Number 555 | April 27, 2021 EastWestCenter.org/APB COVID‐19 Crisis Response Offers Insight into Evolving U.S.‐Cambodia Relaons By Peter Valente and Mahew Sullivan Last year’s MS Westerdam cruise ship fiasco ‐ in which 1,455 passengers and 802 crew were turned away from five different ports before being welcomed by Cambodia ‐ raised many quesons regarding how governments and the internaonal community can improve their responses to global health crises. It also offers a window into the Cambodian government’s response to a global health crisis in the context of an important bilateral relaonship — U.S.‐Cambodia relaons. Shortly aer 700 new passengers boarded the Westerdam in Hong Kong on February 1 the cruise ship found itself stranded in the Indian and Pacific oceans ping‐ponging between Japan, Guam, the Philippines, and Thailand unl February 13, when Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen Peter Valente and allowed the Westerdam to dock in Sihanoukville, Cambodia. The incident serves as an interesng window into Mahew Sullivan, how domesc regime security consideraons combined with mixed moves in internaonal relaons of the East‐West influenced Cambodian decision making. Center in Washington, explain that “In any One of the more bizarre facets of the Westerdam’s story was the in‐person, relavely unprotected meet‐and‐ government where an greet between the Westerdam’s passengers and the Cambodian prime minister immediately aer docking and execuve or leader has amidst a global health crisis over the highly contagious COVID‐19 virus. There has been much speculaon by an outsized funcon in the media on the movaons of Cambodia’s decision and the prime minister’s personal welcome. Some of the that polical system’s various theories appearing in Western media include: diplomac moves toward home countries of the passengers and crew (parcularly the United States), Chinese polical influence causing Cambodia to play decision‐making down the dangers of COVID, or some combinaon of domesc and internaonal polics. calculus, such as Cambodia, leaders While none of the explanaons covering this case study are parcularly implausible, and possibly some oen form personality combinaon of factors existed, the most important explanatory factor for Cambodia’s behavior during the cults or demonstrate pandemic was Cambodia’s need for regime security. That is to say, Hun Sen, Cambodia’s prime minister and that they are the polical strongman since 1985, saw a chance to publicly show polical strength and bravado in the face of a primary if not singular crisis while simultaneously gaining a bargaining chip with larger powers like the United States and China. source of naonal In any government where an execuve or leader has an outsized funcon in that polical system’s decision‐ power.” making calculus, such as Cambodia, leaders oen form personality cults or demonstrate that they are the primary if not singular source of naonal power. A recent arcle from the Carnegie Endowment for Internaonal Peace observed several authoritarian governments’ behaviors and how effecve responses to the pandemic were oen hampered by disorganizaon, inefficient disseminaon of informaon, and regime insecurity. Hun Sen’s regime has significantly restricted civil society, free speech, and other polical freedoms as well as allegedly comming human rights violaons, all of which indicate low tolerance of polical dissent.

When a passenger tested posive for COVID‐19 in Malaysia, Hun Sen declared, “The irresponsibility of some foreigners on the health test of Westerdam passengers makes Cambodia the vicm of its humanitarian work… If I were the Malaysian prime minister, I would remove the health minister for being neglecul and irresponsible.” These high‐profile remarks dismissing the dangers of COVID‐19 indicate the priorizaon of confidence in the polical status quo rather than effecve response to containing and isolang the global pandemic. Although catering to a Chinese audience may have been a goal of Cambodian foreign policy, these personal statements from Hun Sen also fit the profile of an insecure and eccentric authoritarian leader willing to downplay the public danger of COVID‐19 felt across the region for the purposes of projecng a strong and in‐ control polical image.

