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HEADQUARTERS, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND Camp H.M. Smith, HI 96861 1 July 201X

USPACOM OPORD 500X-01 JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE—INCREASE FOOTPRINT

(U) REFERENCES*:

a. CDRUSPACOM CONPLAN 500X, 1 January 201X. b. CDRUSPACOM DEPORD 500X, 1 February 201X. c. (U) JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011. d. (U) JP 2-03 Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 31 October 2012 e. (U) JP 3-10 Joint Security Operations in Theater, 13 November 2014 f. (U) JP 3-22 Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010. g. (S) Order of Battle (CINC OB). h. Map, NIMA series XXXX, sheet reference e, scale 1:1,000,000. * denotes fictitious plans/orders or documents; included to provide realism to training products. 1. Situation a. General (1) Abu Sayyaf is a militant Islamist group based in and around Jolo and islands in the southwestern part of the . For more than four decades Moro groups have been engaged in an insurgency for an independent province in the country. The group is considered very violent, and was responsible for the Philippines' worst terrorist attack, the bombing of Superferry 14 in 2004, which killed 116 people. As of 2012, the group was estimated to have between 200 and 400 members, down from 1,250 in 2000. They use mostly improvised explosive devices, mortars, and automatic rifles. In a video published in the summer of 2014, the senior Abu Sayyaf leader and other masked men swear their allegiance to the "Islamic State" (ISIS) caliph. For many years prior to this Islamic State's competitor, Al Qaeda, had the support of Abu Sayyaf through various connections. Observers were skeptical of whether the pledge would lead to Abu Sayyaf becoming an ISIS outpost in Southeast Asia, or whether it was simply a way for the group to take advantage of the international publicity Islamic State is getting. (2) The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a rebel group that formed following a peace agreement reached between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MILF refused to accept this offer and continued their insurgency operations. In 2010 the MILF expressed that they would pursue a sub-state, likened to a U.S. state, instead of independence from the Philippines. The Muslim sub-state would not exercise power over national defense, foreign affairs, currency and coinage, and postal services, but would maintain troops for internal security. In early 2014 the Philippine government and MILF signed a peace agreement for the creation of the new Muslim autonomous entity called "Bangsamoro" under a law to be approved by the Philippine Congress. The agreement calls for Muslim self-rule in parts of the southern Philippines in exchange for a deactivation of rebel forces by the MILF. MILF forces would turn over their firearms to a third party selected by the MILF and the Philippine government. A regional police force would be established, and the Philippine military would reduce the presence of troops and help disband private armies in the area. (3) The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has escalated its activities in Southeast Asia so effectively that there is now an entire military unit of terrorists recruited from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The Islamic State has posted propaganda and recruitment videos showing children training with weapons inside territory controlled by the terror group, and a separate video of members carrying out the beheading of a Syrian man. Police have arrested several people who were planning to go to Syria to join the terrorist group, and several jihadist groups in Southeast Asia have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, including Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah.

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(4) ISIS has said it intends to establish a province of its "caliphate" in Southeast Asia, where the group could take advantage of some ungoverned spaces to establish a foothold from which to expand recruiting and plan attacks in the new host countries. The development that Southeast Asian terror groups are now flying the black Islamic State flag is a huge problem. Though the current U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State is largely limited to the Middle East, jihadists' approach to fighting the West has no geographic boundaries. Unless the anti-Islamic State coalition does more to cooperate with countries in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, the terror group will just expand its recruiting and attacks across the globe. b. Area of Concern (1) Area of Responsibility. The Area of Responsibility can be defined as the sea, land, and air space specified by the following: Bay of Bengal, Gulf of Thailand, Java Sea, Celebes Sea, Banda Sea, Sulu Sea, South China Sea, Spratly Islands, and the land, sea, and airspace of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. (2) Area of Interest. Consists of the Philippine border with Bangsamoro and its coastline, Indonesia, and Malaysia. (3) Theater of Operations. The first Joint Operational Area (JOA) is composed of multiple areas of operations within Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The second JOA consists of monitoring the several small islands spread throughout the region. c. Deterrent Options (1) JSOTF conducts military, security assistance, and peacekeeping operations to deter terrorist organizations and rogue nation state military forces from acts of aggression, violence, terror, and war. Throughout Operational Phases, JSOTF will maintain a careful balance between combat military operations and demonstrating U.S. and host nation resolve. Force protection measures will center on counter-terrorist and counter insurgency methods. Collection efforts will focus on those indicators that provide early warning and reduce ambiguity regarding potential terrorist plots. This will provide JSOTF the opportunity to act proactively as well as reactively. JSOTF’s Information Operations will emphasize the themes of U.S./Pacific Forces resolve to protect all countries’ citizens and property and the legitimacy of the mission. JSOTF will also undertake Civil Affairs efforts aimed at ensuring continued host-nation support of the operation at the governmental and population levels. d. Enemy Forces (1) Refer to Annex B, this OPLAN. (2) ISIS military forces have been increasingly aggressive in their reconnaissance activities and the intensity of their military training as conventional, small to medium size operational units are evident. There has been a build-up of recruitment activities, especially in Malaysia. (3) There is known support from outside governments and religious charity organizations. Terrorist organizations have been improving their ability to acquire state of the art dual use technology and other military-related supplies across international borders and through aerial and sea ports. (4) Terrorists, militias, and military forces do not possess a level of sophistication to match that of the JSOTF, but are larger than JSOTF footprint. (5) Centers of Gravity (a) The enemy’s strategic center of gravity is religious fundamentalism. (b) The enemy’s operational center of gravity is the military force’s ability to conduct operational combat for a limited duration. (c) The enemy's center of gravity is their ability to infiltrate small guerilla units throughout the operational area and their familiarity with the terrain. e. Friendly Forces (1) Centers of Gravity (a) The friendly theater strategic center of gravity is primarily in Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, along with support from the United Nations, and support for U.S. intervention and combat operations.

