AND dates from a1965conference: mind. Oneofthebestexplanationsthisapproach organization, inpoliticaldebate,andthepublic been considered together—inlaw, inmilitary permanent harm’(WHO2001: 3). causing death,temporary incapacitationor their chemicalactiononlifeprocesses capableof ‘those thatare effectivebecause oftheirtoxicity, i.e. nucleic acidsandprions’,chemicalweaponsas other replicative entities,includingviruses,infectious infectivity ofdisease-causingmicroorganisms and achieve theirintendedtarget effectsthrough the (WHO) definedbiologicalweaponsas‘thosethat A recent report bytheWorld HealthOrganization be classedasbothchemicalandbiologicalweapons. that theythemselvesgenerate’ (WHO2001: 3),can [which] owetheirpathogenicitytotoxicsubstances or microbe. Indeed,manytoxins,‘biologicalagents whether causedbypoisonorpathogen,toxicagent clear one.‘‘Disease’wasusedtorefer toailments between poisonandinfectiousdiseasewasnota C G Chapter 5 battlefield sincetheFirst World War and,asweapons not new. Chemicalweaponshavebeenusedonthe Chemical andbiological(CB)weaponshaveoften The spectre ofchemicalandbiologicalwarfare is come intouse.(Rotblat1972:242) down, theentire spectrumoftheseweaponsmay kind ofbiologicalorchemicalwarfare are broken lethal ones.Iftherestraints onthepractice ofany temporarily incapacitatingandendingwithhighly continuous spectrum,startingfrom thosethatare warfare. The great varietyofpossibleagentsformsa weapons, orbetweenbiologicalandchemical lasting distinctionbetweenincapacitatingandlethal practice itdoesnotappearpossibletomaintainany related. Bothinpublicopinionandmilitary biological andchemicalweaponsare closelyinter- The dangers toworldsecurityposedbyallclassesof LOBAL the latenineteenthcentury, thedistinction poison anddiseaseforhostilepurposes.Until hemical andbiologicalwarfare istheuseof C HEMICAL C IVIL S CEYAND OCIETY W EAPONS movement. However, there are few, ifany, such grass-roots networkssuchastheanti-globalisation groups withlarge constituencieslikeGreenpeace or people’s minds,globalcivilsocietymeansactivist (Anheier, Glasius,andKaldor 2001: 11). Insome global civilsocietyis‘afuzzyandcontestedconcept’ is sustainedandnotundermined. current concernistoensure thattheexistingregime warfare currently lookbleak.Indeed,the primary consolidation oftheinternationalregime againstCB rejected bytheUSin2001. Theprospects forfurther verification protocol tostrengthen theBWC was was includedwhentheBWC wasnegotiated.A unprecedented intrusivenesswhereas nosuchsystem includes aninternationalverificationsystemof biological weapons,sincethemore recent CWC regime ismuchstronger forchemicalthan all memberstatestodestroy anystockpiles.The development, production, andstockpiling,require prohibition ontheuseofCBweapons,prohibit their Weapons Convention(CWC)—which reaffirm the Weapons Convention(BWC) and the1993Chemical two disarmamenttreaties—the 1972Biological The heartofthisstrengthened regime consistsof and weakinternationalregime againstCBwarfare. consolidating whathadpreviously beenafragmented international negotiationsresulting intreaties only inthelate1960s. cousin, returning totheinternationalpoliticalagenda initially overshadowed bytheirnew, more destructive ‘weapons ofmassdestruction’. However, theywere were classedtogetherwithnuclearweaponsas weapons. AftertheSecondWorld War, CBweapons sabotage butalsoastacticalandevenstrategic potential forusingbiologicalagentsnotonly war. Scientificadvancesinthe1940sopenedup large, founditrepugnant andcontrary tothelawsof to theattentionofageneral publicwhich,byand weapons intheFirst World War brought CBwarfare for manycenturies.Themassiveuseofchemical of terror andsabotage,CBweaponshavebeenaround As suggestedinthe2001 editionofthisYearbook, Subsequent decadeswitnessedanumberof B IOLOGICAL Daniel Feakes Daniel 87 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Daniel Feakes Box 5.1: Chemical and biological agents stockpiled or weaponised since 19461

Tear gases, other sensory irritants, and other – O-ethyl S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl disabling chemicals: methylphosphonothiolate (VX) – 10-chloro-5,10-dihydrophenarsazine (adamsite, – O-ethyl S-2-dimethylaminoethyl or DM) methylphosphonothiolate (medemo) – ?-chloroacetophenone (CN) – O-isobutyl S-2-diethylaminoethyl – ?-bromophenylacetonitrile (larmine, BBC or CA) methylphosphonothiolate (VR) – 2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile (CS) – dibenzoxazepine (CR) Further toxins – oleoresin capsicum (OC) – Ricin – 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) – Saxitoxin – Clostridium botulinum toxin Choking agents (lung irritants): – Staphylococcal enterotoxin – phosgene – Aflatoxin – chloropicrin Bacteria and rickettsiae Blood gases: – Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) – hydrogen cyanide – Francisella tularensis (tularaemia) – Brucella suis (brucellosis) Vesicants (blister gases): – Burkholderia mallei (glanders) – bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide (mustard gas) – Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis) – 2-chlorovinyldichloroarsine (lewisite) – Yersinia pestis (plague) – bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl) ether (agent T) – Rickettsia prowazeki (typhus fever) – tris(2-chloroethyl)amine (a nitrogen mustard) – Coxiella burnetii (Q fever)

Nerve gases: Viruses – ethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate – Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (tabun, or GA) – O-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate Source: (WHO 2001) Daniel Feakes (sarin, or GB) – O-1,2,2-trimethylpropyl methylphosphonofluoridate (soman, or GD) – O-cyclohexyl methylphosphonofluoridate 1 Toxic and infective antipersonnel agents stockpiled or otherwise weaponised for state forces since 1946 according to official (cyclosarin, or GF) documents of possessor states

organisations or movements active in CB disarma- While not ignoring these facts, in this chapter I use ment. Applying this definition to the organisations the broad definition of ‘global civil society’ provided and individuals that are involved could lead to the in the 2001 edition of this Yearbook: ‘[T]he sphere of following conclusion: ‘Global civil society has not ideas, values, institutions, organizations, networks been active in the CBW arena. A small group of and individuals located between the family, the state, specialized NGOs almost exclusively in the North and the market, and operating beyond the confines have been. Whether or not you call this largely of national societies, polities, and economies.’ academic group civil society depends on your (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 2001: 17). Therefore, definition; but it’s worth noting the restricted base’ this chapter assumes that the academics and

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS (Hammond 2003). researchers who follow CB disarmament are a part,

88 Box 5.2: Chemical and biological warfare programmes since 1946

Chemical weapons Biological weapons Albania* Canada§ Bosnia-Herzegovina*‡ France§ China* Iraq† France* Russia§ India* United Kingdom§ Iran* United States§ Iraq† Japan*+ South Korea* Russia* United Kingdom* United States* Yugoslavia*‡

* Countries declaring past or present chemical weapons programmes under the CWC. § Countries declaring past or present biological weapons programmes under the BWC confidence-building measures. † Iraq declared chemical and biological weapons programmes under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. ‡ Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia declared the same site, a former chemical weapons production facility near Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. + In 1997 Japan declared the (now destroyed) chemical weapons production facility used by the Aum Shinrikyo cult as it was under government jurisdiction at the time. albeit a small and highly specialised part, of global involved in CB disarmament and external factors civil society. Similar organisations and individuals which influence their composition and activities. In can be found in related issue-areas such as nuclear so doing, these two sections aim to answer the first disarmament or landmines; but they are generally of the questions posed above. The fifth section Daniel Feakes one element of a larger network which includes summarises the international political response to activist and advocacy organisations (Short 1999; CB weapons, including the contribution of civil Johnson 2000). For a number of reasons, this society where appropriate. The sixth section describes combination has so far not materialised in relation to the methods by which civil society has sought to CB disarmament. exert its influence on CB disarmament. Together, This chapter will attempt to answer two main these two sections are designed to provide questions: why has civil society involvement in CB preliminary answers to the second of the questions disarmament been so restrained when compared posed above. The chapter concludes by considering with, for example, its involvement in nuclear what has been and what remains to be achieved in disarmament? And do recent developments both CB disarmament and by proposing an alternative within CB disarmament and within global civil society frame within which further progress could be made. more generally mean that this characterisation may be losing its accuracy? The first section explains the development and use of CB weapons. The second section outlines the three principal ways in which CB weapons have been framed by governments and civil society. The third and fourth sections set the scene for the fifth and

sixth by describing the civil society organisations GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

89 The Development and weapons after being exposed to them in the First Use of Chemical and World War. However, toxic chemicals were of course used to kill millions of Jews and others in extermin- Biological Weapons ation camps. A quantum leap in the development of chemical Early developments weapons occurred with the discovery by German scientists of the nerve agents sarin and tabun, which CB warfare as currently understood has existed since were much more aggressive than earlier weapons. the early twentieth century. However, as the existence In biology, new developments during the 1940s, of ancient bans on the use of poison in warfare and particularly in the field of aerobiology, opened up the historical accounts of battles testify, the use of possibility of the tactical or even strategic use of chemical and biological agents for hostile purposes biological weapons (SIPRI 1971b: 123). In the 1950s, has a much longer history. Through the centuries, the first of a family of more toxic nerve agents, the clouds of poisonous smoke have V-agents, was produced. been used to overcome fortifications and to reduce resistance within During the 1990s, the CB programmes after the Second besieged cities, sometimes success- use of CB weapons by World War fully but often unsuccessfully (SIPRI 1971b: 125–6). During the siege of non-state actors After the Second World War, a the Crimean city of Caffa in 1346, became a major number of states retained an interest the attacking Tatar forces used concern, particularly in CB warfare. The US, UK, and catapults to throw their plague Canada agreed a division of labour victims into the Genoese city, in the West. A on the research, testing, and prod- whereupon the subsequent outbreak defining event was uction of CB weapons, formalised forced the defenders to flee (Wheelis the 1995 sarin attack through a trilateral agreement. The 2002a). UK and Canada abandoned their During the nineteenth century, in Tokyo by Aum offensive CB warfare programmes in as synthetic chemicals became more Shinrikyo the 1950s and 1960s but continued readily available, there were defensive work. The USSR also numerous proposals for the military continued its CB warfare program- use of chemicals. But it was only with the later indus- mes, eventually establishing the world’s largest trialisation of chemistry that large-scale use of stockpile of chemical weapons. A number of other Daniel Feakes chemical weapons became possible. Germany was European and Asian countries have also operated CB first to use lethal CW in the First World War but the warfare programmes since the Second World War other belligerents soon followed suit. The inter-war (see Box 5.1). While these countries have admitted period saw chemical weapons used during the Russian past or present CB warfare programmes, a number of civil war (1919–21), by British forces in the Middle other countries are suspected of possessing CB East and Afghanistan in the early 1920s, and in weapons but have made no public admission. colonial wars by Spain in Morocco (1921–7), by Italy During the 1950s and 1960s, the US carried out a in Libya (1930), by the USSR in Sinkiang (1934), by series of large sea and land trials of CB weapons to Italy in Abyssinia (1935–6), and by Japan in China assess the effectiveness of CB weapons and its (1937–45). In the 1940s, Japan also used relatively vulnerability to them. In 1969, the US unilaterally primitive biological weapons in China; but until the renounced possession of lethal and incapacitating 1940s biological warfare on a large scale was not biological weapons and declared its support for a technologically feasible and was primarily seen as a global ban. At the time, the renunciation was justified weapon of sabotage (SIPRI 1971b: 111). by claims that biological weapons were ineffective A number of reasons have been given as to why and unreliable. However, it later transpired that the US chemical weapons were not used militarily during renounced biological weapons and pushed for a global the Second World War, including the deterrent value ban for precisely the opposite reason. The trials of the of either side’s stockpiles, the availability of protective 1950s and 1960s had demonstrated that biological

