors which goo to make up a great power are vastness of space, great industrial production, density of population, and biological freshness. All former conceptions of power and space have been annulled by the gigantic development of industry and aviation. An empire whose dimensions are not wide enough to prevent complete destruction by air-raids, is no great power at all. Neither is an empire to be considered as a great power if it cannot produce at least 3,000 airplanes and 5,000 tanks a month. But this only applies to present conditions. for we do not know yet how atomic energy will he used and whether other surprises in technical evolution are still in store for us. It might, therefore, be added that an empire which is unable to keep up with new inventions and developments is not a world power in the true sense of the term. The three extant world Powers will partition not only Europe hut the whole planet into three spheres of interests. This tri-partite division

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[11] OTTO STRASSER .

economic war and more especially a propaganda crusade to wi n over the lesser independent states to the respective spheres of power. Thu s, for the present, any hope of constituting a Utopia on this ear th, a Utopia for which all war-weary spirits yearn, is nut of the quest ion . A letter written by Benjamin Franklin seven years before the Revolu­ tion in France and fourteen years before Napoleon set out to co nque r the world, may serve as a warning to those who imagine that the Grea t Powers will abjure imperialism. This missive was written to Robert Livingstone from Paris in the year 1782. .. T he ideas of aggrandize­ ment by conquest are out of fashion. The wise here thi nk France great enough, and its ambition at present seems to be only that of justice and magnanimity towards other nations, fidelity and utility to its Allies." The old adage that the possession of power engenders a desire for even greater power is all too true, and is a foible of human nature. This does not imply that the three world Powers will reject the United Nations Organisation behind which they can conceal their .. imperialistic barrenness" so as to lull the smaller states into an illusion of independence. In reality this is merely an instrument in the hands of the three world Powers, though France and China have been courteously allowed to make use of it. The C.N.O. serves the interests of the present three world Powers more exclusively than the League of Nations served those of previously existing powers. This is proved by the fact that the organisation does not even theoretically acknowledge the integrity of the lesser states, and it grants the" Big Five" the unconditional right of veto. Nevertheless, this organisa tio n ;~~::~:: =;~~~u~h-:::~~~e~e~t:~~S~Oj~~;~:~~:st~a~uue:t~n~ :t7~n:~~ ~~ But the configuration of the re-distributed Earth will take ap pr oxi­ mately the following contours: The United States of America cla im absolute dominion, both economically and politically, over the whole of the Americas and consider themselves entitled to recognition as th e main Power in the Pacific, while sharing the Atlantic with Great Brit ain . The United Kingdom and the Commonwealth concentrate on the Indi an Ocean, while playing a subordinate role in the Pacific, and participa ting in the Atlantic sphere of interest with the U.S.A. Western Europe a nd the Mediterranean are to become more influenced by the policies of Great Britain now than they were before. The U.S.S.R. exercises undisputed sway over all the lands between Elbe (perhaps the Rhine!) and Amur , with advance-posts in western Europe, the Near and Middle Eas t a nd in the direction of China and Hindustan, The three world Po wers will compete strenuously for France, Belgium, the Netherlands a nd all their colonies. Great Britain may aim at welding these States into a western camp which will act in collaboration with herself in the econ omic

[121 GER:MANY IN A DISCNIT£iJ WORI.D and political field. In 1940, Churchill enunciated the idea of incor­ por .'1ting France into the British Commonwealth, and General Smuts reiterated a kindred notion in 1943, and after the war. The Chinese problem, the Indian question, and the ever-recurring European con­ troversy will remain matters for aggressive discussion for some while yet between the three world Powers! Russia's political and economic ambitions are naturally turned towards China and India, while, in addition, there are Afghanistan, Iran, and the whole of the Arab community to be considered. Affairs are yet more complicated by other disputed points among the three world Powers. There is the economic struggle for South America, Africa and Indonesia; the control of airways, monopolies of raw material such as oil and rubber, and many other moot points resulting­ from the relations between the lesser states with one another and with the world Powers. COMING CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF POWER

If the victorious Powers hope that the political situation throughout the world is going to remain as it is at present, they will be grossly mistaken. Stability is against every law of nature, which only knows never ending change, a rise and decline. Even if during the next few decades, the three world Powers are or seem to be strong, they will never be strong enough to stay the shifting of the balance of power among themselves or among the lesser states owing to the compre~ hensible or incomprehensible inter-action of dynamic factors. The alterations in the balance of power which are bound to come sooner or later among the great Powers themselves and in their rela­ tions to other smaller powers must be taken into account, Already now, three years after the war, despite propaganda which still obscures the clear-sighted vision of actual conditions, certain facts lead to the acknowledgment that many a change is taking place in the internal and external affairs of each of the three great Powers and conclusions may be drawn from this. In the United States, it is not so much the usual whirligig con­ nected with the election of a new president every four years (1948, 1952) which causes some uncertainty in the political aspect of home affairs, but the increasing gravity of the economic and financial situa­ tion which might well drive America into imperialistic activities and tactics. 'In the course of two world wars, industrialisation in the U.S. has taken on fantastic proportions, so that the capacity of pro­ duction far exceeds the capacity to consume. Hence it may be assumed that either her production must be reduced to the level of