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(b) The friendly theater strategic center of gravity will be concentrated on Edwin Andrews Air Base in the Philippines, near Bangsamoro, , and Naval Station San Miguel. (c) The friendly operational center of gravity is force protection and our superior ability to effectively exercise command and control and mass combined firepower when needed. (2) Relationships with Internal and Foreign Nations and Organizations. (3) Philippine Forces (a) Army. The Philippines has a moderate standing Army with strength of 85,000, which can be boosted to roughly 185,000 with reservists. The government remains supportive of the international community and U.S. interests in eliminating the threat of attack by terrorist forces, but is unable to adequately protect itself from attack. The AFP is equipped to provide limited assistance to U.S. military operations. (b) Air Force. The is fully committed to be integrated into the ACC air campaign and maintain a joint headquarters with the ACC Commander. (c) Navy. The is currently operating 3 frigates. There are 11 active corvettes and numerous patrol boats, 11 amphibious landing ships and 7 auxiliary ships. (4) The following commands and agencies will support operations as indicated. (a) Department of State (DOS) 1. Obtain use of foreign bases, over flight rights, and transit rights, as required, and establish status of fForces agreements (SOFA) in the Joint Operations Area. 2. Seek political advocacy of other nations in the region to affect assistance in combating military forces. Initiate political and diplomatic activity to gain international support, including the United Nations, for economic sanctions and possible military support. 3. Assist in the arrangement of host nation support. 4. Identify military assistance requirements for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO). Provide guidance and direct the evacuation of U.S. citizens and other qualified nationals in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). 5. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Coordinate activities with deployed U.S. forces and support as directed by U.S. Ambassador or Deputy Chief of Missions. (b) USTRANSCOM 1. Provide strategic airlift and sealift forces and closure estimates for deploying forces. 2. Assist in deployment and redeployment planning and schedule strategic airlift and sealift for deploying forces. 3. Provide noncombatant evacuation airlift and sealift. (c) US Special Operations Command Pacific 1. Provide forces and logistics support as required by JSOTF. 2. Execute SOF operations in support of JSOTF. 3. Provide liaison and/or training teams and strategic reconnaissance elements as required. (d) Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific 1. Provide engineering and base operating support to naval and joint forces.

f. Assumptions (1) Regional partner nations will assist JSOTF Military forces in Joint Operations Areas. (2) Local Military forces will not be able to secure key installations, facilities, APODs/SPODs, and protect American citizens. (3) Nations outside the region will not intervene either for or against terrorist forces with their own armed forces.

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(4) US air forces will be able to establish and maintain air supremacy in the Joint Operations Area. g. Legal Considerations (1) Operations will comply with the law of armed conflict and reference Annex C of this OPLAN. (2) Jurisdiction over civilian common criminal personnel remains with the local courts. As expeditiously as practical, custody of non-U.S. civilian personnel will be transferred to local authorities.

