Nigeria's 2015 General Elections

Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections Ladi Hamalai • Samuel Egwu • J. Shola Omotola Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections

Continuity and Change in Electoral Democracy Ladi Hamalai Samuel Egwu National Institute for Legislative Department of Political Science Studies University of Jos Abuja, Nigeria Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria

J. Shola Omotola Research and Training Department National Institute for Legislative Studies Abuja, Nigeria

ISBN 978-3-319-54095-5 ISBN 978-3-319-54096-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017939865

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland CONTENTS

1 Introduction 1

2 Theoretical and Structural Issues in Nigerian Politics 13

3 Continuity and Change in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy 45

4 Party System and the Dominance of the People’s Democratic Party 73

5 Trends in Voter Behaviour, 1999–2015 103

6 Trends in Election Outcomes, 1999–2015 125

7 Democratic Governance and Political Accountability, 1999–2015 139

8 Electoral Reform and Electoral Administration, 1999– 2015 165

9 Party Politics in the 2015 Nigerian Elections 183

10 The 2015 Presidential Election 203

v vi CONTENTS

11 The 2015 National Assembly Election 231

12 The 2015 Gubernatorial Election 251

13 The 2015 Elections and the Future of Electoral Democracy 273

Bibliography 303

Index 307 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Dr Ladi Hamalai is the Director-General of the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS). An Associate Professor, she was the pioneer Project Coordinator of Policy Analysis and Research Project (PARP), National Assembly, since 2004. She holds Doctorate Degree in Development Studies of the University of Sussex, Brighton, UK. Dr Ladi lectured in the University of Maiduguri and Nigerian Defence Academy from 1982 to 2003. A specialist in economic policy making in Nigeria, she has authored several international publications and holds National Awards: Member of the Order of Federal Republic (MFR), 2001 and one of the 50 Women of Distinction honoured by the Presidency in 2010. Samuel Egwu is Professor of Political Economy and Development Studies in the Department of Political Science, University of Jos. A former President of the Nigerian Political Science Association, he previously worked as the Governance Adviser to the United Nations Development Programme in Nigeria. He has published extensively on governance in Nigeria. He was a member of the 2014 National Conference as a Kogi state delegate to chart a new political course for the country. In 2017, he was appointed a Resident Electoral Commissioner of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). J. Shola Omotola ([email protected]) is Professor of Political Science and Head of Department at the Federal University, Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti State, Nigeria. He has previously worked as a Consultant and Head of the Socio-Political Unit of the Department of Research and Training, National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS), National Assembly,

vii viii ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Abuja, Nigeria. He was, until August 2015, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Redeemer’s University, Nigeria. He obtained his PhD in Comparative African Politics and Governance from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His primary research interests are in comparative African governance institutions, democratization and election studies, legislative studies, oil and environmental politics in the Niger Delta and conﬂict and peacebuilding. His publications on these and related themes have appeared in African Affairs, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, African and Asian Studies, Africa Review, Africa Today, African Security Review, African Sociological Review, Journal of African Law, Taiwan Journal of Democracy etc. He is co-editor of The State in Contemporary Nigeria: Issues, Perspectives and Challenges, 2016; The Legislature and Governance in Nigeria (2014); and Horror in Paradise: Framework for Understanding the Crisis of the Niger Delta, 2014. LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Composition of federal house of representatives by political parties, 1959–1964 84 Table 4.2 Composition of senate by political parties, 1979–1983 84 Table 4.3 Composition of house of representatives and senate by political parties, 1999–2015 85 Table 4.4 Composition of governorship seats by political parties, 1999–2015 86 Table 5.1 Nigeria voter registration proﬁle (1959–2015) 112 Table 5.2 Voter registration and turnout in Nigeria’s presidential election, 1999–2015 113 Table 5.3 Voter registration and turnout in burkina faso, cape verde, chad and ghana presidential election since 1991 116 Table 5.4 South African elections: Voting age, population, voter registration and turnout 116 Table 5.5 Voter registration and turnout in Sri Lanka and Singapore presidential election since 1994 117 Table 5.6 A comparison of the percentage of voter turnout in the last parliamentary 118 Table 6.1 Presidential election result by political party (1999–2015) 131 Table 6.2 Distribution of governors by political parties (1999–2015) 132 Table 6.3 Re-election and retention rate in the US senate 132 Table 10.1 A summary of selected election observation reports in Nigeria, 1999–2015 213 Table 10.2 Results of the presidential election, 2015 217 Table 10.3 Results of 2015 presidential election by geo-political zones 218 Table 10.4 Result of the 1999 presidential election 218

ix x LIST OF TABLES

Table 10.5 Spatial breakdown of voter turnout in presidential elections, 2011 and 2015 219 Table 10.6 Result of the 2003 presidential election 220 Table 10.7 Result of the 2007 presidential election 221 Table 10.8 Result of the 2011 presidential election 222 Table 10.9 Voter turnout in presidential elections, 1959–2007 222 Table 11.1 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 1999 election results 235 Table 11.2 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2003 election results 236 Table 11.3 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2007 election results 237 Table 11.4 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2011 election results 237 Table 11.5 Women representation in the NA, 1999–2011 238 Table 11.6 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2015 election results 244 Table 12.1 Conﬁguration of governorship seats among parties before the 2015 election 253 Table 12.2 Results of the 2015 gubernatorial elections 266 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This book examines the signiﬁcance of the 2015 elections in consolidating Nigeria’s democracy. It is situated within the historical context of the difﬁculty at routinizing democracy since the attainment of nationhood in 1960 and the return to civil rule in May 1999, in particular. However, the book goes beyond a narrative of the elections as an event or a series of events that occurred during the conduct of the 2015 elections. Rather, it attempts to offer a holistic analysis of Nigeria’s electoral process in terms of how the unfolding dynamics of limited changes in the constitutional, institutional, attitudinal and the behavioural frameworks that underpin electoral competition in Nigeria played out in the elections. Therefore, the book attempts to examine the conduct and outcome of the 2015 elections against the background of the pattern of electoralism that had been established since the return to democracy in 1999. But more importantly, the book seeks to draw attention to the dialectics of continuity and change that have been thrown up by the elections and how the lessons learned can be used to build a more enduring democratic system, not only for elections whose outcomes are widely acceptable, but also a democracy that is truly accountable to the Nigerian people in terms of service delivery and addressing the challenges of poverty and social exclusion.

WHY THE BOOK MATTERS Elections have always been a central defining theme in the democratization process, especially of new democracies and even more so in Nigeria where flawed and bitterly contested elections have repeatedly brought democratic aspirations of the citizens to early grief. Though generally regarded as inadequate, given that elections cannot in and of themselves make a democracy, their regularity has been hailed as an important step towards democratic consolidation (Diamond, 2008; Lindberg, 2006). As such, election studies will continue to be an attractive unit of analysis in democratization studies. Secondly, and specifically in Nigeria’s case, elections have always been considered, as in many other African countries, as arguably the weakest link in the democratization process, failing to satisfy their widely acclaimed democratic qualities of competition, participation and legitimacy (Omotola, 2013). This was the general trend and perception of Nigerian elections prior to the conduct of the 2015 elections (Obi, 2008; Adebayo and Omotola, 2007). The general outlook towards the 2015 elections was gloomy. The electoral environment was excessively polluted by a number of factors and the terrain became endangered and slippery. Among other concerns, the reactivation of the north-south divide, rooted in ethno-regional and religious identities, as demonstrated in 2011 when the two leading presidential candidates, namely Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, were packaged and largely behaved as though they were bearers of ethno-regional and religious torch, sent the signal that the 2015 elections may not be significantly different from the precious ones, especially the 2011 elections. Indeed, the 2015 elections elevated ethno-regional and religious polarizations in the country to an unprecedented height. Added to this were the vexed question of the introduction and use of Permanent Voters Card (PVCs) and Electronic Card Reader (ECR), including the accusations and counter-accusations on the alleged lopsidedness in the distribution of PVCs between the two leading political parties, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC), and by logical extension between the north and the south. There was also the raging security dilemma, exemplified most notably by the Boko Haram insurgency with stronghold in the north- eastern part of the country. The influence of the insurgency was so strong that it provided the excuse for the federal government to postpone the elections for over one month. Electioneering campaigns too were largely WHY THE BOOK MATTERS 3 uninspiring, with the language of politics provocative and offensive, indeed characterized by the resort to hate speech. It was, therefore, hardly surprising to see the ascendancy of doomsday prophesies about the elections and the democratization process. In an open letter to then President Jonathan, for example, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, a former Minister of External Affairs under the Babangida administration, after a careful review of the electoral landscape, concluded that the presidential election, irrespective of its outcomes, could instigate post-election violence of great magnitude than had ever been witnessed in the country (Akinyemi, 2014). Before Akinyemi’s prediction had been a much more terrifying warning by John Campbell, a former US Ambassador to Nigeria, suggesting that unless urgent steps were taken to address the challenges facing the country, Nigeria could disintegrate in 2015. The coincidence of the 2015 elections with the projected year of fulfilment of this ‘prediction’ only added troubling dimensions to the 2015 elections. Given the unfavour- able electoral environment as highlighted earlier, Nigerians were worried about the probable fulfilment of this prediction. It follows, logically, that so many things were grossly stacked against the successful conduct of the 2015 elections, with the fear that the elections may go the troubled ways of their predecessors since 1999, particularly the 2011 elections, if not worse. However, Nigeria defied the odds. The elections were not only generally peaceful, with limited election-related violence and deaths compared to previous elections, they also produced unprecedented, positive outcomes that could advance democratization if well harnessed. One of the most unique outcomes of the election was that it led to the alternation of power, the first of its kind in the annals of Nigeria’s electoral history. While it was already significant that an opposition party could defeat an incumbent government, a rare feat in electoral democracy, it was even much more important that the incumbent president, who had just lost power, could quickly concede defeat and congratulate the victorious opposition candidate even before the final tabulation and announcement of official results. Interestingly too, there were no petitions/litigations against the results of the presidential election. This was also the first time such a thing would happen since 1999. The National Assembly (NA) (federal legislative) and state elections also exhibited certain unique characteristics. The most obvious and significant relates to the recomposition and reconfiguration of power 4 1 INTRODUCTION in both chambers of the NA, where for the first time since 1999, and as in the presidential election, the ruling party lost its majority in parliament. Though the PDP had been dominant in parliament since 1999, signs of its gradual decline began manifesting in the 2011 elections when the opposition made considerable gains against the PDP. Similar tendencies manifested in the state elections, where the PDP also lost many of the states under its control to the APC. All these feats were unprecedented. Yet, the 2015 elections were not all about positive outcomes. There were also some negative manifestations as the elections radiated some old tendencies in Nigerian elections. These included the prominence of ethno-regional and religious considerations, pockets of pre-election violence, excessive use of money in violation of the regulation governing campaign financing, abuse of party primaries at different levels, low level of women participation and success in elections, violation of regulations governing media, especially in terms of equal access to all parties in state-owned media outlets, and resort to hate speech, among others. The import of the foregoing is that the 2015 elections were characterized by elements of continuity and change; the former exemplified by the long established traditions in Nigerian elections and the latter by the unprecedented heights recorded in various aspects of the elections, most notably the alternation of power. Therefore, it is pertinent to critically explore and explain both tendencies of continuity and change, in the 2015 elections. How do we account for continuity and change in the 2015 Nigerian elections? What factors underpin the dynamics of continuity and change in the elections? What lessons can be drawn from the overall governance of the elections for the consolidation of Nigeria’s democracy? These are some of the broad concerns which this book seeks to address. We are cognizant of the few publications that have been made on the subject. However, most of such publications are journal articles analysing different aspects of the elections shortly after the elections. To the best of our knowledge, there is not yet a book-length publication on the subject. Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this book, both in terms of its theoretical orientations and empirical illustrations, makes the book a worthy scholarly intervention. By underscoring elements of continuity and change in the 2015 elections, the book has strong historical grounding, as well as comparative insight. STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 5

SCOPE AND COVERAGE OF THE BOOK This book focuses on the dynamics of continuity and change in the 2015 Nigerian elections. With such a focus, the book offers much more than a mere narrative of the story of the 2015 elections. It also presents a critical and comprehensive analysis of Nigeria’s democratization process from a largely institutional perspective. Consequently, the theoretical framework of the book addresses important issues of federalism, ethnicity and class as core analytical themes in the understanding of Nigerian government and politics. Guided by the insights offered by these frameworks, the book explores other salient themes in Nigeria’s electoral processes since 1999, including the rise and fall of the PDP, voting patterns and behaviour, democratic accountability beyond elections, party politics, as well as separate chapters on the Presidential, NA and Governorship elections. In each of these themes, the dynamics of continuity and change were underscored, including institutional innovations and designs, as well as critical reform issues that engendered more effective administration of the 2015 elections.

ANOTE ON METHODOLOGY The book is situated within the mixed method of research, drawing on both the qualitative and quantitative design supplemented by historical and comparative analysis. Data for the study were drawn largely from secondary sources, including books, journals, ofﬁcial publications by relevant electoral stakeholders such as the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and election observation groups, seminar/conference papers, newspapers and magazines and other internet sources. The data were analysed using qualitative content analysis, together with quantitative tools such as tables, graphs and percentage analysis.

STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS The book is organized into 13 chapters. Each of the chapters discusses important theoretical issues around politics and elections in Nigeria, as well as critical trends and developments in party politics and elections beginning from the return to civil rule in 1999 and the 2015 general elections. The first chapter provides a general introduction to the book, 6 1 INTRODUCTION underscoring the significance of such an intervention at this particular point of Nigeria’s democratization. Chapter 2 explores some of the salient theoretical considerations in coming to terms with issues of power, politics and democracy in Nigeria. These issues have given and continue to give Nigerian politics, shape and structure, including the determination of the party system, the issues that frame electioneering campaigns and structure voter preferences, and define the deep structural, institutional and behavioural elements of Nigerian politics. Some of these theoretical and philosophical issues impact on social cleavages such as class and ethnicity, the secularity of the state and the impact of the federal idea and consociation measures on the management of diversity and the electoral process. Not only do these issues resonate in the electoral process as witnessed in the 2015 elections, they are intertwined and linked in the way they frame issues of politics, power and democracy in Nigeria. The appeal to ethnic, regional and communal constituencies by politicians frame politics and elections around these issues with dire consequences for national unity and coherence, yet these identities are readily mobilized by class conscious actors. Ethno-regional political organizations such as the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Ohaneze N’digbo and Afenifere that mask class interests in ethnic garbs should be understood in this manner. Beyond the crisis of internal democracy that crippled the PDP and other parties, the challenge of managing ethnic diversity and of balancing ethnic and regional representation in the recruitment of party leadership and rotation of key executive and legislative positions bring to the foreground the high points of the 2015 general elections. In a similar manner, contestations around the secularity of the Nigerian state played out in the emergence of Boko Haram-led insurgency which threatened Nigeria’s unity and the elections. In Chapter 3, the book offers a panoramic overview of the dynamics of continuity and change in the 2015 elections against the background of Nigeria’s democratization since 1999. Specifically, the chapter highlights salient elements of continuity in the areas of the politics of brinkmanship that has always been a recurrent feature of Nigerian politics since the First Republic. This is exemplified in the undue influences of ethno-regional and religious identities, raising tension in the elections to a dizzying height. Other elements of continuity include the problematic nature of party primaries and candidate selection, especially at the state level, the violation of regulatory norms on campaign financing and media accessibility, as well as the continuing low level of women participation and STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 7 representation in politics, among others. With respect to change, the 2015 elections heralded, for the first time in the annals of Nigeria’s election, the alternation of power between the ruling and opposition parties. Moreover, the election witnessed considerable measure of improvement in the quality of electoral administration for a number of reasons. These include electoral reform initiatives, leading to innovations and improved capacity of INEC for electoral governance, the deployment of technology (card reader), strong civic engagement and citizen agency and the emergence of a strong opposition through party merger, among others. Chapter 4 of the book examines the rise and fall of the PDP from its formation in 1998 through its 16 years of controlling power at the national level and in most of the 36 states of the federation, to the 2015 elections when it was defeated by the opposition APC. The significance of PDP goes beyond the fact that it was a dominant ruling party for over one decade of Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999. The greater significance of the party probably lies in its being a semblance of a national party that came to be associated with Nigeria’s democratic stability. Conscious of its size and membership which cuts across Nigeria’s ethnic and regional divide and incorporating leading political elite from the minority ethnic nationalities, the party, just as the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the Second Republic, adopted a zonal principle in the distribution of party offices as well as key executive and legislative positions. The party’s handling of the zoning principle, especially in the aftermath of the death of President Umaru Yar’adua in 2010 created a series of events leading to the implosion of the party just before the 2015 general elections. What the chapter offers is the sociology of the party by tracing its history to the emergence of G-34, a group of politicians who confronted the General Sani Abacha regime, and the different political groups and tendencies that coalesced to giving birth to the party. The analysis also brings into focus, the prominent role of retired military generals and ‘money bags’ during the formative stage of the party, which partly explains the basis for oligarchic tendency within the party and the very roots of the crisis of internal democracy. It was the grievances within the party fuelled by a combination of agitation by the northern elements, who claimed to be shortchanged with the assumption of the Presidency in 2010 and the hijack of the party hierarchy by a desperate President Jonathan, who wanted a second term that led to the inevitable fragmentation within the party and the defection of five governors, party leaders and parliamentar- ians into the opposition APC in the countdown to the elections. 8 1 INTRODUCTION

Chapters 5 and 6 broach a very important theme in electoral democracy which pertains to voting pattern and voter behaviour. While Chapter 5 dwells on voter behaviour as it relates to trends in voter behaviour, Chapter 6 deals with voter behaviour as it affects outcomes of elections. In the context of electoral democracy, voter behaviour and its determinants are useful in determining the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the electoral process. In the absence of parties that are ideologically rooted, reliance on electioneering campaigns that are not issue-driven, and the low level of class consciousness, voters are more likely to harken to appeals to ethno-religious and regional identities, the common strategy of vote buying or party identification framed by the prevailing system of patronage politics. However, analysis of voter behaviour and establishing the factors shaping voter preferences need to be handled with caution because of intervening variables such as entrenched culture of candidates’ selection rather than elections as well as the low capacity of election management bodies to conduct free and fair elections. The continuation of this theme in Chapter 6 dwells on outcome trends in elections conducted since 1999. The importance of election outcomes is stressed bringing out the central importance of election outcome as a measure of ‘choice’ and ‘voice’ that are critical to the understanding of electoral democracy. The chapter highlights the limitations in interpreting election results since 1999 as a measure of ‘choice’ and ‘voice’ in Nigeria’semergent democratic culture precisely because of incumbency factors at all levels. The power of incumbency is manifested in the ability of sitting presidents and governors to determine election outcome, again, made possible by the institutional weaknesses of political parties and the helplessness of citizens. The chapter further draws attention to the paradigm change represented by the 2011 general elections in this regard, which marked a departure from the 2007 elections, by restoring a measure of public confidence in the electoral process. In Chapter 7, the book provides an audit of Nigeria’s electoral democracy in terms of democratic accountability beyond elections as a formal, procedural process. Without necessarily dwelling on known criticisms of liberal democracy in terms of its inability to offer citizens voice in the policy-making arena, the chapter demonstrates the deficit of Nigeria’s electoral democracy. For instance, despite increased space for civic groups to engage the democratic process beyond successfully challenging authoritarian rule, the level of accountability of the state to citizens in the dimensions of responsiveness and answerability has been abysmally low. Aside the occasional use of protests and the social media, not much space STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK AND OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 9 for citizen’s engagement with the policy process has been offered. Issues highlighted in the chapter include weak electoral governance, the disem- powering neoliberal economic policies pursued by the government since 1999, the high levels of corruption and impunity, mounting insecurity challenges and declining levels of civic participation. The series of electoral reform implemented in the aftermath of the 2007 elections leading to the appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega as the Chairman of INEC as well as the amendment of the 1999 Constitution (Federal Ministry of Information, 1999) and the Electoral Act (2010), with the former largely focused on electoral matters, and how the reform initiatives impacted on the conduct of the 2015 elections in particular, is the focus of Chapter 8. It traces the long road and trajectories in the reform agenda (as limited as it was) and the internal, institutional and organization reform within INEC itself that culminated in the improved election environment and improvement in the conduct of the 2011 but even more significantly on the 2015 elections. Chapter 9 is a reflection on party politics as played out in the 2015 elections. It discusses the significance of the elections against the background of the threat analysis by the US-based think tank, the National Intelligence Council which, in one of its discussion papers in 2005, pre- dicted the possible breakup of Nigeria. This prediction which derived from scenario building anchored on the realities of elite fragmentation and other sources of threats to Nigeria’s coherence later became an ‘urban legend’ in Nigeria, and worked into a narrative that wrongly portrayed the US government and the think tank as Prophets of Doom. The repeated echoing of this prediction by the former US Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, in the period leading to the election especially when insurgency in the north-east was at its peak raised fears that electoral dynamics could hasten the prospect of Nigeria’s breakup. As the chapter shows, not only did the so-called self-fulfilling prophesy fail to come to pass, Nigeria conducted elections which turned out to be largely credible and peaceful. Issues discussed in the chapter include the realignment of political forces aided by the internal crises which had festered within the ruling PDP leading to its implosion in August 2013 and the emergence of a strong opposition, the acrimonious party primaries in the two leading parties with the exception of the transparent process through which the opposition APC elected its presidential candidate and the constitution of the National Peace Committee in response to the intemperate utterances and deliberate fanning of ethnic, religious and regional embers by the leading candidates. 10 1 INTRODUCTION

The presidential election which received the most attention from Nigerians and the international community conducted on 28 March 2015 is discussed in Chapter 10. The chapter draws attention to key trends in the electioneering campaigns and the manner in which political alliances that took place prior to the elections played out. In particular, the chapter examines the geo-political patterns of voting and some evaluation regarding the credibility of the election. However, one of the most important highlights in this chapter is the victory of the opposition APC and the alternation of power that occurred for the first time at the national level in Nigeria’s post-independence electoral history. Chapter 11 examines the elections conducted into the National Assembly (NA) on the same day as the presidential election on 28 March, 2015. The analysis is situated within the context of the significance of the election as dictated by the changing party configurations in the NA occasioned by the emergence of the APC and the defection of legislators from the ruling PDP. While the elections did not differ remarkably from the other elections, it resulted in the creation of a majority for the new ruling APC in the two chambers of the NA. The book, in Chapter 12, discusses the governorship elections that took place on 1 April. The analysis in the chapter draws attention to the significant difference between the governorship elections and the presidential election conducted a week earlier in terms of the level of violence and the perception of being fair, free and credible. Domestic and international observers including the African Union Election Observer Mission (AU EOM) reported, for example, that a number of political party functionaries, candidates and individuals engaged in the use of violent and inflammatory language in the run-up to the election which was conducted with state assembly elections. The numerous infractions and the high level of violence reported in states like Abia, Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Katsina, Imo, Rivers and Sokoto is indicative of the challenges with conducting elections and entrenching electoral democracy in Nigeria. This section also gives broad indications at the subnational level, the changes that took place at the national level in terms of realignment of political forces, especially the significant in-road made by the APC into the traditional strongholds of the PDP in north-central states of Benue, Kogi, Kwara and Plateau. In Chapter 13, which provides the conclusion to the book, a broad indication is provided for the future of electoral democracy in Nigeria, drawing from the lessons of the 2015 elections. While it is expected that stakeholders in Nigeria’s electoral democracy will build on the achievements REFERENCES 11 of the two recent general elections, especially improving the internal capacity of INEC in the areas of logistics, the refinement of technology deployed in the elections especially the card readers, adequate training of ad hoc staff, taming the culture of corruption within the organization, and improved partnerships and collaboration with the other stakeholders, the road to elections that have integrity and credibility appears to be a long one. It could be more so considering possibilities that successive leadership of INEC may lack focus in driving further reform of the electoral process or may lack sufficient good will that had been enjoyed from stakeholders by the Professor Jega-led INEC. Furthermore, if one were to take the reputation of elections in some states to mirror the prevailing level of electoral malfeasance, there are challenges to address in the long run. These challenges necessarily must put at the centre the deepening of electoral reform including exploring alternative to, or complementing the present majoritarian electoral system by looking at Proportional Representation (PR). But there are other substantive issues explored in this chapter which relate to the limits of liberal democracy in driving governance and development agenda. While not discounting the importance of routinizing electoral democracy, there is need to interrogate the adequacy of the liberal democratic agenda which appears to foster political environment conducive to market reforms rather than the core issues of governance, popular empowerment and securing livelihood for majority of the people. In other words, even if Nigeria perfectly gets right the procedural form of democracy in which the vote counts and elections become a mechanism to change unpopular governments on a regular basis, it may not yet provide citizens the space to truly make the state accountable, and to deliver social services especially to the poor. It is this dilemma that led us to revisit the debate about the alternative which social democracy presents to the African people including Nigeria where progress in democratization has co-habited with social exclusion and the disempowerment of the majority.

REFERENCES Adebayo, P. F. & Omotola, J. S. 2007, ‘Public Perceptions of the 2007 Nigeria’s General Elections’, Journal of African Elections, 6(2), pp. 201–216. Akinyemi, A. B. 2014, ‘Open letter to Jonathan, Buhari, By Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi’, 22 December; available at http://blogs.premiumtimesng.com/? p=166391 (accessed on 28 February, 2015). 12 1 INTRODUCTION

Diamond, L. 2008, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build a Free Society throughout the World. New York: Times Books. Electoral Act, 2010, Federal Government Printer, Abuja, Nigeria. Federal Ministry of Information. 1999, 1999 the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Abuja: Federal Ministry of information. Lindberg, S. 2006, Democracy and Elections in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Obi, C. I. 2008, ‘International Election Observation Missions and the Promotion of Democracy: Some Lessons from Nigeria’s 2007 Elections’, Politikon, 35(1), pp. 69–86. Omotola, J. S. 2010, ‘Elections and Democratic Transitions in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic’, African Affairs, 109(437), pp. 535–553. Omotola, J. S. 2013, ‘Opposition and the Challenges of Multiparty Democracy’, The Nigerian Electoral Journal (Special Issue on Opposition Politics in Nigeria), 5(2), pp. 1–46. CHAPTER 2

Theoretical and Structural Issues in Nigerian Politics

INTRODUCTION Power and politics remain at the heart of democracy. Indeed, it is unthinkable to discuss democracy without reference to the concepts of power and politics. To begin with, power constitutes the basis of politics – the central attraction in so far as it remains a relational phenomenon associated with the ability of power holders to inﬂuence the course of action especially in the public sphere. The arena of politics does not only represent an important instrument for capturing and consolidating power but more importantly, it is also about mediating interests, which more often than not, are conﬂictual in nature. Power and politics are, therefore, vital variables in any fruitful discourses about democracy. Thus, the concepts of power, politics and democracy are inseparable and the relationships among them indisputable. Yet, such relationships are not as simplistic and straightforward as they appear to be on the surface. Despite the allusion of mainstream literature to the mutual linkage and inseparability of the two, most of such studies tend to be biased in favour of advanced democracies of Europe and North America at the expense of developing democracies. But more importantly, there is a tendency to assume that the underlying logic of politics and the struggle for power is ‘tribalism’ and for those who care about the sensitivity of using the prism of tribalism in contemporary Africa, the ‘ethnic paradigm’ is privileged above other considerations. In fact, mainstream western interpretation of Nigerian politics and political events often simply have issues around the divide between the

Hausa/Fulani Muslim north and the Christian south that is assumed to be predominantly Yoruba and Ibo. The internal struggle for power within the PDP, for example, is simplified along this fault line just as the analysis of chances of the presidential candidates in the 2015 elections was reduced to this simple dichotomy. Again, along this line, analyses of the chances of candidates in governorship contests are reduced to Muslims versus Christians even by the Nigerian media. Yet, we do know that embedded in Nigerian politics are layers of identities including class and ethnicity that frame political issues and determine how the electorate vote in elections. For instance, it is well-established that the idea of a monolithic north of Hausa/Fulani is a figment of western imagination. Not only is the notion of a unified Hausa/Fulani communal identity and interests false and misleading, the emergence of a strong ethnic minority identity that is also internally undermined by religious division makes a simplified construction of differences along ethnic and religious lines problematic. Similarly, it is difficult to sustain the notion of a Chritian south confront- ing a Muslim north in Nigerian politics considering the significant population of Muslims especially among the Yoruba of the south-west. In other words, it is important to examine the range of theoretical and underlying structural issues that shape political discourse and actions in Nigeria in order to understand how the complex interaction among them have defined, are defining and will continue to define Nigerian politics. This chapter provides an analysis of the overarching context and framework of Nigerian politics that is useful in explaining the nature and outcome of the 2015 general elections. Accordingly, the chapter examines the salient theoretical issues and undercurrents in power, politics and democracy in Nigeria. Therefore, the chapter discusses these issues as they relate to the success or failure of democracy, and how, at the empirical level, they explain the workings of politics and democracy in Nigeria.

POWER,POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY First, we start with the idea of democracy. The literal meaning of democracy, ‘as indicated by its etymological origin in ancient Greek’, according to Plattner (2014: 83) ‘is the power or rule of the people’. Walker (1966: 286) underscored this salient point when he writes that in its original (classical) formulation, democracy was about the ‘doctrine of popular rule’, under which ‘public policy should result from extensive, informed discussion and debate’, thereby increasing ‘the citizen’s awareness of POWER, POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY 15 his/her moral and social responsibilities, reduce the danger of tyranny, and improve the quality of government’. While it is incontrovertible that the original notion of democracy embodies individual liberty/freedom, equality in social and economic spheres was also part of the original meaning of democracy (Osborne 2010). More than any other writer in recent times, Ake (1996b) takes to the cleaners the reformulated version of democracy which reduces the content of democracy to the promotion of civil and political liberty or liberty, while expunging the idea of equality from its original meaning. This, to him, remains the legacy of the bourgeois revolution which has succeeded in giving universalization to liberal democracy, which is not only increasingly becoming illiberal but ends in the democratization of disempowerment. Thus, whereas the majoritarian notion of democracy largely remains valid in the contemporary usage of the term, given the emphasis on free and fair elections, the liberal conception of democracy seems to have altered its classical conception or better still diminished and narrowed the meaning of democracy. It is to overcome this limitation that informs the popular advocacy for social democracy especially in the developing world. The concern seems to be that the liberal notion of democracy, while still recognizing the salience of rule by the people, by aspiring to still ensure the sovereignty of the people through periodic elections, free and fair or not, also tends to constrain popular influences on democracy through the undue ‘elitization’ of power and politics. The entrenchment of elite oligarchy in Nigeria, as in many other African countries, increasingly exemplified by the direct capture of the process of party primaries and candidates’ selection by moneybags, provides a clear example. Such a tendency may be considered to be at the very heart of the elitist conception of power and politics, with its ‘clear presumption of the average citizen’s inadequacies’ (Walker 1966: 286). As a consequence, as Walker (1966) points out, ‘democratic systems must rely on the wisdom, loyalty and skill of their political leaders, not on the population at large’. On the one side of the political system, is a group of the elite, or better still, the ‘political entrepreneurs’, endowed with certain attributes, notably ‘ideological commitments and manipulative skills’; and the citizens at large, the masses, on the other hand, which is ‘usually a much larger class of passive, inert followers assumed to have little knowledge of public affairs and even less interest’ (Walker 1966). The basis or elements of power, defined as ‘all the resources – opportunities, acts, objects, etc – that the influencing agent can exploit in order to affect the behavior of another’ 16 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

(Dahl 1957: 203; quoted in Adekanye 1999: 163), is not limited to ‘ideological commitments and manipulative skills’. Under the increasing influence of globalization and the assumed ‘end of ideology’, politics, especially in developing democracies, has been marked by the decline of ideology. Consequently, the void created by the absence of ideology has brought to the fore, strategies of political mobilization which tend to rely on crude force and impunity as well as the mobilization of ethnic and religious identities. One way of disguising the stranglehold of the elite over the core elements of democratic governance, including power and politics, is ‘the provision for limited, peaceful competition among members of the elite for the formal positions of leadership within the system’. This is in line with Schumpeter’s(1950: 250–283, 1967: 153–188); definition of democracy as that ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. What liberal democracy offers the people are the opportunity to periodically elect their leaders, that is, if elections are properly conducted and the vote counts; other than this, the people lack the opportunity to truly hold their governments to account in between elections. The fact that democratic transition in Nigeria is taking place in the age of globalization has implication for the quality of democracy and elections. The market ideology promoted under the aegis of globalization tends to deepen socio-economic inequalities, which undermines the possibility of realizing the true meaning of individual liberty that democracy seeks to promote. In particular, the fundamentalism underlying the implementation of neoliberal economic policies such as deregulation and privatization of state-owned enterprises, whose processes have, unfortunately, been dominated, if not the exclusive preserve of the rich due to patronage politics has ensured the poor majority lacks opportunity to express their voice and freely choose their leaders. What this means is that social polarization of society may not positively reinforce the deepening of the democratic process. In addition, as the Nigerian example shows, class inequality may also be reinforced by ethnic and regional inequality because of the differential access to opportunities along these lines. Irrespective of the theoretical debates about democracy and its relationship with power and politics, a democracy can be recognized with the presence of certain values. Such values, according to Diamond (2008: 22), include freedom of speech, religious freedom, universal adult suffrage, POWER, POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY 17 competitive, free and fair elections, rule of law and equality of citizens, independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances, political pluralism and civilian control of the military. However, as Omotola (2013) points out, these are not as simplistic and straightforward as they seem because they require the existence of people with democratic mind-set, capable of managing these structures and institutions in line with democratic demands. By implication, the survival or failure of democracy will depend not only on the direction of the maintenance of these forces, but also the nature of society and its regulations. In an elaborate formulation of the reasons for the success and/or failure of democracies, Diskin et al. (2005: 291–309) explore the political and the socio-economic institutions of democracy, developed into four groups of relevant independent variables to assess why democratic regimes collapse. The first group consists of institutional variables, which focuses on types of regime, including federalism, presidentialism and proportionality in relation to the concentration of powers within it. The second addresses societal variables, with emphasis on factors such as societal cleavages, state of the economy and the democratic historical background of the country. The third consists of what they call mediating variables, which are located between the macro-political and the macro-societal groups, including the nature of the party system to the level of government and coalition stability. The last has to do with ‘foreign involvement’, which many others call external democracy promotion. While all these categories are useful, we focus more on institutional and societal variables, because they have the most direct correlation to the Nigerian case. This focus is not informed solely by the specific concern of this chapter, but more importantly, against the background of the institutional and societal tendencies observed in Nigeria’s democracy. At the institutional level, for example, Nigerian democracy has been predicated upon a federal structure where power is shared among the federating units in a manner that supposedly guarantees some measure of autonomy for the federating units. The argument in the literature suggests that federalism is an antidote to democratic instability in plural societies. This explains why Lijphart (1984, 1999) lists federalism as one of the majority-restraining elements in his consensual model of democracy. Federalism is, therefore, conducive to democratic stability, and not damaging. Several other scholars (Diamond 1988, 1995; Horowitz 1994) also allude to the importance of federalism in mediating ethnic and other social tensions for 18 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS the promotion of democratic stability in plural societies. This, however, conflicts with that of Diskin, et al (2005: 292), which hypothesizes that ‘federal states are more prone to democratic collapse than unitary ones’.It is against this background that the diverse forms of affirmative actions or quota systems, be they ethnic, religious, gender or generational should be evaluated (see, for example, Bird 2014), albeit as an antidote to ethnic party development especially in Africa (Basedau and Stroh 2011; Lindberg and Morrison 2008). The federalist approach to democratic stability in plural societies reso- nates with the main societal variables of democratic stability. Take, for instance, the issue of social cleavages, which can manifest in linguistic, ethnic or religious terms. As the argument goes, ‘countries with deep or parallel social cleavages, or both, are more prone to democratic collapse than those with low or cross-cutting cleavages, or both’ (Diskin et al. (2005: 294). Earlier studies by Lipset (1994), Dahl (1971), Horowitz (1994), Lijphart (1977), and many others lend credence to this claim. Similarly, the state of the economy, strong or weak, has also been identified as another vital societal variable to determine the extent of democratic stability. This body of literature is closely connected to the debate about the relationship between democracy and development (Przeworski et al. 1996, 2000;Hadenius1994). The final societal factor relates to the history of democracy, whether favourable or not. The main determinant here has to do with the extent of democratic culture, leading to the assumption that countries with undemocratic or mixed historical backgrounds are more prone to democratic collapse than those with democratic historical, cultural and civil societal backgrounds. Some notable studies in this regard include seminal works by Almond and Verba (1963), Huntington (1991), Diamond (1993) and Putnam (1993). It is at this critical juncture that the intersection between democracy and ethno-religious forces can be located. As studies have shown, the existence of convergent systems of values is a cardinal requirement for democratic stability (Inglehart 1997, 2000). In the absence of such a condition, it does not really matter whether support for democracy is strong or weak; once challenged, ‘contextual circumstances could erode democratic support’ (Moreno and Mendez 2002;cited in Vlas and Gherghina 2012: 337–338). As Inglehart (2000,96) argues, ‘democracy is not attained simply by making institutional changes through elite level maneuvering. Its survival depends also on the values and beliefs of ordinary citizens’. When consensus and trust POWER, POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY 19 are built around democratic values among ethno-regional and religious groups, the likelihood of survival seems to be higher and vice versa (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; cited in; Vlas and Gherghina 2012:337–338). The situation assumes broader significance when intersected with other mediating variables, especially fragmentation and polarization in party politics. When the party system is unduly fragmented and polarized, the chances of democratic success are limited and vice versa. There are also important studies that allude to the economic foundations of democracy and its consolidation (Przeworski et al. 2000;Leftwich1996). While our interest here is not to fully go into the debate about the relationship between democracy and development, including the argument about the minimum level of income or growth that is necessary for democratic survival, one must not lose sight of the many ways in which inequality and non-inclusive growth have unleashed anti-democratic forces and tendencies, including insurgency and militancy that tear at the fabrics of national unity and coherence in Nigeria. By implication, while growth is important, the allocation of the proceeds of growth in such a way that enhances fairness and equality is vital for development and democratic survival. Along this line, it may be useful to contemplate the future that awaits Nigeria’s democracy in a context in which growth is grossly undermined by the fiscal crisis of the state occasioned by a drastic fall in the international prices of petrol for an economy which has remained essentially monocultural. This would appear to be a more frightening scenario compared to concerns about non-inclusive growth that evolved after the election with an opposition party that promises change in power. However, in explaining Nigerian politics in general and the combination of underlying structures and factors that played out in its electoral politics since independence, including the recent 2015 general elections, the following are privileged for consideration: a) federalism and the ethnic-regional question, drawing attention to ethnic and regional balancing strategies; b) secularism and religious influences, including the politics of sharia and ethno-religious conflicts; and c) the predominance of class and elite interests including the attendant issues of inequality, domination and oppression as well as the increasing commoditization of politics exemplified by the role of moneybags and godfathers. 20 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

FEDERALISM,ETHNO-REGIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY The ethnic question has always been an important subject in most meaningful discourses and analyses of the Nigerian project (Ekeh 1975; Osaghae and Onwudiwe 2002; Suberu 2001;Jega2000a, b; Akinwumi 2004). However, only very few studies have examined the specific relationship between ethnicity and democratization in Nigeria (Olamiyan and Omotola 2015). This problem is not peculiar to Nigeria because, as Ibeanu (2006: 6) observes on a broader scale, what was lacking were ‘in-depth studies of the concrete experiences of multi-ethnic African societies in the light of transitions to democracy’. With the exception of a few that identify positive correlations between ethnicity and democracy, the dominant trend in the extant literature points to negative correlation between ethnicity and democracy in Nigeria. As a concept, ethnicity is beclouded by ambiguity. While some underscore cultural factors, both subjectively and objectively, some others emphasize situational forces in explaining ethnicity. Generally, ethnicity can be defined as an organizational, mobilizational, emanci- patory and liberating force, both for individuals and groups, whose success depends largely on its level of politicization. A politicized ethnicity, refers to ‘the articulation of interests in the name of the ethnic group and the struggle to redress or defend those interests’. Ethnicity is, therefore, an identity that can influence a person’ssenseof belonging and influence his/her behaviour vis-à-vis the political community. OmotolaandOlaniyan(2015) review a number of studies that alluded to the possibility of identity transformation, especially in the face of political and economic globalization (Jega 2000a). As Jega (2003) argues, identity (of which ethnic identity is about the strongest) serves as a rallying and organizing principle of social action within the civil society and in state-society relations. One pertinent factor and, perhaps, the single most significant influence on the strength of identity is the perceived existence of an external threat to that identity. Zalewski and Enloe allude to this when they state that ‘clearly, one’s felt need to claim identity or to restore lost identity will depend on whether there is or has been a threat to that identity’ (1995: 286). Usually, threats to an (real or imagined) identity often generate a reaction from the affected to ward off the threat, which may compel identity transformation. The FEDERALISM, ETHNO-REGIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 21 transformation of identity connotes a ‘continuous process, which suggests the changing role of identities and the heightening and increasing magnitude and consequences of identity politics’ (Jega 2000a:6),as opposedtocreatinganentirelynewidentity. Ethnicity has been subjected to contrasting meanings and uses, with three broad theoretical perspectives, namely the primordial, the instrumentalist and social constructivism (Egwu 1998). From an instrumentalist point of view, scholars have argued that identity is neither static nor immutable after all (see Giddens 1991; Bah 2003; Owolabi 2003). By implication, identities are subject to manipulations, depending on the prevailing social, political, economic and cultural realities. This is because the construction of a collective identity, most especially ethnicity, is assumed to guide strategic action for access to and/or control over resources. The centrality of ethnic identity is underscored by the fact that an ethnic group, defined as ‘primarily the political community that inspires the belief in common identity’ (Osaghae 1994, 138), has propen- sities to change and take new forms, depending on reactions to the various questions always generated when ‘self’ confronts the ‘others’. This, perhaps, explains Owolabi’s(2003, 10) definition of ethnicity as ‘a fluid process of composition, decomposition and recomposition’. It is, perhaps, this tendency of ethnic identity to serve as a political resource that facil- itates its propensity to engender conflict, depending on its management. As Turton (1997, 3) points out, ‘in many cases rivals for power make use of ethnic differences as a political resource, but the differences are not responsible for war’. The instrumentalists’ conception of ethnicity as an identity that is not only fluid, but also manipulable in defence of collective action in the pursuit of individual or shared interests, however, contrasts sharply with the primordialists’ view. The primordialists view ethnicity as given: ‘an inherited cultural inventory and the product of longue durée historical process, which although not permanently fixed or naturally given, is difficult to change’ (Hindley 2001, 282). The perspective seems rooted in cultural variables, including myth of collective ancestry (kinship), assumed blood ties, shared historical memories, and association with a specific homeland, to mention but a few (Geertz 1973;Horowitz1985). A third perspective, which attempts to reconcile the foregoing two seemingly diametrically opposed perspectives, is social constructivism. But while the constructivists share the instrumentalists’ assumption that 22 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS ethnicity is made rather than given, they emphasize the imaginative creation of ethnicity to satisfy the social needs of groups in the process of profound political, social and economic change. Against this background, Lijphart argues that ‘the constructors of ethnicity are socio-cultural bro- kers rather than political entrepreneurs’ (1995, 885). Without doubt, each of these perspectives has both merits and demerits. For example, as Lijphart (1995, 855) argues, while politicians will always attempttoappealtoethnicsentiments,suchanappealcanhardlybesuccessful in the absence of basic cultural differences among people. He adds that even where such differences exist; it is equally unrealistic to expect politicians to ignore taking advantage of such divisions. Such neglect, Lijphart insists, would be at their own peril as it may signal their political demise. In both instances, there must be an object that informs and at which the ethnic appeals are targeted. A notable point is that, in coming to terms with the complexity of the ethnic phenomenon and the role it plays especially in the electoral process and political mobilization, all these perspectives are useful. The culturalists cum the primordialists are correct in so far as ethnic groups are historical groups with differences such as language, culture and territory which cannot be wished away. Yet these differences are activated in the social and political processes by interest bearers because these natural groups exist in the first place. The invention or constructivist perspective draws attention to the fact that ethnic boundaries are hardly static and they shift in accordance to the changing context of competition for power and resources as well as the interest of the ruling elite who are the key actors in the ethnic processes. The need to be more nuanced in the analysis of the ethnic phenomenon becomes more imperative in the Nigerian context where there are layers of ethnic identities including the tension between those who consider themselves as ethnic minorities who are locked in the contest for power with the ethnic majorities at different levels. The tension generated by this form of ethnic contradiction and the dilemma of accommodation in the process of democratization is well recognized. As van Amersfoort puts it:

Situations where majority aims and minority aspirations coincide are the exception rather than the rule. Thus, resolving such minority tension is likely to prove a more complex and potentially explosive challenge to democracy than accommodating minorities based on non-ethnic and racial criteria.

An additional, compelling reason for coming to terms with the nuances surrounding the ethnic phenomenon and how ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ FEDERALISM, ETHNO-REGIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 23 deploy it as a tool of political mobilization in the Nigerian context has to do with the interpenetration between ethnic identity on the one hand, and class and religious identities on the other; largely because ethnic identity constitutes a spatial framework for these identities. For example, the congruence between ethnicity and religion and their mutually reinforcing relationships in the political process is recognized by the notion of ethno- religious identity. As the situation has been well captured, sometimes religious identity becomes part of an ethnic group’s identity or vice versa, and presents a volatile social mixture coupled with the power of the ethnic group’s myth of common descent (Salomone 1997). Indeed, numerous studies have shown the overlapping boundaries between ethnic and religious identities in Nigeria in the daily struggles of groups and communities for access to power and resources, or resisting domination (Kastfelt 1994; Adamu 1978; Paden 1973). This integration of ethnicity and religion into a common system of identity underscores the relationship between power and group identity in a manner that has consequence for group definition and perception of power. Infact, a significant element of politicized ethnicity is that it may be invoked by interests which are not necessarily described in ‘ethnic’ terms, for it could be mobilized in pursuit of perceived ‘ethnic interest’ or not related to ethnic interests at all (Szeftel 1994). As Ake (1993) puts it, conflicts arising from the construction of ethnicity to conceal exploitation by building solidarity across class lines, conflicts arising from appeals to ethnic support in the face of vanishing legitimacy, and from the manipulation of ethnicity for obvious political gains are not ethnic problems, but problems of particular political dynamics which are pinned on ethnicity. Therefore, there is a sense in which the politicization of ethnic identity has to be understood ultimately in the context of intra-class struggles for hegemony within a highly fractionalized ruling class. Sklar (1967)is therefore correct in linking the emergence of ethnicity to ‘the new men of power’ whose interest is coterminous with the ‘constitutive interests of the emerging social classes’. In the context of democratization and the contest for political power, which appears to be the most important in developing countries (especially Africa), the mobilization of communal identities is a key resource in winning state power which is the most coveted prize for the actors. Consequently, important political processes such as formation of political parties and electioneering reinforce ethnic and other primordial identities. However, such reinforcement is either positive or negative, depending on 24 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS the degree of protection the political processes offer or are perceived as capable of offering the contending groups (Olaniyan and Omotola 2015). Federalism, a system of government predicated upon power sharing and segmented autonomy, has often been prescribed as a viable instrument for the management of pluralism, especially ethnic diversity in such a way that political stability is guaranteed. In such political systems, Arend (1977) recommends consociational democracy with specific institutional designs. According to LeVan (2011: 34), consociationalism begins with two essential features, namely a ‘grand coalition’ government consisting of the major political leaders who represent critical segments of society and minorities with ‘segmental autonomy’, as well as a ‘mutual veto’ that gives minority interests government representation, as well as an emphasis on proportionality that shapes how the electoral system determines political representation, the allocation of resources, the appointment of civil service positions and the distribution of political positions through quotas or other means. As one of the most deeply segmented societies in Africa, Nigerian policy makers have often given considerations to these cleavages through constitutional designs and the various forms of political engineering, especially since the Second Republic (1999–1983). As a matter of fact, the constitutional foundations of the Second Republic prescribed a federal character principle for a fairly equitable representation of all states of the federation in federal institutions and agencies (Amuwo et al. 1998; Ekeh and Osaghae 1989). The various phases of state creation, leading to a 36- state-federal structure and a federal capital territory (FCT) in Abuja, as well as the various principles and formulas for revenue allocation, constitute important components of efforts aimed at strengthening the federal solutions to the challenges of ethno-regionalism in Nigeria. Other instruments of power sharing have also been deployed, including the idea of rotational presidency and ethno-regional balancing in office sharing within political parties to promote national stability (Omotola 2010; Kendhammer 2010). Whether the application of these institutional devices has yielded the desired result or not is a matter for debate. It, however, needs to be underscored that the application of these devices on their own without democracy, justice and fairness in the society may not advance the ideals of a federal polity (Egwu 2007). One thing that is obvious from the extant literature in general is that these accommodation devices are usually confronted with, at least, three problems. Horowitz (2014) outlines the three FEDERALISM, ETHNO-REGIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 25 problems. The first concerns the adoptability of either of the two principal prescriptions. Under what conditions can either one of them be adopted? The second relates to a possibility inherent in centripetal regimes: the potential degradation of the electoral arrangements that sustain the interethnic coalition. The third derives from a common consequence of the adoption of a consociational regime: Where robust guarantees, including minority vetoes, are adopted, immobilism is a strong possibility, and it may be very difficult to overcome the stasis that immobilism can produce. While these problems may have some form of universality, there may be variations in degree across plural societies. In the Nigerian context, for instance, the application of these ethnic accommodation instruments, despite all limitations, would appear to have moderated interethnic tensions in the country to a reasonable extent. That Nigeria remains one, despite all odds, including a 30-month-agonizing civil war and other forms of separatist agitations and irredentist claims over the years, is testimony to this claim though there is a tendency that the practical application of some of the measures has inflamed ethno-regional passion and polarization. However, a note of caution is necessary not to overstress the effectiveness of these devices. Recent studies underscore the limits of power-sharing devices in the nation-building process in Nigeria. As Kendhammer (2014: 396) points out, despite these devices, Nigeria continues to depend largely ‘onaprimordialnotionofethniccitizenship,’ which ‘undermines the ability of its federal institutions to mediate and cross-cut ethnic conflicts, a problem most clearly reflected in the functioning of the nation’s most important official power sharing institution, the Federal Character Commission (FCC)’. The validity of the aforementioned claims underscoring the limits of power-sharing devices in Nigeria can be located in the domains of certain recent developments in the country. The first has to do with the increasing rise of ethnic-based associations across the country. Though not a new development, given important antecedents in Egbe Omo Oduduwa, Jamiyyar Mutanea Arewa and the Igbo State Union (ISU), and more recently Egbe Afenifere (literally meaning a group of well-wishers), Egbe Ilosiwaju Yoruba (association of progressive Yoruba) and Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE) in Yoruba south-west; Ohanaeze Ndigbo, Igbo Elders Forum (IEF), Eastern Mandate Union (EMU) in Igbo south-east; and Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Northern Elders Forum (NEF) and Arewa Progressive Congress in Hausa-Fulani north, the rise and growing 26 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS influences of these associations suggest the continuing dominance of ethnic citizenship. A number of such groups also exist among various minority ethnic groups in the country. Among the Ijaw, popularly regarded as the fourth largest group in Nigeria, after the three dominant ones, for example, there are the Ijaw National Congress (INC), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) and Ijaw Nationality Protection Organisation (INPO). Other such groups of minority extraction include the MOSOP (Ogoni), Middle Belt Congress (MBC), Southern Minorities Group (SMG), Idoma National Summit (INS), Anioma Forum (AF) and Esan Forum (EF), among others. The increasing political relevance of these associations, particularly in their relationship or encounter with the democratization process, has been explained in terms of ethnic rivalries and competition for scarce resources, at times dovetailing into individual rivalries, as well as class factionalism within the ruling elite (Coleman 1958; Nnoli 1995). While not discounting the usefulness of these explanations, Ibeanu (2012), compellingly draws attention to the overarching importance of the character of the Nigerian state as an arena of capitalist accumulation and attendant exclusionary and exploitative tendencies; and the prolonged rule of the military during which political activities were banned. The vacuum created allowed ethnic associations to step-in as ‘the most potentially effective organizations that could quickly and with minimum prompting as political liberalizationisembarkeduponbyanauthoritar- ian regime’ (Ibeanu 2012: 9). To these may be added the increasing disconnect between the Nigerian state and her citizens dictated the rolling back of the state which has been the case since the imposition of the IMF and world-supported market-based adjustment programme from the mid-1980s. This, undoubtedly, removed the glue that bonded citizens to the state and consequently, has intensified the crisis of the nation- state project in Nigeria. It has become increasingly obvious that the resurgence and growing radicalization of ethnic associations in championing ethnic agenda have dramatically heightened the risks and costs of democratization. Many studies have shown that the redemocratization of Nigeria in May 1999 has, contrary to expectations, seen the increasing ascendancy of ethnicity to an all-time high level as a tool for socio-political mobilization for group protection and security (Omotola 2009; Olarinmoye 2007; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). The point has been stressed to the extent of suggesting that democratization is an accelerator of ethnic conflict rather than a SECULARISM AND THE CONTINUING SHADOW OF RELIGION ON DEMOCRACY 27 framework for addressing the problems of deep ethnic and related societal cleavages. This development has had negative implications for the democratization process in Nigeria. Among others, it accounts for the rise of ethnic Non-State Armed Groups (NSAGs) such as the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) in the south-west, Arewa People’s Congress (APC) in the north, Bakassi Boys in the south-east and Egbesu Boys of Africa, Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the Niger Delta. Although these non-state actors had their origin and justification in the near total collapse of the public order in Nigeria, including politics of marginalization and exclusion, rising insecurity of lives and properties, their activities have since suggested there were more to them than meets the eyes. The fact that they take the form of ethnic chauvinists, willing and able to destroy, maim and kill in the name of ethnic groups on whose behalf they purportedly act makes it imperative to closely study them to uncover their real motives.

SECULARISM AND THE CONTINUING SHADOW OF RELIGION ON DEMOCRACY Nigeria aspires to be a secular democracy in keeping with the project of modernity agreed to by the founding fathers of the Nigerian state. However, the establishment of a truly secular state has been undermined by undue politicization of identity. At the core of the challenge of establishing secularity is the competition in the public sphere by the two dominant religions – Islam and Christianity – despite the equally strong presence of adherents of African Traditional Religion (ATR). The constitution-making process in the 1976–1979 period, for the first time, brought to the fore the danger of religious polarization when debate on the proposal to entrench Sharia in the 1979 Constitution stalled the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly. Although the proposal was defeated, Muslims rejected the draft in the constitution that expressly pronounced Nigeria a secular state on the ground that the notion of secularity was Judeo-Christian. The matter was resolved by a compromise wording in the 1979 Constitution that ‘there shall be no state religion’. However, religious polarization was to rear its ugly head, perhaps in a more vicious form, following the return to civil rule in 1999. Prior to 1999, the spate of ethno-religious conflict in the northern parts of the 28 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS country beginning with the religious crisis in Kafanchan, Kaduna and Kano brought religious division to the fore of national consciousness. While the motivation remains unclear, the decision of the government of Zamfara State to pass a law which elevated Sharia to the level of criminal jurisdiction, and, subsequently followed by other northern states such as Kano, Kaduna, Kastina, to mention a few, heightened religious tension especially in the north where Christians who considered themselves a religious minority raised fears of threats to their religion and personal freedoms. The series of sectarian conflict that have greeted the introduction of Sharia and the levels of killings and destruction of property which had profound negative impact on intergroup relations has coloured the notion of the secularity of the Nigerian state. The Boko Haram sect and its open rejection of the Nigerian state in preference for an Islamic State on the basis of which it launched insurgency activities in the north-eastern parts of the country has further raised the issue of secularity to a new level in terms of public discourse. Vlas and Gherghina (2012: 336) recently raised the controversial question of the interface between the tension generated by public debate on the place of religion in the public space and the demand for secularity on the one hand, and the construction of democracy, on the other. Where does religion meet democracy? They asked the question in the European context which was, until recently, ‘considered the exception from the global trend of the religious resurgence and the revitalization of religious traditions’. But today, as they argue, ‘religion “is coming back to Europe” not only in the form of Islam, as a result of increased immigration, but also in the growth of new Christian movements ..., and in the revitalization of religious traditions, especially in Eastern European countries’. This development, that is, the ‘public visibility of religion raises questions regarding the future of democracy’. If religious revivalism has been seen as a major source of concern for democracy in Europe, the situation appears more worrisome for Africa in general and Nigeria in particular where religion has always been a serious issue in the governance of state affairs. At a general level, religion is seen by some as an anti-democratic force and an intruder in the political sphere (Rorty 1994), while others in the classical tradition such as de Tocqueville consider religion (mainly Christianity) as a necessary asset for democracy or even the mainspring of democracy. There are still others for whom it is not religion per se that matters, but religious affiliation as an important determinant of democracy, with some religions being more compatible SECULARISM AND THE CONTINUING SHADOW OF RELIGION ON DEMOCRACY 29 with democracy than others (Fukuyama 2001; Huntington 1991:71–85; Lipset 1994: 5; all quoted in; Vlas and Gherghina 2012: 337). But in Nigeria, religion appears to be a liability than an asset to democracy, engendering conflict and violence in many instances (Adekunle 2009; Falola 1998; Ilesanmi 1997). The problem may not be unconnected to the religious composition of the country, in which religious and ethno-regional boundaries tend to overlap, with the north predominantly Islamic and the south mainly Christians. Even then, a caveat is needed considering, for example, the near parity in the Muslim–Christian populations as well as the long history of interfaith harmony in the predominantly Yoruba-speaking south-west geo-political zone. Second, discourses about religious freedom in Nigeria have been reduced to engagements and sometimes outright confrontations between Christians and Muslims as if the sensibility of adherents of the ATR in the country is not important. Although the exact population of these religious groups remains contentious, a source puts it at ratio 50:40:10 for Islam, Christianity and ATR respectively. This has been challenged by another source, which claimed to be relying on ‘informed estimates’; it puts it at 53:45:2 in the same order (Agberemi 2006: 369; quoted in Omotola 2009: 85). Given this seemingly delicate composition, the preoccupation of the managers of the state has been how to fashion a workable institutional design that can help facilitate not only religious freedom, but also promote religious stability. As alluded to earlier, efforts to entrench the notion of secularity in the 1979 Constitution met with stiff opposition from northern Muslims who argued that the notion of secularity was Judeo-Christian in origin. The compromise that was achieved in the context of stalled deliberations in the 1977–1978 Constituent Assembly was the replacement of a ‘secular’ state with the formulation that there shall be ‘no state religion’. This veiled acceptance of secularity was retained in the 1999 Constitution. Essentially, secularism has been seen as ‘an ideology that holds that religious issues should not be the basis of politics, or (in the extreme) that religion has no place in public life’ (quoted in Omotola 2009: 83). Specifically, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides, in its section 10 (1), that ‘the government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as state religion’. This provision is further strengthened by section 38 (1-3) of the constitution, which guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Ordinarily, these constitutional provisions should be enough guarantee 30 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS for religious freedom and stability in Nigeria. But, this is yet the case because of the political and economic instrumentalization of religion, which manifests essentially in the transformation of religion from its pure theological foundation to that of political and economic empowerment. As such, religion features prominently in political campaigns and mobilization as much as in the search for solutions to excruciating economic conditions. The ‘political’ sharia introduced by some northern states during the Obasanjo presidency was an example. In what is widely considered as the ingenuity of President Olusegun Obasanjo, the existing federal framework was invoked to manage the attendant religious impasse (Suberu 2009a, b; Omotola 2010). At the semi-official level, however, the promotion of interreligious dialogue and peace-building has also been predicated upon the institutional framework of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC). NIREC is a voluntary interfaith association comprising fifty (50) members, (25 Christians and 25 Muslims) formed by the representatives of the two principal religions – that is, Christianity and Islam in Nigeria, on 11 September, 1999. NIREC was established against the background of incessant ethno-religious crises that enveloped the country over the years. Its primary goals are to provide religious leaders and traditional rulers with a veritable platform to promote greater interaction and understanding among the leaders and followers of both religions; as well as lay foundations for sustainable peace and religious harmony in Nigeria. Probably, as a demonstrable example, the leadership of NIREC is shared fairly equally between Islam and Christianity. Specifically at inception, NIREC was jointly chaired by their Eminences Alhaji Muhammadu Maccido, CFR, the late Sultan of Sokoto and the then President-General, Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) and Dr Sunday Mbang, CON, the Primate of Methodist Church of Nigeria /Archbishop J. Akinola, CON, who were former Presidents of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) respectively. The pioneer National Coordinator/ Executive Secretary of the Council from 1999 to 2007 was the then Villa Chaplain, Rev. Professor Yusuf Amch Obaje. Although there have been changes in personnel, the power-sharing arrangement between Islam and Christianity remains essentially intact. Today, NIREC is jointly chaired by His Eminence Alhaji Muhammad Sa’ad Abubakar, CFR, mni, the Sultan of Sokoto and President-General, NSCIA, and His Grace Dr John Onaiyekan, CON, Catholic Archbishop of Abuja and immediate past President, CAN, with Professor Is-haq Oloyede, a one-time Vice SECULARISM AND THE CONTINUING SHADOW OF RELIGION ON DEMOCRACY 31

Chancellor of University of Ilorin, as the National Coordinator/Executive Secretary. The specific objectives of NIREC, as articulated by the body, include encouraging dialogue between the two major religions (Christianity and Islam); promote ethical values and political stability; and foster national unity. Since inception, NIREC has been in the forefront of the struggle for religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence in a variety of ways. These include holding of public lectures and issuance of communiqués; creating of forum for interreligious communication and dialogue, for example, the rotation of its quarterly meetings among the six geo-political zones of the country; the establishment of Nigerian Youth Summit, whose first meeting held in 2009 in Minna, the Niger state capital, where 250 Muslim and Christian youths from all over the country participated; the implementation of interfaith projects, for example, the Nigeria Interfaith Action Association against Malaria (NIFAAM) and the Nigerian Interfaith Action against HIV/ AIDs, among others. The NIREC platform, using manifold strategies and mechanisms, has been able to wield some moderating influences on peace-building in Nigeria, including mediating in ethno-religious conflicts which have occurred most frequently in northern Nigeria. The Co-Chairmen of NIREC, for example, visited a scene of religious crisis in Bauchi State in December 2007 to address adherents of both faiths on the essence of religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence. The visit reportedly helped reinstall sanity and order in the community. Moreover, the intervention of NIREC prevented the Jos crisis in Plateau State from spilling over to other states of the federation. It is believed that NIREC Co-Chairmen, Emirs and Archbishops prevailed on the aggrieved groups to stand down from making reprisal attacks in their domains. After the 2011 post-election violence that engulfed the northern parts of the country, NIREC, through its Executive Secretary, did a press conference condemning the violence as anti-religious doctrines from both Islamic and Christian perspectives (NIREC, 2011) NIREC, therefore, called on all involved to stop the carnage with immediate effect. Although it cannot be said that with its growing reputation and influence, NIREC has been able to completely stem the tide of ethno- religious conflicts in the country, it has made some moderating impact on the scope, frequency and intensity of sectarian violence. Beyond the institutional platform of NIREC, there have also been attempts by individuals or groups of individual religious leaders across 32 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS religious divides to facilitate the process of peace-building through interreligious dialogue. Smock (2006) explains that religious leaders can work together to promote interreligious dialogue for peace-building. Despite the political underpinning of the protracted Jos crisis and, in particular, the fanning of the embers of religion by politicians as confirmed by Co-Chairmen of NIREC, the initiatives taken using the interreligious platform significantly contributed to dousing the tension. In other words, both the institutional and leadership responses have made some positive impact on peace-building in Nigeria, though there are still challenges ahead. What is important is how to decentralize such frameworks to lower levels of socio-political and religious organizations in such a way that allows for replication. Specifically, attention should be paid to local government and community development association levels to socialize and mobilize religious institutions and actors to serve as agents of social change, especially for the promotion of peace. Aside the Boko Haram-led insurgency, the secularity of the Nigerian state was not at the centre of electioneering in the 2015 elections. However, the visibility of religious organizations and individuals in mobilizing support for or against the two presidential candidates contributed to polarization along religious lines. One issue raised in the electioneering process, for example, was the alleged use of religious venues, especially churches by incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan for making electoral promises. One online platform lamented that instigation of religious disaffection by politicians posed a great threat of dangerous magnitude to Nigeria’s peaceful coexistence and expressed deep worries about allegations that CAN leadership received a bribe of about N6 million to mobilize Christian votes for the incumbent President.