[131 consumption or the United States will have to raise her export trade to unprecedented heights. Public opinion under pressure from the best organised group composing the working classes, has to be kept in mind, for on these classes the United States government largely de­ pends. Therefore, any substantial decrease in production is unthink­ able. There is only one way out of existing economic difficulties: to raise the level of exports of American goods and to find markets in foreign countries. But the urgencies of war productions were not confined to the U.S.A. alone; almost every country in the world had to spur on the workers to greater and greater efforts; even the com­ plete elimination of the industrial life of both Germany and Japan has had little effect on the general industrial situation. Thus we have a frenzied competition for the world markets on the part of all three great Powers. The disadvantage to the expansion of U.S. markets lies in the fact that economic endeavour is hampered by the lack of state subsidies and that wages are excessively high, far higher than in England for instance, and many times higher than in the U.S.S.R. To compensate herself for these disadvantages, the United States is obliged to bring financial and political pressure to bear by the granting of loans, and money-lending naturally breeds contempt and hostility. Being fully aware that in the long run such a policy will provoke the whole world against her, the U.S.A. is supporting her imperialistic policy by the creation of an effective military arm. After two world wars whose aims were to abolish militarism once and for all, the U.S.A. have secured the sanction of government and congress to build a navy far stronger than all the navies in the world put together; moreover, she intends to have the best air-fleet fordecades to come. In addition, the United States lay claim to a large number of strategic bases all over the world which are declared to be indis­ pensable to the security of the country; the Pacific, the Far East, the Near East, Africa and Europe all come into the category of American demands, The crisis which the capitalist system is undergoing in America's democracy must inevitably lead to the use of imperialistic methods, whose repercussions will, of necessity, make themselves felt in the whole of the political structure of the United States. The financial situation which is growing even more acute in the States, must also lead to stronger imperialism. National debt amounts to over 300,000 million dollars and the payment of interest alone exceeds the whole pre-war budget. Then there are the immense costs of military demobilisation and remobilisation, the conversion of industry, the foreign loans granted for political reasons- all these items will aggramte in large measure the already thorny financial tangle. It is possible that in­ fluential capitalist circles in America will attempt to devaluate the dollar

[141 GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

to escape from the dilemma, and this will mean the annihilation of the . middle classes on whom the stability and prosperity of the United States relies to a great extent. The process of doing away with the middle classes had already begun during the war, and it will be accelerated by the introduction of various state measures as, for instance, the taxes regarding public welfare; moreover, there is an urgent need to centralise production to cheapen articles for consumption. As a sequel to this process, true democracy will suffer a decline, for the middle classes and a healthy democracy are inseparable. Another and more serious issue which will exercise an important influence On the development of home policy in the United States, is the menace of depopulation and racial conflict. After the great pioneering epoch and the progressive growth of industrialisation and mechanisation, the general standard of life rose to a high level which allured the individual as much as it corrupted the community. The rise in the standard of life was followed by a steady decrease in the birth-rate ; and despite the boast about her magnificent youth, the U.S.A. is on the verge of relying on immigration rather than on pro­ creation if an increase of population is to be secured. Since, for political and economic reasons, immigration to the United States has been rigorously restricted, American manpower cannot be expected to increase in coming decades. The racial problem in America is another headache. For while the white population is about stationary, the negro population is increasing pro ratio. Though the U.S.A. emphasises that she is a" white and Christian nation," the fact re­ mains that her population is neither pure white nor pure Christian. The statistical data furnished by the World Almanac (1942) prove that only fifty-six million out of a population of one hundred and thirty-three million belong to any denomination at all not excepting the Jews. In other words, the majority of the inhabitants arc not Christians. The assurance that the population is mainly white has a better showing than the question of Christianity, for 90 per cent. of the population do belong to the white races, whereas there are only 10 per cent. coloured people and these are almost exclusively neg-roes. But the percentage of negro births is far in excess of those of the whites; in addition the negroes of the South have emigratedjn masses to the North and East because of the development of industry in these areas, and the consequences are not predictable. History has not even now pronounced her verdict in the quarrel between Jefferson Davies and Lincoln. and the negro question will rise in importance from year to ~:a:~e l~~ ~:e t:n:~~~~u::en ~:::a;m;~~i;se C~~~d:n~~~: t~;i~o:~~t;f assimilation, i.e., the total absorption of the coloured peoples into the politic-al system. has not been vindicated.

[151 ,'ext let us examine conditions in Great Britain. Here the symptoms of internal change are even more blatant than in the U.S.A. The sensational defeat of the Churchill government in the general election of May, 1945, and the victory of the Labour Party, are clea r pointers to the fact that public opinion in the U.K. had undergone a most significant transformation. First of all there are the structural changes in Britain's economic life and, whatever may be the fate of the Labour administration, the days of unlimited capitalism in the British Isles are numbered. The crisis which led to the overthrow of the Churchill government and which showed that there was a funda­ mental change in public opinion, cannot be solved by a mere remodelling of the Civil Service 01 even by slight modifications in the existing system. • Financially Great Britain is incomparably worse off than the United States of America. Had it not been for the political and financial aid given by America, the Sterling would have been devaluated by at least 50 per cent. With her loss of foreign credit after the recent war, her enormous burden of debt, the pauperisation of her people at home, the United Kingdom now faces a financial crisis which verges on catas­ trophe. The American loan mitigated this long term emergency, it is true, but owing to the conditions which accompanied that loan, the financial position is bound to become more unfavourable. The economic situation has deteriorated so fundamentally that there seems littlelikeli­ hoodofimprovement. Thisappliesahovealltothemerchantnavyand to trade in general. In addition tu considerable losses due to sub­ marine warfare, Great Britain has a formidable competitor in the U.S.A. For the first time in her history she takes second place as to her navy and her merchantmen. Whereas before the war the British fleet of merchantmen was in a ratio of 3: I as compared with that of the U.S.A., the ratio has now become inverted to 1:2. We have reasonable cause to presume that the Americans will make full use of this superiority. This means that Great Britain will lose the carrying of American export which before the war amounted to 90 per cent. and also will have to accept American comoetition in the world markets on a more deadly scale than ever. The industrial position is even more unfavourable. During the 1939-45 war, Canada, India, Australia and South Africa developed their industries to so vast an ext~nt that .

