Issue 1333 21 Sept 2018 // USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 //
Feature Report
“The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites”. By Amy F. Woolf and James D. Werner. Published by the Congressional Research Service; Updated Sept. 6, 2018 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45306.pdf The nuclear weapons complex—what NNSA currently refers to as the Nuclear Security Enterprise—consists primarily of nine government-owned, contractor-operated sites in seven states, and a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) nuclear reactor used to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. The complex began with the establishment of the Manhattan Engineer District in 1942, then grew in size and complexity during the Cold War, before evolving into the current configuration during the 1990s. Facilities at the current nine sites include three laboratories, five component fabrication/materials production plants, one assembly and disassembly site, a geologic waste repository, and one testing facility that now conducts research but was previously the location for U.S. underground nuclear tests. This report summarizes the operations at each of these sites. As Congress conducts oversight of DOE’s and NNSA’s management, operations, and programs, and as it authorizes and appropriates funds for the Nuclear Security Enterprise, it may address a wide range of issues related to the nuclear weapons complex. These include questions about organization and management at NNSA, infrastructure recapitalization, plutonium pit production, and concerns about access to necessary supplies of tritium.
Issue No. 1320 22 June 2018
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TABLE OF CONTENTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS Ban on Low-yield Nuclear Weapons Pushed by Handful of Democrats (Stars and Stripes) Opponents of the low-yield nuclear weapons argue the use of any nuclear weapon could quickly escalate and provoke war on much larger proportions. Bombs Away: WWII Heavy Bombers Set Stage for Strategic Deterrence (Airman Magazine) Today’s strategic bombers provide one of the three delivery components of the nuclear triad along with land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which make up our nation’s nuclear deterrence strategy. Air Force Aims to Expand Bomber Fleet (National Defense) Global Strike Command — which is headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana — is responsible for managing the nation’s fleet of bombers, which include the B-1, B-2 and B-52. F.E. Warren Air Force Base to Modernize ICBM Systems (Wyoming Public Media) A large federal investment is coming to Wyoming as Congress is investing $90 billion in modernizing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile weapon systems (ICBMs). Twenty Tons of Uranium Could Be Used to Produce Tritium for Nuclear Weapons (Oak Ridge Today) The project involves the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant near Spring City in Rhea County, among other sites.
US COUNTER-WMD House Approves Bill to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction (Homeland Preparedness News) The House unanimously approved the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 (H.R. 6198), which enables DHS to establish the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office permanently. Missile Defense System Upgrade Meets Soldier’s Urgent Need (Redstone Rocket) The legacy Stinger Block I missile contains a hit-to-kill fuze which is effective against enemy fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Skripal Case: Russian ‘Spies’ Targeted Swiss Chemical Weapons Lab (BBC News) The intended target of the alleged espionage is a designated lab for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In addition to research on dangerous infections, it deals with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons research. White House Sets ‘New Direction’ in Biodefense Strategy (Tampa Bay Times) The goal of the strategy, which was required by Congress, is to more effectively prevent, prepare for and respond to biological threats, which the document said are "among the most serious threats" facing the U.S. and the world.
US ARMS CONTROL Former Launch Officer Warns Trump Strategy Fuels Nuclear Arms Race (CNN) The report also dissects what Blair characterizes as the US nuclear posture's "Achilles' heel" -- the system's communication network. Envoy: US Seeking to Negotiate Treaty with Iran (VOA) The United States is seeking to negotiate a treaty with Iran that will cover both its ballistic missile and
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nuclear programs, the U.S. special envoy for Iran said … Nuclear Theft and Sabotage Threats Remain High, Report Warns (Physics Today) Social unrest contributes to the US’s lack of improvement in the biennial ranking of how well countries protect against theft of weapons-usable materials. U.S., Russia Remain at ‘Impasse’ over Open Skies Treaty Flights (Defense News) The goal of the treaty, proponents say, is to provide open information that can be used to confirm adherence to arms-control treaties.
COMMENTARY Dealing with the Russia Factor in North Korean Negotiations (The Hill) There is no current threat to Russia from North Korea, but the risks associated with nuclear proliferation are of genuine concern, and a nuclear North Korea reduces Russia’s comparative military advantage in the region and lessens its own nuclear deterrent. What’s in a Name? Korean ‘Peace’ and Breaking the Deadlock (War on the Rocks) One option policymakers are considering to move negotiations forward is to trade a North Korean nuclear inventory in exchange for a declaration ending the Korean War. New Book Offers Vital Background on the Iran Nuclear Deal (The Washington Post) The fact that this particular author happens to be Jewish and a woman will raise even more eyebrows among Iran’s ideological attack dogs.