CLASS,ELITE AND DEMOCRACY The build-up to the 2015 elections, as in the previous elections, brought to the fore, the implications of elite fragmentation or lack of unity of purpose among the various factions of the ruling class for democratic stability and national cohesion. The vacillation between callous indiffer- ence and lack of a unified response to Boko Haram insurgency until it became a festering sore tearing at the fabrics of Nigeria’s unity, as well as threatening the entire environment merely draws attention to the reality of elite fragmentation. Similarly, the competing ethno-regional claims over CLASS, ELITE AND DEMOCRACY 33 the presidency at one level on the basis of north/south dichotomy or among the six geo-political zones at a related level, tells a lot about the persistent challenge posed by elite division to democratic stability in Nigeria. Indeed, the battle for the soul of the PDP among the ethno- regional elites within the party which accounted for its implosion in the countdown to the 2015 elections implies that we focus on ruling class/ ruling elite factor in the analysis of politics, democracy and elections in Nigeria. More often than not, class and elite categories are interchangeably used in political analysis as designated by notions of ‘ruling class’ and ‘ruling elite’–notions that satisfactorily convey relations of domination and subordination. This, notwithstanding, ‘class’ and ‘elite’ are founded on different epistemological foundations. For instance, the Marxist theory of class which assigns the ‘motive force’ of history to the class struggles is not simply about the bifurcation of society into the ‘rich’ and the ‘poor’.In the classical Marxian formulation, class differences which are rooted in the ownership of the means of production brings into direct confrontation the class of owners and non-owners of the means of production as the means of social change in the state and class relations. Elitism, on the other hand, avoids the more simplistic, binary conception of class struggles rooted in the ownership of the means of production between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and, instead, understands class division as common features of political and economic life in all kinds of processes and institutions. For elitism, therefore, divisions into ‘elites’ and ‘mass’ can exist in political parties, the military, the universities and other institutions of the society. Robert Michels widely regarded as one of the most influential elitist theorist affirms the inevitability of elite rule in all human organizations in the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ which states that, regardless of how democratic organizations may be at the start, it will eventually and inevitably develop oligarchic tendencies, thus making true democracy practically and theoretically impossible. However, subsequent elitist theorists building on the work of Mosca (1939)andPareto(1968) and other classical theorists, in the 1980s and 1990s, drew attention to the linkages between elite unity or division and the prospects of building democracy to suggest that stable democratic regimes are fostered by unity within the elites. They argue that elite unity or cohesion in combination with economic and other facilitative conditions has accounted for the development of democracy in countries like 34 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS the US, Sweden and Britain, and subject to the availability of economic and other facilitative conditions. Higley and Burton (2006), in particular, warn that a disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic forms over varying intervals, and that a consensually unified national elite, which is historically much rarer, produces a stable regime that may evolve into a modern democracy. It is in the context of the implication of elite unity or division for building democracy in Nigeria that it is important to focus on class and elite identity. The central thing about ‘class’ and class relations or the assertive role of the elites is first about the entrenchment of inequality in power relations through which oppression and exploitation are legitimized. Second, it is about how such relations impact on the electoral process by facilitating elite capture of power and resources. More often not, ‘high inequalities bias the political rules of the game and mold polities in favor of the wealthy and privileged. [T]hey do so (to different degrees) whether regimes are authoritarian or democratic’ (Karl 2003; quoted in Debs and Helmke 2010: 210). The importance of socio-economic inequality in determining access to power and outcome of electoral contest is so critical that it cannot be ignored. As Sklar (1979) reminds us, class relations in Africa are determined by relations of domination, not production; the implication being that actions aimed at strengthening or weakening existing systems of domination can be considered class action. What may appear as convergence between ‘class’ and ‘elite’ analyses and their relevance to Nigerian politics is the dominant role played by a dominant few, not only in the party organs and deciding electoral outcomes, but also in shaping the attitude and perceptions of voters in ways that prevent them from understanding their roles as democratic citizens. The implication, therefore, is that individuals who fit into the category of the Nigerian ruling class by virtue of the influence exerted in politics through the control of economic and political power overlap with the political elites that we can see as the dominant actors in Nigeria’s electoral politics. In the political sense, the elite of power, often pejoratively referred to ‘godfathers’ in Nigeria, would appear to have conquered and captured the democratization process through formal and informal channels of circum- venting democratic institutions and procedures. For example, party primaries and candidate-selection are hardly allowed to be truly democratic. Instead, the moneybags usually hijack the process in favour of ‘anointed CLASS, ELITE AND DEMOCRACY 35 candidates’ often at the expense of popular candidates. Given that there is a simultaneous transition in the economic and political spheres in this era of globalization, the elite of power have also been able to personalize the economy through a well-lubricated political patronage system. The consequence, as is obvious, is manifested in the trapping of the democratization process, including the increasing gap of inequality between the rich and the poor. By failing to invest in policies that will engender popular empowerment in all ramifications, including the failure to invest in critical infrastructures such as power and electricity, the dominant elite of society ensured the entrenchment of heightened unemployment and excruciating poverty. All these meant declining standard of living for majority of the people. In the circumstance, elite mobilization of forces of identity, particularly ethnicity and religion, gets simplified. At the slightest provocations and deprivations, therefore, be it real or imagined, there are always readily available foot-soldiers that can easily be conned into negative behaviours. The elite conspiracy against the people occurs in diverse ways, most notably through the entrenchment of inequality of society, including the monetization and criminalization of the electoral processes such that the minimum requirements of competition, participation and legitimacy are grossly deficient or lacking altogether. Consequently, the delivery of dividends of democracy in Nigeria, under the current structure of democratic governance, has been considered a myth (Ojo 2010). The failure of the democratization process to implement public policies that correspond to the needs of the people is an eloquent testimony. To be sure, despite protests from labour movements and civil society organizations, successive governments have increased the price of petrol resources on several occasions. Moreover, the debate over minimum wage has assumed a serious dimension recently, with most state governors threatening not to pay unless the federal government removes subsidies from oil so as to enable them to receive a greater share of revenues from the federation account. The import of this is that implementing the federally approved minimum wage of 18,000 Naira (now less than $100) will bring more hardship to ordinary Nigerians with the inevitable hike in the prices of petroleum products. This is pathetic, given that those who will benefit from such a minimum wage (civil servants at all levels – federal, state and local government) are less than 5% of the population. While some may argue that it is not actually democracy that should generate the economic good for the citizen, it, nevertheless, has a responsibility of ensuring an environment 36 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS that can enhance the capacity of individual citizens to pursue their economic goals. This is yet to be the case (Omotola 2013). It is however useful to note that not only are these theoretical models and/or structures in their combination or in isolation useful in defining choices of the actors in electoral situations, the boundary between one set of factors or structuresandanotherisblurred.This is particularly the case in the relationship between ethno-regional and religious considerations on the one hand, and class and elite interests, on the other. Class actions and class interests, for instance, can easily be cloaked in ethno-religious and regional demands. As Sklar (1967) has argued, the salience of ethnic identity and mobilization in African politics is linked to ‘the new men of power’ whose interests are coterminous with the ‘constitutive interests of the emerging social classes’.

ECONOMIC GROWTH,SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY As well underscored earlier in this chapter, the sustainability of electoral democracy is linked to a minimum of economic prosperity and growth. The basic underlying assumption is that democracy thrives in the context of a strong middle class that can defend and promote democratic values. Therefore, economic decline and sharp socio-economic inequalities may not be conducive for the survival and consolidation of democracy. That the Nigerian economy has been growing appreciably especially under the current democratic dispensation is indisputable. To be sure, the country has averaged an annual growth rate of 6–7% during this period. Specifically, the GDP growth rate stood at 6.4% in 2007, 5.98% in 2008, 6.96% in 2009, 7.98 in 2010 and 7.36% in 2011. While oil accounts for about 14% of GDP between 2011 and 2014, agriculture accounts for about 40% over the same period. Yet, the rate of growth of the non-oil sector is higher than the oil sector, standing at 8.80%, 7.63%, 9.13% and 9.59% in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. Over the same period, crude oil and natural gas (oil sector) was growing at 0.14%, 0.01%, 1.29% and 1.40%, respectively. It was, therefore, hardly surprising when in 2013, the rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP for the period 1990–2010, resulted in an 89% increase in the estimated size of the Nigerian economy, reaching a nominal GDP of USD 510 billion. Also worthy of note is that much of the nominal GDP CONCLUSION 37 expansion was not linked to the driving role of the oil sector. The exercise reveals a more diversified economy than previously envisaged. Among other critical sectors, the service industry, Nollywood (Nigerian film industry) and telecommunications have emerged as important contributors to GDP and national income. The informal sector has also been found to have grown (and still growing) in leaps and bounds in size, contribution to GDP, estimated total employment and interdependence with the formal sector in selected States of the federation. However, despite these impressive growth statistics, a central concern has been the inability to translate socio-economic growth into socio- economic development. Despite government’s much orchestrated GDP growth, the material wellbeing of the people has not changed in any fundamental sense. Poverty and horizontal inequality, widening gap between the rich and the poor, youth unemployment, rising inflation and general underdevelopment of infrastructures remain key features of the socio-economic landscape. Specifically, despite Nigeria’s rebased GDP, its GDP per capita or per capita income in 2013 stands at $3,010 compared to Mauritius’ $9,210, South Africa’s $6,618 and Algeria’s $5,361 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014). Overall unemployment rate in Nigeria was 23.9% in 2011, with observable regional disparities ranging from 33% in north-eastern region to about 8% in Lagos State. Also in 2011, life expectancy was 51.9 years, with an adult literacy rate of 61.3%, compared to 57.7 years’ life expectancy, and an adult literacy rate of 67% for Africa. This may not be unconnected with the excruciating level of official corruption at all levels of governance and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption agencies, including the legislature and the judiciary in discharging their responsibilities, partly as a result of their political instrumentalization and the weakness of internal accountability mechanisms.

CONCLUSION This chapter has examined some theoretical issues pertaining to power, politics and democracy in Nigeria. In it, we place emphasis on three explanatory themes, namely institutional variables, especially federalism and how this informed the introduction and application of power-sharing devices; societal variables, especially the issue of social cleavages, which can manifest in linguistics, ethnic or religious terms; and mediating variables, including fragmentation and polarization in the political party system. As the chapter 38 2 THEORETICAL AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES IN NIGERIAN POLITICS reveals, power and politics are at the heart of democracy; and it is unthinkable to discuss democracy without reference to the concepts of power and politics. The effective regulation of power and politics in a way that guarantees harmonious cohabitation has ramifications for democratic stability. However, mediating the relationship in such a way that will engender stability has been problematic in Nigeria. While Nigeria has been adept in institutional engineering for the promotion of stable democratic polity, codified in terms of ethno-regional and religious accommodation devices such as the federal character principle, rotational presidency, secularism and a host of others, the contradictions in the implementation of such institutional innovations have always been their undoing. Consequently, federalism, ethnicity, religion, class, party system, and so on, key institutional and societal variables, while exerting some measure of positive influences on democracy, also continue to undermine the democratization process.

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Continuity and Change in Nigeria’s Electoral Democracy

INTRODUCTION This chapter focuses mainly on the elements of continuity and change witnessed in Nigeria’s 2015 elections. This is done against the background of Nigeria’s democratization since 1999, at times going deeper into the memory lane for illustrations from previous Republics. Specifically, the chapter highlights salient themes in continuity and change as witnessed in the elections. Some of the salient elements of continuity identified in the chapter include the politics of brinkmanship, a recurrent feature of Nigerian politics since the First Republic, including dominance of ethno-regional and religious themes across the electoral cycle, raising tension in the elections into a dizzying height. Other elements of continuity include the problematic nature of party primaries and candidate selection, disregard for regulatory norms on campaign finance and media accessibility, as well as the continuing low level of women participation and representation in politics, among others. With respect to change, the 2015 elections heralded, for the first time in the annals of Nigeria’s election, the alternation of power at the national level between the ruling and opposition parties. Moreover, the election witnessed considerable measure of improvement in the quality of electoral administration for a number of reasons. These include electoral reform initiatives, leading to innovations and improved capacity of INEC for electoral governance, the deployment of technology (card reader), strong civic engagement and citizen-agency and the emergence of a strong opposition through party merger, among others.

SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS As earlier indicated, that the 2015 elections held against the background of uncertainties that beclouded the initial schedules of February 2015 is considered a plus for Nigeria’s march to democratic consolidation. On 7 February, 2014, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC announced a six-week shift in the polls that had been ﬁxed almost a year earlier when it released the election calendar for the 2015 general elections. The Presidential and National Assemblyoriginallyscheduledtobeheldon14February,2015was shifted to 28 March, 2015, while the Governorship and State Assembly elections were moved from 28 February to 11 April, 2015. Although INEC explained that the postponement was within the law and the powers conferred on it, the events in the weeks and days leading to the postponement showed that it was a fait accompli. The implication was that, INEC’s constitutional autonomy regarding the conduct of credible and democratic elections had been gravely undermined through perceived executive subterfuge and interference. A further postponement, as it was widely feared, would result in a constitutional crisis considering the constitutional time frame for conducting elections before the winners are sworn in on 29 May. Early foreboding of the postponement was the position reportedly canvassed by the National Security Adviser (NSA), retired Colonel Sambo Dasuki, at a Chattam House lecture in London (a week earlier) where he was said to have alluded to the failure on the part of INEC to carry out efﬁciently, the distribution of the Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs) which would be used in the elections. This was to be followed by a letter to INEC, conveying the position of security chiefs that security agencies prosecuting the war against insurgency in the north- east would not be available to provide election security for the period scheduled for the election which, in any case, could not be held in that part of the country given the prevailing security situation. On the basis of doubts created, and the attendant speculation about postponement, a meeting of the National Council of State was convened to discuss the state of preparations for the elections. Although it was advised that INEC should carry out consultations with the stakeholders to determine the feasibility of holding the elections as scheduled, it had no choice but to postpone the elections because security decisions were clearly outside its purview. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 47

That the 2015 general elections constituted a landmark event in Nigeria’s political history is not in doubt. It was the country’s first experience of 16 years of uninterrupted civil and constitutional rule, and the fifth successive general elections that ensured peaceful transfer of power from one civilian government to another. Although such peaceful transfer of power occurred with shift in the locus of power from one segment to another among the country’s divided political elite within the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the ruling party from the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the 2015 elections heralded alternation of power. The victory of the opposition party (a rainbow coalition) was based on alliance between the south-west and the north, where two of the leading parties in the merger – the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) and the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) had strong electoral bases. Thus, going by the parameters used in assessing the performance of emerging democracies against the backdrop of the dominance of parties that won the transition elections, Nigeria can be considered as having joined the league of democracies that show remarkable signs of democratic deepening and consolidation. For many, the outcome of the election was even more remarkable that the opposition won on the first ballot considering the balance of political forces that raised the possibility of a second round of ballot. INEC itself shared this expectation to the extent that it made desperate efforts to push as priority, among others, an amendment to the electoral act to increase the number of days within which such election would be conducted from seven to 21 days. Thus, as it turned out, the presidential candidate of the APC, Muhammadu Buhari, won 15,424,921 of the validly cast votes while the PDP’s candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan secured 12, 853,162. In the National Assembly elections, the APC won 211 out of the 360 seats contested, to PDP’s 142, in the House of Representatives; and in the Senate, the APC won 60 seats out of the 109 seats contested to PDP’s 49 seats. In addition to winning the presidency and establishing a majority in the two chambers of the National Assembly, it established control of 22 out of the 36 states of the federation. The feat achieved in the elections is unprecedented in Nigeria’s post- independence political history. The initial promise of democratic progress in Africa’s most populous country with the greatest concentration of the black race, which was heralded by attainment of nationhood on 1 October, 1960, failed to materialize. The democratic experiment broke down barely after the second elections in 1966. At the root was the crisis 48 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY of political hegemony among the fractious political elite that reduced the contest for power at the national level to a supremacy battle between the elites of the three dominant ‘ethnic-power blocs’ in the country reflected in the configuration of the party system. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) which unabashedly did not disguise its representation of the northern aristocracy and the predominantly Muslim north, the Action Group (AG) which, like the NPC, sprang from a Yoruba cultural organization held tenaciously to its electoral base among the Yoruba of the south-west, and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) whose initial national image had been diminished by close association with the interests of the Igbo people of the eastern region fought electoral battles supposedly on behalf of their regional and ethnic constituencies. So salient was the ethno-regional factor that it whittled the importance of other forms of cleavages in Nigerian politics, especially the strong ideological undercurrents of political contest that encouraged the emergence of parties like the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). A similar fate befell the Second Republic (1979–1983), which witnessed the reincarnation of the ethno-regional parties of the First Republic. With the exception of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which had a semblance of a national party and the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) which sought to mobilize along a clear ideological line, the other parties had strong ethno- regional electoral base. In a typical fashion of history repeating itself, the Second Republic did not survive beyond the second election in 1983 which was discredited by allegations of use of state power and incumbency, not only to keep the ruling NPN in power, but to deliberately seek control of ethnic constituencies of the leading opposition parties despite lacking electoral support. Similarly, the elections which were least contentious and more acceptable were the ones either brokered by the departing colonial authorities in 1959/1960, or those supervised by the departing military regimes as in 1979 and 1998/1999 period under the leadership of General Olusegun Obasanjo and General Abdulsalam Abubakar respectively. In other words, for these exceptions, all the other elections in Nigeria’s post-independence period have been bitterly fought, characterized by lack of trust in the electoral umpires. In addition, the destructive fractional competition for power in which one group sought to neutralize the other through deft political manoeuvres and the politicization of identities threatened national stability and survival to the extent that the federal system which was adopted as a compromise between the ethnic and the class interests of the political elite failed to moderate the bitter contest. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 49

The overall significance of the 2015 general elections and the progress in Nigeria’s democratic journey comes out in bold relief when placed in the context of the global resurgence of democracy in the post-Cold War era. Huntington (1991) captures this as ‘the third wave’, during which many authoritarian regimes around the world turned towards democratic forms of government as a result of the convergence of internal and external pressures. Described as Africa’s second wave of democratization, this democratic tide is somewhat moderated in many African states, as it soon became apparent that many of the regimes that emerged in this period did not fully appropriate democratic values, while also retaining many features of the preceding autocratic regime. These ‘hybrid regimes’ as described by Diamond and Suberu (2002) and van de Walle (2006) are characterized by elements of democracy and liberal politics which operate alongside neopatrimonial and authoritarian tendencies. Nigeria’s tendency towards an imperial presidency in the eight-year-rule of President Olusegun Obasanjo between 1999 and 2007 which witnessed the emasculation of the legislature at the national level, a failed tenure elongation plot, and a series of elections characterized by the capture of the people’s sovereignty, draw attention to the danger posed to new democracies by strong authoritarian undercurrents. The term imperial presidency was used by Arthur M. Schlesinger, a famous American historian, to describe a presidency which enhances the powers of the president and uses the power of the executive office to carry out unconstitutional actions. In such a presidency, ‘the constitutional boundaries of the president do not restrict them, because the powers that the president invokes are often ‘executive’ in nature. From ‘executive orders’ to ‘executive privilege’ the president invokes many powers not granted them in the constitution ...(Schlesinger 2004). By implication, abuse of power is a dominant feature of imperial presidency. Isumonah (2012: 46) has argued that imperial presidency was the order of the day in Obasanjo’s Nigeria between 1999 and 2007. According to him, political competition and participation are crucial to democratic consolidation. However, during this period, ‘legal and formal guarantees for political competition and participation’ as he demonstrated, were ‘nullified by imperial exercise of presidential powers’. Obasanjo effected these by fostering ‘one-party domination and in effect derogated from political competition and participation, through the instruments of ‘party machinery, the INEC, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and state agents of force’. In fact, Obasanjo’s excesses in Odi, Bayelsa state 50 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY and later Zaki Biam in the north-central geo-political zone through the unilateral deployment of the military without adherence to constitutional requirement for legislative approval before or after the deployment constituted one of the main article of impeachment against him in 2002 (Omotola 2006). The high level of instability in the leadership of the NASS, particularly in terms of the gale of impeachment of Senate President attests to his overbearing dominance. It was arguably in the spirit of imperial presidency that Obasanjo initiated the third-term agenda (tenure elongation) and subsequently declared the 2007 presidential election as ‘a do or die’ affair following the defeat of the third-term agenda. His decision to continue to withhold federal allocations to local government councils in Lagos state, despite a valid judicial pronouncement to the contrary by a competent court of jurisdiction represents another dimension of the trouble (Omotola, 200, 2011). It is, however, important to note that despite his enormous power and the tendency to abuse it, there were occasions when other democratic players mounted fierce resistance to Obasanjo’s excesses. A most relevant example relates to the fierce resistance to his third term (tenure elongation) bid by a segment of the NASS and a coalition of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) that mobilized for the defeat of the agenda. The House of Representatives under the Speakership of Ghali Umar Na’Abba, also had a running battle with President Obasanjo in resisting his domineering activities. Nigeria’s progress in the procedural dimension of electoral democracy is further supported by the peaceful nature of the election considering fears that large-scale violence and threat to the country’s corporate existence would undermine the credibility of the elections. Such fears were informed by the various security threats assessments in the period leading to the elections. The basis of fears were reinforced by the emergence of a stronger opposition APC that openly and transparently chose General Muhammed Buhari, who incidentally was the opposition presidential candidate in the 2011 elections during which post-election violence afflicted many northern states, leading to the death of over 800 people. According to a report by Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) in 2011, ‘an estimated 938 people were killed and 735 were injured in three days of rioting and targeted ethnic-religious killings’; and more than 65,000 people were displaced and 350 churches burned. Interestingly, it was the general perception of his supporters that he lost the election due to the rigging machinations of the then ruling PDP that SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 51 allegedly fuelled the violence. As the Lemu Panel Report (2011) puts it, ‘one comment credited to the former military leader shortly before the election that voters should “guard their vote” was “ ...misconstrued by many voters to imply recourse to violence.”’ Therefore, to a large extent, the outcome of the 2015 elections provides broad indications that electoral democracy is beginning to gain a foothold and that a decade and a half legacy of electoral authoritarianism which reached its peak in the 2007 elections is gradually being reversed alongside the emergence of a culture of elections whereby defeated candidates accept their losses and accept the victory of declared candidates. This reinforces what is regarded as the value of elections in a representative democracy. Elklit and Reynolds (2002), for example, use the quality of elections described as ‘the extent to which political actors see the entire political process as legitimate and binding’ as a key indicator of the performance of a democracy. Such elections must be imbued with three core elements: competition, participation and legitimacy. Indeed, the emerging literature on electoral credibility or integrity provides rich ideas regarding the determinants of perception of electoral fairness including individual-level factors as well as aggregate or institutional aspects of elections which may vary from contest to contest (see Birch, 2008). As will be suggested later, the election benefited in a large measure from the modicum of electoral reform that made possible the appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega as Chairman of the INEC and a series of institutional and operational reforms undertaken by his leadership. Yet, all these reforms could have come to naught in the absence of a sitting president committed to free and fair elections. Apart from appointing Professor Jega on account of his personal integrity, President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan tacitly provided support to INEC by being dismissive of the false start of the 2011 elections. In the build-up to the 2015 elections, he resisted pressure from PDP leaders and henchmen who urged him to sack Professor Attahiru Jega as Chairman of INEC apparently to forestall the use of PVCs and SCR that were considered threatening to the victory of the PDP in the face of an increasingly powerful opposition. However, it was in the collation of the presidential votes that the statesmanship of President Goodluck Jonathan came out in bold relief. The three full days it took for the presidential vote count to be collated before announcement at the INEC National Collation Centre in Abuja was a trial period for Nigeria’s democratic process. As the announcement of results by states 52 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY continued on 31 March, the process was disrupted by an outburst from Mr Godsday Orubebe, a former Minister of the Niger Delta, and a representative of the PDP at the collation centre who came in company of retired Colonel Bello Fadile, a director in the Office of the NSA. The antics was ignored by President Jonathan who later conceded defeat and congratulated General Muhammed Buhari as the winner of the keenly contested election, thus setting the stage for some of the most critical aspects of change witnessed in the 2015 elections, including the alternation of power and post-election peace and stability.

ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE 2015 ELECTIONS Both continuity and change constitute the defining elements of the 2015 general elections, and, therefore should draw attention to positive lessons from the elections which need to be reinforced, while addressing the deeper issues embedded in Nigeria’s political economy which has continued to undermine the credibility of the electoral process. Indeed, while focusing on the positive elements of the elections, it is more heuristic to focus attention on the deep historical, institutional, attitudinal and behavioural elements that are neither amenable to quick-fix solutions nor can be overcome within a few electoral cycles. But even more important, is the urgent need to shift greater attention to the substantive dimension of electoral democracy which is about the degree of political accountability and ensuring that democracy meets the expectation of voters and citizens to meet their daily material needs. In other words, even if electoral integrity was achieved in the 2015 elections, it does not necessarily equal democracy. The momentum for change which culminated in the victory of the opposition in the elections can be found in the profound change that had occurred in Nigeria’s electoral environment following the appointment of the Professor Jega-led INEC in June 2010. In a very significant sense, the 2015 elections built on the positive legacy of the 2011 elections which was aided by fresh voter registration based on biometric technology that enabled over 70 million voters to be registered in place of the discredited electoral roll that had been created by Professor Attahiru Jega’s predecessor, Professor Maurice Iwu. This coupled with increased stakeholders’ engagement confidence-building measures with political parties, a new regime of open communication for sharing electoral ELEMENTS OF CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE 2015 ELECTIONS 53 information with key stakeholders as well as partnership with the NYSC and the security agencies led to improved outcome in the 2011 elections with the ultimate consequence of improving public confidence in the electoral process. Ensuring further improvement in the 2015 elections was made possiblebyacombinationofinnovative measures and improved internal capacity within INEC for electoral governance which are discussed later in this chapter. The elections provided opportunity for leveraging on partnerships with the NYSC and the security agencies which were forged in the 2011 elections. The new media which created immense possibility for inclusive electoral process as evident inthewaythesemediasourceswerecultivatedespeciallybytheyouth population proved to be more veritable platforms of participation in the election, especially for the youth, women and the physically challenged persons who pressed for greater visibility as voters and as candidates. However, what arguably stands out in defining the momentum of change in the election is what appears as the emergent culture of elections whereby defeated candidates accept defeat and, in many cases, congratulate their winning opponents. While the acceptance of defeat by President Jonathan was the most symbolic, there were many instances in which it happened at the subnational-level elections. Again, it is imperative to establish that this important culture of elections which is largely tied to the level of acceptability of electoral outcomes by parties and candidates started in the 2011 elections as evident in the dramatic drop in the number of election disputes before Election Petitions Tribunal. It would be recalled that the outcome of the 2007 elections alone generated 1,250 election petitions. The presidential election had 8, the gubernatorial 105, the Senate 150, the House of representatives 331 and the State House of Assembly 656 (Aiyede 2007: 50). But when the electoral process is treated as a cycle rather than a specific event of activities on the election day, then the 1,250 cases recorded amount to just a tip of the iceberg. In an astonishing revelation, The Herald, a national daily newspaper, reveals that the 2007 elections recorded an alarming 6,180 cases throughout the electoral process (Lawal 2008: 1&23, quoted in; Omotola 2010). But in 2011 there was a dramatic drop in the number of election petitions. Specifically, the 2011 elections had a total of 733 petitions, including two for the presidential election, 53 for the Governorship, 90 for Senate, 198 for House of Representatives and 54 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

390 for the State House of Assemblies (Jega 2012a). There was a further drop in 2015 with a total of 611 election petition cases. The positive trends in election results, particularly the gradual decline in the winning party’s share of total votes cast in the general election, as well as the number of seats won in parliament also constitute distinguishable elements of change. This was most glaring in the 2015 elections where the winning party (APC) in the presidential election polled a total of 15,424,921 (53.96%) of the total valid votes cast, compared to 12,853, 162 (44.96%) by the closest rival, the PDP; thus making the 2015 presidential election so far the most keenly contested in Nigeria. However, this trend began in 2011 when President Goodluck Jonathan garnered 22,495,187 (58.89%) of the votes against Buhari’s 12, 214, 853 (31.98%) in the presidential election. The PDP also began to lose its stronghold on the National Assembly and also lost a few of the states under its control to the defunct opposition CPC and ACN. This is significant when compared to the results of previous presidential elections since 1999. In the presidential election of 1999, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo had 18, 738, 154 (62.78%) of the votes cast compared to Chief Olu Falae’s 11, 110, 287 (37.22%). In 2003, Obasanjo repeated the same feat with 24, 456, 140 (61.94%) of the total votes cast against Buhari’s 12, 710, 022 (32.19%). In 2007, Musa Yar’Adua had 24, 638, 063 (69.60%) of the total votes cast compared to Buhari’s 6, 605, 299 (18.66%). This outrageous margin of victory in the 2007 presidential election with the winning and losing parties with the highest and lowest figures ever respectively underlines, overtly or covertly, some of the excesses of the 2007 elections. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the election has generally been seen as arguably the worst in Nigeria’s electoral history (Amuwo 2009; Adebayo and Omotola 2007; Obi 2008; Omotola 2009, 2010). It would appear that much of the claim about the improved integrity of the electoral process is hinged on the outcome of the presidential election rather than ‘local’ contests for seats in the national and state assemblies and the governorship elections where varying degrees of infractions were established by both domestic and international observers. Evidence of electoral authoritarianism was commonplace in many states where deliberate efforts were made to subvert the integrity of the electoral process. In many states in the south-east and the south-south geo-political zones where opposition to the use of card readers was strongest in the period leading to the elections, desperate politicians sabotaged the use of card readers as opposed to the failure of card readers in many instances or the ELECTORAL REFORM AND IMPROVED ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT 55 inability of untrained ad hoc staff who replaced trained ones to effectively use the card readers as a result of connivance between politicians and INEC officials. In many of these states, armed youth gangs and militants intimidated voters and scared away many from the polling units, while ballot box snatching and ballot box stuffing were widely reported (European Union, 2015; CLEEN Foundation 2015). On the whole, politics of brinkmanship and the type of grandstanding that characterized Nigeria’s post-independence electoral history were reenacted to a large extent in the build-up to the elections. In many cases, politicians on all sides inflamed ethnic and religious passion in the bid to win at all cost, reducing the electoral contest to warfare. The helplessness of the election management body and citizens as in the previous elections remained key concerns in the 2015 general elections. All this points to the institutional weaknesses that lie at the core of electoral malfeasance involving election management bodies, political parties and citizens in the context of a majoritarian electoral system that engenders cut-throat competition for power.

ELECTORAL REFORM AND IMPROVED ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT As alluded to earlier, improvement in the the 2015 elections was largely a consequence of the modicum of electoral reform achieved and the improved electoral environment it contributed to in the period leading to the election. Taking the 2007 elections as the baseline of the most fundamentally flawed elections since Nigeria returned to democracy in 1999, popular clamour for electoral reform could not be ignored. However, it was the decision of President Umaru Yar’Adua, a key beneficiary of the flawed election, to set up the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) with the mandate of reviewing the electoral process including exploring alternative electoral system that brought about a modicum of electoral reform. This became necessary considering that public confidence and trust in public institutions especially the election management body had reached the lowest ebb and the ‘exit’ option available for consideration to many citizens. Although the most important recommendations of the Committee chaired by Justice Muhammed Uwais were not accepted by the government, the fervour for reform pressured President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan to appoint Professor Attahiru Jega as the Chairman of INEC in June 2010. Despite being an appointee of the 56 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY president without following an open and transparent process as widely demanded by Nigerians, Professor Jega who had previously led the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) to successfully prosecute a strike against the military presidency of General Ibrahim Babangida, was perceived by the Nigerian public as a man of integrity to lead the electoral umpire. The ability of INEC to maintain its focus and conduct two major elections between 2010 and 2015 whose outcomes have been widely accepted, in spite of buffeting from all the sides of the partisan divide, was largely a result of the institutional autonomy and capacity of INEC under the leadership of Professor Attahiru Jega. The drive, focus and leadership which he brought to bear in addressing the complex challenges of election management targeted at internal operations and electoral integrity issues that historically tended to render electoral outcomes either outrightly unacceptable or, at best, highly contestable changed the narrative of elections. Kuna (2015) further identifies five important elements situated within the broad framework of electoral reform agenda driven by the commission which accounted for the improved integrity of Nigeria’s electoral process especially in the 2015 general elections. The first is the institutional autonomy of INEC made possible not only by the leadership quality of Professor Jega as the Chairman of the commission, but even more importantly, by non-interference of the political leadership because President Goodluck Jonathan showed a rare commitment to the idea of free, fair and credible elections as a cardinal doctrine of the ‘Transformation Agenda’ of his government. This, coupled with the financial autonomy granted INEC, provided an enabling political environment to make internal reforms within INEC possible. This enabled the commission to, among other things, carry out biometric voter register, pursue improved legal framework for elections and demonstrate neutrality in the administration of the 2011 elections. To begin with, the decision to embark on a completely new voter register based on biometric technology was inevitable as it became clear that the integrity of the register inherited from the previous INEC leadership had been badly damaged by massive loss of data for many states. Therefore, it was appropriate that the new leadership postpones the elections which were initially scheduled to be held from December 2010 to April 2011. The exercise which required massive procurement of Direct Data Capturing Machines (DDC), deployment of logistics and public enlightenment campaigns resulted in the registration of about 73.5 million voters. Against ELECTORAL REFORM AND IMPROVED ELECTORAL ENVIRONMENT 57 all odds and to the consternation of experts and sections of Nigeria’s Development Partners, within a record time, INEC purchased 132,000 laptops for the direct data capture exercise in excess of the estimated 120,000 polling units as part of the plan for redundancies, purchased the same numbers of printers, digital cameras finger print scanners (Jega 2012a, b). In addition, INEC in collaboration with civil society and other stakeholders, became drivers in the campaigns and engagements that led to improved legal framework for the 2011 elections, including financial autonomy and improved regulatory powers over parties’ candidates’ selection process and regulation of campaign finances. It is also important that the new leadership, despite the deep challenges and recorded instances of infractions, succeeded to a large extent in insulating the commission and its staff from bare faced partisanship that would have outrightly compromised its neutrality and integrity. The second factor was planning. This ensured coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of INEC in the 2015 elections. That planning was a cardinal element of INEC’s success can be seen in the systematic approach to process review and learning lessons from the 2011 general elections. This involved the organizational appraisal of INEC carried out by Price Water House and Cooper (PwC) on the basis of which internal reorganization of units and departments was implemented, the review of the voter registration exercise and the 2011 elections and a series of stakeholders’ review involving civil society, political parties, security agencies and the median as well as the choice of software and contract administration. Other important elements of the planning process include the development of a five-year strategic plan with short-, medium- and long-term components and the development of manuals and guidelines for important actors in the electoral process. The third element is creativity and innovation. Based on a thorough reflection of the historical antecedents of INEC and the integrity deficit suffered by the commission in the series of elections conducted since 1999, the leadership of Professor Attahiru Jega sought to bring about certain innovations and creativity to improve the electoral process. The salient ones include the development of Election Management System (EMS), Election Project Plan (EPP), election security framework under the aegis of Inter-Agency Committee for Coordination of Election Security (ICCES), redesign of business processes, INEC Citizen Contact Centre and the introduction of PVC and Smart Card Readers (SCR). 58 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

The fourth element which distinguishes the leadership of Professor Attahiru Jega from other previous ones is a new tradition of openness, information sharing and public outreach. In instances where the commission experienced lapses and error of judgement, it communicated the problems and solicited public understanding and support. In 2011, for instance, it had to postpone the National Assembly election (which was the first in the series of elections) due to the failure of logistics and followed this established tradition throughout the period it lasted. The deployment of SCR, in particular, turned out to be a game changer in the election. Even in many instances where the card reader failed to perform the expected function of authenticating the voter whose name is in the Voter Register, the ‘myth’ it created accounted for the success of the election and its perception as fair and credible. This electronic voter authentication system was introduced for the first time in Nigeria’s electoral system to read the PVC which has an embedded chip that contains all the biometrics of a legitimate holder. According to the voting guideline issued by INEC, holders of PVCs have to be authenticated by the SRC before being duly accredited for voting. Opposition mounted against the use of SCR especially from the ruling PDP was so high that it became a subject of litigation before a Federal High Court in Abuja which threw out the request to stop the use of the card readers in the elections. Finally, the commission benefited from linkages and partnership deliberately forged with key stakeholders in electoral democracy. This stakeholders-approach enabled INEC not only to disseminate electoral information to stakeholders such as political parties, civil society, and the media, but also build mutual trust and confidence. In the same regard, INEC’s openness and willingness to engage provided space for development partners to offer technical and financial assistance where necessary, an issue that needed to be situated within the wider discourse on democracy promotion from abroad.

MULTIPARTYISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG OPPOSITION Multipartyism and the existence of political alternatives which enable voters to choose is a dominant canon of neoliberal democracy that gives ‘free and fair elections’ and ‘individual choice’ the meaning they deserve in the context of electoral democracy. However, emphasis on multipartyism and the dynamics of interparty relations is not to suggest MULTIPARTYISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A STRONG OPPOSITION 59 that intra-party dynamics is not a significant issue in the 2015 elections considering that intra-party tension and even violence has been a key element that shapes electoral democracy in Nigeria. In this regard, a key attribute of the 2015 elections is the context of multiparty existence and the emergence of a strong opposition which wrestled power from the ruling PDP which had been in power for 16 years. The significance is that the election can easily pass as Nigeria’s most competitive election since independence in which an incumbent government with access to enormous state resources in an environment where rules governing campaign finances are too weak to prevent an incumbent from using state resources to electoral advantage was defeated. The significance of the competitive nature of the election comes into bolder relief when it is considered against the background of the violence that greeted the outcome of the 2011 presidential elections involving these same candidates. In the aftermath of deregistration of some political parties by INEC following the 2011 elections, 25 political parties fought the 2015 elections. However, the PDP and the APC were the two parties that shaped the electoral contest at the national level with the other parties adopting either of the two presidential candidates. The realignment of political forces that resulted in the emergence of two strong parties at the national level resulted from two mutually reinforcing processes. One was the crisis of internal democracy within the ruling PDP which reached a boiling point following the death of President Umaru Yar’adua in 2010 when the assumption of the presidency by Goodluck Ebele Jonathan triggered a northern opposition from within the party on the ground that the north which was allegedly entitled to the presidency for eight years had been short changed by the south. In the midst of the ethno-regional tension within the party which was heightened by the victory of President Jonathan in the 2011 general elections, he embarked on deft manouvres to tighten his control over the party in preparation for his second term in the 2015 elections. The appointment of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur as Chairman of the party was widely suspected to be one of such moves to prepare for his emergence as the sole presidential candidate. Disagreement fueled by northern opposition came to the fore at the special convention of the party in Abuja in August, 2013 during which seven PDP governors, the former Vice-President, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar and a number of party leaders broke away to form the new PDP (nPDP). Five of these governors were to defect to the newly formed opposition, the All Progressive Congress (APC). 60 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

The emergence of APC as a leading opposition party in 2013 followed a very long and tortuous path after weak and fragmented opposition parties that diminished in significance following every general election conducted since 1999. In response to what opposition parties regarded as the rigging machine of the PDP, there were attempts in 2007 and 2011 to forge loose alliance to fight the PDP but each election resulted in extending its control over the polity. This probably informed the decision of the legacy parties – ACN, the CPC, the All Nigeria Peoples’ Party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) – to coalesce into the APC in the countdown to the 2015 general elections. The coming together, for example, of the ACN which had hitherto successfully wrestled the south-west from the PDP and the CPC which had the record of delivering an impressive 12 million votes for its presidential candidate in the 2011 elections with strong electoral base from the north-west, north-east amounted to significant realignment of political forces. The existence of two major parties at the national level was a potpourri of danger and opportunity for the election. On the one hand, the elements of danger could be found in the acrimonious politicking, the resort to intemperate speeches and utterances, the cheap appeal to ethno-regional and religious sentiments, the unabashed resort to hate speech which was common to both sides of the political divide. While the ruling party drew attention to the perceived ill-health of the APC presidential candidate and harped on alleged lack of basic qualification, and sought to convince Nigerians of the supposed link between the opposition party and the Boko Haram insurgents, the opposition took the ruling party and its sitting president to the cleaners by accusing it of incompetence, failure to guarantee security and the inability to overcome the ravaging insurgency in the north-east, and portrayed it as a government that encouraged profligacy and corruption. The level of grandstanding and desperation for power, reinforced by incidents of communal conflict, militancy and rival cult wars in many parts of the country raised the level of perception of threats to the elections and encouraged mass movements of Nigerians to their ethnic homelands. On the other hand, sustained pressure from civil society and citizens forced the attention of the two parties to policy issues in a way that may be considered significant for the first time in electioneering in Nigeria. Although the policy debates tended to be dwarfed by mudslinging and bare-faced resort to manipulation of ethno-regional and religious identities that characterized the campaigns of the ruling and opposition parties, INSURGENCY AND SECURITY THREATS TO THE ELECTIONS 61 the leading candidates were occasionally forced to address policy issues. The opposition APC, for example, within the framework of its ‘Change’ agenda made allusions to issues of insecurity and threat to Nigeria’s territorial integrity posed by the war against Boko Haram and terror which it alleged the government had failed to tackle, made political capital out of the prevailing levels of corruption and impunity, and made references to the diversification of the economy to reduce dependence on export of crude petroleum. Issues of employment-generation and social protection appeared to also be cardinal in the Manifesto which was made public mid-way in the electioneering campaigns. On its part, the ruling PDP which had in place a Transformation Agenda since Goodluck Jonathan ascended the presidency in 2011 made efforts to draw attention to its achievements in agriculture, infrastructure especially the revival of rail transportation and the reform of the power sector, among others. However, what is not clear is the extent to which voter-preferences in national and subnational elections were structured by the policy issues and alternatives raised by the political parties and candidates. Nevertheless, the elections point to the salience that issue-based campaigns which are at the heart of democratic accountability will assume in subsequent elections. In the aftermath of the election which witnessed complex realignment of political forces, Nigeria is left with two major political parties; the erstwhile ruling PDP internally fractured by the problems of internal democracy and the undue influence of godfathers, and the new ruling APC which remains largely a rainbow coalition that urgently needs to reinvent its political identity in Nigeria’s fluid political environment. It also remains to be seen whether tendencies towards a two-party dominant system which have existed in all of Nigeria’s democratic experiment induced largely by the First Past the Post System based on single-member constituency will endure, or whether a more diffused multiparty system will reemerge.

INSURGENCY AND SECURITY THREATS TO THE ELECTIONS The 2015 elections were conducted under conditions of uncertainty and trepidation occasioned by insurgency and security threats. The situation itself can be explained by the high levels of elite fragmentation which resonated in intra- and interparty crises, resort to violence by party supporters, rising incidents of ethno-religious conflict, activation of cult groups and militancy as well as increased spate of farmers/herders conflict in various parts of the country. In every electoral cycle, deep-seated 62 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY communal grievances feed into the dynamics of elections and assume high levels in terms of occurrences and intensity. These were reinforced by the activities of the deadly Boko Haram-led insurgency in the northeastern parts of the country which assumed a frightening dimension from 2009. Although popularly known as Boko Haram which translates to ‘Western Education is Forbidden’ in Hausa, the real name of the sect is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (Arabic for People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad). The sect is opposed to democracy, secular government and symbols of capitalist modernity, and targets both Muslims and non-Muslims opposed to the cause it claims to promote. The insurgents, mobilizing on the basis of religious sentiments and the failure of governance, not only raised the spectre of generalized insecurity, but have called to question Nigeria’s national coherence, unity and integration. All these threat factors were considered in the series of security threats analysis in the period leading to the election (CLEEN Foundation, 2014). However, the most pronounced threat to the election came from the activities of the Boko Haram sect which openly declared war against the Nigerian state from 2009 following the confrontation between members of the sect and the Nigerian security forces when its leader, Mohammed Yusuf was executed. The sect, believed to have links with multinational terror group, Islamic State for Iraq and Syria, from that moment declared war against the Nigerian state. The success of its terrorist campaigns resulted in the seizure of large swathes of Nigeria’s territory. According to Crisis Group (2015),thedeadlyactiv- ities of the sect had, between May 2013 and October 2014, resulted in 5,000 casualties and 750,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). More recently, Governor Shettima of Borno State gave an estimate of 20,000 deaths and two million IDPs resulting from the activities of the insurgents. In the period leading to the elections there were fears of the sect turning into a secessionist and separatist group, following declaration of caliphate status on seized towns and communities in Yobe and Borno States and hoisting their flags. The abduction of over 200 school girls from their Dormitory in Chibok in April 2013 brought into public consciousness the level of threat posed by the sect. In a very disturbing sense, there appeared to be a confluence between the north/south polarization fueled by the campaign strategy of the ruling PDP and the APC opposition and the overt underlying religious motive of the sect which conveyed the threat that the election could fuel large-scale violence along these fault lines especially considering the general INSURGENCY AND SECURITY THREATS TO THE ELECTIONS 63 impression created by the ruling PDP that Boko Haram was a creation of aggrieved northern politicians who lost to President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011. Alarmed by the level of killings and displacement of the civilian population, the INEC Chairman warned in December 2013 that unless the security forces were in the position to contain insurgency in the north- east, it would be difficult to hold election in the region. Apparently building on the fear expressed by the leadership of INEC, what appeared to be orchestrated campaign for the postponement of the election was launched in some quarters. While debating the state of insurgency and the need to extend the state of emergency which had been imposed on Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States since June 2013 and renewed every six months, the leadership of the Senate alluded to the possibility that the elections may be postponed. Senate President, David Mark and his Deputy, Ike Ekweremadu canvassed the position that since Nigeria was practically in a state of war, there was justifiable ground to postpone the election. However, this position could not be sustained as a result of strong opposition from civil society groups who warned of the dire constitutional consequences of postponement and the reassurance from the INEC leadership that argued that since countries like Iraq and Afghanistan still conduct elections in the face of more serious terrorist activities, INEC was in the position to conduct the elections in the affected states and would address the logistics challenges of IDP voting. The question of what to do with the large number of IDPs in the states directly affected by insurgency and in the neighbouring states raised concerns regarding the inclusiveness and the democratic character of the elections in the same proportion that raging terrorist activities posed a dilemma to conducting elections which is a civic activity in the region. As it also became clear, being a signatory to the Kampala Convention of 2009 otherwise known as the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs, there was no alternative to arrangements that would enable IDPs to participate in the elections as a matter of right. INEC, with the support of civil society and development partners had to squarely address the challenge of IDPs voting through a dedicated Task Force to deal with the logistics of PVC distribution, bringing them on the electoral roll and implementing intensive civic and voter education.The success of the elections including the wide acceptance of the outcome as well as its generally peaceful nature against this backdrop speaks volume about the determined efforts of Nigerians to give democracy a chance. 64 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

WOMEN PARTICIPATION AND GENDER EQUITY IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS Gender imbalance and underrepresentation of women in elective positions have raised doubts about the inclusiveness and democratic character of Nigeria’s elections since 1999. This is because elections and democracy are about representation and capturing the diversities of the population. In a country where the population of the female gender constitutes more than half of the population, the exclusion of women raises questions about the health of the country’s democracy. The fact that Nigeria is a signatory to the various forms of affirmative actions at international level and has, in place, a National Gender Policy that commits to 30% representation of women in both elective and appointive positions would even raise more doubts about the commitment of the Nigerian state and the ruling elite to gender equity in the management of the public space. Despite the huge advocacy efforts undertaken by civic groups especially coalitions of movements advocating for gender equity since 1999, significant progress has not been made in this realm. The reason is that the diverse forms of obstacles militating against effective women participation in decision-making in general and women representation in politics in particular have not considerably changed nor are they being seriously addressed. These obstacles are rooted in African cultural traditions, reinforced by the ideology of patriarchy and the masculine nature of politics most assured by the prevailing culture of political violence. In addition, the undue monetization of politics in an economy that affords only few economic opportunities for wealth accumulation and ownership, among others (Omotola 2007) erodes the required level-playing field that favours the participation of women as candidates. The absence of legislation that entrenches Affirmative Action such as quota system aimed at securing protected seats to women as well as electoral system that is solely based on First Past the Post System mean that women will remain marginalized for a long time. As was in the previous elections and, therefore, a strong indicator of the elements of continuity in the electoral process, the number of women who aspired to contest elections into executive positions, especially the offices of the president and governor remained abysmally poor. In the very few exceptional cases, women candidates could only feature on the platform of minor parties with limited spatial and electoral appeals. In the presidential election, for example, Comfort Sonaiya was the candidate of KOWA party CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND CITIZENS AGENCY 65 where she returned a vote of 13, 075 (0.05%) of the total votes cast. The initial hope that Nigeria would produce the first female governor through Aisha Alhassan, the APC candidate, ended up as an aborted dream following the eventual declaration of the PDP candidate as the winner and the Supreme Court decision upholding the verdict. The trend continued in the National Assembly elections where women did not fare any better. It is undisputable that women have been at the margin of legislative governance since 1999, having been perpetually underrepresented in the parliament. In a Senate of 109 Senators, the highest representation of women was attained in 2007 when only 9 (8.2%) of them were elected, compared to 3 (2.8%) in 1999; 4 (3.7%) in 2003; and 8 (7.3%) in 2011. This dropped to 7 (6.4%) in 2015. A similar pattern was noticeable in the HoRs where the highest rate of women representation was recorded also in 2007 with only 27 (6.1%) women elected in a House of 360 members. One of the lessons learned from the 2011 elections was that despite the emergence of a large pool of female aspirants on different party platforms (encouraged by pressure to grant application fees waiver to them) only a few and in ‘insignificant’ parties secured their party tickets for the election. Another lesson was that despite the significant improvement in the credibility of the elections, the level of women representation did not change. Although the Women for Change platform created by Dame Patience Jonathan aided the emergence of a few women it tied to the patronage system built around the Office of the First Lady, rather than an open platform for all women. Therefore, the decision of Professor Attahiru Jega-led INECtoputinplaceagenderpolicyintheCommissionwaswelcomedin the hope that it could contribute to increased participation of women. However, as the outcome of the 2015 elections shows, women representation in the parliaments dropped sharply to 14 (3.9%). The road to gender balance and improved representation of women appears to be a long one.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND CITIZENS AGENCY Delivering a public lecture at the University of Lagos Centre for Social Research and Advocacy after the end of the 2011 elections, former INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Jega, among others, identified what he termed, ‘the National Consensus for Reforming the Elections’ as a critical factor in the success of the 2011 elections (Jega 2012a, b). This strikes at the heart of civic engagement and citizens’ agency in the 66 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY struggle to entrench democratic elections in Nigeria. It is a recurring theme in the struggles for democratic society in Nigeria beginning with the anti-colonial struggles and the battles for the expansion of the democratic space waged by the Nigerian people and their organizations. If civic engagement and citizens agency could be reckoned with as playing a critical role in the success of the 2011 general elections, it was even more so on the 2015 elections. Civic engagement and citizens agency are at the heart of the democratic process and democratic election in particular. In a very important sense, civic engagement and citizens agency defined the character and outcome of the 2015 elections. At the very broad level, civic engagement and citizens agency cover the entire spectrum of civic engagement involving ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ groups that may seek to advance or retard democratic progress. Despite their potentially constructive roles in the configuration of state power, ‘uncivil’ ethno- regional political organizations and their leaders who serve as spokes- persons of their different constituencies are a part of civic groups that play largely divisive roles in the electoral process. This is evident in the activities of groups such as the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the South-South People’s Assembly (SSPA), the Ijaw National Congress (INC) Ohaneze N’digbo and Afenifere. In the context of mobilization towards the election, faith-based organizations such as the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) were drawn into the political forays with uncon- firmed allegations that religious leaders were paid to pray for the electoral success of the leading candidates. For example, Northern political elites on the platform of the ACF and the Northern Unity Forum (NUF) challenged the candidature of the incumbent president on the ground that it was the turn of the north which was denied by President Goodluck Jonathan’s assumption of the presidency in 2010. As a strategy of resisting the candidature of President Goodluck Jonathan in the 2015 general elections, it sought as it did in 2011, to unite key northern elites to speak with a united voice. Using these platforms, northern elites first threatened fire and brimstone should PDP decide to field Jonathan in the 2015 elections, and, once made the sole candidate of the party, threatened to go to war. Meanwhile, in response to the deepening of northern opposition to President Goodluck Jonathan’s reelection, ethno-regional groups and individuals from the Niger Delta and the south-east rallied support for the president. The public space came to be saturated with inflammatory and CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND CITIZENS AGENCY 67 divisive speeches by self-appointed and, sometimes, faceless organizations that threatened violence if the outcome of the election failed to go their way(s). While the ACF and the Northern Elders Council issued veiled threats about the end of the Nigerian project should President Jonathan win, individuals like Chief Edwin Clark and groups like the INC, the United Niger Delta Volunteer Force and Grassroots Coalition for Goodluck Jonathan provocatively reminded northern power elites that it was the entitle- ment of a Niger Delta person to occupy the presidency for eight years. The Grassroots Coalition for Goodluck Jonathan issued a similar threat. The leadership of Ohaneze N’digbo, elected in 2013, not only took the decision that the Igbo would not field a presidential candidate in the elections, but outrightly adopted the incumbent president as the Igbo candidate, while expressing the position that it would be the turn of the Igbo to produce the president after the second tenure of President Goodluck Jonathan. The tendency for regional issues to take the centre state has permeated all the regions including the south-west where intra- elite fragmentation has led to discordant tunes with the Afenifere, throw- ing its weight behind President Goodluck Jonathan as a bargain for addressing the alleged marginalization of the ‘Yoruba race’ in the post- Olusegun Obasanjo presidency era. The Yoruba Unity Forum, another pan-Yoruba organization endorsed President Goodluck Jonathan as presidential candidate and canvassed support for him in the election in the same belief. Despite the divisive dimension of civic engagement with the 2015 elections, civil society groups and citizens made positive impact on the elections in different domains such as civic and voter education, citizen mobilization for mandate protection and election observation. Groups such as Democracy Vanguard, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), the Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC) – led Civil Society Situation Room and the Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition (NDCSC) contributed to the credibility of the elections. For example, the Parallel Voter Tabulation (PVT) or the Quick Count Election observation methodology undertaken by Nigeria’s foremost election observation coalition group, the TMG lends credibility to the results of the elections as officially announced by the INEC. This is evident in the result of the random sampling of 1,507 polling units spread across each of the 774 Local Government Areas in the country by citizens’ observers where nearly one million Nigerians voted. According to the results, General Buhari of APC received 59.4% of the 68 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY votes instead of 53.9% announced by INEC, and, Goodluck Jonathan received a total of 39.3% of the votes cast instead of 45.0% as announced by INEC (TMG, 2015). The strength of TMG’s election observation technique lies not only in the fact that it provides timely and accurate information on the conduct of voting and counting, and to independently verify official election results, it is also built on the capacity to deploy long-term observers covering all the stages of the electoral process. This strategy of long-term observation enables the TMG to monitor the activities of INEC, political parties and their campaigns and the implementation of voter education activities. The Civil Society Situation Room, in a different way, reinforces the positive role(s) of civic engagement in promoting the transparency and credibility of the electoral process. The activities undertaken by this platform which brought together over 60 civil society groups in the 2011 elections were largely scaled up in the build-up to the 2015 elections, and enabled the platform which is linked to INEC Situation Room, not only to advocate around reform issues that would drive the electoral process to greater transparency, but to track incidents such as violence, diversion of electoral materials, late arrival or non-availability of election officials at polling units and other forms of infractions which are immediately escalated to INEC for quick remedial interventions. Civic virtues and mobilization of citizens to deepen electoral democracy and build on the gains of wrestling power from the military in 1999 have been a huge part of the social capital that has aided Nigeria’s steady and slow progress to democratic consolidation. Sustained civic engagement even under severe funding constraints because of diminishing resources from the traditional sources in the global north also draw attention to the democratic energy of Nigerian citizens and their organizations. It speaks to the tenacity of civic groups in their commitment to democracy that they provided support anchor to INEC even under the most difficult circumstances, including sustained advocacy and support for electoral reform.

NIGERIA’S DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS The 2015 general elections also brought into bold relief, the central importance of democracy promotion abroad. The fact that Nigeria’s 2015 elections came under serious international scrutiny, to some extent, account for the outcome of the elections. However, this must be situated NIGERIA’S DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS 69 in the wider context of Nigeria’s strategic importance as a regional leader being looked up to for leadership to the rest of Africa on issues of democracy and governance. Nigeria is considered a regional power on account of its human and natural resource endowment, the sheer strength of its population and the role it has played over the years in spearheading issues of eradication of colonialism and other forms of foreign domination, regional integration and security, and its immense potential for becoming a model to other African countries to emulate. Not surprisingly, the return to civilian rule in May 1999 was widely acclaimed by western governments and donors. Western governments, donors and election observers began to engage Nigeria’s democratic process and began to make substantial investment in its support after a careful assessment of the 2003 elections. Following the observed lapses including the low level of tolerance for the opposition, incidents of electoral violence, rigging and ballot box snatching, a more systematic approach to engaging with Nigeria’sdemo- cratic process began with the emergence of networked donors who launched the Joint Donor Basket Fund (JDBF) in support of the 2007 elections. This apparently marked a significant turning point in donor-support of Nigeria’s democratic and electoral processes. The JDBF brought together a group of like-minded donors consisting of the European Union (EU), United Kingdom Department for International Development (DfiD), the Canadian International Development Assistance (CIDA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that managed the Fund. Using Electoral Cycle approach, these donors replaced the JDBF with the Democratic Governance for Development (DGD) after a review of the JDBF in the aftermath of the flawed 2007 elections, encouraged by the evidence that support to civil society made some positive impact. Both DGDI and DGDII provided technical and funding support to stakeholders such as INEC, political parties, women, the mass media and political parties in the 2011 and the 2015 general elections. There are other support platforms such as those driven by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) that enabled the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and International Forum for Electoral Assistance (IFES) to provide targeted technical support to key stakeholders in the electoral process: election management bodies, political parties, women groups, civil society at large and the media. USAID support for capacity building for INEC, police and the media is estimated at a cost of $15 million. Outside the basket fund in support of Nigeria’s electoral process, DfiD, 70 3 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NIGERIA’S ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY since 2009 has implemented a five-year-support to deepening democracy in Nigeria to the tune of about $55 million (Crisis Group, 2015). However, the realization that the issues involved go beyond technical support has made political dialogue and diplomatic initiative a complemen- tary aspect of democracy support. On this score, it is instructive to note that despite the deep structural malaise of the Nigerian political economy and the phenomenal situation of elite capture of power and resources, Nigerian political elites defer to international standards and norms of democracy and human rights which successive Nigerian governments have acceded to at international and regional levels. Therefore, the political elites, despite the importance of domestic sovereignty allow engagement of international development partners. They sometimes, for their own credibility and legitimacy, entertain ambassadors and special envoys from leading western governments, multilateral development agencies and bilateral organizations. Nigeria’s development partners have often used platforms provided by regular visits to pass important messages that reinforce the need to preserve Nigeria’s unity and push the frontiers of democracy as the antidote to the many crises of development and progress. The importance of such political messaging and dialogue became manifest in the context of insurgency that brought out the high level of fragmentation among the political elite, the support for the ‘Abuja Peace Accord’ in the face of threats to peaceful elections. It would appear, in some context, that diplomatic pressure and political dialogue could play a more decisive role in contributing to peaceful elections than technical support. This is not only because Nigerian elites increasingly care a lot about their international image and would want to be perceived as observing international norms and standards including those governing elections; and probably would want to avoid a relapse into a rogue state status as was the case in the Abacha years, it is also because the globalization of democracy and democracy promotion abroad which brought delinquent leaders under sanctions including prosecution at the International Criminal Court (ICC) has reduced the risk of derailment of democratic governance. Indeed, it was not surprising that in the face of dangerous manouvres and show of desperation by parties and candidates in the build-up to the elections, attention was constantly drawn to the prospect of ICC trial for those found to be culpable in the event of breakdown of law and order, with references made to the alleged perpetrators of the 2008 electoral violence in Kenya and the more recent experience of Laurent Gbagbo in Cote d’Ivoire. Perhaps, in the fullness of time, the role of the international community and REFERENCES 71

Nigeria’s development partners in the decision of President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan to accept defeat may be revealed.

CONCLUSION What this chapter has done is not just to situate the 2015 elections within the broader historical and institutional contexts of governance, but also illustrate, with a bird’s eye view, some of the most basic elements of continuity and change developed across the various chapters of the book. In doing this, the chapter explores various interventions and themes that underpin continuity and change, including electoral reform and improved INEC’s capacity for effective electoral management, multipartyism, the emergence of strong opposition, insurgency and insecurity, women participation and gender equality, civic engagement and citizens agency and the role of development partners. These and related issues, as illustrated in the chapter, account for the observable course and outcomes of the 2015 elections in Nigeria.

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European Union Election Observation Mission, 2015, Second preliminary statement: more efficient polling although increased incidents of violence and interference, 13 April 2015, available at http://www.eueom.eu/files/pressre leases/english/130415-nigeria-ps2_en.pdf (accessed 20 November 2015). Huntington, S. P. 1991, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. International Crisis Group, 2015, Nigeria’s Dangerous 2015 Elections: Limiting the Violence. Brussels: ICG. Isumonah, A. 2012, ‘Imperial presidency and democratic consolidation in Nigeria’, Africa Today, 59(1), pp. 43–68. Jega, A. M. 2012a, ‘The Electoral Process and Security Sector Synergy’. A Paper Delivered to EIMC 6 Participants of Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Abuja. Jega, A. M. 2012b, 2011 General Elections and the Consolidation of the Democratic Process in Nigeria, Centre for Social Research and Advocacy, University of Lagos. Kuna, M. J. 2015, ‘Reflections on the 2015 General Elections’. Paper presented at Technical Advisory Group Retreat, March, 2015, Abuja. Lawal, K. 2008, ‘2007 Elections: Courts Receive 6, 180 Cases’, The Herald (Ilorin, 12 May), pp.1 & 23. Lemu Report, 2011, The Report of the Federal Panel of Investigation into the 2011 Election Violence and Civil Disturbances, Abuja. Obi, C. I. 2008, ‘International election observation missions and the promotion of democracy: some lessons from Nigeria’s 2007 elections’, Politikon, 35(1), pp. 69–86. Omotola, J. S. 2006, ‘The limits of election monitoring: The 2003 Nigerian general elections’, Representation: A Journal of Representative Democracy, 42(2), pp. 57–67. Omotola, J. S. 2007, ‘Godfathers and the 2007 Nigerian general elections’, Journal of African Elections, 6(2), pp. 134–154. Omotola, J. S. 2009, ‘Nigerian parties and political ideology’, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 1(3), pp. 612–634. Omotola, J. S. 2010, ‘Elections and democratic transitions in Nigeria under the fourth republic’, African Affairs, 109(437), pp. 535–553. Omotola, J. S. 2011, ‘Electoral reform and the prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria’, Journal of African Elections, 10(1), pp. 187–207. Schlesinger, A. Jr. 2004, War and the American Presidency.NewYork:W.W.Norton. Transition Monitoring Group, 2015, Report of the March 2015 Presidential and National Assembly Elections, Abuja. van de Walle, N. 2006, ‘Tipping games: When do opposition parties coalesce’,inA Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. CHAPTER 4

Party System and the Dominance of the People’s Democratic Party

INTRODUCTION Historically, Nigeria’s party system has vacillated between two broad but not necessarily contradictory tendencies. While the plural nature of the Nigerian polity and the inherent political tendencies have dictated multipartyism, the dynamics of electoral politics and the need for opposition parties to either merge or form alliances to fight elections against dominant or ruling coalitions tend to move Nigeria towards a two-party system. There is a sense in which the latter tendency confirms what is widely regarded as Maurice Duverger’s law, which identifies a correlation between a First Past the Post Electoral System and the formation of a two-party system (see Duverger 1986, for example). Unlike the previous democratic dispensations, the uninterruption of the democratic process for more than four electoral cycles has enabled the dynamics of a single- member constituency elections based on First Past the Post System to play out in moving the multiparty system in the direction of a two-party dominant system with the emergence of APC that won the 2015 elections as an opposition party. In both the First and Second Republics which did not survive beyond the first electoral cycle there were trends towards a two-party dominant system which could not be consummated because of the rude interruption of the democratic experiments by the military. Nigeria returned to the path of democracy in 1999 under a multiparty system. In the course of implementing the short transition programme initiated by the military regime of General Abdulsalam Abubakar that

© The Author(s) 2017 73 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_4 74 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY ushered in the Fourth Republic, three political parties were registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). They include the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the All People’s Party (APP) that later morphed into the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). These three political parties contested the elections of 1999. By December 2002, the number of registered political parties rose to thirty (30), with additional three (3) parties registered in January/February, 2006 to bring the number to thirty-three (33). Again, in the run-up to the 2007 general elections, additional parties were registered by INEC to increase the number to sixty-three (63). However, following the deregistration of some political parties by INEC, as empowered by Section 78 (7) of the Electoral Act 2010, as amended, considering the inability of such parties to stage any meaningful competition in the elections of 2007, there emerged only twenty-five (25) officially recognized political partiesinINEC’s register (Mbah and Nwangwu 2014:167). A multiparty system, more than any other party system, conduces to advancing the principle of electoral democracy because it offers a platform of representation to all political, religious, social, cultural and economic interests in society through the provision of competing alternatives/ choices to the electorate. In this regard, a multiparty system appears to promote unity in diversity; and ensuring that no single political party is large and strong enough to rule alone, leading to a system of coalition government (Tsuwa 2014). Elsewhere, Kuenzi and Lambright (2005: 423–424) capture the attractions of multiparty systems in its ability to ‘enhance the quality of democracy in a polity by increasing the choices before voters, augmenting the representation of different groups, and miti- gating the likelihood of civil strife’. These appeals are particularly attractive to Nigeria given her plural character, especially the ethno-regional and religious configurations of her polity. This probably may have contributed to the high expectations that attended the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in Nigeria in 1999. Indeed, it was anticipated, among others, that multipartyism would help reinforce the plural and inherently democratic qualities of the Nigerian political system. However, rather than promote genuine democratic competition, offer real alternatives to the electorate, engender unity in diversity and ensuring that no single party is big enough to form government alone, thereby facilitating the formation of more inclusive governments, the advent of multiparty democracy would appear to have yielded undesirable outcomes that tend to negate the fundamental tenets of multiparty democracy. One INTRODUCTION 75 of the most basic exemplifications of the negation manifests in the dominance of the PDP in the control of state power at both national and subnational levels since 1999, pushing other leading political parties to the margins of politics (Kendhammer 2010). This dominance, however, was successfully challenged by the opposition – the APC – in the 2015 general elections. How did the dominance of the PDP in Nigerian politics since 1999 manifest? What are the predisposing factors for the dominance of the PDP since 1999? These are the two main research puzzles to be addressed in this chapter. The primary objectives are to, first, pinpoint specificsignifiers/signposts of the dominance of the PDP, illustrating the form and character of its dominance; and second, to offer explanations for the dominance. The central arguments in this chapter are that the dominance of the PDP (since 1999) is evident from its landslide victories in the executive and legislative elections at both federal and state levels in successive elections since 1999 till the 2015 elections. The victory of the APC, a conglomerate of hitherto independent political parties, namely, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the ANPP and a breakaway faction of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), brought to an end, the dominance of a party which had not only proclaimed itself the largest party in Africa, but was determined to hold on to power for a hundred years. Some factors account for the dominance of PDP, most notably the ability of the party to build a fairly truly multiethnic coalition across the country enshrined in the symbolism of umbrella, the party’s logo; the emergence of retired military officers as a strong power bloc in Nigerian politics post-1999; the ineffectiveness of election administration due largely to deficiencies in the institutional and the constitutional and legal frameworks for election administration, including the forms and character of INEC; the incumbency factor, particularly control over key institutions of government such as security agencies, the treasury, the national assembly and official patronage networks; poor state of the economy, epitomized by rising poverty, unemployment and rising costs of living, all of which made it possible to manipulate the electorate; and the inherent contradictions/weaknesses associated with opposition parties, including acute shortage of resources, fractionalization and poor coordination, among others. The chapter begins with a reflection on theoretical perspectives on party systems, first by clarifying the concept of party system as well as the 76 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY strengths and weaknesses of the various forms of party systems. It also explores the concept of the dominant party, showing its distinguishing attributes, the emergence and organization of the PDP, trends in the elections from 1999 to 2011 at all levels to illustrate the dominance of the PDP in Nigeria since 1999 and the explanation of the predisposing factors for the dominance of PDP.