Moreover, there was nothing low‐key about the disembarking of the Westerdam passengers in Sihanoukville, Cambodia. Internaonal media coverage throughout February 2020 used photographs of an unmasked Hun Sen posing in Sihanoukville next to the Westerdam, handing out flowers, and shaking hands with joyful disembarking passengers. Local Cambodian media sources oen highlighted praise from the internaonal community and the regime’s ‘humanitarianism’ in accepng the ship. The significant publicity accompanying the welcoming of the Westerdam indicates a push to depict the Cambodian PM as a great leader and humanitarian, thus shiing the narrave marred by negave coverage of Cambodia’s governance and human rights issues.

Hun Sen’s priorizaon of regime security manifests itself in Cambodia's foreign policy and may affect U.S.‐ Cambodian relaons. As one U.S. State Department official recently indicated in an interview, diplomacy with the regime can be “unpredictable”. In November 2019, the Trump administraon sent the Cambodian leader a leer looking for some sort of so‐reset or entente in relaons. Hun Sen’s response took an amicable tone, agreeing that democrac values were worth pursuing, and that friendship with the United States could be "It also may be risky for possible on the condion that Washington not advocate for regime change: “I am reassured by your explicit statement whereby you seek genuine engagement to pursue democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law the new U.S. rather than through regime change.” However, the core interest of the Cambodian administraon ‐ regime administraon to stand security ‐ seems to trump all other foreign policy priories and may be parally responsible for Cambodia’s lean too strongly on toward China and its authoritarian‐friendly Belt‐and‐Road strategy in recent decades. principle in Southeast Asia if Washington is In recent months, many commentators have urged the administraon to maintain a strong human‐rights stance hoping to maintain in U.S. foreign policy towards Asia and the Pacific, parcularly in the context of compeng with Chinese polical capital and authoritarianism and its human‐rights violaons. A strong U.S. stance on human‐rights could indeed help avoid a regional Washington present Indo‐Pacific governments more palatable alternaves to China’s militarizaon and pendulum swing influence in the region. Moreover, disregarding tradional U.S. democrac values could send the wrong signal to other democrac partners in the region degrading Washington’s credibility and ulmately benefing Beijing’s toward China.” disinformaon and influencing campaigns.

On the other hand, it also may be risky for the new U.S. administraon to stand too strongly on principle in Southeast Asia if Washington is hoping to maintain polical capital and avoid a regional pendulum swing toward China. If Southeast Asian regimes look to the new U.S. administraon and see only the sck of admonion without construcve engagement, then Cambodian leaders may alternavely seek the carrot of Chinese no‐ strings‐aached Belt‐and‐Road engagement. Likewise, other regional partners, even close allies like Japan, have at mes shown reservaon in taking more punive acons against non‐democrac regional regimes. The East‐ West Center’s 2020 U.S. Presidenal Elecon report surveying Indo‐Pacific atudes towards U.S. foreign policy in the region indicated that partners such as India and Vietnam maintained some apprehensions about an overly‐human‐rights‐focused U.S. foreign policy.

There may be some signs for openings for further relaonship‐building between the United States and Cambodia. Last year, Cambodia was first among all ASEAN countries to confirm aendance at the planned U.S.‐ ASEAN summit in Las Vegas (cancelled due to the pandemic). Nonetheless, given the realies of Cambodia’s regime and its priorizaon of regime security, even over global health, the U.S. will ulmately need to carefully and pragmacally calculate the costs and benefits of using carrots versus scks in future U.S.‐Cambodia engagement. Peter Valente and MaƩhew Sullivan are a Programs Coordinator and Projects Coordinator, respecvely, at the East‐West Center in Washington. They can be contacted at [email protected] and sulli‐ [email protected].

APB Series Founding Editor: Dr. Satu Limaye | APB Series Coordinator: Peter Valente The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of the East-West Center or any organization with which the author is affiliated.

The East-West Center promotes better relations and understanding among the people and nations of the United States, Asia, and the Pacific through cooperative study, research, and dialogue. Established by the US Congress in 1960, the Center serves as a resource for information and analysis on critical issues of common concern, bringing people together to exchange views, build expertise, and develop policy options.