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS equipment, and Hitler’s personal aversion to chemical weapons posed a potential threat to cities: ‘It was

90 therefore important to discourage the development developing CB capabilities, while State Department and production of these weapons by additional officials have listed the same countries but also add countries and to maintain US strategic deterrence Cuba. Some of these countries are not members of based on other weapon systems’ (Tucker 2002: 128). the CWC or BWC and these allegations cannot there- Chemical weapons have been used in at least three fore be subjected to international verification. conflicts in the mid- to late twentieth century, once However, Iran and Cuba are members of both the again all in the developing world. In Vietnam, the US CWC and BWC, and Iraq, Libya, and North Korea are used tear gas and herbicides despite widespread inter- BWC members; but the US has chosen not to make national criticism, in the Yemeni civil war Egypt used use of the mechanisms provided for in each treaty for chemical weapons against the Royalist forces (1963–7), investigating violations. In addition, it is widely and Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and its assumed that Israel, a member of neither the CWC nor own Kurdish civilians (1983–8). In contrast, biological the BWC, possesses stockpiles of CB weapons, in weapons have not verifiably been used in combat addition to its nuclear arsenal (Cohen 2001). since the end of the Second World War. During the 1990s, the use of CB weapons by non- The USSR had a biological state actors became a major concern, weapons programme and believed particularly in the West. A defining the US renunciation to be a de- Chemical and event was the 1995 sarin attack in ception. While joining the global ban biological weapons Tokyo by Aum Shinrikyo and the on biological weapons, the USSR have never played a subsequent discovery that the cult accelerated its programme by con- had previously launched 19 attacks cealing activities within a seemingly central role in military with CB weapons, most of which had legitimate civilian concern (Alibek strategy. They have failed (Smithson and Levy 2000: and Handelman 1999). US and UK remained on the 103). Although fears that Aum’s suspicions about this programme activities would set a precedent for were confirmed only later by Soviet periphery of war- other terrorists to follow have not defectors. fighting doctrine and been realised, a great deal of capability government attention and resources Proliferation and use in has been committed to preventing developing countries CB terrorism, especially in the US. This was evident before the 2001 anthrax letters in By the 1980s, both East and West no longer regarded the US, but American anti-CB terrorism programmes chemical weapons as an essential part of their have been enhanced massively since then, although Daniel Feakes arsenals and decided to negotiate their stockpiles there is no proven link between the anthrax letters and away. In addition, all BWC members had undertaken international terrorism. While many allegations have to continue negotiations on a chemical weapons ban. been made about the CB capabilities of al-Qaeda, Fear of each other’s weapons was replaced by fear of there is no publicly available evidence that the proliferation of CB weapons to developing countries. organisation has developed a sophisticated CB These fears were confirmed by the use of chemical capability. weapons by Iraq against Iran and its own civilians in Iraq’s alleged possession of CB weapons was a the 1980s, by the revelation of an apparent Libyan primary justification for the 2003 US-UK invasion. chemical weapons programme, and further dis- Between 1991 and 1998, United Nations weapons closures about Iraq’s CB warfare programmes by inspectors uncovered a large chemical weapons United Nations weapons inspectors in the 1990s. In programme and oversaw the destruction of many the developing world, CB weapons were seen as chemical weapons. The inspectors also discovered a force-equalisers—the ‘poor man’s atom bomb’—either biological weapons programme but their further against regional adversaries or against the US investigation was hampered by Iraqi non-cooperation. (Robinson, Stock, and Sutherland 1994: 711). When the inspectors were withdrawn in 1998, much A number of countries, especially in the Middle of the infrastructure of Iraq’s CB programmes had East, are suspected of possessing CB weapons. The US been destroyed but many questions remained Central Intelligence Agency mentions Iran, Iraq, Libya, unanswered.

North Korea, Syria, and Sudan as possessing or GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

91 When the inspectors returned in 2002, they encountered a lack of substantive cooperation in addressing the unresolved issues but also did not find any significant stocks of undeclared CB weapons before they were withdrawn again in 2003. American and British military forces are now searching for hidden CB weapons in Iraq but, at the time of writing, had yet to find anything despite extensive intelligence data, information from pre- war defectors, and now information from people within Iraq. Despite this history of the development and use of CB weapons, they have never played a central role in military strategy. They have instead remained on the periphery of war-fighting doctrine and capability, with even militaries being reluctant to adopt CB weapons, preferring instead the reliability of high explosives. Developed countries have largely abandoned their CB warfare programmes but have maintained protective programmes for their armed forces, leaving today’s CB weapons in the hands of a small number of developing countries unable to afford similar protection against CB weapons. While the chances of CB weapons being used in a major Front cover of the British Daily Mirror tabloid, 8 January 2003 international conflict have thus decreased, the likelihood that such weapons will be used in so-called advance, we will be able not only to devise ‘New Wars’ has increased (Kaldor 1999). The use of CB additional ways to destroy life but will also become weapons in ‘New Wars’ is likely to see a return to the able to manipulate it—including the processes of age-old practice of poison and disease being used to cognition, development, reproduction, and intimidate and terrorise civilians rather than between inheritance. A world in which these capabilities are armies on a battlefield. widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict had Daniel Feakes Current technological developments radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or Scientific and technological progress will influence subjugation. (Meselson 2000: 16) the future development and use of CB weapons. Current advances in biotechnology and pharmacology Developing countries do not possess the resources and hold out the potential for significant gains but also capabilities to misuse biotechnology in this way. run the risk of being misused for hostile purposes Instead, it is the actions of major developed countries (Wheelis 2002b). The Harvard geneticist Matthew which should be of concern. Commenting on Meselson (2000: 16) asks: ‘Every major technology— revelations about secret US biodefence research, metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, Wheelis and Dando (2002: 6) argue: electronics, nuclear energy—has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also The likelihood that the US programme goes well for hostile ones. Must this also happen with beyond the projects so far revealed further suggests biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology that the US may be embarking on an exploration of of the twenty-first century?’ the military applications of biotechnology—actively If so, the prospects are frightening: exploiting it to develop an offensive ‘non-lethal’ chemical weapons capability; beginning to use it to During the century ahead, as our ability to modify explore possible offensive bioweapons development

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS fundamental life processes continues its rapid strategies as part of threat assessment; and eager to

92 use it to develop antimateriel BW. We fear that this 1925 Geneva Protocol, and therefore for the 1993 is pioneering very dangerous ground. [Chemical Weapons Convention] as well. It is a culturally diverse ancestry, reaching back not only Although at first glance so-called ‘non-lethal’ CB through Hague and Roman law via Grotius, but also weapons might seem more acceptable than lethal through the warfare regulations which the Saracens ones, the introduction of ‘non-lethal’ CB agents derived from the Koran’ (Robinson 1998: 17). For onto the battlefield undermines the existing taboo many centuries, ‘any use of poison, even against against the use of any poison or disease for hostile soldiers, has come to be understood as an purposes and brings with it the risk of escalation to unacceptable practice of warfare. The use of poison lethal CB agents. In addition, the description ‘non- has come to be stigmatized as immoral in and of lethal’ is a clear misnomer as in certain situations itself’ (Price 1997: 26). such weapons can have a similar lethality to Just why CB warfare has been delegitimised to conventional weapons, as demonstrated when such an extent is disputed. A 1973 study refers to a Russian special forces used a ‘deep psychological aversion among derivative of the chemical fentanyl the majority of people, including the to end the siege of a Moscow The taboo against the military, who become aware of CB theatre in October 2002 (Klotz, weapons … Poison and disease can use of poison in Furmanski, and Wheelis 2003). This unnerve people to an extent which incident, and reports that the warfare has ancient other dangers cannot; and the United States transported riot and cross-cultural outbreaks of mass hysteria and the control agents and incapacitating superstitions which they have roots. There is a chemicals to the forces which provoked in the past are well invaded Iraq (Lean and Carrell particular odium and recorded’ (SIPRI 1973a: 118). The 2003), has raised awareness of the fear associated with number of popular films and novels potential that novel weapons, even about escaping viruses testifies to CB weapons in the ‘non-lethal’ ones, based on biotech this. Another explanation is that the research have for undermining the popular imagination aversion to CB warfare is deeply international regime against CB rooted in human nature, ‘perhaps in warfare (Dando 2003). human chromosomes themselves’ (Mandelbaum 1981: 39). Whatever the rationale, it cannot be denied that Framing Chemical and there is a particular odium and fear associated with Daniel Feakes Biological Weapons CB weapons in the popular imagination. This is one reason why the international community has been ow an issue is framed influences the way relatively successful in negotiating disarmament civil society addresses it and the resonance treaties for CB weapons. The main products of the Hthe issue has with the general public (Keck ‘taboo’ frame include major elements of the present- and Sikkink 1998). Three distinct but related frames day international regime against CB warfare such can be identified as having been applied to CB as the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and weapons often concurrently, namely, the ‘taboo’ Declaration and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. frame, the ‘WMD’ frame, and the ‘CB terrorism’ Despite their widespread delegitimisation, CB frame. weapons, like other weapons systems, are considered The first of these frames still very much applies to within the ‘state security discourse’. This discourse is CB weapons today and the other two frames depend based upon ‘an essentialized notion of state upon it. The taboo against the use of poison in sovereignty’ in which the state possesses a monopoly warfare has ancient and cross-cultural roots. on the use of force as ‘necessary’ to the preservation References to toxic warfare can be found in the of the state, and the possibility of their removal from Indian epics Ramayana and Mahabharata and in national arsenals is seen as a threat to the state. The later Chinese and Greek sources. From the Sanskrit ‘state security discourse’ thus ‘effectively forecloses Laws of Manu which forbade the use of poison the capacity of civil society to contest or to question

weapons ‘a line of ancestry can be drawn for the the weapons of war that secure its existence’ (de GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