[161 GERMANY IN A DISL'KITED WORLD and economic interests irrespective of what Great Britain will do. The internal difficulties in the dominions, and especially in Canada and South Africa, let alone India, contribute in no small measure to the decline of the British Empire and its prestige. Undoubtedly, America will derive excellent profits from these changed conditions and will certainly not lend a hand in the re-establishing of a strong British Empire. There is an added burden in maintaining considerable forces on land, at sea and -in the air, causing peace-time conscription, which cannot be prolonged too long. Nothing can demonstrate more clearly the fiasco of statesmanship in this second world war than the fact that the United States of America as well as the United Kingdom and her Empire are forced to maintain large armies- and to produce considerable amounts of armaments now that the war is over. The situation reminds us of the worst times of European competition in armaments. Apart from the incalculable energies of the atomic bomb, the creation of enormous navies, immense air-fleets and standing armies are the main characteristics of this .. vic­ torious peace" for which the utmost economic and financial sacrifices had and have to be made. The threat of depopulation applies to the British Isles in no less measure than it does to the U.S.A. The population of Great Britain has been stationary for many years, but decreases are likely. Thesame is true of the white populations of Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, though in the last-named country the French population is still on the increase. The growing self-assertion of the coloured races within the British Empire is not to be gauged by its moral effect alone, but by the material fact that political influence among these races is apt to weaken the general position of the whites in the regions concerned. much to the detriment of both Great Britain and the U.S.A. Finally, what about Russia? Much of the ambiguity and uncer­ tainty which surrounds the Soviet Union's internal affairs is due to Stalin's personality. Stalin controls all the military, political and ad­ ministrative factors, thus being omnipotent in Soviet affairs until his death or until he is deposed from the dictatorship. Any weakening of Russia's internal or foreign position is remote as long as he is alive, but afterwards we may expect almost anything, because so far no one has been recognised as his successor, as possessing his energy and shrewdness, and the inevitable aftermath of a personal dictatorship is usually one of weakness. The first grand impetus of the Bolshevik Party and its general ideology have considerably slackened owing to Stalin's personal dictatorship and to his change of views on inter­ national communism, which, through his influence, has become a Russian nationalistic idea. This shift towards Russian nationalism may in the

Ilil long run result in strengthening Soviet power, though for the immediate future it will prove derogatory to her foreign influence. Whether these blighting effects can be remedied before severely injuring the Soviet position, entirely depend on Stalin's statesmanship and, of course, on the number of his days. Two important factors which affect the lives of the present genera­ tiun in Russia are; (1) Exhaustion of the people through the strain of the revolution and counter-revolution, reconstruction, rearmament, and the murderous war itself (But let us remember that" the people" in a dictatorship have not much of a say!). (2) The growing desire uf the Russian people to raise the standard of living, a desire which arises automatically by the contacts of the Red Army with western civilisation and culture. If the peoples of Russia attain their goal in this respect. there will be added comforts, less armament industry and a tendency to effeminacy. Considering the sound constitution of the Russian people as a whole and the well-nigh inexhaustible reservoir of strength in Siberia alone. these future problems do not shake the U.S.S.R. to her founda­ tions, whereas her nationality problem does. It would be contrary to every historical precedent were the numerous nations which at present comprise the Soviet Union not in due time to assert them­ selves and snap the bounds which now bind them to Moscow. Fifty million Europeans, Finlanders, Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Rumanians, have, as a sequel to the war, been annexed to the Soviet Union, mostly against their will. The Ukranians, White Russians and Caucasians realise their importance now the fighting is at an end; regional feeling will inevitably assert itself as soon as the standard of their culture is ripe for such developments. Backward peoples can be held together by huge centralised States and can be governed by a compact minority. but it is extremely difficult to do so with self-confident peoples who have become conscious of their national values and their individuality. It may further be assumed that Siberia. the basis of future Russian world power, will oppose g-overnment from far-away Moscow. But it is necessary to stress the fact that these internal dangers to the Soviet Union's mig-ht are potential rather than actual so long as Stalin remains dictator. Russia's present intransigent attitude towards Washington and towards the British Empire is very much in evidence and will cer­ tainly place her in jeopardy. Public opinion in the Anglo-American world is not likely to be bamboozled for long at Moscow's vacillations and the pretence that" internal problems ,. trouble China. Persia. the Balkans. Eastern Europe and so forth, if there should go on appearing in these countries communist groups supplied with ample funds. having considerable military forces at their command. and fl81 GER.MAj'Y \.' A DISlJNlTED \V~RLD

doing everything in their power to undermine the respective govern­ ments. Besides, the peoples in East and Central Europe who have suffered so terribly during Russian occupation, will undoubtedly rise against any form of tyranny should they receive political, financial and military support from abroad. It may be presumed that Moscow has made a quintessential political error in annexing the eastern provinces of Germany, and cruelly crush­ .ing the German inhabitants of these areas. These acts have made any co-operation between Germany and Russia improbable in the future, unless Moscow makes a complete turn-about. From the viewpoint of world politics, Moscow's post-war policy has brought her few friends and few allies, if the communists and their fellow travellers be excepted, and should martial proceedings ensue, the Soviet Union mig-ht have to face a hostile coalition of the whole world.