PARTY SYSTEM AND A DOMINANT PARTY Party system typifies the network of relationships through which parties interact and influence the political process (Agbaje 1999). This network of relationships, when elaborately defined as Nnoli (2003) has done, encap- sulates three basic elements. The first, according to him, relates to the constitutional and regulatory frameworks governing the formation, organization and functioning of political parties. The second has to do with the balance of the electoral support among political parties in a given political system. The third typifies the actual number of political parties operating in a country at any point in time (see also Tsuwa 2014:60–61). The emphasis of this chapter is on the third element relating to the number of parties, given that the question of the appropriate number of parties suitable for guaranteeing the deepening of a democracy and political stability in a political system has been the central concern of discourses on party systems across ages. This is understandable because, as Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) argue, ‘the characteristics of party systems affect the extent to which parties serve these functions’. The number of parties competing for power represents one of such essential attributes of party systems. Studies have identified three basic types of party systems, namely, one-party, two-party and multiparty systems. Depending on the number of parties, the party system can influence, in no small measure, the degree of the clarity in the alternatives/choices available to the electorate, political accountability, democratic stability and national unity, among others (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). Put differently, there is a positive relationship between the number of political parties and the level of democracy in a political system. In a one-party system, for example, where only one political party is legally recognized, it is assumed that such a party system would promote national unity by suppressing the prospects of the rise of ethnic-based parties, especially in culturally diverse and deeply segmented societies present in most African countries and typified by the Nigerian situation. PARTY SYSTEM AND A DOMINANT PARTY 77

Unfortunately, this provided one of the rationalizations advanced by the post-colonial ruling elite for dismantling the pluralist political arrangements that ushered in independence and replacing existing multiparty system with one-party dictatorship. However, this has proved very costly, undermining the germinating seeds of democracy on the continent as it suffers under the heavy yoke of attendant authoritarianism, political exclusion, criminalization of dissent and unhealthy patronage system. Nigeria, on account of her plural tradition, remains an exception to the flowering of one-party dictatorship, although military dictatorship thrived for decades. On the other hand, the strengths of a two-party system under which only two political parties are legally recognized, are rooted in its presumed capacity to engender effective and stable government, accountable and responsible party government, and alternation of power, which provides electoral choice for the voters. This conviction largely informed the political engineering of the Ibrahim Babangida regime which attempted to impose a two-party system in Nigeria’s aborted Third Republic (Oyediran and Agbaje 1991; Lewis 1994; Adejumobi, 1997). Ordinarily, as argued elsewhere, ‘the existence of two political parties should represent two different ideological camps, as has been the case between the Labour and Conservative parties in Britain and the Democrats and the Republicans in the USA’ (Omotola 2009: 635; Omotola, 2010: 131). Evolved and entrenched two-party system helps streamline the electoral choices of voters and vice versa. Unfortunately, this was seldom the case with respect to Nigeria under the aborted Third Republic. While the SDP was a ‘little to the left’ and the NRC a ‘little to the right’, nothing much differentiated the parties ideologically (Yaqub, 2002: 128, quoted in Omotola, 2010: 133). But in a multiparty system, where more than two parties are legally in existence, notable advantages include the opportunities it offers for the representative of diverse interests, be they political, economic, socio-cultural or ethnic; and the possible expansion of electoral choice for voters. For these reasons, multiparty systems are generally perceived as capable of improving the quality of democracy, not only by increasing the choices before voters, but permitting representation for a multitude of interests in the polity, thereby creating a sense of belonging among the different groups in society in terms of access to the government (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005: 425). These explain why Nigeria, except for the failed experiment under the aborted Third Republic, has always been a 78 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY multiparty system. However, despite its appeal, multiparty system has also been associated with some contradictions, most notably the tendency to pose many ‘governability’ problems, including difficulties in creating inclusive governments. As the argument goes, ‘if the party composition of government is too fragmented, producing coherent policy is likely to be challenging’ (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005: 424). Yet the possibility of polarization has also been associated with a multiparty system (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). What the foregoing suggests is that, each party system has its unique features, strengths and weaknesses. Depending on the applications of these features, any party system can either reinforce the political system in general, particularly its democratic system or vice versa. For instance, when a multiparty system is perverted, probably as a result of the form and character of politics and democratization in general, the result may be the emergence of an electoral authoritarian regime characterized by one-party dominance, despite the existence of many parties. According to Reuter and Remington (2009: 503), a dominant party can be explained as ‘a party that has the leading role in determining access to most political offices’. For Greene (2010: 811), dominant parties are ‘central power holders for long periods of time’. In his own elaboration, Bogaards (2004) introduced element of time with a minimum electoral threshold when he defines a dominant party system as one where one party wins an absolute majority in parliament over at least three consecutive elections and captures the presidency. He would later slightly modify this definition which sees a dominant party system as one ‘with meaningful elections where one party maintains the ability to determine social choice through government policy for, at least, 20 consecutive years or four consecutive elections’ (Bogaards 2008: 115). This presupposes that a party may not necessarily need to win an absolute majority in parliament to be regarded as dominant, at least at the initial stage. With a little above simple majority or a little below absolute majority, the party, once it has control over the presidency and other executive positions at the state (subnational) level, can deploy all means (both conventional and unconventional), including patronage, subtle threats and other forms of abuse of power of incumbency, to persuade, intimidate and/or compel cross carpeting or even a smooth passage of its bills. Reuter and Reuter and Remington (2009: 503) allude to these possibilities in their discussion of the attributes and mechanisms of a PARTY SYSTEM AND A DOMINANT PARTY 79 dominantpartywhentheypositthatsuchaparty‘shares some powers over policy making, patronage distribution, and political appointments and uses privileged access to the public purse and public policy to maintain its position in power’. Some of the specific measures listed include putting pressure on the courts and election commissions to refuse opposition parties’ opportunities to register, denying them access to the media while providing extensive and favourable publicity to the dominant party, manipulate court rulings on the fairness of election campaign tactics, intimidate voters, pad vote counts and the like. The ultimate goal of these measures, as they contend, is to ‘ensure that election outcomes never threaten the rulers’ political control’. Under such a system, while ‘some opportunities for opposition forces to compete may exist, these forces are largely marginalized’,the‘operative rule is that the authorities must never be required to relinquish power as a result of an electoral defeat’ (Reuter and Remington 2009: 503). For Bogaards (2008), such a system is reputed for the resort to ‘extra- democratic means’ including failure to ‘allow for competition on an equal basis’. Moreover, the boundary between the state and the party is often erased or made increasingly blurred. When this happens, the dominance of party’s role as a successful supplier of certain benefits to rulers, other elites and voters can be entrenched. This is partly what Greene (2010: 807) had in mind when he emphasized the ability to politicize public resources as a powerful weapon of a dominant party. Despite these distortions, Bogaards (2008) insists that a dominant party should ensure the meaningfulness of elections, measured by three procedural elements: (a) the chief executive and a legislature that cannot be dismissed by the executive are chosen through regular popular elections; (b) opposition forces are allowed to form independent parties and compete in elections; and (c) the incumbent does not engage in outcome- changing electoral fraud without which dominant party rule would have ended. This suggests an indirect way of legitimizing an illegitimate election by creating a false sense of participation and competition in opposition forces so that they can continue to have ‘little reason to invest in parties, whereas fraud on the margins that increases the dominant party’s vote when it would have won, diminishes but does not doom, the meaningfulness of electoral competition’. Evidently, this amounts to drawing from the fountain of the menu of manipulation (Schedler 2002). Essentially, therefore, a dominant party is distinguishable by the thresholds of power, longevity in office (time) and ‘meaningfulness’ of elections. 80 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY

EMERGENCE AND ORGANIZATION OF PDP The PDP was one of the three main political parties founded at the tail- end of military rule in 1998. It fulfilled INEC’s electoral guidelines for the registration of political parties; the other two being the AD and the APP. Whereas, nine political parties were originally granted provisional registration to participate in the 5th December 1998 local government elections, the inability of six of them to meet the minimum threshold of performance in the election, which mandated parties to score at least 5% of the total number of votes cast in, at least, 24 states of the federation to qualify for final registration, ensured that the provisional registration of these parties was withdrawn (Momoh and Thovoethin 2001; cited in Mbah and Nwangwu 2014: 161). According to Kendhammer (2010), the PDP emerged ‘out of the G-34, a national coalition of former politicians, ex-military officers, and others’,as‘an organisation based on top-down integration of national elites, rather than, as was the case with previous large parties, a regional elite seeking to incorporate other regional elites into a national framework after the fact’. Ideally, the first and most basic distinguishing element of a political party is its ideology. Not only does it serve as a major instrument of state power, playing a major role in the acquisition, use and consolidation of power, but also functions as a political lifeline for the animation of politics, forcing individuals and groups alike to make political judgements, especially in the face of competing and conflicting divides (Omotola 2009). But the PDP, like most other parties in Nigeria, lacks a clearly delineated and identifiable ideology. As Kendhammer (2010) puts it, ‘like other successful Nigerian parties, the PDP has been rooted less in a commitment to ideology than in a commitment to “incorporating diverse regional and parochial interests”, with special attention to the efficient disbursement of federal funds to the state and local governments within the established political networks’. There are many indices to buttress this claim. First, the origin and recruitment of membership into the party, especially at the elite level, gave room for concern about the party’s ideological stance. As Ghali Umar Na’bba, a one-time Speaker of the House of Representatives (HoRs) under the umbrella of the party pointed out, the PDP draws its founders from ‘all and sundry political persuasions: conservatives, radicals and progressives’ (cited in Omoruyi 2002:8). Most of these people, according to Omoruyi, supported the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 presidential election and flirted with the military during the annulment EMERGENCE AND ORGANIZATION OF PDP 81 and in the post-annulment periods; including some serving as ministers or members of the Interim National Government (ING) or as members of the Abacha ‘undemocratic’ constitutional conference or as leaders of some of the five political parties set up and managed by General Abacha’s aides that finally endorsed him as the sole presidential candidate in April 1998 (Omoruyi 2002:8–9). Moreover, the inability of the party to effectively manage its conflicts, either at the intra- or interparty level, also reflects its ideological vacuity. The most notable illustration(s) of this failure can be located in the high rate of leadership turnover within the PDP. For example, between 1999 and 2005, the PDP was led by Dr Alex Ekwueme, its first Interim National Chairman, Chief Solomon Lar, Chief Barnabas Germade, Chief Audu Ogbeh, Dr Ahmadu Ali and Prince Vincent Ogbulafor. Between the 2005 and the 2015 elections, the party also became a victim of leadership instability, having been led by Dr Okwesilieze Nwodo, Dr Bello Haliru Muhammed, Alhaji Kawu Baraje, Alhaji Bamanga Tukur and Alhaji Ahmadu Adamu Muazu. After the 2015 elections, Mr Uche Secondus took over the national chairmanship position of the party in acting capacity. Overall, the PDP has had 12 National Chairmen either in acting or substantive capacity. This averages less than one and half years, specifically one year, three months of leadership turnover over a period of sixteen (16) years. In a sense, leadership instability cannot be isolated from the nature of party organization. Generally, the organization of a party has to do with its nature of power distribution and flow of activities, including the functional and power basis of the party (Nwanegbo 2014: 41). Such bases are usually codified in the constitution of the party, which stipulates the structural foundations upon which the party rests. The PDP is not an exception. In this respect, Article 11 of the 1999 constitution of the PDP, as amended, provides for party structures for the effective organization of the party at various levels, including Ward, Local Government Areas (LGAs), Senatorial District, State, Zonal and National levels. In an attempt to institutionalize these structures, Article 12 of the PDP constitution estab- lishes the organs of the party to include: a) Ward Executive Committee; b) Ward Congresses; c) Local Government Executive Committee; d) Local Government Area Congress; e) Senatorial District Working Committee; f) Senatorial Caucus; g) State Working Committee; h) State Caucus; i) State Executive Committee; j) State Congress; k) Zonal Working Committee; l) Zonal Executive Committee; m) Zonal Congress; n) National Working Committee; o) National Caucus; p) National Board of Trustees; q) 82 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY

National Executive Committee; r) National Congress. The role composition, functions and powers of each of these organs are well stated in the party constitution (see Nwanegbo 2014). The rationale for the decentralized form of the party’s organizational structure is the need to create a sense of belonging, or better still, a sense of ownership in the various segments and stakeholders across the country. By extension, such a decentralized network of organization is not just a response to Nigeria’s federal qualities but also expected to provide formidable foundations for the effective mobilization of electoral support. But this requires that the party organizational structures at various jurisdictions live up to their responsibilities, else these aspirations may turn out to be tall dreams. In the circumstance, the party may have to resort to foul tactics to sustain its interests – winning and consolidating its hold on power. This has largely been the lot of the PDP, as will be demonstrated shortly.

PDP DOMINANCE, 1999–2014 It is not an overstatement to claim that the PDP has dominated Nigeria’s political landscape since 1999. This is evident when assessed against the background of respectable indices and measures, including the power and longevity thresholds as established in the mainstream literature (Bogaards 2004, 2008; Greene 2010). With respect to power threshold, for example, the PDP was always recording landslide victories in both executive and legislative elections at both federal and state levels in successive elections between 1999 and the 2015 elections when its dominance was arrested by the electoral victory of the opposition APC (now incumbent party in power). During this period, the PDP not only won and retained the presidency, but also had sufﬁcient majority in both chambers of the national parliament to muddle through its legislative affairs. This dominance was equally extended to subnational levels – states and local governments – where the party also held sway during the same period. For example, in the local government elections held at the outset of the transition programme in December 1998, out of the 774 LGAs in the country, the PDP won in 389, compared to the APP’s 182, AD’s 100 and the six other parties’ 103 (Momoh and Thovoethin 2001; Mbah and Nwangwu 2014). From this ﬁgure, the PDP had three LGAs above half (50%) the total number in the country (389 compared to all other eight parties’ share of 385). PDP DOMINANCE, 1999–2014 83

In the governorship and the State House of Assembly elections that followed in January 1999, the PDP maintained its lead nationwide by winning 21 governorship seats, leaving the APP with nine and AD with six states. The PDP also won majority in the State Houses where it won the governorship. Also in the National Assembly election of 20 February 1999, the PDP maintained its lead by winning 59 (56.4%) of the 109 Senatorial seats and 206 (57.1%) of the 360 seats in the HORs; against APP’s 29 (31.2%) seats in the Senate and 74 (30.6%) of the seat in the HORs; and AD’s 20 (12.4%) seats in the Senate and 68 (12.4%) in the HORs. In the presidential election of that year, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP was declared the winner and the duly elected President of Nigeria. He won with a total of 18,738,154 votes (62.78%) over Olu Falae, who ran for the APP/AD alliance, with 11,110,287 (37.22%) (Akinboye 2004; Omotola 2010; Omotola 2013). During the 2003 elections, the PDP emerged as the winner at all levels with very wide margins. President Obasanjo won the presidency with a total of 24,109,157 (61.80%) of total votes cast, while General Mohammadu Buhari, the ANPP candidate, emerged runner-up with 12,495,326 (32.3%). The PDP also won 76 (53.69%) of the 109 Senatorial seats, leaving the ANPP and AD with 27 (27.87%) and 6 (9.74%) seats respectively. In the HORs, the PDP won 223 (54.49%), the APP (now ANPP) 96 (27.44%) and AD 34 (9.28%) seats (Omotola 2010). The pattern continued unabated in the 2007 elections, with the ruling PDP declared winner with an unimaginable landslide at all levels. In the presidential election, Alhaji Umaru Musa Yar’Adua won with 24,638,063 votes (70.34%) of total votes cast, leaving the other 24 opposition presidential candidates with 10,385,442 votes (29.66%) of total votes cast. Out of these, the two leading opposition candidates, namely retired General Muhammadu Buhari and Alhaji Abubakar Atiku of the ANPP and Action Congress (AC) respectively, had combined votes of 9,243,143, amounting to 26.39% of total votes cast. The PDP extended its dominance to all other elections, winning 29 of the 36 governorship positions (80.55%); 87 of the 109 senatorial seats (79.81%); and 247 of the 360 HORs seats (68.61%) (Omotola 2009:195)(Tables 4.1–4.3). At the state level, PDP had 57% of the seats in 1999 elections. PDP’s share of States Houses of Assembly seats rose to 72.7% in 2003 and 73% in 2007. PDP’s share declined in 2011 to 67% (Table 4.4). As can be gleaned from the aforementioned tables and ﬁgures, all transition parties (NPC, NPN, PDP) that won the ﬁrst elections 84 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Table 4.1 Composition of federal house of representatives by political parties, 1959–1964

NPC/NNA NCNC/AG ZCP AG

1959 148 89 – 75 1964 189 109 5 –

Source: Hamalai (2014: 47) conducted by Military regimes never lost elections and rather expanded their electoral fortune with each successive election. By the time the 2011 elections took place, the dominance of the PDP had become established, having won the three previous successive elections at all levels in a landslide. However, in the 2011 elections, while the party maintained its dominance by winning the presidency with 22,495,187 (58.89%) compared to Buhari’s CPC of 12, 214, 853 (31.98%) and Nuhu Ribadu’s ACN of 2, 079, 151 (5.41%) of total votes cast, its stronghold on the National Assembly was no longer as strong as in the previous elections. This may not be unconnected with the emergence of CPC as a powerful political force, driven largely by grassroots appeal and the charismatic nature of its national leader and presidential candidate, Mohammad Buhari. Yet, the party still won 45 seats in the Senate and 123 in the HoRs, compared to ACN’s 13 and 47 seats in the Senate and HoRs respectively; ANPP’s 7 and 25; and CPC’s5 and 30 seats in the same order (Omotola, Omotola 2013: 25). It was during this period that PDP’s dominance began to wane, falling from 263 seats in the HoRs in 2007 to 205 in 2011. During this same period, leading opposition parties also made significant inroads, with the ACN moving from 30 to 69 seats, the LP 8 seats for the first time and the CPC, a relatively new party, won 38 seats. APGA also had 7 seats. This shows that the year 2011 was significant in the electoral life of Nigeria. Not only

Table 4.2 Composition of senate by political parties, 1979–1983

NPN UPN NPP GNPP PRP

1979 36 28 16 8 7 1983 60 6 12 1 5

Source: Hamalai (2014: 47) Table 4.3 Composition of house of representatives and senate by political parties, 1999–2015

PDP APP/ANPP AD/AC/ACN LP CPC APGA APC Others

House of Representatives 1999 214 78 67 –– – – – 2003 223 96 34 –– – – – 2007 263 63 30 –– 3 –– 2011* 205 27 69 8 38 7 – 6 2013/2015** 171 –––––172 – 2015 125 –––––225 10 Senate 1999 67 23 19 –– – – – 2003 75 28 6 –– – – – 2007 87 14 6 –– – – – 2011*** 71 7 18 4 7 ––2

2013/2015**** 71 3 1 34 1999 DOMINANCE, PDP 2015 49 –––––60 –

Source: Hamalai (2014: 49); Omotola (2013b) * Figures based on results announced by INEC ** During this period, there was high level of instability in membership of the HORs according to party lines dues to three main factors. One was the gale of defection back and forth across parties, but mostly to the new opposition APC; and two the issue of by-elections as well as court nulliﬁcation of some results. The third and perhaps most signiﬁcantly factor was the merger of the then ACN, CPC and ANPP to form APC, which altered the majority–minority line of demarcation slightly in favour of the new APC

ﬁ –

***Figures based on of cial results released by INEC 2014 ** **New ﬁgure due to similar reasons given in Table 4.3 85 86 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Table 4.4 Composition of governorship seats by political parties, 1999–2015

PDP APP/ANPP AD/ACN PPA APGA LP CPC APC

1999 21 9 6 ––––– 2003 28 7 1 ––––– 2007 28 5 1 2 1 –– – 2010 28 3 3 – 11–– 2011 23 3 6 – 211 – 2013 19 ––––––16 2015 13 –––1 ––22

Source: All tables and figures adapted from Hamalai (2014:47–54) were the elections of the year rated as the best in the annals of Nigeria’s electoral history, at least up to that time, but also for the first time, the dominance of the ruling party was fiercely challenged. This must have enamoured the opposition parties about their genuine prospects in the 2015 elections, especially if they could pool their resources and acts together. As it turned out, the opposition acted in this line. The foregoing results and propositions underscore two salient elements about PDP’s dominance between 1999 and 2015. One, they reveal, beyond any reasonable doubt, the power threshold of the PDP, given its electoral victory in both the executive and legislative elections at the federal and state levels. This is an important indicator of dominance. Two, it typifies the longevity (time dimensions) threshold of the dominance, the party being able to win at all levels in four successive elections. This is another salient indicator of party dominance. The third crucial element, which has to do with the ‘meaningfulness’ of the election, may not have been accommodated in the foregoing analysis, but deserves some comment. In this respect, the scorecard is mixed. While the dominant PDP has always ensured that both the executive and the legislature are constituted through regular popular elections, in which opposition forces are allowed to form independent partiesandcompeteinelections;thePDPalsooftenengagedin‘outcome-changing electoral fraud’ without which it could not have been able to maintain its dominance for that long. Although such a tendency was associated with all elections before 2011, it reached a notable height in the 2007 elections when the election was declared a ‘do or die’ affair and its entire processes were completely garrisoned (Omotola 2009). In the 2011 elections when the administration of the election was more EXPLAINING PDP’S DOMINANCE 87 effective, following the outcome of the Justice Muhamed Uwais Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) and the subsequent appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega as INEC Chairman, the victory of the PDP became leaner compared to the previous elections. In the 2015 elections when the incentive structure and opportunities for ‘outcome-changing electoral fraud’ were drastically reduced to a minimal level through certain innovations by INEC, especially the use of Card Reader, the PDP was defeated in the presidential election and, for the first time since 1999, it lost its majority status in the national parliament.

EXPLAINING PDP’S DOMINANCE How can we explain the dominance of PDP in four successive elections (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) in Nigeria? Such a puzzle is legitimate, especially against the background of evident poor economic performance, endemic corruption, rising poverty and unemployment, excruciating national security challenges and a host of other indicators of an under- performing state. Six major factors can be adduced for the dominant electoral position enjoyed by PDP from incipience in 1998 up to its defeat in the 2015 general elections, namely: a) the ability of the PDP to build a fairly truly multiethnic coalition across the country; b) the emergence of the retired military as a strong power factor in Nigerian politics post-1999; c) the ineffectiveness of election administration due largely to deficiencies in the institutional frameworks for election administration, including the forms and character of INEC; d) incumbency factor, particularly control over key institutions of government such as security agencies, the treasury, the National Assembly and official patronage networks; e) poor state of the economy, epitomized by rising poverty, unemployment and rising costs of living, all of which made it possible to manipulate the electorate; and f) inherent contradictions/weaknesses associated with opposition parties, including acute shortage of resources, fractionalization and poor coordination. In what follows, we elaborate on each of these explanatory themes. First, is the ability of PDP to build a fairly truly multiethnic coalition across the country. Contrary to the prevailing political party traditions in the country, where most parties are usually defined and rooted in ethno- regional, cultural and religious identities, as was largely the case in the First and the Second Republics (Diamond, 1988; Diamond and Suberu, 2002), the PDP managed to transcend these fault lines and/or cleavages to build 88 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY a truly national outlook. Apart from its adoption of the federal character principle in the zoning of offices, it also came up with the idea of rotational presidency between the north and the south at inception in 1999. As a demonstration of its commitment to these principles, the PDP’s campaign in 1999, according to Kendhammer (2010: 57), ‘played to the popular notions of the federal character and the zoning of power, which had transcended their original intent as mechanisms for an elite peace pact and had become a rallying cry for local politicians and ordinary voters’. Apart from zoning, the PDP specifically ‘courted minorities’, especially in the so-called Middle Belt, that area of the old northern region (including the city of Jos) not historically part of Hausaland and the Niger Delta (the ‘south–south’ zone) such a tendency may not be entirely new to the country. Indeed, it was reminiscent of the Second Republic, when the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) also entered into alliances with these same set of minorities in order to retain power in the second election of 1983 (Osaghae 1998). A practical demonstration of the party’s (PDP) commitment to the zoning formulae is reflected in the pattern of its elite recruitment and zoning of offices according to geo-political zones in a fairly balanced way. For instance, during the study period, the north-west, a zone that is predominantly populated by Hausa and Fulani Muslims, occupied the presidency between 2007 and 2010, and the Speaker of the HoRs from 1999–2003 to 2011–2015. The north-east, another Muslim dominated zone populated by the Kanuri and Hausa people, filled the office of the Vice President from 1999 to 2007. The north-central, a zone that habours many ethnic minority groups, including the Tiv, Nupe, Jukun, Okun and so on, with a fairly evenly distributed Christian and Muslim population, occupied the Senate presidency from 2007 to 2015. For the south-west, a predominantly Yoruba zone with significant Christian and Muslim population, occupied the presidency from 1999 to 2007, and the Speaker of the HoRs from 2007 to 2011. The south-east, a zone populated predominantly by Igbo Christians, occupied the Senate presidency from 1999 to 2007 and Deputy Speaker of the HoRs from 2007 to 2015. The south-south, in the oil-rich Niger Delta, was allotted the Vice Presidency from 2007 to 2010 and the presidency from 2011 to 2015 when the PDP was ousted from power (Kendhammer 2010: 59) Apart from zoning, the PDP has also been deploying what Kendhammer (2010: 65) called ‘ethnic and religious talk’, through the use of ‘prominent ethnic and cultural defence organisations that served as EXPLAINING PDP’S DOMINANCE 89 non-partisan vehicles for chauvinism that might have otherwise strained intra-party relations to breaking point’. Prominent among such organizations are the Afenifere in Yorubaland, Ohanaeze in the south-east and the Arewa Consultative Forum in the north. The alliance between the PDP and prominent ethno-cultural defence organizations serves multiple purposes (Kendhammer 2010). Unfortunately, other parties have not been able to match PDP in building a truly multiethnic organization with national outlook. Probably as a result of this shortcoming, the parties have not been in a position to allocate offices to all ethno-cultural groups across the country. The AD and the ACN were, for example, predominantly a south-west – Yoruba- parties; the APP/ANPP and the CPC were also mainly a northern party with strongholds in Muslim populated states of the north. APGA has its base in the south-east among the Igbos. With this geography, it would be unthinkable to expect any of these ethnic and cultural-based parties to muster any serious performance in national election outside their domains. The national reach of PDP could, therefore, be seen as a major factor in its dominance between 1999 and 2015. The second explanatory factor for the dominance of the party is the influence of the retired military in Nigerian politics post-1999. At the outset of the democratic transition programme of the Abubakar Abdulsalami regime in 1998, Nigeria was already suffused with a fairly large contingent of retired military officers, notably Generals Yakubu Gowon, Olusegun Obasanjo, T.Y. Danjumo, Muhammadu Buhari, Ibrahim Babangida, David Mark, Tunde Ogbeha, Major General Mamman Kotangora, Brigadier Generals Olagunsoye Oyinlola, Raji Rasaki and a host of others (Amaike 2006). Largely encouraged on the lessons of the Second Republic during which a number of retired military officers played active roles in politics, beginning from their participation in the struggle for power in diverse forms, including public debate on the draft constitution produced by the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC), formation and membership of political parties, elections into federal and state legislatures, among others (Adekanye 1999:69–102), most of the retired officers have been actively engaged in politics under the Fourth Republic. Their involvement has taken diverse forms including contesting party primaries for high political offices such as the presidency, National Assembly and governorship tickets; actual representation of parties as candidates in general elections at various levels; eventual election into public offices at various levels, 90 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY appointment into ministerial, ambassadorial and chairmen and members of high-ranking board positions. While this trend cuts across parties, one indisputable fact is that most of the retired officers pursue their aspirations on the platform of the PDP. For example, General Ibrahim Babangida is reputed as one of the main drivers behind the formation of PDP, with many of its planning meeting reportedly held in his Minna, Niger state capital’s hilltop house. Ever since, many retired Generals, including Babangida himself, Theophilus Danjuma, Olusegun Obasanjo, Aliyu Gusau and Mamman Kotangora have attempted to be president under the umbrella of the PDP. Many others have sought other high offices in the National Assembly, especially as Senators of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, including David Mark, who served as Senate President for two terms (2007–2015), Tunde Ogbeha who also served two terms as a Senator (1999–2007) and so on. A few others have also served as state governors such as Olagunsoye Oyinlola in Osun state. It is not mere coincidence that most of the retired military are seeking to realize their political ambitions on the platform of PDP. As noted earlier, the formation of PDP benefited, in no small measure, from the extensive networks and power connections of the retired military, including Ibarahim Babangida (IBB), TY Danjuma and several others. Moreover, the transition to the Fourth Republic was marshalled by the military under Abdulasalami Abubakar. And as studies have shown, the emergence from Prison of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo as the presidential candidate of PDP has been seen as a ‘pacted affairs’ within the top hierarchy of the military (Adekanye 1999). The import of this is that behind the scene, the transitional military government of Abdulsalami Abubakar clandestinely, together with other top retired military officers such as IBB, teleguided the transition along a given path and towards a predetermined destination – PDP’s victory. That the retired military could play such an influential role within PDP to boost its hegemony is not surprising. The group is sufficiently enamoured to do so not only for its extended network of connections across the country built during successive military regimes for the distribution of patronage, but also for its stupendous wealth. As Adekanye (1999: 29) points out, the retired military in Nigeria sits atop a powerful ‘military- business complex’, a term which depicts ‘the complex of increasingly interlocking interests among representatives of the military establishment and private business in general, including businessmen specializing in EXPLAINING PDP’S DOMINANCE 91 defence contracts and procurement, and the recent contributions of the growing class of retired military officers in particular to the development of this phenomenon, its many dimensions, as well as operations’. This military-business complex has since blossomed and witnessed rapid expansion to be able to make significant inroads into the core sector of the national economy, including defence procurement and contracts, large- scale farming and agro-allied ventures, import and export business, including shipping, distributive trade and commerce, building and construction, petroleum business, private mining and quarrying, motor industry, including transportation and haulage services, real estate or property development, manufacturing and industry, banking and insurance, private security business, printing and publishing, as well as law, medical and other professional practices and retainership. Adekanye (1999:33–60) went ahead to detail these major business groups, specifying the name of particular business groups, as well as their owners operating in those areas. Indeed, since the inception of the party, many more retired officers have joined the league, placing their vast resources at the disposal of PDP, further entrenching its military connections. This, in no small measure, would have contributed to the dominance of PDP over the last 16 years. The ineffectiveness of election administration which has fostered electoralism is the third factor. Until recently, the administration of elections in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic has not been effective. This was due largely to deficiencies in the institutional, legal and administrative frameworks for election administration. However, it is the institutional deficit of INEC especially its internal capacity to conduct free and credible elections in a country as vast as Nigeria that stands out as a key obstacle to effective electoral administration. As a concept, electoral administration is a sub-set of electoral governance, the latter encompassing ‘the wider set of activities that creates and maintains the broad institutional framework in which voting and electoral competition take place’ (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002: 7). It is a comprehensive and multitasking activity, involving rule making, rule application and rule adjudication. Rule making involves designing the basic rules of the electoral game; rule application deals with implementing these rules to specifications to organize the electoral game; and rule adjudication entails resolving disputes arising from the game. On the whole, electoral governance involves ‘the interaction of constitutional, legal, and institutional rules and organizational practices that determine the basic rules for election procedures and electoral competition; organize campaigns, 92 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY voter registration, and election day tallies; and resolve disputes and certify results’ (Hartlyn et al. 2008: 75). Election administration is the middle ground in the governance process, dealing specifically with rule application. It basically has to do with the mechanisms of how elections are conducted, including preparations, voting, collation and announcement of results. Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) constitute part of ‘a set of institutions and rules that together determine the probity of electoral processes, and in emerging democracies, where administrative processes are weak and distrust across political actors is high, their role at the center of electoral processes tends to be more visible’ (Birch 2008: 307). Thus, the effectiveness of election administration depends on the independence and professionalism of electoral institutions, particularly the EMB, because ‘institutional structures that promote a “level playing field” at each stage of the electoral process will enhance the extent to which voters perceive their elections to be fair’ (Hartlyn et al. 2008: 71). This is why one of the hallmarks of a mature democracy is professional, independent, non-partisan election administration. Unfortunately, Nigeria’s EMB, namely the INEC, has not only been unable to administer elections effectively, but its professionalism, autonomy and capacity over the years also remained questionable. First, the composition of INEC has been the prerogative of the President, making it easily susceptible to manipulation by the President and the federal authorities. Second, the oversight role expected of the legislature in the screen- ing of presidential nominees for INEC positions is rendered impotent by the fact that PDP, the President’s party, had legislative majority sufficient to secure its wishes in Parliament between 1999 and 2014. Third, the tenure of the INEC chairmen and commissioners is without security. Yet, job security is generally known to increase the stakes officials have in the electoral process: if they mess up the process, they may lose their positions. Nigerian electoral officers statutorily occupy office for five years, renewable for another term. They can, however, be removed by the President on flimsy grounds. Yet over the same period, the funding of the electoral body was irregular, having to depend on the benevolence of the President for financing its activities. This significant financial control contributes to the inability of INEC to make adequate, timely planning and preparations for successful elections (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006; Omotola, 2010). It was in the context of these deplorable contradictions that INEC operated during its heydays. The implications of this for election EXPLAINING PDP’S DOMINANCE 93 administration during the period were many. Among others, it made INEC a willing tool in the hands of the ruling PDP for all forms of electoral fraud and corruption. The reports of local and international election monitoring groups across various elections until the 2007 elections contain sordid evidence about the manipulation of the electoral process and outcomes in favour of PDP. This, however, peaked during the 2007 elections to the extent that even in regions that elections were reportedly not held, results were concocted in favour of PDP especially in the south-east and south-south of the country (Adebayo and Omotola 2007; Amuwo 2009; Obi 2009). So in a way, PDP was able to maintain its stronghold on power because it profited heavily from the ineffectiveness of election administration. Fourth, is the deployment of the power of incumbency in the electoral process. The role of the power of incumbency in the dominance of the PDP cannot be overemphasized. Once it captured power in the 1999 elections, PDP came to rely on its control over key institutions of government such as INEC, security agencies, the legislature, the judiciary, the treasury, mass media and other official patronage networks to marshal its ego at the expense of the opposition parties. Its control over these resources has been instrumental in its dominance during the study period. While this was the case in virtually all elections since 1999, the 2007 elections witnessed an unprecedented fraud and manipulation in favour of the PDP (Omotola 2009). In fact, the election recorded the worst in terms of excessive abuse of power of incumbency. Having declared the elections a ‘do or die affair’, the then President Obasanjo went ahead to deploy state machineries to the service of his party’s interests. For example, INEC was deliberately disempowered through its gross lack of capacity and autonomy, so much so that some card carrying members of PDP were accommodated in its composition. Besides, the line of demarcation between official state and PDP functions was so faint that it was difficult to differentiate between the two. Consequently, it became possible to deploy state resources, including finance and presidential jets for purely party affairs such as electioneering campaign. State-owned media, particularly the National Television Authority (NTA) and Radio Nigeria, were almost monopolized by PDP to the marginalization/exclusion of opposition parties. Hamalai (2012, 2014: 42); has argued convincingly about the structural and superstructural factors that could boost the electoral chances of incumbents. These include increased capacity and funding for candidates, 94 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY ability of elected officials to influence project implementation, use of official facilities during campaign to gain additional mileage, and greater access to media, among others. Hamalai (2014) noted further that in many African countries, including Nigeria where election malpractices are common, ‘incumbents have powers to influence and manipulate electoral processes to their advantage and thus security and election agents can be compromised. However, incumbency advantage doesn’t seem to have relevance to legislative elections given the about 70% turnover rates across Africa’ (Hamalai 2014: 43). Some of the explanations she offered for this development include colonial heritage, institutional weaknesses and polarization of elections, among others. Beyond these explanations lie many other factors. In Nigeria, for instance, security forces are known to have been unduly politicized and used to provide security cover for electoral manipulations in diverse forms. Some of the notable irregularities associated with Nigeria’s elections during the period under review include late commencement of voting in many parts of the country, inadequate voting materials, lack of secrecy in the voting process, omission of names and/or pictures of some candidates from the ballot papers, prevalence of underage voting, and rampant cases of ballot box snatching at gunpoint by party thugs and militias. Others include the stuffing of ballot boxes with already thumb-printed ballot papers, reported cases of collusion and connivance between security officials and party agents to rig elections, violence and intimidation of opposition political party members and agents, lack of transparency in the collation, counting and tabulation of votes and outright falsification of results. These could have been averted, or, at least, minimized if the security agencies had lived up to their responsibility of providing election security in a professional, competent and impartial manner. Yet, post- election issues such as election petitions and tribunals are also hampered by the seeming control of the government over the judiciary. Consequently, some electoral litigations turned limitless in duration as some lasted for over two years. While the petitions lasted, the PDP through its declared candidates was already in office taking advantage of state resources to frustrate the opposition and ensuring judicial victory. Another dimension of the manifestation of power of incumbency that tended to strengthen the dominance of PDP was its control over expansive bases of patronage. These include the distribution of political appointments, contracts and financial gratifications. EXPLAINING PDP’S DOMINANCE 95

These tendencies resonate with the position of Greene (2010: 811– 812), who argued convincingly that ‘dominant parties win consistently because they generate resource-advantages from the public budget that fundamentally skew the partisan playing field in their favor’. The strategies often employed to do this, which are typically considered illicit, according to Greene, are four: First, they can divert funds from the budgets of state- owned enterprises (SOEs) since often such massive companies are usually run by political appointees, their finances hidden from public scrutiny, and they engage in difficult-to-track transfers with the government that yield manifold opportunities to divert public funds for partisan usage. The NNPC offers a close semblance to such SOEs in Nigeria. Second, a large public sector allows the incumbent to dole out huge numbers of patronage jobs to supporters and withhold them from opponents. Third, the economic importance of the state encourages domestic businesses to ‘pay to play’ by exchanging kickbacks and sometimes illicit campaign contributions for economic protection or state contracts. Finally, dominant parties virtually transform public agencies into campaign headquarters by using office supplies, phones, postage, vehicles, and public employees themselves to inform and mobilize voters. As Greene (2010) concludes, incumbents have recourse to public resources which their opponents do not necessarily have. The poor state of the Nigerian economy is yet another factor that contributed to the dominance of the PDP for a very long period. The poor state of the economy, like any other, is epitomized by the rising level of poverty, unemployment and inflation, among others, all of which made it possible to easily manipulate the electorate. Statistics released in June 2013 on the population of Nigerians in abject poverty by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that about 112 million Nigerians (67%) live below the poverty line. Such a trend is nothing but a huge betrayal of the vast resource endowments of the country on the one hand, and the failure of democratic government to minister to the needs of the people, on the other. Egwu (2014a) underscores this point very well when he argues that ‘it remains a huge deficit that Nigeria’s democracy can neither deliver services nor meet the expectations of citizens whose sense of helplessness and alienation could spell danger to the survival of democracy’. The failure to address the basic problems of survival, according to him, ‘create conditions and throw up forces that will undermine the entrenchment of democratic values and cultures as evident in the rise of insurgency, protracted ethno-religious violence and the swelling of a 96 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY reserved army of the unemployed that is often recruited as private soldiers to prosecute election war’. Beyond the validity of these postulations, we are more concerned with the direct implications of poverty for the manipulation of the people as an electoral resource. In this regard, the undue monetization of elections, including the recourse to vote buying, has been buoyed by the pervasive nature of poverty and unemployment. A 2007 survey conducted by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFESs) and Practical Sampling International show ‘that more than seven out of ten Nigerians believe that vote buying happens either “all of the time” or “most of the time” in the country’s elections’ (quoted in Onapajo et al. 2015: 2). In the same study, Onapajo et al. (2015) demonstrates, with ample evidence, how vote buying transverses all facets and actors in Nigerian elections, showing how electoral officers, security agents and the electorate were bribed in specific elections in Nigeria. Interestingly, most of these transac- tions listed in the work were facilitated by the PDP and/or its agents, particularly in Ekiti and Osun gubernatorial elections. Finally, are the contradictions and weaknesses that have characterized opposition parties’ politics since 1999. Opposition parties are vital to democracy. Apart from holding the government (ruling party) accountable through constant engagement with public policy and constructive criticisms, they are also expected to present themselves as alternative government in waiting. But for them to be able to do these, it is expected that they will have a clearly delineated ideological stand that not only distinguishes them from the ruling party, but also clearly articulates their alternative path of governance. Moreover, the characteristics and behaviour of the opposition parties also matter. In the least, such parties are expected to be attractive in terms of the way they comport themselves, including the promotion of internal democracy and what they promise to bring to governance that will enhance the lot of the populace. Their ability to build a broad-based coalition is another salient element of the behaviour of a party. It is such coalitions that will help them in the pooling of resources, both financial and administrative, which can put them in a strong position to challenge the incumbent party (Omotola, Omotola 2013). However, opposition parties in Nigeria have hardly lived up to these requirements. Some of the weaknesses associated with opposition parties in Nigeria include ideological vagueness, problematic nature of internal democracy, acute shortage of resources worsened by absence of CRISIS OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DECLINE OF PDP 97 government funding of parties, fractionalization and poor coordination, all of which limit the reach of their attractiveness. For example, because of the perceived lack of difference in the ideological and policy orientations of the ruling PDP and other opposition parties, it is common to hear people say ‘all the parties are the same’. This suggests that the so-called opposition parties are not different from the ruling party in any fundamental sense. One should not be confounded by such a characterization because when one critically considers the operations of some of these opposition parties, especially in the area of holding national conventions, party primaries and candidate-selection, the degree of internal democracy within them is nothing to write home about. Again, rather than build broad-based coalitions to engender a stronger platform of engagements with the ruling party, pre-election coalitions under the Fourth Republic have been a rare political phenomenon. The parties chose to go it all alone. The fragmentation, or better still fractionalization, means that each of them goes into the elections from a position of weakness, rather than strength. Moreover, it also denies them opportunity of effective resource mobilization through the pooling of financial and administrative resources. In the final analysis, the opposition ends up as a bunch of unattractive parties, ill-considered, rightly or wrongly, as a form of democratic dis- traction. In the circumstance, it does not really matter whether the ruling partyisperformingwellornot.Aslongastheelectoratehastheimpres- sion that there is no attractive alternative, the probability that they will continue to vote for the ruling party remains high. The PDP, without any doubt, profited hugely from this tendency to consolidate its dominance between 1999 and 2015 when the opposition was finally able to harness its strength through the merger of leading opposition parties to form a mega party that successfully dislodged the PDP in the 2015 elections.

CRISIS OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY AND THE DECLINE OF PDP The deteriorating condition of internal party democracy in the PDP contributedinsosmallmeasuretothe decline of its dominance and its eventual defeat. Before the 2015 elections, the PDP had a reputation of not only leadership instability, but incessant conflicts over party primaries and candidate-selection. The tendency was for the party 98 4 PARTY SYSTEM AND THE DOMINANCE OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY chiefs to hijack and monopolize these processes in such a way that reduced members to mere clients, instead of stakeholders. Added to these were the inherent weaknesses associated with the internal mechanisms for redress by aggrieved party members. Often, the setting up of committees to look into grievances has not been very effective. Worse still, the party’s insistence that whatever happened should be considered exclusively as part of the internal affairs of the party did not help matters. While these tendencies had always played out in the party and they managed to contain them, the situation proved intractable in the march towards the 2015 elections. In the party’s Convention of 2013, some prominent members of the party, led by Atiku Abubakar, a pioneer member of the party and Nigeria’s former Vice President from 1999 to 2007, alleged manipulation and marginalization in the process, and he along with his allies staged a walkout from the Convention. This group, following failed reconciliatory moves, eventually formed what was called the New PDP, consisting of Atiku Abubakar, Alhaji Baraje, a former National Chairman of the PDP, seven serving governors most notably Rotimi Amaechi of Rivers state, Fatai Ahmed of Kwara state (two of the seven governors, namely Aliyu Babangida of Niger state and Sule Lamido of Jigawa state, later returned to the PDP), among others, and Senator Bukola Saraki, a former a two-term governor of Kwara state. Given the stronghold of these individuals on the politics of their domains, their defection resulted into a gale of other high profile defections, including serving members of the National Assembly, State Houses of Assembly and other prominent PDP members. As it turned out, the loss of the PDP became the gains of the APC, which as at the time of these defections, was already emerging as a credible alternative in public reckoning. So the depletion of the PDP helped to swell the rank of the APC in significant ways. Originally, APC evolved from the merger of the defunct ACN, the CPC, ANPP, and a breakaway faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), led by Rochas Okorocha, the governor of Imo state. Intended to supplant the PDP, the APC obviously gained strength from the addition of the breakaway faction of the PDP. It allowed the party the opportunity to leverage financial and administrative resources and give the PDP a spirited challenge. Consequently, the APC succeeded in the 2015 elections, and brought an end to the 16-year dominance of PDP since 1999. REFERENCES 99

CONCLUSION This chapter has attempted to draw attention to two important issues arising from the 16-year dominance of the PDP. The ﬁrst, sought to demonstrate the dominance of the PDP in Nigerian politics since 1999, showing the form and character of the domination. The second was to account for this domination using important predisposing factors. With respect to the ﬁrst,wehaveshownthatthePDP,givenits power threshold and longevity (time) threshold, actually dominated Nigerian party system between 1999 and 2015. This was evident by the fact that the party won the presidency and majority number of the seats in both Chambers of the National Assembly. It also repeated the same feat in state executive and legislative elections. Altogether, the PDP proved its dominance in four consecutive elections (1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011) to satisfy the longevity threshold. With respect to the second, we offer six explanatory themes in accounting for the dominance of the PDP as discussed in the last substantive section of the chapter. In order to avoid the risk of repetition, it is needless restating them here. It is, however, important to note that while each of these explanations can stand on its own; they are also collectively interwo- ven, reinforcing one another. Now that power has changed hands and role-reversal has occurred, it would be interesting to see what would become of the new opposition (the PDP), whether it will fail to work on being attractive and allow the APC, the new ruling party, the opportunity to draw from the menu of manipulation to establish its own dominance.

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Trends in Voter Behaviour, 1999–2015

INTRODUCTION The legitimacy of democratic governance is predicated on the credibility of the electoral process which, in turn, is shaped by the quality of electoral institutions. Well-functioning electoral institutions promote an inclusive and transparent electoral process. By extension, electoral legitimacy measured by the outcome of the electoral process is enhanced when every eligible participant is afforded and utilizes the opportunity to participate. Scholars have used voter behaviour, turn-out rate and voting pattern to make informed judgement regarding the inclusiveness and quality of the electoral process (Hamalai 2014). Indeed, participatory and inclusive democratic governance presupposes that every eligible citizen is availed the opportunity of choosing among competing manifestoes, ideologies, policies, candidates’ perceived capacity to deliver on campaign promises etc. However, the ideals of a credible electoral process continue to dimin- ish due to institutional and procedural pathologies which appear pronounced in, though not conﬁned, to emerging democracies. Some of the dysfunctions, as identiﬁed by scholars, include declining voter-turnout, vote buying, manipulation of voters through appeal to sectarian sentiments and other primordial considerations, intimidation/coercion and rigging (Hamalai 2014). Although the crises that engulf democratic elections are universal, Nigeria has had a relatively unfair share of electoral crises. The trends in voter behaviour in Nigeria since 1959 suggest that the dysfunctions in the

© The Author(s) 2017 103 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_5 104 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 nation’s electoral system have persisted. Elections in Nigeria have continued to record low turnout and defied electoral systems that work in other climes such as the Proportional Representation and First Past the Post System. The high premium placed by political actors on winning at all cost and institutional failures is some of the factors that account for this situation. Since the return to democracy in 1999, Nigerians have had five opportunities to exercise their franchise in electing political leaders into the legislative and executive positions at all the levels of governance. These elections were characterized by varying levels of infractions premised on the prevailing socio-political environment at each point in time. For example, the coming of the 1999 elections overwhelmed the electorates more than the pedigree and antecedents of the candidates fielded by the political parties. They seem less concerned on what the prospective rulers can do but rather caught in the euphoria of the reemergence of democracy after a long era of military rule. Less attention was paid to procedural details as the primary objective was to disengage the military from government (Adebayo and Omotola 2007:202). The second election in 2003 was somewhat not different from the first one and in fact a major watershed in the history of Nigeria’s democratic project. The major reason hinged on the fact that Nigerian democratic experience had never witnessed a democratic transition from one civilian administration to the other. Politicians, analysts, voters, international communities and other stakeholders were extremely sceptical about what the outcome of the election would be. This attracted greater interest within and outside the shores of the country and politicians and stakeholders decided not to overheat the polity by accommodating the inadequacies of the 2003 elections in the same way that the desire to ease out the military in 1999 made the outcome of the transition elections acceptable. The 2007 elections availed the electorates the opportunity to choose a new president after the the maximum two terms of the presidency of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo that lasted for eight years. The voters were caught in the dilemma of whether to vote quietly as the period was the first time the baton of power would change hands from one democratically elected president to another; or engage with the political issues arising from his eight-year rule such as high-level civilian dictatorship, selective war against corruption, erosion of independence and impartiality of INEC, and the tension that national political tension and mistrust created by his failed INTRODUCTION 105 tenure elongation project. However, as it turned out, the 2007 presidential election that brought Umar Yar’Adua into power was widely acknowledged as the worst election in the electoral history of the country. To douse the tension that could have emerged from the outcome of the election and save the country from the kind of political turmoil that led to the remilitarization of the polity in the aftermath of the 1983 general elections, the elected president acknowledged irregularities in the elections that brought him to power and promised to carry out a comprehensive reform of the electoral process. This was to later create a national momentum behind electoral reform that subsequently defined other elections. Nigeria’s democratic election witnessed a new trend in voter behaviour during the 2011 general elections considered by domestic and international observes as marking a turning point in the conduct of free and credible elections since the return to democracy in 1999. This may be attributed to two factors. First, the rebirth of a new impartial, independent and efficient INEC under the Chairmanship of Professor Attahiru Jega which was as an accidental fallout of the electoral reform agenda initiated by President Yar’Adua that created a new electoral environment filled with hope and enthusiasm. The decision of the leadership to postpone the election initially scheduled to be held in February 2011 to give time to create a new voter register of 73.3 million voters also generated interest and raised the hope of enfranchisement of millions that would have been denied the opportunity to vote on the basis of the voter register created in 2006 which had become thoroughly discredited (Jega 2012). What appeared as nation-wide and voters’ sympathy for the candidature of President Goodluck Jonathan who was the PDP Presidential flag bearer, generated by his personal narrative of person from a humble background and of a minority ethnic extraction also may have contributed to improved voter turnout. During the electioneering period, political parties and their flag bearers engaged in massive campaign using different strategies. It was a period that marked the beginning of issue-based voting especially in the south- west where people voted based on whom they believe would perform neither without sentiment nor for money (vote buying). While elements of vote buying, and voting on the basis of communal interests were observed in other regions, the massive electoral support from the south- west based on perception of candidates’ ability decided the eventual winner of the presidential contest. In the same vein, the 2015 elections 106 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 was a total deviation from what an average politician expected. The business as usual nature of vote buying, godfather influence and party leaders’ preference for loyal candidates over credible ones appears to be fading in Nigerian politics. Voter behaviour determined by ethnic and religious considerations is just one out of several other factors. Money politics was noticeable across parties but seemed lopsided with the incumbent PDP gaining the upper hand. Apart from the huge amount of money (N21.27 billion) allegedly raised by governors and businessmen for the presidential campaign of the PDP in December, 2014 (Adetayo 2014), subsequent revelations about what has come to be known as the ‘Dasukigate’, where $2.1 billion meant for prosecuting the war against Boko Haram was allegedly diverted to the election of Goodluck Jonathan and other office seekers in the PDP in the 2015 elections, remain a case in point. The eventual winner of the presidential election, Muhammadu Buhari, had informed voters at the internal party primary that he had no money to give any voter but his willingness to relentlessly serve the interest of the common man by repositioning the Nigerian socio-political economy. However, the 2015 elections became the most tensed election in Nigeria’s electoral history premised on the condescending attitude and adoption of reckless campaign strategies by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Advertised hate speeches in national newspapers and docu- mentaries aired on televisions targeted at the presidential candidate of the opposition APC, Muhammed Buhari and party leaders, especially Senator Ahmed Asiwaju Tinubu created anxiety and palpable ethno-regional and religious divisions in the country in which media regulatory bodies appeared helpless. Consequently, fears of descent into anarchy and the possible disintegration of Nigeria as a corporate entity dominated the minds of voters and raised concerns within the international community. It is expected that five successive democratic elections are enough to provide the basis for a reasonable and empirical analysis of voter behaviour. It is on this note that this chapter examines the trends in voting pattern of Nigerians in the past five democratic elections in the current Fourth Republic. This would enable empirical identification and understanding of voting patterns against the mere rhetorical analysis of ethno-religious factor as the sole determinant of voter behaviour in Nigeria. It further serves the purpose of gauging critical factors that shape the attitude of voters to elections in comparison with other mature and struggling democracies. This kind of evidence helps to situate the position of Nigeria’s democratic maturity among the comity of global democracies INTRODUCTION 107 and good governance, and stimulates awareness regarding factors that determine voter behaviour and identify positive elements that can be reinforced or addressed, respectively. However, it is pertinent to note that a study of this nature is not free from certain limitations. For instance, it is always methodologically problematic in measuring or ascertaining the reasons why people vote in a particular direction especially in heteroge- neous societies that comprise mixed orientations (in terms of religion, education, social status, expectation from government, among others). How do we accommodate changes in voting pattern of individuals (minority) within a larger society (majority)? For instance, those who voted against the tide in a particular society where a candidate is given bloc vote. Credible and professionally managed opinion polls and surveys are needed to provide empirical grounding for conclusions reached in terms of determinants of voter behaviour and the set of incentives that voters need to vote for parties and candidates. There is also the problem of getting the exact voting trend in the wave of electoral rigging by desperate politicians. It is widely believed that votes don’t count in Nigeria as the political bigwigs will find their way through against the dictate of voters’ choices. Epitaphs used in many studies of election trends since 1999 such as ‘digital rigging’, ‘competitive rigging’, ‘direct capture of popular sovereignty’ and ‘electoral coup’, all draw attention to the difficulty of ascertaining the extent to which election results actually reflect the choice of the electorate in the first place. The judgments of courts that have several elections across the country provide additional evidence that it is the context of a pervasive electoral authoritarianism and all we can do at best is to reach tentative conclusions. To this end, it is difficult to ascertain the real trend beyond data (election results) which might be different from the true voice of the electorates. Nevertheless, it is expected that some degree of validity exists in respect of the conclusion reached since the data (election results) used derived from what had been certified valid either through court judgment or public acceptability as true reflection of voters’ choice (by both voters and political gladiators). The interpretation here relies on majority decision in terms of the actual winner of an election and discountenances the number of vote cast for the loser(s) as such is insignificant in Nigerian- type majoritarian electoral systems. The chapter begins (after introduction) by conceptualizing issues in voter behaviour as espoused by scholars in extant literatures. This is followed by the examination of the nexus between voter behaviour and 108 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 democratic sustenance. The section also identified the factors that shape voters’ behaviour in Nigeria. The next section analyses the trends in voter behaviour since 1999 using comparative analysis. Data from US (as a developed democracy) and some developing democracies like Ghana, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and Chad among others were employed in comparison with that of Nigeria to ascertain the direction of Nigeria’s voting behaviour in the comity of democratic countries. The fifth section examines the challenges and prospects of voter behaviour to electoral and democratic development and the chapter ends with conclusion and implementable recommendations on how the challenges can be mitigated upon and the prospects actualized in order to strengthen Nigeria’s electoral process.

VOTER BEHAVIOUR AND ELECTIONS Some progress has been made towards understanding why people vote in a particular direction amidst prevailing factors that inform choices. Efforts at studying voting behaviour became noticeable in the early nineteenth century when Siegfried (1913) analysed voting behaviour in France. During this early attempt, scholars made use of aggregate data analysis that is, using actual election returns by geo-political units for example, wards, districts etc. (Gosnell 1930) to explain why voters made certain electoral choices and the underlying factors that influence their decisions. However, it became a subject of scholarly studies in the mid-twentieth century. Goldman (1966) opined that scholars, especially political scien- tists, were interested in identifying the determinants of vote choice by the electorate in order to explain how and why decisions were made either by the decision makers or by the electorate. Studying voting behaviour requires analytical skills adopted in political science and psychology because it is an issue of the mind which both parties (politicians and voters) must understand in order to win. The political class must read the mood of the voters to design their manifestos in such a way that will convince majority voters to cast their mandate for such a political party or candidate. On the other hand, the electorates must also be able to draw a line between mere rhetorics and achievable political promises to avoid making a wrong voting decision. This led to the emergence of the field of Political Psychology. Political psychologists study ways in which affective influence may help voters make more informed voting choices, with some proposing that affective tendencies may explain how the electorate VOTER BEHAVIOUR AND ELECTIONS 109 makes informed political choices in spite of low overall levels of political attentiveness and sophistication. In general terms, voting behaviour refers to factors that determine the manner in which a particular group of people vote for a specific political party or candidates at a point in time. Premised on this, it is a means of legitimizing democratic rule; instancing ‘participation’ in the political process involving integration into the political community; instancing an act of decision-making; a role-action involving definite political orientation imbedded in a particular type of political culture; or a direct relation of the individual citizens to the formal government. Although international legal frameworks such as Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) explicitly states that: ‘The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.’ Voters are at liberty to either vote for candidates and political parties of their choice except in few exceptional compulsory situations. Therefore, voters make their decisions whether to cast their vote or not and which candidate deserves their votes. Democracy, on the other hand, is a representative system of government in which the masses have the constitutional right to choose their leaders through competitive and credible elections. Liberal democracies, also known as constitutional democracies, are built on the principles of free and fair elections, a competitive political process and universal suffrage. Underscoring the importance of democracy, the United Nation’s General Assembly on 23 March 2005 identified the essential elements of democracy to include respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Staddon 2013). Scholars have advanced several theories aimed at explaining voter behaviour in the electoral process. Some of these theories include, among others; the rational choice, party identification model and the sociological approach to voting. Rational choice theory centres on the notion that voting decisions are hinged on cost-benefit analyses where voters match their individual issue preferences with party platforms. Rational choice theory assumes that preferences are complete (the voter decides whether to vote or not vote and on which party or candidate to vote based on a conscious assessment of the candidates, political parties and the entire system), transitive and have independence of irrelevant alternatives. The rational voter decides to 110 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 vote or not to vote based on available information, probabilities of events, and potential costs and benefits in determining preferences. According to Olson (1965) ‘only a separate and “selective” incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way’. Downs (1957), posited the voter is a rational being therefore, ‘he knows that no party will be able to do everything that it says it will do. Hence he cannot merely compare platforms; instead he must estimate in his own mind what the parties would actually do were they in power’. What this means therefore is that policy preferences are exogenous, the interplay of voters’ preferences and parties’ policy positions play fundamental roles in vote choices (Heath and Anderson 2000). Party identification model centres on the basic assumption that voters are expressive rather than instrumental, and that issues preferences are considered to be endogenous to vote (Heath and Anderson 2000). This theory believes that voters have established psychological ties to certain political parties, and naturally vote for them in every election (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964). This connection or tie reflects family influence stemming from early socialization (i.e. many voters are influenced in their vote decisions by the partisanship of their various families). In Nigeria and the US for instance, voting decisions are always influenced along party lines (PDP or APC in Nigeria; Democrats or Republican in the US) based on family or social group partisanship. However, this does not apply to every situation as people are mostly influenced by rational economic considerations in making voting decisions rather than just identifying with a political party based on family tradition. This played out in the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. The south-east geo-political zone voted massively for the PDP at both federal and state elections because they believed that Dr Jonathan’s government with key Ibo functionaries occupying strategic positions had favoured the region by upgrading Enugu Airport to an international one, construction of aban- doned roads, second Niger bridge etc., while other regions cited the worsening economic condition of the country in voting against the PDP. Prior to the defection of the group of five PDP governors to the All Progressives Congress (APC) in 2014, APC had only four governors out of the 19 states of the north. However, PDP won only 2 states in the 2015 elections signalling displeasure with PDP’s 16 years of government. Sociological approach to voting behaviour emphasizes the impact of social structure, with the argument that social group memberships influence people’s voting decisions. Originating from the Columbia School TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR SINCE 1999: COMPARING NIGERIA ... 111

(1940s–1950s) in a survey of the American electorates (Heath & Anderson 2000), sociological theory maintains that group preferences and choices greatly influence the voting behaviour of members. Voters are considered to vote for political parties that best reflect the interest of their groups (Rose and Urwin 1969; Lijphart 1979, 1980; Heath & Anderson 2000). The findings of the Columbia School (1940s, 1950s) harped on voting and peoples’ choice and argued that groups: religious groups, workplace group and social acquaintances pattern voting behaviour as group preferences, choices and dislikes determine greatly individual member voting choices. For instance, the Jehovah’s Witnesses (a group of Christians) believe that taking part in politics in any form is sinful. Therefore, no true witness gets involved in political activities, ranging from political campaigns to voting, from contesting to accepting appointments. This is to say that social class and socialization have strong influences on voters’ electoral decisions. Speaking on the British experience Pulzer (1967) opined that ‘class is the basis of British politics, all else is embellishment and detail’. However, a group of scholars have posited that voting behaviour should not be studied from the voter’s perspective but that contextual and environmental dynamics such as the role of the media, the prevailing economic structures and conditions, performance of the incumbent government and political parties’ manifestoes and the context in which the relationship between voters, parties becomes stronger (Curtice 2002; van der Eijk 2002; Glasgow and Alvarez 2005; Johnson et al. 2002). Voter behaviours are influenced by a range of factors, especially social-group identity, which helps to forge enduring partisan identification. In addition, voters are, to a greater or lesser extent, susceptible to the influence of more short-term and contingent factors such as campaign events, issues and candidate appeals. In particular, the perceived governing competence of candidates and political parties often weighs heavily on voters’ choices.

TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR SINCE 1999: COMPARING NIGERIA WITH OTHER DEMOCRACIES In Nigeria, the effect of voter behaviour on the electoral process and, by extension, democratic development can be aggregated on two dimensions: Voter Turnout and Voters’ Choice. Recently, there has been a spate on interest in measuring the legitimacy of a government through 112 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 the percentage of vote which the political party that formed such a government was able to garner during the election. Studies have shown that the primary essence of election is not only to choose political executives but also to confer legitimacy upon those chosen to represent the electors and hold representatives to account for their actions while in ofﬁce (Pitkin 1967; Onah 1997; Onu and Momoh 2005;Ottaway1995;Bratton1998; Anifowose and Babawale 2003). However, it is observed that the percentage of voters that actually voted in elections compared to the number of registered voters is dwindling, continuously. Even in advanced democracies like the US, scholars and analysts are disturbed by low turnout of voters in elections which call to question, the validity of seeing American political system as the world model of democracy. Cynicism and distrust for politicians and the democratic political process have been advanced as the major determinant of low voter turnout (Hamalai 2014). The trend in Nigeria almost necessitated the postponement of the 2015 general elections for the second time when stakeholders requested for it as a result of low turnout of voters for collection of the Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs). It took the diligent explanation of the INEC Chairman, Prof. Attahiru Jega to convince the stakeholders that the low collection of the PVCs should not disrupt the electoral calendar as such is experienced throughout the world (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). From the above table, we can infer that the voter turnout in the 1999 presidential election was somewhat encouraging. However, it is not out of place to expect that the turnout could have been more, owing to the enthusiasm of the disengagement of the military from politics. A closer

Table 5.1 Nigeria voter registration proﬁle (1959–2015)

Year Registered Voters Valid Votes %

1959 9,036,038 7,185,555.000 80 1979 48,633,782 12,532,195.00 26 1983 65,304,818 25,430,096.00 39 1992 38,866,366 15,800,766.00 41 1999 57,938,945 30,280,052.00 52 2003 60,823,022 39,480,489.00 65 2007 61,567,036 35,397,517.00 57 2011 73,528,040 38,209,978.00 52 2015 67,422,005 28,567,564.00 42

Source: Updated from Hamalai (2014: 10) TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR SINCE 1999: COMPARING NIGERIA ... 113

Table 5.2 Voter registration and turnout in Nigeria’s presidential election, 1999–2015

Year Population Voting Age Total Total Vote % of Voter Population (VAP) Registered Cast Turnout Voters

1999 108,258,359 52,792,781 57,938,945 30,280,052 52.3 2003 129,934,911 64,319,246 60,823,022 42,018,735 69.1 2007 131,859,731 71,004,507 61,567,036 35,397,517 57.5 2011 155,215,573 81,691,751 73,528,040 39,469,484 53.7 2015 177,155,754 87,784,373 67,422,005 29,432,083 43.7

Source: Authors’ computation with data from IDEA, IFES, INEC websites & Hamalai 2014

look at the data shows one irregularity. If the voting age population figure is put at 52,792,781; the question is ‘how could the registered voters be 57,938,945?’ Perhaps, it implies that there were about 5 million registered underage voters. As earlier argued, stakeholders paid less attention to procedural details and scrutiny of INEC activities as the primary objective was to disengage the military from government. In addition, the election was not tense as it was a battle between two Yoruba candidates, Olusegun Obasanjo and Olu Falae under different political platforms. Whoever won, a Yoruba man was certain to become the president since the two parties based on elite consensus decided to compensate the south-west for annulment of the 12 June, 1993 presidential election whose assumed winner, Chief M.K.O. Abiola died in the process of realizing his mandate having been imprisoned by the military. In all, more than 30 million voters turned up for the election putting the turnout rate at 52.3%. Four years later, the figure showed that the voters believed that democracy had come to stay and more than 42 million of them came out in a political battle between the incumbent President Olusegun Obasanjo and a northern challenger (Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, Rtd.). It was a battle of two retired army generals. A close perusal of the voter behaviour shows that ethno-religious voting crept back into the nation’s electioneering system. While the northerners voted for Buhari, the southerners comprising the easterners and westerners gave bloc vote to the incumbent president. President Obasanjo was able to win the reelection as he banked on the full support of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) which did not field any presidential candidate in order to enable a Yoruba man (Obasanjo) to have another chance 114 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 at the presidency. The voter turnout increased from 52.3% in 1999 to 69.1% in 2003. However, the 2007 elections signaled the beginning of a marked decline in voter turnout in the history of democratic election in the Fourth Republic. One plausible guess would be that like the 1999 presidential election that pitched two Yoruba candidates, the 2007 presidential election was largely a two-way contest between two Katsina brothers (Umar Musa Yar’Adua of the PDP and Gen. Muhammadu Buhari of the ANPP). This type of conclusion would seem to have ignored the stiff nature of the competition evident in the electioneering campaigns and the narrative of the ANPP presidential flag bearer around what he perceived as the PDP rigging machine, for which reason he challenged the outcome of the 2003 presidential to the highest court in the land; 35,397,517 voters turned out for the election making the Election Monitoring Body (EMB) to record a 57.5% voter turnout. Despite the drop, the turnout was appreciable because it was more than what was recorded in 1999. In 2011, the trend was indifferent as only 39,469,484 out of 73,528,040 voters turned up to elect the president. The election was tense because it was a battle between a dominating and grounded ruling party whose candidate was a minority (that enjoyed the support of most Nigerians owing to the sympathy of the ‘I had no shoe’ campaign jingle; and a newly formed ethnic-based party [Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)] that fielded a northerner who enjoyed the support of majority northerners in the belief that it was still their turn to produce the president to make up for the premature death of President Umaru Yar’Adua. But even more importantly, the candidacy of Gen. Muhammed Buhari drew support especially from the subaltern classes in northern Nigeria rather than in the ruling class circles based on what the masses believed to be his anti-corruption stance and the ideals of probity in running public office. This popular narrative has much less to do with the religion and ethnicity of the candidate than imaginations derived from his first military presidency and much later in the management of the Petroleum Trust Fund (Ibrahim and Egwu 2005). This trajectory of narratives partly worked out in the post-electoral violence that erupted which claimed hundreds of lives and destruction of properties. The crisis almost tore Nigeria apart as other regions especially the south-south and south-east threatened a retaliatory attack on northerners domiciled in the regions. The 2015 turnout reached a record time low as there was a further drop in voter turnout. From the table, one sees that the low voter turnout did TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR SINCE 1999: COMPARING NIGERIA ... 115 not emerge on the Election Day; rather it started from the refusal or inability of some voters to register in the first instance. For example, the voting age population of the country in 2015 was put at 87,784,373 out of the entire population figure of 177,155,754 putting the Voter Age Population (VAP) of expected eligible voters at 49.6%. However, only 67,422,005 qualified voters eventually registered. This shows that about 23.2% qualified voters had already been disenfranchised. More worrisome was the discovery that only 43.7% actually voted in the 2015 presidential election. This means that 37,989,922 voters accounting for 56.3% did not or were unable to vote. It is observed that more than half of the registered voters voted in the previous elections except in 2015. This became the worst election in terms of voter turnout in the history of the Fourth Republic electoral development despite the trust and confidence which the people reposed in the Attahiru Jega-led INEC. The previous elections recorded more than half of the voter turnout despite the fact that most people believed their votes would not count due to the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of INEC. One can attribute the low turnout in the 2015 elections to fear of electoral violence, because the electioneering period was the most tensed in the history of the nation. No analyst could predict that the process would end peacefully. The international community was worried, citizens were disturbed and INEC permanent and ad hoc staff set out for work with trepidation no assurance of safe return to their families. The trend is not peculiar to Nigeria alone as it is witnessed by some of her other contemporaries. Countries like Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and Chad also witnessed low turnout in the last three to five successive elections (Table 5.3). Registered voters, as a proportion of voting age population in the US differ from Congressional and Presidential elections. The range is between 30 and 60% for Congressional elections between 1962 and 2015 while the figure for presidential elections has been significantly higher with a range of 40–80%. Whereas 135 million voters registered; only 90.6 million voted in the 2010 Congressional elections. Howbeit, voter turnout for presidential elections have been appreciable as 132.6 million voted out of the 174.8 million registered voters in 2008 presidential elections (see Hamalai 2014)(Table 5.4) It is also observed that the trend in the voter turnout fluctuates in these countries. It should be noted that none of them adopted compulsory voting. However, there are other developing democracies like Ghana 116 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015

Table 5.3 Voter registration and turnout in burkina faso, cape verde, chad and ghana presidential election since 1991

Year Population Voting Age Total Total Vote % of Voter Population Registered Cast Turnout Voters

Burkina Faso 1991 9,191,000 4,595,500 3,564,501 1,256,381 35.3 1998 11,123,673 5,032,586 4,210,234 2,361,294 56.1 2005 13,925,313 6,216,114 3,924,328 2,262,899 57.7 2010 16,241,811 7,707,700 3,234,555 1,773,151 54.8 Cape Verde 2001 436,530 213,973 260,275 153,407 58.9 2006 475,947 218,632 323,554 171,819 53.1 2011 516,197 322,531 304,836 182,597 59.9 Chad 1996 6,559,000 3,345,090 3,567,913 2,672,358 74.9 2001 7,689,365 3,552,534 4,069,099 2,487,215 61.1 2006 9,944,201 4,235,756 5,697,922 3,024,226 53.1 2011 10,758,945 4,774,767 4,964,807 2,765,765 55.7 Ghana 1994 17,865,000 11,254,950 10,937,279 7,709,084 70.5 1999 18,864,358 11,001,583 11,779,200 8,635,290 73.3 2005 20,064,776 14,062,676 13,327,160 9,717,039 72.9 2010 21,083,826 14,799,473 14,088,500 10,495,451 74.5 2015 21,866,445 15,262,770 15,044,490 12,264,377 81.5

Source: Author’s computation with data from IDEA and IFES websites

Table 5.4 South African elections: Voting age, population, voter registration and turnout

Year VAP Registered Turnout Registered Turnout of VAP

2000 70 48 34 2006 72 48 35 2011 75 58 44 2014 ⃰ 73 47 53.7

Source: Collette Schultz-Herznberg, Senior Researcher, Corruption and Governance Institute of Security Studies ⃰ IDEA: Global Database on Elections and Democracy (cited in Hamalai 2014) TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR SINCE 1999: COMPARING NIGERIA ... 117

Table 5.5 Voter registration and turnout in Sri Lanka and Singapore presidential election since 1994

Year Population Voting Age Total Total Vote % of Voter Population Registered Cast Turnout Voters

Sri Lanka 1994 17,865,000 11,254,950 10,937,279 7,709,084 70.5 1999 18,864,358 11,001,583 11,779,200 8,635,290 73.3 2005 20,064,776 14,062,676 13,327,160 9,717,039 72.9 2010 21,083,826 14,799,473 14,088,500 10,495,451 74.5 2015 21,866,445 15,262,770 15,044,490 12,264,377 81.5 Singapore 1993 2,874,000 1,983,060 1,756,517 1,659,482 94.5 2011 5,183,700 3,891,370 2,274,773 2,153,014 94.7

Source: Author’s computation with data from IDEA website and Sri Lanka that did not adopt compulsory voting but witnessed relatively high voter turnout (Table 5.5). Taking a look at the voter behaviour in terms of the turnout in Singapore where compulsory voting is in place, we observed that the turnout is very high. Out of all these countries, it is worrisome to note that only Nigeria recorded less than 50% of voter turnout. The same is observed in parliamentary election among developing democracies (Table 5.6). From the chart, Botswana recorded 84.8% voter turnout despite the fact that there is no compulsory voting in place. The 93.2% recorded by Singapore is as a result of the compulsory voting. Ghana’s high turnout could be attributed to the developmental strides being witnessed in the country. Burkina Faso, Cape Verde and South Africa recorded more than 70% turnout while Sri Lanka and India recorded 61.3 and 66.4% respectively. Out of the ten sampled countries, Nigeria recorded the lowest of 43.7% followed by Chad with 56.6%. Voter behaviour with regard to their preferences and choice of political parties and candidates is heavily built on subjectivism rather than objecti- vism. Most voters are yet to premise their preferences on developmental issues but sympathy for political party based on ethno-religious afﬁliation. It is established in extant literature that political parties in Nigeria (right from the colonial era) were formed based on ethnicity rather than ideology (see Bakare 2013; Sklar and Whitaker 1964; Aborisade and Mundt 2002, 118 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015

Table 5.6 A comparison of the percentage of voter turnout in the last parliamentary

Country (Year of Last Election) % Voter Turnout in Last Parliamentary Election

Nigeria (2015) 43.7 Burkina Faso (2012) 76 Cape Verde (2011) 76 Chad (2011) 56.6 Ghana (2012) 80 Sri Lanka (2010) 61.3 Singapore (2011) 93.2 South Africa (2014) 73.5 Botswana (2014) 84.8 India (2014) 66.4

among others). The campaign strategies of these political parties were ethnic and religious based which eventually affected the voting behaviour of Nigerians. Though, some voters already made up their minds on which party and candidate(s) they are voting for, the campaign jingles do serve as mind changers for those who are not strongly committed to their dispositions. This same trend was observed in the US as far back as 1940. From an innovative seven-wave regional panel survey, Lazarsfeld et al. (1944)in their ingenious analysis of electoral decision-making ‘The People’s Choice’ found out that many voters had already made up their minds several months before the 1940 US-presidential elections but discovered that some voters changed their minds during the campaign period and thus concluded that the campaign primarily served to reinforce already existing political predispositions. To them, these political predispositions were found to be determined by stable socio-demographic characteristics, including religious denomination and place of residence. It is pertinent to note that the same ethno-religious-oriented voter behaviour also characterized European politics. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) found that European voting behaviour is obviously characterized by social considerations rather than public issues. To them, this accounted for the evolution of Western European party systems based on the concept of social cleavages. This accounted for the notion of voting behaviour based on social groupings for example, workers voting for socialist parties and Catholics voting for TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR SINCE 1999: COMPARING NIGERIA ... 119

Christian-Democratic parties. Since these social characteristics (mostly religion and ethnicity) are stable, voting along this line is stable over time. From these analyses, it becomes obvious that social characteristics significantly shape voter choices. In Nigeria, social characteristics greatly influence voter choices to the extent that it becomes difficult to draw a line of demarcation between issues and sentiment. Voters’ dispositions are shrouded by social factors which eventually define their choices. An average Nigerian voter considers ethno-religious background of the political office contenders rather than their antecedents in taking voting decisions. Premised on this, political parties exploit the situation by channeling their attention to those areas seen as their strongholds based on political sympathy derived therein. Campaign strategies are also tailored along these lines in order to capture voters’ sympathy. The resultant effect of the influence of social characteristics on voter choices is clearly seen in the electoral results of the five successive elections. Comparing the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections, it becomes obvious that Nigerians voted based on ethno-religious affiliation rather than issue based. The wisdom behind choosing these elections stems from the fact that they were contested by the same major candidates (Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari). From the above tables, it is observed that majority of the electorates in the entire north-west voted for Muhammadu Buhari (CPC) neither because of what he could do nor his antecedent but because he hails from the region. He also won four out of the six states in the north-east. He lost in Adamawa and Taraba because the two states are Christian dominated and are geographically located in the north-central than the zone where they belong. Goodluck Jonathan won all the states in the south-east, south-south, south-west (except Osun state where Nuhu Ribadu of the ACN won) and north-central (except in Niger state that is Muslim dominated and geographically located more in the north-west). These are zones where there is heavy domination of Christians and the zones make up the southern region of the country where he hails from. A closer look at the 2015 elections result projects the same trajectory, only that political circumstance as a result of the major opposition parties’ merger and decamping of major political bigwigs from the PDP to the newly formed APC changed the final outcome in favour of the APC. Goodluck Jonathan retained his support from the entire south-east and south-south. However, he lost his grip on the entire north-central, 120 5 TRENDS IN VOTER BEHAVIOUR, 1999–2015 north-east (except Taraba state) and south-west (except Ekiti state). Gen. Muhammadu Buhari profited from the change and won the entire north- central, north-west, north-east (except Taraba state) and south-west (except Ekiti state). The dimension of ethno-religious voting pattern also effected a change in the control of the National Assembly. In 2011, the PDP won majority of the seats especially from the stronghold regions. However, the CPC failed to capitalize on its outstanding performance to become the major opposition party in the National Assembly. The ACN that won only Osun state in the presidential election managed to become the major opposition party.

CONCLUSION Available data indicate rapid decline in voter turnout in most democracies thereby calling to question the credibility of democracy among nations today. Despite the loss of interest on electoral outcomes by voters and the declining voter turnout across democracies, there is little or no evidence showing that pluralist democracy is on the decline. This is because across democracies (emergent and advanced alike) voters have little or no trust in campaign promises and in extreme cases lack conﬁdence in government as an institution. This has forced the voting population to depend on material gains in order to cast their votes in every election. Thus, candidates and political parties have to provide incentives and aggressive political campaigns in order to attract increased voter turnout. Although, this is applicable in Nigeria, ethno-religious sentiments play important roles in voter behaviour. This situation has been exploited by politicians to cause division and discourage voter turnout in some areas. For instance, the threat from the Oba of Lagos, Rilwanu Akiolu against the Ibos in Lagos was seen as the factor that accounted for the low turnout of Ibos in the 2015 general elections. While northerners turned out en-mass to vote for their – own Muhammadu Buhari – as the only one that has the magic wand to save Nigeria. Also, Nigerians were fed-up with the 16 years of PDP’s rule and wanted a change. Therefore, the overwhelming victory of the APC in the 2015 elections was largely a decision to vote against the disappointing governance records of the PDP. Yet, such a decision would have been practically impossible if the APC did not become a viable opposition party, either through the REFERENCES 121 deft political manouvres of its leaders or a direct beneﬁt from the implosion of PDP from within and the gale of defection into the APC that followed. Voter turnout does not necessarily effect the quality of democracy as there is dormant support for the system from non-voters. Therefore, making voting compulsory may not effect any noticeable change. Given the secret ballot system in Nigeria, the introduction and enforcement of compulsory voting may not work.

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Trends in Election Outcomes, 1999–2015

INTRODUCTION Thespreadofdemocracytotheentireworldhasbeenasignificant achievement of modern society. Central to the philosophical tenets of democratic governance is the idea of ‘choice’ and ‘voice’ in the determination of who governs. Election provides the medium through which citizens make choices in relation to form and content of governance, and by implication, express their voice in the political process. Hence, the credibility of any democratic government is largely hinged on the quality of the electoral process and election outcomes. Acceptability of election outcomes by the contending parties is a function of the transparency and quality of the electoral process. Meanwhile, election and its outcomes, in each country, are unique and reflect individual country’s political and historical peculiarities. While no single electoral system is suitable to all countries, it is expected that the electoral process adhere to obligations and commitments outlined in international best practices and human rights instruments. Specific emphasis is often laid on building the capacity of the national electoral management bodies to implement credible elections in line with their respective legal mandates. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has organized five successful elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015). Evidence suggests that elections in Nigeria have been marred by violence ranging from vitriolic attacks, hate speeches to assassination of politicians. The four previous national elections recorded pockets of violent conflicts with the 2011 general elections being the most bloody despite attracting local and international

© The Author(s) 2017 125 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_6 126 6 TRENDS IN ELECTION OUTCOMES, 1999–2015 commendations of being well organized. Prior the 2015 elections, the outcome of the previous elections had been subjected to controversy and litigation. At the height of the electoral malfeasance in 2007, there were 1,290 election petitions before the Election Petitions Tribunals across the country. Pre-2015 elections was characterized with a ‘do-or-die’ mentality provoking various forms of electoral malpractices. Consequently, Nigeria’s election has been described as synonymous with rigging (Kurfi 2005:10).Thedesireto enhance the quality of the electoral process and boost the credibility and acceptability of the outcome has propelled a series of electoral reforms. Despite the plethora of reforms aimed at achieving credible electoral outcomes, some critical observers have expressed reservations on the outcome of the various elections. These reforms include, among others, a new biometric voter register, a remodified open ballot system (REMOBS), improved security features on sensitive electoral materials, such as serial numbering and colour-coding of ballot papers and results sheets, as well as security coding of ballot boxes, a more transparent framework for results collation and making returns. They also include: revised framework for engagement of ad hoc staff, more transparent procedures on Election Day, including pasting of results at polling units and collation centres. Others are closer collaborations and partnerships with a range of critical stakeholders such as political parties, security agencies, civil society organizations, media professionals etc. enhanced voter education and citizens’ engagement. With the exception of the 2015 general election that was, for the first time, in Nigeria’s political history, won by the opposition party, (APC), previous elections threw up questionable outcomes as the ruling PDP continued to win a landslide victory. This situation weighed adversely on voter turnout and political participation in the country as several Nigerians lost confidence and trust in the system. The steady decline in citizen’s participation in the electoral process may not be unconnected with the general perception that electoral outcomes are already predetermined and that involvement in the process is mere futility. This chapter examines some of the salient issues and factors that shaped the outcomes of Nigerian elections between 1999 and 2015.

PRELIMINARY PUZZLES Despite the Electoral Act, 2006, the ERC constituted in 2007 and its useful recommendations, the Electoral Act, 2010 and the Electoral Act, 2010 (as amended), those ills pervading the nation’s electoral system continued unabated. These include, among others, the abuse of the power of incumbency; severe financial and logistical constraints on the work of INEC thereby ELECTION OUTCOMES AS A MEASURE OF DEMOCRACY 127 making it dependent on state and local governments for field offices of the electoral body; unreliability of voters’ registers, untimely delivery of electoral materials. Others include the introduction of Permanent Voters Card (PVC); the card reader and viability to receive claims and objections against them, in conformity with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2011 and other laid- down regulations; failure of the political parties, INEC and other electoral management stakeholders to accept nomination papers or manipulate them or prohibit nomination papers from the opposition. Also included are ballot boxes stuffing; ballot paper manipulation within polling units or other places; surrogate voting or multiple voting; results falsification and manipulation; electoral violence, before, during and after the elections; the unwholesome role of security agencies in favour of the ruling party; and the time-consuming and complicated adjudication process which sometimes encourages impunity in Nigeria’s electoral process. This trend of events engendered crises that have taken their toll on both human and material resources in Nigeria. For instance, the post-presidential election crisis of 2011, the operation ‘Wet eh’ in the Western region etc. remain eloquent testimonies of the adverse impact of fraudulent election outcomes on peace and stability. On the contrary, countries with good electoral laws and requisite reforms like the US, South Africa and Canada have peaceful election outcomes and are more developed due mainly to the fact that popular candidates are elected based on merit. This has reduced election-related tension and destruction in these countries, unlike Nigeria where election outcome is always tainted with violence as candidates strive to win at all cost. Countries with electoral laws that either allow desperate politicians to rig their way into offices, infringe on peoples’ right to choose their leaders by undermining free, fair and credible elections are sitting on a keg of gunpowder. Perhaps, citizens are most likely to express their anger and frustration through violent means as the Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans and Syrians (Arab Spring) have shown. An election outcome fraught with violent crises always threatens democracy, hampers development and destroys existing infrastructures.

ELECTION OUTCOMES AS A MEASURE OF DEMOCRACY Elections have remained one of the most debated concepts in modern society. It stands out as the most fundamental manifestation of democracy. Therefore, no society can lay claim to being a democracy except it con- ducts regular/periodic election in order to avail the citizenry the 128 6 TRENDS IN ELECTION OUTCOMES, 1999–2015 opportunity to choose their leaders. However, the characteristics of each country’s political system determine the outcome of elections (Alapiki 2004). To the extent that outcomes of democratic elections provide a measure of the legitimacy of the government, the entire processes of selecting, conducting and announcing the results have resounding effects on the outcome and indicate the level of the political maturity of countries involved (Paki and Inokoba 2006). Thus, election is a formal process through which the electorates choose their leaders, express their acceptance or rejection of public policies and chart their own course (Inokoba & Kumokor 2011). It is not adminis- tratively feasible for everyone to take part in the running of government, hence the introduction of representative democracy predicated on periodic and credible elections. When elections are conducted with integrity and are credible, it then truly implies a mandate that binds the electorate and elected public officials in a mutual relationship in which the former can demand and enforce political accountability on the latter, and where the latter fails, they can be changed at the next election. What is often regarded as the promissory note of electoral democracy is the express power of voters to reward performing elected officials during periodic elections and accordingly, to punish those who fail to deliver on their electoral promises. But it is important that its outcome is indeterminable until the power of the vote is expressed. Election outcome, on the other hand, is the resulting situation from the election proper. This comprises the result declared at the end of the election, the reactions that greet the announcement of the result and the acceptance by political gladiators that the election had followed due process. This explains the differences between stable and peaceful democracies and volatile and violence-prone democracies (advanced democracies and emerging/nascent democracies). While political gladiators engage in malpractices in order to predetermine election outcomes in favour of themselves and their political parties as in most emerging democracies including Nigeria, actors are compelled by a combination of rules and public vigilance to observe the rules of the game. In the US for instance, power has severally transited from the Republicans to the Democrats successfully as people vote personalities and the broad policy choices presented by the Democrats and the Republicans. That is to say that the government of the day, the political parties, the armed forces, police, election umpire and adjudicating bodies, civil society organizations, the ELECTION OUTCOMES AS A MEASURE OF DEMOCRACY 129 mass of citizens owe it a duty to accept and support the process and not undermine it through violence, intimidation or any other unlawful means. On the contrary, in many Third World countries, elections are reduced to warfare in which the winner is the one who amasses the most potent instruments of violence. This notion of zero-sum competition underlying electoral competition or what has been popularized as ‘do or die’ mentality undermines election as a contest of ideas based on clearly defined rules. So elections and its outcomes have, on several occasions, been undermined as much by state actors as they have been undermined by non-state actors. This explains the spate of violence that often follows the declaration of election results in Africa. For instance, the 2011 post-election violence in northern Nigeria, the Laurent Gbagbo-Alassane Ouattara case in Côte d’Ivoire, the Rwanda experience that resulted in the 1994 genocide etc. Therefore, to achieve a credible election outcome that will be accepted by all, the following ingredients are a sine qua non:

a. An enabling legislative/legal framework; b. The impartial and neutral practices of election administrators, the media and the forces that maintain law and order; and c. Acceptance of the competitive electoral process by all the political forces in the country.

Table 5.2 presents voter registration and turnout in Nigeria since 1999. Election outcomes in Nigeria have always been influenced by incumbency factors. This assertion is very manifest in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections. The ruling PDP made optimum usage of its incumbency power advantage. One of the major issues that surrounded those elections was the crude use of the incumbency factor by those already in power to prevent the alternation of power between the ruling party and the opposition. To the incumbent office holders in Nigeria, their reelection bid commences immediately after they are elected into office. Some of them build political empire/dynasty aimed at guaranteeing the future of their friends and relatives. Therefore, the finances of the government are appropriated/expended to consolidate their hold on power rather than for public good. Usually, public media and other structures of propaganda are captured and controlled by these desperate politicians. And the security machineries are influenced to protect the interests of the incumbents. Dissenting voices and outlets are clamped in order to avail the incumbent unquestionable reign like an emperor. 130 6 TRENDS IN ELECTION OUTCOMES, 1999–2015

The results of the 2015 general elections present the same trajectory, only that political circumstances dictated by the merger of the major opposition parties and decamping of major political bigwigs from the PDP to the newly formed APC changed the final outcome in favour of the APC. The PDP retained its support from the entire south-east and south-south. However, it lost its grip on the entire north-central, north- east (except Taraba State) and south-west (except Ekiti State). APC, the main opposition political party, profited from the change and won the entire north-central, north-west, north-east (except Taraba State) and south-west (except Ekiti State). This also affected the majority seat of the National Assembly. PDP retained majority seat in both Chambers of the National Assembly since 2011. However, the jinx was broken in the 2015 general elections as the APC did not just win the presidential election but is now the party with majority seat in both Chambers. The tables below capture the seats won by each political party since 1999. Table 6.1 indicates that the outcome of 1999 elections was more democratic in outlook as the three dominant political parties recorded brilliant showing in the election unlike 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections where the PDP had simple majority. However, the 2015 outcome was a clear departure from the status quo as the opposition APC won 69 seats against PDP’s 49 in the Senate. This shows that democracy has been entrenched and that credible election has come to stay in Nigeria. However, prior to the expiration of the tenure of the Seventh Assembly, the opposition APC was neck to neck with the ruling PDP in the House of Representatives. This was necessitated by the gale of defections that pervaded Nigerian political landscape in the build-up to the 2015 general elections. After the national elections of 28 March, 2015, the PDP was relegated to the opposition with its 125 seats against APC’s 214 seats (majority party) as captured in Table 4.3 (Composition of House of Representatives and Senate by Political Parties, 1999-2015). Table 6.1 shows that the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) has won the presidential elections four times since 1999 with the main opposition party the APC winning the presidential election for the firsttimein2015.ItalsoportraysthewidegapbetweenthePDP candidate in 2003 and 2007 presidential elections, 24,456,140 against ANPP’s 12,710,022 in 2003 and 24,638,063 against 6,605,299 (Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Table 6.1 Presidential election result by political party (1999–2015) DEMOCRACY OF MEASURE A AS OUTCOMES ELECTION

Party 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015

PDP 18,738,154 24,456,140 24,638,063 22,495,187 12,853,162* AD/APP/ANPP 11,110,287 12,710,022 6,605,299 46,554 – APGA – 1,297,445 –– – ACN ––2,637,848 2,079,151 – CPC –––12,215,853 – APC ––––15,424,921* Others ––––304,100*

Source: Updated from (Hamalai 2014: 57); Election in Nigeria, African Election Database, http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html#1999-2011_ Presidential_Election *INEC website (2015) 131 132 6 TRENDS IN ELECTION OUTCOMES, 1999–2015

Table 6.2 Distribution of governors by political parties (1999–2015)

Year PDP APP/ANPP AD/ACN CPC APGA PPA LP

1999 21 9 6 –––– 2003 28 7 1 –––– 2007 28 5 1 – 12– 2010 28 3 3 – 1 – 1 2011 23 3 6 1 2 – 1 2013 19 APC – 16 1 –––– 2015 13 22 1 ––––

Source: Updated from (Hamalai 2014: 59); African Election Database, Nigerian Election, http://african electionstripod.com/ng_2011governor.html

FACTORS THAT PATTERNED 2015 GENERAL ELECTION OUTCOME IN NIGERIA Several factors can be identified as determinants of the outcome of the 2015 general elections out of which five salient ones have been identified and elaborated. These include monetary and other forms of inducements, propaganda and advertisements, campaign turnouts (optics), institutional factors, the militarization of the polity and manipulation of sectional sentiments. These issues are discussed one after the other.

Table 6.3 Re-election and retention rate in the US senate

Start Year End Year Congress Re-Election Party Seat Retention Rate (%) Rate (%)

1989 1991 101 90.1 99.6 1991 1993 102 87.7 98.3 1993 1995 103 73.6 98.1 1995 1997 104 79.8 88.2 1997 1999 105 77.4 98.7 1999 2001 106 89.9 99.3 2001 2003 107 88.2 98.7 2003 2005 108 87.7 98.1 2005 2007 109 88.6 98.7 2007 2009 110 84.9 93.1 2009 2011 111 86.9 94.0

Source: Open Secrets.org, Centre for Responsive Politics FACTORS THAT PATTERNED 2015 GENERAL ELECTION OUTCOME IN NIGERIA 133

Monetary and related material inducements have significantly determined the outcome of Nigeria’s elections. Everywhere in the world, elections cost money. Political parties and candidates are required to devote resources towards activities like advertising, research, polling, logistics, and hiring and paying members of staff. In Nigeria, the role of money in determining electoral outcomes is amplified in the general elections since 1999. It is now known in our local parlance as ‘stomach infrastructure’ which entails wooing voters by giving out money and gifts items. Experiences have shown that proper elections hardly take place in most parts of the country as politicians only remember the electorate on the election year. Therefore, election results have often a strong link with the levels of spending on stomach infrastructure. Usually, the party that spends the most on directly wooing voters is the one most likely to be rewarded with votes. More often, the law enforcement agents and staff of the election commission compromise and work for certain political parties and politicians who induce them monetarily. In a report on ‘Money and Politics in Nigeria’ in 2008, the International Foundation for Electoral System, a civil society organization, observed the negative effects of money politics in Nigeria. However, the 2015 general elections appeared to have presented a different case, as it was the first time in 16 years the opposition political party won overwhelmingly both at national elections and state elections. Factors accounting for this include, among others, increasing loss of confidence and trust in the entire system and frustration orchestrated by rising unemployment and poverty rate, perceived thriving corruption and insecurity. Thus, Nigerians wanted a change as they took their destiny in their hands. Propaganda and the deployment of capital intensive election advertisements more often linked to incumbency factor have always determined who wins or loses elections in Nigeria. The incumbency factor confers great advantage on Nigerian politicians, as it gives them unrestrained access to state resources. This situation is aided by the near lack of accountability and transparency culture as they usually walk the streets free after looting the public treasury. Past efforts to track campaign finances of parties did not create the expected impact except for 2007 when the activities of Political Finance Group supported by IFES resulted in some political parties reporting on their finances. Lack of capacity within INEC to track party campaign finances gives liberty to parties especially those in power at different levels to raise money even from 134 6 TRENDS IN ELECTION OUTCOMES, 1999–2015 infamous sources to tilt the political game in their favour. For instance, the PDP which was in power from 1999 to 29 May, 2015 had the sole advantage of controlling and assigning, at federal level, of lucrative licenses (crude oil lifting, petrol and kerosene importation, etc.) and import waiv- ers. As a result, it had always been favoured by businessmen and benefici- aries of such allocations through generous donations. This gave it unlimited powers to bankroll its campaigns and grease their propaganda machinery. However, with the drastic drop in oil price in recent years the fortunes of these public office-holders nose-dived leaving them at a much tensed situation in their bid to survive. Just as in other elections since 1999, state-owned media institutions, specifically broadcast media, took partisan stands in their reportage and advertisements in the 2015 general electioneering campaign. On a regular basis, the flagship nightly television news on the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) channel was completely dominated by reports of the ruling party’s campaign rallies and other activities. There were perceived differences in the levels of spending between the PDP and the All Progressives Congress (APC) on their media campaign and advertising. According to Common-Wealth report (30 March, 2015), several advertisements were highly provocative and made accusations about opposing candidates and INEC which were noticeably defamatory and libellous. Nigerian media institutions both public and private published and broad- casted lucrative adverts without censure by the regulatory authorities. Many newspapers published ‘wrap advertisements’ which looked like nor- mal front pages, but were in fact paid-for advertising masquerading as news (Commonwealth Report, 30 March, 2015). For instance, the documentary ‘the Real Buhari’ and another on Tinubu ran by the African Independent Television (AIT) and NTA are eloquent testimonials to the bias reportage and advertisement. The hate advert ran by the Governor of Ekiti state, Mr Peter Ayodele Fayose on the front page of most of the national dailies is another infamous example. It is deducible from the extent of the inflammatory campaign comments, editorial articles and advertisements appearing in the media that political parties simply ignored INEC’s 2013 Code of Conduct for Political Parties, which prohibits such activities. And that Nigerian Broadcasting Commission has derailed on its mandate of regulating media activities. The role of campaign turnouts in shaping public perception and attitudes of voters towards certain parties and candidates in the determination FACTORS THAT PATTERNED 2015 GENERAL ELECTION OUTCOME IN NIGERIA 135 of the final outcome cannot be overemphasized. In every democracy, the turnout at campaign rallies is indicative of what the election outcome would be. In a CNN interview, an ex-CIA Director Leon Panetta, observed that the presidency of the US goes beyond mere politics and substance to include considerations for ‘optics’. Large turnouts in political parties’ campaign rallies accords concomitant positive psychological effect on the benefiting parties. This was what the PDP enjoyed for close to 16 years before the APC tsunami that swept through the nation’s political landscape in the build-up to the 2015 general elections. This understand- ably gave Nigerians a tip about the outcome and true to predictions, the APC swept the polls. Politics in Nigeria is far less about ideology than about immediate personal interests. The gale of defections from PDP to APC and vice versa is an eloquent indication to a politics devoid of ideological lean- ings. Defections make for great ‘optics’ for the benefiting party, as some of the defecting politicians command great followership and portray the other party in uncomplimentary light. The unprecedented strength of the APC (first in the history of opposition in Nigeria) stemmed due mainly to the defections of the group of five PDP governors APC in November 2013. Besides these factors, there are important institutional factors that determine election outcome. The insistence of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on the use of the biometrics- based PVC is one important factor that determined the turnout of the 2015 general elections. According to figures released by INEC, 68,833,476 million eligible Nigerians registered to vote in the 2015 elections, 56,431,255 million collected their PVCs while only 29,432,083 million voted. Many Nigerians were denied their civic rights to vote due to hitches recorded during the elections. There were card reader battery failures, and failure of the card readers to recognize PVCs in some polling units. That was the first time that the PVCs were used in Nigeria. In the 2011 elections, temporary voter cards (TVCs) – laminated slips of paper, with no biometric capability – were used. The distribution of the PVCs was characteristically chaotic leading to postponement of election. The tendency for sitting presidents, governors and ruling parties to directly and indirectly use law enforcement agencies to electoral advantage and to the detriment of the opposition political parties is a recurrent theme in election outcomes that are considered as not reflecting the will of the people. More often than not, these agents are used at will to protect 136 6 TRENDS IN ELECTION OUTCOMES, 1999–2015 supporters and intimidate opponents. This played out in Ekiti, Osun and River states elections where the APC alleged that the PDP was bent on winning through a policy of ‘militarization’. However, this has a long antecedence in Nigeria’s electoral history dating back to the First and Second Republics. It reached an absurd and embarrassing level in the 1983 general elections when the open partisanship of the police could not be hidden. Capturing what transpired during the 1983 general elections, Prof. Wole Soyinka in his book, The Open Sore of a Continent, described the then Inspector-General of Police as ‘an uncouth, power- crazed police chief who promptly inaugurated a scorched-earth policy in order to ensure his master’s second tenure as Nigeria’s head of state’. This same scenario played out in 2013 when the same Wole Soyinka likened the then Rivers Police Commissioner to Mr Sunday Adewusi, the former Nigeria Inspector General of Police in the Second Republic, when he was caught in the web of partisanship in the handling of Rivers crisis. On the other hand, opposition in most cases, has constituted a torn in the flesh of the ruling party. The attacks on the former President Goodluck Jonathan’s campaign logistics and apparatuses in Plateau, Katsina, Bauchi etc. states were carried out by supporters of the APC who wanted power at all cost, even if they had to kill. A salient aspect of public mobilization in elections in Nigeria is the cheap appeal to communal sentiments and the tendency for unsuspect- ing voters to positively respond to such appeals in framing their understanding of political issues. Most of the elections conducted in Nigeria have been driven by sentimental considerations and not based on the merit of candidates. However, the 2015 general elections were the worst case of sentiment-driven elections. Newspapers’ headlines were inundated with reports of attacks revolving around religion, and personality. Campaign advertising and social media conversations were fraught with attacks on political parties and candidates based on religious and other primordial sentiments. This greatly affected the outcome of these elections. While the APC was seen as a Muslim political party pursuing a Muslim agenda, the PDP was seen as predominantly a Christian-dominated party pursuing the southern agenda of dominating the north. This explained the bloc vote APC got from the northern states with the exception of Taraba and Gombe states where the PDP managed to hold sway. PDP swept the polls in the eastern and south- south geo-political zones while the south-western zone was the battle ground of both parties. REFERENCES 137

The PDP, for example, worked hard to portray Muhammadu Buhari as frail and terminally ill, a Muslim fundamentalist, not possessing the minimum educational qualiﬁcation for presidential election, and a man who has not shed any of the dictatorial bent that deﬁned his military administration. APC was not innocent of this campaign of calumny and character assassination.

CONCLUSION This chapter has examined the critical factors that influenced the course and outcomes of the 2015 elections in Nigeria. As in the previous elections, these include the deployment of money, the influence of godfathers, the media landscape, appeal to forces of identity such as ethnicity and religion, as well as the series of electoral reforms that enhanced the institutional and administrative autonomy of INEC, including its institutional reputation. While these factors were not entirely new to Nigeria, they tended to assume more prominence in the election. Although the power of incumbency tended to favour the PDP, making it possible for it to leverage on non-institutional forces than the APC, the latter tended to profit more from institutional dynamics in the electoral process, most notably the merger of leading opposition parties and the series of electoral reforms that made INEC better positioned to conduct free and fair elections.

REFERENCES Alapiki, H. E. 2004, Politics and Governance in Nigeria Port-Harcourt Amethyst and Colleagues Publishers Hamalai, L. 2014, Continuity and Change in Nigeria’s Elections: A Collection of Essays, National Institute for Legislative Studies National Assembly, Abuja. Inokoba, P. K., and Kumokor, I. 2011, ‘Electoral Crisis and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria’,. Journal of Social Science, 27(2): pp. 139–148. Kurﬁ, A. 2005, Nigerian General Elections 1951-2003: My Roles and Reminiscences. Abuja: Spectrum Paki, F. and Inokoba, P. 2006, An Invitation to Political Science, Kemuela Publications, Port Harcourt. CHAPTER 7

Democratic Governance and Political Accountability, 1999–2015

INTRODUCTION Political accountability, considered as ‘a doctrine associated with the responsibility of the rulers to defend their action before the ruled’ (Ojo 2014: 100), is at the heart of democratic governance. In fact, it can be argued that the higher the level of political accountability, the higher the quality of democratic governance. This is true in the sense of the contents and substance of democratic governance. However, the relationship between political accountability and democratic governance may not necessarily be given. Much depends on certain intervening variables, particularly citizen’s participation. Whereas democratic governance is usually structured and regulated by normative rules usually codiﬁed in the constitution, constitutionalism, that is, adherence to the letters and spirit of the constitution, hinges largely on the existence of a vigilant and active citizenship, which constantly engages in activities that can hold the government accountable for its actions and/or inactions. Citizens’ participation can, therefore, be seen as the connecting rod between democratic governance and the entrenchment of political accountability in a democracy. As Olukoshi (2011: 15) rightly points out, it is unthinkable to ‘talk meaningfully about democratic governance and accountability if citizens cannot take an active part in policy-making and be conﬁdent that their active citizenry will help shape public policy’. This is why the debate about the role of civil society in democratic development becomes pre-eminent for reasons that are obvious. The importance of civil society, for instance,

© The Author(s) 2017 139 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_7 140 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 derives not only from its role in resisting the excesses of the state and state officials as assumed in the binary narrative of standing in opposition to the state in western democracies, it derives also from the reality that the unleashing of the powers of civil society in no small measure, contributed to the expansion of the democratic space that ushered in Nigeria’s democracy in 1999, as has been the case in democracy’s ‘third wave’ in most developing societies. Interestingly, as ‘the initial momentum for political reform and change’ in Africa deepens, African citizens are beginning to demonstrate greater awareness about politics. Nigeria has not been an exception. Such awareness is expressed in diverse forms, including citizen’s audit of governments through increasing participation in politics. By logical extension, increasing participation should, ordinarily, be accompanied by an increase in the quality and delivery of democratic governance. Put differently, democratic governance should foster political accountability, where the citizens will be the primary stakeholders of politics. This is the main research puzzle to be explored in this chapter, with emphasis on the relationship between democratic governance and political accountability in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic. The chapter first seeks to clarify notions and nuances around democratic governance and political accountability, showing the relationship between them. It proceeds to offer a brief historical account about the state of political accountability in Nigeria before 1999. This is followed by the analytical fulcrum of the chapter, which deals with a critical analysis of the state of political accountability in Nigeria between 1999 and 2014, presented under four analytical themes. These are electoral and legal accountability; socio-economic development, economic wellbeing and financial accountability; national security issues; and citizen’s participation and political accountability. The final section recaps the central arguments of the chapter, before teasing out the main conclusions arising therefrom.

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY It is pertinent to begin by clarifying the key concepts of democratic governance and political accountability, showing the nexus between them. Generally, democratic governance is one predicated upon democratic values and principles. Such values and principles include freedom of the individuals in various aspects of political life, equality among citizens, justice in the relations between the people and the government and the participation of the people in choosing those in government. This is in line DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 141 with the ‘common good and the will of the people’ thesis of democracy. As Schumpeter (1950: 250–283, 1967: 153–188) argues, democracy entails that ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions, which promotes the realization of the common good by making the people decide issues through the election of individuals, who are to assemble in order to carry out its will’. Held shares similar views when he views democracy as a ‘means to self-fulfillment’,as‘a mean to an end’, which ‘serves to protect the liberty of citizens and to maintain the minimum public goods (the rule of law, electoral politics, a safety net, security) necessary for citizens to go about their self-chosen ends and objectives’ (Held 2006: 231). The second side of democracy, according to Schumpeter (1950; cf Quinton 1967: 173); emphasizes the centrality of competition to the emergence of political leadership. In this sense democracy is an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. Archibugi (2008:26–30), defines democracy in terms of certain ‘cardinal principles’, namely ‘nonviolence, popular control and political equality’. According to him, the principle of non-violence is reflected in ‘the willingness of the various components to accept a priori the rules of the game and consequently the rule of law’, which must ‘not be interpreted in the absolute sense but as a commitment to use force only as a last resort and even then to exercise it within the bounds of legality’ (p. 27). Popular control, according to Archibugi, ‘is characterized by the fact that government action is constantly under public scrutiny. The actions undertaken are subjected to the people’s control during decision making and throughout the administrative action’. In other words, ‘both decisions and decision makers are under control. This means that political action must be authorized and accountable and, in order to allow popular control, it must be shaped by transparent rules’ (p. 28). Only then can administration be responsive to popular yearnings and aspirations and accountable to the public. Finally, Archibugi notes that political equality ‘demands that all members of the community have same rights, in the first place the right to participate in political life’. All members must be able to contribute, directly or indirectly, to the process of making appointments to public offices and to be appointed themselves, all of which require adequate representation. In what seems like a compendium of these democratic values, Diamond (2008: 22) submits that a system could be said to be democratic if it 142 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 ensures the following attributes: freedom of speech, religious freedom, universal adult suffrage, competitive, free and fair elections, rule of law and equality of citizens, independent judiciary, institutional checks and balances, political pluralism and civilian control of the military. What these general conceptions suggest is that democracy as a system of government stresses the sovereignty of the people (see Zack-William 2001: 213–214). Whereas the sovereignty of the people is usually guaranteed by the law, there are no institutional guarantees that such constitutional provisions would be effectively utilized by the people. This explains why Dahl (2000) differentiates between democracy as an idea and democracy as a practice. As he argues, ‘having rights and opportunities is not strictly equivalent to using them’. The mere fact that a democratic society concedes certain rights, for example to vote and be voted for, to its citizens, does not imply that all qualified citizens will participate in these activities. But if governments will ever be accountable, citizens must be willing and able, at all times, to explore their sovereignty in crucial matters of governance. This takes us to the concept of political accountability. Hyden (2010: 2–3) explains political accountability in terms of ‘a relationship between two parties where one – the agent (A) – is expected to perform certain tasks in response to expectations held by another party, usually referred to as the principal (P)’. Such a relationship, as Hyden further notes, can also be between a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim (P) and the agent (A) responsible for fulfilling or respecting that right, where ‘the principal sets the terms under which the agent must report on actions taken within the relevant domain and what sanctions can be directed toward the agent if the terms are not met’. Based on this reading of political accountability, Hyden (2010) identifies two central criteria of accountability, namely: (1) responsiveness and (2) answerability. For him, while responsiveness connotes ‘the extent to which the agent has acted in a manner that meets the expectations of the principal’, answerability refers to ‘how far the agent has given a truthful report on what measures have been taken and with what consequences’. Whereas, accountability can either be vertical or horizontal, and each of these typologies further divided into different variants, this chapter is interested in vertical accountability, particularly its electoral variant through which citizens delegate political power to their representatives and hold them accountable through periodic elections. This focus is informed by the fact that electoral accountability is the aspect that con- nects directly with the primary focus of this study, that is, political DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 143 accountability and democratic governance. In this case, citizens constitute the principal and the government, defined loosely to encompass both the ruling and opposition parties striving to outdo each other during election periods, the agent. During such periods, citizens tend to pronounce their verdict not only on the exercise of power granted to the government in power as a form of trust, but also their assessment of the potentials of alternative government in waiting, the opposition. At the heart of these patterns of exchanges in state–society relations lies the crucial subject of political participation. This is because generally, ‘participation is a prime criterion for defining the democratic citizen and his or her role within the political process’ (Dalton 2006: 2). Verba and Nie (1972:2–3) define political participation as behaviour designed to affect the choice of governmental personnel and/or policies. For Kaase and Marsh, political participation entails ‘all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system’. In a more expanded version, Nelson (1979:8)defines political participation as an ‘action of private citizens intended to influence the actions or the composition of national or local government’. In yet another attempt to expand the definition, Booth and Seligson (1978:6)define political participation as ‘behaviour influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods’. Following his review of these definitions, Conge (1988) defines of political participation as ‘individual or collective action at the national or local level that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding allocation of public goods ...the action can be verbal or written ...violent or non-violent ...can be of any intensity’ (Conge 1988: 147). What these definitions reveal is that political participation is, in itself, multifaceted, including membership of political party, involvement in political campaigns, contributions to political debates, funding political activities, contesting elections, among others, all of which can be expressed in different ways, including peacefully or violently, induced or voluntary and so on. This suggests that participation must, of necessity, exhibit some attributes for it to fulfil its democratic utility. One attribute that is particularly relevant here relates to the independence/autonomy of actions. Dalton (2006:6)defines autonomy as involving ‘the citizen’s role in being sufficiently informed about government to exercise a participatory role’, including participation in democratic deliberation and discuss politics with other citizens, and ideally understand the views of others. 144 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015

It follows, logically, that political accountability and participation constitute important elements of our citizenship. Both provide critical linkage in state–society relations regarding the social contract (Olukoshi 2011: 18). Granted that participation offers platforms for demanding accountability, and despite democratic reforms, there has been some considerable shrinking of the political space for formal and informal participation. But at times, the increasing alienation of citizens from politics, which manifests in various shoddy electoral deals, including increasing militarization of electoral politics, can turn out to be a blessing in disguise. This is because in the circumstance, citizens always tend to seek alternative arenas and modes of political debates and engagements (O’loughlin 2012: 115; Kisby and Sloam 2012). In the light of this, it is hardly surprising that Kisby & Sloam (2012:4) admonishes that in understanding political participation, it is important to appreciate ‘how each new generation comes to develop its own conception of citizenship and express itself through civic and political engagement’. Such conceptions can speak directly to the extent of political awareness and knowledge on the part of citizens. While the general tendency in the literature is to reinforce a pessimistic view of the average voter’s level of political knowledge (Rapeli 2014: 59), there can also be exceptions. As the Nigerian experience under the Fourth Republic illustrates, as will be demonstrated presently, by attempting to ‘audit’ their government through various channels, including diverse forms of political participation such as popular protests and the use of social media, in a seemingly autonomous way devoid of censorship, indirectly express some reasonable level of political awareness and knowledge. By citizens’ audit we mean the processes and the mechanisms through which citizens, as the principal, aspire to reward and/or punish the government being its agent, electo- rally. It refers to a narrower form of social audit, defined as ‘an accountability mechanism where citizens organize and mobilize to evaluate or audit government’s performance and policy decisions’ (Berthin 2011: 20). The critical questions and premise, as Berthin points out, are whether citizens have the skills, capacity and tools to effectively monitor and evaluate their governments and decision-makers. The import of the foregoing is that political accountability, especially in a democratic setting, is a-two-way traffic, demanding responsibility from both the government and the governed. On the one hand, the government has responsibility for meeting popular expectations as well as offering truthful reports about what it has done to fulfil those expectations, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 145 including the consequences of such interventions. On the other, citizens have responsibility for influencing the process of determining and defining what constitutes popular expectations of government at any point in time, as well as do anything within the ambit of the law to ensure that the government delivers on such expectations. By implication, for an effective application of this logic to the Nigerian situation, there is need for a careful articulation of what actually constitute popular expectations, that is, demand the society places on the government, what many often referred to as dividends of democracy. Against the background of severe deprivations under successive military regimes, Nigerians seemed to place so much expectations on the nascent democracy at inception, considering it as probably ‘the final solution to the country’s multifaceted problems, including political, economic, and social dislocations’ (Omotola 2013: 172). Any democracy that would offer such protection must, of necessity, be of high quality. Morlino (2009: 3–4) defines the quality of a product in terms of procedure, content and result. He goes ahead to define fivefold procedural qualities of democracy: as rule of law, electoral accountability, interinstitutional accountability, participation and competition. Content-related qualities entail what he calls the two most important democratic values, namely freedom and equality/solidarity; while the ‘quality of responsiveness’ relates to result, for example, ‘democracy’s capacity to give citizens an adequate answer by implementing public policies that correspond to their needs’ (Morlino 2009: 3). Interestingly, these three elements are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. For example, as Morlino rightly points out, ‘if the rule of law is weak, we can also expect less inter-institutional and electoral accountability’ (cited in Omotola 2013: 181). Similarly, Davies (2003:1–6) identifies six ways through which a democratic government and its officials can demonstrate responsibility for their actions and/or inactions. These are: a) Political accountability, defined as a doctrine associated with the responsibility of the rulers to defend their actions before the ruled; b) Legal accountability, which shows responsibility to obey laws, sometimes referred to as regime rule of law, the absence of which is considered injurious to democratic development; c) Fiscal accountability, that is, responsibility for public funds put in the care of public officials to show that public money has been used judiciously for public purposes, including effective public account auditing; d) Programme accountability, dealing with responsibility for executing public programmes; e) Process accountability, 146 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 which has to do with responsibility to plan, adopt and follow established procedures in administration; and f) Outcome or performance accountability, that is, responsibility for results, good or bad (also quotedinOjo2014: 100). Derivable from the aforementioned logic, the expectations of Nigerians from democratic governance include national security, including security of life and property, food security and social security; economic stability and wellbeing; respect for the rule of law; accountability and transparency in governance; free and fair elections, and several other issues generally categorized as dividends of democracy.

POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY PRIOR 1999 The challenges of democratic governance and public accountability in Nigeria are multifaceted and deep-rooted (Davies 2003; Adebanwi 2010; Enweremadu 2012). Elections represent a core component of the problem. Under the colonial government, Nigeria was unable to organize credible elections acceptable to all stakeholders in the electoral process. As Omotola (2013: 183) affirms, the colonial creation and constitutional development of Nigeria along ethnic lines, especially since the official introduction of regionalism by the Richard Constitution of 1946, and its subsequent adoption and consolidation by other constitutions that followed up till 1963, ensured the deep entrenchment of ethnic politics in the country. This has continued to have implications for national political development. It is, therefore, not surprising that the first general elections held in 1959, which ushered the country into independence in 1960, were contested, won and lost on ethnic platforms, than on party and ideological bases. The accusations and counter-accusations of electoral fraud and attendant twist and turns in the emergent government, were said to have contributed to the collapse of the First Republic in 1966 (Dudley 1973, 1982). The collapse of the Second Republic in 1983 was also partly attributed to the absence of electoral accountability in the second elections of that year (Babarinsa 2003;Joseph1987). Similar tendencies, particularly the heavy deployment of money by the two presidential candidates, namely Alhaji Bashir Tofa of the National Republican Convention (NRC) and Chief MKO Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), were also fingered in the abortion of the Third Republic in 1993. This was despite POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY PRIOR 1999 147 the conduct of a widely acclaimed election believed to have been won by Chief MKO Abiola under the platform of the SDP (Nwosu 2008). Beyond electoral accountability, however, there were also serious cases relating to the crises of fiscal, process and outcome accountability. The problem is rooted in the colonial history of the country, whose ‘excessive centralisation, concentration and personalisation of power’, as Ibrahim (2003: 313) pointed out, ‘provided for a culture of unbridled corruption and fettered democracy’. The best illustration of this was the emergence of ‘two publics in Africa’ such that while the primordial public was built on a system of accountability and control, based on moral principles, the civic public became a contested terrain for private accumulation based on amoral principles (Ekeh 1975). Public accountability was, therefore, lopsided in favour of the primordial public at the expense of the civic public. This marked the beginning of official corruption in Nigeria and the manifestation of a privatized state. A state is said to be privatized when ‘it is appropriated to the service of private interests by the dominant faction of the elite’ (cited in Omotola 2006: 217). The rise in the level of corruption in Nigeria coincided with the emergence of oil boom which started in the 1970s. The oil boom era ‘raised the stakes for the control of power at the centre, and corruption, in the guise of populist economic policies, became an explicit instrument of personal political agenda’ (Ibrahim 2003: 3). The Second Republic also collapsed for gross lack of accountability, what Richard Joseph called prebendal politics, defined as a process whereby the offices of the state were allocated and then exploited as benefits by the office holder(s) (Joseph 1987). The prebendalization of politics, or better still perversion of the political process, was legitimated by a set of political norms, according to which the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or ambition, but concurrently the satisfaction of the short-term objectives of a sub-set of the general population (Ake 1996: 42). If serious perversions were so prevalent under a supposedly democratic government, leading to the collapse of democratic republics (the first and the second), the level of contradictions under successive intervening military regimes is better imagined. It was under this heavy yoke of accountability-gap that Nigeria transited to democracy in 1999, with renewed hope for the sustainable entrenchment of accountability in governance. Whether such expectations have been fulfilled is the subject of the next section. 148 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015

A)THE STATE OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2014 We now explore four analytical themes in this discourse on the state of political accountability in Nigeria during the period under study, focusing on electoral and legal accountability, economic performance and livelihood challenges, national security challenges and citizens’ participation and political accountability. The range of issues to explore to give a near accurate picture of the level of political accountability could include other issues such as human rights and the degree of horizontal accountability including the effectiveness of legislative oversight of the executive. The exploration is limited to issues itemized earlier, which are discussed in fair detail, one after the other. Electoral and legal accountability is at the heart of democratic governance. Since 1999, the promotion of democratic values, including rule of law has been a major preoccupation of successive administrations, at least, in theory. The starting point here must, of necessity, be the conduct of elections as an important institution of democracy that demands serious accountability to the people. This is because at every stage of the process, there are established rules of electoral governance before, during and after the conduct of elections. Political accountability in a democracy, therefore, commences with the electoral processes. The extent of adherence to the rules of the game by all players counts a great deal for the democratic quality of elections, measured in terms of participation, competition and legitimacy. Whereas periodic elections have been institutionalized since 1999, with elections taking place every four years (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015), the democratic qualities of such elections, in the real sense of the term have, until recently, left more to be desired. While the 1999 and 2003 elections were fraught with one irregularity or the other, the pace of electoral malfeasance reached a crescendo with the 2007 elections, whose entire process was completely garrisoned as attested by the report of local and international election monitoring groups (Obi 2008). Among other violations, the votes of the people counted for little, if for anything at all. The elections were characterized by various forms of corruption and fraud, including widespread rigging, falsiﬁcation of results and violence. This was hardly surprising, President Obasanjo having described the exercise as ‘a do or die affair’. The 2011 elections was considered a greater improvement on previous elections, especially in terms of its overall administration A) THE STATE OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2014 149

(Gberie 2011;Egwemi2011). The noticeable improvement has been explained largely in terms of the gains that accompanied the electoral reform instituted by President Yar’Adua’s administration following the deep legitimacy crisis that attended the inauguration of his government. Admitting that the election that brought him to power in 2007 was deeply compromised, Yar’Adua promised to reform the electoral process, a promise he honoured with the setting up of the Muhammad Uwais Electoral Reform Committee (ERC). Among other gains of the ERC was the introduction of policy measures aimed at engendering the administrative and financial autonomy of the INEC. The eventual appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega as INEC’s Chairman was also a key highlight of the reform process. Under him, there appears to have been a significant improvement in the institutional reputation and public image of INEC, a development that has rubbed positively on INEC in the discharge of its responsibility. It is important to note that electoral reform could be seen as an attempt to entrench some measure of political and legal accountability, especially if the exercise yields the desired results by facilitating public trust in electoral institutions, processes and outcomes. As much as this was attained to a reasonable degree, the outcome of the elections turned out to be cata- strophic, leading to serious post-election violence in the northern part of the country, where over 1,000 people were killed during the post-election phase alone and about seventy-four thousand people (74,000) were displaced [International Crisis Group (ICG), 15 September 2011: 7). Such a development was strange, considering the fact that the election was generally considered to be an improvement on previous ones. It may not be unconnected with the zoning controversy that surrounded the emergence of President Jonathan as the presidential candidate of the PDP following the death of Yar’Adua. Worse still, the handling of post-election petitions at election tribunals/courts was also taking a long time. In the specific case of the 2007 elections, there were cases that lasted more than two years, with the declared winners already in office and prosecuting their cases with state resources, as witnessed in Ekiti, Ondo and Osun states, among others. This development tilted the environment of electoral justice disproportionately in favour of the incumbent against the opposition. By so doing, electoral and legal accountability were both compromised, given that justice delayed, as it is often said, is justice denied. With eventual determination of these three cases in favour of the then opposition, the electoral 150 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 calendar of the country has since been altered. These were apart from alleged cases of corruption of the judicial process in some of these cases. The Justice Katsina Alu-Ayo Salami saga over the tribunal in Sokoto state and subsequent accusations and counter-accusations about Osun state, were notable examples. Beyond elections, however, there are many other examples of the violation of rule of law. A notable case in point was the 2006 third- term agenda, when then President Olusegun Obasanjo attempted to elongate his tenure beyond the statutorily permitted two terms of four years each. However, conscious of its role in engendering public accountability, the people mobilized to defeat the agenda as a result of a groundswell of public opposition to it, which was championed mainly, but not exclusively, by civil society movements, including the academia, the mass media, and democracy activists, who helped to raise popular awareness about the third-term agenda and associated problems (Olurode 2006). Another example has to do with the constitutional crisis generated by the mismanagement of President Yar’Adua’s health crisis and eventual death in 2010. President Yar’Adua took ill and was flown to King Faisal Specialist Hospital in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on 23 November, 2009. His failure to transmit a letter to the National Assembly (NASS) declaring that he was proceeding on leave for health reasons, as statutorily mandated by Section 145 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999), generated a serious constitutional crisis. This prevented the then Vice President (VP), Goodluck Jonathan, to step in as Acting President. Rather than explore appropriate constitutional and political means to resolving the crisis, the National Assembly failed to act until the matter was almost getting out of hand. It took the intervention of the Save Nigeria Group (SNG), a coalition of civil society groups and notable democracy and human rights activists under the leadership of Professors Wole Soyinka and Pat Utomi and the Pentecostal Pastor, Tunde Bakare, which demanded a timely and correct resolution of the constitutional crisis, to salvage the situation. It took a hurried constitutional amendment invoking the ‘Dotrine of Necessity’ to break the constitutional logjam to enable the then Vice-President to assume the presidency in acting capacity before Umaru Yar’Adua’s ultimate demise. The fact that electoral and legal accountability in Nigeria has not lived up to expectations is evident from the 2014 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), where Nigeria is placed at the 37th place out of the B) ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND LIVELIHOOD CHALLENGES 151

52 African countries covered in the report with an average score of 45.8% and change of 0.6% over a ﬁve-year period. Speciﬁcally, Nigeria’s ranking in the relevant indicators of governance and democracy was worrisome. Under participation and human rights, for example, Nigeria ranked 23rd for participation, with a score of 52.2%; 28th and a score of 49.0% for human rights and 35th and a score of 45.7 for gender balance. Under safety and rule of law, Nigeria ranked 44th with a score of 38.1% for rule of law; and 30th with a score of 36.6% for accountability (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014).

B)ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND LIVELIHOOD CHALLENGES While it is conventional wisdom that democratic stability and survival require a threshold of economic performance, the litmus test is the extent to which it positively addresses the livelihood challenges of the citizenry. Successive governments, since 1999, have attempted to respond to the socio-economic challenges facing the country in diverse ways. However, despite policy proclamations and a number of initiatives aimed at diversifying the Nigerian economy, the oil sector remains the main asset of the economy and the fiscal basis of Nigerian federalism. To be sure, not only does oil account for about 95% of total exports, but also contributes about 80% of total government revenue. Disappointingly, increasing oil revenues were squandered by the managers of the state, which could not efficiently manage oil proceeds so as to facilitate the diversification of the Nigerian economy. Hence the continuing dominance of the oil sector and the increasing susceptibility of the economy to oil shock. A most recent illustration of this relates to the downward revision of the crude oil bench- mark for 2015 proposed in the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), submitted for the 2015 budget, due mainly to the impact of the declining global oil prices (Omotola, J. S. and C. Nyuykonge 2015). Despite the continuing dominance of the oil sector, efforts are also being made to promote the non-oil sector, especially agriculture. The Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration (1999–2007), for example, introduced anti-corruption reforms aimed at waging war against corruption. This led to the establishment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), as well as the Due Process and Public Procurement Act (Enweremadu 2012; Adebanwi and Obadare 2010; Adebanwi 2010; Omotola 2006). The administration also initiated some poverty 152 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 eradication programmes, most notably the Poverty Alleviation (later Eradication) Programme (PAP to PEP), introduced in 2000 as a temporary anti-poverty scheme mainly to reduce the problem of unemployment and hence raise effective demand in the economy, increase the level of productivity of the economy; and drastically reduce the embarrassing crime wave in the country; the National Anti-Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) aimed at the provision of ‘strategies for the eradication of absolute poverty in Nigeria’, the achievement of sustainable macro- economic growth through the elimination of waste and inefficiency; promotion of good governance, infrastructural development and deregulation of basic services, among others, as well as the banking sector’s recapitalization and consolidation initiative under Professor Soludo’s governorship of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). Another policy intervention of the administration was the introduction of the National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS), replicated at state (SEEDS) and local (LEEDS) government levels. NEEDS rests on four key strategies, including reforming government and institutions. Here, the concern is to restructure, right size, reprofessionalize and strengthen government and public institutions to deliver effective services to the people. It also aims to eliminate waste and inefficiency, and free up resources for investment in infrastructure and social services by government. It also seeks to fight corruption, ensure greater transparency, promote rule of law and strict enforcement of contracts. Another important strategy of NEEDS was to purportedly grow the private sector as the engine room of growth and wealth creation, employment generation and poverty reduction. In this regard, the government is to serve as an enabler, the facilitator and the regulator. Third, NEEDS is people-centred, seeking to implement a social charter, with emphasis on people’s welfare, health, education, employment, poverty-reduction, empowerment, security and participation. Hence, a key strategy of the social charter is inclusiveness and empowerment. The fourth key strategy of the NEEDS is value-reorientation. The central message here is that ‘it is not business as usual’.Hence,itsemphasison anti-corruption measures, fight against the advance fee fraudsters and strive towards greater transparency in public and private financial trans- actions (see Soludo 2004). In its own attempt to be responsive to the socio-economic needs of Nigerians, President Yar’Adua’s administration introduced a Seven-Point Agenda, aimed at addressing the crisis of power and energy, food security, B) ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND LIVELIHOOD CHALLENGES 153 wealth creation, transport sector reform, land reforms, security and education. In addition, there were what the government called two special interest issues, namely the Niger Delta and disadvantaged groups such as the ethnic minority groups. A typical intervention here includes the Niger Delta Amnesty Programmes aimed at (i) stoppage of disruptions to oil production; (ii) increase in government rents; and (iii) the possibility of the economic growth and development of the region, with a predominant anchor on infrastructural development (LaMonica et al. 2014; Obi and Rustad 2011). President Goodluck Jonathan built its socio-economic interventions upon what it labelled as ‘Transformation Agenda’. Although not systematically articulated with a clear vision, the agenda aimed at the diversification of the Nigerian economy and by so doing arrest the heavy reliance on the oil sector by systematically building the non-oil sectors, including agriculture, power, petroleum and infrastructure. In the power sector, reform measures were aimed at ensuring stable power supply by improving the capacity for power generation and distribution across the country. Similar reform measures in the oil sector, especially the local content initiative and the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), if effectively implemented, can also engender opportunities and investments, particularly in the upstream and midstream sectors. The PIB was aimed at creating conducive business environment for the petroleum industry, enhancing the benefit to the Nigerian people from the exploitation of the country’s petroleum resources, optimizing domestic gas supply for Nigeria’s energy and industrial needs, establishing a progressive fiscal framework that can stimulate both private investment and public revenues, promoting the commercialization, liberalization and deregulation of the sector, creating a transparent and effective regulatory framework, promoting the development of Nigerian content in the petroleum industry, and generally developing an economically viable and environmentally sustainable petroleum industry in the country (Omorogbe 2013). Overall, these interventions would appear to have recorded some measure of success that could have resulted in improved livelihood for Nigerians. The most recent illustration of this claim would be the recent rebasing of Nigeria’s GDP for the period 1990–2010, resulting in an 89% increase in the estimated size of the Nigerian economy, which elevated the country to the status of the largest economy in Africa, with an estimated nominal GDP of USD 510 billion. This is far ahead of South Africa’s currently estimated nominal GDP of USD 352 billion. Also worthy of 154 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 note is the fact that much of the nominal GDP expansion was not linked to the driving role of the oil sector. The exercise rather reveals a more diversified economy than previously envisaged. Among other critical sectors, the service industry, Nollywood (Nigerian film industry) and telecommunications have emerged as important contributors to GDP and national income. Despite this appreciable feat, some critical concerns about the socio- economic status of the country abound. The first relates to the inability to translate socio-economic growth into socio-economic development. Despite the GDP growth, the real economy has not changed in any fundamental sense. Poverty and horizontal inequality, widening gap between the rich and the poor, youth unemployment, rising inflation and general underdevelopment of infrastructures remain key features of the socio-economic landscape. Specifically, despite Nigeria’s rebased GDP, its GDP per capita or per capita income in 2013 stands at $3,010 compared to Mauritius’ $9,210, South Africa’s $6,618 and Algeria’s $5,361 (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014). Despite GDP growth, the nation’s external reserve into the Excess Crude Account has been grossly depleted, external debt is rising again, and investment climate is unfavour- able due to the high costs of doing business in Nigeria, including endemic corruption and unstable power supply, among others (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014). Overall unemployment rate in Nigeria was 23.9% in 2011, with observable regional disparities in unemployment rate in Nigeria ranging from 33% in north-eastern region to about 8% in Lagos state. Also in 2011, life expectancy was 51.9 years, with an adult literacy rate of 61.3%, compared to 57.7 years’ life expectancy, and an adult literacy rate of 67% for Africa. While the problem is multifaceted, the gross lack of fiscal accountability would appear to be the strongest factor militating against the socio- economic development of Nigeria and the guarantee of human security encompassing physical, economic, social and food security for the majority of the Nigerian people. This is hardly surprising considering the endemic culture of corruption and impunity that has been the lot of Nigeria since Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999. The scandalous and systemic nature of corruption since 1999 has been the subject of many studies, revealing mindless looting of national treasury across various institutions of government. The seemingly endless scams in the petroleum ministry and the NNPC superintended by Deziani Allison-Madueke under Jonathan’s administration, including the N10 billion allegedly spent on a chartered C) NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 155 jet and the $20 million declared missing/unaccounted from the coffers of the NNPC by the then CBN Governor, Sanusi Lamido, elevated the problem to a dizzying height. The situation is so bad that the NNPC was found not to be accountable to any institution (Federal Republic of Nigeria, FRN 2010). Rather than submit to the probe set up by the House of Representatives to prove their innocence, both parties had resorted to delay tactics by going to court to challenge the legality of the probe. The scam in the Aviation Ministry involving the Minister, Stella Oduah, which came to be known as ‘Oduagate’, was also revealing. ‘Oduagate’ involves the controversial purchase, in October 2013, of two bullet-proof BMW cars by the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority (NCAA) for official usage of Minister of Aviation Stella Oduah, at the cost of N255 million. For a very long time, the government turned deaf ears to public outcry for thorough investigations of these cases. Unfortunately, the various anti-corruption institutions, including the ICPC and EFCC, have proven to be ineffective in dealing with the problem (Enweremadu 2012; Adebanwi 2010; Omotola 2006). Apart from internal contradictions associated with some of these agencies such as internal corruption and capacity deficit, the judiciary has also been fingered in the ineffectiveness of these agencies in fulfilling its mandates (Enweremadu 2012). Little wonder, the 2014 Mo IIAG ranked Nigeria poorly with respect to socio-economic development. Specifically, in terms of sustainable economic opportunity, which constitutes a crucial aspect of governance, Nigeria ranked 18th with a score of 55.2% for public management; 31st with a score of 44.8% for business environment; 44th with a score of 19.6% for infrastructure; and 27th with a score of 55.6% for rural sector. With respect to human development, the report shows that Nigeria occupied 25th with a score of 52.6% for human welfare; 32nd with a score of 45.8% for education and 47th with a score of 60.4% for health (Mo Ibrahim Foundation 2014).