93 94 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Daniel Feakes blank screens forpopularfantasies.Americanscould their future potential.Thistransformed theminto that theiruseintheFirst World War wasnoguideto poison gasasbeingintheir‘infantstage’. Thismeant chemical campaigndescribedbomberaircraft and effective thanhighexplosives. defence; anditwasnotclearthatgasmore kill; gasmasks,clothing,andshelters provided a to buildupthelarge concentration ofgasneededto they hadreal limitationsasitwasdifficultforartillery chemical weaponsintheFirst World War hadshown many militaryexpertsbelievedthattheactualuseof Atlantic Oceanmadesuchanattackimpossible,and Americans believedthatthevastreaches of the greatest chemicalwarfare capability. was todeterGermanybydevelopingtheworld’s argued thattheonlywaytoprevent suchanattack drop newpoisongasesonAmericancities.Itwas airships wouldsoonbeabletocross theAtlanticand convince AmericansthatGermanaeroplanes and Germany combined.Thecampaign’s strategy wasto more poisongasin1919 thanBritain,France, and America hadbeenpreparing toproduce anduse America haddevelopedduringtheFirst World War. down thegiantchemicalwarfare programme second wastostopthearmyestablishmentclosing high tariffimposedonforeign dyeimports.The new Americanartificialdyeindustrybygettinga The first wastosecure wartimeinvestmentsinthe manufacturers launchedacampaignwithtwogoals. chemists, chemicalwarfare officers, andchemical (Jenkins 2002). AftertheFirst World War, American precedents. order toadvocateaparticularpolicy, hashistorical government toinstilfearinitsownpopulation, the spectre ofchemicalandbiologicalweaponsbya Charter’s prohibition ofpre-emptive war. Theuseof used tojustifyAmericaandBritainbreaking theUN aggressive foreign policies.Mostnotablyithasbeen curtailing civillibertiesathomeandpursuing dominated thenews.Stateshaveusedthistojustify chemical, biological,ornuclearweaponshas Since late2001 theideathatterrorists coulduse Box 5.3: To overcome thesedifficulties,theleaders ofthe The problem thecampaignfacedwasthat The first exampleisfrom theUnitedStates The politicsoffear:historicalprecedents coalition playedonGermanfantasiesaboutairpower Danger, OneDefence’. poster’s slogansummeditup,‘OnePeople, One breakable nationalcommunity’. Or, asoneair-defence All citizensmustbecomeboundinto‘oneun- and actsasafighter’‘isdisciplinedsoldier’. was accomplishedwhen‘theindividualthinks,feels, armies couldwinthewar. Thegoalofcivildefence task wastokeepthenationworkingsothatGerman see themselvesassoldiers onthehomefront whose defence officials),Germanmenandwomenshould experts (fire wardens, police,theRedCross, civil- against airattackshouldbeleftuptotechnical of seeingthemselvesascivilianswhosedefence expansionist foreign policy. Theyargued that, instead this wouldenableGermanytopursue anaggressive of civilianmorale inNovember1918. Theirsuccessin of GermandefeatintheFirst World War: thecollapse sought toovercome whattheyidentifiedasthecause aviation engineers, andNaziParty ideologists. They between Germanveteran airpilots,strategists, 1993). The1930ssawtheemergence ofacoalition must cross theAtlanticOcean. problems becomeintractable whenthebombers civilian populationisequippedwithgasmasks.The by eitheraircraft oranti-aircraft guns,andifthe These difficultiesare multipliedifthecityisdefended concentration ofgasoverthewholealarge city. the ground allmakeitdifficulttobuildupalethal laying ofagasplumebyprecise levelflyingcloseto and thenecessityofeitheraccurate bombingorthe impossible. Theshapeofbuildings,windconditions, American citiesbyatransatlantic attackwasalso “Down withtheSlaveTreaty”’. Theannihilationof most popularcryinGermanywas“NoMore War” not the historianA.J.P. Taylor (1981: 59)reports, ‘the initially supportanewwar. Evenaslate1929, After years ofwartheGermanpeoplewouldnot Democratic administration hostiletoanewwar. wartime governmenthadbeenreplaced byaSocial Chicago, andothercitiesinasingleairraid. ating theentire populationofNewYork, Washington, imagine aircraft crossing theAtlanticandannihil- Like theAmericanchemicalcampaign, My secondexampleisfrom Germany(Fritzsche There wasnosuchGermanthreat. Germany’s the Leaguewithatotalofover8millionmembers. By January1936there were over7,000branches of air raid officials,andsoonuptoAirMinisterGoering. wardens toblockwardens, districtleaders, city-wide formed thebottomofapyramid linkinghouse and adispatcherfrom amongtheresidents. They assigned afire detail,ahosecrew, medicalaides, was askedtoelectahousewarden. Theyinturn Defence Leaguewassetup.Everyapartmentbuilding and aeroplane bookssatontheshelves.(7)AnAir posters showingbomberattackshungonthewalls, mindedness: modelaeroplanes hungfrom theceiling, raids. Schoolrooms becamecentres ofair- and drilledstudentsinhowtoremain calmduringair strategists, showedstudentshowtoweargasmasks, (6) Teachers alsodiscussedthetheoriesofair aviation hadleftGermanyvulnerable toairattack. and howAlliedrestrictions duringthe1920son history theystudiedthedevelopmentofaviation literature theyread thememoirs ofairaces,andin of flight,inchemistrytheystudiedpoisongas, physics classesstudentslearntaboutthemechanics be activelyinvolvedindefendingthenation.(5)In glider clubs,inpersuading civiliansthattheyshould aerial dangerand,more importantly, through its another vehicleforeducatingGermansaboutthe 1933, andheavilysubsidisedbytheNazis,provided wires. (4)TheGermanAirsports League,foundedin explosives dangledfrom street lampsandstreetcar with avividyellowstripe.Incitysquares aerial installed eight-foothighdummybombs,marked (3) Across GermanytheReichAirDefenceLeague that thenexttimeitmightbe‘gasorincendiaries’. Berlin withleaflets.Thejournal June 1933,‘unknownforeign’ aeroplanes bombed attacks todemonstrate theirvulnerability. On24 (2) Germancitieswere subjectedtosimulatedair system whichcouldbefatallydisruptedbyairattack. cities, andthenationasawhole,formedgiant aerial photographs. Thesesoughttoshowthatbig a livedreality byparticipatinginairdefence. and bygettingGermanstoexperiencethethreat as showing Germans’totalvulnerability totheairthreat of saturating Germanywithimagesandwritings and poisongas.Thiswasachievedthrough astrategy The strategy included(1)exhibitionsshowing Flugsport warned operate inmanynationalspacesatonce. society organisations andnetworkswhichcan challenged onlythrough thecreation ofglobalcivil and therolling backofcivillibertiesathomecanbe fear ofterrorism tojustifyimperialexpansionabroad 128–30). destruction afteradecadeoftrying(Balmer2001: produced aneffectivebiologicalweaponofmass that evenalarge statelikeBritainwasnotsure ithad (WHO 2001: s.2.4),andtohistorianswhocantellher anthrax itisverydifficulttoinfectalarge population for example,thatwhileitisrelatively easytoproduce access tobiologistswhomshetrustswhocantellher, joining acivicassociation,however, shecanhave knowing howtoassessCohen’s claim.Through American, orindeedworldcitizen,hasnowayof it coulddestroy halfthepopulation’. Theordinary anthrax couldbespread overacity, say, Washington, pound bagofsugarandstated,‘thisamount This Week military actiononIraq. AppearingonABCtelevision’s intended togainAmericansupportforpossible 1–14). claims (Tocqueville 1968:657–70, 872;Hirst 1994: expertise necessarytocallintoquestionthestate’s to assemblethescientific,legal,andotherformsof state’s useofreal dangers toextenditspowers and citizens havethestrength tocallintoquestionthe through beingamemberofcivicassociationthat state intimesofdanger. Heargued thatitisonly atoms, there isastrong tendencytoidentifywiththe themselves anatominaseaofmillionsother modern liberal democracy inwhicheachcitizenfinds dangers? AlexisdeTocqueville warnedthat,ina own civilliberties.Howcanwerespond tothese extension ofstatepowerattheexpensetheir form thebasisforpersuading peopletosupportthe emphasising itsunprecedented nature, andthiscan into ablankscreen forpopularfantasiesby deadly gases—canbedescribedsoastotransform it Dominick Jenkins,LondonSchoolofEconomics hs thesaturation oftheglobalspacewith Thus, Take Secretary forDefenseWilliamCohen’s claim, These twoexamplesshowhowareal thing— in November1997,Cohenheldupafive- 95 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Daniel Feakes Larrinaga and Turenne Sjolander 1998: 370). The another so that treaty provisions are similar whether international consideration of CB disarmament takes dealing with nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. place within ‘a world view where states are perceived Another characteristic of the WMD frame is that it to be the primary agent for analysis and action’ is a product of the developed world; it lacks resonance (Carroll 2002: 23). As will be shown below, this with developing countries and their populations and environment impacts greatly upon civil society and with large sections of global civil society. For example: its activities in CB disarmament. ‘African civil society has not been active in the CBW Since the mid-1940s, CB weapons—along with arena at all. While there is interest in the issue, civil nuclear weapons—have been framed as ‘weapons of society organizations have naturally focused on more mass destruction’ (WMD) by governments, pressing and immediate issues including small arms international organisations, and civil society. The proliferation and use, HIV/AIDS and food crises’ (Gould term originated with attempts within the United 2003). At the state level, this is reflected in the fact Nations to devise a ‘system for the regulation of that Africa has the lowest membership of any region armaments’ under Article 26 of the in the CWC and BWC despite the fact UN Charter. However, as noted that chemical weapons have been above, major elements of the By equating CB used in a number of African countries international regime against CB weapons with nuclear and others are suspected of possess- warfare pre-date the definition of weapons, they are ing either chemical or biological CB weapons as WMD. The definition weapons. By not joining the CWC and of WMD adopted by the United conceptualised as a BWC countries also limit their access Nations mentions only ‘lethal threat to the very to technology and to assistance if chemical and biological weapons’, survival of the state attacked or threatened with attack thus legitimising by default the by CB weapons. range of CB weapons sometimes and therefore as an More recently, and particularly termed ‘non-lethal’ but which some issue in which only in the West, a third frame has been regard as the bigger threat to states can legitimately applied to CB weapons: CB terror- international security. ism. Although the threat of CB The association of CB weapons be involved terrorism emanates from non-state with nuclear weapons has proved actors possibly with state sponsor- useful to Western states seeking to justify their ship, once again it is the state which has responded continued possession of nuclear weapons (as a and which has set the agenda. In many ways, the rise deterrent against the use of CB weapons by ‘rogue of CB terrorism is not a new framing of CB weapons; Daniel Feakes states’) and now to rationalise preventive action, and rather; it is a return to the ancient use of chemical has also proved useful to legitimise the possession of or biological agents to terrorise, intimidate, and CB weapons by states in the South as a deterrent sabotage. The 2001 anthrax letters in the US caused against the nuclear powers or, in the case of the a worldwide panic and national hysteria within the Middle East, as a counter to Israel’s nuclear arsenal US but killed only five people. (Price 1995: 99–100; Croddy 2002: 46). In assessing the real threat posed by CB terrorism, By equating CB weapons with nuclear weapons, it is worth recalling the resources expended by the US the WMD discourse conceptualises them as a threat and USSR to develop effective biological weapons and to the very survival of the state and therefore as an that Aum Shinrikyo in Japan spent $30 million on its issue in which only states can legitimately be chemical weapons programme (Smithson and Levy involved. Over the years, states have developed a 2000: 80). Few terrorist organisations have such generic approach to dealing with WMD based, in resources available. In addition, the ease of part, on concepts such as arms control and production and dissemination of CB weapons is verification. This approach emphasises consensus- frequently overstated by both the media and based multilateral treaty negotiation, oversight by an politicians. It is likely that terrorists will continue to international organisation, and referral of violators to prefer weapons with high levels of effectiveness and the United Nations Security Council. A distinct field reliability, such as high explosives and small of international law has been developed in which arms, rather than CB weapons which are difficult

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS one international agreement borrows elements from both to produce and to use. While international