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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Stars and Stripes (Washington, D.C.) Ban on Low-yield Nuclear Weapons Pushed by Handful of Democrats By Claudia Grisales Sept. 18, 2018 WASHINGTON — A group of Democratic lawmakers introduced legislation Tuesday that would ban so-called “low-yield” nuclear weapons, which they contend increase the chance of war. Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., joined Reps. Adam Smith, D-Wash., ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, Ted Lieu and John Garamendi, both D-Calif., and Earl Blumenauer, D-Ore., to introduce the legislation to prohibit research, development, production and deployment of low- yield nuclear warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The weapons have the potential to lower the threshold and increase the risk of the United States entering into nuclear war, the lawmakers said. Their legislation, S. 3448 and H.R. 6840, follows President Donald Trump’s nuclear strategy unveiled earlier this year, which emphasizes the development of the low-yield nuclear weapons to deter threats from North Korea, Russia and China. “We should not fund President Trump’s request for new low-yield nuclear weapons. His proposal dangerously lowers the threshold to nuclear use and siphons money away from genuine military readiness needs,” Smith said. “We already have a nuclear deterrent that is more than adequate to achieve our national security goals. Funding new, low-yield weapons would only draw us further into an unnecessary nuclear arms race and increase the risks of miscalculation.” The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, a policy document that the Trump administration unveiled in February, reaffirms a long-held American doctrine that includes limiting the use of nuclear weapons to “extreme circumstances” and the need to maintain the nation’s nuclear triad of land-, sea-, and air-based capabilities. However, it also calls for the United States to develop new capabilities including the lower-yield nuclear warheads that could be fired from submarines. That capability is designed to ensure Russia is aware the United States has nuclear weapons that are not so devastating that the nation would risk detonating them, defense officials said at the time. Opponents of the low-yield nuclear weapons argue the use of any nuclear weapon could quickly escalate and provoke war on much larger proportions. The lawmakers’ “Hold the LYNE - or Low-Yield Nuclear Explosive - Act” looks to stop such a potential, they said. “There’s no such thing as a low-yield nuclear war. Use of any nuclear weapon, regardless of its killing power, could be catastrophically destabilizing,” said Lieu, an Air Force veteran. “It opens the door for severe miscalculation and could drag the U.S. and our allies into a devastating nuclear conflict.” Garamendi said his previous efforts to prohibit the authorization and funding to develop a low- yield nuclear warhead for a submarine-launched ballistic missile were narrowly defeated. The warheads will increase the risk of nuclear war and fuel a dangerous arms race, he warned.
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In addition, the United States is already on track to spend more than $1.2 trillion in the next 30 years just to modernize and maintain its current nuclear arsenal, Garamendi argued. “We should abandon our focus on outdated Cold War tactics and focus on the strategic challenges we face today, including accounting for the irresponsible spending on weapons we can’t afford to build and the world can’t afford for us to use,” Blumenauer said. The legislation has been endorsed by more than two dozen groups that monitor the use of nuclear weapons, including the Arms Control Association, the Union of Concerned Scientists, Peace Action, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety. “I don’t understand how anyone thinks building new ‘more-usable’ nuclear weapons will make us safer, when by definition, their creation increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used,” said Paul Kawika Martin, senior director for policy and political affairs at Peace Action. “Instead of jump-starting a new arms race, we need to return to steadfast diplomacy to reduce and eliminate the world’s nuclear arsenals.” Markey said the move towards low-yield nukes also marked the “height of fiscal and political folly.” “Its development is just a further example of how the Trump administration is surrendering decades of American leadership that have helped move the world away from the dangers posed by nuclear weapons,” he said. “A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, and the Trump administration’s attempts to market a new one are ill-advised and dangerous.” Stars and Stripes reporter Corey Dickstein contributed to this story. https://www.stripes.com/news/us/ban-on-low-yield-nuclear-weapons-pushed-by-handful-of- democrats-1.548156 Return to top
Airman Magazine (Fort George G. Meade, Md.) Bombs Away: WWII Heavy Bombers Set Stage for Strategic Deterrence By Bennie J. Davis III Sept. 14, 2018 Fort George G. Meade (AFNS) -- At 19, he went to war, and now at 94, he’s the only living member of his 10-man bomber crew who flew missions over Germany during World War II as part of the Eighth Air Force. He wanted to sit in the cockpit as a pilot, but a failed depth perception test found him sitting underneath the plane as a ball turret gunner on the B-17 Flying Fortress. But while his view of the ground may have changed, his view of the bomber never wavered. “The B-17 was the best airplane ever built, ‘cause it brought you home,’” he said. “We’ve come home on a wing and a prayer, sometimes you come in on two engines, sometimes two engines and a half of a wing, but you got home.” Many never did, however, as between 1942 and 1945 flying bombing missions for the “Mighty 8th” proved to be the most dangerous occupation in the U.S. Army Air Forces. Airmen were asked to complete a 25-mission quota at a time when the life expectancy of a crew didn’t surpass six missions. Casualty rates for heavy bomber crews also reached as high as 89 percent.