WORLD POWERS OF TO-MORROW

The three world Powers of to-day enjoy that place in the sun which was once occupied by the world powers of yesterday, but there are other powers starting already out to be the rivals of to-morrow. Any attempts on the part of the present world Powers to assure their status in perpetuity are as futile as were the endeavours of Portugal and Spain in the sixteenth century to assert their prepon­ derance over France and England. Without making any claim to being a prophet, one can easily foretell that China. India, and South America are on the road to becoming- the world powers of the future. Each of these countries has the indispensable prerequisites for growing into world powers: they possess space and sufficient men and raw materials; the only thing they now lack is adequate industrial production. China has already asserted herself. As the Cairo Conference of 1943 clearly showed, the astute policy of Generalissimo Chiang Kai­ Shek succeeded in creating a stepping-stone to the materialisation of this claim. China was the most valuable ally of t U.S.A. against Japanese aggression and is a potential ally of the Anglo-Americans against Russia. She can rely on actual support from the Ang-lo-Saxon powers, whose self-interests lead them to side steadily with Chiang­ Kai-Shek, Viewed from the historical angle, China's struggle with j apan was nothing other than a strenuous effort to achieve supremacy in the Far East. The comparison with Prussia's race against ~e~s~::ri~~ It~6~r:v::tVi~~;.im:~ri~~st~ces:re~~d~e::;,~~~t~h;:~nnaq~:r~~:

[191 vI Japan and she certainly will cultivate the friendship of Korea, Siam and Indo-China. During the protracted struggle with Japan, China was constrained to modernise her economy and her internal organisation. Once the strain of civil war has fallen from her burdened shoulders, she may rapidly develop her economic and political strength. In spite of the poverty of her people, and in spite of the obstacles which Russia may throw up, there is every reason to suppose that China will attain the .position of a great power within the next fifty years. Russia, well aware of the probability of Chinese aspirations, which, if they materialise, will weaken the Soviet position in East Asia, will in future try even harder to frustrate these objectives. Russia has already forced independence on Outer Mongolia, is doing all she can to foster every separatist movement in Manchuria and Siankiang; neither is she parsimonious in the matter of money and the supply of weapons to strengthen and enlarge communist influences in China in the hope of bringing the whole country under Moscow's tutelage. Should this policy prove to be impracticable, owing to Chiang Kai-Sheks methods and the support he has from the Anglo-American powers, Russia will aim at least at dividing China into three parts or more. The struggles against Chinese unity, be they labelled" independence movements" or - .. communist opposition," boil down to the fact that machinations on the part of Moscow are afoot in order to frustrate China in her en­ deavour to achieve the position of a world power. The day is far distant when India will become a world power. For the time being and for many years to come, India is a problem of the gravest importance to the British Empire, since at any time that country might yet cause serious conflicts between Great Britain and Russia. Though for the moment India seems to be out of the competitive race for world power, some day she will emancipate herself because the national and economic position is growing ever stronger and will de­ velop more rapidly as time goes on. The industrialisation of India began during the first world war and has continued to develop on a gigantic scale in the course of the late war. It is natural that her economic significance should have been enhanced and it is equally natural that the sire to be independent economically, politically find nationally should have gone hand in hand with this achievement. Historical experience leads us to assume that when the struggle for independence has been completed, and this depends largely on the policies adopted by London and Moscow, India-Pakistan, with her vast territories and enormous population and productiveness, may well reach the status ofa world power. South America's metamorphosis into a world power is already under And of this we may be certain' her growth will be almost un-

[20] GER~IANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD fettered and harmonious, and, presumably, march forward at a quicker pace than can be the case with China and India. She win not be hampered by the imperial rivalries of the present world Powers, though the dense shadow cast across the Western Hemisphere by the paramount United States win deny her the enjoyment of a place in the sun for some time to come. The process of industrialising South America is well under way owing to the pressure exercised by the United States' economic policy which, in its turn, had to be adapted to the blockade measures introduced during the first and second world wars. Still, South America's industrial efficiency has not reached the height requisite to becoming a world power. In an indirect way, the U.S.A. is helping South America to strengthen her productive efficiency, and this on account of those among her capitalists who desire to acquire remunerative and lowly-taxed investments in Central and South America. And it is worthy of note to mention that foreign capitalistic penetration of a country does not to any considerable degree affect the awakening national spirit, as is shown in the case of Mexico, who simply expropriated the American Petroleum Companies. Once Latin America has brought productive efficiency to the level of her vast territories and populations, there remain only a national rallying cry and sound leader­ ship to convert her into a great power. For many decades, the problem of leadership and the competition for this post have regulated South American relations. Argentina and Brazil both intend to play the leading role in South America, and this accounts for the divergence of their policies and mutual antagonism. Moreover, their respective foreign policies differ as has been clearly demonstrated by the fact that in each of the two world wars, Argentina has been neutral, while Brazil has sided with the U.S.A. At the moment, Brazil basks in the rays of \Vashington's favour, whereas Argentina is indirectly influenced by European powers. It is impossible to predict whether Rio de Janeiro win assume the mantle of leadership in South America, or whether Buenos Aires is destined for this part. Were historical and linguistic considerations to act as the decisive factor; the odds would be on the side of Argentina, for she was at the head of Spanish America for centuries, and her language, which is Spanish, is spoken by everyone save in Brazil, where the people talk Portuguese. Be this as it may, South Arnericar's significance and power will increase during the next few decades. At first she will be the main source of supply for raw materials and an outlet for foreign markets, but in years ahead she will become a unified economic and political great power.

[211 STRANGLED FATHERLAND

Though for the moment the outlook for both Europe and Germany appearsverypoorindeed,whenwlaws of nature, but even the most serious diseases can be cured if there is sufficient vital spark and a strong will to live. Among the old, this vital spark is lacking and the phenomena of life undergo a change. So it is with nations. Europe is hoary with age. The vigour which i., left no longer suffices to rehabilitate her as the dominant factor in the world. As early as 1914 she had to share with the United States in world dominion and to-day the U.S.S.R. and the budding world powers are also making world-wide claims. This, however, does not mean that Europe is effete. But since Europe is an ancient conglomeration, she has to husband her strength and refrain from embarking on ambitious projects far beyond the capacities of her old age. To further this aim, the nations which compose Europe will have to pool their combined strength and act in concert to advance their mutual interests It is time fora bold conception of Europe. In such an organically unified Europe, Germany cannot help but be one of the strongest members, but like the other components of the European family of nations, she will not be in a position to assume the mantle of a great power because of lack of space and lack of raw materials. True, her productive efficiency and her population are equal to those of a great power, but these assets alone do not make for that status. By the Potsdam " diktat .. Germany was to concede about 25 per cent. of her territory (equal to about 30 percent. of the total of her till­ able land); the German inhabitants of this ceded territory to he evicted and compressed into a kind of "rump" Germany, which means that from 10 to 15 millio Germans are" expellees" from their homesteads and exposed to starvation; and a methodical ruination of Germany's hig industry, causing slow death for another 10 million Germans hy starvation. Germany is to be so ~reat1y reduced that, as the American Senator, Claude Pepper, declared, the number of her population is not to exceed that of France. Thus a population of 70 million is artificially reduced, while the talk about democracy, re-education, etc., goes OIL What would the reaction to the Potsdam stipulations have been if they did not apply to Germany, but to, let us say, England? They