96 for preemption’ (Ellis2003:115). explicitly acknowledgesprospective requirements first time—privileges counterproliferation and nonproliferation approach withonethat—forthe replaces thetraditional state-centered US proliferant statesandnonstateactors, essentially aimed atrefocusing USeffortstodealwith administration’s newnationalsecuritystrategy, action abovemultilateral consultations: ‘TheBush the militaryabovediplomatic,andunilateral emphasises thenationalaboveinternational, been overstated. threat which,aftertheinvasion,appears tohave threat posedbyIraq’s alleged WMDstockpiles,a strenuous effortstoconvince theirpopulationsofthe US andUKgovernmentsmade disarming Iraq ofitsWMD.Boththe was initiallyjustifiedonthebasisof recent US-UKinvasionofIraq, which date ofthispolicyhasbeenthe weapons.’ Theclearest expression to with theworld’s mostdestructive dangerous regimes tothreaten us will notpermittheworld’s most said: ‘TheUnitedStatesofAmerica Korea, and‘theirterrorist allies’, and evil’ consistingofIran, Iraq, North President Bushspokeofan‘axis State oftheUnionaddress, US as traditional diplomacy. Inhis2002 now aslikelytoinvolvemilitaryforce framed, responses totheissueofCBweaponsare proliferation andterrorism’ (Ellis2003:117). Thusre- CB terrorism threats toproduce anew‘nexusof the USandUK,bycombinationofWMD weapons hasbeenfurtherre-framed, particularlyin actors. solutions directed atstatesrather thannon-state which maystillrequire reliance uponmore traditional despite thethreat posedbystate-sponsored terrorism and couchedintermsof‘homelandsecurity’. Thisis the response toCBterrorism hasbeenlargely national multilateral solutionsandinternationalcooperation, activity undertheWMDframe hasbeenbasedon In dealingwithCBwarfare threats thisview Since 11 September 2001, theresponse toCB and reliability, suchas levels ofeffectiveness high explosivesand weapons withhigh continue toprefer small arms, rather than CBweapons It islikelythat terrorists will but there are ofcourse someexceptions.Theyare principally inNorthAmericaandWestern Europe, civil societyorganisations are basedin theWest, undertaken andhow. Themajorityofthemostactive which haveadirect bearingonwhatactivitiesare a numberofmore specificdefiningcharacteristics Simmons 2002: 82). many ‘insiders’ butfew‘outsiders’ (Oliviero and responsibility, civilsocietyinCBdisarmamenthas civil societyorganisations followingcorporate social (Rissanen 2002: 33).Usingadefinitionappliedto little ofthetraditional, grass roots NGOadvocacy’ based nongovernmentalparticipation;there was dominantly academic,research andpolicyanalysis of theBWC protocol negotiations: ‘Thiswaspre- the epistemiccommunity. According tooneobserver disarmament islargely limited tothemembers of action’. Incontrast, civilsocietyinvolvementinCB movement campaigns’and‘non-violentdirect hensive Test BanTreaty negotiations, ‘public society. Astudyofcivilsocietyinvolvementin communities are commoninotherareas ofcivil within thatdomainorissue-area’. Epistemic authoritative claimtopolicy-relevant knowledge and competenceinaparticulardomainan network ofprofessionals withrecognized expertise T Disarmament Chemical andBiological Civil SocietyInvolvementin Civil societyinvolvementinCBdisarmamenthas community’, definedbyHaas(1992:3)as‘a provides agoodexampleofan‘epistemic he civilsocietyinvolvementinCBdisarmament of, inthecaseofCompre- involvement intheissuemadeup part ofabroader civilsociety epistemic communityformsbuta ment isthatinbothcasesthe two issue-areas andCBdisarma- (Keck andSikkink1998:134). involved inthetropical forest issue stemic communitywasinitially 52), whilea‘relatively small’epi- and professionals’ (Johnson2000: governmental experts,academics the role of‘elite,principallynon- prehensive Test BanTreaty highlights negotiationofthe1996Com- the The difference betweenthese 97 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Daniel Feakes overwhelmingly based within academia and, even as the Quakers, humanitarian groups such as Amnesty among those not in academia, academic qualifi- International and Human Rights Watch, and cations are highly regarded. In very general terms, environmental groups such as Greenpeace. three main types of civil society organisation are Mention should also be made of civil society most actively involved in CB disarmament: academic organisations, particularly in the United States, which centres and programmes; scientific networks; and oppose elements of the international regime against research and policy centres. There are of course CB warfare. For example, in 1991 the Heritage overlaps between these three categories, and other Foundation proposed the reversal of the US decision organisations are involved in a more ad hoc fashion. to renounce chemical weapons production and US While most of these organisations are national rather retention of a modest biological weapons stockpile, than international, they network and collaborate while in 1997 the Center for Security Policy opposed extensively with one another across borders. US ratification of the CWC. Academic centres and pro- The interrelationship between CB grammes active within CB disarma- weapons and the WMD frame ment include the Harvard Sussex Three main types of imposed by governments upon Program on CBW Armament and civil society them means that the community’s Arms Limitation (URL), the Depart- organisation are most boundaries can be easily discerned ment of Peace Studies at the as few of its members participate University of Bradford (URL), and the actively involved in in other issue-areas, even in nuclear Center for Nonproliferation Studies chemical and disarmament. While this allows for at the Monterey Institute for Inter- biological subject specialisation, it also means national Studies (URL). One observer that the community is somewhat has noted that the preponderance disarmament: insular and immune from develop- of academics within the community academic centres and ments in other issue-areas. All of means that it includes ‘people who programmes, scientific these characteristics contribute to a don’t know if they want to community which is both discrete in document or change the world’ networks, and its activities and restrained in its (Hammond 2003). research and policy policy proposals. In this, it is similar Reflecting the origins of civil centres to the epistemic community in society involvement in CB disarm- nuclear disarmament which pro- ament and the technical nature of motes ‘limited, practical, incre- the issue, there are many natural scientists, specifically mental demands and policy initiatives that are Daniel Feakes chemists and biologists. The Pugwash Conferences on perceived by governments as pragmatic steps that Science and World Affairs (URL) has been active in CB can be realized in the short to medium term’ disarmament since the 1950s (see Box 5.4). Other (Johnson 2000: 50). scientific networks include the Federation of American At the individual level, there is a remarkable Scientists (URL) and the International Network of degree of continuity among the community’s Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (URL). members, with some participants having been Research and policy institutes include the involved in CB disarmament for over four decades. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute While this level of continuity bring great advantages (URL), the Chemical and Biological Arms Control in terms of subject-matter expertise and institu- Institute and the Verification Research, Training and tional memory, it can also make it more difficult for Information Centre (URL). Green Cross International the community to renew itself through the (URL) has done a lot to empower and bring together recruitment of new members. The community is local communities in both the United States and also a rather small one, similar to the ‘handful of Russia which are situated close to chemical weapons people’ within the tropical forest epistemic storage facilities. community (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 134). According Outside of this core group of civil society to the originators of the concept, an epistemic organisations are a number of organisations with a community typically has under 35 members and more irregular or less active involvement in CB sometimes much fewer (Adler and Haas 1992: 380).

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS disarmament. Among them are religious groups such It would not be surprising to find that the number

98 feed intolaterintergovernmental negotiations. verification measures, theworkdonebySIPRIdid signature in1972didnotincludeanyserious laboratories. AlthoughtheBWC asopenedfor the feasibilityofinternationalinspectionstobiological parliament, ofPugwash,undertookaproject toassess (SIPRI), itselflargely acreation, through theSwedish the StockholmInternationalPeace Research Institute the mid-1960s,StudyGroup, in collaboration with of lowgovernmentalactivityonCBdisarmament.In research projects. Thesehave oftenoccurred at times has conducted,orbeencloselyassociatedwith,policy and frequently more revealing, discussions. or organisations, thusproviding formore informal, rather thanasrepresentatives oftheirgovernments participants takepartintheworkshopsasindividuals relationships, discussissues,andshare ideas.All researchers, analysts,andNGOstafftobuildup place forglobalcivilsocietyallowingscientists, Study Group’ (Robinson1999:236). officials intocontinuingworkingcontactwiththe been ‘bringingpolicymakers andothergovernmental developments. Butperhapstheirmainfunctionhas new topics,andforincreasing awareness ofnew forum forthepresentation ofnewresearch, forairing there havebeenover50since1964,are theprimary Theirmeetings,ofwhich and policyresearch projects. had three elements:asteeringcommittee,workshops, and itssuccessors. Thevariousstudygroups haveall subsequently takenforward bytheBW StudyGroup regime thatexiststoday’(Robinson1999:230). route towards thenewinternationalanti-CBW had noprecedent; itwasthefirst clearmarkeronthe in thisarea saysofthe1959meeting:‘Themeeting involved eversince.OneaccountofPugwash’s work conference onCBwarfare in1959andhasbeen Nova Scotia.Pugwashfirst heldaninternational its first meetingwasheldinthevillageofPugwash, Russell-Einstein Manifesto Affairs (Moore 1997).Pugwashgrew outofthe1955 to thePugwashConferences onScienceandWorld disarmament wouldbecompletewithoutreference No accountoftherole ofglobalcivilsocietyinCB Box 5.4: At varioustimesinitshistory, theStudy Group The workshopshavealsoservedasameeting Pugwash’s involvementinCBdisarmamentwas The Pugwashmovementandchemicalbiologicalwarfare and issonamedbecause would oftensimplymock’. officials inthemore prominent Western countries was agoalwhich,inthelate1960s,government of aninternationaltreaty onchemicalweapons.This role ingradually securingrespectability forthegoal of Pugwash[atthelevelgovernment]hasbeenits concludes that‘perhapsthegreatest achievement describes it(Robinson1999:245).Thissameaccount ‘remarkable communityofinterest’, asoneaccount participated inPugwashactivitythisfield:a 1959 and1998,645peoplefrom 46countrieshad and theoriginalityofitspolicyresearch .Between its involvement,theinformalnature ofitsworkshops, continuityof Itchieflyresides inthe documentation. disarmament isnoteasydueprimarilytoalackof in 1969–70 (Kaplan 1999:151). to dowiththeUSrenunciation ofbiologicalweapons President Nixon’s NationalSecurityAdviser, hadmuch through hisHarvard colleagueHenryKissinger, then in theStudyGroup sincethe1960s.Indeed,Meselson, the University ofSussexhavebeencloselyinvolved Harvard University andJulianPerry Robinsonfrom 1999). AlongsideKaplan, MatthewMeselsonfrom General ofPugwashfrom 1976to1988(Kaplan meeting. Kaplan wentontobecomeSecretary- 1958 andwastheninvolvedinplanningthe1959 CB weapons.HeattendedaPugwashconference in was aWHOmicrobiologist already concernedabout (Robinson 1999:230).Intheearly1950s,Kaplan role inPugwashworkthisarea eversince of the1959meetingandhasplayedaleadership among themisMartinKaplan, whowastheinstigator particular individuals,someformanydecades.Chief disarmament isalsothestoryofinvolvement CWC andBWC protocol negotiations. use ofnationaltrialinspectionsduringboththe This approach wasemulatedbygovernmentswiththe to theeventualsuccessofCWC negotiations. and thecivilchemicalindustry, whichwere essential facilitated contactsbetweenthediplomatsinGeneva inspection visits.Through thiswork,Pugwash civil chemicalindustry, includinganumberoftrial philosophy anddesignofon-siteinspectionsinthe In the1970s, theStudyGroup didworkonthe Assessing theinfluenceofPugwashinCB The storyofPugwashinvolvementinCB 99 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Daniel Feakes of individuals actively involved in CB disarmament technical publications and discrete communications is somewhat similar. with government officials and diplomats. However, In terms of organisations involved, the most there are recent indications that developments recent CWC and BWC meetings were attended by, elsewhere in global civil society are beginning to respectively, only 6 and 16 civil society organisa- filter through. tions, compared with the 62 which attended the A relative newcomer to CB disarmament, the 2002 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Sunshine Project ( URL), has been instrumental in Committee. One advantage of this small size is the introducing new thinking to the existing civil society ease of communication and collaboration among actors. In contrast to the individuals traditionally the community. Members are in frequent contact by involved in CB disarmament, the Project’s staff have e-mail and telephone and meetings such as those backgrounds in public advocacy and grass-roots organised by Pugwash often involve a large networking. While utilising traditional civil society proportion of the community. tools, such as the resolution supporting the BWC The community is also well-connected in terms of protocol handed to the ad hoc group chairman in its relationship with governments and international April 2001, the Sunshine Project has also attempted organisations. The long-term involvement of some to re-frame CB disarmament so that it resonates community members means that more widely. In particular, the they have developed strong personal Project has emphasised the rele- contacts with government officials. Throughout the 1990s, vance of biodiversity and biosafety, Additionally, some individuals now the community areas of great civil society activity, to active for civil society in CB changed little, it CB disarmament. In so doing, it disarmament were previously has brought the issue to a whole responsible for the issue-area as remained highly new audience, thus broadening government officials or diplomats, specialised and the traditional CB disarmament thus further strengthening the academic, operating community. contacts between global civil society The collapse of the BWC and policy-makers. While this may mainly through protocol negotiations and the provide civil society with a better technical publications success of Landmine Monitor understanding of how decisions are and discrete encouraged the establishment of made, it also contributes to the the BioWeapons Prevention Project communications with discrete and restrained character (URL) to undertake a similar global of civil society involvement in government officials monitoring role for the BWC. The Daniel Feakes CB disarmament and it further and diplomats Project was launched in November reinforces the process-minded, 2002 and is currently still in its state-centric approach to CB start-up phase. Funds have been disarmament. pledged by a number of sympathetic governments Since the early 1990s, there have been remarkable and two have already contributed. The Project aims developments in civil society both in terms of the to improve global monitoring of BWC compliance by number and diversity of organisations and individuals empowering civil society nationally, raising public involved and in terms of the activities undertaken. awareness, and publishing an annual BioWeapons Even in the disarmament field, civil society has Monitor which it hopes will emulate the success of demonstrated that it can undermine the ‘state Landmine Monitor in monitoring national security discourse’ and make a role for itself, as it did compliance with the 1997 Mine Ban Convention. most successfully in the negotiations for the 1997 The Project is specifically intended to create a Mine Ban Convention. network encompassing sections of global civil It might be expected that these developments society which have not previously been active in would have impacted on civil society in CB CB disarmament. The network already includes civil disarmament but, until recently, there had been little society organisations from Europe, North America, evidence of ‘spillover’. Throughout the 1990s, the and Africa. community changed little, it remained highly