C)NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES Using the notion of national security in the conventional literature without more recent emphasis on human security as a measure of democratic accountability leaves one in no doubt that Nigeria’s democracy has performed below expectation. Nigeria has always been a theatre of instability and insecurity for years. In its recent history, the country has been plagued by a rising spate of identity-based conflict rooted in ethno-regional, 156 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 religious and communal dimensions; resource-based conflict as in the case of the oil-rich Niger Delta; the Boko Haram insurgency ravaging the north-eastern part of the country; and escalating rural banditry in the northern part of the country, all of which have taken heavy tolls on the struggle for sustainable democracy and development. Ethno-regional and communal conflicts in Nigeria have been driven by a number of factors, most notably the political manipulation and transformation of identity by the power elite, horizontal inequality, competition for resources and internal contradictions within ethno-regional and religious formations (see Onwuzuruigbo 2010, 2011). Such conflicts have claimed many lives in their thousands, with properties worth billions of Naira destroyed. Similar factors, together with other political economy considerations and external interests have also been deployed in the explanation of the Boko Haram insurgency (Oyeniyi 2014; Onuoha 2010). Rural banditry has also been another major source of insecurity in the country, affecting the political economy negatively, including loss of lives and property. Agitation politics and militancy in the Niger Delta has been a contentious site of oil and environmental politics, where the mismanagement of oil resources has engendered protracted violence in the struggle for resource control and environmental justice. Other major sources of insecurity are rooted in criminal activities such as armed robbery, piracy, oil bunkering and pipeline vandalization, as well as kidnapping for ransom; all with heavy tolls on national security. Given the centrality of national security to the core responsibility of any government and the fulfilment of individual potentials, successive governments since 1999 have devised policy and practical responses to the problem. In the case of ethno-regional and religious conflicts, the strategy has been the adoption of institutional devices for promoting ethno-regional and religious balancing in government establishments/institutions. The constitutional adoption of secularism and federal character principles (first introduced in the 1979 constitution of Nigeria and has been retained in all successive constitutions till today), which sought to ensure fair representation of all groups in public institutions, remains an example. In some specific instances, commissions/panels of inquiry have been set up to ascertain the remote and immediate causes of conflict, as was the case with the 2011 post-election violence. With respect to agitation for resource control and environmental justice in the Niger Delta, notable institutional responses include the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission, the creation of a distinct Ministry of Niger D) CITIZEN’S PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITIES 157

Delta Affairs and the Amnesty programme. For the Boko Haram, there was the declaration of a state of emergency in three northern states, namely Adamawa, Borno and Yobe and military actions against the insurgency. However, despite these interventions, the problem of insecurity continues to afﬂict the country. For example, the Boko Haram insurgency alone was said to have created, as at August 2014, about 650,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and many refugees across the borders (cited in Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015). In fact, in Borno and Yobe states, the two most affected states by the insurgency, ‘over 10,000 inhabitants of these states have become refugees in the Republic of Cameroon’ (Egwu 2014). In one account, it has been revealed that Boko Haram insurgency has led to more than 100,000 Nigerians seeking refuge in Niger’s Diffa region since the beginning of 2014; while in another it was estimated that there were 44,000 Nigerian refugees in Cameroon and 2,700 in Chad (cited in Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015). If anything, the excruciating spate of insecurity in the country constitutes an indictment on the government. Above all else, national insecurity portrays the government as unaccountable and irresponsible, given that security constitutes one of the most important responsibilities of any government. In the absence of security, the socio-economic and political initiatives of the government are bound to suffer, if not fail all together. In the ﬁnal analysis, it is the people, the primary stakeholders of governance that will be at the receiving end in terms of general underdevelopment, rising poverty and loss of lives and property.

D)CITIZEN’S PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITIES A very useful measure highlighted here is the degree of citizens’ participation and the extent they are able to hold the state and its institutions to account. In their own attempt to hold their government and public officials accountable, Nigerians have responded in diverse ways. The first and most basic form of their response pertains to participation in politics, which in the least, manifests in voting during elections. Such moments offer opportunities for citizens to pass judgement on the government in power and at the same time make a pronouncement on the government in waiting, namely the opposition party. While this means of making the government accountable were deployed in 2003, 2007, 2011, its effectiveness was marginal, given the ineffectiveness of electoral governance, 158 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015 which allowed the processes to be rigged against the populace. During this period, the votes hardly counted in the true sense of the term. Owing to the gross lack of electoral integrity, elections tend to be perverted as instruments of entrenching political accountability. As such, it became difficult, if not impossible, to know if election outcomes were true reflections of popular will and, by extension, the popular verdict on government performance. However, building on the gains recorded in the 2011 elections, following the application of the approved recommendations of the ERC, the 2015 electoral process recorded greater heights in terms of its overall democratic qualities and integrity. Effectively administered as much as possible in an atmosphere devoid of violence, at least compared to previous elections, Nigerians were able to make their votes count. For the first time since 1999, there was alternation of power from PDP, the ruling party, to the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC). Without any doubt, the alternation could be given two interpretations in terms of political accountability on the part of the citizens. First, it could be seen as a reflection of popular disaffection and verdict on the government of the day, which has been in power since 1999. Second and by logical extension, the alternation represents the clearest evidence of the absence of political accountability on the part of the government. In other words, it was a way of saying that the government has not been sufficiently responsive and answerable to the people, hence the decision to vote it out. The citizens have also expressed the willingness to hold the government accountable through civil activism and protests. Notable examples include the mass mobilization against the third-term agenda in 2006; the nationwide protest against the sudden increase of fuel pump prices in January 2012 in the name of removal of fuel subsidy; the protest against the refusal to make then VP Jonathan Acting President following the disappearance of then President Yar’Adua; and most recently, the protest to demand for the rescue of the Chibok girls kidnapped by the Boko Haram in April 2013 under the auspices of the bring-back-our-girls movement. In some instances, these popular interventions have yielded positive gains, forcing some concessions from the government. But in some other instances, they have not been able to deliver on their promises. Irrespective of their outcomes, however, the most basic thing is that such interventions reveal the existence of a vibrant civil society that is not only aware and conscious of its role in promoting political accountability, but also willing and able to explore available avenues to demand it. CONCLUSION 159

In all these processes, the role of the social media has been crucial. The social media, apart from providing a tool for coordination without censorship, has also aided the effective mobilization of the people in support of such interventions. Online accessories such as twitter, Facebook and many others have proved to be viable instruments.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, an attempt has been made to examine the state of political accountability in Nigeria between 1999 and 2014. The analysis reveals that while the successive governments have taken steps to entrench political accountability, the execution of such interventions has not been adequately imbued with the required level of political will to yield the desired results. The import of this is that official interventions aimed at promoting one form of accountability or the other have been accompanied by mixed results, some positive and others, negative. While the war against corruption through institutional designs such as the ICPC and EFCC, for example, is important, it has not been able to effect any fundamental change in the structure of corruption in the country due to inherent internal contradictions in the institutions. Similarly, the PIB offers prospects for redressing contradictions in the oil sector and repositioning the sector for greater height, the undue protraction in passing the bill till date would appear to have added troubling twists and turns to its prospects. The time lag has allowed antagonists to the bill to muster more resources to lobby against the timely passage of the bill in its original form. The citizens too have always demonstrated some measure of political awareness and consciousness in demanding accountability from the government. Their participation in politics through voting, civil activism and protests and the use of social media tools such as twitter and Facebook are instructive. Despite these advances, however, there is room for improvement. The fact that national security situation remains deplorable, with telling impact on socio-economic development of the country, including rising unemployment, poverty and general underdevelopment, suggests that political accountability remains poor. If this is so, it means that both the official and unofficial responses have not lived up to expectations. The key lesson that comes across boldly from the narrative is that political accountability imposes a responsibility on both the government and the governed. Unless both parties play their distinct but interdependent roles effectively, the attainment of political accountability may be a mirage. 160 7 DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, 1999–2015

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Electoral Reform and Electoral Administration, 1999–2015

INTRODUCTION Until recently, Nigeria’s electoral processes have been deeply enmeshed in serious crises and contradictions. These contradictions manifest in diverse forms, notably the ineffectiveness of election administration, itself a product of many factors, including gross lack of capacity and autonomy on the part of the election management body (EMB), that is, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). There were also noticeable weaknesses associated with other socio-political institutions involved in electoral governance such as political parties, the legislature, the judiciary and the security agencies. Together, the contradictions of these vital institutions combined to frustrate the actualization of the democratic qualities of elections deﬁned in terms of participation, competition and legitimacy. For these and related reasons, a consistent student of Nigerian politics concludes that the history of elections in Nigeria is that of ‘electoral fraud and competitive rigging’ (Ibrahim 2007: 1). Consequently, rather than serving as a democratic asset, elections in Nigeria, particularly under the Fourth Republic, tragically became democratic liabilities (Omotola 2009, 2010;Kew2010). The trouble with Nigeria’s electoral processes reached unacceptable levels during the 2007 elections, whose administration was arguably the worst in the annals of Nigeria’s electoral history. The elections were characterized by all sorts of electoral fraud and violence, resulting in a deepening crisis of legitimacy (Adebayo and Omotola 2007; Obi 2008; Amuwo 2009). The high level of public outcry denouncing the processes

© The Author(s) 2017 165 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_8 166 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015 and outcomes of the elections may have compelled the emergent government of the late President Yar’Adua to concede that the elections were truly far short of international standards. His response was a promise to initiate an electoral reform process that would help remedy the problem and chart alternative pathways for the effectiveness of electoral administration in the country. A commitment to this promise led to the setting up of the Justice Muhammed Uwais’ Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) in 2007, whose recommendations, together with other changes in the constitutional and legal frameworks of electoral administration, as well as internal reforms and innovations carried out by INEC, were instrumental to the marked improvement in Nigeria’s electoral environment. These developments and perceptions, especially the decision to initiate the reform process and the thinking that such reforms have had positive impact on election administration in the country should not be surprising. After all, the mainstream literature draws attention to the positive impact that sustainable electoral reforms could make in many respects. Among others, electoral reform is said to be endowed with a capacity to engender public trust in electoral institutions and increase confidence in electoral processes and outcomes. By logical extension, sustainable electoral reform is capable of addressing contradictions in the institutional frameworks of electoral administration, thereby facilitating the effectiveness of the process and enhancing the prospects of boosting the democratic qualities of elections in all ramifications. It is, however, pertinent to note that the impact of electoral reform is not as straightforward as it ordinarily seems. Depending on specific reform measures, electoral reforms could have diverse political consequences, including for participation and voter’sturn- out, parliamentary activities, electoral processes and outcomes and trust in electoral institutions (Green and Gerber 2004; Johnson et al. 2006). In some other instances, electoral reforms have been known to produce mixed results – the positive and the negative. Specifically, Rigby and Springer (2001) find in their study of the consequences of electoral reform in the US that ‘some electoral reforms promote equality, while others further stratify the electorate, particularly when state registration rolls are already unrepresentative in terms of income groups’. Similarly, in the case of Canada, electoral reforms especially those that promote proportional representation, will help smaller parties increase the number of female representatives, increase turnout and improve attitude towards politics, yet he found no consistent evidence that the electoral reforms would produce such changes. In another interesting study, Berinsky (2005) concludes that WHY ELECTORAL REFORMS MATTER 167 electoral reforms aimed at enhancing voter’s turnout in the US ended complicating the problem by increasing socio-economic biases in the composition of the voting public. In Belgium, Hooghe et al. (2005) found that reforms affecting the electoral law affect both the electoral behaviour of voters and political parties, including the party finance and party strategy. It is partly for the inconsistency in trends of the consequences of electoral reforms that Stein et al. (2003) contend that ‘the effectiveness of electoral reforms is contingent upon the strategic behavior of elites. Without strategic decisions by elites to use electoral reforms to their advantage, electoral reforms will be unrelated to voter turnout’. In the light of the seeming confusion in the comparative literature on the consequences of electoral reform which, according to Omotola (2011), ‘limits generalisational capabilities on the subject’, it seems more rewarding to focus on specific cases of reform, as this chapter attempts to do on Nigeria. The primary concern of the chapter is to critically interrogate the electoral reform process since 1999 with a view to identifying the reform measures and their impact on election administration in Nigeria under the Fourth Republic. The chapter opens with brief theoretical reflections on the importance of electoral reform, including the sources of the pressure for electoral reform in Nigeria. This is followed by an analysis of the various reform measures that have been introduced since 1999. Electoral reform has many dimensions, including reforming the electoral law, the electoral geography (e.g. redrawing constituency boundaries), electoral and party systems, the EMB, among others. In the Nigerian case, the reforms generally have been targeted at instituting a strong EMB with substantial administrative and financial autonomy, promoting a democratic political culture within parties and the populace; and internal adjustments and innovations within INEC to boost its professionalism, impartiality and effectiveness. The third section examines the impact/consequences of electoral reforms on the electoral processes in Nigeria. The concluding section reexamines the main arguments and then offers some policy prescriptions.

WHY ELECTORAL REFORMS MATTER In the comparative literature on democratization in general and election administration in particular, it has been argued that institutional designs matter for effective election administration and democratic consolidation (Elklit and Reynolds 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; International IDEA 2006; Birch 2008). For example, Hartlyn et al. (2008:75),intheir 168 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015 comparative study of Latin America to test the significance of electoral governance to the consolidation of democracy, established ‘an important positive role for professional, independent electoral commissions on electoral outcomes’, showing that ‘formal-legal independence matters when the rules of the game are likely to be respected’. In addition, they found that ‘low-quality elections are found disproportionately where incumbents seek re-election and where victory margins are extremely wide rather than nar- row’. Similarly, International IDEA (2006) buttresses this position when it posits that winners and losers can accept electoral processes and results as binding provided elections are effectively administered, which is only possible if the EMB has autonomy, measured basically in terms of its structure, composition, funding and capability. In a related vein, Diamond (2008:25) observes that elections can only satisfy their democratic potentials if they are: (a) administered by a neutral authority; (b) when the electoral administration is sufficiently competent and resourceful to take specificprecau- tions against fraud; (c) when the police, military and courts treat competing candidates and parties impartially; (d) when contenders all have access to the public media; (e) when electoral districts and rules do not grossly handicap the opposition; (f) when the secret of the ballot is protected; (g) when virtually all adults can vote; (h) when procedures for organizing and counting the votes are widely known; and (i) when they are transparent and impartial procedures for resolving election complaints and disputes. Until recently, all these requisites were either missing or in short supply in the Nigerian context, exemplified by the institutional deficiencies of INEC, especially its lack of professionalism and independence, as well as the low quality of Nigerian elections, which have been well documented (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006;Akhaine2011;Omotola2010). The quality of an election has been defined in terms of ‘the extent to which political actors see the entire electoral process as legitimate and binding’ (Elklit and Reynolds 2002: 86–87). But in Nigeria, elections have increasingly lost their democratic contents and relevance due largely to the breach of the social contract between the governed and the government that elections ordinarily symbo- lize (Kew 2010). While the problem has been a recurrent theme in successive elections in Nigeria, it reached a disconcerting height during the 2007 ‘garrisoned’ electoral processes and outcomes. Among others, the 2007 elections were characterized by unprecedented bitter contestation, disputes and protests over the processes and outcomes. As studies have revealed, from the conduct of the elections alone, there were 1,290 election petitions. The presidential election had eight, the gubernatorial 105, the Senate 150, the ELECTORAL REFORM MEASURES SINCE 1999 169

House of Representatives 331 and the State House of Assembly 656. But when the electoral process is treated as a cycle rather than a speciﬁc event of activities on the election day, then the 1,250 cases recorded amount to just a tip of the iceberg. In an astonishing report, The Herald, a national daily newspaper, reveals that the 2007 elections recorded an alarming 6,180 cases throughout the electoral process (Lawal 2008: 1 and 23). Moreover, several results were annulled in several states and at different levels, including the gubernatorial elections in Kogi, Edo, Kebbi, Sokoto, Adamawa, Ekiti, Osun and Ondo states (see Omotola 2009, 2011). Finally, it is also important to note that the pressure for electoral reform has largely been from within, with opposition political parties, civil society organizations and the electorate – the leading voices. As Omotola (2011) points out, in the aftermath of the 2007 elections, leading opposition parties, particularly the ACN and ANPP were miffed about the increasing undermining of their efforts by the ineffectiveness of the INEC, which conferred undue advantage on the ruling PDP. Pro-democracy activists and civil society groups too were determined to ensure that a capable EMB was instituted to conduct free, fair and credible elections, where the votes will actually count. For example, during its protest about the health crisis of late President Yar’Adua and the refusal by the National Assembly to make the then Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan the acting president, one of the three demands of the Save Nigeria Group (SNG), a coalition of civil society groups and notable democracy and human rights activists, was a ‘quick and thorough implementation of the Uwais Report on reform starting with the immediate removal of Professor Maurice Iwu as Chairman and the reconstitution of INEC with some persons of impeccable integrity and competence’.

ELECTORAL REFORM MEASURES SINCE 1999 As noted earlier, electoral reforms in Nigeria have generally been targeted at fostering the independence of the EMB and promoting a democratic political culture within political parties. The essence is to evolve a strong institutional basis of politics capable of effectively governing the electoral process and regulating the behaviour of political actors. In what follows, this section explores the various initiatives that have been devised to reform the electoral processes in the country. In particular, we focus on three explanatory themes, namely reform of the Constitutional and Legal Frameworks of election administration, the Justice Muhhammed Uwais’ ERC and Internal Reforms and Innovations by INEC. 170 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015

REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION Generally, the legal frameworks for election administration in Nigeria are codified into two main documents, namely the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the various electoral acts, but often supplemented by other regulatory instruments such as guidelines, legal precedence and codes of conduct, all of which ‘must be unequivocal in policy goals and thematic directions that should facilitate the functions of the EMB in its engagements with all stakeholders, such as allowing for successful delineation of electoral constituencies, defining contestable positions, eligibility of candidates, and clearly defining the roles and ethical expectations of election managers’ (Igini 2015: 1). For any law to be able to do these effectively, such laws must, according to the ACE Project (2010; cited in Igini 2015:2) satisfy certain qualities including clarity and absence of ambiguity, clear delineation of powers and responsibilities of national and local electoral management bodies, early and proper enactment of relevant legislation, and adequate provision for complaints and dispute resolution. Since 1999, several changes have been made to the legal frameworks of election administration with a view to ensuring that they measure up to the foregoing requirements and thereby strengthen the administration of elections and deepen the democratization process. For example, the transitional election in 1999 under the military tutelage of Gen. Abdulsalam Abubakar, was regulated by the Transition to Civil Rule (Political Programme) Decree No. 34 of 1998; the National Assembly (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 5 of 1998; and The presidential election (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 6 of 1999. Although there were contentions regarding the adequacy or otherwise of these legal documents, the overriding preoccupation with getting the military out of power would appear to have overshadowed the premium that could have been attached to such considerations. Since then, the legal frameworks of election administration have been overhauled on a number of occasions. For example, the 1999 Constitution (and now as amended in 2010), has since replaced all the 2008 decrees. Similarly, Electoral Act has since been passed and amended first in 2001, then the 2002 Electoral Act, followed by that of 2006 through the latest one, the Electoral Act of 2010 (as amended) under which the 2015 elections were conducted. While the 1999 Constitution provided for the establishment, composition and powers of INEC, the Electoral Act specifies, among others, REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ... 171 guidelines for the registration of voters, procedures for the conduct of elections, registration and regulation of political parties and determination of electoral offences. Other issues addressed in the Electoral Act include the regulation of party finance, party primaries, media access, constituency delineation, polling units creation, party finances, time for commencement of campaigns and party nomination (Igini 2015). In the amendment to the 1999 Constitution in 2010 following the report of the ERC, the constitution further empowered the administrative and financial autonomy of INEC by charging its budget and the salaries of its chair and members to the Consolidated Revenue Fund. The amendment also addressed issues such as the timing of elections, the jurisdiction of the courts in determining election petitions, the composition of election petition tribunals and the time limits for determining election petitions, among others (Akinduro 2014). Although controversies still subsist regarding some of these provisions and their applications, for example the controversy over the attempt by INEC to invoke its powers over the creation of polling units shortly before the 2015 elections, including litigation to challenge the exercise, it will not be totally out of place to claim that these legal reforms had some positive moderating effects on the effective administration of the 2015 elections. Among other benefits, the new legal environment, despite abiding concerns and calls for further reforms, especially the issue about INEC’s power to disqualify a candidate nominated by a political party or not, simplified the administration of the 2015 elections. Even INEC, in November 2012, proposed further amendments to the legal frameworks as part of preparations for the 2015 elections, including voting by Nigerians in the Diaspora, the establishment of an Electoral Offences Commission (EOC) and an Electoral Offences Tribunal, the nomination of candidates, campaign funding, the regulation of voting procedures, the right of the commission to disqualify candidates, women’s participation in politics, and constituency delimitation, among others (Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, 2015). As recent as June 2015, shortly before his final exit from office, Professor Attahiru Jega still advocated the need for further reform of the electoral legal framework. The new demands suggest there is room for improvement.

The Justice Muhammed Uwais’ ERC In the aftermath of the ‘muddled’ (Suberu 2007) and ‘garrisoned’ (Omotola 2009) elections of 2007, which generated huge popular outcry 172 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015 locally and internationally, President Yar’Adua, in his inaugural speech of 29 May, 2007, promised to initiate an electoral reform process to redress observable lapses. Pursuant to this promise, the president began the reform process with the inauguration of a 23-man ERC on 28 August 2007, with a comprehensive mandate to evolve an electoral process that will enable us to anchor democracy as the framework for national integration, sustained growth and national development. The ERC consists of some notable and credible Nigerians, including a former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Muhammed Uwais as Chairman, and also representative of diverse interests, including the civil society, mass media, academia, women, trade unions and professionals. In fulfilling its mandates, the ERC conducted public hearings across the country, and in the process collated memoranda from diverse stakeholders. Specifically, the ERC received a total of 1,466 memoranda from the general public. It also held public hearings in two capital cities in each of the six geo-political zones and the Federal Capital Territory during which a total of 907 presentations were made. This created the impression not only that the ERC enjoys some level of autonomy, which is important for the effectiveness of its activities, but also that the government seems to have genuine intention to reform the electoral process (Omotola 2011). Elsewhere Omotola (2011: 196–200), notes that the most salient recommendations of the ERC have been duly summarized which, if well implemented, would not only guarantee the autonomy of the INEC, but also suggested options for ensuring a democratic party system, where internal party democracy will thrive. Specifically, the ERC recommends, among others, the establishment of a new, truly, non-partisan independent and impartial INEC composed of a chairman, deputy chairman and six persons of unquestionable integrity, one of whom must come from each of the six geo-political zones in the country. This is in addition to the inclusion of six other nominees comprising one nominee each from the following bodies: Labour; Nigerian Bar Association; Media; National Youth Council; Nigerian Civil Society; and Women Organizations. All the appointments will be subject to Senate confirmation. The chairman, according to the recommendations, is to be appointed through an open and transparent process whereby the National Judicial Council (NJC) should advertise the positions, spelling out requisite qualifi- cations; receive applications/nominations from the general public; shortlist three persons for each position; and send the nominations to the National REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ... 173

Council of State to select one for each position and forward to the Senate for confirmation. More importantly, the ERC recommended that the funding of INEC is to be first-line charge on the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the Federation so as to guarantee financial and administrative independence. Moreover, the ERC also made recommendations regarding the actual conduct of the elections. First, the ERC suggested an Open Secret Ballot System, which allows voters to go into a polling booth to mark their ballots in secrecy and drop them in boxes in the open as well as the accreditation of registered voters prior to the commencement of voting for the purpose of tracking how many people cast their ballots in a polling station. The ERC also recommended that voter register be displayed prior to the elections to enable registered voters, political parties and the electorate generally make claims and objections; and that election results should be announced at all polling centres by presiding officers, duly signed and copies given to accredited agents, the Police and the SSS. In order to checkmate a situation whereby declared winners of contested elections results assume office and deploy state resources to prosecute their election cases, the ERC recommended that all election petitions be discarded before swearing in of winners. This may have informed the recommendation that all electoral petitions be dealt with up to the highest appellate within a maximum period of six months, four and two months at the Tribunal and Appeal respectively. It also recommended that provisions be made for independent candidates. Other important recommendations of the ERC, as articulated by Omotola (2011), include the establishment of a Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission (PPRRC) to, among other things, register political parties, monitor their organization and operations and arrange for the annual auditing of accounts; establishment of an EOC to, among other things, deter the commission of electoral malpractices, investigate where they occur and prosecute alleged offenders; and the establishment of the Centre for Democratic Studies (CDS) to undertake broad civic and political education for legislators, political office holders, security agencies, political parties and the general public. These recommendations were widely commended by civil society groups and opposition political parties as capable of laying the foundations not only for an independent and a more effective INEC, but also for the consolidation of democracy. However, the initial hope that trailed the report soon began to wane following the foot-dragging of the government in making official pronouncements on the recommendations of the report (Omotola 174 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015

2011). By the time it eventually did, its white paper further dampened popular expectations. In the White Paper, the Federal Executive Council (FEC) rejected certain recommendations of the ERC, including the appointment of the INEC’s Chairman by the NJC, the deferment of the swearing-in of elected persons until the courts had fully disposed of petitions against them, and shifting of the onus of proof to INEC. Rather, the FEC insisted that INEC Chairman be appointed by the President, that the swearing-in of elected officials should hold on the announcement of winners and that the onus of proof remain on the petitioner. As Omotola (2011) further points out, the rejection of these crucial recommendations of the ERC raises questions about government’s commitment to fundamental reform of the electoral process. Opposition parties, notably the then Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN); All Nigeria People Party (ANPP); Democratic People’s Alliance (DPA); and the Conference of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP), the umbrella body for Nigerian parties, as well as leading civil society groups, including the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC); Alliance for Credible Election (ACE); Transition Monitoring Group (TMG); Electoral Reform Network (ERN); Citizen’s Forum for Constitutional Reform (CFCR); Gender for Constitutional Reform Network (GCRN); and the National Coalition on Affirmative Action (NCAA), spoke against the rejection (Akintunde 2010, cited in Omotola 2011). In spite of the popular outcry that attended the white paper, the government proceeded with the reform process. The first major step was the appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega, a respected political scientist and democracy activist, as the Chairman of INEC, a decision that was widely commended based on the credibility and past records of Jega in previous national positions/assignments. The financial autonomy of INEC was also guaranteed by charging its funding directly to the consolidated funds, which allows it to prepare its budget and defend the same before the parliament. With these two important changes, INEC was able to commence preparation for the elections, beginning with the voter’s registration exercise. It is, however, important that some of the proposed reform measures required constitutional amendments to become operational. This necessitated the review of the Electoral Act 2006 to accommodate some of these and related changes. Therefore, the new 2010 Electoral Act was amended to accommodate the proposed changes, such as the new order/sequen- cing of elections, as well as a provision banning carpet crossing once a candidate had won on the platform of a political party. Unlike in the past REFORM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ... 175 when such an action attracted no penalty, any candidate that contravened it under the new Electoral Act would forfeit his/her seat in parliament and stand for fresh elections under his new political party.

Internal Reforms and Innovation by INEC to Build Administrative Capacity INEC, under Professor Jega complemented the foregoing external reform measures with some far-reaching internal adjustments and innovations aimed at boosting its administrative capacity and effectiveness. Arguably, given that the time between Jega’s appointment and the 2011 elections was very short, not much internal reorganization and changes were feasible. However, the relative success of the 2011 elections heightened expectations about INEC, thereby placing it under stricter public scrutiny (Orji 2014: 127). Aware of such heightened expectations, INEC began making efforts to remove obstacles to the success of the 2015 elections. Between the 2011 and 2015 elections, the commission initiated ‘reforms aimed at improving its structure, planning and policymaking capacities’. Among other interventions, as Orji (2014: 127) reveals, the commission ‘implemented a comprehensive restructuring of its bureaucracy, proposed a series of changes to the election legal framework, developed a comprehensive business-process mapping, and developed a new communication policy’. In another incisive piece, Egwu (2014:3)identifies some other salient reform interventions by INEC as (1) Increased public confidence in the electoral process following the outcome of the 2011 general elections and the series of governorship elections despite the signs of relapse in the Anambra governorship election; (2) Continued refinement and improvement on the Electoral Roll that had over 70 million registered voters with the rolling out of Continuous Voter Registration (CVR) and issuance of Permanent Voters Card (PVC), to terminate the latter by December 2014; (3) INEC’s internal review and lessons learned from the 2011 elections that informed a five-year strategic plan and the rolling out of Election Project Plan, Election Management System, improved stakeholders’ engagement (political parties, civil society, security agencies and the National Youth Service Corps) (also cited in Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015). The revitalization of the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) into a vibrant platform for addressing interparty concerns, including conflicts, was also very crucial to the entire process. All these were preceded and possibly predicated upon the report of the Adele Jinadu Registration 176 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015 and Election Review Committee (RERC), which reviewed the registration and election of 2011 (Oyekanmi 2015). Together, these internal adjustments had some positive impact on the capacity and effectiveness of INEC in planning and executing the 2015 elections. It is important to note that contributions of the RERC under the Chairmanship of Professor Adele Jinadu, especially in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections were pivotal to INEC’s internal reform processes. Essentially, the RERC was established to: (a) appraise all the operational processes of voter registrations and elections, including planning, organization and coordination and evaluation of activities focusing on such issues as logistics, procurement and delivery of materials, deployment of personnel and so on; (b) assess the legal framework for the conduct of elections with a view to addressing some of the key challenges that had arisen in the course of both the registration and elections; (c) examine the role, performance and especially the overall administrative procedures and channels within and between departments in the coordination and execution of the registration and elections; (d) review the processes of party primaries and nomination of candidates during the 2011 elections and INEC monitoring of the processes; (e) comprehen- sively assess the entire process of recruitment, training, deployment, performance and remuneration of ad hoc staff during the registration of voters and elections; (f) audit the Commission’s cooperation and relations with other bodies such as MDAs, NGOs, security agencies and development partners during the registration exercise and elections; and (g) identify other issues in the registration and elections that are likely to impact on the conduct of the 2015 general elections and make appropriate recommendations (INEC 2012:2–3). In its report, based on extensive consultations with relevant stakeholders in the six geo-political zones of the country, RERC was able to identify a number of challenges associated with the operational processes of voter registration and elections in Nigeria. These include, among others (a) inadequate training of personnel, (b) late arrival of registration materials, (c) delays in distribution of materials, (d) poor technical capacity of ad hoc staff, (e) multiple/underage registration, (f) lack of public enlightenment on display of voters register, (g) logistic challenges such as inadequate storage facilities in the states, as well as inadequate vehicles in some state headquarters and local government areas, and (h) challenges relating to polling, counting, collation, announcement and transmission of results (INEC 2012:11–12). ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL REFORMS ON ELECTIONS 177

The RERC proceeded to make some recommendations that could assist INEC in addressing the identified challenges. Specifically, its recommendations were directed at strategic operational plans, voter registration, legal frameworks for the conduct of elections with respect to voter registration, monitoring of political parties, political party finance, election petition, number of political parties/deregistration of political parties, as well as required constitutional and electoral act amendments (INEC 2012:13–16). INEC acted upon these and related recommendations, which contributed to the marked improvement in the effectiveness of the administration and overall democratic qualities of the 2015 elections.

ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL REFORMS ON ELECTIONS Two general elections have been held after these major reforms of the electoral legal frameworks: the 2011 and 2015 general elections. These elections provide the empirical bases for evaluating the impact of these reform measures, defined in terms of the overall quality of the elections. First and foremost, it is important to note that the electoral reform process was criticized at every stage. Yet, the effort would appear to have made some positive impact on the overall administration of the 2011 and 2015 elections. With respect to the 2011 elections, for example, the financial autonomy granted INEC enabled it easier access to funds, which enabled it to commence early preparations, beginning with early registration of voters. Although the registration exercise was characterized by a number of irregularities, for example, the reported missing of some imported data capture machine for the exercise and sundry logistics problems that bedevilled the early stages of the exercise such as power failure, the dysfunctionality of the machines, especially its inability to capture finger prints (most of which were rectified as the exercise progressed), the relative speed with which INEC secured the release of funds for the exercise would have been unthinkable without the reform process. Within a relatively short time, the Senate approved N87,721,961,531 (87 billion, 721 million, 961 thousand, 531 naira) requested by INEC for the 2011 general elections (Omotola 2011). The actual conduct of the 2011 elections was also generally said to have witnessed a marked improvement on previous ones both at the level of voting and counting of results (Gberie 2011; Akhaine 2011). The reports 178 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015 of international and local election observers attest to this claim (Adesina 2011). This is not to say the election was perfect. Several cases of late arrival of materials and election officers were reported in many places; the prevalence of underage voters in some states; the resort to political violence; ballot box snatching and stuffing, among others. In fact, the legitimacy of the election was challenged as the electoral outcomes were seriously contested with litigations by the leading opposition parties, namely the ACN and CPC. The most disturbing aspect was the outbreak of post-election violence in the northern part of the country, during which over 1,000 people were killed in the post-election phase and about seventy-four thousand people (74,000) were displaced (International Crisis Group, ICG, 15 September, 2011: 7). In another account, the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) reported in one of its policy briefs that during the 2011 post-election violence, ‘an estimated 938 people were killed and 735 were injured’ (2014: 2; cited in Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015). The 2015 elections were, by every account, much more effective in administration (Orji 2014; Oyekanmi 2015; Adebiyi 2015). This lofty feat was not unconnected with the reform measures across the various strata discussed earlier. The introduction of PCVs and the deployment of auto- mated card reader for the accreditation of registered voters, for example, helped to reduce the perennial problems of multiple voting, impersona- tion, manipulation and falsification of election results and many other ills of the precious elections. These innovations would not have been possible in the absence of the autonomy-enhancing features of the electoral reform process. The exceptional courage displayed by the INEC Chairman, Professor Jega (even in the face of provocations from various quarters, including frontal attacks against his person), could also have benefited from the enhanced institutional autonomy of INEC facilitated by the reforms. The significance of the reform measures, gauged by the overall quality of the 2015 elections, assumes more pertinence against the background of real forces that could thwart their effective administration. For one, the manipulation of ethno-regional identity reached new heights in the march towards the elections, making the elections to appear like a form of warfare between the north and the south. For another, the seemingly unprecedented level of elite fragmentation, also along ethno-regional and religious lines, was another source of serious concern. Worse still, the heightened politicization of the military (and other security apparatuses of the state, CONCLUSION 179 especially the Department of State Security, (DSS)) in the service of the ruling PDP also generated its own tensions. When these are added to the prevailing atmosphere of insecurity, particularly the Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria, it becomes obvious that INEC was actually confronted with an almost insurmountable task of conducting free, fair and credible elections (Omotola and Nyuykonge, 2015). Despite these challenges, INEC conducted the best elections so far in the annals of Nigeria’s electoral history. The democratic qualities of the elections were not only substantially enhanced, but also for the first time in Nigeria electoral turnover, or better still, alternation of power, was recorded: opposition’s victory in the presidential election heralded the end of PDP’s single-party dominance since 1999. Without any doubt, the reform initiatives played a major part in the attainment of this height. That these reform measures have had positive impact on the effectiveness of electoral administration and the democratization process as a whole has been supported by some empirical studies. Before the reforms discussed herein, Kerr (2013) using data on the 2007 elections, showed that Nigerians had limited or no trust in the capacity of INEC and rated it very poorly in the administration of the 2007 elections. However, after the reforms, the popular rating of INEC, both in terms of its capacity and performance, has changed. A recent study, which assessed the level of public trust in electoral institutions, particularly INEC, in terms of capacity, independence and performance, based on the 2011 elections being the first litmus test for the practical applications of the approved components of the ERC report, holding electoral reform as its independent variable, reveals substantial improvement in the popular perception of INEC in almost all ramifications (Omotola 2015). Interestingly, the study also shows cross-regional similarities in the trends of popular perception of INEC across the country. Given the widespread commendation of the 2015 elections locally and internationally, popular trust in INEC may have risen. This is an important research implication of this chapter.

CONCLUSION This chapter has undertaken a critical evaluation of the form and character, as well as the impact of electoral reforms in Nigeria since 1999. After underscoring the necessity for electoral reform, the chapter identifies three broad strands of electoral reform, namely reforms of the constitutional and legal frameworks of elections, the ERC and internal reforms and 180 8 ELECTORAL REFORM AND ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION, 1999–2015 innovations within INEC itself. While each of these categories has had specific targets and impact, together they have had some positive moderating effects on the administration of elections and overall quality of Nigeria’s democratization by election. These were possible because, among other gains, electoral reforms have boosted the administrative and financial autonomy and capacity of INEC, eroded longstanding negative perceptions about the commission thereby enhancing popular trust in the commission and promoted international support for the electoral process. While challenges abound, exemplified by demand for additional reforms, the reality of the 2015 elections shows that it is no longer business as usual. Further reform efforts are therefore required to consolidate the gains of the 2015 elections.

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Party Politics in the 2015 Nigerian Elections

INTRODUCTION The triumph of the opposition over the incumbent ruling party remains one of the most important highpoints of the 2015 general elections in Nigeria. The ruling PDP was not only defeated at the presidential level, it substantially lost to the opposition APC, its control of many states and its dominance in the National Assembly as well as many state assemblies. Scholars have attributed the success of APC to the successful coalition of political parties which came together for the major purpose of dismantling the behemoth that PDP had become. Indeed, the triumph of the opposition represents a major step in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. Before its defeat, PDP had dominated the Nigerian political landscape like a colossus. It had control over large parts of the country; produced the highest number of lawmakers and had its presence in all the local governments in the country. It prided itself as the biggest party in Africa and vowed, according to Vincent Ogbulafor, a former Chairman of the party, to rule the country for 60 years, ‘whether they like it or not’ (Ogbulafor 2008). The party’s claim was actually predicated not only on its presence in all the nooks and crannies of the country, but also in the control of all the security agencies in the country. And these forces were easily deployed during elections to advance the interest of the party. In some cases, opposition ﬁgures were restricted through diverse ways, including arrest on the eve of elections as was the case in the Ekiti and Osun gubernatorial elections in 2014. In fact, the near-total control of the security arm of the

© The Author(s) 2017 183 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_9 184 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS state made several people foreclose the possibility of wrestling power from the sitting government. But in what amounts to a landmark historical achievement, the APC was able to defeat the PDP not only at the presidential level; but also in the governorship as well as national and State Assembly elections. APC won clearly in four of the six geo-political zones in the country. It encroached on erstwhile PDP strongholds in the north-central geo-political zone and at the end of the voting exercises PDP had been reduced from being a national party to a regional party in the south-east and south-south zones. The processes leading to this unprecedented outcome deserve proper scrutiny, which is the primary focus of this chapter. The chapter proceeds from the methodological standpoint that unraveling this puzzle requires a critical interrogation of the form and character of politics in the period leading to the 2015 elections. In other words, it is important to study the nature of politics holistically, especially with respect to the manners the two leading political parties – ruling and main opposition – organized around crucial issues of governance during the elections. Deriving from this perspective, the chapter underscores a number of themes in the nature of politics that gave rise to the observable outcomes. In the first section, the chapter underscores the significance of 2015 in Nigerian politics. In the second section, the chapter reflects on the primacy of the following issues, namely: (a) Opposition merger and coordination; (b) Party Primaries and Candidate selection; (c) Electioneering campaigns; (d) Active citizenship; (e) Rising Tensions and Peace Committee; (f) Opposition victory and electoral turnover; and (g) Post-election peace and stability. In what follows, effort is devoted to an explanation of the role each of these salient issues played in shaping the processes and outcomes of the 2015 elections. The final section recaps the main arguments of the chapter before concluding.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 2015 IN NIGERIAN POLITICS The form and character of politics during the 2015 elections in Nigeria are significant for a number of reasons. First, the year 2015 is, in itself, a year that deserves closer attention for obvious reasons. Among others, 2015 had long raised anxiety because of the prediction that Nigeria could disintegrate as a result of the accentuation of its centrifugal forces to a breaking point. As if to give bite to the prediction, the march towards the elections exhibited such divisive tendencies so much so that the political atmosphere attained an excruciatingly high political THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 2015 IN NIGERIAN POLITICS 185 temperature. It was for this and related tensions that former Foreign Affairs Minister, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, warned in an open letter to the two leading presidential candidates, Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, that ‘the certainty of violence after the 2015 elections is higher than it was in 2011; irrespective of the winner’ (Akinyemi 2014). The lessons of history lend some credibility to Akinyemi’s(2014) position. In the most recent past, precisely in the aftermath of the 2011 presidential elections, the level of post-election violence that erupted in the northern parts of the country, together with its devastating consequences in terms of attendant loss of lives, destruction of property and internal displacement of persons, was quite alarming. This became more worrisome against the background that until then, the 2011 elections were generally acknowledged as better than all other elections since 1999 (Gberie 2011; Akhaine 2011). If the outcome of such elections widely perceived as free and credible could produce such a devastating violent response, how much more one whose processes had been firmly enmeshed in deep-seated controversy and the dispositions of its key actors driven largely by forces of identity and related uncomplimentary considerations? Moreover, the situation was aggravated by the fact that the elections were to be conducted in an unhealthy environment, most notably the excruciating state of national security and weak economic foundations. With respect to the security situation, the insurgency by Boko Haram, a militant group rooted in the north-eastern part of the country, represented the greatest threats. Unfortunately, the insurgency would appear to have been unduly politicized and manipulated in all ramifications by key political players in the elections to score cheap political points. Worse still, these tendencies assumed an ethno-regional and religious character, as well as the unprecedented fractionalization of some elites along these fault lines (Olaniyan and Asuelime 2014). Therefore, it was hardly surprising to see that the Boko Haram question assumed a prominent position in the electioneering campaigns of the two leading political parties, the PDP and APC. At the economic front, the level of poverty and income inequality, despite the recent rebasing of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), which made Nigeria emerge as the largest economy in Africa with a GDP of USD 510 billion per annum, remained high. There were also subregional and regional dimensions to the concerns. The Boko Haram insurgency was already disequilibrating the stability of 186 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS

West Africa and Nigeria’s immediate neighbours. Speciﬁcally, the insurgency caused massive displacements in northern Nigeria with a sizeable refugee population in Cameroon and Niger Republic (Egwu 2015). Given that Nigeria has always been the leading actor in the maintenance of peace and stability in the subregion, it follows, logically, that the 2015 elections, if mismanaged, could complicate and exacerbate problems such as humanitar- ian emergencies and internal displacement of persons which could collectively precipitate democratic failure (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015). The import of the foregoing is that a number of issues surrounded 2015 made the electoral politics and outcome vital to the survival of Nigeria’s democracy, its corporate existence and the stability of West Africa and Africa as a whole. The odds were many. But in a landmark achievement for the country, Nigeria deﬁed the odds. The elections did not only go very well, but the much-feared outbreak of violence was also averted. What accounted for these positive outcomes? The chapter attempts to give insight into this by examining salient issues in the political processes and outcomes of the 2015 elections.

SALIENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICS AND OUTCOMES OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS Basically, this section analyses seven salient issues that shaped the politics and outcomes of the 2015 Nigerian elections. They are:

Merger of Opposition It is apposite to begin with the observation that until the successful merger of leading opposition parties to form the APC in late 2013, merger was completely alien to party politics in Nigeria. Rather, the tendency was for parties to form coalitions, either pre- or post-elections. Coalition building can be seen to be a precursor of the merger of opposition parties in the 2015 elections. That merger has not been a key future of politics in Nigeria, despite the tendency of the ruling party to dominate politics for long spells, exemplified by the fact that power alternation has never occurred in Nigeria until the 2015 elections, should not be surprising. As studies have shown, party merger is a very rare political incident globally. Notable exemptions include the Social Democratic Party (SDP)-Liberal merger in England, SALIENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICS AND OUTCOMES OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS 187 the Conservative-Alliance in Canada to form the New Conservative Party (NCP) in Canada and the merger of the DJP, NDRP and RDP in Korea (Kim 1997; Godbout and Belanger 2005).Therarityofthe phenomenon had come with its own contradictions, most notably the paucity of theoretical literature on the subject. In the circumstance, ‘when confronted with a party merger’, as Godbout and Belanger (2005: 1) rightly argue, ‘scholars and pundits usually develop an ad hoc explanation in order to shed some light on the motives behind such an unusual phenomenon’. One major implication of this is that scholars are left ‘withverylittleinthewayofaunified theory of mergers with some predictive power’. In an attempt to fill the vacuum, one method often adopted by scholars is to improvise by applying the theory of coalition, as Kim (1997:83–100) did in the case of Korean election of 1990. Unfortunately, as Kim (1997: 86) himself confessed, ‘merger and coalition are conceptually distinct phenomena. A coalition is a temporary union, while a merger is a permanent one’. Since coalition has been the prevailing order until now, it is important to reflect briefly on the history and performance of coalition in Nigeria. Such a reflection will help to provide some insight into certain important dynamics in the process, including explanations for success and/or failure. As Omotola aptly documents, in the first federal election of 1954, for instance, a total of 184 seats were contested. The Northern People’s Congress (NPC) led with 79 seats; the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) won 56 seats; the Action Group (AG) had 27 seats; the Kamerun National Congress (KRC) won 6 seats; while others had 16 seats (Nwosu et al. 1998: 50). None of these parties had enough seats to form the government at the centre. This necessitated the formation of a coalition. The NPC and the NCNC, contrary to popular expectations, formed a coalition government at the centre, with the AG in official opposition (see Dudley 1982). Also in the Federal General Elections of 1959, out of the 312 seats contested for in the House of Representatives, the NPC maintained its lead with 134 seats; the NCNC alliance with Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU) won 89 seats; leaving the AG and United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) alliance with 73 seats. Again, none of the parties had enough seats in terms of two-third majority to form the government at the centre. As such, NPC entered into coalition with the NCNC/NEPU alliance to form the government at the centre, while the AG/UMBC alliance remained in opposition (Dudley 1982). This 188 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS coalition was generally condemned for violating the size principle of any functional coalition. Besides, the parties that formed the coalition; NPC, NCNC and NEPU were seen as poles apart ideologically. While the NPC was a ‘conservative’ and a ‘regionally based’ party, the NCNC was a ‘welfarist’ and ‘trans-regional’ party (Nwosu et al. 1998: 55; Ojiagbo 1980:19). Ever since, coalitions/alliances have been commonplace in Nigeria as witnessed in the first post-independence election of 1964 between the NPC; Akintola’s Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP); the Niger Delta Congress (NDC), the Mid-West Democratic Front (MDF) and the Dynamic Party (DP), which formed the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA); an alliance built on the need for national unity’ and the NCNC, AG, NEPU, UMBC, Zamfara Commoner’s Party (ZCP), and Kano People’s Party (KPP), which formed the United Progress Grand Alliance (UPGA), whose campaign emphasis was on a promise to restructure the federation and create new regions where necessary to halt Northern hegemony (Osaghae 1998:42–43). During the Second Republic (1979–1983), the NPN made overtures to the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) for coalition, which the latter accepted and joined the government at the centre. During the 1999 elections, there was a pre-election coalition between the defunct All Peoples Party (APP) and the defunct Alliance of Democracy (AD) for both to present a joint candidate for the presidential election, featuring Chief Olu Falae of the AD. Also in 2003, the then President Olusegun Obasanjo allegedly entered into an alliance with the AD to help his reelection bid. A similar attempt involving the AD, ANPP and a splinter group from the PDP to contest the 2007 presidential elections also failed, the same way the 2011 coalition negotiation between the Congress of Progressive Change (CPC) and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) was stillborn. These coalitions hardly endured, let alone producing the desired outcome. Their failures may not be unconnected with a number of factors, including ego and the inability of politicians in the merging coalitions to reconcile their differences, reducing the coalitions to nothing more than a ‘marriage of strange bed fellows’ (Chidi 2015: 57) doomed for failure as a result of ‘individual differences and petty jealousies’ (Suwald 2011). Other issues such as ethno-regional and religious differences and weak ideological standing have also been highlighted. For these and related reasons, after initial stability, these coalitions, however, broke down as a result of crisis over distribution of largesse (see Omoruyi SALIENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICS AND OUTCOMES OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS 189

1989;Osaghae1998: 129). Obviously, as the aforementioned account reveals, the history of coalition building in Nigeria is the history of failed experiments in political institutional innovations and designs. That being the case, one cannot but wonder the rationale for taking it up further to the level of merger where each merging party would lose its long-standing identity. There are a number of explanations for this development. First, as shown in the previous narrative, opposition coalitions have always proven to be highly ineffective in winning power from the ruling party in Nigeria. The experience may have informed the search for alternative mechanisms for opposition victory. Second, the PDP has dominated the Nigerian political landscape since 1999, leaving limited space for the effective functioning of opposition parties. Third, there seems to be a widely shared perception, especially by leading opposition parties and a signiﬁcant proportion of the civil society that PDP’s dominance was not a product of effective performance in power, especially in the light of growing poverty, rising unemployment and increasing cost of living in the country. Moreover, there was also the perceived improvement in the professionalism and capability of the INEC to be more effective in the administration of elections. This was as a result of a series of reform initiatives that have been put in place to positively enhance the process. Finally, all these considerations could have gingered the opposition in their urge to develop a formidable oppositional platform to dislodge the PDP; hence the recourse to the merger that led to the birth of the APC. As it is well noted, the APC was a product of the merger of the defunct ACN, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), and a breakaway faction of the All Progressive’s Grand Alliance (APGA) led by Rochas Okorocha, the Governor of Imo State. Aimed essentially at supplanting the PDP, the emergence of APC as a mega party not only made the contest for 2015 more intense, but altered the course of politics and outcomes in the election. On the one hand, the merger engendered, for the ﬁrst time, real competition in the political process. The most apparent indicators of competition include alternation of power whereby the opposition won the presidential election and gained more seats in both chambers of the federal legislature. On the other, the merger also came with its own complications, most notably the heightened proclivity towards violence, epitomized by excessive hate speech and the running of a largely dysfunctional electioneering campaign (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015). 190 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS

Party Primaries and Candidate Selection The process of candidate selection for an election is vital as a pointer to and signifier of the democratic character of any political party. Ideally, the process is expected to be open, transparent, competitive, participatory and legitimate in all ramifications. When these conditions are fulfilled, it not only enhances the democratic credentials of the party, but also helps build the political and social capital of the party, including a sense of belonging, generalizes trust, cohesion and discipline within the party. Moreover, it also helps to broaden citizen’s commitment to democracy and deepen the democratization process. If perverted, however, it also poses serious threats to the wellbeing of the party and the health of democracy. The selection of candidates for elective offices is usually done through a process known as party primaries. The process involves the nomination of delegates from across the various constituencies in the country to gather in designated centres and vote for their preferred candidates or flag bearer in a given electoral contest with other parties/candidates. Unfortunately, party primaries, as recent experiences have shown, have become one of the weakest democratic links in Nigeria. They are everything but democratic. Apart from the manipulation of the process to pave the way for anointed candidates of the godfathers using diverse foul tactics, there have also been instances where party leaders resorted to elimination by substituting the names of the preferred candidates for those who actually won the primaries. A typical case was in Imo state, where Senator Ifeanyi Ararume won the primaries but another candidate’s name was put on the ballot nonetheless (Omotola 2010a). Moreover, in cases where incumbents are standing elections, party primaries have become a mere democratic ritual for the endorsement of the incumbents. Statements such as ‘no vacancy in the government house’, often issued in the form of subtle threats to other aspirants for such offices, which have become commonplace in Nigeria at various levels of governance, are valid testimonies. The process of constituting the delegates to the primaries has, in itself, been another nightmarish experience in some parties at one time or the other. In the final analysis, rather than strengthen democracy, the way and manner parties’ primaries have been conducted would appear to have undermined party primaries. There were expectations that the process would be better handled in the 2015 elections by the two leading parties, the PDP and APC. As noted earlier, the successful merger of opposition parties had engendered a sense SALIENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICS AND OUTCOMES OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS 191 of real competitions for the first time in Nigerian elections since 1999. Specifically for the PDP, the emergence of the APC posed significantly real threat to its 16-year dominance. With the APC, the opposition seemed to have, for the first time since 1999, genuine credentials and prospects of winning power at the centre. Against these backgrounds, both parties were expected to do the right things that would enhance their electoral fortunes, beginning with the conduct of transparent and truly democratic primaries. As it turned out, the exercise left more to be desired as it was marred by controversies. Though a general tendency, the process seemed much more problematic within the ruling PDP. In the PDP, for example, the primary election for the presidential candidate, according to Omotola and Nyuykonge (2015: 6), ‘was “completely closed”, given that no other aspirants were allowed access to the nomination form. Even candidates who paid for the form were not issued the form by the party secretariat’. Consequently, ‘the eventual convocation of the national convention was, therefore, nothing more than a political ritual to legitimise the candidacy of the incumbent, President Jonathan.’ But for the APC, the primary was organized in such a way that suggested adherence to well-known democratic principles of competition, participation and legitimacy. Among other indicators, the primary was keenly contested by five candidates, namely former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso of Kano state, Governor Rochas Okorocha of Imo state, Sam Nda-Isah, the publisher of Leadership newspaper, and Mohammed Buhari, the eventual winner. The competitiveness of the primary was evidenced by the ability of four of these candidates to put up some good performance. To be sure, Buhari scored 3,430, Atiku: 954, Kwankwaso: 974, Okorocha: 674, Nda-Isaiah: 10 in the primary election (Sahara Reporter, 11 December 2014). The manner of these primaries partly shaped the course of politics and its outcomes in 2015. For the PDP, the closed nature of the process contributed to growing tensions and polarization within the party, further fuelling an already skyrocketing gale of high-profile defections from the party. But for the APC, the success of the exercise, contrary to the expectations of critics, contributed to endearing the party to Nigerians as a real alternative government. Though there were contentions with respect to the production of a running mate to Buhari, leading to some protraction, the eventual emergence of Professor Yemi Osinbajo also added to the growing positive image of the APC. More than anything else, it helped douse the mounting 192 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS tension over the rumoured possibility of a Muslim–Muslim ticket that could feature Buhari and Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, a former Governor of Lagos state and Chieftain of the party.

Electioneering Campaigns With the conclusion of the party primaries, the ground was set for full- blown electioneering campaigns. According to the Electoral Act 2010 as amended, parties or candidates are permitted to begin campaign 90 days to the elections. However, it is important to note that there were exemptions to this requirement during the 2015 elections. The most notable was the fact that a non-governmental organization, namely the Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN), started some form of campaigns for President Jonathan long before the statutory period. Specifically, TAN initiated and sustained a nationwide campaign on a geo-political basis ostensibly aimed at ‘persuading’ President Goodluck Jonathan to seek reelection in 2015. As The Guardian (November, 2014) captured the situationinaneditorial,‘the fact that key government officials, including the Secretary to the Federal Government of Nigeria and serving Ministers such as Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, are part of the jamboree, moving from one geopolitical zone to the other collecting signatures, suggests that TAN could not have been without the active connivance of the presidency’. Another deviation from the legal frameworks of electioneering campaigns manifested in the amount of airtime granted the various parties and candidates, especially on state-owned media outlets, both prints and electronics. As it turned out, there was so much lopsidedness in this regard so much so that ‘almost all the time was devoted to PDP campaigns at the expense of other parties’ (Omotola and Nyukyukonge 2015). Beyond these notable exemptions there were other dimensions to the electioneering campaigns that significantly affected the electoral processes and outcomes. Above all else, neither of the two leading parties could be said to be exceptional in their outings, given that the campaigns were generally uninspiring. Rather than focus on substance, the parties dwelled more on the trivial issues of politics, especially accusations and counter- accusations about the personality and eligibility of the two leading presidential candidates, namely Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammed Buhari, without any big ideas to drive the process. The level of smear campaign, if not outright hate speech, was outrageous. For example, the PDP repeatedly accused Buhari of having cancer SALIENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICS AND OUTCOMES OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS 193 and therefore unhealthy and unfit to be president, without any proof. They also alleged that he had no secondary school certificate as the minimum mandatory requirement to contest for the office. At times, the accusations against Buhari were comical and pedestrian with claims that he did not know the full meaning of APC, the platform under which he was running for the presidency; and that he could not recollect his phone number and the name of his running mate, among others. In another instance, Jonathan’s campaign office claimed that Buhari’sChatham’s house lecture was ‘arranged’ with $5 billion. In another statement by the same office, the fuel scarcity across the country before the election was said to have been engineered by the opposition APC (Omotola and Nyukyukonge 2015). The APC also cannot be totally exonerated from this trend of negative campaigns. However, it appeared to be more cautious, focusing more on four core issues it claimed would be its priority if elected into office at the centre. These issues are national security, revamping and diversifying the national economy, waging an effective war against corruption and promotion of youth employment. These were apart from stressing what the party considered to be the recklessness, wastefulness, cluelessness and general underperformance of the PDP-led administration under Goodluck Jonathan. Despite these deviations, the campaigns generally went well, with both parties admonishing their supporters to eschew violence. President Jonathan’s oft-repeated statement that his ambition was not worth the blood of any Nigerian was particularly remarkable. The way security agencies provided security cover for the campaign rallies of the PDP and APC was also significant.

Active Citizenship The political processes and outcomes of the 2015 elections were also greatly inﬂuenced by the active engagement with the electoral processes. This process of engagement was greatly enhanced by the leading role of reputable civil society organisations (CSOs) such as the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), CLEEN Foundation, Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth & Advancement (YIAGA), Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre (PLAC), Election Situation Room and a host of others. These CSOs undertook a number of critical interventions that shaped the course of the political processes in no small measure, including pressure for electoral reforms, organization of political debates among political parties, 194 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS social and political mobilization of the electorate, peace advocacy, election security threats analysis and election monitoring. For example, the CDD, apart from its widely publicized Political Party Discussion Series (PPDS) through which it organized televised debates between the PDP and APC on major issues in the political economy of the country such as national security and other governance issues, also issued periodic election security threats analyses. Moreover, the CDD also deployed election observers to many states of the federation, in addition to its distinct Situation Room for both the federal and state elections. On its part, YIAGA was reputed for its extensive training programmes for the youth, especially on the use of social media tools for electioneering purposes. However, the most consistent security threats analyses were by the CLEEN Foundation. These activities helped empower average citizens, at least at the elite level, in engaging the political processes. The public debates between the PDP and the APC featuring question sessions from the audience, which were transmitted live on the Africa Independent Television (AIT), enhanced public enlightenment regarding the policy directions of the leading political parties. Such an understanding may have aided, directly or indirectly, the electoral choices of the voters. It also facilitated opportunities for policy dialogues and interventions with critical stakeholders in the electoral processes, particularly political parties and INEC. The massive mobilization of the youth constituency equally helped to boost youth political participation in positive manners. At the risk of being counter- factual in the absence of empirical data to that effect, the absence of or limited involvement of the youth in election violence at the various phases of the electoral cycle, especially post-election, is partly attributable to these diverse forms of civil encounter with the political processes.