[221 GER:>IANY IN A DISC.'ITED W ORI Il would deprive highly industrialised Britain of her entire merchant navy; her industrial plants and equipment would be transferred abr oad; no new industry could be established; foreign credits would be confi scated; trad e with other countries would be prohibited, as also commerce, fina ncial t ransactions and insurance arrangements. Twenty million Eng lish people would starve to death. Everybody would con sid er such a stat e of affairs truly iniquitous. In actual fact, Germany is even wor se off than this owing to the terrible devastation caused by air-raids, which have almost completely destroyed many industrial plants, fa rms and dwellings inside the Reich. Further, millions of Germans hav e been expelled from eastern Germany, from the Sudetenland, Silesia, etc . These people are not only herded together into an over-populated zone, but have no work or hope and are consequently rotting away. But neith er the vengeful decla ra tions of Potsdam nor the hopefu l Atlanti c Charter will stand much chance of realisation, for they arc built on qui cksand. They have been constructed on the basis of incompatible contradictions. \Vhat advantage will it be to Europe if Germany is destroyed when it is only by a Ger ma n recovery that Europe can expect to survive ? I ' either can the British Commonwealth and Great Britain Or the U.S.A. and the whole world economy be stabilised unle ss Europe is relieved of her burdens. Already the shortage of German coal has paralysed the entire economic syst em and inflicted quite unnecessary suffering on the popul ations of Europe. Those who imagine that th e mines of Upp er. Silesia will work as efficiently under Polish administration as they did ~:~:rt ~e~:~ns :: ~ ~ : ~;: ~ n; ~o ~:~~ i ~~e uj~::rst;i:~~;: :~~e~:~;~li~~\ '~I~ i~~; forme rly did under German, that the transplantation of German indus­ tries int o othe r European countries will prove practicable and profitable, are making a tremendous mistake. Such" experts" ignore the gener al cha racte ristics of the Germans, their spirit of enterprise, their ent hus ias m, their traditions, all of which can neither be commandeered nor simply imbibed. There has been nothing in times past to hinder Polan d or France, It aly Or Spain in developing the quantity or the qua lity of their indust ries ; that these countr ies have not done so to the ext en t that Germany did, is partly due to peculiarities of national charac te r which cannot be expected to change merely by possessing stolen machinery. It is mainly the Germans, the Dutch and the Swiss who have been inst rumental in developing the industrial age on the continent. It is neithe r subversive propagan da nor wishful thinking which leads one to proph esy th e utt er fiasco of the Potsdam ag-reement. The Potsdam mandate can only exist permanently if the victorious Powers achieve complete unanimity. and since such concord cannot be

[23 1 OTTO STRASSER achieved, the whole idea will topple like a house of cards. T he dis­ crepancy between the interests of the present world Powers is too vast to be bridged securely and durably. In the course of deca des, centuries, and even millenia, history has demonstrated that such re­ conciliations of interests are impossible GERMANY'S INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTION Economically, politically and culturally, Germany was for decades condemned to. wade through the swamp of capitalism, imperialism and fascism, and suffered more acutely under these ordeals than almos t any other country because she had taken a leading place in all thes e processes. The root of Germany's decline must not just be traced to the advent of a Hitler and Nazism, nor to Prussian militarism and the Prussian ideology of Might is Right. We shall have to go back to the Middle Ages to find the source from which reconstruction of Germany as a peaceful member of the European community will spring. The" Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" was on the whole a constructive idea, and might serve as spiritual gui de for the formulation of Germany's modern policy . Never again must Germany submit to the Prussian imperialist policy of Blood and Iron. A federally consolidated Germany will be the seed fro m which the Federal States of Europe will grow. To achieve this, a new economic system is urgently required. The spi rit of solidarity is the basis of such a new economic system: co-operation of all classes and trades within the framework of a free society. This kind of economic structure resembles the old fief and gui ld sys tem rather than the modern conception of economic egotism which we call unlimited capitalism, or group egotis-n which is represented by the selfishness of one particular class or race as in contemporary police states. With the inauguration of a new economic order, the political reconstruction of Germany on the lines of a federation of rea lly demo­ cratic states with regional self-administration, must be unde rtaken. A federalised Germany will be capable of setting in motion the latent energies of the people for their own well-being and that of Eur ope as a whole. A federalised Germany cannot misdirect political energy as the centralised state is capable and inclined to do. Moreover, the fear engendered among other European states by a centralised Gennany will vanish into thin air. A path toward- a European confederation will be paved. The self-administration of the trade guilds which a mode rn, demo­ cratic, federated Germany assures, holds out excellent prospects for the renewal of the German nation which will be in a position to exercise control pennanently and efficiently over affairs of State. If suc h prin -