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS specialised and academic, operating mainly through

100 External Factors: However, this level of access compares poorly to Access and Funding that now granted to civil society in other areas, particularly human rights and the environment, but he main external factor influencing civil society even in nuclear disarmament. At the Nuclear Non- in CB disarmament is the ‘state security Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in 2002, Tdiscourse’ and the framing of CB weapons as civil society presentations were heard during a formal WMD and as potential terrorist weapons. This shapes session for the first time. In contrast, during the the environment in which civil society operates in CB Preparatory Committee for the fifth BWC Review disarmament and influences its character and Conference, Mexico’s proposal, that ‘in order to keep activities. However, at least two other factors also pace with practice regarding NGOs in other matter, namely, the degree of access granted to CB multilateral fora’ civil society be allowed to submit disarmament processes and the availability of funding material orally and in writing, was not adopted for activities; while a third, the (Pearson 2001: 18). Those civil indirect influence of developments society organisations present in other sections of global civil The formal access submitted a note to the chairman society, may be becoming more which included the following: ‘[W]e of civil society important. would like to be present as observers One study has found that the in international in all sessions as we would thereby formal access of civil society in disarmament forums become much more aware of the international disarmament forums real issues—rather than just the fixes is almost invariably is ‘almost invariably at the lower in Plenary. We are, however, realists end of the spectrum’ (Carroll 2002: at the lower end and recognize that evolutionary 21). Access matters because without of the spectrum progress is the way forward.’ it civil society is less aware of the However, there was no ‘evolutionary issues at stake in a conference or progress’ at the conference and, in negotiation and has to rely on other sources of retrospect, the note looks timid and reactive. In the information, invariably the participating diplomats future, civil society will have to cooperate proactively themselves who do not always have an interest in with sympathetic states like Mexico in order to gain providing a balanced account. Without access, civil greater access. society is little more than a disenfranchised observer Civil society compensates for its lack of formal able to listen to bland political statements but kept access to meetings in CB disarmament through its away from the real debate. Of course, access is not good connections with diplomats, whether at the Daniel Feakes all-important: ‘[A]n exclusive focus on the question meetings or nationally. Some states actually go out of the relative lack of formal NGO “access” to of their way to keep civil society informed and multilateral disarmament badly distorts the reality of involved in ways other than observing meetings, the many important roles that NGOs can and do play ways which are sometimes of more mutual benefit. in disarmament affairs’ (Atwood 2002: 9). For example, under an initiative begun by the French Accredited civil society organisations have access presidency of the European Union in 2000, successive only to the opening and closing plenary sessions of presidencies hosted lunchtime meetings between the annual CWC conferences, the BWC ad hoc group, European Union diplomats and civil society and the respective review conferences. They cannot organisations during sessions of the BWC ad hoc attend sessions of the subsidiary bodies where the group. main debates occur. Documentation available does A practice which has only rarely been transferred not include draft decisions or working papers, and to CB disarmament is the inclusion of non-govern- documents submitted by civil society are not mental experts on state delegations, although it is distributed as official documents. They are also common practice among some Non-Proliferation provided with no or very minimal office facilities. Treaty states parties. Proposals for improved access in Civil society organizations were allowed to address nuclear disarmament apply equally to CB disarma- informal sessions of the fourth and fifth BWC Review ment: ‘Effectiveness could be enhanced by opening Conferences and a half-day ‘Open Forum’ took place working sessions of negotiations to NGOs, and in

parallel to the first CWC Review Conference. particular allowing NGOs not only to observe from a GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

101 distance but to work with diplomats on the floor, The International Response to making NGO access comparable to that enjoyed in the Chemical and Biological human rights and environmental fields’ (Burroughs and Cabasso 1999: 476). Weapons The large bulk of funding for civil society in CB disarmament comes from a small number of mainly he international community identified CB American private foundations including the weapons as being separate from other weapons MacArthur Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Tat an early stage. A United Nations (1969: 1) Carnegie Corporation, and the Ploughshares Fund, report states: ‘No form of warfare has been more as well as, in the UK, the Joseph Rowntree Charitable condemned than has the use of this category of Trust, which have long supported progressive thinking weapons.’ Much effort, particularly from the mid- on international security. As with all sections of civil 1960s, has been made to develop rules and practices society, the actors concerned with CB disarmament among states which reinforce the notion that the have long struggled for funds and survived on an use of CB weapons should be limited, if not banned insecure financial footing. entirely. Over the years, CB disarmament has In the 1990s, three factors made this situation even developed an architecture of principles, norms, rules, worse. The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of and procedures which can aptly be described as an the USSR encouraged some foundations to ‘declare international regime (Krasner 1983: 2). victory’ and reorient their funding priorities away from security issues The 1900s: The Hague In 1918, the towards issues more ‘relevant’ in the Peace Conferences post-Cold War world (Bernauer 2001: International 631). Another consequence of the Committee of the Red The codification of the norm into Cold War’s end was the increased international law actually began Cross protested against complexity of the international over a century before the negoti- security field, now incorporating a the use of chemical ation of the first major CB disarma- plethora of new groups seeking weapons, describing it ment treaty. The 1874 International funding on topics such as small arms, Declaration Concerning the Laws as ‘criminal’ landmines, conflict resolution, and and Customs of War especially peacekeeping. Also during the 1990s, forbids the ‘employment of poison the successful negotiation of treaties such as the CWC or poisoned weapons’. Although the 1874 declaration and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the never entered into force, its prohibition of poison or Daniel Feakes indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty poisoned weapons was taken up in the 1899 convinced other foundations that the important work Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of had been done. Taken together, these three factors War on Land signed in The Hague along with contributed to a huge reduction in the number of Declaration IV.2 under which the contracting parties foundations making grants in international security. agreed to ‘abstain from the use of projectiles the From more than 75 foundations making grants in the object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or international security field in 1984, the number deleterious gases’. Study of the papers of the 1874 dropped to 25 by 1994 (Wallerstein 2002: 86). conference shows that the reference to poison and Organisations working in CB disarmament fared poisoned weapons in the declaration included the particularly badly because, according to one spreading of disease, an interpretation which was foundation official, ‘there has been a natural adopted without discussion in The Hague (SIPRI reluctance to abandon or reduce the scope of [work 1973b: 96). on nuclear reductions] in order to divert resources to other, more contemporary threats, such as biological The 1910s and 1920s: weapons’ (Wallerstein 2002: 85). Funding constraints The First World War and limit the activities which civil society can undertake the Geneva Protocol and also restrict the entry of new talent into CB disarmament, precisely at a time of generational Although chemical weapons were massively used

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS change when new entrants are much needed. during the First World War, it was widely accepted

102 that these prohibitions had entered international experts appointed by the United Nations Secretary- customary law. All belligerents went to great efforts General, induced the other, by a World Health to deny that their own actions were in contravention Organization group of consultants. The authors of the of the treaties while at the same time demonising UN report hoped it would ‘contribute to public their opponents for their use of chemical weapons. awareness of the profoundly dangerous results if In 1918, the International Committee of the Red these weapons were ever used and that an aroused Cross protested against the use of chemical weapons, public will demand and receive assurances that describing it as ‘criminal’ (ICRC 1918). Governments are working for the earliest effective After the war, the next significant milestone in the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (bio- development of the international regime against CB logical) weapons’ (United Nations 1969: 88). warfare was the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which By 1968, the prohibition of CB warfare was ‘generally acknowledged the existing norm against the use of considered one of the most urgent measures to be chemical weapons: ‘Whereas the use in war of taken up following the conclusion of the Treaty on the asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’ (SIPRI 1971a: analogous liquids, materials or devices, has been 253). In the US, 22 prominent scientists and doctors justly condemned by the general opinion of the (including 7 Nobel laureates), supported by 5,000 civilised world . . .’ (emphasis added). The Protocol also scientists, sent a petition to President Johnson. In other codified the extension of the prohibition to include countries, revelations by journalists and protests by biological weapons. students also raised popular aware- The negotiation of the Geneva ness (Sigmund 1980). In the UK, one Protocol took place in an atmos- In 1972, the Biological of the main activists identified ‘the phere of intense public opposition to Weapons Convention need for a grass-roots movement’ chemical weapons created in part was the first treaty to (Sigmund 1980: 7). Gradually, many by counterproductive claims from states also came to the conclusion chemical weapons proponents about outlaw an entire class that the international regime against supposed new ‘super’ weapons. (See of weapons of mass CB warfare was in need of strength- Box 5.4). According to one account: destruction ening. CB weapons were under ‘From their initial mobilization at consideration together by the Geneva the hands of publicists and lobbyists, disarmament conference but a ban popular attitudes towards CBW throughout much of on chemical weapons seemed far off. Europe and America were concerted in their hostility. In 1968, the UK therefore proposed that the issues As they gathered strength in the early 1920s, they had be separated and introduced a draft convention on Daniel Feakes the effect of stimulating and sustaining international biological weapons. Many states initially opposed the efforts to abolish CBW’ (SIPRI 1971b: 263). separation, but political momentum was provided in 1969 when President Nixon announced the US The 1960s: The Vietnam War and the Biological renunciation of biological weapons (also partly inspired Weapons Convention by opposition to the Vietnam war) and its support for the UK draft, and in 1971 when the USSR and its CB weapons returned to the international political allies reversed their earlier opposition to separation. agenda only in the mid-1960s, prompted by the use The subsequent negotiations led to the 1972 BWC of chemical weapons in the Yemeni civil war, by prohibiting the development, production, and concerns expressed publicly by eminent scientists, stockpiling of biological weapons and requiring the but mostly by the use of toxic chemicals by the US destruction of any existing stocks. The BWC was thus the in Vietnam. The situation in Vietnam and the public first international disarmament treaty to outlaw an attention it was attracting inspired the United entire class of WMD. One of the authors of the WHO Nations General Assembly to adopt a resolution on CB report wrote later that it and the report by the warfare in 1966 which led to the inclusion of CB Secretary-General’s expert group ‘were influential in weapons in the agenda of the Geneva disarmament achieving the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972’ conference. (Kaplan 1999: 151). Public attention to CB weapons was heightened Article IX of the BWC required that states parties

by two authoritative reports: one, by a group of undertake ‘to continue negotiations in good faith with GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