2. Mission. When directed, JSOTF in coordination with the Governments of Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia conducts military operations and humanitarian assistance to protect U.S. interests and discourage terrorist aggression in the region. The endstate is the establishment of a more robust JSOTF capable of projecting force over a larger JOA while safeguarding of our equipment and positions from hostile actions. Success is Philippines’ military and law enforcement organizations operating freely within its own borders and pursuing two national objectives: (1) a stable government free of outside military threats and, (2) a nation that has gained the upper hand in subversive threats, radical means to overthrow a freely elected government. 3. Execution (1) Concept of Operations. JSOTF expansion is envisioned as an increased footprint and mission in 5 phases: (1) planning, (2) marshaling, (3) movement, (4) arrival and assembly (RSOI), and (5) beddown. Phases may overlap and are condition based. Service Special Operations Command will provide incoming forces that will arrive rapidly, assemble, and provide partner nation forces with maximum support. To be successful in this endeavor, we must remain cognizant of the fact that we will be operating in a hostile environment. Their most likely course of action will be to conduct limited attacks with the intent of disrupting our vital support operations and psychological will. (2) Commander’s Intent. Conduct operations in the Joint Operations Area to create an environment that prevents terrorist organizations from establishing operational capability within the region and from projecting any capability transnationally. Our end state comes when POTUS, SECDEF, and CDRUSPACOM declare end of operations and withdrawal. JSOTF is dissolved when all forces have redeployed, reached home station, or their further deployed location. Force protection will be paramount. (3) General. JSOTF conducts military operations including security assistance within the designated areas of Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia to deter aggressive terrorist forces. (4) Deployment. Designated forces will deploy from CONUS and maritime positions to intermediate staging bases. To assist with the operation, the Governments of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia have agreed to provide intermediate staging bases (ISB). (5) Employment. JSOTF forces will deploy and, during each phase of the operation, every precaution should be taken to limit the disruption of host countries’ economic, political, and governmental status. The duration of this operation is uncertain. (a) Phase I, Planning. Planning should be continuous and deliberate. Planning should include the refinement of troop, equipment, and supply or sustainment lists for general missions and specific contingencies. Continuous planning includes the preparation of OPLANs and the modification of any existing plans to provide for changes in force capabilities and introduction of any new equipment and procedures. During deliberate planning, plans appropriate to the mission are reviewed and modified according to the mission assigned and the specific situation for the subsequent deployment. (b) Phase II, Marshaling. Assigned units complete all final equipment and personnel checks for movement to the aerial port of embarkation (APOE). This phase ends upon the departure of the last element of the fly-in echelon (FIE) from the APOE. (c) Phase III, Movement. This phase will consist of the movement of forces by air and sea to the arrival and assembly area (AAA). This phase begins upon the departure of the first aircraft from the APOE or when the transit begins to a designated AAA. The phase ends when the last aircraft arrives in the AAA and the last ship has arrived at the offload site(s). (d) Phase IV, Arrival and Assembly. This phase is considered the most crucial phase of operations. It begins when the first ship or the first aircraft of the main body arrives in the designated

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AAA. It ends when adequate equipment and supplies have been offloaded and issued to units and command and control has been established. (e) Phase V, Beddown. This phase includes the buildup of additional facilities and operating locations to house incoming JSOTF personnel. This phase ends and turns into sustainment when the Commander has reports that all facilities and locations are operational and essential elements have attained combat readiness. b. Tasks (1) U.S. Special Operations Command Pacific. Deploy Special Operations Forces to the JSOTF - Philippines, Commander. (2) Navy Facilities Engineering Command Pacific, Deploy engineering and logistics forces to the JSOTF-Philippines, Commander. (3) Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Philippines, provide operational and logistics support to receive inbound forces. c. Coordinating Instructions (1) Direct liaison is authorized among all service components. (2) Coordination with the local governments and U.S. Department of State will be conducted until Phase III when executive liaison is anticipated. (3) Reporting requirements will be IAW this OPLAN, its annexes, and CJCS requirements. (4) Force protection and physical security is essential throughout this operation and will be written into all aspects of planning and execution. (5) No air, land, sea, or special operations will be conducted across international borders, or in the territorial waters of other nations, without NCA authorization. 4. Administration and Logistics a. Concept of Support. When directed by CJCS to execute OPLAN 9518X-XX, JSOTF has directive authority for all logistics in joint operations area. (1) Service Special Operations Component Commands will coordinate appropriate logistics support to deployed forces. Single Service Logistics Support is required for service-specific items; inter- service, common, and cross-servicing agreements may be used to minimize common support requirements. Copies of the agreements will be provided. (2) Develop tailored deployment packages to provide anticipated supply service and maintenance support for troops, equipment, and aircraft. (3) Provide logistics support for operations at the lowest level. Request requirements beyond Service Component capabilities. (4) During deployment, initial priority is to the development of the APODs/SPODs. The secondary mission is sustainment base operations to receive, process, medicate, feed, and transport civilian evacuees. (5) Primary means of intra-theater resupply for all forces is containerized delivery system (CDS) and combat off-load. 5. Command and Control a. Command Relationships. Refer to Annex J. (1) JSOTF is the supported command. b. Command Post (1) Edwin Andrews Air Base (2) Fort Bonifacio (3) Naval Station San Miguel. c. Command, Control and communications Systems. Refer to Annex K.

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[Name] General, USA Commander in Chief

Annexes:

A—TASK ORGANIZATION B—INTELLIGENCE B—OPERATIONS D—LOGISTICS E—PERSONNEL F—PUBLIC AFFAIRS G—CIVIL AFFAIRS H—METEOROLOGICAL AND OCEANOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS J—COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS K—COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS L—ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS M—MAPPING, CHARTING, AND GEODESY N—SPACE OPERATIONS P—HOST-NATION SUPPORT Q—MEDICAL SERVICES S—SPECIAL TECHNICAL OPERATIONS: (PROVIDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER) W—OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT X— EXECUTION CHECKLIST

OFFICIAL:

/s/ Name MG, USA Director, J5

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