[24] GERMANY TN A DISUNITED WORLD ciples of good citizenship are to be adequately appli ed to the c co no ~ i c and political life, a change of heart among German peopl e and a re vival of the ir cultur al institutions is essential. No effort mus t be spared to foster the religious spirit, for this is intimately bound up with a revival of old German culture and craftsmanship. \Vestern civilisation will only be saved in this way ; there will be economic and politi cal security, a fres h outlook on life, and universal prosperity. It is a task of life or death for the German people themselves to try and save their country and Occid ental civilisation, irrespective of vicious and vindictive pea ce tr eaties whi ch have little in common with democratic idealism or European recovery. FREN CH-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Su rely, an indispensable prerequisite of any fruitful co-operation betwee n the European states and their formation into a European Federa tion is that France and Germany must work together! As matt er s sta nd, France must take the first step. Occupied Germany is unfit to take the initiative. If, as throughout the last centuries, France holds rath er aloof from European affairs and continues her chauvinistic policy in respect of Germany, and if, as heretofore, she thinks herself justified in calling for assistance from abroad in order to maintain her prcsumptuousattitude, then European co-operation is out of the question and Europe will become a continent subject to bargaining and double­ dealing in the struggle of the world Powers. Unfortunately, France is st ill under th e delusion that she is a strong country, and blinds herself and da zzles the world in general, endeavouring to capture the leading role in worl d affairs , a role which sh e i~; neith er called upon to assume nor able to play. In this second world war, France has played a very minor pa rt from whi chever angle one views th e situation, and there is no pr ospect of her ever soaring to the heights she once occupied. This is no more and no less than sober fact. The birth-rate is already so low, that it is estimated that by 1985 the population of France will be no more tban 28 million i she is so greatly debilitated that it would be a veritable miracle were she to re-establish her former position, let alon e enlarge her sphere of economic, political, and military interests; she does not even appear to be in a position to maintain her possessions in East Asia, Asia Minor and in Africa without aid from outside Powers. Yet in spite of so disastrous a condition, France still keeps to her old­ tim e policy of a nnihilating Germany, just as in the days of Richelieu, Louis XIV , Napol eon I, Napoleon III, Clemenceau and Poin care. Th ose who have the salvation of western civilisation at heart feel dismay ed wh en the y contempla te the French policy of ripping away the Sa a r district. the Rhineland, parts of Baden. Wtirttenberg, and

[25] OTTO STRASSER

possibly the Ruhr, from the body of Germany. Already befo re this war, French territorial assets greatly exceeded those of Ger ma ny, though tlfere were only 72 inhabitants to the sq uare kilometre as agai nst 148 Germans to the square kilometre; now Ger man territory is only half that of France and something like 230 Germans are herded together in the square kilometre; in addition, French colonial possessions amount to approximately 12 million square kilometres. There will be many psychological impediments to overco me before true collaboration between France and Germany can start. Throughout the centuries, France and Germany have wag-ed war aga inst one another; there is the ticklish problem of historical guilt, if any ; but these past wars do not form the background of antagonism so much as d sentiment of jealousy on the part of France. The French are fully aware of the discrepancy between the population of France and that of Germany; they also recognise that German productivity far exceeds their own and they en tertain a repugnance to recognise th ese obvious facts. The large and wealthy colonial empire whic h Fr ance still possesses could well serve as a French asset in collaboration with Germany and other E uro pea n nations ; mistrust on the part of France. however, contributes to her disinclination to co-operate because she fears that Germany migh t exploit her goodwill in the long run. Whatever the precise reasons for France's unw illing nes s to col. laborate with Germany, it is up to Germany to try to convince France that German intentions are sincere. The same applies to Germa ny's preparedness to co-o pera te with all other European nations. THE EUROPEAN FEDERATION AND AFRICA

If a pan-European federation is to be born at all, Fr ance and Germany ought to work solid ly together. The British Co mmonwealth rather than the United States of America would serve as model for the crea tio n .of this federation. The history, culture and economy of the various European nations differ much more than the forty-eight federal states of America; therefore, the elements which make up the British Commonwealth, in which the continent of Australia and the small island of Bermuda enjoy equal rights in every respec t, bear a nearer resemblance to European conditions. Th e object of the European Federation is to bring the nations into closer contact wit h one another to the advantag-e of all who pa rticipate. Each of the European nations would preserve its specific national, cultural and economic traditions and should have a chance of develop­ ing these in full measure for the benefit of Europe as a whole. for

[261 GERMANY L ' A DISUNITED WORLD furope's strength depends precisely on the multiplicity of the vari ous nation s. Th e nations of the European continent must be bound to one anoth er by common vital interests and common vital aims , but they should not be welded together into uniform compactness; neither should one pr eponderate over another, but each should unf old its str ength in th e best interests of Europe. It is no simple matter to construct such a complicated and subtle mechan ism as the Federal States of Europe and, when once brought into being , to keep it going in a satisfactory manner. It would be contrary to the spirit, sense and purpose of the federation tocreatea centra lised g overnment of the whole of Europe; there can be only the regu lar mee ting of the various governments on an equal basis. It could be constit uted from the governmental representatives of all European countr ies and, perhaps later, it might be amplified by direct representa­ tion from the peoples themselves; it would have to elect a chairman from among its members annually, or it might entrust the presidency to Switzerland once and for all. Th e beneficial effect of a federation of European nations would probably first make itself felt in the economic life of the people. Should this prove true , it would form a firm basis whereon to build a confident co-ope rati on in the political and cult ural spheres likewise. Regional g roups within the framework of the European Federarion-s-a Balkan Union, a Latin Union, Benelux, a Scandinavian Union, and so forth­ migh t with advantage be taken into consideration since it may well be that th ese var ious unions will be helpful in the construction ofso complex an organisa tion. Furthermore, it wi1l put to flight all existing prejudices ag ainst Germany. Europe will have to cope with a number of problems of the utmost importance now and in the immediate future: food, finance, production, air lines, transport, the supply of raw materials and many others. All these are convincing arguments in favour of the creation of the European Federation. T he most important impulse of such a European Federation will be the consumer use of Africa. Two world wars have brough t home to 350 million Europeans, exclusive of the Russians and the Briti sh , the bitter fact that they depend on vital goods from over­ seas . If in the future, these 350 million Europeans want to secure their lives they will have to secure, jointl y or separately, a common sou rce of supply. This sou rce can be found only in Africa. She is the least developed of any continent, and possesses in ab unda nce the very goods Eu rope needs , she is geographically as well as g eo-politically within reach of Europe, and the exploitation of her resources would not collide with the interests of present