103 Signing ceremony for the Chemical Weapons Convention. © Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

a view to reaching early agreement on effective missiles in Europe led by European Nuclear measures’ for the prohibition of chemical weapons. Disarmament (Murphy, Hay, and Rose 1984: 107). However, the issue remained on the agenda for another Political and public interest in the CWC negotiations 20 years until an even more comprehensive agreement increased when Iraqi use of chemical weapons was prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling, confirmed by the United Nations in 1984 and in and use of chemical weapons was eventually finalised. subsequent years (see Box 5.5). Press reports of the attacks and the transfer of some of the victims to Daniel Feakes The 1980s: The Iran-Iraq war and the hospitals in Western Europe increased public awareness Chemical Weapons Convention of chemical weapons, although political condemnation of Iraq was less forthcoming as major Western countries During the 1980s, there was ‘a widespread sense that were supporting Iraq in the ongoing war. The 1989 the existing regime of international law and custom Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical which inhibited resort to toxic warfare was coming Weapons referred only to ‘recent violations’ of the 1925 under increasing threat, and that it might well prove Geneva Protocol without mentioning Iraq by name. to be in the best interests of all states if the regime, Key political events in the negotiation of the CWC symbolised by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, were during the 1980s included the introduction in 1984 somehow strengthened’ (Robinson 1993: 37). In of a new US draft chemical weapons convention, the Western Europe, scientists and peace activists joined acceptance by the USSR in 1987 of the intrusive together to protest against the possibility of new US verification provisions proposed by the US, and the ‘binary’ chemical weapons being deployed. In the announcement in 1989 of a more flexible US UK, over 2,000 scientists signed a petition in 1981 negotiating position. A number of factors contributed against the new weapons (Murphy, Hay, and Rose to the finalisation of the 1993 CWC: 1984: ix). The UK Scientists’ Campaign and its associated Working Party on Chemical and Biological First, the end of the cold war increased mutual trust Warfare was intended to emulate civil society and confidence among states. Other positive factors

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS opposition to the stationing of new US nuclear included changes in the US negotiating position, the

104 Rights Watch describesthesceneasfollows: Halabja. Basedoninterviewswithsurvivors, Human aircraft dropped mustard gasandnerveagentson records attacksonover60villages. border townofHalabja,butHumanRightsWatch most well-knownincidentwastheattackon to havebegunin1987butintensified1988.The of chemicalweaponsagainstKurdish villagesappears has publishedadetailedaccountofevents.Theuse Anfal campaignagainsttheKurds asgenocideand Human RightsWatch (1995)hasdescribedtheIraqi its campaignagainstownKurdish population. chemical weaponsagainstciviliansbyIraq aspartof 1987 setaprecedent forthewidespread useof long-term effectsofexposure tomustard gas. war, over34,000victimsare stillbeingtreated forthe the war. Evennow, manyyears aftertheendof weapons duringthewar, ofwhom3,500diedduring personnel andcivilianswere exposedtochemical Iranian figures, anestimated100,000 military been injured bychemicalweapons’. According to ‘a newdimensionisthatciviliansinIran havealso forces’. In1987,afurtherinvestigationreported that forces haveusedchemicalweaponsagainstIranian tion statedspecificallythat‘onmanyoccasions,Iraqi had usedthem.In1986,however, anotherinvestiga- agent tabuninthewar, withoutstatingwhichside confirmed theuseofmustard gasandthenerve or evenearlier. In1984,aUNinvestigationteam use chemicalweaponsagainstIranian troops by1983 weapons. Itappears thatIraqi forces hadbegunto to seethewidespread useoflethalchemical The Iran-Iraq warof1980–8wasthemostrecent war Box 5.5: During theafternoonof16March 1988,Iraqi The attackontheIranian cityofSardasht inJune had beenknockedoutthedaybefore by there were nostreetlights; thepower into thestreets. Itwasgrowing darkand they hadnoalternativebuttoemerge to theirfaces,orsetfires. Butinthe end with damptowels,orpressed wetcloths plug thecracks around theentrance panic andclaustrophobia. Sometriedto In theshelters, there wasimmediate Halabja: ThechemicalweaponscampaignagainsttheKurds Iraqi forces usedchemicalweapons. identified 281 sitesthroughout northernIraq where Middle Eastaverage. Theresearchers havealso on Hiroshima andthatcancerrates are fourtimesthe those suffered byvictimsoftheatomicbombattack of congenitalabnormalitiesare fourtofivetimes survey ofIraqi Kurdistan whichhas foundthatrates Staff oftheinstitutehavecarriedoutamedical established inHalabjawithinternationalassistance. people ofHalabja. recent years toraise awareness ofthesuffering has organised aseriesofinternationalmeetingsin doctors inIraq. TheWashington Kurdish Institute researchers intheWest collaborating withKurdish been dueinlarge measure toacademicsand attention. Whatassistancetheyhavereceived has victims havereceived littleinthewayofinternational and appealsformore assistanceforthevictims. with remembrance ceremonies, politicalstatements in Iraqi Kurdistan andincountriesaround theworld higher. Everyyearon16March HalabjaDayismarked estimated ataround 5,500butcouldhavebeenmuch been Kurdish civilians.Thenumberofdeadhasbeen world andclearlyshowedthatmostofthedeadhad The pictures whichtheytookwere seenaround the attacks, Iran allowedjournaliststovisitthetown. of theattackwere treated. Afewdaysafterthe A postgraduate medicalinstitutehasbeen In theyears sincetheattackonHalabja, Refugees from HalabjafledtoIran where survivors blood. eyes.’ Theirurinewasstreaked with and feltasensation‘likeneedlesinthe masks. Thosewhofledcouldbarely see, clothing, theirfacesconcealedbygas darkened streets, dressed inprotective Iranian soldiers flittedthrough the laughing hysterically, before collapsing. their cars. Survivors stumbledaround, slumped overthesteeringwheelsof littered thestreets, huddledindoorways, Dead bodies—humanandanimal— of Halabjacouldseenightmarishscenes. artillery fire. Inthedimlight,people 105 GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS Daniel Feakes collapse of the Soviet Union, the outcome of the 1991 other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or Persian Gulf War (which clearly demonstrated that devices’ and the employment of ‘poison or poisoned chemical weapons are no longer politically desirable), weapons’ (Burroughs and Cabasso 1999: 471–2). So, and not least the clear political will of the majority of while the use of chemical weapons is criminalised, no states to totally prohibit chemical weapons. direct reference to biological weapons is made. Some (Robinson, Stock, and Sutherland 1994: 705) have argued that the Statute could be interpreted as also applying to biological weapons (Burroughs and The negotiation of the CWC, particularly as it entered Cabasso 1999: 472), but the UK government recently its end-game, attracted high-level political attention stated: ‘The use of biological weapons in not from the likes of Australian Foreign Minister Gareth specifically a crime under the ICC Statute at present’ Evans and US Vice-President George H. W. Bush. (United Kingdom 2002: Ev. 24). Thanks in part to the efforts of civil society, the The explicit reference to biological weapons in chemical industry actively followed the negotiations earlier drafts was dropped under pressure from Arab and was largely supportive of the CWC. states: ‘Some states argued that, if nuclear weapons The CWC represents a significant consolidation of were not expressly included, then biological and the international regime against CB chemical weapons, “poor man’s warfare with the creation of a weapons”, ought not to be included verification system of unpre- Few civil society actors either’ (Glasius 2002: 158). cedented intrusiveness overseen by It is also not clear whether the in CB disarmament a new international organisation. Statute criminalises the use of ‘non- The CWC has already served as a paid much attention to lethal’ chemical weapons in warfare. model for the 1996 Comprehensive the negotiation of the However, later elaboration of the Test Ban Treaty and the failed BWC Elements of Crimes saw the ICC Statute, and an Protocol (see Box 5.5) and will inclusion of a footnote stating: doubtless act as a precedent for opportunity to further ‘Nothing in this element shall be future developments within inter- codify the norm interpreted as limiting or prejudicing national law. in any way existing or developing against CB warfare rules of international law with The 1990s and 2000s: The ICC was missed respect to development, production, Statute and the BWC Protocol stockpiling and use of chemical weapons’ (United Nations 1999: 25). The negotiation of the 1998 Statute of the The reference to ‘existing or developing rules of Daniel Feakes International Criminal Court (ICC) represented a international law’ implies recognition of the missed opportunity for strengthening the inter- provisions of the Geneva Protocol and the CWC national regime against CB warfare. The draft statute relating to ‘non-lethal’ chemical weapons. In fact, included four options for defining what weapons this footnote was the result of discrete pressure from were to be criminalised, two of which expressly civil society. prohibited both chemical and biological weapons. In Few if any of the civil society actors in CB negotiating the Statute, states agreed that the war disarmament paid much attention to the negotiation crimes over which jurisdiction was to be established of the ICC Statute and none were in Rome for the should go no further than existing customary final negotiations. The disarmament organisations international law. With respect to CB warfare, this present in Rome were overwhelming concerned with meant that they should reflect the Hague Conventions nuclear weapons; as they had not been sensitised to and the Geneva Protocol but not the more recent the importance of the explicit inclusion of biological BWC and CWC, which are not regarded as having weapons, they did not lobby on the issue. However, entered customary law. However, other parts of the the Statute as adopted is a lot more ambiguous on Statute are more progressive about what constitutes this point than if biological weapons had been customary law, above all the gender provisions. expressly included, and an opportunity to further As the result of political horse-trading in the codify the norm against CB warfare was missed. closing days of the negotiations, the Statute The 1999 Hague Appeal for Peace gathering to

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS criminalises the use of ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or celebrate the centenary of the Hague peace

106 conference represented an opportunity for raising Global Civil Society Activities in civil society awareness of CB weapons. However, Chemical and Biological alongside the many panels on nuclear disarmament and small arms, only two were devoted to CB Disarmament weapons. The resultant Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice included just one paragraph on CB iven the characteristics of civil society weapons. Similarly, the peace, security, and involvement in CB disarmament and the ‘state disarmament strand of the Millennium Forum in Gsecurity discourse’ within which it operates, 2000 made no mention of chemical weapons and the range of activities undertaken is limited compared lumped discussion of biological weapons in with a with other issue-areas and takes as its target audience number of other issues. While this might be the state representatives. One study of civil society result of ignorance on the part of the event activity in international negotiations has identified organisers, it probably also reflects the isolation of seven types of activity: problem definition, agenda civil society in CB disarmament from other sections setting and goal setting; enforcement of principles of global civil society. and norms; provision of information and expertise; The 25th anniversary of the entry public advocacy and mobilisation; into force of the BWC and the 75th lobbying; direct participation in the anniversary of the adoption of the Unlike in other areas formulation of international Geneva Protocol both fell in 2000 and of global civil society agreements; and monitoring and the events could have been used to activity, in CB other assistance with compliance draw much-deserved attention to the (Albin 1999: 378). treaties. In the event, the BWC disarmament there anniversary was marked by specialist has been little space Problem definition, agenda workshops in New York and Geneva for any actors other setting, and goal setting and the Geneva Protocol anniversary by written statements from Presidents than governments to Unlike other areas of global civil Clinton and Putin. Lacking, however, play a role in agenda- society activity, in CB disarmament was any attempt by civil society to setting there has been little space for any sensitise a wider audience to the actors other than governments to significance of these treaties or indeed play a role in agenda-setting. to launch a coordinated campaign to encourage states Whereas the International Coalition to Ban Landmines to ratify them. was able to re-frame antipersonnel landmines from Daniel Feakes The end-game of the negotiations to draft a a purely military to a wider humanitarian and societal supplemental protocol to strengthen the BWC took issue (Short 1999: 496), in CB disarmament global place in 2001 (see Box 5.6). From 1995, civil society civil society has to operate within the ‘state security had focused on influencing the negotiations through discourse’ and has largely had to react to an agenda publications and meetings but had failed to promote the set by governments, specifically an agenda dominated importance of the protocol to wider global civil society, by WMD and lately by CB terrorism. ‘Compared with had not sensitised the media to the issue, and was agenda-setting processes in international trade, unable to mobilise the general public. One assessment human rights, or environmental policy, nongovern- of civil society’s role describes it as ‘successful in shaping mental actors have been only very indirectly involved the verification protocol and prodding it along, yet in identifying and framing problems and possible unable to engender sufficiently broad civil society solutions’ (Bernauer 2001: 630). interest when the rubber hit the road and intense The ‘state security discourse’ means that politics were in order’ (Hammond 2003). governments do ‘not like having civil society involved in national security issues’ (Johnson 2000: 49). One way in which governments operationalise this dislike is by allowing civil society little or no access to the agenda-setting process in CB disarmament when compared with other issue-areas. In the 1960s, civil

society in the shape of Pugwash did achieve a degree GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