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During his time at RAF Ridgewell, England from 1943 – 1945 Perrone flew 32 missions with the 533rd Bomb Squadron at the height of the aerial campaigns against the Third Reich. He is credited with 3.5 kills from the ball turret. “You’re by yourself and it’s an odd feeling (shooting someone down). It’s been so long ago, I can’t think of all the ins and outs. I prayed a lot, I can tell you that,” said Perrone. “War, it’s a young man’s game.” According to Perrone, the amount of bombers in the air during missions was mind-boggling. Most missions involved hundreds of B-17 and B-24 Liberator bombers targeting ball-bearing plants, rail yards, oil production facilities and aircraft manufacturing factories. Nighttime area bombing attacks by the RAF complimented the daytime precision bombing raids by the U.S. Army Air Force. The bombers wreaked havoc on the German war machine, but allied casualties began to mount due to German 88mm anti-aircraft gun shells, commonly described as “flak,” and the vulnerability of the bombers to be attacked head-on by the Luftwaffe or German air force. Bomber losses rapidly increased to a rate the Eighth could not withstand. On Sept. 6, 1943, Perrone’s crew joined a raid on a German ball bearing production plant. Of the 400 Flying Fortresses launched for the mission, 60 were shot down and 600 Airmen were lost. “The flak was so thick you could walk on it,” said Perrone. “During the ins and outs of the cities, through flak, was the only time I was scared. I always wanted to see those puffs of flak clouds below me, way below me.” “When the Germans look up to see all our bombers, better them than us, believe me when I tell you, it had to be tough on them, and as the war went along, we became stronger and stronger and stronger,” said Perrone. “There were some towns and cities in Germany we leveled. We broke the Germans’ backs. The British softened them and then we really gave it to them.” The strength was provided by the long-range escort of P-38 Lightning and P-47 Thunderbolt aircraft outfitted with extra fuel drop tanks. Eventually, the employment of the P-51 Mustang allowed fighter escorts to reach Berlin. The bombers and fighters together destroyed the Luftwaffe and air supremacy was gained over western Germany. “My favorite memory; my last mission. I knew I was done and everything was okay,” said Perrone. “I was more scared on my last mission than my first.” Perrone considers himself lucky, only one in five aircrew members of the 8th AF made the quota to end their tour of duty. At the end of the war in Europe USAAF shifted focus to Japan with the deployment of the most technologically advanced aircraft, and the last bomber of World War II, the B-29 Superfortress. The B-29 was designed as a high-altitude strategic bomber, but it was primarily used as a low- altitude night bomber in the Pacific theater. It was equipped with a pressurized cabin and had a central fire system of remotely controlled gun turrets each armed with .50 caliber machine guns. The Superfortress also became the first nuclear capable aircraft. On Aug. 6, 1945, a B-29 named the “Enola Gay” deployed the world’s first atomic weapon on Hiroshima, Japan. Three days later a second B-29, “Bockscar,” dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki.