The Role of National Peace Committee (NPC) As noted earlier, the pre-election phase was highly tendentious and characterized, as it were, with excessive mobilization of forces of identity, particularly ethno-regionalism and religion, as well as elite fractionalism of immense proportion. Consequently, the election was made to assume the status of warfare between the largely Christian south and Muslim north. Worse still, while the north seemed more united in this characterization, the south was further bifurcated by the divide in party alliance between the south-west on the one hand; and the south-east and south- south on the other, the former predominantly APC and the latter mainly SALIENT ISSUES IN THE POLITICS AND OUTCOMES OF THE 2015 ELECTIONS 195

PDP. The undue politicization of the security institutions of the state, especially the military and the Department of State Security (DSS), whose partisanship and bias in favour of the incumbent was glaring to all discerning and dispassionate minds, only heightened the tensions. Furthermore, the manipulation of the transition process climaxed with the eventual postponement of the elections for a period of six weeks from its original schedules in what was obviously a well-orchestrated design by the ruling PDP. This also added its own twists and turns to the prevailing chaotic environment of politics, notably the heightening of mutual suspi- cions between the PDP and APC about the integrity of the whole process and the commitment of the former to conducting free, fair and credible elections. Before then, there had been accusations and counter-accusations about the neutrality of INEC in the whole process, including controversies over the distribution of PVCs, which the PDP claimed was being done in favour of the APC. INEC vehemently denied such allegations and the six-week postponement actually allowed it to redress some of the observable lapses and alleged imbalance in the distribution per state, in a very fundamental way. With these pre-election developments, many had envisaged and pre- dicted a calamitous end, irrespective of the outcomes of the elections. As a way to salvaging the situation, a NPC was constituted. The NPC consisted of eminent Nigerians, namely Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar Rtd, Chairman, Commodore Ebitu Ukiwe Rtd, Vice Chairman, Cardinal John Onaiyekan, the Sultan of Sokoto His Eminence Sa‘ad Abubarkar, Bishop of Sokoto Diocese, Bishop Hassan Kukah – the Coordinator. Other members include the foremost businessman, Alhaji Aliko Dangote, Alhaji Muhammed Musdafa, Primate of Anglican Church, Most Rev. Nicholas Okoh, President of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor and Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC). Others are Justice Rose Ukeje, Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Chairman of the 2014 National Conference, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, Prof. Ameze Guobadia, Prof. Zainab Alkali, Publisher of Vanguard Newspapers, Mr Sam Pemu- Amuka and former President of the Nigerian Bar Association, Dame Priscilla Kuye, Professor Oshita O. Oshita, Director General, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and Senator Ben Obi, Special Adviser to President on Inter-Party Affairs (Alli 2015). The NPC facilitated the signing of a pre-election peace accord on 14 January 2015 by President Jonathan, General Buhari and 10 other 196 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS presidential candidates and their parties, including the Action Alliance (AA), Alliance for Democracy (AD), United Democratic Party (UDP), United Progressive Party (UPP), African Democratic Congress (ADC), and Hope Democratic Party (HDP), among others (Premium Times, 26 March, 2015). This was pertinent for a number of reasons. First, as already noted, serious tensions were already building and soaring to a frightening height. There were genuine concerns that unless urgent proactive steps were taken, the outcome of the elections could degenerate into post-election violence. Second, the recent history of the country in this respect, particularly the violence that attended the results of the 2011 presidential elections, called for sober reflection to prevent a recurrence of the 2011 experience. Yet, the country is reputed for a fairly consistent pattern and trend of electoral violence that pre-dated the Fourth Republic, as witnessed in the First, Second and aborted Third Republics. Any initiative aimed at terminating the vicious cycle of such a bad record was, therefore, a welcome development. Accordingly, the purpose was to encourage peaceful elections and deploy mediated solutions to electoral disputes, including facilitating free, fair and credible elections through the promotion of issue-based campaigns devoid of violence, among others. The significance of the NPC and the agreements it facilitated is reflectedinthefactthattheprocesswas closely followed by the international community (EU-EOM 2015). Specifically, in the Accord the individual presidential candidates pledged their allegiance to the constitution, the unity and survival of Nigeria as one entity and their commitment to abide by all laid down rules and regulations. They further committed themselves to peaceful conduct of election campaigns at the various stages (cited in Alli 2015:13). This accord was renewed by the NPC on 26 March, 2015, two days before Election Day by General Buhari and President Jonathan. The primary substance of the Accord as articulated by Bishop Hassan Kukah was the commitment to free, fair and credible elections. The signatories to the Accord equally charged their political parties and supporters to abide by the same commitment (cited in Obiajuru 2015). Key players in the peace process worked assiduously to ensure its success. The role of the development partners was particularly helpful. The UNDP, for example, supported ‘the process leading to the setting up of a National Peace Committee’, which monitored ‘adherence to the Abuja Accord, sensitising Nigerians on peace and mediate in election- related conflicts’ (UNDP 2015a). Moreover, ‘the sensitization workshop at which the Accord was signed was organised with support from UNDP OPPOSITION VICTORY AND POWER ALTERNATION 197 through the Democratic Governance for Development Project (DGDII) in collaboration with the Office of the Special Advisor to The President on Inter-Party Affairs’ (UNDP 2015b). In the sensitization workshop, various speakers, including General Abdulsalam Abubakar, Professor Ibrahim Gambari and a host of others appealed to Nigerians to eschew violence in all its ramifications during the elections. The presence of the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan and Chief Emeka Anyaoku, former Commonwealth Secretary-General at the signing of the peace accord, not only added bite to the initiative, but underscored the significance of development partners in the process. Though the overall impact of the NPC on the electoral processes and outcomes, especially in terms of forestalling violent outbreak cannot be stated in precise terms, there are reasons to believe that the NPC was decisive in the whole process. Though electioneering campaigns witnessed violation of elements of the accord, the situation could have been worse in the absence of such accords. The eventual concession of defeat by then President Jonathan could also be credited to the interventions of the peace committee (Alli 2015). This feat, apart from helping to douse tension and potential outbreak of post-election violence, also helped to legitimize the electoral outcomes and processes. In its report on the 2015 Presidential and National Assembly election of 28 March, 2015, the IPCR, Abuja, noted that the ‘positive attitude of Nigerians is the outcome of the targeted advocacy and pre-emptive diplomacy deployed by various stakeholders, including the National Peace Committee (NPC)’, among other stakeholders (IPCR, 2015: 2).

OPPOSITION VICTORY AND POWER ALTERNATION Alternation of power, otherwise known as electoral turnover, has been seen as an important step towards the consolidation of democracy. By electoral turnover of power it is meant the ‘electoral turnover of the chief political executive in presidential elections and a changed majority in parliamentary elections’, which is not only an indicator of electoral competitiveness, but also its legitimacy (Lindberg, 2004; Rakner and Svasand, 2003). The 2015 elections fulfilled these conditions by producing opposition victory for the first time in Nigeria. For the avoidance of doubt, the PDP has dominated the political scene since 1999, winning the presidency in all elections between 1999 and 2011. It also had majority in both chambers 198 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS of the National Parliament during the same period. However, this dominance was broken in the 2015 elections when the APC won the presidency and has majority in both chambers of the National Assembly. This unprecedented feat can be explained in terms of a number of factors. Among others, the effective merger of opposition parties earlier highlighted in section “Merger of Opposition” of this section was crucial, but we need not repeat ourselves here. The merger is not in itself a sufficient condition for power alternation. A number of other intervening factors interacted to facilitate its success. These include the attractiveness of the new mega opposition, the APC, defined in terms of its alternative policy agenda for addressing the contradictions of governance in the country, the bigger platform it offered to mobilize and pool financial and administrative resources together; and the poor economic performance of the PDP in its 16 years of governance. The gale of defections that hit the PDP as the 2015 elections approached also counted in favour of the APC. Similarly, various electoral reform measures, which culminated in improved electoral environment, including enhanced autonomy, capability and professionalism of the INEC were also decisive. Moreover, the improved location of other critical democratic players such as political parties and civil society also helped to engender some measure of participation and competitiveness of the process.

POST-ELECTION PEACE AND STABILITY The cumulative effect of all these salient issues that shaped the political processes and outcomes of the 2015 elections was the averting of a major tragedy, post-election violence of immense proportion. This was a negation of all prophesies of doom about the possibility of post- election violence that could degenerate into civil war and possible disintegration of the country. However, following the intervention of the NPC, the existence of an improved electoral environment leading to a much more defined effectiveness in election administration and a host of other critical interventions, Nigeria defied the odds. The announcement of the election results did not generate violence. The escape from post-election violence owed a lot to Jonathan’s acceptance of defeat, a process believed to have profited from the positive intervention of the NPC. Even more unique was the fact that Jonathan and his party did not resort to litigation, as had always been the case since 1999; a development to further strengthen the legitimacy of the REFERENCES 199 elections. If the interventions had failed and Jonathan rejected the election results, the situation could have been different. Since then, a reasonable measure of an atmosphere of peace and stability has prevailed in the political system. The consolidation of prevailing peace and stability is vital to Nigeria’s democratic development and economic transformation. This will require sustainable investment in the promotion of social cohesion and good governance in manners that will ensure a fairly equitable allocation of the dividends of democracy, irrespective of ethnic, religious or party affiliations. Attaining this will task the creative ingenuity of the APC, first in putting its own house in order, resolving all internal conflicts and diligently delivering on its campaign promises; and that of the PDP to provide constructive criticisms to keep the APC on its toes and always avail itself as an alternative government in waiting. CSOs too must not relent in their interventions in promoting and deepening democratic political culture in all ramifications.

CONCLUSION The politics of the 2015 elections, including its processes and outcomes, was shaped by a number of salient issues. After underscoring the national and regional signiﬁcance of the 2015 elections, the chapter went ahead to identify and explain seven salient factors that shaped the political processes and outcomes. These include opposition merger, party primaries and candidate selection, electioneering campaigns, active citizenship, pre-election tensions and the setting up of the NPC, opposition victory and alternation of power and ﬁnally, post-election peace and stability. Sustaining the atmosphere of peace and stability remains a fundamental challenge that all democratic players, locally and internationally, must be willing to promote.

REFERENCES Akhaine, S. O. 2011, ‘Nigeria’s 2011 elections: The ‘crippled giant’ learns to walk?’ African Affairs, 110(441), pp. 649–655. Akinyemi, A. B. 2014, ‘Open letter to Jonathan, Buhari, By Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi’, 22 December; available at’, http://blogs.premiumtimesng.com/? p=166391 accessed on 28 February, 2015 Alli, W. O. 2015, ‘Violence-Free Elections: Perspectives on the Peace Initiatives on the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria’, paper presented at the Electoral 200 9 PARTY POLITICS IN THE 2015 NIGERIAN ELECTIONS

Institute’s (TEI) Post-2015 Election Conference, 29 July- 2 August, 2015; available at http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/ Violence-Free-Elections-Perspectives-on-the-Peace-Initiatives-on-the-2015- General-Elections-in-Nigeria.pdf (accessed on 18 September, 2015). Chidi, N. J. 2015, ‘Politics of merger of political parties in Nigeria: The past and present efforts to evolve two major parties’ Journal of Policy and Development Studies, 9(3), pp. 52–63. Dudley, B. J. 1982, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. London: Macmillan. Egwu, S. G. 2015, Technology of Power and Dramaturgy of Politics,73rd Inaugural Lecture, University of Jos. European Union Election Observation Mission, EUEOM, 2015, Final Report Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015; available at http://www.premiumtimesng. com/regional/north-central/179153-buhari-jonathan-meets-sign-another- peace-accord.html (accessed on 20 January, 2016). Gberie, L. 2011, The 2011 Elections in Nigeria: A New Dawn? Institute of security Studies Situation Report, 13 May, 2011; available at http://www. obsafrique.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/13May2011Nigeria.pdf (accessed on 12 May, 2015). Godbout, J. and Belanger, E. 2005, ‘A Theory of Party Mergers,’ Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Meeting, Ontario, Canada, June 2-4. Institute for Peace and Conﬂict Resolution (IPCR), 2015, ‘Statement on the March 28, 2015 Presidential/National Assembly Elections’, 2 April, 2015, available at http://ipcr.gov.ng/books/public%20statement.pdf (accessed on 20 January, 2016). Kim, H. 1997, ‘Rational Choice Politics and Third World Politics: The 1990 Party Merger in Korea,’ Comparative Politics 30 (1), pp. 83–100. Lindberg, S. 2004, ‘The Democratic Qualities of Competitive Elections: Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 42(1), pp. 61–105. Nwosu, N. I., Oyedele, S. O., and Olaniyi, J. O. 1998, An Introduction to Constitutional Development in Nigeria. Ibadan: Sunad Publishers. Obiajuru, N. 2015, ‘Jonathan, Buhari Renew Peace Accord at the 11th Hour’, available at https://www.naij.com/409368-jonathan-set-to-hold-talks-with- buhari-at-the-11th-hour.html (accessed on 18 September, 2015). Ogbulafor, V. 2008, ‘PDP will rule Nigeria Nigeria, whther they like it or not, for not less than 60 years’,inNairaland, 19 December, retrieved from http:// www.nairaland.com/209654/pdp-rule-nigeria-whether-like on 9 June 2015. Ojiagbo, L. O. ed. 1980, Nigeria Returns to Civil Rule. Lagos: Tokion Press. Olaniyan, A., and Asuelime, L. 2014, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and the Widening of Cleavages in Nigeria’, African Security, 7(2), pp. 91–109. REFERENCES 201

Omoruyi, O. 1989, ‘Federal character and the party system in the second republic’, in P. P. Ekeh, and E. Osaghae (eds.), Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria, Ibadan: Heinemann. Omotola, J. S. 2010a, ‘Elections and democratic transitions in Nigeria under the fourth republic’, African Affairs, 109(437), pp. 535–553. Omotola, J. S., and Nyuykonge, C., 2015, Nigeria’s 2015 general elections: Challenges and opportunities, ACCORD Policy and Practice Brief (PPB) No. 33, Durban, South Africa, March; available at http://www.accord.org. za/images/downloads/brief/ACCORD-policy-practice-brief-33pdf (accessed on 15 May, 2015). Osaghae, E. E. 1998, Nigeria since Independence: Crippled Giant. London: C Hurst and Co. Rakner, L., and Svasand, L. 2003, Uncertainty as a Strategy: Electoral Processes in Zambia 1991-2001. Working Paper 2003: 13 Chr. Michelson Institute Development Studies and Human Rights, Norway. Available at www.cmi.no/ public/public.htm Sahara Reporters, 2014, ‘Buhari Wins APC Presidential Primary, Confronts President Jonathan In February Election’, 11 December, available at http:// saharareporters.com/2014/12/11/buhari-wins-apc-presidential-primary-con fronts-president-jonathan-february-election (accessed on 18 September, 2015). Suwald, N. 2011, ‘Opposition parties’ pact as a historical anachronism’, Nigeria Village Square, 6 February, retrieved from http://www.nigeriavillagesquare. com/articles/guest-articles/opposition-parties-pact-as-a-historical-anachron ism.html on 8 June 2015. Premium Times, 2015, ‘Buhari, Jonathan meet, sign another peace accord’,26 March; available at http://www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/north-cen tral/179153-buhari-jonathan-meets-sign-another-peace-accord.html (accessed on 20 January, 2016). UNDP, 2015a, ‘On the eve of elections: Presidential front-runners renew pledges to peaceful polls, and respect outcome’, 27 May, available at http://www.ng. undp.org/content/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/03/27/ on-the-eve-of-elections-presidential-front-runners-renew-pledges-to-peaceful- polls-and-respect-outcome.html (accessed on 20 January, 2016). UNDP, 2015b, ‘2015 Nigeria General Elections: Presidential Candidates pledge peace, sign Accord’, 14 January, available at http://www.ng.undp.org/con tent/nigeria/en/home/presscenter/articles/2015/01/14/2015-nigeria-gen eral-elections-presidential-candidates-pledge-peace-sign-accord.html (accessed on 20 January, 2016). CHAPTER 10

The 2015 Presidential Election

INTRODUCTION This chapter focuses on the 2015 presidential election. Although some of the issues involved have been partially highlighted in earlier chapters, focusing on them separately gives the benefits of in-depth examinations of the salient issues underlying the presidential election. This is the primary purpose of this chapter, the aim of which is to critically examine the conduct of the 2015 presidential election, with a view to identifying its high and low points. Pursuant to this goal, the chapter addresses, first and foremost, why the 2015 presidential election matters. In the second section, the chapter examines salient issues in the presidential election, namely party primaries and candidates selection, with emphasis on the two leading political parties, the PDP and APC, electioneering campaigns, election administration and election integrity, voting patterns and election results, as well as post-election reactions. Across these subsections, we reflected on important ethno-regional and religious forces as intervening variables in the voting pattern. We also underscored the key factors in the improved administration and integrity of the election, and accounts for the success and failure of the winning and losing candidates/parties using the same explanatory themes. The analyses that run through these themes reinforced that despite noticeable gaps in certain aspects, the 2015 presidential election seemed more effectively administered, resulting in deeper democratic qualities of competition, participation and legitimacy. We drew on the reports of both local and international election observers

© The Author(s) 2017 203 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_10 204 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION across presidential elections since 1999 to date; and the widespread acceptance of the electoral outcome without post-election litigations and violence, as customary in the past and widely anticipated before the election, as some of the most visible afﬁrmation of this conclusion.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION The 2015 presidential election in Nigeria matters for a number of inter- related reasons. First, the election was, in a sense, a rematch of the 2011 election, which pitched the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, not just a southern Christian, but also of the ethnic minority extraction, against Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim and a former military head of state (Campbell and Bunche 2016). The concern here grew out of the fact that in their previous competitive encounter during the 2011 presidential election, the reaction to the electoral outcome in which then President Jonathan was declared the winner was unwholesome. As it turned out, the declaration of the results was greeted with serious post-election violence, especially in the northern parts of the country, leading to loss of lives, displacement of persons and wanton destruction of properties. As source documents, violence and unrest in the run-up to the 2011 polls claimed the lives of more than 800 people and led to the displacement of approximately 65,000 (Human Rights Watch 2011). Second and partly deriving from the foregoing, were genuine concerns that the presidential election could again precipitate violence that could destabilize Nigeria. The fear that history could repeat itself, especially given the failure of the government to decisively deal with the dastardly events of 2011, was palpable and could not completely be ruled out. As noted earlier and at the risk of repetition Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, a former Foreign Affairs Minister, aptly represents this concern in an open letter to the two leading presidential candidates, Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari, in which he maintained that ‘the certainty of violence after the 2015 elections is higher than it was in 2011. If President Jonathan wins, the North would erupt into violence as it did in 2011. If Buhari wins, the Niger Delta will erupt into violence. I don’t believe that we need rocket science to make this prediction’ (Akinyemi 2014: 1). The validity of such a claim was buttressed by emerging signs in the march towards the election, including the presence of visible threats and counter- threats emerging from both sides; most notably by ex-Niger Delta militants, particularly Asari Dokubo (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015: 3). SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 205

Indeed, Dokubo threatened on more than one occasion that there would be ‘war if Jonathan fails to be re-elected as president for a second term’ (see Okolo 2014: 165). Third, the emergence of a mega opposition party, the All Progressive Congress (APC), which grew from the merger of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP) and a splinter group from the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), posed signiﬁcant threats to the 16 years of dominance by the PDP on Nigerian government and politics. In the event of losing power at the centre, for which the emergence of the APC held some prospects, there was so much uncertainty as to how the PDP would respond to such a development. Such a concern is creditable because if it happened, that would be the ﬁrst of its kind in the annals of Nigeria’s electoral history. Moreover, the PDP being the incumbent government then, had enormous power over state’s resources, including total control over all security apparatuses of the state that it could deploy to frustrate such eventuality. This perception gained traction when, following the ‘prompting’ of leading actors of the PDP, particularly Sambo Dasuki, the National Security Adviser, in a Chatham House lecture, the elections were eventually postponed for six weeks to, supposedly, ‘allow the government defeat’ the Boko Haram insurgency. The International Crisis Group (ICG) described the postponement as ‘perilous’ (2015: 1). For keen observers of the Nigerian situation, this rationalization was curious, especially when one considered the fact that the said insurgency had been there for years without a decisive response from the government. To now envisage the defeat of the insurgency within six weeks smacks of a hidden agenda. It can, therefore, be reasonably argued that the postponement added to the growing concerns about the integrity of the elections in general and the presidential election in particular.

SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Party Primaries and Candidate Selection Party primaries occupy a central position in electoral and party politics. It is through it that candidates who represent or fly the flag of the various political parties for elective offices are elected. Ordinarily, the process is supposed to be democratic in terms of participation, competition and 206 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION legitimacy. When these conditions are fulfilled, party primaries not only reinforce party cohesion, discipline, stability and performance, portraying the party as internally democratic, but also energize the democratization process and vice versa. Though party primaries and candidates selection have a problematic history in Nigeria, especially under the Fourth Republic, there were expectations that the 2015 election could be positively different, following a series of reform measures initiated by INEC to engender democratic political culture. Disappointingly, the situation did not improve in any fundamental sense. As argued elsewhere, there was sufficient evidence to show that ‘the two main parties did not accord sufficient attention to these requirements’ of competition, participation and/or legitimacy of the process and outcome (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015: 6). Specifically, as Omotola and Nyuykonge (2015: 6) pointed out, ‘the PDP’s primary election for the presidential candidate was “completely closed”, given that no other aspirants were allowed access to the nomination form. Even candidates who paid for the form did not receive one from the party secretariat’. Consequently, ‘the eventual convocation of the national convention was, therefore, nothing more than a political ritual to legitimise the candidacy of the incumbent, President Jonathan’. It was, therefore, little surprise that ‘President Jonathan’s emergence as the PDP’s presidential candidate on 10 December, 2014’, not only aggravated the already tensed situation of the party, but further polarized the party, leading ‘to the defection of some PDP members in the House of Representatives to APC’ (Durotoye 2015: 178). The process of candidates selection for the presidential election seemed a little better within the APC for obvious reasons, most notably the fact that the presidential primary was keenly contested by five candidates: former Vice President Atiku Abubakar, then Governor Rabiu Kwankwaso of Kano State, Governor Rochas Okorocha of Imo state, newspaper owner, Sam Nda Isaiah, and Mohammedu Buhari, the eventual winner, who ‘scored 57.2 percent of the 5,992 votes cast’ (Durotoye 2015: 177). The exercise was, however, reportedly marred by allegations of massive deployment of money by the contenders. The emergence of Jonathan, a southern Christian, as the candidate of the PDP; and Buhari, a northern Muslim, as the candidate of APC, contributed to the elevation of ethno-regional and religious considerations in the subsequent stages of the electoral processes to an unprecedented level. In an attempt to deflate this tendency, the PDP maintained SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 207 its long-standing zoning arrangement by retaining Namadi Sambo, a northern Muslim from the north-west, as Jonathan’s Vice-Presidential candidate. In its own strategic calculation, the APC opted for Prof. Yemi Oshibajo, a Christian from the south-west, as its Vice-Presidential candidate (Adibe 2015). Though these strategic moves introduced some sense of balance, they were not able to eliminate the ethno-regional and religious dichotomy between the Muslim dominated north and the Christian dominated south. As it turned out and will be illustrated shortly, these forces played out significantly in the electoral processes and outcomes.

Electioneering Campaigns Generally, the presidential electioneering campaigns were seen as uninspiring, with main emphasis on accusations and counter-accusations about the personalities and eligibility of the two leading presidential candidates: Jonathan and Buhari. The PDP repeatedly tried to label the APC as an Islamic party that would islamize the country if voted into power. In fact, many believed that Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s ambition of featuring as Buhari’s running mate (Vice-Presidential candidate) in the election was allegedly quashed by this allegation. The party’s strategists were said to have vehemently argued that being a Muslim like Buhari, featuring a Muslim–Muslim ticket could be counter-productive. Among others, it was capable of not only offending Christians, but also ‘cement the PDP’s labelling of APC as an Islamic party’ (Adibe 2015: 6). They also accused Buhari of having cancer and, therefore, being unfit to serve as president. The party alleged that Buhari did not have a secondary school certificate, the minimum mandatory requirement to contest for the office of president. At a point, the PDP alleged that the fuel shortages across the country at that time were engineered by the APC. The APC also had its own deviations and was always harping on what it considered the corruption, recklessness, wastefulness, cluelessness and general underperformance of the PDP-led administration and raising alarm at every opportunity about the plans of the PDP to rig the elections and retain power at all costs. In one instance, the APC, through the then Governor of Rivers state, Mr Rotimi Amaechi, who headed the presidential campaign committee of the APC, alleged that the Jonathan presidency had bribed the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) with N7 billion to mobilize support for Jonathan’s candidacy. Although the national leadership of CAN repeatedly and vehemently denied the 208 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION allegation, the Executive Director of the Voice of Northern Christian Movement, Pastor Kallamu Musa-Dikwa, insisted that the National Office of CAN had received the money and disbursed it to state chapters of the religious body (Animashaun 2015: 196). Most of these and related allegations, from both sides, were made without any verifiable proofs, at least not before the elections. These tendencies explain why the electioneering campaigns were seen as generally ‘uninspiring, with the parties more interested in discussing trivial issues, at the expense of articulating ideas on the way forward’. (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015: 7). With such signs of desperation and bitterness on both sides, all in the name of retaining or capturing power at all cost, which these tendencies portended, it was obvious (to discerning minds) that the outcome of the presidential election may prove decisive in the overall direction of the transition process and, by extension, the democratization process as a whole. With limited issue-based campaigns, it was not quite surprising that the attendant void was filled by recourse to hate speech, which was the most outrageous dimension of the electioneering campaigns. As Animashaun (2015) has demonstrated, ‘hate campaigns, which manifested through hateful and abusive speeches during campaign rallies and in media advertisements, became so absurd that some eminent Nigerians – including John Cardinal Onayeikan, Catholic Bishop of Abuja; and the Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka – counselled politicians to tread the path of honour in their electioneering activities’. The Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, NCSSR (2015: 3) identified some specific cases of hate speech in the presidential election campaigns as follows:

1. The Ekiti State Governor, Peter Ayodele Fayose in January repeatedly took out front page newspaper advertorials warning voters not to vote for the APC presidential candidate Muhamadu Buhari. These adverts, now widely known as ‘death wish advertorials’ insi- nuated that the presidential candidate was likely to die in ofﬁce if elected, just as late President, Yaradua. 2. Speaking during the PDP women presidential campaign rally in Kogi State, the Nation’s First Lady, Patience Jonathan, reportedly described Gen. Buhari as unﬁt to be the country’s president, calling him old and brain dead. 3. Nigerian First Lady, Patience Jonathan was also recorded to have urged the members of the PDP to stone anyone who promises them change. ‘Change’ is the slogan of the All Progressives Congress (APC). SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 209

4. In the same campaign speech given at a rally which was held on Monday, 2 March, (what year?) in Calabar, the capital of Cross River state, Mrs Jonathan was quoted as saying ‘Our people no dey born shildren wey dem no dey ﬁt count. Our men no dey born shildren throway for street. We no dey like the people for that side.’ Thus making derogatory statements deprecating the northern parts of the country where the awful practice of child abandonment known as ‘Almajiri’ still occurs. 5. After emerging unscathed from the plethora of criticisms that followed the documentary on Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, presidential candidate of the APC earlier in the year, a popular television Network, AIT, on 1 March (what year?) aired a documentary titled ‘Lion of Bourdillon’. The hour-long documentary, aired at 11 p.m. showcased various properties and companies across Lagos purportedly owned by Senator Bola Ahmed Tinubu, a top leader of the APC describing him as ‘Nigeria’s biggest landlord’. It also alleged that the APC chieftain was ‘charged for narcotics’ in 1993.

Other elements of hate speech during the presidential election campaigns, according to Ibraheem et al. (2015:9),include:(1)theclaim by President Goodluck Jonathan, during a rally in Enugu, that the APC candidate, Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, could not remember his own mobile phone number; and (2) allegation by, PDP Campaign presidential campaign leader, Fani-Kayode in a media briefing where he said that the APC flag bearer was receiving funding from terrorist groups, including the Boko Haram and ISIS. As Ibraheem and Ogwezzy et al. (2015: 9) revealed, the fact that these were carried live by NTA made the TV Station liable because, according to Section 5.3.4 of the Nigerian Broadcasting Code: ‘Inthecoverageof live political campaigns/rallies, the broadcaster shall be held responsible for the content of the broadcast.’ In spite of these negative trends, the campaigns also exhibited some positive aspects. Specifically, the two main candidates, Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari attempted to market their policy agenda in some critical sectors of the national political economy, most notably security, corruption, economy, unemployment, poverty, infrastructure and energy, among others, all of which were of great concerns to the electorate. Judging by the electoral outcome of the presidential election, which produced Muhammadu Buhari as the President, the first opposition 210 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION candidate to attain such a feat, one can safely conclude that the campaign promises of the APC’s candidate were more in tandem with popular aspirations and expectations. It is, however, important to know that the effective and timely implementation of these promises is another thing entirely. Here, the civil society has enormous responsibility in holding the government accountable to its promises. The Centre for Democracy and Development has initiated a viable platform for this through its ‘Buharimetre’ (http:// www.buharimeter.ng/). The ‘Buharimetre’ is an accountability mechanism that generates all the lists of campaign promises in the various sectors of the political economy and provides a platform for tracking implementation. Another disturbing trend in the electioneering campaign was the gross lopsidedness in access to the media, especially state-owned media outlets, particularly the National Television Authority (NTA) and the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN). As a source argued, ‘the requirement to evenly allocate airtime to all parties on government owned/controlled media outlets, particularly the National Television Authority’,was ‘grossly abused, with almost all the coverage devoted to PDP campaigns, to the detriment of other parties. The campaigns, however, have generally been uninspiring, with the parties more interested in discussing trivial issues, at the expense of articulating ideas on the way forward’. (Omotola and Nyuykonge 2015: 7). The report of the EU-EOM also captured this lopsidedness in its content analysis of media coverage of the campaigns. Specifically, it reported that the NTA and the FRCN apparently favoured the PDP against the APC during the campaigns. As it puts it:

In prime-time news, PDP received 57% of NTA’s political coverage, and 43% of FRCN’s. Additionally the incumbent gained extra airtime through coverage of Presidential and Federal Government activities, which amounted to another 27% of NTA airtime and 35% FRCN’s. In contrast to PDP’s total 84% coverage, APC received 11% on NTA, and on FRCN, PDP’s 78% contrasts with ACP’s 13%. (EU EOM, 2015: 10)

Electoral Administration and Election Integrity The effective administration of elections counts for election integrity. As a concept, electoral integrity basically has to do with the degree of freeness and fairness of elections, or better still, the extent to which a given election fulﬁls the democratic qualities of competition, participation and legitimacy. SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 211

Conversely, any election that lacks these qualities cannot be said to possess integrity. As such, elections characterized as ‘well-run contests’ that can be described as ‘credible’, ‘acceptable’, ‘genuine’, or the standard rhetoric of ‘free and fair’ are considered as elections having integrity (cited in Onapajo 2015a, b: 4). Such elections, according to Alemika (2006:2),areoften shaped by a number of factors, namely: (a) legal framework; (b) electoral system; (c) technical efficiency of electoral management authority; (d) relative autonomy of the electoral agency from interference by other organs of government and the ruling party; and (e) degree to which electoral processes, decisions, participation and outcomes are insulated from manipulation, corruption and violence (cited in Onapajo 2015b: 4). This shows that determining the integrity of any election must accommodate critical issues in the pre-election, election and post-election phases. Whereas the foregoing suggests that effective administration for electoral integrity imposes responsibilities on many democratic institutional actors, including political parties, civil society, mass media, among others, studies have demonstrated that professional, independent electoral commissions have important positive roles in enhancing the integrity of the electoral processes and outcomes. This explains why Election Management Bodies (EMBs), as the primary institutional mechanism of election administration, are vital to the overall quality of elections, defined as ‘the extent to which political actors see the entire electoral process as legitimate and binding’ (Elklit and Reynolds 2002: 87). Put differently, winners and losers can accept electoral processes and results as binding provided elections are effectively administered, but effective administration is only possible if the EMB has autonomy, measured basically in terms of its structure, composition, funding and capability. This is why one of the hallmarks of a mature democracy is professional, independent, non- partisan election administration. A major issue in the measurement of the extent of the integrity of any election has to do with its operationalization. Without necessarily going into the debate in the literature about this subject, we settle for election observation/monitoring reports as useful instruments for the exercise. We opt for this approach because despite abiding valid criticisms (Omotola 2006), election monitoring remains one of the most internationally acclaimed instruments for measuring the integrity of an election. Moreover, the approach also addresses almost all the aspects of the other known approaches, including the legalistic, best-practice of election norms by the international community, democratic theory and international 212 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION norms approaches (see Onapajo 2015b); while at the same time, covering the three phases of the electoral cycle. In his application of these framework to the 2015 election covering the three phases of the electoral cycle, Onapajo (2015b: 18) arrived at the conclusion that ‘the 2015 general elections may appear positive in terms of the assessment of the election day; however, there are many issues to be addressed at the pre-election phase of the electoral process’. For him, those issues include strengthening the legal instruments governing the country’s elections, especially in the light of outstanding issues that have been highlighted for reform by various stakeholders, the party selection of candidates at the primaries level, campaign media and campaign finance. This conclusion does not conflict in any fundamental way with those of other related studies. Yet, there is no denying the marked improvement in the effectiveness of election administration and the democratic qualities of the 2015 presidential election. As a way of subjecting this to further verification, we deploy our main operationalization instrument, that is, the reports of the various election observation groups (domestic and international) across the various elections since 1999. This is presented in Table 10.1. Some deductions can be made from Table 10.1. One, Nigerian elections since 1999 have always been bedevilled by a number of irregularities at the various phases of the electoral cycle, including fraud and violence. Two, these tendencies peaked during the 2007 elections when the most damning verdicts were contained in the various observation reports. Three, there has been a marked improvement in the quality of election administration and effective administration since the 2011 election. Four, despite reported lapses, the 2015 elections remain the most credible and with the most significant outcome, leading to alternation of power for the first time in the annals of the country’s electoral history. Finally, the 2015 presidential election comes across as one with the highest degree of legitimacy. This was evident by, at least, three important factors. The first relates to the conces- sional disposition of the incumbent President, Goodluck Jonathan, who lost the presidency. Before the official announcement of results, he had demonstrated uncommon statesmanship by calling Buhari to concede defeat and congratulate him. Second, there were no post-election litigations challenging the outcome of the presidential election. Third, there was no post- election violence upon the announcement of the results. All these had been unprecedented in Nigeria, (at least since 1999) and strengthen the legitimacy of the electoral processes and its outcomes. SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 213

Table 10.1 A summary of selected election observation reports in Nigeria, 1999–2015

Elections Observers Report

1999 TMG ‘The election saw marked increase in the number of Carter Centre electoral malpractices’. ‘There were areas where the incidence of electoral fraud was great enough to completely distort the election result.’ Reported concerns ‘about the serious evidence of serious flaws in the electoral process in certain parts of the country’. It noted cases of widespread irregularities, including ‘ballot box stuffing, inflated voter turnout, altered results, voter disenfranchisement, and inconsistent application of INEC’s procedures across the country’, as well as a ‘miraculous 100 percent turnout of voters in Rivers State during the presidential election’. 2003 TMG ‘There were scores of cases of alleged electoral fraud NDI across the country, often with the collusion of election EU EOM officials and security personnel.’ IRI ‘We have serious concerns about the legitimacy of the results in certain constituencies’, where it found ‘ballot stuffing, rigging, voter intimidation, violence and fraud’, particularly in the south and south-east of the country. ‘The presidential and gubernatorial (governorship) elections were marred by serious irregularities and fraud; in a certain number of states, minimum standards for democratic elections were not met. The observers witnessed election fraud in 13 states.’ Found ‘outright or attempted fraud’ in three states – Cross River, Imo and Rivers states, noted how ‘four polling stations closed before 1.00 p.m. with 100 per cent of the votes going to one political party’, and that there were ‘Many observed instances of premeditated electoral manipulations, underage, double and group voting, ...[and] direct evidence of box stuffing and gross falsification of result forms’. 2007 TMG ‘ ...the April 14 and 21, 2007 general elections are the NDI worst elections that ever took place in the EU EOM country’ ...‘Our monitors throughout the country IRI documented numerous lapses, irregularities and HRW electoral malpractices that characterized the elections in ACE many states. We, therefore, reject it and call for its

(continued ) 214 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table 10.1 (continued)

Elections Observers Report

ICG cancellation. INEC has failed woefully in its responsibilities to conduct free and fair elections. We call on the international community not to recognize these discredited elections and not to confer legitimacy on any government that emerges therefrom’. ‘Though INEC scored itself 80 per cent, but I felt if I were to score her based on her performance, I will score her a failure grade. INEC did not just work.’ ‘The 2007 State and Federal elections fell far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic elections.’ Noted cases of ‘underage voting, errors on voter’s registration list, stuffed ballot boxes, lack of privacy for voting, falsified results and several other forms of irregularity’. ‘Many seasoned observers stated that the 2007 polls were among the worst they had ever witnessed anywhere in the world.’ Reported ‘intimidation of voters by thugs, alleged partisanship of some INEC and some security personnel, underage voting, hoarding of election materials, including ballots and result sheets by some INEC officials, snatching and theft of ballot boxes and papers, lack of voting in polling stations in many states, and the diversion of voting materials especially ballot papers and voting sheets to the private homes of powerful politicians from where ballot papers were thumb-printed or results tampered with’. ‘The elections ...were the most poorly organized and massively rigged in the country’s history ...the campaigns and elections also witnessed violence, including over 20 people killed ...Widespread electoral malpractices and the staggering scale of falsified results were possible because of serious shortcomings with the regulatory agencies most notably the ...(INEC). Vigorously manipulated by the presidency, INEC virtually abdicated its responsibility as an impartial umpire. Inefficient and non-transparent in its operations, it became an accessory to active rigging. Similarly, the massively deployed police and other security services were expected to help curb violence but largely turned blind eyes to, and in some cases helped in, the brazen falsification of results.’ SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 215

Table 10.1 (continued)

Elections Observers Report

2011 NDI ‘Nigeria’s 2011 general elections ...were significantly EU EOM more transparent and credible than the three preceding Commonwealth polls in 1999, 2003 and 2007.’ JDPC ‘The 2011 general elections marked an important step towards strengthening democratic elections in Nigeria, but challenges remain.’ The ‘April 2011 elections marked a genuine celebration of democracy in Africa’s most populous country ...Previously held notions that Nigeria can only hold flawed elections are now being discarded and this country can now shake off that stigma and redeem its image’. ‘The elections renewed people’s confidence in the electoral system as they knew their vote would count.’ 2015 NDI ‘ ...the March 28 elections highlighted strong and EU EOM enthusiastic commitment of Nigerians to democratic Commonwealth processes and the possibility of determining the Nigerian Civil leadership of the country through peaceful, transparent Society Election and credible elections. The delegation recognizes that Situation Room Nigerian voters conducted themselves in a peaceful and (NCSESR) orderly manner on election day and urges politicians across the spectrum to recognize and respect this public manifestation of citizens’ commitment to the democratic process ...’ ‘The 2015 elections were historic because the opposition won for the first time since the transition from military rule in 1999, and with the incumbent presidential candidate conceding defeat and thus paving the way for a peaceful handover of power. However these highly competitive elections were marred by incidents of violence, abuse of incumbency, and attempts at manipulation. Although the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) made commendable attempts to strengthen electoral arrangements, systemic weaknesses leave the process vulnerable to abuse by political contenders. ... now is the time for the new office holders, legislative bodies, INEC and other stakeholders to demonstrate their commitment to electoral reform’.

(continued ) 216 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table 10.1 (continued)

Elections Observers Report

‘These elections mark an important step forward for democracy in Africa’s most populous country, and a key member of the Commonwealth,. ... Notwithstanding the organisational and technical deficiencies, the conduct of the Presidential and National Assembly elections was credible, peaceful, transparent and reflected the will of the people of Nigeria.’ ‘The presidential and National Assembly elections ...were conducted in a generally peaceful and orderly manner with enthusiastic voters committed to patiently attend the accreditation and voting process from early in the morning. However, voters endured severe difficulties during the elections due to several operational and logistic lapses ...This was compounded by the difficulties experienced in the use of card readers for the voter accreditation process. ...In the face of a difficult security environment, logistical and operational challenges, and many other adversities ...INEC managed to safeguard the voting rights of Nigerian citizens. Throughout the elections, especially when faced with challenges, the commission consulted widely with political parties, civil society organisations and other stakeholders in an effort to promote inclusiveness in its decision-making processes and the transparency of the elections. In spite of the progress that the 2015 elections represent ...a number of reforms and improvements are required to ensure that the achievements of the two past elections are consolidated.’

Sources: TMG (1999, 2003, 2007); NDI (2003, 2012, 2015); EU EOM (2003, 2007, 2011, 2015); Omotola (2006, 2009, 2010), Adebayo and Omotola (2007); Obi (2008); Onapajo (BBC 2015a; Onapajo 2015b)

Voting Pattern and Election Results Fourteen political parties presented candidates for the presidential election. This shows that the level of participation was relatively high. However, the same cannot be said of the competitiveness of the election. Apart from the two leading candidates of the APC and PDP, the 12 other candidates jointly polled less than 1% of the total votes cast. This implied SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 217 that real electoral competition took place between only the two leading candidates/parties. The official results announced by INEC revealed that Muhammadu Buhari of APC won the presidential election with 15,424,921 (53.96%) of the total valid votes cast. This was closely followed by Goodluck Jonathan, who polled 12,853, 162 (44.96%) of the votes, leaving other 12 presidential candidates with 309,480 of the total votes cast. This is not only lesser than 1% of the total valid votes cast, but also lesser than invalid/ blank votes put at 844,519 votes (Table 10.2). The detail is contained in Table 10.3, showing the name of all the presidential candidates, their party platforms and the number of votes won. These results are, in themselves, significant for a number of reasons. Indeed, merely looking at their face value only tells a part of the story. A deeper reflection reveals broader issues of continuity and change in the results. Among others, it fails to illustrate the voting patterns in the

Table 10.2 Results of the presidential election, 2015

S/N Candidate Party Votes %

1 Muhammadu Buhari All Progressives Congress 15,424,921 53.96 2 Goodluck Jonathan People’s Democratic Party 12,853,162 44.96 3 Adebayo Ayeni African Peoples Alliance 53,537 0.19 4 Ganiyu Galadima Allied Congress Party of 40,311 0.14 Nigeria 5 Sam Eke Citizens Popular Party 36,300 0.13 6 Rufus Salau Alliance for Democracy 30,673 0.11 7 Mani Ahmad African Democratic Congress 29,665 0.10 8 Allagoa Chinedu Peoples Party of Nigeria 24,475 0.09 9 Martin Onovo National Conscience Party 24,455 0.09 10 Tunde Anifowose- Accord Alliance 22,125 0.08 Kelani 11 Chekwas Okorie United Progressive Party 18,220 0.06 12 Comfort Sonaiya Kowa Party 13,076 0.05 13 Godson Okoye United Democratic Party 9,208 0.03 14 Ambrose Albert Owuru Hope Party 7,435 0.03 Invalid/Blank Votes 844,519 - Total 29,432,083 100 Registered Voters 67,422,005

Source: INEC Sources, 2015 218 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table 10.3 Results of 2015 presidential election by geo-political zones

Geo-Political Zones APC PDP Total

North-Central 2,411,013 1,874,638 4,285,651 North-East 2,848,678 796,588 3,645,266 North-West 7,115,199 1,339,709 8,454,908 South-East 198,778 2,464,906 2,663,684 South-South 418,590 4,714,725 5,133,315 South-West 2,433,193 1,821,399 4,254,592 Total 15,425,451 13,011,965 28,437,416

Source: Computed from INEC Dataset, 2015 presidential election. In other words, the results of the 2015 presidential election afﬁrmed some notable trends from previous presidential elections, erased some and established some other new patterns that would have to be observed across future elections to determine if such could also develop into a pattern or trend in subsequent presidential elections. In order to establish this position, a cursory look at the results of previous presidential elections, as well as the geo-political distribution of the votes is important. Since the results above also provide some insights into the spatial dimension of voter turnout in the presidential election, it is also useful to show the regional patterns of turnout in the presidential election. This is provided in Table 10.4. Before analysing the results, some comment on the success of the opposition, for the ﬁrst time in the history of Nigeria’s presidential election, is in order. Interestingly, the same set of factors can help explain the success of the APC and the failure of the PDP. Such factors include improvements in the quality of election administration, which increases the possibilities of making the votes count, following series of reform initiatives aimed at strengthening the autonomy, capacity and professionalism of the INEC. This was unlike under the previous order when the

Table 10.4 Result of the 1999 presidential election

Candidate (Party) (Coalition) Number of Votes % of Votes

Olusegun Obasanjo (PDP) 18, 738, 154 62.78% Olu Falae (AD) (AD-APP) 11, 110, 287 37.22%

Source: Hamalai (2014); Omotola (2013) SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 219

Table 10.5 Spatial breakdown of voter turnout in presidential elections, 2011 and 2015

Geo-Political Zones 2015 2011

North-Central 43.47 49 North-East 45.22 56 North-West 55.09 56 South-East 40.52 63 South-South 57.81 62 South-West 40.26 32 vote hardly counted (Agbaje and Adejumobi 2006); the poor record of performance by Jonathan’s administration, especially in the areas of national security and the economy. The poor response to the Boko Haram insurgency was particularly instrumental in the defeat of the PDP; the merger of dominant opposition parties to form a mega party that could better mobilize financial and administrative resources to confront the PDP; and internal fractionalization of the PDP, leading to high profile defections from the party to swell the rank and file of the APC, among others (Onapajo 2015a). Now to the election results. From Table 10.5, the first most basic electoral pattern inherited from previous results of presidential elections is that it has always tended to be a race between the two most prominent political parties in the country, usually the ruling party and the leading opposition party. Whereas all the presidential elections have always had multiple contestants, other parties (besides the first two) hardly made any meaningful impact on the results. This trend was discernible in all presidential elections since 1999 till date as contained in the following Tables 10.6–10.9. As seen in Tables 10.6–10.9, two parties contested the presidential election of 1999 (PDP and AD-APP alliance). In 2003, when the number of registered parties had increased, the number of presidential candidates also increased significantly to 20. In the 2007 general elections, 25 parties fielded presidential candidates, but slightly declined to 20 and 14 in the 2011 and 2015 presidential elections, respectively. The results reveal that the real competition had always been between the two leading parties. For example, in the 2003 presidential election (with 20 candidates) the two leading candidates/parties, namely PDP and ANPP polled 61.94% and 32.19%, respectively. This amounts to 94.13% of the total votes cast, 220 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table 10.6 Result of the 2003 presidential election

Candidate (Party) No of Votes % of Votes

Olusegun Obasanjo (PDP) 24,456,140 61.94 Muhammadu Buhari (ANPP) 12,710,022 32.19 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (APGA) 1,297,445 3.29 Jim Nwobodo (UNPP) 169,609 0.43 Gani Fawehimi (NCP) 161,333 0.41 Sarah Jubril (PAC) 157,560 0.40 Ike Nwachukwu (NDP) 132,997 0.34 Christopher Okotie (JP) 119,547 0.30 Balarabe Musa (PRP) 100,765 0.26 Arthur Nwankwo (PMP) 57,720 0.15 Emmanuel Okereke (APLP) 26,921 0.07 Kalu Idika Kalu (NNPP) 23,830 0.06 Muhammadu Dikko Yusuf (MDJ) 21,403 0.05 Yahaya Ndu (ARP) 11,565 0.03 Abayomi Ferreira (DA) 6,727 0.02 Tunji Braithwaite (NAP) 6,932 0.02 Iheanyichukwu Nnaji (BNPP) 5,987 0.02 Olapade Agoro (NAC) 5,756 0.01 Pere Ajuwa (LDPN) 4,473 0.01 Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo (MMN) 3,757 0.01

Source: Hamalai (2014); Omotola (2013) leaving 18 other candidates/parties with less than 6% of the total votes cast. The trend continued in 2007 when the two leading parties – the PDP and ANPP had 69.60% and 18.66% of the total votes cast, respectively, amounting to a total of 89.16%, leaving other 23 candidates with a little above 10% of the total votes cast. In this election, the level of competitiveness, however, declined between the two leading parties. The increase in the number of parties ﬁelding candidates from 20 in 2003 to 25 in 2007 may have contributed to the weakening of the competitive strength of the leading opposition party, lending some form of credence to the claim that some of the smaller parties were actually ‘owned’ and sponsored by the PDP in opposition strongholds (see Omotola 2013). However, stronger competitiveness between two leading parties was restored in the 2011 presidential election during which the two leading candidates, the PDP and CPC had 58.89% and 31.98% respectively. This amounts to 90.87% of the total votes cast, leaving the remaining 18 candidates/parties to a paltry 9.13% of the total votes cast. Yet, the SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 221

Table 10.7 Result of the 2007 presidential election

Candidate/Party No of Votes % of Votes

Umaru Musa Yar’Adua (PDP) 24,638,063 69.60 Muhammadu Buhari (ANPP) 6,605,299 18.66 Atiku Abubakar (AC) 2,637,848 7.45 Orji Uzor Kalu (PPA) 608,803 1.72 Attahiru Bafarawa (DPP) 289,224 0.82 Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu (APGA) 155,947 0.44 Pere Ajuwa (AD) 89,241 0.25 Christopher Okotie (FRESH) 74,049 0.21 Patrick Utomi (ADC) 50,849 0.14 Asakarawon Olapere (NPC) 33,771 0.10 Ambrose Owuru (HDP) 28,519 0.08 Arthur Nwankwo (PMP) 24,164 0.07 Emmanuel Okereke (ALP) 22,677 0.06 Lawrence Adedoyin (APS) 22,409 0.06 Aliyu Habu Fari (NDP) 21,974 0.06 Galtima Liman (NNPP) 21,665 0.06 Maxi Okwu (CPP) 14,027 0.04 Sunny Okogwu (RPN) 13,566 0.04 Iheanyichukwu Nnaji (BNPP) 11,705 0.03 Osagie Obayuwana (NCP) 8,229 0.02 Olapade Agoro (NAC) 5,752 0.02 Akpone Solomon (NMDP) 5,752 0.02 Isa Odidi (ND) 5,408 0.02 Aminu Abubakar (NUP) 4,355 0.01 Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo (MMN) 4,309 0.01

Source: Hamalai (2014) & Omotola (2013)

strongest degree of competition between the two leading parties was witnessed in the 2015 presidential election where the winning APC and runner-up PDP had 53.96% and 44.96% of the total votes cast, respectively. This adds up to 98.92% of the total votes cast, leaving the other 12 candidates/parties with only 1.18% of the total votes cast, thereby providing the strongest evidence that parties outside the top two only make the number but with no serious impact on the electoral outcomes. The 2015 presidential election results also reveal some element of continuity and change in the ethno-regional and religious character of voting. In the north-central (NC), for example, the PDP had been the dominant force before the 2015 presidential election. Though the contest 222 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Table 10.8 Result of the 2011 presidential election

Candidate (Party) No of Votes % of Votes

Goodluck Jonathan (PDP) 22,495,187 58.89 Muhammadu Buhari (CPC) 12,214,853 31.98 Nuhu Ribadu (ACN) 2,079,151 5.41 Ibrahim Shekarau (ANPP) 917,012 2.40 Mahmud Waziri (PDC) 82,243 0.21 Nwadike Chikezie (PMP) 56,248 0.15 Lawson Aroh (PPP) 54,203 0.14 Peter Nwangwu (ADC) 51,682 0.14 Iheanyichukwu Nnaji (BNPP) 47,272 0.12 Christopher Okotie (FRESH) 34,331 0.09 Dele Momodu (NCP) 26,376 0.07 Solomon Akpona (NMDP) 25,938 0.07 Lawrence Adedoyin (APS) 23,740 0.06 Ebiti Ndok (UNPD) 21,203 0.06 John Dara (NTP) 19,744 0.05 Rasheed Shitta-Bey (MPPP) 16,492 0.04 Yahaya Ndu (ARP) 12,264 0.03 Ambrose Owuru (HDP) 12,023 0.03 Patrick Utomi (SDMP) 11,544 0.03 Christopher Nwaokobia (LDPN) 8,472 0.02

Source: All tables adapted from African Elections Database, available at http://africanelections.tripod. com/ng.html (accessed on 15 October, 2013, reproduced in Omotola 2013)

Table 10.9 Voter turnout in presidential elections, 1959–2007

Elections Registered Voters Turnout Percentage

1959 General Election 9,043,404 7,189,797 79.50 1979 Presidential Election 48,633,782 16, 846, 633 34.00 1983 Presidential Election 65,304,818 25,430,096 38.00 1993 Presidential Election 37,826,460 14,321,963 37.00 1999 Presidential Election 57,838,945 30,280,052 52.30 2003 Presidential Election 60,823,022 42,018,735 69.10 2007 Presidential Election 61,567,036 35,397,517 valid votes 57.50 2011 Presidential Election 73,528,040 39,469,484 53.70 2015 Presidential Election 67,422,005 29,432,083 43.65

Source: Updated from Hamalai (2014); Omotola and Aiyedogbon (2012) SALIENT ISSUES IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 223 was fierce and seemingly close this time around, the PDP lost its dominance in the region, where the APC polled 2,411,013 votes, against PDP’s 1,874,638. The performance of the APC in this otherwise stronghold of the PDP may not be unconnected with internal divisions within the PDP, culminating in the gale of defections that attended the problem. Also in the south-west (SW), hitherto reputed as the stronghold of national opposition politics save for the brief period of 2003–2007, the contest was also very close, though the APC won with 2,433,193, against PDP’s 1,821,399 (Table 10.5). The closeness of the results can be explained partly in terms of the heavy deployment of power of incumbency, especially the massive influx of financial resources into the region in the aftermath of the postponement of the presidential election. However, wide margins between the two parties were noticeable in the four other political zones, two apiece. As contained in Table 10.5, in the north-east (NE) and the north-west (NW), the APC held sway with 2,848, and 678 against PDP’s 796,588; and 7,115,199 against PDP’s 1,339, and 709, respectively. Similar patterns were maintained in the south-east (SE) and south-south (SS). In the former, the PDP polled a total of 2,464,906 votes against APC’s 198,778; while in the latter, the PDP garnered 4,714,725 votes compared to APC’s 418,590 votes. Similar factors explain this trend. In the NW, Muhammadu Buhari, the APC’s candidate not only enjoyed a kind of traditional-loyalty followership in the region, but it had also been his electoral strength in previous elections. It was, therefore, unthinkable for the PDP to make any serious inroads into the region. For the NE, the menace of the Boko Haram and its attendant woes appeared to have denuded the PDP of its influence in the region. In the SS and SE, Goodluck Jonathan, PDP’s candidate also enjoyed huge support. Besides, the two regions had also enjoyed significant measure of federal patronage, especially in terms of political appointments in an unprecedented manner. The 2015 presidential election also experienced low voter turnout compared to previous elections. Standing at 52.30% in the earlier election of 1999, it increased to 69.10% in the 2003 election. The increase may be as a result of the fact that unlike in 1999 when there was so much scepticism about the reality of the transition programme, after years of several false starts, by 2003 it had become obvious that the democratization process was on course; hence, the rise in the level of popular participation. However, by 2007, there was a reduction in the level of turnout again at 57.50%. This further declined to 53.70% and 43.65% in 2011 and 224 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

2015 respectively. The progressive decline in turnout may not be unconnected to diverse forms of contradictions associated with the electoral processes which tend to erode public confidence in the institutional capacity, autonomy and professionalism of the INEC to conduct credible, free and fair elections where the votes would actually count. Worse still, the gains of a series of electoral reform initiatives, particularly those associated with the Justice Muhammed Uwais’ Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) would appear to have been lost to the excruciating level of post-election violence that attended the 2011 presidential election results. The pervasive tensions and fears regarding the possibility of the outbreak of violence in the march towards the 2015 presidential election may have served to exacerbate the problem in 2015. There are also regional variations in voter turnout that deserve some comments. The most glaring is the fact that the decline in voter turnout is universal across the six geo-political zones but one, as indicated in Table 10.4. However, the decline is steeper in some regions than the others. Specifically, while the NC witnessed roughly 7% decline from 49% in 2011 to 43.47% in 2015, the NE recorded 45.22% in 2015 compared to 56% in 2011. However, the NW enjoyed some stability with 55.09% in 2015 from 56.00% in 2011, a difference of less than 1%. For the SE and SS, turnout was 40.52% in 2015 against 63% in 2011; and 57.81% in 2015 against 62% in 2011. The only region to have recorded an increase in turnout was the SW, which graduated from 32% in 2011 to 40.26% in 2015. These figures raise pertinent issues that cannot be easily wished away. For instance, why the general decline in turnout? Why the regional variations? At a general level, declining voter turnout can be explained in terms of general voter apathy, itself a product of several other factors, including declining confidence in electoral institutions and the failure of democracy to respond to the democratic and developmental yearnings and aspirations of the people. Over the years, rather than empowering people in manners that enhance their welfare, there has been an increase in the number of democratic refugees across the land. But the situation in the NE defies logic. Given that the region has been the bedrock of the Boko Haram insurgency and attendant contradictions, it is ironic that the region could still pose a higher level of turnout than many other regions, including the NC, SE and SW. That the SW had always featured at the lowest rung of the ladder of turnout is surprising, especially given that the region is generally seen as the hotbed of political consciousness and activism. POST-ELECTION RESPONSES 225

These general and specific observations may have broader ramifications for voter registration than could be deduced from these figures. They may be a pointer to the fact that the voter register may not yet be as clean as INEC had portrayed it, raising the need for a careful and thorough reexamina- tion of the register regarding the possibility of multiple registration and general cleansing.

POST-ELECTION RESPONSES Contrary to pre-election prognostications, the announcement of the results of the presidential election did not usher in a regime of post- election violence as was the case in 2011. Such an unanticipated positive development could be attributed to certain forces in the conduct of the elections and thereafter. Apart from the marked improvement in the administration of the election, epitomized by certain innovations, including the deployment of technology and use of Permanent Voters Card (PVCs), the intervention of diverse forms of peace initiatives, especially the National Peace Committee, which brokered a Peace Accord that was signed on 10 January, 2015 in Abuja under the watch of Mr Kofi Annan and Chief Emeka Anyaoku. In the aftermath of the pronouncement of election results, there are at least two very significant issues that warrant some consideration. The first has to do with President Jonathan’s concession of defeat and the second opposition’s reactions. What would have constituted the third element, that is, election observation reports, has already been addressed in a previous section. With respect to the first, the concession of defeat by Jonathan is significant in many respects. Apart from being the first time an incumbent would be defeated in a presidential election in Nigeria, such a demonstration of grace is unknown to Nigeria’s presidential electoral history. It was an enviable step that saved the country from the orgy of violence that would have followed. As Alli (2015: 20) rightly pointed out, though that was ‘the right thing to do’, the situation could have been different if Jonathan had contested ‘the results or refused to accept the results, definitely there would have been violence across the land’. For Jonathan, acting otherwise was not an option because there was fulfilment in keeping his promise for a free and fair election to Nigerians, which for him, amounted to leaving ‘a legacy of democratic freedom, transparency, economic growth, and free and fair elections’. He, therefore urged those 226 10 THE 2015 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION who may have disagreements with the electoral outcome to follow due process of law in seeking for redress. Expectedly, the opposition not only applauded the uniqueness of Jonathan’s concession, but also acknowledged its positive impact on dousing tensions and averting recourse to violence. Alhaji Lai Muhammed, APC’s spokesperson, for example, corroborated this when he asserted in a press statement after the results were announced that, ‘there had always been this fear that he might not want to concede, but he will remain a hero for this move. The tension will go down dramatically’ (Aljazera, 4 April, 2015). Mohammadu Buhari, the newly elected president, also acknowledged that fact that ‘Jonathan’s action turned around Nigeria’s nervous political process. His action actually doused tension and averted crisis in Nigeria’ (quoted in Alli, 2015: 20). In his own reaction, President Buhari then called for ‘calm, sober celebrations’, warning supporters not to attack opponents, adding that ‘He or she is not with me, whoever does that’ (BBC 2015b). Finally, there was no litigation on the presidential election. This is also another unique post-election development, the first of its kind since 1999. These reactions of both the winning and losing candidates cannot be dissociated from the peace initiatives. They are also partly connected to the improved quality of the election administration process. Together they helped saved the country from all damning predictions and kept the democratization process on course.

CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have devoted attention to the presidential election within historical and comparative perspectives. This way we were able to identify elements of continuity and change across various presidential elections since 1999. After a brief comment on why the 2015 presidential election matters, the chapter examined what it considered to be salient issues in the elections, namely party primaries and candidate selection, electioneering campaigns, election administration, voting pattern/behaviour and election results, as well as post-election reactions, especially Jonathan’s concession of defeat and opposition’s responses. In the ﬁnal analysis, the chapter submits that there were evident improvements in the overall effectiveness of electoral administration and the democratic qualities of the elections. These positive developments were due to a number of reform initiatives that boosted the capacity, autonomy and professionalism REFERENCES 227 of the INEC to conduct credible, free and fair elections and enhance its public image. Despite these advances, there were also notable shortcomings that require urgent attention for improvement.

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The 2015 National Assembly Election

INTRODUCTION Elections into the Eight National Assembly (NASS) in Nigeria, consisting of the two Chambers – the Senate and the House of Representatives – were held concurrently with the presidential election on 28 March, 2015. Just as the presidential election, the NASS election also generated its own unique concerns and was significant for a number of reasons. For instance, shortly before the election, the battle of supremacy between the then ruling PDP and the new mega party, APC, reached a crescendo following the defection of leading members of the former to the latter. Earlier, the successful merger of the four legacy parties as they are now called, the defunct ACN, CPC, ANPP and a faction of APGA altered the configuration of membership of the NASS in both chambers, bridging the gap between the PDP and the main opposition, the APC. What the defections did was to further alter the configuration in favour of the APC. These developments heightened tensions and attracted litigations on both sides from both parties. The inability to find a lasting solution to the problem further exerted immense pressure on both parties in their bid to either retain and/or gain control over the eight Assemblies. This chapter analyses the dynamics of the 2015 NASS election, with a view to underscoring not only its high and low points, but identifying elements of continuity and change in the election. The chapter opens with a consideration of some salient issues that constituted the background to the 2015 NASS election. Here, attention is devoted to two explanatory

© The Author(s) 2017 231 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_11 232 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION themes, namely the significance of the 2015 NASS election and the composition of the NASS before the election, showing the dominance of the PDP since 1999. The second section provides an analysis of the 2015 NASS elections and the consequent reconfiguration of the NASS. Issues such as party primaries and candidate selection, election integrity, election results and new composition of the NASS along party, gender and leadership lines are given consideration. These issues are discussed in relation to the previous experiences of the NASS since 1999. The final section draws important conclusions and lessons learned.

TWO SALIENT BACKGROUND ISSUES We consider two background issues as salient to the understanding of the 2015 NASS elections, beginning with the signiﬁcance of the NA election to underscore why it matters. The second relates to the composition of the NASS in both chambers across all elections since 1999 (before the 2015 election).

The Significance of the 2015 NASS Election There is a general sense in which legislative elections are vital in a democracy. First, it is unthinkable to speak of a democracy without a legislative arm of government saddled with the tasks of representation, legislation and oversight. The effective performance of these roles is central to the success of any democracy. While a number of factors interplay to ensure effective legislative performance, including the quantity and quality of available resources, it has long been recognized that the form and character of legislative election constitute an important take-off point. The assumption is that if legislators are elected through credible, free and fair electoral processes in both the party primaries and general elections, then the higher the probability that they can maintain reasonable measure of independence and insulation from executive dominance and manipulations. Also, as a presidential democracy predicated upon the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislative arm must be constituted through a separate election different from the president’s. But beyond the general rationalizations, there are also specific salient issues underpinning the significance of the 2015 NASS election. First, the emergence of a mega political party, the APC, as a strong political player in TWO SALIENT BACKGROUND ISSUES 233 the system, posed serious threats to the hegemony of the PDP in the NASS since 1999. It all started in November 2013, when five serving Governors of the PDP, namely Mr Chibuike Amaechi (Rivers), Alhaji Ahmed Abdulfatah (Kwara), Dr Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso (Kano), Alhaji Murtala Nyako (Adamawa) and Alhaji Aliyu Wamakko (Sokoto), defected to the APC. The legislators from these states, who are more often than not, loyal to their governors, followed suit. In one fell swoop, 49 legislators mostly from the states of the defecting governors defected to the APC on the same day (Bello 2013). The breakdown shows that Kano has the highest number with 14, followed by Rivers 13, Sokoto 11, Adamawa and Kwara have 6 and 5, respectively (Thisday, 27 November, 2013). With this development, the number of APC legislators in the HoR, having initially risen to 137 following the merger increased to 186. This was not surprising because in most cases, the legislators were usually the political godsons of the governors, who not only influenced their emergence as party candidates in the first instance, but eventually footed their electoral bills. Consequently, the APC, for the first time, boasted of a slim majority of 186 out of 360 legislators in the HoRs. The APC, however, suffered a setback when on 18 December, 2013, following intense political wrangling and pressure from political factions and interests both within and outside the NASS, its number dropped to 172 against PDP’s 171. In yet another landmark coup, the APC benefited from another major defection when on 28 October, 2014, the Speaker of the HoRs, Mallam Aminu Tambuwal, defected to the party. The struggle for supremacy, especially with respect to the leadership of the HoR, following the new configuration that resulted from the series of defections, generated tensions, acrimonies and litigations between the two parties. For the APC, the leadership of the HoRs deserved reconstitution to make it reflect the balance of political forces, while for the PDP, such an interparty power shift was unimaginable because as far as the party was concerned, those who defected must forfeit their seats and go for reelection as stipulated in the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, an issue on which they sought judicial intervention. Moreover, the PDP also argued that for crossing to the APC, presiding Speaker of the HoR, Rt. Hon. Aminu Waziri Tambuwal, who was elected on the platform, was expected to also vacate his seat. This demand may be valid because, as Naanen rightly pointed out ‘Section 109 of the 1999 constitution clearly states that any elected official who defects to another party must resign his position. But this constitutional provision is hardly respected, making party boundaries 234 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION so fluid that elected representatives cross carpet at will without sanction’ (Naanen 2015: 7). What is important is that defections across parties are not new in Nigerian politics. After independence, this trend continued. Akinbade has argued that in the First Republic many politicians defected to the ruling party. For example of the ‘75 members of parliament elected on the platform of AG in 1959, only 13 remained in 1961. The same scenario played out in the Second Republic with many opposition politicians defecting to the then ruling NPN ...’. However, in the Fourth Republic defection and the underlying opportunism assumed the status of a norm, confirming Egwemi’s(2015: 7) point that it has assumed a life of its own in the Fourth Republic. In the hope of squaring up to defected members, the PDP had wanted to reconvene the house, which had earlier been adjourned by Speaker Tambuwal until 3 December, immediately after the announcement of his defection. It took the intervention of a Federal High Court, which granted the relief sought by the APC lawmakers by issuing an injunction to stop them. In another case instituted by the PDP, Justice Ademola Adeniyi of the Federal High Court, Abuja also granted the relief sought by the PDP to restrain members of the HoRs that defected to the APC, from altering or changing the leadership of the House, pending the determination of a suit before the court. The tension peaked with the botched attempt by security agents to lockout APC lawmakers, including Speaker Tambuwal, from entering the National Assembly Complex on Thursday, 19 November, 2015, forcing some lawmakers to scale the fence of the complex. The sustained tension that compelled the PDP leadership to reverse the situation on the eve of the 2015 NASS election, gave clear indications that the party would come out worse-off. For instance, for the first time, there was in existence, an opposition party which really looked like a genuine contender for power and an alternative to the hitherto domineering PDP at the centre. If the opposition APC were to win the presidential election as it turned out, it would require, at least, a simple majority for the smooth running of government. The PDP also needed to show that it remained a powerful force to be reckoned with in the political scheme of things; and in the event of defeat in the presidential election, as suggested by the prevailing trends, including the gales of defections from the party, it would also require some reasonable presence in the NASS to be able to retain some degree of political relevance. These considerations combined to shore-up the importance of the NASS assembly election thereby putting TWO SALIENT BACKGROUND ISSUES 235 extra pressure on the parties in their determination to do well in the election.