[27 1 a nd future wo rld powe rs . Nat ura lly, British possessions in Africa do not fall within the orbit of a n All-E uropean manageme nt unless Great Britain herself chooses to be incl uded. Tact and prudence also demand that French possessions in Africa should remai n untouched until such time as the French themselves have overcome thei r suspicions in regard to joining the European Federation whole -heartedly . Once France is convinced that her colon ial realm is res pected as her inalien­ able national possession, which is in no way and for no purpose included in any action the Fe dera l States of Europe may deem ex pedient to undertake, then much of France's dislike of the idea to help org a nise the European Federation will vanish. Under present condi tio ns, about one -third of Africa, mainly con­ sisting of Belgian, Portuguese and Spanish colonies, and the former German and Ita lian possessions will be the te rra in which the Federation of European states would develop and from whence Europe would be su pplied with the requisites for her economic life. The common utilisation a nd administration of the sup ply regions in Africa by the Euro pean Federation should be regulated by a public body such as the African Company of the European Federal States, whose duty it will be to shoulder responsibility in the execution of the tasks imposed by the decrees and decisions of the co-operating gove rn ments. The African possessions of such nations as the Europ ean Federal Stat es will run on behalf of the Federation as a whole, will keep their ow n flags flying; the mo ther tong ue of the nation concerne d will remain the lega l and administrative lan gu age ; all administrative officials on active service at the time of the take-over must be left at their posts, a nd all their rights should be recognised. An a nn ual rent amounting to the average rate of profit during the last ten years of peace must be paid to the owner State prev ious to the take-over by the F ederation, and will cover a period of 99 years. The expenditure and profit of the African regions under the European Federal States' admi nistration must be ap portioned fairly to the diverse nations-with the exception of France, so long as her colo nial possessions in Africa are no t included in the federated scheme. T he ratio of compensation woul d best func­ tion pro rata to population in the countries concerned and this will have to be adjusted from time to time according to changing circ umstances­ perhaps at ten -yearly intervals. Apart from the tremendous material gains from joint exploitation and utilisation of African sup plies for the benefit of the European family of nations, the moral effect of s uch unified effort will promote a feeling of good fellowship and peace among the various members of the Federation. nnder existing conditions, Europe must keep he rself to herself and make the best possible use of the African treasure. Sh e will, therefore, have to dissociate herself from all other politica l interests.

[28] GER~lAKY I,' A D1SCKITED WO RLD . an d es pec ially from those of America, Asia and Australia. Only if Eu rope concentrates all her attention and all her political end eavour on her ow n affairs (with Africa as a source of supply) an d refuses to be in,-oh'cd in the complex interests of other continents, only if Europe follows the path of European solidarity, will she su cc eed in keepin g aloof fro m outs ide world politi cal confli cts. It does not matter by wh at na me the policy of the F ederal States of Europe is called, the fact remains th at there will actually be a kind of European-African M onr oe Doc tr ine whi ch does not permit of interference from without an d keeps her fro m interfering with outside interests. British possession s in Africa, wh ich are integral parts of the British Commonwealth, will be totally outs ide the sphe res of interests connected with the F ederal States of Europe--unless they desire to join. For the same reason, European co u nt ries whose colonies are not in Africa, su ch as the As iat ic an d Ame rica n possessions of France, the Netherlands, Portugal, et c ., will be excluded from the European federal union. It is solely th e regions in Africa above defined, exclusive of islands, which will come wit hin the sphere of influence of the Federation of European States. T hese will cons t itu te a kind of Dominion of Africa and belong to the Federation. On ce the Federation is formed, it will have no interests in the Atlantic, Pacific an d Indian O ceans, and there will he no need to create a navy of siza ble strength, but merely one which will be capable of defen ding the European and African coasts and especially the shores of tb e Mediterranean. Similar arguments apply to the future air-fleet of the European Federation. Bearing in mind that th e Federation will be clo se ly link ed with th e Af rican con tinen t , there mu st l.e an oppor­ tun ity of b uild ing air traffi c.

GERMANY AND THE BRITISH COJlIMONWEALTH

Thoug h there exist very weighty reasons for the creation of a F ederal Europe, and though this must be Ge rmany's foremost aim, it is likely tha t the whole proj ect will come to nought. The re ca n be no douht about the fact that to form such a federation it is absolute ly essential that France and Germany should co-operate. T houg h the Germans would do all in their pow er t o be on g ood terms 7oi:ht:er~~~:~; ~o~:i:~~vh:~otl~~~e~: rtil~:en;'i~'1nnsc~'1r:i~b~~:~:~a;~, ~:~~ lab ora te in a ny such sch eme. We hav e to fa ce fa cts squ ar ely . France is leani ng towa rds th e forei gn poli cy of Cl em en ceau and Poincare and inte nds to rob Germany of essentially German territory such as t h»