107 Box 5.6: The Biological Weapons Convention Verification Protocol

The BWC which was eventually approved by the the protocol. While many non-aligned countries did Geneva disarmament conference in 1971 was a much not participate actively in the negotiations, a group diluted version of the original UK draft treaty including Pakistan, Iran, India, and Cuba actively introduced three years earlier (Sims 2001: 24). Most opposed further restrictions on technology transfers, significantly, it lacked any of the functional substitutes setting them in opposition to Western countries keen for verification included in the UK draft. From its very to strengthen export controls. birth, therefore, some felt that the BWC was in need A largely unknown quantity in the negotiations of strengthening. At each of the subsequent five- was the US. The Clinton Administration’s acceptance yearly review conferences, various states parties have of the ad hoc group process was a reversal of previous spoken in favour of strengthening the BWC, with US policy, which had considered the BWC to be verification having been discussed since 1986 (Sims ‘unverifiable’ but did not represent a whole-hearted 2001: 83). commitment to verification (Sims 2001: 108). However, The 1991 review conference established an ad hoc throughout the negotiations the US was a relatively group of governmental experts ‘to identify and passive participant, many officials from the previous examine potential verification measures from a administration remained in post, and President Clinton scientific and technical standpoint’. A special never gave much-needed political direction to the conference in 1994 created an ad hoc group ‘to lower-level officials. consider appropriate measures, including possible Civil society was represented by a small number of verification measures, and draft proposals to academics and researchers who followed the strengthen the Convention, to be included, as negotiations as best they could given their limited appropriate, in a legally binding instrument’. Between access to the meetings. They produced reports of the 1995 and 2001, the ad hoc group drafted a detailed negotiations for a wider audience and also technical ‘verification protocol’ intended to supplement, but reports aimed at the diplomats participating in the not replace, the original BWC. negotiations (Rissanen 2002: 33). This protocol, like the CWC upon which it was The chairman of the negotiations released his draft largely modelled, was built upon three verification of the verification protocol in March 2001, a few ‘pillars’, namely, national declarations, visits by months after President Bush assumed office. While international inspectors to declared facilities, and he urged civil society to support the protocol and Daniel Feakes investigations in cases of suspected violations. pressure governments to do likewise, the issue lacked Implementation of the protocol would have been profile and the small group of academics and overseen by a new international organisation (Feakes researchers who had been following the negotiations 2001). The negotiations proceeded slowly with lacked the means and constituency to organise a large deadlines for completion being set and then missed. campaign. In addition, there were splits among this The European Union and others such as Australia, group with some arguing that the draft protocol did Canada, and South Africa were strongly supportive of not go far enough but most that it was ‘better than

of success in shaping the international agenda on CB and widely accepted and that disarmament treaties warfare, but this was before the agenda became are in force. These treaties ‘establish standards against dominated by concerns of WMD and CB terrorism. which transnational civil society can, and does, loudly and publicly compare the actual behavior of states Enforcement of principles and norms and corporations’ (Florini 2000: 225). One example of this is the role played by civil society in upholding the Civil society has been more active in CB disarmament broad definitions of CB weapons used in the CWC and with regard to the normative area aided by the fact BWC, otherwise known as the ‘general purpose

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS that the taboo against CB warfare is so long-standing criteria’ (Tuerlings and Robinson 1999). Given the

108 nothing’. During early 2001, the Bush Administration and in newspapers. The issue was also raised by conducted an internal review of the protocol. This parliamentarians in a number of countries. Despite was the time of greatest (but still limited) non- the early warnings, there was little that could be governmental pressure within the US joined also by done to prevent the US rejection of the protocol or diplomatic pressure from Washington’s European allies. to pressure other governments to continue without However, leaks to the press made it very clear that the the US. After the US announced its rejection, ‘[t]he protocol lacked strong supporters within the new NGOs came together and launched a “counter- administration (Feakes and Littlewood 2002). offensive”, trying to rally public and governmental With the November 2001 deadline for completion support for the Protocol. They contacted members of of the protocol negotiations fast approaching, BWC their respective parliaments and wrote op-eds and states parties met in July in Geneva to give their letters to the editor in newspapers and magazines, opinions on the protocol. On the first two days, over trying to enhance greater domestic interest in and 50 states spoke in support of the chairman’s efforts. support for the Protocol’ (Rissanen 2002). However, However, in its statement the US announced not only this reactive approach was really too little too late, its rejection of the protocol as drafted, but also its and it ultimately failed. rejection of the entire approach taken by the ad hoc However, the protocol soon faded from public group since 1995 (Chevrier 2001). Unlike in other attention and is remembered now, if at all, in the treaty negotiations the idea of continuing without wider world as just one in a series of international the US was never seriously considered by the ad hoc treaties rejected by the new Bush Administration. group despite being mentioned by some delegates The US rejection of the BWC protocol had already and non-governmental experts. A number of different soured the atmosphere prior to the November 2001 reasons have since been given. The ad hoc group review conference. However, the situation worsened always operated on the basis of consensus and the US further when the US tabled a last-minute proposal could have blocked adoption of the protocol. Without to terminate the mandate of the ad hoc group. No the US, the protocol would not apply to the world’s other country could accept this and the conference largest biotech and pharmaceutical industry, thus was therefore suspended for a one-year cooling-off disadvantaging competitors in countries which did period. As states parties reconvened in Geneva in join. It was also argued that the absence of the US November 2002, expectations of a successful Daniel Feakes would create a domino effect, with other countries outcome were low. In the end, a minimal action plan also deciding to stay out. for the period up until the 2006 review conference Paradoxically, it was only with the rejection of was adopted involving annual meetings on specific the protocol by the US that the issue achieved a topics. With the first meeting scheduled for August higher public profile and many of the academics and 2003, the value of this so-called new process cannot researchers who had been following the negotiations yet be ascertained. were interviewed on television news programmes

preponderance of scientists within the CB disarma- and military authorities to strengthen their ment community, much attention has been paid to commitment to the international humanitarian law the ethics of chemical, and particularly biological, norms which prohibit the hostile uses of biological research. agents and to work together to subject potentially As in other areas of international humanitarian dangerous biotechnology to effective controls’ and law, the International Committee of the Red Cross has also on ‘the scientific and medical communities, played its traditional normative role in CB disarma- industry and civil society in general to ensure that ment. In 2002, it launched an appeal on Biotechnology, potentially dangerous biological knowledge and agents

Weapons and Humanity, which called on ‘all political be subject to effective controls’ (ICRC 2002). GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

109 Provision of information and expertise While the media are some of the primary consumers of CB disarmament information and The primary activity for civil society in CB expertise, the relationship is a relatively reactive one disarmament is the provision of information and from the point of view of the experts. Civil society expertise. This reflects the academic backgrounds of actors in CB disarmament do not spend a lot of time many of the individuals involved. For them, written proactively sensitising the media to particular issues, publications and the provision of expertise are more but they do spend time responding to questions from highly valued than participation in public advocacy journalists and reacting to events. The passive or mobilisation. There are four target audiences: approach was illustrated recently when, although policy-makers and diplomats; other global civil many experts doubted that Iraq possessed a stockpile society actors; the media; and the general public. of CB weapons worth going to war for, few of them The vast majority of the civil society actors in CB proactively sought opportunities to promote their disarmament see policy-makers in national capitals opinion. An example of a proactive approach from and diplomats involved in negotiations as their civil society was the briefing packs prepared for the primary audience. During the BWC protocol media on the BWC protocol by the International negotiations, the University of Bradford Department Security Information Service (URL) in the UK. of Peace Studies produced a series of 33 briefing Occasionally, civil society actors involved in CB papers and 22 evaluation papers for the diplo- disarmament write for a wider audience, particularly mats involved (Pearson 2002: 3). One in an attempt to explain a complex diplomat wrote later that the nego- issue and to play down the often tiations ‘received an important By and large the CB exaggerated threat portrayed by the political and substantive impetus by disarmament media (Murphy, Hay, and Rose 1984: discussions in and publications community has not ; Croddy 2002). In 2001, the British emanating from academic and American Security Information scientific circles and the NGO- been a successful Council published a guide to community’ (Kervers 2002: 278). Civil advocate or mobiliser BW intended for non-specialists society also provides information and (Crowley 2001) and a shorter expertise to governments through information pamphlet. The pam- service on advisory bodies such as the CWC National phlet summarised the main concerns about BW and Authority Advisory Committee in the UK and the advocated the completion of the BWC protocol Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee negotiations. in Canada. Daniel Feakes Other publications provide information to fellow Public advocacy and mobilisation civil society actors in CB disarmament. For example, the quarterly CBW Conventions Bulletin contains It is with public advocacy and mobilisation that civil the only publicly available account of developments society has had most difficulties in CB disarmament. within the Organization for the Prohibition of There are exceptions, but by and large the CB Chemical Weapons in addition to a chronology of disarmament community has not been a successful recent CB warfare-related events and a bibliography advocate or mobiliser. In the words of one community of relevant publications. While undertaking and member: ‘We have excellent subject matter experts; publishing its own research, the Sunshine Project has but don’t know how to do outreach.’ (Hammond 2003). also established an on-line clearing house of official This can be explained by at least four factors: the US documents declassified under the Freedom of types of civil society actors involved; the complexity Information Act, thereby allowing others to use of the subject matter; the difficulty of engaging the them in their own research (Sunshine Project 2003). public generally on disarmament issues; and the fact In addition, professional or membership-based that the CWC and BWC give the impression that CB organisations such as the World Medical Association disarmament has been achieved. or the British Medical Association have disseminated An interesting contrast is provided by the public information to their members, drawing their campaign mobilised in March 2002 against the US attention to CB disarmament issues. decision to call for the removal of the director-

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS general of the Organization for the Prohibition of

110 Chemical Weapons, the Brazilian diplomat Jose encouragement to supportive Senators … [W]ere able Bustani. The campaign did not originate with the to make unique contributions to the national debate civil society actors in CB disarmament (some of whom that can only be made by outside, independent shared the US concerns about Bustani’s leadership), actors. (Parachini 1997: 37) but with peace activists in the MoveOn.org (URL) organisation. However, it gained widespread press attention in the UK, an Internet petition, and a letter Direct participation in the formulation of to The Guardian signed by figures from popular international agreements culture, and forced the UK government to explain its support for the US in Parliament. The issue was a Governments have allowed no scope for civil society transient one as Bustani was soon removed to directly participate in the formulation of inter- nonetheless, but it did demonstrate what could be national agreements relating to CB disarmament. achieved. The closest which civil society comes to such a role is the opportunity for transmitting policy ideas Lobbying indirectly within the Pugwash CB warfare study group, which has both governmental and non- The CB disarmament community has had some governmental membership, including industry success in lobbying but, as with public advocacy and participation. As Adler (1992: 105) notes: ‘[T]he mobilisation, lobbying is not an political influence of transnational activity which comes naturally to Governments have epistemic communities, such as the those involved. In addition, lobbying Pugwash group in the security field, allowed no scope for in CB disarmament is an activity is most likely to rest on the transfer which takes place mainly at a civil society to directly from the international to the national rather than an international participate in the domestic scene of the ideas that level. national scientists and experts raise formulation of inter- The US ratification of the CWC, at their transnational meetings.’ for example, was helped considerably national agreements Workshops of the Pugwash study by US civil society. When the CWC relating to CB group on CB warfare are nowadays was first considered by the Senate in timed and located so as to coincide disarmament September 1996, opponents of the with international conferences CWC made all the running, led by relating to CB disarmament, thus Republican senators assisted by some civil society ensuring a high level of attendance by both civil Daniel Feakes organisations opposed to the treaty. When it was society and governmental representatives. reintroduced early in 1997, the treaty’s supporters in the White House, Congress, and civil society were Monitoring and other assistance with better prepared. Although the ratification process compliance was handled badly by the Clinton Administration, the US eventually ratified with a few days to spare Opportunities for civil society to monitor (Smithson 1997). According to an account of the compliance in CB disarmament do exist and have campaign, civil society contributed to the national been exploited to a limited degree. However, once debate in four ways. They again the influence of the ‘state security discourse’ means that the role of civil society is limited and elevated the intensity of public debate on the that what few activities have taken place have Convention and the problems posed by the done so at a national rather than a global level. An proliferation of chemical weapons … [I]mproved example of national monitoring is the work of the coordination and communication among themselves, Sunshine Project in detailing the extent of the with the executive and legislative branches of biodefence programmes of the German military government, and with the news media … [H]elped to (van Aken 2001) and its investigation into the US focus members of the Clinton administration on the Joint Non Lethal Weapons Directorate (Sunshine task at hand in the months prior to active Project 2002a).