Composition of the National Assembly since 1999 The second background issue that made the 2015 NASS election signiﬁ- cant was the composition of both chambers since 1999, especially with reference to party representation, gender and leadership. With respect to political party representation, the PDP had been the dominant party in the NASS from 1999 to the 2015 elections. This dominance is captured in Tables 11.1–11.4: As Tables 11.1–11.4 reveal, though the PDP had been dominant, the NASS elections since 1999, had always provided avenues for other political parties to compete and participate in the electoral processes. Unfortunately, the level of competitiveness had remained abysmally low to the extent that the PDP was able to maintain its hegemony between 1999 and 2011. The competitiveness of legislative elections can be measured by such indicators as winner’s share of the vote, winning party’s share of legislative seats, second party’s share of legislative seats and turnover of power (Lindberg 2004). Winner’s share of the votes is a percentage of the total valid votes cast; therefore, the closeness of the outcome among competing parties is a reﬂection of the level of electoral competition (Lindberg 2004, 2009). If we go by this argument, then the elections were everything but competitive. Such an argument ignores the possibility that a party, particularly the ruling party, may win an election with a

Table 11.1 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 1999 election results

Party Senate House of Representatives % of Votes Number of % of Votes Number of Seats (109) Seats (360)

People’s Democratic 56.4 59 57.1 206 Party (PDP) All People’s Party (APP) 31.2 29 30.6 74 Alliance for 12.4 20 12.4 68 Democracy (AD) Vacant/Undeclared Seats – 1 – 12 236 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Table 11.2 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2003 election results

Party Senate House of Representatives Number of %of Number Number of %of Number Votes Votes of Seats Votes Votes of Seats (109) (360)

People’s 15,585,538 53.69 76 15,927,807 54.49 223 Democratic Party (PDP) All Nigeria 8,091,783 27.87 27 8,021,531 27.44 96 People’s Party (ANPP) Alliance for 2,828,082 9.74 6 2,711,972 9.28 34 Democracy (AD) United 789,705 2.72 – 803,432 2.75 2 Nigeria People’s Party (UNPP) National 459,462 1.58 – 561,161 1.92 1 Democratic Party (NDP) All 429,073 1.48 – 397,147 1.36 2 Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) People’s 204,929 0.71 – 222,938 0.76 1 Redemption Party (PRP) Others 641,535 2.21 – 587,082 2.01 – Vacant –– – – – 1

landslide not only on the strength of its organization, popularity and campaign strategies, but also through electoral corruption and violence. The same explanation goes for winning party’s share of parliamentary seats. If the winning party has two-third majority in the parliament, which automatically confers on it the ability to effect constitutional changes without recourse to the others, such a system could not be said to be very competitive. Worse TWO SALIENT BACKGROUND ISSUES 237

Table 11.3 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2007 election results

Party Senate HoRs No of Seats (109) No of Seats (360)

People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 87 263 All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) 14 63 Action Congress (AC) 6 30 Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA) 1 3 Accord Party (ACCORD) 1 – Labour Party (LP) – 1 still, the second party’s share of the seats in both chambers has also always been low as to enable them to have any serious political influence on the legislative business. With this trend, the question of alternation of power was never an option between 1999 and 2011. Areflection on the data in Table 11.4 lends credence to this claim. Specifically, in 1999 the PDP won 59 (56.4%) of the 109 senatorial seats and 206 (57.2%) of the seats in the HoR. This almost doubled the number of seats won by the runner-up, namely the APP, which had 29 (31.2%) and 74 (30.6%) of seats in the Senate and HoR in the same election, respectively. In 2003, the PDP led with 76 (53.69%) and 223 (54.49%) of the seats in the Senate and HoR respectively, leaving the second party, the ANPP with 27 (27.87%) and 96 (27.44%) of senatorial and HoR seats. The third party, the AD won just 6 (9.74%) and 34 (9.28%) seats in the Senate and HoR. In the 2007 election, the PDP recorded a landslide with

Table 11.4 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2011 election results

Party Senate HoRs No of Seats (109) No of Seats (360)

People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 45 123 Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) 13 47 All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) 7 25 Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) 5 30 Others 4 9

Source: Tables 11.1–11.4 adapted from Hamalai (2014); Omotola (2013) 238 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

87 (79.81%) and 263 (73.3%) of seats in the Senate and HOR, compared to ANPP’s 14 (12.84%) and 63 (17.5%), respectively. In 2011, however, the parliamentary dominance of the PDP was seriously challenged, though it still maintained its lead in both chambers. The PDP had 45 (41.28%) and 123 (34.16%) seats in the Senate and HoRs; followed by the ACN, which had 13 (11.92%) and 47 (13.05%); the ANPP with 7 (6.42%) and 25 (6.94); and CPC with 5 (4.58%) and 30 (8.33%) in the same order (Omotola 2013). The previous data reveal that despite the fact that the legislative dominance of the PDP was seriously challenged in the 2011 NASS election, not just by the second party, but two other opposition parties that had some reasonable number of seats in both chambers, the PDP still managed to retain its majority with 45 (41.28%) and 123 (34.16%) seats in the Senate and HoR respectively. As marginal as this gain may seem, it constituted part of the reasons why some analysts attributed some reasonable measure of credibility to the 2011 elections (Akhaine 2011; Gberie 2011; Omotola 2011). The gender composition of the NASS has also been very appalling in both chambers since 1999, with very marginal women representation. This is as presented in Table 11.5: From Table 11.5, it is obvious that women have always been underrepresented in both chambers of the NASS under the Fourth Republic. In a Senate of 109 senators, the highest representation of women was attained in 2007 when only 9 (8.2%) of them were elected. Rather than improve, as was the case from 1999 when it moved from 3 (2.8%) to 4 (3.7%) in 2003, it disappointingly dropped from 9 in 2007 to 8 (7.3%) in 2011. Similar pattern was noticeable in the HoR where the highest rate of women representation was recorded also in 2007 when only 27 (6.1) women were elected in a house comprising 360 members. As it happened in the Senate, women representation also declined from 27 in 2007 to 24 (6.7%) in 2011; and the lowest representation of women recorded in 1999

Table 11.5 Women representation in the NA, 1999–2011

NA 1999 2003 2007 2011

Senate 3 (2.8%) 4 (3.7%) 9 (8.2%) 8 (7.3%) HoRs 12 (3.3%) 22 (6.1%) 27 (7.5%) 24 (6.7%)

Source: Hamalai (2014: 79) TWO SALIENT BACKGROUND ISSUES 239 when only 12 (3.3%) women were elected, followed by an increase to 22 (6.1%) in 2003. In the absence of adequate numerical representation of women in the NASS, it becomes problematic, if not impossible, to begin to talk about the substantive representation of women. Substantive representation of women is often defined in terms of the activities of women parliamentar- ians in championing and delivering on specific women-related friendly policies (Omotola 2007). This can be done effectively if women occupy leadership positions in parliament, including serving as members of the principal officials of parliament and/or serving as committee chairpersons. Either way, they require, first and foremost, the numerical strength of their representation as a ladder to substantive representation. Many have identified diverse forms of obstacles militating against effective women participation in politics in general and women representation in politics in particular. In this respect, studies allude to forces such as African cultural traditions that tend to treat women as ‘subhuman’, the patriarchal and masculine nature of politics in this part of the world, exemplified by the prevailing culture of political violence, the undue monetization of politics in an economy that affords only few economic opportunities for wealth accumulation and ownership, among others (Omotola 2007). For these and related constraints, the dominant tendency is to argue for diverse forms of affirmative action such as quota system, whose main preoccupation is the automatic allocation of certain percentage of offices to women on the basis of their gender. But as argued elsewhere, such a practice is imbued with a double-edged sword. While it may hold secure improved gender representation numerically, it can also compromise the whole essence of that representation at the substantive level (Omotola 2007). In the circumstance, it would be better for women to rely on their ‘politics’ in gaining entrance into the arena of power and politics, if such entrance is to yield enduring returns for the advancement of women’sinterests. Of course, a careful reading of the aforementioned analysis reveals the obvious about the leadership composition of the NASS. Given the dominance of the PDP in both chambers between 1999 and 2011, it should be expected that the PDP will also dominate the leadership of the NASS. And that was the situation all through the period, with the opposition parties restricted to traditionally oppositional offices such as Minority Leader in both chambers. The only exception is that membership and leadership of legislative committees were often distributed across parties, but in a way that still reflected the numerical strength of the PDP. The same logic 240 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION extends to women representation in leadership positions. In the absence of adequate numerical representation, women found it hard to get key leadership positions apart from serving as committee members, and in few exceptional cases, committee chairpersons. One major exception, however, was the emergence of Patricia Etteh as the Speaker of the HoR in 2007. Unfortunately, she was compelled to resign her position as Speaker on 30 October, 2007, following weeks of allegations and counter- allegations bordering on corruption (Sahara Reporter 2014). These constituted some of the most salient background issues against which the 2015 NASS election was conducted. In the next section, we shall examine some vital elements of continuity and change inherent in the 2015 NASS elections.

THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER IN THE NASS It is undeniable that one signiﬁcant consequence of the outcome of the 2015 elections at the national level was the reconﬁguration of power in the NASS. However, in bringing into focus the overall impact of this development, this section explores pertinent issues of party primaries and electioneering campaigns, election results and distribution of power among the parties and legislative turnover.

Pre-Election Issues: Party Primaries and Electioneering Campaigns Two issues are central to this section, namely issues of party primaries and candidate selection processes and the electioneering campaigns. With respect to the first, it is important to note that most of the parties conducted party primaries to select their flag bearers in the NASS election. Depending on the constitutions of each of the parties, the primaries are either through a competitive election or by consensus. In the APC, for example, the National Working Committee (NWC) is saddled with the task of organizing primary election for the nomination of its presidential Candidates, Governorship Candidates and Candidates for election into the National and State Assemblies. The procedures for the exercise are outlined in Article 20 of the APC Constitution dealing with Procedure for Nomination of Candidates, which stipulates ‘indirect primaries for the purpose of nominating a candidate shall be done at a designated venue for that THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER IN THE NASS 241 purpose, by an Electoral College of delegates democratically elected by members of the Party from the various wards contained in the particular constituency at congresses’. However, the constitution made provisions for possible amendment of the procedure to allow for consensus. However, despite the conduct of party primaries, there were issues about the transparency and openness of the process, broadly encapsulated in terms of level of compliances with regulations governing the exercise. Across the two dominant parties, there were several cases of allegations and counter-allegations about the gross violation of the laws governing the conduct of party primaries. Moreover, in many instances, there were allegations of malpractices and fraud, including resort to violence and the excessive use of money to buy the votes of delegates. In some extreme instances, there were allegations that the primaries did not even hold at all as the process was allegedly hijacked by some godfathers to anoint their godsons. Therefore, it was hardly surprising to see the outcomes greeted with protests and controversies, including litigations. Though found across parties, it was much more pronounced in the PDP. The cases listed earlier came mostly from the PDP. A public commentator reflected on the extent of the problems within the PDP stating that the primary elections were marred by widespread internal wrangling (Ukeh 2015). There are many obvious cases within the PDP. In Anambra State, for example, there were multiple primary elections held by different factions for the National Assembly elections. In the state, most of the senatorial aspirants held their respective primary elections and declared themselves and their favoured ones winners. These were baffling, given that the PDP NWC had announced a postponement of the National Assembly primary elections in the state. There is a sense in which primaries conducted in the state since 1999 for selecting candidates for election into the National Assembly provide insight into the disturbing nature of lack of transparency in the process in the country. For instance, in 1999, known candidates at the time of conducting election into the Senate were not those who eventually represented the state. This repeated itself in the 2003 and, to some extent, in the 2007 elections. Again, parallel primaries organized by state executive members of the party and party committees mandated by the NWC of the party threw up different candidates who claimed to be candidates for election into the Senate. The attendant litigations were fought in the Supreme Court which gave a ruling that has created confusion rather than any resolution for the dispute. 242 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

In a unanimous ruling of the apex court on 29 January, 2016, the court upheld the judgment of the Appeal Court which said that senators representing Anambra South, Andy Ubah and his Anambra Central counter- part, Stella Oduah, were products of pre-election irregularities, the same verdict earlier passed in relation to the third senator representing the state, Uche Ekwinife. The issue was that a faction of the PDP in Anambra state led by Ejike Oguebego, was recognized as the authentic executive of the party in the state, and, therefore, was the right organ to conduct primary election prior to the 2015 election. Instead, these senators were selected in the party primary conducted by a PDP faction led by Augustine Akobundo, which was endorsed by INEC (Premium Times, 29 January, 2016). However, contrary to the popular interpretation of the public and the media to the effect that these products of illegal primary had been sacked, the Supreme Court said its judgment was only in relation to the legal status of the primary that threw them up as candidates. Also in Ebonyi state, the PDP equally announced the postponement of the primary election but the exercise was conducted and results declared. He also noted that in Enugu, two primary elections were held, with one attended by the INEC observers as well as all major stakeholders in the state and another conducted by an aggrieved aspirant. Other cases within the PDP included that of Delta state, where the state chapter of the PDP ‘rejected the National Assembly Primary Election committee and Electoral Appeal Panel members posted to the state for senatorial and governorship primary elections’. Also in Rivers state, protesters under the umbrella of ‘Coalition of Rivers State PDP House of Assembly and National Assembly Aspirants’ in a petition dated 3 December, 2014, signed by 31 aggrieved members and addressed to president Goodluck Jonathan, also insisted that the NWC must issue a clearance certificate to all aspirants. The move was necessitated by the decision of the NWC in charge of the primary election to screen out some aspirants. Similar trends were reported in other political parties. For example, in the specific case of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), ‘acertaincon- troversy surfaced in Imo State following the substitution of a contestant for another person as the Imo State senatorial candidate of the party for the 2015 elections’. The exercise in Anambra state, especially of the HoR in APGA, wasalsosaidtohavebeentrailedbyconfusionandintrigues,withsomeof those who felt they were outmanoeuvred petitioning Governor Willie Obiano and the national chairman of the party, Chief Victor Umeh. In Kogi state, there were massive protests over the conduct of the NASS THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER IN THE NASS 243 primaries. For instance, some aspirants to the HoR staged a protest at the party’s secretariat over alleged hijacking of election materials by some party stakeholders. In fact, the grievances over the conduct of the NASS primaries in the state led to the fractionalization of the party, with aggrieved aspirants and their supporters, led by Samuel Aro, a former member of the HoR who wanted a ticket to the Senate, defecting to the Accord Party in pursuit of their aspiration. Abuse of procedures of party primaries in varying degrees characterized the selection processes across the parties in the period leading to the 2015 general elections. And as Onapajo rightly pointed out, ‘this problem affected the quality of the 2015 electoral process’. The EU EOM (2015:4)wasright in noting that ‘the lack of an effective monitoring mechanism for internal party democratic processes for candidate nomination’ and ‘INEC’s inability to reject nominated aspirants (who emerged in dubious circumstances)’ had negative implications for the credibility of the entire process. The aforementioned claim is validated by the fact that in some of these states where these aberrations were committed, many of the NASS seats have been annulled by election petition tribunals up to the appellate court, calling for the conduct of fresh elections within 90 days. The two of the three senatorial seats in Kogi state have been annulled, with a ban on the APC not to field candidates for the rescheduled election. The main reason for such annulments included non-compliance with the electoral law on party primaries and candidate selection. Other cancellations and call for fresh elections have been made in Rivers, Anambra, Imo, Taraba, Akwa Ibom, Enugu, Benue and a host of others. These cases of annulment attest to the fact that defective party primaries could have dire consequences on the integrity of the overall election. Since the NASS elections were conducted concurrently with the presidential election, we need not replicate what has already been said about the administration and the integrity of the elections. Moreover, the election observation reports summarized on the chapter on the presidential election also apply to the NASS elections.

Election Results and the Composition of the National Assembly The result released by INEC show that the APC won convincingly in both chambers of the NASS. The breakdown of the results, as contained in Table 11.6, attests to this claim. 244 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Table 11.6 Composition of the national assembly, based on the 2015 election results

Party Senate HoRs No of Seats (109) No of Seats (360)

APC 60 (55%) 225 (62%) PDP 49 (45%) 125 (33%) Others: Labour Party, APGA, ACCORD 0 10 (3%)

Source: Computed from NCSSR (2015: 47)

As can be seen from the election results announced by INEC and presented in Table 11.6, out of the 109 seats in the Senate, the APC won 60 senatorial Districts (55%), while the PDP won 49 (45%), leaving nothing to the other parties in the contest. Looking at the senatorial election results critically, a few facts indicating elements of continuity and change are discernible. One, the gradual decline of the PDP in the Senate, whose signs had begun to manifest in the 2011 election when the party lost 14 seats sliding from 87 Senate seats in 2007 to 73 seats in 2011, continued unabated. The downward spiralling of the PDP in the Senate continued, with the party losing additional 24 Senate seats from 73 in 2011 to 49 in 2015. Conversely, the progressive ascendancy of the opposition in the Senate, which began to crystallize following the formation of the APC through the merger of four opposition parties, experienced a boost during the 2015 election. When summed up, the parties that formed the APC had combined senatorial seats of 20 in 2007 (see Table 11.4) compared to PDP’s 73. Their combined senatorial seats increased to 25 in 2011 before the merger, against PDP’s 45 the same time. In the 2015 election after the merger, APC recorded a quantum leap with 60 senatorial seats, compared to PDP’s 49, thereby establishing the leadership of the party in the eighth Senate. The trend was not different in the HoR where the PDP also suffered further decline in number and its loss became the gains of the erstwhile opposition APC. To be sure, out of the 360 seats in the HoR, the APC won 225 (62%), while the PDP won 125 seats (35%), leaving the three other political parties, namely Labour Party, the APGA and the Accord Party with a combined share of 10 seats (3%). By implication, the PDP suffered a loss of 140 seats in 2011, falling from 263 seats in 2007 to 123 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER IN THE NASS 245 seats in 2011. Though it did not suffer further decline in 2015, winning a total of 125 seats, this figure pales into insignificance, especially when we consider the fact that the APC won 225 seats in the same election, beating the PDP with exactly 100 seats in the HoR. By implication, the rise of a new party with majority seats in both chambers imposes its own new demands, especially in the sphere of leadership composition. Going by traditions and conventions, the new APC should provide the leadership of the Senate and the HoR, leaving the usually designated posts for the opposition. However, as a result of internal strife and polarization and realignment of forces, the APC lost/conceded the office of its Deputy president to the opposition PDP, a feat that has never happened since 1999. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the development has continued to generate tension in the Senate. Be that as it may, the APC is clearly in the forefront of the leadership of both chambers as dictated by the outcome of the 2015 NASS election. It is also important to note that the 2015 election narrowed the number of parties with representation in both chambers of the NASS. This is a significant departure from the situation between 2003 and 2007 when, at least, six parties controlled seats in the National Assembly (Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, NCSSR, 2015: 47). In 2003, for example, three parties won seats in the Senate and seven in the HoR. Parties in the Senate became five in 2007 and six in 2011; but for the HoR, there were six parties in 2007 and seven in 2011. By 2015, the number of parties in the parliament had declined to only two (2) in the Senate and five (5) in the HoR. The gradual reduction in the number of parties winning seats in the NASS would appear to have further legitimized the decision of INEC to deregister some 28 political parties, despite controversies and litigation over the propriety of such an action, for poor electoral showing, particularly their inability to win seats in the NASS and in any of the 36 State Houses of Assemblies (SHAs). The results of the 2015 NASS election also have important gender ramifications in terms of continuity and change. Above all else, it affirms the long-standing tradition established since 1999, regarding the underrepresentation of women in parliament. In the Senate, only eight (8) female senators were elected, amounting to a meagre 6.4%. These were Oluremi Tinubu (Lagos Central, APC), Stella Oduah (Anambra North, PDP), Fatimata Raji Rasaki (Ekiti Central, PDP), Abiodun Olujimi (Ekiti South, PDP), Uche Ekwunife, (Anambra Central, PDP), Rose Okoh (Cross River North, PDP), Monsurat Sunmonu (Oyo Central, APC) 246 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION and Binta Masi Garba (Adamawa North, APC) (Tsan 2015: 4; Uzoanya and Awodipe 2015: 8; quoted in Akpan 2015:10–11). When compared to the previous elections, it constitutes a decline from 9 (8.3%) in 2007 and constant at 8 (6.4%) in 2011. The decline in the HoR was sharper, declining from 22 (5.8%), 27 (6.9%) and 24 (7.2%) in 2003, 2007 and 2011 respectively to 14 (3.9%) in 2015. This shows that Nigeria still has a long way to go when it comes to women political representation.

Legislative Turnover The 2015 NASS election results also followed similar pattern in terms of legislative turnover and reelection rates. A recent study by Hamalai, Obadan and Egwu (2015) showed that reelection into Nigerian parliament has been very low, meaning a high rate of legislative turnover. Specifically, this shows that in the Sixth Assembly, out of 109 senators elected in 2007, 86 (79%) were elected for the first time. This shows that only 23 (14%) were reelected, implying a very high turnover rate. This means that 79% of the senators who served in the Fifth Assembly (2003– 2007) were not returned to the Senate in 2007. A similar pattern was also reported in the HoR, where the turnover rate in the Seventh Assembly, inaugurated on 6 June, 2011, was also found to be very high. For instance, out of the 109 senators, only 36 (33%) were reelected while 73 (67%) were elected for the first time. This implies a turnover rate of 67.0%. They also found the situation to be worse in the HoR, where out of 360 members, 260 (72.2%) were elected for the first time, implying that only 100 (17.8%) were reelected. This trend continued in the 2015 NASS election where more than 70 and 250 members of the Seventh Assembly were not reelected in the Senate and HoR respectively. This shows that about 39 (35%) senators were reelected, implying a turnover rate of 64.2%. For the HoR, it shows that only about 110 (30.5%) were reelected, with a turnover rate of 69.5%. The turnover rate seems too high and could impact legislative performance and effectiveness. Speaking about this at the induction course organized by the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS) for the newly elected legislators on 28 March, 2015, the then Senate president, David Mark lamented the high rate of legislative turnover (Krishi and Sule 2015). The validity of this claim can hardly be contested and raises valid concerns about the conditions responsible for high rates of legislative REFERENCES 247 turnover. While forces such as the poor state of internal party democracy and the monetization of politics could be partly responsible for this trend, it would appear that in the 2015 case, the defeat of the PDP in the NASS, which had majority of the members prior the emergence of the APC, could have played a significant role in the development.

CONCLUSION Our primary objective in this chapter was to analyse the dynamics of the 2015 NASS election, with a view to underscoring not only its high and low points, but also identifying elements of continuity and change in the election. In doing this, the chapter has examined what it considered as some of the most salient issues that constituted the background to the 2015 NASS election. This was the signiﬁcance of the 2015 NASS election, showing why the NASS elections matter; and the composition of the NASS before the election, showing the dominance of the PDP since 1999. The chapter also undertook a critical analysis of the 2015 NASS election and its attendant reconﬁguration, with strong comparative ferment with previous elections under the Fourth Republic. Drawing insights from issues such as party primaries and candidate selection, election integrity, election results and new composition of the NASS along party, gender, leadership lines and legislative turnover, the chapter underscored important elements of continuity and change in both chambers of the NASS. The shift in the composition of the NASS in favour of the new governing party, the APC; and the attendant leadership change, represents the most obvious element of change. However, in terms of party structure, the two leading parties remain dominant, as before; the gender dimension remains disproportionately skewed against women; and the level of turnover remains very high as has always been the case under the Fourth Republic. These were obvious issues of continuity, though not very palatable ones.

REFERENCES Akhaine, S. O. 2011, ‘Nigeria’s 2011 elections: The ‘crippled giant’ learns to walk?’ African Affairs, 110(441), pp. 649–655. Akpan, N. E. 2015, Men Without Women: An Analysis of the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria, available at http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/07/Conference-Paper-by-Nse-Etim-Akpan.pdf 248 11 THE 2015 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION

Bello, U. A. 2013, Kogi PDP Primary Elections that deﬁed Wada’s Voice www. sundaytrust.com.ng (accessed on 5 July, 2016) Egwemi, V. ed. 2011, Issues in the 2011 General Elections in Nigeria. Lapai: Department of History and International Relations, IBB University. European Union Election Observation Mission, EUEOM, 2015, Final Report Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2015; available at http://www.premiumtimesng. com/regional/north-central/179153-buhari-jonathan-meets-sign-another- peace-accord.html (accessed on 20 January, 2016). Gberie, L. 2011, The 2011 Elections in Nigeria: A New Dawn? Institute of security Studies Situation Report, 13 May, 2011; available at http://www. obsafrique.eu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/13May2011Nigeria.pdf (accessed on 12 May, 2015). Hamalai, L. 2014, Continuity and Change in Nigeria’s Elections: A Collection of Essays. Abuja: National Institute for Legislative Studies National Assembly. Hamalai, L., Obadan, M., and Egwu, S. 2015, National Assembly Capacity Needs Assessment. Abuja: NILS. Krishi, M. A., and Sule, I. K. 2015, Inside 8th Assembly Lawmakers’ Induction Course, Daily Trust, 8 May, 2015, available at http://www.pressreader.com/ nigeria/daily-trust/20150508/281788512626294/TextView Lindberg, S. 2004, ‘The democratic qualities of multiparty elections: Participation, competition and legitimacy in Africa’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 42(1), pp. 61–105. Lindberg, S. 2009 (ed.), Democratization by Elections: A New Mode of Transition. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins. Naanen, B. 2015, 2015 Elections: Threatened Collapse of Opposition, and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria, available at http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/07/Conference-Paper-by-Ben-Naanen.pdf Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, NCSSR, 2015, Report on Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections 28 March & 11 April 2015; available at http://www.placng. org/situation_room/sr/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SITUATION- ROOM-REPORT-ON-2015-ELECTIONS.pdf (accessed on 25 November, 2016). Omotola, J. S. 2007, ‘Godfathers and the 2007 Nigerian general elections’, Journal of African Elections, 6(2), pp. 134–54. Omotola, J. S. 2011, ‘Electoral reform and the prospects of democratic consolidation in Nigeria’, Journal of African Elections, 10(1), pp. 187–207. Omotola, J. S. 2013, ‘Opposition and the challenges of multiparty democracy’, The Nigerian Electoral Journal (Special Issue on Opposition Politics in Nigeria), 5(2), pp. 1–46. Sahara Reporter, 2014, ‘Buhari Wins APC Presidential Primary, Confronts President Jonathan In February Election’, 11 December, available at REFERENCES 249

http://saharareporters.com/2014/12/11/buhari-wins-apc-presidential-pri mary-confronts-president-jonathan-february-election (accessedon18 September, 2015). Tsan, A. 2015, ‘2015 Elections: How Women Fared’, Leadership, April, 17. Ukeh, O. 2015, ‘2015, PDP and vexed primary elections’, The Sun; available at http://sunnewsonline.com/new/2015-pdp-and-vexed-primary-elections/ (accessed on 20 January, 2016). Uzoanya, E. P. and Awodipe, T. 2015, ‘Nigerian Women’s Scorecard in 2015 Polls’, The Guardian, April 18. CHAPTER 12

The 2015 Gubernatorial Election

INTRODUCTION The gubernatorial elections, together with those of the State Houses of Assembly across the country, were held on 11 April, 2015, two weeks after the presidential and National Assembly (NASS) elections. Despite the generally positive outlook of the national elections, especially with respect to their democratic qualities, a number of flaws were widely reported about the overall effectiveness of their administration of the state level. The most notable of such concerns relates to the failure of election technologies, particularly the electronic card readers in many parts of the country; as well as pockets of violence recorded in some states. Therefore, the gubernatorial elections offered an opportunity to INEC and other institutions such as security agencies, to remedy deficiencies noticed in the earlier elections. Second, the realignment of political forces, occasioned by the successful merger of the legacy parties into the APC as already noted, not only altered the configuration of the political terrain in many states, but also heightened the stakes and tensions associated with the gubernatorial elections across many states. Consequently, and in line with the long-standing tradition of Nigerian elections, the state elections became much more volatile and violence-prone. Third, the pre-election threats analysis conducted by some notable local civil society organisations (CSOs), especially the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) and CLEEN Foundation, among others, had repeatedly warned about certain states that were more prone to violence during the elections. Indeed, many states were coded red signifying

© The Author(s) 2017 251 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_12 252 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION high levels of violence, a few were coded amber showing low levels of security threats, while only a handful had green indicating prospects of peaceful elections even as the situation rapidly changed as the Election Day drew nearer. With these and related considerations, it became clear that the gubernatorial elections had important implications for the overall integrity of the 2015 general elections. Getting it right could instil confidence not only into INEC’s capability for rapid response, especially in the light of the short- comingsrecordedinthefederalelections, but also the capability of security agencies to provide effective election security. While it is clear that some issues raised here had earlier been raised in the chapters on the presidential and NASS elections, and, indeed, partially highlighted across the chapters, focusing on the gubernatorial election as an isolated experience gives the benefits of in-depth examinations of the salient issues around the elections. The chapter examines power distribution among the various political parties before the 2015 election with emphasis on the state won and controlled by the various political parties at the state level since 1999. Set against this background, the chapter proceeds to look at the salient themes in the 2015 gubernatorial elections and the attendant reconfiguration of power among the various political parties. Among others, the chapter examines: (a) pre-election issues, most notably party primaries, candidate selection and electioneering campaigns; (b) election administration and election integrity, drawing important insights from election monitoring reports; (c) election results and reconfiguration of power, with emphasis on party distribution across states; (d) Some notable exceptionalism, especially the south-east and the south-south where the PDP maintained its stronghold; and (e) post-election issues, especially election petitions and outcomes. In the final analysis, the chapter concludes, on the strength of available evidence, that the 2015 gubernatorial elections, though a step forward when compared to the previous elections since 1999, it still had all the trappings of more volatility and greater proclivity to abuse and violence showing clearly that the more local elections are, the higher the proclivity for violence and related antics employed by the politicians to win at all costs.

GOVERNORSHIP POWER DISTRIBUTION AMONG PARTIES BEFORE THE 2015 ELECTION Consistent with observed trends, the PDP dominated the governorship elections in Nigeria since 1999. As can be seen in Table 12.1,inthe founding election of 1999, three parties won governorship seats, with the GOVERNORSHIP POWER DISTRIBUTION AMONG PARTIES ... 253

Table 12.1 Conﬁguration of governorship seats among parties before the 2015 election

S/No Parties 1999 2003 2007 2011

1 AC/ACN –– 1(+3) 6 2AD61 –– 3 APP/ANPP 9 7 5 3 4 APGA – 0(+1) – 2 5 CPC –– – 1 6LP –– 0(+1) 1 7 PDP 21 27 (−1) 28 (−4) 23 8 PPA –– 2= Total 36 36 36 36

Source: Computed from various sources: Akinyele (2004); Hamalai (2014); Akhaine (2011); Gberie (2011)

PDP claiming victory in 21 states, fairly spread across the country, leaving the Alliance for Democracy (AD) with six states all in the south-west and the All People’s Party (APP), which later became the All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), with nine states, all in the northern part of the country. In the 2003 governorship election, the power configuration among the parties remained largely unchanged in the sense that the PDP maintained, indeed consolidated its hold in the gubernatorial elections, increasing the number of states under its control from 21 in 2003 to 27 in 2003. However, the gains of the PDP became the loss of the AD, which lost five of the six additional states won by the PDP, namely Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states, leaving only Lagos state for the AC. The routing of the AD in the south-west in 2003 has been explained in terms of the unintended outcome of alliance forged between the AD and the PDP during the presidential election on the basis of which the former was not to present its own presidential candidate. The confusion of the electorate of the south-west which did not know that the alliance was limited to the presidential election and the resort to underhand dealings by the ruling PDP whose presidential candidate, President Olusegun Obasanjo was desperate to record electoral success in the geo-political zone, did in the AD as it was almost completely routed leaving only Lagos state as the only AD controlled state. It is believed that President Olusegun Obasanjo was frequently taunted by his political adversaries within DP for his inability to win significant votes from his immediate south-west 254 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION constituency in the 1999 presidential election. To overcome the seeming challenge to his legitimacy, he was said to have used the alliance as a strategy to penetrate the zone which had enjoyed a bloc vote of the AD in the 1999 governorship elections. It should be noted that a significant development in the period leading to the 2003 general elections was the registration of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) which eventually won the governorship of Anambra state after protracted legal battle which resulted in the annulment of the election of Dr Chris Nigige of the PDP who was initially declared winner. The ruling of the Appeal Court based on the recounting of the valid votes in the election brought into clear relief, not only the level of abuse of the electoral process through the deployment of incumbency factor, but also the stranglehold of godfathers and moneybags over the electoral process as demonstrated by the encounter between Dr Chris Nigige and those who allegedly colluded with INEC to rig him into power. But the more significant issue however is that APGA which was registered along with other parties in the period leading to the 2003 elections was intended as a regional party to provide a platform for the presidential ambition of the Ikemba, Sir Odumegwu Ojukwu, among others. Although the reality of electoral politics has led to attempts to establish the party outside the south-east enclave, it has remained essentially an Igbo party, which explains the victory of Dr Peter Obi who fought the Anambra governorship election in 2003 on its platform. APGA has continued to control power in Anambra in addition to the victory it has recorded in Imo governorship election since 2007. The judiciary had always been tested in Nigeria’s electoral processes. However, its involvement peaked in 2007, given the garrisoned nature of the elections. In the original results declared by INEC, the PDP was allocated the governorship in 28 states, thereby further consolidating its stronghold. However, after protracted litigation, some lasting for over two years, the PDP lost four of the states initially allocated to it by Maurice Iwu’s INEC, to the opposition. Three of these went to the ACN (Edo, Ekiti and Osun states) to increase its tally to four and the fourth state to Labour Party (LP) in Ondo state, a new entrant into the list. The APP/ ANPP thoroughly weakened by internal crises and disagreement within the leadership continued its gradual decline by winning only three states, having won nine and seven in 1999 and 2003 respectively. The Progressive Peoples Alliance (PPA), another new entrant in this category, also won the governorship in two states, namely Abia and Anambra. THE 2015 ELECTION AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER AT STATE LEVEL 255

Although the PDP maintained its lead in the 2011 election, it began showing signs of diminishing returns, losing one of the 24 states it retained in 2007 and had to be confined to 23 states. On the other hand, the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) recorded a marginal gain to move from four to six states, including the consolidation of its victory in Edo state, which it regained for the first time in 2007 after a fierce legal battle. Another interesting dimension of the 2011 gubernatorial election was the fact that it increased the number of parties with governorship seats to six, the highest since 1999. The breakdown shows that ANPP had three, APGA two, Congress of Progressive Change (CPC), a new party built around General Muhammadu Buhari from a breakaway faction of the ANPP, had one (Nasarawa state) and the LP retained its control of Ondo state at the governorship level. Overall, the distribution of governorship seats among the parties prior to the 2015 election, as Table 12.1 reveals was disproportionately skewed in favour of the PDP. The dominance of PDP which has been covered in a chapter of this book does not require detailed analysis here to avoid repetition. The table also reveals that following elections after elections, the number of parties winning governorship election equally increased. From three in 1999 and 2003, it became four in 2007 and six in 2011. This may be due to the dramatic increase in the number of political parties and the attendant realignment of political forces, apart from the legitimacy question, including performance and delivery of the dividends of democracy that hung around the neck of the PDP for some years. Finally, the table shows that only the PDP was able to build a fairly truly multiethnic party. All others were restricted to their geo-political zones, the only exception being the ACN with its victory in Edo state. This was the situation before the 2015 governorship elections.

THE 2015 ELECTION AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER AT STATE LEVEL In this section, we focus on some central themes in the conduct of the 2015 gubernatorial elections across the various stages of the electoral cycle, focusing on the following: a) Pre-election issues: primaries, candidate selection and electioneering campaigns; b) Election administration and Election integrity, drawing insights from election observation reports; c) Election results and reconﬁguration of power among political parties; and d) Some exceptionalism, including the south-east and south-south 256 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION where the PDP retained its electoral stronghold despite its loss at the centre. In what follows, we examine these themes, one after the other.

Pre-Election Issues: Primaries, Candidate Selection and Electioneering Campaigns Party primaries and candidates’ selection has always been one of the weakest links in Nigeria’s democratization since 1999 (Omotola 2013a). The problem is not unconnected with the fact that the process is often hijacked by godfathers through the deployment of their extended political patronage network, overwhelming financial capacity and access to or control of state power, thereby determining candidates for all categories of elections (Omotola 2009b; Adebayo and Omotola 2007). This problem, as Onapajo (2015;10–11) points out, ‘featured prominently in the 2015 electoral process, which involved all the major political parties and was particularly acute in the gubernatorial elections, where the party primaries were deeply enmeshed in diverse forms of controversies and protestations’. A representative sample will be used for illustration. To begin with, in Lagos state, there were controversies and allegations of improprieties regarding the PDP gubernatorial primaries. Senator Musiliu Obanikoro, a former Minister of Defence, who lost to Jimi Agbaje, contested the result of the primary election in court. According to him, the party leaders, particularly Chief Bode George and Chief Adeseye Ogunlewe, manipulated the primaries in favour of Agbaje. Obanikoro’s supporters also embarked on street protests in Lagos and Badagry, calling for his recognition as the governorship candidate of the party, without which they threatened to decamp to the opposition APC. The response of the party leaders to the accusations against them did not help matters either. For example, Chief Bode George, responded by describing Obanikoro as a ‘desperate and obsessed man who is apparently incapable of absorbing the reality of his defeat by a well-bred and better man’. He was quoted to have said, ‘ ...Enough of his desperate tantrums and lunacy. Lagos has moved on, far beyond the primitive wretch- edness of little, ill-bred hooligans’ (Salaudeen et al. 2014). Also in Rivers state, Mr Nyesom Wike, a former Minister of State for Education, was declared the winner of the state’s PDP governorship primaries. However, other aspirants who lost out, operating under the umbrella of the Rivers Mainstream Coalition (RMC) led by Prof. Israel Owate, insisted that Wike’s emergence as the party’s governorship candidate was a show of shame and therefore unacceptable. According to the THE 2015 ELECTION AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER AT STATE LEVEL 257 spokesman of the MRC, Sotonye Ijuye-Dagogo, ‘We reject in its entirety the emergence of Wike as the governorship candidate of the PDP in Rivers State. We shall not concede our state to rogue politicians’. Moreover, one of the aggrieved aspirants, Tonye Princewill, also defected to the LP. The situation was not any different in Oyo state where the emergence of Senator Teslim Folarin as the governorship candidate of the PDP also generated its own contradictions. The tensions associated with the exercise climaxed with the defection of Chief Adebayo Alao-Akala, a one-time governor of the state, to run under the platform of the LP. Another aspirant, Oluseyi Makinde, also defected to the Social Democratic Party (SDP), where he picked the governorship ticket. In Ogun state, controversy over the governorship primary could be said to be one of the major undoing of PDP in the governorship election. Ogun West Senatorial District, the only zone said not to have produced a governor of the state since its creation in 1976, rooted for Prince Gboyega Nasir Isiaka, who eventually won the primary of 8 December, 2014. However, there were allegations of interference from the National Secretariat of PDP, which allegedly preferred Rt. Hon. Dimeji Bankole, a former Speaker of the HoR. In a seeming corroboration of the alleged interference from the centre, the then National Publicity Secretary of the PDP, Chief Olisa Metuh, declared the primaries won by Isiaka ‘null and void and of no effect’, stating that ‘a new date will be communicated for the governorship primary in Ogun State’ (Salaudeen et al. 2014). Also in Adamawa state, the governorship primary that produced former Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Mallam Nuhu Ribadu as the gubernatorial candidate of the PDP, dee- pened the intra-party crisis. This was because the national headquarters of the party ordered that the congress be held in Abuja without the consent of the state Executive. The response of the state Executive was the conduct of a parallel primary with the support of the Governor, James Ngilari and his supporters, thereby producing two governorship candidates for the party. The situation in Plateau state was not any better. It was such that 14 of the aspirants who lost out rejected the outcome, describing the process as ‘a show of shame’. They responded by writing a petition to the national headquarters of the party, calling for the cancellation and the conduct of a new primary. The trend was also experienced in Imo state where the PDP primary also generated controversies. Although 30 candidates participated in the primaries, only three made serious impact in terms of the number of voters 258 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION each of them garnered. In the official result released by the Tengu Tsegba who chaired Imo state PDP Governorship Primaries Committee (GPC), Chief Emeka Ihedioha scored 346, against Senator Ifeanyi Araraume 336 and Chief Ikedi Ohakim’s 213. These results were, however, challenged by Ararume. In his petition the state’s GPC, Ararume alleged, that there was a mistake in the computation of the results released by the Electoral Committee. According to him, he scored 336 votes, while Ihedioha scored 325 votes, claiming that the electoral panel was guilty of allowing over voting, declaring more votes than the total number of registered delegates, which he puts at 1,017, compared to the 1,027 actual votes cast and announced. The difference of ten votes, according to Ararume, was awarded to Ihedioha (The News, 10 December, 2014). Moreover, in Benue state, there is a clear documentation of how Dr Samuel Ortom, a former Minister of State, Industry, Trade and Investment, resigned his membership of the PDP because of alleged ‘overwhelming intimidation and determination from the powers-that-be to use all means to exclude him from the governorship primary election’, insisting that ‘it was common knowledge that the entire nomination process was fraught with injustice from the beginning when it was obvious that a decision was taken to deliberately disenfranchise the larger number of party members at the ward congresses’. He later joined the APC and secured its governorship ticket. Similar trends were observed in Nasarawa state where a former Minister of Information, Mr Labaran Maku, lost the primary to Mr Yusuf Agabi, a former Director in the Niger Delta Ministry, and decided to leave the party for APGA, where he picked the ticket. Also in Katsina state, Abdullahi Umar Tsauri defected to APGA,wherehepickedthegover- norship ticket, after losing at the PDP primary election. Given the tensions, controversies and protestations that attended the gubernatorial primaries and candidate selection, as illustrated before, it is, therefore, hardly surprising, as it turned out, that party primaries and candidate selection processes impacted negatively on the quality of the 2015 governorship elections. The EU EOM (2015:4)affirmed this in its report that ‘lack of an effective monitoring mechanism for internal party democratic processes for candidate nomination’ and ‘INEC’s inability to reject nominated aspirants (who emerged in dubious circumstances)’ had negative implications for the credibility of the entire process (also quoted in Onapajo 2015: 11). The situation could not have been different, given the diverse ways in which some aspirants, especially those who lost out, responded to THE 2015 ELECTION AND THE RECONFIGURATION OF POWER AT STATE LEVEL 259 the processes and outcomes of the primaries. In this respect, three patterns of responses are discernible from the cases cited earlier. The first relates to those who chose to remain within their party and seek redress through internal party mechanisms, most especially through petitions to the appeal panels. This seems the most prevalent option and in line with the regulatory frameworks for the conduct of party primaries. Specifically, Section 87 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) made clear provisions for the conduct of party primaries and the resolution of conflicts that may arise therefrom. INEC was conscious of this when it stipulated 2 October–11 December, 2014 not only for the conduct of primaries, but also for the resolution of disputes arising therefrom (INEC 2014;PLAC2014). The second has to do with the rejection of internal party arrangements in preference for the court for the adjudication of disputes arising from party primaries. This option was adopted by Obaniko in Lagos state. The third category, which was particularly rampant in 2015, was the recourse to outright defection from the party to another. This was experienced in Katsina, Nasarawa, Oyo, Rivers and a host of other states. Shortly after the conduct of party primaries and resolution of associated disputes, the parties moved into electioneering campaigns. As originally stipulated by INEC, campaigns for the gubernatorial elections were to end on 26 February, 2015, two days to the original date of the gubernatorial election on 28 February, 2015. However, following the postponement of the election to 11 April, 2015, it is reasonable to argue that campaigns should end by 9 April, 2015. This is plausible because Section 91 of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) prohibits advertisements or broadcasts of campaigns 24 hours prior to the day of election (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2010). Overall, the campaigns for the gubernatorial election generally went well and media coverage seemed better, especially for the opposition parties. The improvement in the media environment could be attributed to the opposition victory in the earlier presidential election. As the European Union Election Observer Mission (EU EOM) puts it in one of its reports: ‘Following APC’s presidential election success, media coverage of the party has notably increased, including in state outlets, resulting in overall a more balanced coverage of political actors’ (EU EOM 2015:8). Notwithstanding marginal improvement, abuses were still associated with the gubernatorial campaign processes especially in the south-south and south-west (EU EOM 2015). Worse still, marginalization of opposition parties in media coverage continued at state levels. The EU EOM 260 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

(2015) puts it thus: ‘at state level incumbent parties’ candidates continued to receive preferential treatment by state broadcast media, contrary to the legally required equal coverage of contestants’. Similarly, the African Union Election Observer Mission (AU EOM) also reported some abuses in the campaigns. As it documented: ‘The AUEOM, however, noted that a number of political party functionaries, candidates and individuals engaged in the use of violent and inﬂammatory language in the run-up to the state assembly and gubernatorial elections’. This is disappointing because prior to the commencement of political campaigns, parties had committed themselves to a code of conduct in that respect: The lesson from the foregoing is that while institutional designs, including regulatory norms for electioneering campaigns matter, they are not inherently self-sufﬁcient. They require the presence of democratic players, especially at the elite level, who are willing and able to play the game according to established rules.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND INTEGRITY OF THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION It is important to note ab initio that the gubernatorial elections of 11 April, 2015, were held in 29 of the 36 states of the federation. This was because of the reality of staggered election foisted on Nigeria’s electoral calendar by the series of courts annulment of gubernatorial election results in some states, namely Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo and Osun states (Omotola 2009a, 2010a). Consequently, gubernatorial elections in the other states are scheduled for future dates. For this reason, the analysis here is mainly but not exclusively to the 29 states covered on 11 April. As with the presidential and NASS elections, we also draw insight from election observation reports as an indication of the effectiveness of the administration and integrity of the 2015 gubernatorial election. Most of the reports credited INEC with better performance in the conduct of the gubernatorial election compared to the presidential election. If valid, the improvement may not be unconnected with INEC’s willingness to learn from the mistakes of the presidential election to improve the gubernatorial elections. At a general level, INEC exhibited some impressive degree of professionalism in the administration of the election, including timely THE ADMINISTRATION AND INTEGRITY OF THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 261 distribution of election materials, early opening of polling centres, early arrival of electoral and security officials, smooth processes of accreditation, voting, collation and announcement of results. As noted by the Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, NCSSR (2015), the voting process was also smoother in most states, following marked improvement in the functionality of the card readers. The EU EOM (2015) corroborates these claims in its reports when it states that their ‘observers saw no evidence of centralised systematic fraud. Overall the process appeared to be more efficient with polling staff working diligently and improvements evident in the timelier opening of polling sites’. The African Union Commission (2015) also notes that during the 11 April gubernatorial election, ‘INEC staffs were generally on time for the opening of the accreditation process in most Polling Units across the country. By 8:30am most polling units visited by the AUEOM ...had opened and accreditation began’. The effectiveness of the administration of the election also profited from the improved professionalism of other key players, such as security agencies and CSOs, who acted in a largely professional and complemen- tary manner. The security agents, for example, provided election security in a largely professional manner. As the CLEEN Foundation (2015) reports:

There was a marked improvement in the arrival of security officials at their designated polling units; before 8:00am when they opened: 80% of security officials had already reported at their posts and 4% arrived at 9:00am or thereafter ...Civility and impartiality of officers was noticeable. In 95% of the units observed, security officials were described as very approachable and only in 5% of units were they described as somewhat approachable ...the conduct of the security officials during the elections were good in 88% of the polling units by the observers.

This is not to say that everything about the conduct of the gubernatorial elections was positive. There were also the downsides, which impacted the overall integrity of the processes and outcomes, with telling implications for the legitimacy of the elections in some states. In this respect, two issues are particularly illustrative. One, compared to the presidential election, the level of voter turnout in the election was very low, with a national average of less than 50% (about 45%). The AUEOM (2015) documented in its report that turnout for the 11 262 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

April Gubernatorial and State Assembly Elections was much lower than the Presidential and National Assembly Elections arguably because of ‘voter fatigue’, positing that ‘most voters might have lost interest in the elections because their parties may not have performed well in the presidential and national assembly elections’. This explanation sounds reasonable but lacks empirical substantiation, for example, in terms of survey report elicited directly from the electorate. Other sources also attest to the problem of low turnout. In its state by state analysis of turnout in the gubernatorial election, for instance, the NCSSR (2015: 44) found that:

Two-thirds of Nigerian states (that is, 24 out of 36 states) had voter turnout of less than 50 percent. The hotly-contested south-south state of Rivers had the highest turnout figure of 71 percent, while the keenly-contested state Lagos in the southwest had the lowest turnout figure with only 29 percent of registered voters casting their ballots. Four states in the south-south region (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers States), each of which gave President Jonathan more than 90 percent of its votes, recorded turnout figures of more than 64 percent, that is, 20 percentage points higher than the nationwide average, despite the very low turnout in Edo State (36 percent). Several southern states, including Lagos, Ogun, Abia, Edo, Anambra and Ebonyi, which were considered relatively peaceful had a lower turnout than many northern states, including those contending with the Boko Haram insurgency.

In the NCSSR’s(2015) interpretation of this trend, ‘this questions the link between insecurity and political participation, and refutes the view that the Boko Haram insurgency would affect the 2015 elections by discouraging participation’. However, an alternative reading of the trend, which seems much more plausible, is to question the authenticity and reliability of the figures. Such a trend negates all known conventional wisdom about the relationship between violence and political participation. Moreover, the region is known for such a tendency, as demonstrated in the 2011 elections (see Omotola and Aiyedogbon 2012). Two, in comparison with the presidential election, the level of fraud and violence associated with the gubernatorial election was also very high. Many of such cases were reported at several polling units in Akwa Ibom, Abia, Anambra, Delta, Imo, Rivers, Benue, Katsina, Sokoto and Kano states, with a number of deaths. In particular, the NCSSR (2015) singled out Rivers and Akwa Ibom states, claiming that the overall conduct of the THE ADMINISTRATION AND INTEGRITY OF THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 263 elections in those states ‘raised doubts about the credibility of the elections results in those two states’. It further noted that ‘in many parts of Rivers State, deep-rooted political animosities played out in a violent manner and threatened to subvert the electoral processes’. Elsewhere, the EU-EOM (2015) also noted that there was an increase in security incidents during the gubernatorial election, with ‘at least 30 people killed, predominantly from inter-party clashes and attacks on election sites’. These were in addition to other procedural shortcomings encountered during the election. These include the problematic nature of card reader fingerprint verification, party agents were at times seen interfering in polling officials’ work, and inconsistency in essential ballot checks during counting and collation. These incidents of violence and interference were said to be most pronounced in Rivers and Akwa Ibom states. It was negative trends as these, which constituted gross violation of the Electoral Act and procedures that led to the cancellation of voting in some states and the loud call for the cancellation of elections in some states, most notably Rivers and Akwa Ibom. Yet, the governorship election was dented by the high level of litigations over the results, with telling implications for the integrity of the elections and legitimacy of attendant governments. Though many governorship candidates congratulated the declared winners, the results of the gubernatorial elections were seriously contested in many states. The most controversial of such cases were in Akwa Ibom, Rivers and Taraba states, where the opposition vehemently rejected the electoral outcomes, citing undue deployment of force/violence by the incumbent party in those states, the PDP. This was unlike in the presidential election, where the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan conceded defeat and congratulated the ‘winner’ before the official declaration of results. In its overall summation of the verdict on the conduct of the gubernatorial election, the CDD avers that ‘while accreditation in the 28 March, 2015 presidential and national assembly elections was slowed down by technical hitches’, the gubernatorial election ‘appears to have taken place with a minimal number of glitches despite significantly lower voter turnout. However, many states ...recorded worrying levels of election-related violence with considerable deterioration in Lagos and Rivers states, key battlegrounds’. It also lamented, with serious concern, ‘the high incidence of human rights violations reported across the country including loss of lives, arson and destruction of property, deliberate targeting of electoral officials, intimidation of voters etc’. This seems a fair assessment of the 264 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION administration of the gubernatorial election, suggesting that despite noticeable improvement, some genuine concerns abound. Given the variations in the level of violence across states, one cannot but wonder at the basis of judicial pronouncements on electoral petitions in most affected states. Three states stood out in this connection, namely Akwa-Ibom, Rivers and Taraba. In these states, the electoral processes were widely reported to have been severely compromised, including manifestations of violence and other forms of violation of the electoral act as attested by the reports of local and international election observer groups alluded to earlier. The final outcomes of the electoral petition cases would appear to have, on the balance, left more to be desired and therefore greeted with mixed feelings. Specifically, the election petition tribunal and court of appeal initially upheld the petition of the APC Rivers state, cancelling the elections and ordering a rerun. The tribunal in Akwa-Ibom did the same, but the Court of Appeal only cancelled elections in 18 Local Government Areas (LGAs) but still went ahead to uphold the election results. However, in both cases, the Supreme Court upturned the decisions of the lower courts and upheld the elections of the PDP candidates. In arriving at this decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the reliance on contradictions associated with the card readers by the petitioners was not sufficient to establish their claims. This is because, as the Supreme Court reasoned, ‘the function of the card reader, though quite commendable in the conduct of the 2015 elections, is solely to authenticate the owner of the voter’s card and prevent multiple voting by a single voter’, adding that ‘the card reader cannot replace the voters register, recognised by the constitution’ (Okakwu 2016). Also ruling in the case of Akwa- Ibom state, the Supreme Court was of the view that the lower courts erred in cancelling elections in 18 and subsequently the entire 31 LGAs of the state on the basis of non-compliance. The Supreme Court also held that the tribunal was wrong to base its judgment on non-compliance with the use of card readers. On allegation of violence and irregularities during the election, Supreme Court was of the view that the petitioners, namely Umana Umana and the APC failed to prove the allegations: ‘The two respondents were not able to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt because they failed to bring witnesses from all the polling units to substantiate their claims’ (Premium Times 2016). THE ADMINISTRATION AND INTEGRITY OF THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 265

These judgements raised serious questions about the relationship between law and justice, exemplified by the controversies that attended their pronouncements. For many public commentators, these judgements fell below expectations. For the APC, the logic of the judgement was questionable, which the state chapter of the party demands that the judgment should be probed by President Buhari. These lamentations seem a true reflection of popular perception of these judgements, as attested to by the reports of leading election observer groups; yet one must not lose sight of the fact that the Supreme Court remains the highest and final appellate court in the country. The respect for its pronouncements, without recourse to self-help such as violence, despite these reservations, bodes well for the future of Nigeria’sdemocracy.

Election Results and the Reconﬁguration of Power among Political Parties The results of the gubernatorial elections were announced on time. According to the ofﬁcial results released by INEC, the APC won the governorship in 20 states, leaving the PDP with nine (9) states. This gave the APC a total of 22 state governors, having already been in control of Edo and Osun states, two of the seven states with staggered gubernatorial election dates, the PDP a total of 13 and APGA retained its one slot in Anambra state. The breakdown of the results is presented in Table 12.2: A careful examination of the results reveals some interesting issues. These include:

(a) The results followed a similar pattern with those of the presidential and NASS elections, with the opposition party, in this case the APC maintaining a steady lead in gubernatorial election for the first time since 1999; (b) Also for the first time since 1999, the opposition was able to make significant inroads into the ruling party’s (PDP) strongholds, especially in the north-central political zone, a region traditionally known as a buffer for the PDP such as Plateau, Benue, Niger and Kwara states. The case of Kwara state is understandable, the main political gladiators in the state having played prominent roles not only in the balkanization of the PDP, but also in the leadership of the ‘new PDP’, a breakaway faction of the ruling PDP and the subsequent merger with the APC; 266 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

Table 12.2 Results of the 2015 gubernatorial elections

S/N State Governor Party APC PDP

1 Abia Okezie Ikpeazu PDP 264,713 2 Adamawa Jibrilla Bindo APC 205,576 46,519 3 Akwa Ibom Udom Emmanuel PDP 89,865 996,071 4 Bauchi Barr.Mohammed Abubakar APC 654,934 282,650 5 Benue Samuel Ortom APC 413,803 173,165 6 Borno Kashim Shetima APC 473,543 25,640 7 Cross River Senator Benedict Ayade PDP 53,983 342,016 8 Delta Senator (Dr.) Ifeanyi Okowa PDP 67,825 724,680 9 Ebonyi Eng. Dave Umuahi PDP 27,853 289,867 10 Enugu Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi PDP 43,839 482,277 11 Gombe Gov Ibrahim Dankwambo PDP 205,132 285,369 12 Imo Gov Rochas Okorochas APC 416,996 320,705 13 Jigawa Alhaji Badaru Abubakar APC 648 045 479 447 14 Kaduna Nasir El Rufai APC 1,117,635 485,833 15 Kano Abduallhi Ganduje APC 1,546,434 509,726 16 Katsina Aminu Masari APC 943,085 476,768 17 Kebbi Atiku Bagudu APC 477,376 293,443 18 Kwara Gov Abdulfatah Ahmed APC 295 832 115 220 19 Lagos Akinwunmi Ambode APC 811,994 659,788 20 Nasarawa Umaru Tanko Almakura APC 191 463 114 674 21 Niger Abubakar Sani-Bello APC 593, 702 239, 772 22 Ogun Gov. Ibikunle Amosun APC 306,998 201,440 23 Oyo Gov. Abiola Ajimobi APC 327,310 79,019 24 Plateau Barr. Simon Lalong APC 564, 913 520, 627 25 Rivers Nyesom Wike PDP 124, 846 1,029,102 26 Sokoto Speaker Aminu Tambuwal APC 647,609 269,074 27 Taraba Darius Ishaku PDP 275,984 369,318 28 Yobe Gov Ibrahim Gaidam APC 334,847 179,700 29 Zamfara Gov Abdulaziz Yari APC 716,964 201,938

Source: NCSSR, 2015:61–62

(c) Opposition’s penetration was also extended to states like Bauchi, the home state of Dr Adamu Muazu, a two-term governor (1999–2007) of the state under the umbrella of the PDP and the National Chairman of the PDP, who led them into the 2015 elections. That was the ﬁrst time since 1999 that a sitting National Chairman of the PDP would lose the governorship of his state to an opposition party; and (d) Again for the ﬁrst time, the spatial spread of the PDP, measured in terms of the distribution of its governorship seats across the various THE ADMINISTRATION AND INTEGRITY OF THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION 267

geo-political zones, suffered a drastic decline. While the party won gubernatorial elections in most of the south-east and south-south states, it only secured gubernatorial seats outside these two zones in Gombe and Taraba states, both in the north-east. This is surprising because one of the major strengths of the PDP that kept it in power for this long was its alleged ability to build and consolidate an extended multinational framework of operations across the country (see, Kendhammer 2010).

It remains to be seen how these new configurations of power at the state level will reshape the course of the democratization process in Nigeria. However, with the realities of these results, together with the benefitof hindsight, these electoral trends are likely to have significant implications at two levels, some obvious and some others, speculative. The most basic relates to the reconfiguration of power among Nigerian political parties the results have engendered. As currently constituted, the new ruling party, the APC, has 22 governorship seats, leaving only 11 (with the addition of Ekiti and Osun under its control with staggered election) states to the PDP. The outstanding seven states awaiting elections are not sufficient to tilt the balance of power in favour of the PDP, assuming it wins the governorship in all those states. Yet, such a possibility is seemingly unlikely, given the proclivity of Nigerian politicians, as supported by the lessons of history, including in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of the 2015 presidential election results, to defect to the ruling party at the centre. The second implication, which is closely related to the first, but largely speculative, is the likely impact the new arrangement of power may have on opposition politics. In the immediate past, especially between 2011 and 2015, at least, five parties had governorship seats: the ACN, ANPP, APGA, CPC and PDP. Today, only the APGA has governorship seat in Anambra state, all others belong to the APC and PDP. During this period, the opposition was generally weak, fragmented and incapable of position- ing itself as an alternative platform of governance (Omotola 2013b). All that changed with the merger of leading opposition parties, which strengthened them in terms of administrative and financial capacity, as well as policy alternatives (Omotola 2015). With the look of things, it is obvious that the new opposition, the PDP, will need some time to recover from the shock of its loss, having had its mind fixatedonits self-acclaimed impregnability and infallibility, exemplified by the empty 268 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION boast of a number of its National Leaders that it would rule the country for at least 60 years, if not forever. The way the PDP comports itself, especially during its recovery period and internal organization, counts a lot not only for the future of opposition politics in general, but that of the PDP in particular.

Some Notable Exceptions In spite of the commonalities in the trends of the presidential and governorship elections, the latter conveys some notable divergences. First, the APC, despite its new credentials as government-elect at the centre, could not find an entry into the south-east and the south-south during the gubernatorial election. This is significant, given the tendency of Nigerian politicians to respond to the temptations of what has been generally regarded as the bandwagon effect. But in this case, the outcome of the presidential election had little or no bandwagon effect on the voting pattern in the gubernatorial elections in the two geo-political zones. Rather, the PDP stood its ground and retained its strongholds in this axis. Second, the level of voter turnout, as noted earlier, was low compared to that of the presidential election. If this represents a source of worry in itself, given that the presidential election that preceded it was largely free and fair and devoid of any serious post-election violence, as was the case in 2011, a more worrisome dimension pertains to the variations in turnout across various states of the federation. With a national average of about 45%, it was surprising to note that turnout in four states of the south- south: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers averaged 64%, 20% more than the national average. Given the widely reported high scale of violence in those states during the gubernatorial elections, one may be tempted to raise critical questions about the authenticity of these figures. The concern assumes more significance when we consider the fact that in other southern states, otherwise considered as relatively peaceful during the gubernatorial elections, for example Lagos, Ogun, Abia, Anambra and Ebonyi, recorded very low turnout that were sometimes lower than in many other states, including those affected by Boko Haram. The only exception was Borno state, which had a lower turnout than most other southern states. To be sure, Rivers state had the highest turnout in the gubernatorial election with 71%, Lagos state had the lowest at 29%. Edo state, another APC controlled state, had 36%. CONCLUSION 269

This raises the question of the determinants of voting behaviour in Nigeria, suggesting significant variations across regions. Here, the intention is not to delve into this ‘extraneous’ issue, however, it is relevant to reiterate that the south-south and the south-east have a history of excessive and inexplicable voter turnout since 1999. For instance, the 1999 presidential election was marred by widespread irregularities, including a ‘miraculous’ 100% turnout of voters in Rivers state (quoted in Omotola 2010: 9). Similar patterns were documented across the two zones in the 2011 presidential elections and constituted one of the fundamental grouses of the opposition parties over the credibility of the results. The ACN, for example, alleged that an analysis of the results put out by INEC in 2011 showed a troubling pattern of clear manipulation. According to the ACN, ‘everywhere the PDP perceived it was strong, it came out with incredibly high number of voters in its favour. Conversely, anywhere the opposition was perceived to be strong, the opposition`s margin of victory was unreasonably low’. The ACN went further to state that ‘whereas high voter turnout was recorded in states perceived to be sympathetic to President Jonathan in the different geopolitical zones (Bayelsa in South-South 85%, Imo in South- East 84%, and Plateau in North-Central 62%), the opposite was the case for areas where the opposition, was believed to be strong’. It added that ‘even in Katsina, Buhari’s hometown, the turnout was a paltry 52%! Kano (53%); Sokoto (40%) and Zamfara (51%)’. Unfortunately, as the ACN further revealed, ‘Edo state, though a state in the South-South, recorded a paltry turnout of only 37%, apparently because the state was not believed – by the figure cooks – to be sympathetic to President Jonathan, being controlled by the ACN. The figures for the South-West are also revealing: Lagos (31.8%); Ogun (28%); Osun (39%) and Oyo (33%)’ (all quoted in Omotola and Aiyedogbon 2012:65–66). This is an area that deserves further empirical investigation.

CONCLUSION This chapter has critically examined the administration, outcome and integrity of the 2015 gubernatorial elections in Nigeria. As noted from the outset, the gubernatorial elections offered INEC the opportunity to remedy the lapses that earlier manifested in the presidential election. In determining the effectiveness or otherwise of the administration, the chapter relied heavily but not solely on the reports of domestic and international election 270 12 THE 2015 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION observers. After a brief historical background on power distribution (that is governorship) seats among the various political parties prior to the 2015 election, the chapter analysed central themes in the administration of the election. It addressed the form and character of party primaries, candidate selection and electioneering campaigns; the administration and integrity of the election, drawing insights from election observation reports; a critical interpretation of the election results as well as the attendant reconfiguration of power among political parties; and what were considered as notable exceptions, including not only the retention of the south-east and south- south as a stronghold of the PDP, but the exceptional voter turnout from the two regions. This approach helped identify important elements of continuity and change in governorship election since 1999. Deriving from the analyses of these salient issues, the chapter reveals that the administration of the 2015 gubernatorial elections constituted a critical step forward compared to the previous ones since 1999. One of the significant gains was the reconfiguration of power among parties, suggesting that if opposition parties can get their acts together, Nigerian ruling parties are, after all, not unassailable as they tend to posture and make people to believe. It also showed that the unprecedented feat recorded by the APC during the presidential and NASS elections was not a fluke. Moreover, the election revealed that key stakeholders in election administration, especially INEC and security agents, can actually learn from their past mistakes and improve on future performances. Yet, despite the gains of the gubernatorial elections, there are still causes for concerns. As the election revealed, some negative tendencies such as violence, technological glitches in the deployment of the card readers and a few other forms of irregularities still abound. What is required in moving forward is for all democratic players, including INEC, political parties, CSOs, mass media, youth organizations etc., to draw on the lessons of the 2015 elections for the improvement of election administration and the consolidation of democracy.