[29) OTTO STRASSER

Saar, or to slice off such regions as the Rhineland and ioternationalise the Ruhr, thus crippling Germany and harming the German people. If this policy is adopted, then with the best intentions in the world, Germany can do practically nothing, for there will be no beneficial co-operation between the two countries and thus the idea of a federated Europe will be still-born. It is a regrettable historical fact that for many centuries, France's policy has permanently and invariably been guided by egoistic motives and never by a far-seeing European point of view. Constantly, France has caIled in the aid of extra-European powers such as Turkey, Russia, America and so forth against her European neighbours. Should the idea of creating a European Federation be frustrated by France adhering to her ancient anti-German policy, there can be no practical alternative left to Germany but to come to an enduring agreement with the British Commonwealth and, if possible, to develop a free union between herself, Great Britain and the Dominions. Close co-operation with Russia, once advocated by reactionary German politicians, and to-day by people with communist sympathies, is unlikely on account of the monstrous post-war policy adopted by Moscow against Germany. The Germans will never cede Koenigs­ berg, Breslau, Danzig, Stettin and all that these cities stand for In German history. A close and sound Anglo-German co-operation, or a Germany as partner of the British Commonwealth, would not only be consonant with the ties of relationship between those Teutonic tribes which remained in continental Europe and the Angles and Saxons who migrated to the British Isles, but would also mean a recapitulation of a long-time political and personal relationship between England and Germany, present circumstances underlining such historical precedent. The loss of 30 percent. of her tillable land has shaken Germany to her V1~ry foundations. The 70 million Germans who lived in pre-Hitler Germany had to strain every nerve to the utmost in order to bring export to" level that enabled them to buy the needed raw materials and food stuffs. Their standard of life was even then about 25 per cent. below that of the British people and approximately 60 percent. below that of the Americans. Now, being deprived of agricultural land and industrial productiveness, the population is threatened with starvation. And there are not only the 70 million Germans of pre-Hilter days to consider, but also those miIlions who have been expelled! The crushing defeat after a protracted war has made the Germans very aware of the fact that they must reduce the necessities of life to a minimum, but even that minimum cannot be attained unless they are able to work and live in the greater and sounder economic framework of a federated Europe or of the British Commonwealth, Should the latter be the solution to the problem, the [3°1 GERMANY IN A DISUNITED W ORLD strength of the British Empire would be considerably increased, for the two ar e not only consang uineous but also the history, culture a nd ability of Britain and Germany are similar. Moreov er, if the Britis h Commo nwealth is to maintain her position as a gr eat power on a leve l with the U .S .A. and the U.S.S.R., she will need all available st rength at her comma nd. A Germany closely linked economically and politicall y with Great Britain would contribute towards the safety and mig ht of the Commonwealt h, just as Canada, Australia or South Afri ca do at prese nt. Fr om a purely German point of view, such a proposal ma y be unpa lata ble and seem illogical. So far as their vital interests a re concerned, the Germans may prefer the solution of their problems by the for mation of a European confederation. Yet the idea of Ge rman y becomi ng a partner in the British Commonwealth, besides securing the existence of the people of Germany, could- as well as the Europea n Federation- ac hieve an even gr eater aim which mankind is longing for: it would bring about the pa cification of Europe and rescue European culture and a decent st andard of life at the eleventh hour.

In Exile, Autumn 1947 . DR. OTIO STRASSER. Dr OTTO STRASSER was one of the half-dozen top-ranking National-Socialists, following the ideas of it's founder, T. G. Masaryk, from whom first the Austrians and then the Germans had taken over idea and programme. Though he was never in sympathy with Hitler's policies, Dr. Strasser believed that the National-Socialist Party pro­ gramme was the only one at the time that could regenerate Germany. He was the Nazi Party's rebellious " brain" from 1926-1930, and as one of the key men during these formative years he knew Hitler, Goering. Gocbbels, Hess, Himrnler, Streicher. Rosenberg, Haushofer and the others intimately. He broke with the Nazis three years before they rose to power in the Reich, and with his newly-founded "Black Front," opposed them bitterly ever since. He fled Germany in 1933, living for a time in Austria, then Czechoslovakia. Switzerland. France. Portugal. Bermuda and Canada, all the time carrying on a desperate fight against the Hitler system. Goebbe1s himself denounced Dr. Strasser as Nazi public enemy No. I. and his name topped the refugee extradition list presented to the former Vichy Government when the Nazi armies conquered Paris. Despite a price of one million Reichsmarks offered by the Gestapo for his capture, Dr. Strasser escaped over the Spanish mountains to reach safety once morc-a truly fantastic story unequalled by fiction. Otto Strasser was born at Windsheim, in Franconia, Bavaria. He was a student at the Oberrealschule of Munich when the 1914 wai broke out, and he became the youngest volunteer in the Bavarian army, rising from the ranks to become an officer on tbe Western Front, twice wounded, and decorated for outstanding bravery. After 1918 he studied Law and Political Science at Munich, Berlin and \Yurzburg. His brother, Gregor, was killed by Goering's order in the blood purge of 1934. During and before the recent war the Strasser group carried on a relentless struggle against the Gestapo, distributing underground leaflets, broadcasting secretly, unmasking Nazi agents in the Western Hemisphere. After a bomb explosion in 1939. during one of Hitler's beer cellar speeches in Munich, the entire Nazi Press hurled vitriolic abuse at "this British murder tool," requesting the Swiss Government to hand over Dr. Strasser to the Gestapo. Hunted from country to country, never giving up the unequal fight, separated from his wife and children for over eight long years. Strasser helped to beat the Nazi Gestapo in the end. Now. at fifty, square, ruddy-faced, Hitler's Trotzky is one of ruined Germany's white hopes-for unlike Trotzky, he survived his opponent and he never joined in the revolutionary terror. As a war-time exile in far away Nova Scotia, he planned for a Fatherland that may yet arise out of the ashes of post-war chaos. He is not forgotten at home, and before 1948 has run its course a new party will spring into action in Germany. To many patriots in the Reich, and to many of his non­ German friends abroad, Dr. Strasser is the man who can pull Germany out of the ever-worsening dilemma, and whose energy, integrity and idealism could well help in the building of a peaceful Germany work­ ing for and in a peaceful Europe.

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