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Six days later Japan surrendered, the war was over and the era of nuclear deterrence began. With the advent of the nuclear weapon, bombers became the first vehicle to deliver apocalyptic devastation. Today’s strategic bombers provide one of the three delivery components of the nuclear triad along with land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which make up our nation’s nuclear deterrence strategy. “The capabilities of our nuclear deterrence are the bedrock of everything we do as a military,” said Gen. John E. Hyten, commander of U.S. Strategic Command at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. “It’s the thing that keeps our adversaries from taking a step too far. Nuclear deterrence keeps the great power conflicts down and the horrible death and destruction, like what was seen during World War II, away from the world.” In its infancy, the Air Force, then dubbed the Army Air Corps, lacked strategic bombing support while under Army control. The Army wasn’t convinced airplanes should be used for strategic bombing, but advocates like Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell argued bombers could replace traditional land and naval tactics as a dominant form by striking an enemy nation’s industrial complex and crippling its economic ability to fight. The Army’s prevailing view of the airplane, however, was as a reconnaissance and tactical bombing vehicle supporting ground troops on the front lines. Despite the debate, the American bomber was born in 1934 and shepherded in a new era of aerial combat. “World War II set the groundwork on how we employ, taking in collateral damage and validating how air power in so influential,” said 1st Lt. Andy Alexander, B-52H Stratofortress weapons systems officer at the 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. “Strategic bombing doctrine of World War II continues today in terms showing how decisive air power is to the campaign picture. The wars we fight today cannot be fought without bomber airpower.” Alexander is a second-generation “bomber crew dog” of the Eighth Air Force. His grandfather, Bill Alexander was a co-pilot on a B-24 for the 489th Bombardment Group out of RAF Halesworth, England. “I can’t imagine what he and his crew went through,” said Alexander of his grandfather. “You are basically in a flying unpressurized beer can with a couple engines strapped onto it, a few guns and about 8,000 pounds of bombs. There’s no GPS, no inertial navigation system, it’s charts and a protractor getting you across the English Channel through clouds of German flak. It’s noisy and freezing 20 degrees below zero. Oh, and there’s like a 0.06 percent chance of survival over the course of 25 missions.” “They were truly our greatest generation,” he added. Alexander said the basics of bombing doctrine were established in World War II, but with a myriad of sensors helping deploy munitions with absolute precision, landing within inches from the target, the B-52, B-1 Lancer and B-2 Spirit have certainly come a long way. Alexander explained what happened in the skies of Europe was absolutely instrumental. The losses were catastrophic, but at the time the USAAF had to launch 70 aircraft to take out a facility in the hopes one got lucky to peer through the clouds and strike a target. Nowadays one B-52 can take out that same facility, but from 1,000 miles away. “They laid down the absolute fundamentals of what air power brings to the picture in terms of complete destruction of enemy objectives,” said Alexander. “We provide the same thing today in a much more non-contested environment.”
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Alexander said the 8th AF is in demand by combatant commanders around the world. The strategic importance of bombers is even more important today than ever in terms of our posturing, projecting power, nuclear deterrence and assuring our allies. “Strategic bombers are also incredibly important to the nuclear triad. You have your intercontinental ballistic missiles and they stay in the ground all day. You have submarines, but it’s their job for you to not see them. The difference with the nuclear bomber is the visibility,” said Alexander. “If there’s a nuclear bomber in your yard, you know it’s there. It’s the most visible part of the triad.” Alexander stated another importance of the bombers is their recall ability. The president has the ability to recall the aircraft before weapons are launched. It’s the flexibility the bomber brings to the triad. “Strategic posturing sometimes is a greater deterrence,” said Alexander of what the nuclear bombers bring to the fight. “You can have the B-1s in Guam, but when the B-52 shows up it’s a different message … it’s the big stick. When that happens the tone does change. No one wants to go to war. Deterrence, that’s what we will be focusing on.” Alexander said when he walks the halls of the Mighty 8th AF and sees the black and white photos of the bomber crews of World War II, he sees the pride and spirit of our crews today, a bond and dependence of each other knowing the guy or gal on the left or right of you would die for you to protect our freedoms. “There is a great sense of camaraderie with bomber crews, because we have to work more as a team,” said Alexander. “Thanks to the Army Air Corps we have the most powerful and devastating Air Force the world has ever seen.” Perrone isn’t too sure about all that. All he does know is he made his mission quota and did what he was asked to do. Now he meets every Wednesday for lunch with a fellow World War II and Mighty 8th veteran Jack Goldstein. The two were stationed on the same base in England, but never met. Goldstein also completed his 25 missions as waist gunner on the B-17. He too is the last of his crew from the 535th Bomb Squadron. “I was only there for the last six months of the war, but I completed my missions and we all went home together in 1945,” said Goldstein. It took 40 years for Goldstein to open up and talk about the war. He now shares these stories with fellow veterans, but his family is unaware. The pictures and documents stuffed away for decades in the back of his closet are now proudly displayed in his home. “I now feel proud now when people come and thank us for our service,” said Goldstein. “There’s not too many of us kids left.” Each of them outlived their crews, and most World War II veterans are the last remaining of a dying breed … a breed that helped shape the importance of aerial warfare and set the stage for the bomber crews of today. https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/1634297/bombs-away-wwii-heavy-bombers- set-stage-for-strategic-deterrence/ Return to top