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Omotola, J. S. 2013a, ‘Trapped in transition: Nigeria’s ﬁrst democratic decade and beyond’, Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 9(2), pp. 171–200. Omotola, J. S. 2013b, ‘Opposition and the challenges of multiparty democracy’, The Nigerian Electoral Journal (Special Issue on Opposition Politics in Nigeria), 5(2), pp. 1–46. Omotola, J. S. 2015, Opposition Merger, Electoral Turnover and Democratisation in Nigeria, paper presented at a Conference on The 2015 Nigeria’s General Election, organized by the Electoral Institute, INEC, Abuja. Omotola, S., and Aiyedogbon, G. 2012, ‘Political Participation and Voter Turnout in Nigeria’s 2011 Elections’, Journal of African Elections, 11(1), pp. 54–73. Onapajo, H. 2015, ‘How Credible Were the Nigerian 2015 General Elections? An “Electoral Integrity” Framework of Analysis’, paper presented at the International Conference on the 2015 Nigerian Election, organized by the Electoral Institute (TEI) of INEC, TEI Ofﬁce, Abuja, Nigeria, 27–29 July, 2016. PLAC, 2014, INEC Time Table and Schedule of Activities for General Elections, 2015; available at http://www.placng.org/new/general-elections-2015-time table.php (accessed on 20 January, 2015). Premium Times, 2016, ‘Supreme Court gives reasons for upholding Udom Emmanuel’s election as Akwa Ibom governor’, Premium Tines, 15 February, http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/198476-supreme- court-gives-reasons-for-upholding-udom-emmanuels-election-as-akwa-ibom- governor.html (accessed on 20 April, 2016). Salaudeen, L., Olaniyi, B., Oladele, B., Nwokolo, E., and Manyam, B, 2014, ‘Governorship primaries: Warring PDP factions adamant, stall peace efforts’, The Nation, 20 December; available at http://thenationonlineng.net/gover norship-primaries-warring-pdp-factions-adamant-stall-peace-efforts/ (accessed on 20 January, 2016). The News, 2014, ‘Ihedioha, Araraume claim Imo PDP governorship candidacy’,10 December; available at http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2014/12/ihedioha-ara raume-claim-imo-pdp-governorship-candidacy/ (accessed on 20 January, 2016). CHAPTER 13

The 2015 Elections and the Future of Electoral Democracy

INTRODUCTION The narrative in this book provides evidence of Nigeria’s remarkable progress in electoral democracy; elections are held regularly, are becoming more competitive, and outcomes are increasingly considered as a reflection of people’s will. The evidence is that of a gradual departure from the legacy of electoral authoritarianism that reached its nadir in the 2007 elections, which heightened the trends since 1999 where the vote did not count and the will of the people was deliberately thwarted, while primitive accumulation of votes ensured that elected officials were behol- den to party godfathers and financiers who anointed them through party primaries that were thoroughly discredited. Nigeria has not only broken the jinx of the second democratic elections that often sounded the death knell of its democratic experiments as in the First and Second Republics, it has passed the threshold of four successive elections which, especially since 2011, have been imbued with integrity and credibility. The chapters that focused on voter behaviour both in terms of voter turnout and election outcome demonstrate that in comparison with other democracies, mature and struggling, elections especially beginning with the 2011 elections, score Nigeria’s democratic experiment high. Together with increased public confidence in the electoral process and the acceptance of the ballot as the means of accessing power, the ghost of military intervention in politics is being banished. Occasional endorsement of the democratic process by the top echelon of the military hierarchy in the form

© The Author(s) 2017 273 L. Hamalai et al., Nigeria’s 2015 General Elections, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54096-2_13 274 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY of public statements to the effect that it would defend democracy and resist temptation to intervene has lent further credence to the fact that democracy has become the new game for a wide spectrum of the Nigerian elites. The competitive nature of elections has been borne out by the inconclusive outcome of the supplementary elections that have been conducted in states like Kogi, Bayelsa and Rivers. In Kogi state, for example, INEC declared the governorship election conducted on 21 November, 2015 inconclusive. The death of the APC governorship candidate, Alhaji Abubakar Audu, and the complex legal implications arising from gaps in the electoral law notwithstanding, INEC said that the number of cancelled votes in 91 polling units which stood at 49,000 was more than the difference between the votes of the two leading candidates in the election. While the incumbent governor Idris Wada of PDP scored 1,999, 514 votes, his challenger and candidate of the opposition party, Abubakar Audu scored 240, 867 votes. In the governorship election that followed in Bayelsa State on 5 and 6 December, 2015, the outcome was declared inconclusive until there was areruninfive local government areas on 10 January, 2016. In the final poll results announced after the rerun, the incumbent governor of the state, Henry Dickson scored a total of 134, 998 votes to defeat Timipre Sylva of the APC who scored 86, 813 votes. Other governorship rerun elections in Taraba and Rivers as well as several legislative elections also ended in a stalemate. There are varied reasons for elections that are inconclusive, including the desperation of politicians to win at all costs and the high level of violence deployed to achieve such victory. In Bayelsa and Rivers, ex-militants and rival cult groups acting on behalf of rival political candidates who are their principals, unleashed violence and intimidated voters and election officials which led to the undue militarization of the election environment. Despite the massive deployment of security agencies, armed non-state actors did not allow the people to exercise their right to vote. While violence and desperation of politicians have always been useful in explaining low levels of credibility in election outcomes, the increasing competitiveness of elections with two major parties may possibly account for elections that have ended on inconclusive notes. According to the new Chairman of INEC, Professor Mahmud Yakubu, appointed as successor to Professor Attahiru Jega in August 2015, the main reason for the inconclusive trends is that elections have become more competitive than in the INTRODUCTION 275 past. Until there is a major political shift in the country, the two dominant party systems that emerged in the build-up to the elections is likely to subsist for some time. The improvement in the credibility of the 2015 elections, especially the alternation of power at the national level may not be the ultimate evidence of establishing and routinizing a culture of free and fair elections, but it does respond to the dilemma raised in the literature about emerging democracies. It has been noted that despite regular and open elections becoming an institutionalized feature of African politics and the formal institution of democracy that enjoys the most public support, people still question the effectiveness and competitiveness of elections because of doubts that elections can bring about alterations of incumbent presidents and ruling parties. What seems remarkable for Nigeria in this regard was the ‘myth’ whichcametosurroundtherulingpartywhichnotonlyprojected itself as the biggest party in Africa, south of the Sahara, but the sense of electoral invincibility it seemed to enjoy following the extension of its grips on power in the aftermath of every election conducted prior to the 2015 general elections. The feeling, similar to that of the corporate giants in the US prior to the global meltdown of the 2008–2009 period that PDP was ‘too big to fall’, prevented the party from implosion for a long time despite the challenges of the crises of internal democracy within the party. There would hardly be a better proof that the quality of electoral governance has improved considerably than the remarkable decline in the contestation of electoral outcomes which began in the 2011 elections going by the number of election cases taken to the courts for adjudication. According to the then Acting National Chairman of INEC, Hajiya Amina Zakari, the number of election petitions nationwide after the conclusion of the 2011 elections stood at 732 as against the 1,290 recorded after the 2007 elections. The figure declined further to 611 cases after the 2015 elections. This trend, in a large measure, is a reflection of the increasing level of outcome of elections by losers and has significantly restored a measure of public confidence in the electoral process. However, it should be recognized that what has changed the paradigm of elections in Nigeria is the crystallization of the momentum for electoral reform which began to gather following stakeholders’ review of the noticeable institutional and constitutional lapses in the 2003 elections. The review and commitment to required changes before the 2007 276 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY elections, coupled with the support of Nigeria’s development partners connected with the strident demand from civic groups and reform minded segments of the political class which had launched advocacy for reform from the inception of the Fourth Republic. But it was the decision of President Umaru Yar’adua, a leading beneficiary of the electoral malfeasance in the 2007 elections to throw his weight behind electoral reform that facilitated the limited electoral reform that was implemented in the period leading to the 2011 elections. Although the most salutary recommendations in the report of the ERC which he appointed under the leadership of the retired Justice Muhammed Uwais, including the structural autonomy of INEC were not implemented, it created a reform tempo that led President Goodluck Jonathan to appoint a person generally perceived to be credible in the person of Professor Attahiru Jega as the Chairman of INEC in June 2010. The series of reforms witnessed since then have somehow redefined Nigeria’s electoral environment to the extent that it is no more considered a misplaced judgement that there is a strong correlation between electoral reform and the improved integrity of electoral process in Nigeria. Apart from the appointment of a new leadership which replaced that of Professor Maurice Iwu during which Nigeria conducted the worst elections in her post-independence history, the constitutional amendment efforts of the National Assembly in 2010 was targeted at provisions that relate to the electoral process. It was the same spirit to improve the constitutional and legal environment of elections that informed the amendments to the Electoral Act 2010. A particularly progressive aspect of the changes that were made was the granting of financial autonomy to INEC, in addition to provisions relating to the regulation of campaign finances. This was accompanied by courageous decisions taken by Prof. Attahiru- Jega-led INEC especially the decision to postpone the 2011 elections which were initially scheduled to be held in January 2011 to April of the same year to embark on fresh registration of voters considering the reported loss of substantial data in the existing electoral roll which would have disenfranchised many Nigerians should that be the basis for conducting the elections. The decision to carry out the voter registration exercise based on biometric technology made it possible to deal with previous challenges of multiple registrations and voting. The exercise resulted in the registration of over 70 million Nigerians who were issued with Temporary Voter Cards for the 2011 general elections. The integrity of the voter roll was further improved after dealing with problems of LESSONS FROM THE 2015 ELECTIONS 277 multiple registration in the period leading to the 2015 elections, leaving the register with about 69 million eligible voters on the basis of which INEC produced Permanent Voter Cards that were used in the 2015 elections. Essentially, while elections have improved considerably, progress in procedural democracy in Nigeria is occurring amidst the fragility of democratic structures and institutions. Therefore, the hope for democratic consolidation needs to be counter-balanced with the threats that also exist in the long haul to building enduring democratic institutions and values. In looking at the challenges to address moving into the future, this chapter provides a review of the lessons from the 2015 elections, the elements of the reform agenda that needs to be addressed and the greater challenge of building a democracy that works for the citizens beyond the fanfare of elections.

LESSONS FROM THE 2015 ELECTIONS There are useful lessons to learn from the 2015 elections in order to engage the country’s electoral democracy for the purposes of building enduring democratic structures and culture for going into the future. One of such lessons is that while election is conflict-generating by nature, it is a very important mechanism for resolving the endemic crisis of political succession. The crisis of political succession has remained the weakest point in the establishment of democratic governance in much of Africa. Making elections routine, substantially fair and credible and ensuring peaceful transfer of power from one set of political elites to another receives a lot of attention in the literature on democratic consolidation. In drawing the difference between democratization and a consolidated democracy, for example, Fernandez (2006: 7) argued that ‘while the former could lead to a state with a democratic system, the later encom- passes the understanding of the system and the formal and informal acceptance of its own citizens in regard to institutional, political and societal obedience to democratic rules and practices’. Linz and Stepan (1996: 5) came close to making the same point when they suggested that a democracy becomes consolidated when democratic processes and institutions become the only game in town. Broadly speaking, political succession refers to the process of changing leadership and involves three key stages: vacating of power by the older ruler, the selection of the new leader and the legitimation of the new 278 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY leader (Banjo 2008; Govea and Holm 1998). As the African experience and that of Nigeria shows, the problem of political succession is not only associated with transition from authoritarian political order to democracy, it occurs even where established procedures and easy legitimation occur. The crisis of political succession has remained a pronounced feature of the cyclical crisis of electoral democracy in Nigeria’s post-independence history. Fuelled by the trappings of state power, the entrenched system of patronage politics and cut-throat competition for power engendered by the ‘winner takes all’ associated with the First Past the System (FPTP); the crisis of political succession brought the First Republic to a premature end in 1966. Much later, the annulment of the 12 June, 1993 presidential election also brought to the fore the crisis of political succession. The immediate significance of the 2015 elections in this regard comes out in bolder relief when the rough edges of power contest which acquired ethno-regional undertone in the period after the death of President Umaru Yar’adua even with the PDP considered. The aspiration of President Olusegun Obasanjo to secure a third term through constitutional amendment and the defeat of the agenda in 2006 and enforcement of strict respect for term limit by sections of the political class, parliamen- tarians and civil society (Jibrin and Egwu 2010), further draws attention to the inherent problems of political succession. The 2015 elections also highlight the growing institutional confidence within INEC as an election management body (EMB) that has improved its internal capacity to manage and deliver elections that are fair and credible. However, as the point has been consistently made, this is partly a response of the Nigerian state which has bowed to popular pressure to undertake reforms that have fairly repositioned INEC to leverage on its internal vision and resources to change the narrative of elections. But even more importantly, it is a product of leadership within INEC and the creative use of the space that has been enabled by the reform agenda. Such a focused leadership, driven by vision and mobilization of stakeholders as well as forging strategic partnerships with security agencies, networked donors has been able to put in place a five-year strategic plan, Election Project Plan and Election Management System, deployed appropriate technology and willing to engage the Nigerian public. The immediate challenge is sustaining this leadership vision and focus in the context of leadership change. Even if the successor to Professor Attahiru Jega has the same level of integrity, the important point is that, the process of leadership recruitment in INEC needs to LESSONS FROM THE 2015 ELECTIONS 279 be revisited in order to entrench an autonomous process in the mold suggested by the ERC and the civic groups. Despite the credibility that has been attributed to the leadership of Prof. Attahiru Jega, it should be seen as a coincidence that President Goodluck Jonathan appointed somebody of his calibre in order therefore to guarantee a leadership for INEC that is accountable to the Nigerian public, a more open and transparent process is required. The 2015 elections provide clear indications of internal momentum for the reform of Nigeria’s party system, especially the increased possibilities that parties themselves may drive agenda for improved internal democracy. Weak internal democratic structures within the political parties have remained the ‘Archilles Heels’ of the Nigerian party system since 1999, typifying its most worrisome pathology. Where it exists, internal party democracy helps to nurture citizens’ political competencies and/or producing more capable representatives which, in turn, ensures that the party produces better policies and political programmes. Parties play a crucial role not just in representing interests, aggregating preferences, and form- ing governments, but also in managing conflict and promoting stable politics. In addition, because they are vehicles for translating diverse public views into coherent public policy, political parties are a vital component of good governance. The frustration with reforming parties to promote internal democracy is a huge one because it is tied to the underlying patronage system of Nigerian politics and the inability of INEC and other regulatory bodies to properly and efficiently monitor the conduct of party primaries. Even if these bodies are in the position to do so, the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended), limits the power of INEC to compel parties to stand by the outcomes of party primaries. In the face of failure of regulation and lack of incentives for parties to reform willingly, the outcome of the 2015 elections may push parties to recognize the link between credible party primaries and election outcome as exemplified by the PDP which suffered a major electoral setback in the elections on account of the problem of internal democracy. It is strongly believed by many Nigerians and the PDP hierarchy that its poor handling of issues related to candidates’ selection accounted for the mass defection into the opposition APC. In respect of the presidential primary, the party made the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan its sole candidate. At a point the party even claimed that it printed only one form for the President. This was in sharp contrast to the open and 280 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY competitive presidential primary conducted by the APC which, to some extent, became the game changer in the election. In the aftermath of the election, there has been a momentum for internal reform that has gathered within the PDP leading to the emergence of at least four reform bodies and/or groups. First, is the Post- Election Review Committee set up by the NWC with the Deputy Senate President, Ike Ekweremadu as the Chairman. Among others, the Committee was mandated to determine the degree of anti-party activities, compromises and outright sabotage that may have led to the defeat at the elections, propose a road map to reposition the party to win the 2019 general elections, trace the origin and underlying causes of the party’s decline and review the structures put in place for the 2015 general elections. Although it took the committee more than three weeks given to complete the assignment, the work of the committee was stalled by allegations that the BoT and the NEC of the party were not consulted prior to the setting up of the Committee. The party further decided that the consideration of the report of the PDP Post Election Assessment Committee would include input from members of PDP leadership organs, including PDP Governors’ Forum, PDP National Assembly Caucus, Board of Trustees, National Caucus, National Working Committee (NWC) and the National Executive Committee (NEC). The second committee of the party is the Committee on e-membership registration set up by the acting Chairman of the party, Prince Uche Sekondus. The committee which was set up on 8 September, 2015 is linked to revitalizing party membership and internal democracy at the grassroots level. The committee chaired by Chief Raymond Dokpesi was given six months to complete its assignment. Besides, the party set up a Youth Restructuring Committee under the leadership of Tony Nwodu to examine the institutional and operational framework within the party as well as review the level of inclusiveness of the youth in both appointive and elective positions. In addition to these committees, a group within the party built around the founding members who claim to have derived their mandate from the party caucus and the BoT launched a Reform Conference Committee. Many members of the group included those who had consistently bemoaned the decline of the democratic ideals behind the emergence of the party led by former Information Minister, Professor Jerry Gana. According to this group, the primary goal was to restore the core values and directive principles of the party, remobilize nationwide support for the LESSONS FROM THE 2015 ELECTIONS 281 party and reorganize to ensure effective transfer of power to the people, and above all, revive and ensure the practice of genuine internal democracy and promote transparency and zero-tolerance for corruption. While inaugurating committees meant to organize the Conference in October 2015, the NWC of the party called the members to order on the ground that other committees set up by the party could sufficiently address the issues. Although it remains unclear the extent to which the leadership of PDP is willing to pursue the reform agenda which it has identified, it is obvious that clamour for internal democracy appears to inform all the struggles within the party. But even more importantly, is the determined efforts to use democratic method in dealing with the distribution of party offices and elective positions bearing in mind the events that led to the failure of the party in the build-up to the 2015 general elections. One example is the on-going tension within the party generated by the question of which zone should produce the party national chairman during the party convention scheduled to be held on 21 May, 2016. While the north-east which has held the position with the replacement of Alhaji Bamanga Tukur by Adamu Muazu in the election period and later by Modu Sheriff in the post-election period insists that the position is meant for the zone, there is a strong claim by the south-west that it was the turn of the zone. However, in anticipation of the likely consequences of the tension this could generate at the convention, the party has set up a zoning committee to handle the matter. Furthermore, the critical importance of sustained civil society vigilance and citizen agency in changing the dynamics of elections comes out very boldly in the 2011 elections and even much more visibly in the 2015 elections. Building the effectiveness of the state and its institutions to deliver services and be accountable to the people is at the heart of the role of civil society in strengthening governance and democracy. The history of Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999 and the role of civic groups in different domains to engage shows that securing the future of electoral democracy will require more structured engagement by civic groups and citizens. More than any previous era, the leadership of Prof. Attahiru Jega enjoyed a very robust relationship with civil society, partly reflecting his personal antecedence as an activist dating back to his leadership of the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). His appointment witnessed a series of confidence building measures between INEC and civil 282 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY society which reversed the frostiness that characterized the relationship between INEC and civil society in the Prof. Maurice Iwu era. Although the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) expected to be signed between INEC and civil society in the countdown to the 2011 elections was not signed, civil society goodwill and partnership strengthened INEC’s efforts in the management of elections under Prof. Jega’s leadership. In the false start to the 2011 elections, for example, when the National Assembly elections had to be postponed, the support of civil society was leveraged upon to weather the storm. Again, when a six-week postponement of the 2015 general elections was foisted on INEC, the rallying of support from civil society helped to convey positive messages especially considering that the institution came under attack from the ruling PDP and government controlled media. While the set of lessons identified earlier provide useful indications of what to build on to make elections more credible in Nigeria, there are lessons pointing to gaps that need to be addressed. There are lessons, for example, that derive from the underlying political economy of Nigeria that are not amenable to quick-fix solutions; rather, they are issues to be addressed by tinkering with the very structure of the Nigerian economy and the distribution of resources among the various strata of the society. One of such issues mentioned in passing include the non-inclusive, until recently, consistent growth of the Nigerian economy which is tied largely to the dependent nature of the economy and the neo-liberal economic policies that undergird the management of the economy. Livelihood issues such as poverty and unemployment that have created a large pool of youths that are armed as thugs during elections or the ethnic and regional inequality that triggers insurgency and all other forms of violence are tied to the deeper issues of the political economy. Not to be ignored is the system of patronage politics which is somehow tied to the deeper issues of the Nigerian political economy. In many democracies, a strong correlation has been established between the rise in illiberal democracy and state revenues that are derived from petroleum tendencies by the mid-2000s with African countries at the centre of the discourse. Freedom House, which tracks democratic trends and elections around the globe, noted that 2007 was by far the worst year for freedom in the world since the end of the cold war with 38 countries witnessing decline in their freedom scores. Thomas Friedman’s(2010) model of democratic decline in countries is explained by what he describes as the rise of ‘petro-authoritarianism’ based on the ‘The First Law of Petro- THE IMPERATIVE OF DEEPENING ELECTORAL REFORM 283

Politics’. He explains this law as follows: ‘the price of oil and the pace of freedom operate in an inverse correlation such that as the price of oil goes up, the pace of freedom goes down and as the price of oil goes down, the pace of freedom goes up’. What is however, not clear is what happens to the patronage system if the fiscal viability of the state is undermined by the collapse in the international price of oil as it is likely to be for Nigeria for some time to come. To reframe the question, is the fall in the international prices of oil likely to reverse the entrenched patterns of patronage- politics and rent-seeking behaviour that have precluded the possibility of promoting transparency and accountability? The answer to this question does not pander to a straightforward narrative when it is considered that Nigeria’s annual earnings from oil export at the current exchange rate is a paltry $30 billion, barely higher than the annual budget of the United States of America Justice Department (Oloja 2016). In the absence of a diversified economy, the reform of the tax system, and the prevailing level of corruption, it would be difficult to deliver services and improve infrastructure to secure the legitimacy of the democratic regime. This is likely to provide the litmus test of the new government which campaigned on the mantra of change and the promise to clean up the state by fighting corruption, fix the economy, create employment and invest in social protection. There are other numerous challenges that need to be addressed especially in the realm of constitutional and electoral reform. However, the modality of achieving the reform agenda needs to be thoroughly and openly debated. For instance, the choice will be between taking a peaceful approach or a comprehensive amendment that looks at the relevant sections to be amended in both the constitution and the electoral law. These issues are discussed in the section that follows.

THE IMPERATIVE OF DEEPENING ELECTORAL REFORM The ERC provides Nigeria the big picture of electoral reform and a viable roadmap to a reform agenda that would impact on key institutions, agencies and actors in the electoral process in addition to examining alternative electoral systems. The 22-member ERC made a number of far-reaching recommendations. It is important to highlight, among others, the salient recommendations and proposals of the Committee which brought Nigerians of varied experience and backgrounds together. 284 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

First, the Committee recommended the structural transformation and autonomy of INEC especially the mode of appointment of the Chairman andmembersoftheCommissionincontradistinction to the executive fiat enjoyed by the president in this regard. In conformity with the notion of independence as envisaged by the Commission and in a departure from multipartisan electoral commissions found elsewhere, it proposed a nationwide advertisement of the positions, a process of public scrutiny in the form of publishing the list of applicants and subjecting them to claims and objections. Meanwhile, a very contentious issue in the constitutional requirement for membership of electoral commissions is that such persons should be qualified to be a member of the House of Representatives. It is debatable if this is a product of inelegant draughts- manship, but the logical implication of this is that such a person, to begin with, should be a member of a political party. The assigned role to the National Judicial Commission is superintending over the process to remove it from executive influence. This autonomous process of recruiting the leadership of INEC and state independent commissions along with financial autonomy, in the form of first line charge to the Consolidated Revenue of the Federal was a cardinal recommendation of the electoral committee. On the basis of the present constitutional status of INEC which compromises its independence and capacity and the various State Independent Electoral Commissions (SIECs), the Committee recommended for unbundling especially of INEC by the reallocation of some of its key functions to a separate body. This, according to the Committee’s proposal would necessitate the creation, by legislation, of three new bodies, namely, Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission, Constituency Delimitation Commission and the Electoral Offences Commission. Under this arrangement, the primary business of INEC would be election administration. The committee also called for the reintroduction of independent candidature in all elections. The committee was to design requirements for nomination and payment of deposits by desiring candidates, which would be forfeited in the event that the candidate fails to score a stipulated percentage of the votes cast at an election. Furthermore, there is an extensive proposal for Proportional Representation (PR) in elections to the legislatures and local government councils. In opting for the PR system, the committee stated its rationale to promoting universal adult suffrage by ensuring that all votes are of equal value, that no valid vote cast THE IMPERATIVE OF DEEPENING ELECTORAL REFORM 285 is rendered useless, ineffective or wasted as votes cast nationwide or state- wide or local government areawide, as the case may be, are taken into account. Promoting the inclusiveness of the electoral process especially the representation of women and other disadvantaged groups in the legislatures and the local government councils was a core principle behind the proposal. This particular proposal was aimed, among others, at reducing the number of wasted votes and tone down the negative impact of the ‘winner takes all’ mentality embedded in the majoritarian system. The committee’s public consultations also focused on the party system especially the challenges of internal party democracy, inclusive governance and the existence of small and unviable political parties. Consequently, the recommendations of the committee strongly emphasized the importance of transparent party primaries and adherence to party’s constitution, twin- ing of leadership positions to enhance representation of women in the running of party affairs as well as the need to streamline the number of parties while retaining the multiparty system. The government of President Umaru Yar’adua, following the submis- sion of the ERC report, set up another government committee to study the recommendations and issue a white paper. As it turned out, the government rejected the most important recommendations in the white paper. Also sidelined were the Bills proposed by the Committee which were expected to be forwarded to the National Assembly, to among others, create the proposed Political Party Registration and Regulatory Commission, the Electoral Offences Commission and for constitutional amendment to reflect the proposals made by the Committee. In other words, there were no significant changes that followed the well-received report of the electoral committee. But as mentioned earlier, some limited reforms did happen including the granting of financial autonomy to INEC and the appointment of a man who brought his personal integrity to bear on the task of leading INEC. In the build-up to the 2015 elections, INEC was optimistic that further reforms of the legal framework of elections could be achieved. Consequently, INEC identified 23 sections of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) for amendment. The issues identified by INEC include operational independence, setting election date in accordance with the constitution, disqualifying persons convicted of electoral offences from running for, and holding party offices, determining access of political parties to the ballots, establishment of electoral offences tribunal with the powers to investigate and prosecute and extending the time for conducting run-off 286 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY elections from 7 to 21 days. An additional issue canvassed by INEC is limiting the role of the armed forces to securing the distribution and delivery of election materials, while the Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) demanded outlawing cross-carpeting. The National Assembly squandered so much time that as at the time the amendments were effected, including provision for electronic voting, it was too late to impact on the 2015 elections. The imperative of deepening electoral reform, focusing on those issues that have been excluded from amendments effected so far finds support in the numerous challenges that were encountered in the 2015 elections especially in relation to elections at the subnational level and in the failure of the card readers aside from instances of deliberate sabotage by politicians and INEC officials. First, it is important to continue to advocate and campaign for the structural independence and operational autonomy of INEC so that it truly becomes an independent commission. Despite the outright objection of government to the involvement of the NJC in the appointment of INEC Chair and members of the board of the commission, the principle of independent and autonomous process of leadership selection remains valid. Second, unbundling INEC should be considered a top priority in the reform agenda. Given Nigeria’s vast size and population, separate bodies to relief INEC as recommended in the ERC should be considered, because the challenge is more of capacity within INEC to administer elections along with administration and regulation of parties and the prosecution of election offenders, than the will to do so. Despite the will by Prof. Attahiru-led INEC to prosecute electoral offenders, the Commission could only prosecute 200 offenders after the 2011 general elections. Whether INEC is unbundled or not, and regardless of its limited capacity to effectively monitor party primaries, the review of the Electoral Act 2010 (as amended) is both urgent and imperative to expressly provide for the power of INEC to use the reports of its monitoring of party primaries to ensure that only the candidates who scored the highest votes are put forward for elections. The ambiguity in the Act which recognizes the monitoring powers of INEC on the one hand, and recognizes the discretion of parties in ultimately determining the candidates is not healthy for internal party democracy. The spirit of amendment will be to ensure that parties follow their own rules and procedures with regard to candidates’ selection without necessarily compromising their powers in this regard. THE IMPERATIVE OF DEEPENING ELECTORAL REFORM 287

Deliberate acts of violence and related infractions targeted at undermining the credibility of the 2015 elections were widely reported. States that recorded significant number of violent incidents include Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Ebonyi and Ondo states. INEC’s records show that there were 66 reports of violent incidents targeted at polling units, the commission’sofficials, voters and election materials. These were in Rivers state (16 incidents), Ondo (8), Cross River and Ebonyi (6 each), Akwa Ibom (5) Bayelsa (4), Lagos and Kaduna (3 each), Jigawa, Enugu, Ekiti and Osun (2 each), Katsina, Plateau, Kogi, Abia, Imo, Kano and Ogun (1 each). Although Prof. Attahiru Jega vowed that the commission would prosecute these offenders, the challenge of internal capacity and the lack of investigative and prosecutorial powers by the commission would pose a severe constraint. What appears as most challenging to INEC’s internal capacity is the regulation of campaign and election finances, a mandate that is shared with anti-corruption institutions like the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and the Independent Corrupt Practices Investigation and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC); however, difficult to effectively discharge. As in the previous elections, the role of money was very visible and was particularly at the root of the corruption of party primaries’ processes. It would still remain a daunting challenge to effectively track and regulate political finance even with a dedicated body for that purpose, but the existence of such a body and effective partnership with civil society and creating synergy with anti-corruption agency could make party campaign finances more transparent. The Supreme Court judgment on the governorship election petition from Rivers which upturned the judgment of the Governorship Election Petition Tribunal and the Appeal Court which earlier annulled the election on the grounds of violence and substantial non-compliance, especially the setting aside of the use of card readers has raised concern about the role of card readers. In what is largely considered as mischief by many Nigerians, the basis of the Supreme Court judgment was that the use of card readers which was not mentioned in the law was displacing the voter register. However, from what is known to common sense, card readers are not intended to displace the voter register; rather, it is to build more integrity for the voter register to avoid proxy voting and related forms of sharp practices by politicians and their supporters to undermine the electoral process. Therefore, INEC may need to consider seeking an amendment to the Electoral Act to recognize card readers. 288 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

The series of elections conducted in staggered state governorship elections in states like Anambra and the rerun elections in Ekiti between 2011 and 2015 as well as many of the state governorship elections in 2015 especially in Rivers, Akwa Ibom and Bayelsa draw attention to the structural design of the national EMB and the challenge it poses to credible elections. Arising from the fact that Resident Electoral Commissioners (REC) are directly appointed by the president and scrutinized by the National Assembly like the Chairman and members of the INEC Board, INEC finds it difficult to enforce disciplinary actions on erring RECs. Since it is common knowledge that many of these RECs are card carrying members of political parties, they have colluded with incumbent executives and politicians to undermine the electoral process. Dealing with this structural problem will be an important issue in the reform agenda to be pursued in line with the recommendation of the ERC to subject the appointment of RECs to INEC control and scrutiny such that a more unified INEC would better administer and manage elections. However, reform initiatives should not be limited to INEC, and, therefore need to thoroughly focus on the SIECs to move them in the direction of institutional autonomy and internal capacity building. Although there is a strong sentiment, informed by the control of state governors over state electoral commissions which conduct elections at their behest, there is need to factor in the reality of federal existence in responding to the challenges faced by state-level electoral commissions which have the constitutional responsibility to conduct local government elections. In fact, so overwhelming were the sentiments expressed about the SIECs that the ERC recommended that they become subsumed under INEC. The arguments in favour of this derived largely from the abuse of SIECs by governors and the behaviour of the REC who have tended to work at cross purposes with INEC because they are directly appointed by the President. The sentiments notwithstanding, it makes more sense to subject the SIECs to the kind of reforms that are advocated for INEC including an independent process of recruiting their leadership and enjoy- ment of financial autonomy. But a major advocacy issue would be the need to reform the majoritarian electoral system that Nigeria inherited from Britain. This system, as had been shown in many instances, generates unbridled competition for power, accounts for so much wasted votes, and, above all, accounts for the low level of representation of women and other disadvantaged groups. The ERC in a key recommendation called for the introduction of the PR THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 289 system alongside the FPTP for Nigeria to have Mixed Member Representation in the legislatures based on party list form of the PR. Prior to the setting up of the ERC, civic society advocacy groups had already taken up the campaign especially in the aftermath of the 2003 elections. The issue became more popular in the reform agenda in the post-ERC report as evident in the public consultations in the course of constitutional amendment exercise leading to the 2011 elections and even the lost opportunity for early reform before the 2015 general elections. It is expected that women advocacy groups in civil society and reform- minded elements of the political class would put at the forefront of the reform agenda, the benefits of reforming the electoral system. While it will positively rob off on the entire electoral process, women and other disadvantaged groups are more likely to benefit from a more inclusive electoral process that comes with it. One concern, however, is that practical working out of this electoral system is the influence it confers on party leaders in determining the priority accorded to individuals and groups in drawing up the party list. In a situation like Nigeria where political parties are institutionally weak and internal governance processes are not transparent the system may not produce the desired benefits. Again, it brings attention back to the reform of the party system to build institutionally viable political parties that can support the development of electoral democracy.

THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS It is axiomatic to conclude that modern societies cannot function in the absence of strong institutions which are required whether for economic development and functioning democracies. Institutions undergird the process of wealth generation and property relations in the economic sphere just as democracies are as strong as the institutions that are designed to guarantee free and equal competition in the political market place, and promoting both horizontal and vertical accountability of the state. The institutions of liberal democracy such as the executive, the legislature, judiciary, political parties and the EMBs and civil society, therefore, do not only determine the vibrancy of a democracy, but play other vital roles that are critical to the reproduction of democracy. While the legislature and the judiciary are institutions for fostering horizontal accountability, civil society and the legislature to some extent, promote vertical accountability that is at the heart of democratic politics. It goes 290 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY without saying that functional party systems and EMBs constitute institutional foundations of an enduring democratic order, which show worrying pathologies in the Nigerian situation (Egwu 2014). But then, what are institutions and why do they matter? According to North (1990), institutions which may be formal or informal are humanly devised rules and constraints in a society that shape or structure human interactions and behaviours, what is often referred to as the ‘rules of the game’. While formal institutions, according to Leftwich (2005), are normally established and constituted by binding laws, regulations and legal orders which prescribe what may or may not be done, informal institutions are constituted by conventions, norms, values and accepted ways of doing things, embedded in traditional social practices which can be equally binding. What is important, however, is that institutions are durable social rules and procedures, formal or informal, which structure the social, economic and political relations and interactions of those affected by them (Leftwich 2006). While scholars like North (1990) argue that institutions are conceptually different from the behaviour they seek to influence, others like Greif (2006)arereluctanttomakesuchadistinctiononthe ground that, for them ‘a legal rule, a constitutional provision, a moral code, or beliefs that do not influence behaviour are not a component of institutions’ (p. 30). However, institutions whether formal or informal, face common challenges of how they are established, maintained or changed. In other words, the existence and survival of institutions are not to be taken for granted. The literature clearly suggests that deinstitutionalization which is a process whereby the legitimacy of an institutionalized organizational practice erodes or discontinues is a necessary aspect of the process of institutionalization andtothatextent,apartofthesamecontinuum. The tragedy of Africa’s leadership experience is that big and strong men have become substitutes for institutions. The challenge of Africa is to build enduring democratic institutions that are capable of nourishing relationships between authority, accountability and responsibility. In the absence of such institutions, characterized by reciprocal behaviour and legitimate relations between the governors and the governed, Africa will not meaningfully address its developmental challenges. According to Piing (2010), because democratic elections are processes, not events, the key element in building democratic culture in Africa requirement is to anchor the practices in unambiguous and predictable processes and strong institutions THE CHALLENGES OF BUILDING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 291 supported by popular participation to guarantee managing elections and building institutions of competition that are widely accepted by winners and losers. Furthermore, democracy is much more than electing leaders periodically through competitive elections. It is also about acceptance of a culture that institutionalizes certain basic freedoms and liberties: freedom of association, assembly, and expression of ideas, political organizations, and property rights. For this to happen, there is a need to strengthen the constitutions and constitutionalism, promote peaceful constitutional transfer of power, establish civilian control of the security apparatus, promote and protect fundamental freedoms and human rights, taking into account their universality, interdependence and indivisibility. These can hardly be achieved if democratization is not underpinned by strong institutions. But as important as institutions and the rules within which they function are, one needs to go beyond institutions and focus on the role of leadership and the key actors in the political system especially in relation to institutions that govern electoral democracy. This point is important because the constraint to the development of democratic institutions comes from the combined effect of centralization of power in the executive and in the capital in many of the struggling democracies around the world. Closely linked to this is the high stake in controlling elections. Thus, while institutions matter, institutions have to be built, nurtured and strengthened by the political leadership to provide for enduring and sustainable development. The task of building and sustaining the institutions of liberal democracy, as it has been well argued, falls largely on the key political actors. In the words of Schedler (2001: 68), ‘democracy is neither a divine gift nor a side effect of societal factors; it is the work of political actors’. But even more importantly, while institutions are important a democracy lies buried more deep within a society that is just within the formal institutions (Linz and Stepan 1996: 7), and the political actors have to accept it as a way of gaining power including acceptance of election results even where they lose. It is instructive that, among others, two institutions central to the flourishing of democracy in any country are the party system and the institution of parliament. If one of the institutions, political parties carry the moral burden of being the den of corruption, then it is right to conclude that our democracy is sick. And when parliaments are dysfunctional and fail in the core responsibility of holding the executive to account especially in presidential democracies, then executive excesses can become 292 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY a fetter for the nourishing of democracy and the guarantee of individual freedom and liberty. One more example of an institution that shapes the growth of democracy is the police which primarily has the responsibility of the maintenance of law and order in a democratic setting. This institution has been described in the Transparency International (TI) report as the hotbed of corruption. In more recent times, concerns about insecurity and Nigeria’s corporate existence have featured very prominently, and they are not unrelated to the social and geographical distribution of opportunities and wealth, which are symptomatic of the general weaknesses of institutions including those that undergird the accumulation and distribution of wealth in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria’s ranking as 43rd out of 53 countries in Africa and 14th out of the 26 countries in the West African sub-region on the 2012 Ibrahim Mo Index of African Governance using indices such as Safety and Rule of Law, Sustainable Economic Opportunity and Human Development encompassing poverty, health and education speaks volume about the environment of weak institutions and institutional malady. The implication of the foregoing is that the range of reform issues to address must bring into sharp focus, institutions that directly regulate and manage the electoral process and those that deal with the provision of security, law and order as well as the distribution of economic benefits even where they are not directly involved in the management of elections. The central importance of focusing on the EMBs cannot be over emphasized as has been stressed throughout this book. The need to also focus on political parties as the institutional foundation of democracy is also a given. Institutional reform is critical to key state institutions such as the police and the military, issues that are at the heart of the reform of the security sector with emphasis on subordinating them to civilian oversight and considerable level of conforming to democratic ethos. This is becoming more inevitable considering, for example, the increasing level of involvement of security agencies beyond securing the safety of the elections. In particular, it will be important to build the capacities of these state agencies through civic awareness campaigns to make them more amenable to democratic behaviour. Available evidence of loyalty to incumbent regimes and the bare-faced partisanship of some security agents compel attention to the reform of these institutions in the same way that reports about human rights abuses and extra-judicial killings perpetrated by security agencies (Amnesty International 2015) can significantly whittle down the legitimacy of democratic regimes. FROM PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY 293

Similarly, institutions of the state and the market that distribute economic beneﬁts need to be recalibrated to overcome economic and social inequalities which are capable of threatening the survival of Nigeria’s democracy. Not necessarily because democratic survival is hinged on a minimal level of economic growth and prosperity as emphasized in the growing literature on emerging democracies, but because livelihood issues such as poverty, unemployment and other crimes have direct bearing on the electoral process. The disruptive roles played by armed thugs that are recruited from the reserved army of the unemployed and the role which violence plays in undermining the credibility throughout all the electoral cycles of post-independence Nigeria provide strong indications that to secure the electoral process from all manners of infractions requires a comprehensive programme of economic and social reforms.

FROM PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY There appears to be so much pre-occupation with entrenching the procedural dimension of electoral democracy, sometimes to the neglect of the substantive dimension of the democratic project, namely, the expectation that democracy should enable citizens hold their government accountable to deliver services especially to the poor. But the neglect is only part of the problem because of the very limited nature of liberal democracy. It has been noted that a source of frustration with ‘electoral’ democracy comes with the realization that it alone does not ensure the presence of a responsive and accountable leadership between elections. Bratton men- tions the tendency for incumbency factor to stall opposition politics and for construction of durable patronage networks and political machines that reward supporters and punish enemies to take the centre stage rather than accountable governance. Democracy, however, is not only about elections and getting the procedural dimension right. As a matter of fact, extant literature on liberal democracy draws attention to the distinction between the procedural and the substantive dimensions of democracy, not as separate but integrated project in the search for a system of rule that is not just legitimate but answerable to the people in meeting their daily needs for freedom, liberty and material survival. In other words, both dimensions of democracy are central to the debate on democracy. The essence of democracy is that the people should exercise their sovereign power to govern themselves, more often than not through their elected representatives. For this reason, getting right the 294 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY procedural aspect of democracy is at the heart of the idea of liberal democracy; the central feature being the indeterminate nature of electoral contest and the fact that the winner today can become the loser tomorrow. On the substantive side, democracy is expected to offer more than periodic elections, peaceful political succession, human rights and the flowering of civil and political liberties. Democracy is expected to deliver services and advance the collective wellbeing of the people. In other words, democracy is not simply a framework for advancing the market but also for addressing the problem of development and social exclusion. Democratic governance should enable a country to checkmate corruption and impunity and ensure that elected public officials are held to account. The phenomenon of non-inclusive growth even when annual growth rates of over 6% has been recorded over a decade leaves much to be said about Nigeria’s lack of progress in the realm of substantive democracy. The failure to address these basic problems could create conditions and throw up forces that will undermine the entrenchment of democratic values and cultures as evident in the rise of insurgency, protracted ethno-religious violence and the swelling of a reserved army of the unemployed that is often recruited as private soldiers to prosecute election war. It should be remembered that the more recent struggle for democracy in Africa and Nigeria in particular occurred in the context of deep economic crisis and authoritarian political order. For this reason, the expectation is that democracy would enable citizens to address the two problems simultaneously. The recognition that it is not an issue of sequence: first, addressing procedural democracy before moving to the substantive dimension implies that citizens will increasingly perceive democracy as failing to meet their basic expectation and needs. Nevertheless, we do have the obligation and the opportunity to engage this democracy by mobilizing from below through waging consistent battle against corruption; creating and building accountability forums to enable constituents interface with their elected representatives at all levels, and foster the accountability of governments and state institutions to the people. Civic groups are expected to play their traditional role of checking and limiting the power of the state deriving from the orientation acquired in combating authoritarian rule, provide additional channels for articulating and representing interest, strengthen mechanisms and channels of information flow to citizens and citizens groups, and redouble energy in seeking to strengthen the state by enhancing its accountability, responsiveness and inclusiveness. As the soft underbelly of a capitalist society, FROM PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY 295 civic groups should extend the focus of their daily work beyond monitoring and observing the procedural aspect of elections and begin to address the challenge of governance and making electoral democracy relevant to the daily survival of the people. According to Ross (2006), the expectation that democracy can advance pro-poor governance is hinged on three assumptions: (1) Democracy makes it possible for the poor to penalize governments that fail to provide for public welfare at elections; (2) Democracy improves the flow of information between the poor and the government; (3) Democracy provides more funding for public services and produces more public goods than non-democracies. However, as the evidence across democracies seems to suggest, the actual workings of democracy especially of its liberal type do not lead to significant reduction in poverty. In the Nigerian context, at least until recently, flawed elections meant a weak notion of mandate and lack of incentives on the part of the elected government to be accountable to the people or the so-called electorate to demand accountable governance from their leaders. What this means is that the promissory note inherent in democracy for the electorate to punish non-performing leaders at elections and rewarding performing ones does not exist. But even more important is the observation by Ross (2006) that while democracies prevent the worst-case scenarios of poverty and deprivation, they hardly achieve the best results. This very much applies to the Nigerian situation and tends to confirm that in liberal democracies underpinned by neo-liberal reforms, there is a high proclivity towards social inequality. We also know from historical experience that extreme inequality, as we observe in Nigeria today, is not good for development and growth, much less for democracy because it can set in motion violent reactions and violent events that can undermine the basis for a stability and democratic progress. Again, from historical experience, if inequality is not addressed through peaceful means and peaceful democratic institutions it always potentially becomes a source of violence. It is in this context that we need to debate the type of democracy that Nigeria needs. But the question is: Can liberal democracy foster genuine development or can it advance democracy on the substantive side? It is important to ask this question because if it cannot, we will then need to interrogate it entirely and begin to contemplate the alternative. Early criticisms of liberal democracy from mainstream liberal thought drew attention to the fact that democracy is by and large an elite project, rather than a form of rule that can lead to the popular empowerment of the people. Claude Ake 296 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY specifically reminded us that the western ruling class following the bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries deliberately expunged the idea of equality from the original meaning of democracy, and only emphasized the libertarian element of democracy; because equality threatened private property which is the foundation of a capitalist society. What this means is that, from the very beginning, the western ruling class deliberately constructed democracy to empty it of the idea of people’s power. It is for this reason that liberal democracy elevates civil and political liberties to the neglect of economic and social equality. However, as it is today, liberal democracy is a hegemonic project that is ideologically driven by the IMF and the World Bank and it is defended as the only form of democracy that is pushed by the Washington consensus. The suspicion that liberal democracy may, in the end, serve as the political shell to advance market ideology and neo-liberalism in countries under- going democratic transition including Nigeria, formed the basis of the conclusion reached by Claude Ake (1994) that our type of democratization will necessarily result in the democratization of disempowerment. For instance, the human security situation in Nigeria has remained precarious despite the results of the recent rebasing of the Nigerian economy indicating that it is the 28th largest economy in the world and the 1st in Africa raising the per capita GDP from $1,555 to $2,688 (The Economist, April 12, 2014). The consistent record of economic growth has not resulted in abundance of life for the majority of the people as reflected in Nigeria’s ranking in the Human Development Index (HDI) report of the UNDP, which focuses on life expectancy, school enrolment, income indices, and Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI). Since 2010, the HDI has consistently ranked Nigeria low: 153rd in 2011 and 2012 and 152nd in 2013. All this represents a sad story of the decline in the status of the material wellbeing of Nigerians. The high levels of corruption and the entrenched culture of impunity; coupled with absence of efforts on the part of government at all levels to implement pro-poor policies and effect redistribution of wealth have aggravated the crisis of human security in Nigeria. The human security challenge is also evidenced by Nigeria’s global status as a peaceful country where people can live in happiness. Once described as one of the happiest people on earth, it has become a country torn by civil strife, violence and crimes of all sorts including rural banditry that has made existence suffocating. The 2014 Global Peace Index which ranked 162 countries by measures such as security, extent of conflict and FROM PROCEDURAL TO SUBSTANTIVE DEMOCRACY 297 degree of militarization put Nigeria as the 14th least peaceful country in the world. Noting that the level of peace in Nigeria had fallen by 5% since 2008, the report rates countries like Chad, Lebanon and Yemen as more peaceful than Nigeria. The Boko Haram-led insurgency in the north- eastern part of Nigeria, the frequent ethno-religious combustions in different parts of the country and the activities of ethnic militias, cult groups and rural bandits have made Nigeria the 20th saddest country to live in, according to the latest ranking by the Forbes Magazine. Nigeria’s global ranking along these dimensions is a consequence of the debilitating state of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, which are compounded by the failure of democratic governance and the inadequacies of the state. It may be difficult for Nigeria to be impervious to the globalizing trends of homogenization of the political culture of liberal democracy and its correlate of market ideology, which are the core of the powerful movement that led to the tearing down of the structures of the various forms of authoritarian rule popularly called democracy’s ‘third wave’. However, there is a need to interrogate the essence of Nigerian-type democracy which appears more as a framework for advancing the market at the expense of advancing the material wellbeing of the citizens. It is for this reason that debates around the sustainability of the democratic project in Africa, and in Nigeria, in particular must shift from liberal to social democracy. In a devastating critique of liberalism, Ake (1991, 2000) points to the changes to the original conception of democracy, and the increasing focus on the idea of liberty, while the notion of equality has been deliberately expunged in the course of the bourgeois revolution. Under the aegis of globalization, he argues, the idea of democracy which is narrowed to its liberal form spreads because it is rendered mean- ingless and innocuous without losing its symbolic values. Elite support for democracy is then explained by the logic that it is the prescribed route to power upheld by key financial institutions like the World Bank and the IMF which have their own agenda. What may appear more damaging about the inappropriateness of liberal democracy to Africa is found in the argument that the core values run contrary to the African realities. For instance, liberal democracy assures individualism for people who are basically communal and think in collective terms, the abstract universalism it assumes makes sense only in urban context, while the basic assumptions underlying political parties and their functioning appear largely unfit for African societies where interest group interests take precedence over associational life (Ake 1996). Ake’s 298 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY trenchant critique finds support in other scholars who insist that the relationships of solidarities are more real in Africa rather than the abstract notion of the individual as defined by the rationality of the political market place that is at the core liberal democratic politics (Nyamnjoh 2005; Obi 2006). One possible temptation is to run to the other extreme that what Africa perhaps needs is a return to the pre-colonial mode of politics and organizing power which appears to be the option that follows the tendency to romanticize the pre-colonial past. This is hardly a plausible option because the essential African character constructed from the pre-colonial past was largely dictated by the prevailing level of development of African societies which lacked uniformity, meaning that it is very difficult to capture all the nuances of the pre-colonial past by extrapolating from a few examples of the polities of the time. Instead, what should be recognized is the universal values of democracy which is not necessarily narrowed to liberal democracy. These values include liberty and equality, which can be meaningfully advanced beyond the market solutions. Indeed, one reservation that enemies of liberal democracy in Africa harbour is that it fails to recognize the very nature of the African state which is very authoritarian and autocratic, and hardly can become amenable to liberal politics of tolerance and accommodation of dissent (Larok 2011). However, it would appear to us, on the contrary, that the reason why liberal democracy (and even more social democracy) should be taken seriously is to defend and promote the core values of democracy to reform and tame the African state. Taming the excesses of the state and bringing the state to the arena of development at the same time would be a major advancement to the attainment of social democracy. The option that appears to be viable is the construction of a social democratic state where the state itself becomes the active promoter of development in ways that are accountable to the people. The more recent appeal of the developmentalist state should draw relevant lessons from the nature of the developmentalist state in the first decades of post- independence life where very powerful state systems disconnected from the people and surviving by promoting the ideology of development inflicted untold hardships on the African people in terms of egregious violation of human rights and the criminalization of dissent. It should also draw lessons from the Asian Tigers where human rights and dignity were sacrificed for economic progress. CONCLUDING REMARKS 299

CONCLUDING REMARKS Despite all its limitations, modern societies are yet to find an alternative to democracy as a mode of organizing political life and the construction of the state because of its limitless opportunities. Yet, historical experience suggests that realizing and entrenching democratic society is always a long haul that cannot be achieved within a few electoral cycles. It is in this sense that Nigeria’s return to constitutional framework of governance in 1999 and its survival through five uninterrupted electoral cycles is perceived as a remarkable achievement. But more importantly, it is an achievement that should be credited to the democratic energies of the Nigerian people who fought to dismantle authoritarian rule and have remained engaged with the process in spite of the weaknesses of democratic institutions. The analysis in this book does not only draw attention to the weaknesses of democratic institutions such as political parties, parliament and EMBs, but more critically to the inadequacies of the political class who, by and large, have phobia for elections. While international norms compel them to accept elections as a mode of leadership selection, they cannot contemplate the power of the people to freely choose their leaders. It is their vested interest to access power without the excruciating pains of subjecting themselves to public scrutiny that explains their deliberate subversion of the electoral process. To address this challenge, it should become a priority to strengthen the democratic institutions to the extent that rules, mechanisms and the norms of a democratic society should render individuals and groups accountable. Building democratic institutions and improving the environment of elections are important issues for all the stakeholders in Nigeria’s electoral democracy to address. The future of electoral democracy in Nigeria will be determined by the capacity of INEC to conduct elections that are transparent and credible and to continue to improve on its internal capacity. There are a number of immediate issues to be addressed by INEC based on the noticeable lapses and challenges identified in the 2015 general elections. One of such would be the printing and distribution of PVCs, the functionality of card readers and the phenomenon of underage voting widely reported across the country in the 2015 elections. There are largely administrative issues as well as the need to refine the technology of elections. They require further clean-up of the voter register and leveraging on its administrative structures which are present all over the country to address these challenges. 300 13 THE 2015 ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY

However, there is paucity in civic and political education that should target Nigerian citizens on the core values of democracy and the voting procedures. The task that is required in this regard goes beyond what INEC can effectively discharge, despite being one of its constitutional mandates. While the coordinating and leadership role of INEC in civic and voter education cannot be denied, political parties and civil society should be encouraged to improve their level of engagement to capacitate the electorate and citizens to exercise their democratic right of not only choosing but holding their governments to account. On the whole, it is important to continue to deepen electoral democracy by undertaking required reforms, build a culture of credible and free elections, and ensuring that election outcomes reﬂect the wishes and preferences of voters and citizens. But more importantly, there is need to make democracy work for the people and advance the common good. In moving from procedural to substantive democracy, we must use institutions and mechanisms to compel elected governments to deliver services especially to the poor, and increasingly, transcend liberal democracy by pushing democratic reform in the direction of social democracy.

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A Arab Spring, 127 Abubakar Abdulsalami, 89–90, 195 Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), 6, Abuja Peace Accord, 70 25, 66, 89 Action Congress of Nigeria Arewa People’s Congress (APC), 27 (ACN), 47, 54, 60, 75, 84, 89, Atiku Abubakar, 59, 98, 191, 206 98, 119–120, 169, 174, 178, Attahiru Jega, 9, 51–52, 55–58, 65, 87, 188–189, 205, 231, 237–238, 105, 112, 115, 149, 171, 174, 255, 267, 269 274, 276, 278–279, 281, 287 Afenifere, 6, 25, 66–67, 89 Audu Ogbeh, 81 Afﬁrmative Action, 64, 174 African Independent Television (AIT), 134 African Traditional Religion B (ATR), 27 Bakassi Boys, 27 Ahmadu Adamu Muazu, 81 Bamanga Tukur, 59, 81, 281 Ahmadu Ali, 81 Barnabas Germade, 81 Ahmed Asiwaju Tinubu, 106 Bashir Tofa, 146 Alex Ekwueme, 81 Boko Haram, 2, 6, 28, 32, 60–63, Alliance of Democracy, 188 106, 156–158, 179, 185, Alliance for Democracy (AD), 74, 205, 209, 219, 223–224, 262, 113, 253 268, 297 All Progressive Congress (APC), 2, 59, Britain, 34, 77, 288 158, 205 All Progressive’s Grand Alliance, 189 Aminu Waziri Tambuwal, 233 APC, see All Progressive Congress C (APC) Canadian International Development APGA, see All Progressive’s Grand Assistance (CIDA), 69 Alliance Central Bank of Nigeria, 152

Centre for Democracy and E Development, 193, 210, 251 Economic and Financial Crimes Chattam House, 46 Commission (EFCC), 49, 151, Christian Association of Nigeria 257, 287 (CAN), 30, 66, 195, 207 ECOWAS, 123 Civil Society Legislative Advocacy EFCC, see Economic and Financial Centre (CISLAC), 67 Crimes Commission Civil Society Organisations Egwu, 21, 24, 95, 114, 157, 175, 186, (CSOs), 50, 193, 251 246, 278, 290 CLEEN Foundation, 55, 62, Election Management Bodies, 8, 55, 193–194, 251, 261 69, 211 Code of Conduct for Political Election Management System Parties, 134 (EMS), 57, 175, 278 Cold War, 49 Election Observer Mission Compulsory voting, 115, (AU EOM), 10, 260 117, 121 Election Petitions Tribunal, 53, 126 Congressional elections, 115 Election Project Plan (EPP), 57, Congress for Progressive Change 175, 278 (CPC, 47, 75, 114, 189, Electoral Act (2010), 9, 74, 126, 192, 205, 237 259, 276, 279, 285–286 Constitutional amendment, 150, 174, Electoral College, 241 276, 278, 285, 289 Electoral democracy, 3, 8, 10–11, 36, Constitution Drafting Committee 45–71, 74, 128, 273–300 (CDC), 89 Electoralism, 1, 91 Court of Appeal, 264 Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), 92, 125, 170 Electoral Offences Commission, 171, D 284, 285 David Mark, 63, 89, 90, 246 Electoral Reform Committee Democratic Governance for (ERC), 55, 87, 149, 166, 224 Development (DGD), Electronic Card Reader, 2, 251 69, 197 EMB, see Election Management Bodies Democratization, 2–3, 5–6, 11, 15, ERC, see Electoral Reform Committee 20, 22–23, 26–27, 34–35, 38, 45, Ethnicity, 5–6, 14, 20–23, 26, 35, 38, 49, 78, 167, 170, 179–180, 190, 114, 117, 119, 137 206, 208, 223, 226, 256, 267, European Union (EU), 69 277, 291, 296 Extra-judicial killings, 292 Developing democracies, 13, 16, 108, 115, 117 Deziani Allison-Madueke, 154 F Direct Data Capturing Machines Federal Character Commission (DDC), 56 (FCC), 25 INDEX 309

Federalism, 5, 17, 19–20, 24, I 37–38, 151 Ibarahim Babangida, 90 Federalist, 18 IBB, see Ibarahim Babangida Federal Radio Corporation of Ibrahim Index of African Governance Nigeria, 210 (IIAG), 150, 155 Fifth Assembly, 246 ICPC, see Independent Corrupt First Past the Post System, 61, 64, Practices Commission 73, 104 IDPs, see Internally displaced persons First Republic, 6, 45, 48, 146, (IDPs) 234, 278 Ijaw National Congress, 26, 66 Fourth Republic, 47, 74, 89–91, 97, Ike Ekweremadu, 63, 280 106, 114–115, 140, 144, 165, 167, IMF, 26, 296 196, 206, 234, 238, 247, 276 Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), 151, 155, 159, 287 Independent National Electoral G Commission (INEC), 5, 7, Ghali Umar Na’Abba, 50, 80 9, 11, 45–47, 49, 51–53, Globalization, 16, 20, 35, 70, 297 55–59, 63, 65, 67–71, 74–75, Global Peace Index, 296 80, 87, 91–93, 104–105, Goodluck Jonathan, 2, 32, 47, 51, 54, 112–113, 115, 126, 127, 56, 61, 63, 66–68, 105–106, 133–135, 137, 149, 165–180, 119, 136, 150, 153, 169, 185, 189, 194–195, 198, 206, 218, 192–193, 204, 209, 212, 217, 224–225, 227, 242–245, 223, 242, 263, 276, 279 251–252, 254, 258–261, 265, Grassroots Coalition for Goodluck 269, 274–279, 282, 284–288, Jonathan, 67 299–300 Institutional reform, 292 Instrumentalists, 21 H Inter-Agency Committee for Hamalai, 93, 94, 103, 112–113, 115, Coordination of Election Security 232, 246 (ICCES), 57 Hausa, 14, 25, 62, 88 Internally Displaced Persons Hausa/Fulani, 14 (IDPs), 62, 157 HoRs, see House of Representatives International Criminal Court House of Representatives, 47, 50, 53, (ICC), 70 80, 84–85, 130, 169, 187, 206, International Forum for 231, 284 Electoral Assistance Human Development Index, 296 (IFES), 69 Human rights, 70, 109, 125, 148, The International Republican Institute 150–151, 169, 204, 263, (IRI), 69 291–292, 294, 298 Inter-Party Advisory Council, 286 310 INDEX

J National Assembly, 3, 46–47, 54, 58, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal- 65, 83–84, 87, 89–90, 98–99, Jihad, see Boko Haram 120, 130, 150, 169–170, 183, Jerry Gana, 280 197–198, 231–247, 251, John Onaiyekan, 30, 195 262–263, 276, 280, 282, Judeo-Christian, 27, 29 285–286, 288 June 12, 1993, 80, 113, 278 National Consensus for Reforming the Elections, 65 National Council of Nigerian Citizens L (NCNC), 48 Lai Muhammed, 226 National Council of State, 46, Legislative turnover, 240, 246–247 172–173 Lemu Panel Report, 51 National Democratic Institute Liberal democracy, 8, 11, 15–16, 58, (NDI), 69 282, 289, 291, 293–298, 300 National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy, 152 National Gender Policy, 64 M National Institute for Legislative Marxist, 33 Studies, 246 Maurice Iwu, 52, 169, 254, 276, 282 National Intelligence Council, 9 Medium Term Expenditure National Party of Nigeria (NPN), 7, Framework (MTEF), 151 48, 88 Middle Belt, 26, 88, 187 National Peace Committee, 9, Mixed Member Representation, 289 194–197, 225 M.K.O. Abiola, 113, 146–147 National Republican Convention Movement for the Emancipation of (NRC), 146 the Niger Delta (MEND), 27 National Security Adviser (NSA, 46 Muhammadu Buhari, 2, 47, 83, 89, National Television Authority, 93, 210 106, 113–114, 119–120, 137, National Working Committee, 81, 185, 204, 209, 217, 223, 255 240, 280 Muhammadu Maccido, 30 Niger Delta, 27, 52, 66, 67, 88, 153, Muhammed Uwais, 55, 166, 172, 156, 188, 204, 258 224, 276 Niger Delta Development Multipartyism, 58, 71, 73–74 Commission, 156 Multiparty system, 61, 73–74, Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 76–78, 285 (NDPVF), 27 Nigeria Interfaith Action Association against Malaria (NIFAAM), 31 N Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic NASS, see National Assembly Affairs (NSCIA), 30, 66 National Anti-Poverty Eradication NILS, see National Institute for Programme, 152 Legislative Studies INDEX 311

Non-State Armed Groups 265, 267, 270, 279, 284–285, (NSAGs), 27 288–289, 291–292, 297, Northern Elements Progressive Union 299–300 (NEPU), 48 Political Parties Registration and Regulatory Commission, 173, 284 Political party representation, 235 O Post-Election Review Committee, 280 Odua People’s Congress (OPC), 27 Post-election violence, 3, 31, 50, 129, Ohaneze N’digbo, 6, 66–67 156, 178, 185, 196–198, 204, Okwesilieze Nwodo, 81 224, 268 Olisa Metuh, 257 Presidential elections, 54, 59, 80, 105, Olusegun Obasanjo, 30, 48–49, 54, 113–119, 130–131, 137, 185, 67, 83, 89–90, 104, 113, 188, 196, 203–227, 254, 267, 150–151, 188, 253, 278 269, 278 Open Secret Ballot System, 173 Price Water House and Cooper (PwC), 57 Primordialists, 21–22 P Proportional Representation (PR), 11, Parallel Voter Tabulation (PVT), 67 104, 166, 284 Parliamentary election, 117, 197 PVC, see Permanent Voters Card Patience Jonathan, 65, 208 PDP, see People’s Democratic Party (PDP) Q People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 2, Quota system, 18, 64, 239 47, 73–99, 106, 130, 205 People’s Redemption Party (PRP), 48 Permanent Voters Card, 2, 46, 112, 127, 176, 225 R Petroleum Industry Bill, 153 Rabiu Kwankwaso, 191, 206 Petroleum Trust Fund, 114 Rational choice theory, 109 Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre Raymond Dokpesi, 280 (PLAC), 67, 193 Reform Conference Committee, 280 Political Finance Group, 133 Religious revivalism, 28 Political parties, 2, 8, 23–24, 33, 52, Resident Electoral 55, 57–59, 61, 68–69, 74–77, Commissioners, 288 80–81, 84–86, 89, 104–105, Rochas Okorocha, 98, 189, 191, 206 109–111, 117–120, 126–128, Rotimi Amaechi, 98, 207 130, 132–136, 165, 167, 169, 171, 173–174, 176–177, 183–185, 193–194, 196, 198, S 203, 205, 211, 216, 219, 235, Sambo Dasuki, 46, 208 242, 244–245, 252, 255–256, Sam Nda Isaiah, 206 312 INDEX

Sani Abacha, 7 71, 73, 75, 81–82, 86–87, 97–98, Sanusi Lamido, 155 105–106, 110, 115, 119–120, Save Nigeria Group (SNG), 150, 169 126, 135, 137, 171, 175–180, Second Republic, 7, 24, 48, 73, 87–89, 184–199, 204, 206, 212, 136, 146–147, 188, 234, 273 240–247, 252–260, 262, 264, Seventh Assembly, 130, 246 273–300 Sharia, 19, 27–28, 30 Shola Omotola, 2, 11, 17, 20, 24, 26, – – 29 30, 36, 50, 53 54, 64, 77, 80, U – – – 83 86, 92 93, 96, 104, 145 147, Uche Secondus, 81 – 151, 155, 157, 165, 167 169, Umaru Yar’adua, 7, 55, 59, 114, 150, – – 172 174, 175, 178 179, 276, 278, 285 – 186 193, 198, 204, 206, 208, United Kingdom Department for – – 210 211, 220 221, 232, International Development – – 238 239, 256, 260, 262, 267 269 (DﬁD), 69 Sixth Assembly, 246 United Nations Development Social constructivism, 21 Programme (UNDP), 69 Social Democratic Party (SDP), 146, United Niger Delta Volunteer 186, 257 Force, 67 Solomon Lar, 81 United States Agency for International State Independent Electoral Development (USAID), 69 Commissions, 284 United States of America, 10, 13, 283 Stella Oduah, 155, 242, 245 Universal Declaration of Human Suffrage, 16, 109, 142, 284 Rights, 109 Sunday Mbang, 30 Supreme Court, 65, 241–242, 264–265, 287 V Vincent Ogbulafor, 81, 183 Voter education, 63, 67–68, 126, 300 T Voting behaviour, 108–111, 118, 269 Theophilus Danjuma, 90 Third Republic, 77, 146, 196 TMG, see Transition Monitoring Group W Tocqueville, 28 World Bank, 296–297 Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria, 192 Transition Monitoring Group Y (TMG), 67, 174, 193 Yemi Osinbajo, 191 2015 elections, 1–7, 9–10, 14, 32–33, Yoruba, 14, 25, 29, 48, 67, 88–89, 45–47, 51–55, 57, 59, 61, 65–68, 113–114