presidential engagement, while providing GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

111 The Sunshine Project, in a tactic borrowed from how to ensure effective national implementation of civil society groups working on environmental both treaties, and, perhaps most importantly, how to problems, has also taken this monitoring role a address non-compliance with treaty obligations and stage further by filing a legal suit against the enforce treaty prohibitions. Failure to address these Directorate for violating the national law which implementation challenges can be just as damaging to implements the BWC in the US (Sunshine Project the international regime against CB warfare as failure 2002b). Tuerlings and Robinson (1999), in their to further consolidate the regime. elaboration of a ‘tri-sectoral network’ involving The involvement of civil society in CB disarmament the public (governments), the private (industry), is now in a phase of transformation. There are four and the civil (non-government) sectors, highlight primary driving forces at work: the apparent end of the role of the civil sector, particularly academic and multilateral treaty-making as exemplified by the research scientists, in monitoring new developments collapse of the BWC protocol negotiations; a within biology and chemistry and thus contributing heightened public awareness of CB weapons, to upholding the relevance of the CWC and BWC in particularly of proliferation and terrorism; the face of scientific and techno- developments in other sections of logical advances. CB disarmament global civil society; and the creation of an alternative frame for treaties have been CB weapons. Not all of these Conclusions successfully phenomena are new; CB weapons he current situation is one in negotiated, meaning rated high in the public conscious- which, in contrast to nuclear ness in the late 1960s and again in Tweapons, the use, production, that CB disarmament the 1980s, and there have been development, and stockpiling of CB appears to have other periods when treaty-making weapons has been banned under been done seems to have been at an end. What international law. The international makes the current situation unique regime against CB warfare has is the combination of all of these many adherents: the BWC has 146 states parties; the factors and the interplay between them. CWC has 151 states parties; and the Geneva Protocol The collapse of the BWC protocol negotiations has 132 states parties. In many ways this is an made some civil society actors in CB disarmament immensely encouraging situation but it also works seek out new, more radical approaches, which they against the international regime. With regard to readily found in other areas of global civil society. nuclear weapons, disarmament and delegitimisation Increased public awareness has provided an Daniel Feakes have not yet taken place, meaning that a lot of opportunity and a requirement for CB disarmament political and public attention is still paid to to be re-framed away from the state-centric, abstract, achieving or obstructing these goals. and technically complex focus on WMD and towards In contrast, CB disarmament treaties have been a more inclusive and resonant alternative. successfully negotiated and are now in force, meaning For a number of reasons, the way in which CB that CB disarmament is no longer a significant weapons are currently framed is neither useful nor political issue as it appears to have been ‘done’. It is accurate. WMD is in many ways a spurious concept common for international treaties to lose political and because CB weapons have much more in common public profile once they have entered the phase of with each other than either have with nuclear routine implementation and the international regime weapons: ‘Only nuclear weapons are completely against CB warfare is no exception (Flowerree 1990). indiscriminate by their explosive power, heat radiation While many governments and civil society and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be organisations were involved in campaigns for CWC called a weapon of mass destruction’ (Harigel 2001). ratification at the national level, many of them did not CB weapons differ from nuclear weapons in their maintain their involvement once the campaign had potential lethality and destructive power, feasibility of succeeded. Key issues in this post-negotiation phase protection, and defences, potential mission, and legal include: how to ensure that the BWC and CWC keep constraints on use and possession (Panofsky 1998). pace with developments in science and technology, The current public concern about CB terrorism

GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS how to uphold restrictions on non-lethal CB weapons, overestimates the ease with which CB weapons can

112 be produced and disseminated, as a closer study of infectious disease knows no boundaries and West the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo demonstrates. Nile Virus or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome According to the US Department of Defense in 1996: demonstrate that our globalising world actually ‘The ability to create mass casualties by using facilitates the spread of disease, primarily through air chemical and biological weapons depends on many transport. One eminent biologist writes that: ‘[T]he factors. Finding the right agent, weaponizing the problem of biological weapons rises above the agent, delivering the agent in an effective manner, security interests of individual states and poses an and waiting for the optimal meteorological conditions unprecedented challenge to all’ (Meselson 2000: 19). would be a challenge to any terrorist group. We just As the issue of landmines was ‘humanitarianized’ need to keep in perspective the reality of recent and (de Larrinaga and Turenne Sjolander 1998), the new potential events’ (Swain 1996). frame for CB weapons would have to incorporate In addition, the current framing of CB weapons CB weapons into the emerging concept of ‘human lacks resonance for global civil society. While security’. Few other weapons are as indiscriminate participation in and attention to other areas of as CB weapons and almost none affects only international law by civil society are humans (and plants and animals), increasing, its involvement in CB leaving property and infrastructure disarmament has remained static. If an alternative untouched. A more inclusive frame This matters because, as other areas frame for CB weapons for CB weapons would build on the of global civil society have shown, is to be realised, the linkages between CB disarmament when international agreements or on the one hand and public health regimes are under threat, public existing civil society and biodiversity on the other. pressure and civil society action can actors will have to The current frame has failed to be effective in reducing the threat. change their mindset resonate with governments or civil The small epistemic community society in the developing world, so currently following CB disarmament and habits an approach which emphasises the can only sit and watch when, for linkages with public health and example, the BWC protocol collapses. biodiversity should be more success- An alternative frame for CB weapons would ful. Another element in this alternative frame, again encourage the evolution of a what Keck and Sikkink reflecting developments in other areas, would be the (1998) describe as a ‘transnational advocacy network’ concept of individual responsibility. The current consisting not only of an epistemic community but treaties against CB warfare are directed mainly to also of public movement campaigns and non-violent the actions of states, not individuals. Recently, it has Daniel Feakes direct action, all cooperating with each other. This is been proposed to make acts prohibited to states already the case in nuclear disarmament: ‘The track crimes under international law. The International record shows that civil society was most successful Criminal Court Statute does not criminalise the when it worked at both the elite and public specific prohibitions of the CWC and BWC, so a draft movement levels … The very different strategies of treaty to do so has been prepared by the Harvard prominent public activism and quiet, behind-the- Sussex Program (Meselson and Robinson 1998). By scenes partnerships with policy makers can reinforce extending universal jurisdiction to violations of the each other’ (Johnson 2000: 75). CWC and BWC, the draft treaty would make violators An alternative frame would incorporate numerous hostes humani generi (‘enemies of all humanity’). elements. The state-centric focus of the WMD frame However, it is by no means certain that the issue would be replaced by an emphasis on the threat can be re-framed satisfactorily. The negotiation of the which CB weapons pose to global security and a Mine Ban Convention provides some food for return to the taboo against the use of poison and thought: ‘One of the great turning points in the disease in warfare: ‘Indeed, perhaps we must now efforts to ban [anti-personnel landmines] involved start looking at that ancient taboo against CBW and changing the terms of the debate from a military to at the BWC it has generated, not so much as a a humanitarian issue … The Ottawa Process certainly contribution to our national security, but as essential benefited from a media-friendly, morally unambigu- underpinning for the welfare and even the survival ous issue. Unfortunately, it may also suggest that

of our species’(Poste and Robinson 2000: 9). After all, the scope for such initiatives may be limited to certain GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS

113 topics’ (Short 1999: 496). Comparisons with I would like to thank Julian Perry Robinson, Mary Kaldor landmines are not necessarily useful. CB weapons and Marlies Glasius for their comments on earlier drafts have already been banned by international law and of this chapter, and Edward Hammond and Chandre treaties are being implemented, thus removing the Gould for their insights via e-mail. potential for a simple and direct ‘ban CB weapons’ campaign. A campaign based on ‘implement the CWC and References BWC as negotiated’ is not nearly as memorable. In addition, landmines are a tangible item intended for Adler, E. (1992). ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National a single use. CB weapons, in contrast, are largely Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution intangible items and the chemical and biological of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’. International agents which are their key components are dual- Organization, 46: 101–45. use, with many legitimate purposes which cannot — and Haas, P. M (1992). ‘Conclusion: Epistemic be hindered. Symbolism is also important. The Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a landmines campaign, like other civil society Reflective Research Program’. International campaigns, used powerful images and testimony Organization 46: 367–90. from witnesses and victims, often women and Albin, C. (1999). ‘Can NGOs Enhance the Effectiveness of children. While there are, of course, victims of CB International Negotiation?’ International Negotiation, weapons—for example, Iraqis who survived the 43: 371–87. Halabja massacre and those who were infected with Alibek, K. and Handelman, S. (1999). Biohazard: The anthrax from contaminated letters in the US—they Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological are not nearly so numerous. Weapons Program in the World—Told From Inside by If an alternative frame for CB weapons is to be the Man Who Ran It. London: Hutchinson. realised, the existing civil society actors in CB Anheier, H., Glasius, M., and Kaldor, M. (2001). ‘Introducing disarmament will have to change their mindset and Global Civil Society’. In H. Anheier, M. Glasius, and M. habits. More emphasis needs to be placed on public Kaldor (eds), Global Civil Society 2001. Oxford: Oxford advocacy and mobilisation, activities which the University Press. current academically oriented community is too ill- Atwood, D. C. (2002). ‘NGOs and Disarmament: Views from equipped and under-resourced to carry out. In the Coal Face’. Disarmament Forum, 1: 5–14. particular, partnerships need to be established with Balmer, B. (2001). Britain and Biological Warfare: Expert other sections of global civil society so that, as in Advice and Science Policy 1930–1965. London: nuclear disarmament, the different actors can Palgrave. Daniel Feakes conduct joint campaigns involving policy research, Bernauer, T. (2001). ‘Warfare: Nuclear, Biological, and public movements, and direct action, with all actors Chemical Weapons’. In P. Simmons and C. de Jonge playing to their own strengths. Oudraat (eds), Managing Global Issues: Lessons The creation of the BioWeapons Prevention Project Learned. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for could indicate that moves in this direction are under International Peace. way; but the Project’s prolonged birth is also a sign BioWeapons Prevention Project . that this approach is not unanimously accepted. The Burroughs, J. and Cabasso, J. (1999). ‘Confronting the current civil society actors in CB disarmament need Nuclear-Armed States in International Negotiating to become better communicators so that their ideas Forums: Lessons for NGOs’. International Negotiation, 4: and policy proposals reach beyond the present narrow 459–82. target audience. As in other civil society campaigns, Carroll, S. (2002). ‘NGO Access to Multilateral Fora: Does more use ought to be made of political opportunity Disarmament Lag Behind?’ Disarmament Forum, 1: structures, such as the anniversary of particular 15–26. treaties and other international conferences and Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey events like the anthrax letters and the war against Institute for International Studies Iraq, to educate or interest the public. The intro- . duction of biological weapons issues into biodiversity Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute and biosafety negotiations is one such example, but .

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