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National Defense (Arlington, Va.) Air Force Aims to Expand Bomber Fleet By Yasmin Tadjdeh Sept. 17, 2018 The Air Force knows it wants to expand its bomber fleet, but hasn't identified exactly what aircraft might be involved, Global Strike Command's leader said Sept. 17. Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson said the service must grow its fleet. “The Air Force is too small for what the nation expects of us,” she said during keynote remarks at the Air Force Association’s annual Air, Space & Cyber Conference in National Harbor, Maryland on Sept. 17. The service determined it should go from 312 squadrons to 386, which includes a bump of five squadrons for the bomber fleet. That is the largest by percentage out of the rest of the service’s inventory, she added. Gen. Timothy Ray, Global Strike Command commander, said later in the day that the exact composition of those five squadrons is still being puzzled out. “It’s not ready to be translated into tails,” he told reporters during a media roundtable at the conference. “This effort really is a back and forth with Congress.” There are still a number of other studies that need to be conducted before he could say what those squadrons of the future would look like, he added. Global Strike Command — which is headquartered at Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana — is responsible for managing the nation’s fleet of bombers, which include the B-1, B-2 and B-52. Ray took over the command in August, replacing former commander Gen. Robin Rand, who retired Sept. 1. The study laid out by Wilson is an “aspirational look” at how the service could be composed in the future, Ray said. Since the force structure numbers are still new, it “has not been something we have … worked towards because there is still a dialogue with Congress that has to happen,” he said. The study is not synchronized with Global Strike Command’s bomber vector, a roadmap for its future fleet that was released earlier this year, he noted. It would be “hard to say” when that synchronization may happen, he noted. “This is the beginning of the debate,” he said. Nevertheless, the command knows that it has to project power, Ray said. “You can do it with enough granularity, without having to be specific to a given platform,” he said. “We know that everything we do is going to shoot long-range cruise missiles in the future and we know that we are going to have some penetrating capability.” Ray added: “This wasn’t a conversation about, ‘What can the B-1 do? What can the B-52 do? What can the B-2 do?’ It’s a question of, broadly speaking, what do we need in terms of capabilities that the commanders out there are going to ask for?” The B-1, B-2 and B-52 are no longer in production. The B-21 Raider, which is also known as the long-range strike bomber, is currently under development and is expected to be fielded in the mid- 2020s. Northrop Grumman is under contract for the secretive program, which is being spearheaded by the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office. Wilson said the service would need to boost the squadron numbers in the 2025 to 2030 time frame.
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Ray noted that he had recently met with the B-21 team and said he was confident the program was going well. “Looking at the progress that has been made, the structure of the contract and the way things are coming together, I’m very comfortable with” the program, he said without giving further details. http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/9/17/air-force-bomber-coverage- 091718 Return to top
Wyoming Public Media (Laramie, Wyo.) F.E. Warren Air Force Base to Modernize ICBM Systems By London Homer-Wambeam Sept. 13, 2018 A large federal investment is coming to Wyoming as Congress is investing $90 billion in modernizing Intercontinental Ballistic Missile weapon systems (ICBMs). ICBMs are stored at three locations across the United States, including F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne. According to a press release from the Wyoming Business Council, the portion of the project taking place in Cheyenne will be the largest economic development investment in Wyoming history. The national project will be headed by either Boeing or Northrop Grumman, who will contract with local companies. Cheyenne Chamber of Commerce Vice President Stephanie Meisner said that if Wyoming business are not prepared to take these contracts, Boeing or Northrop Grumman will look elsewhere. “Now there are a lot of business within the state of Wyoming that are well outfitted for this. But for those that have not necessarily taken that leap yet they’ll have to utilize this next year or two to most certainly be outfitted,” said Meisner. The chamber has created online tools to help businesses become approved suppliers and able to prepare to work on the project. “This is our initiative focused on allowing businesses to position themselves to receive this funding to some level. And even if they don’t receive funding, it will certainly position them for future government procurement opportunities,” said Meisner. Construction is projected to begin in 2020. http://www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/fe-warren-air-force-base-modernize-icbm-systems Return to top
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Oak Ridge Today (Oak Ridge, Tenn.) Twenty Tons of Uranium Could Be Used to Produce Tritium for Nuclear Weapons By John Huotari Sept. 14, 2018 About 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium could be “down-blended” to low-enriched uranium and transferred to the Tennessee Valley Authority for use as a fuel to produce tritium for nuclear weapons, according to a public notice published in the Federal Register this week. The project involves the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant near Spring City in Rhea County, among other sites. The National Nuclear Security Administration and TVA announced in August that they intend to enter into an agreement to “down-blend” highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium in order to help produce tritium, a key “boosting” component in nuclear weapons. The highly enriched uranium used for the “down-blending” will be processed, packaged, and shipped from Y-12, according to the NNSA. Y-12 is an NNSA site, and it is the main storage facility for certain categories of highly enriched uranium. Low-enriched uranium, or LEU fuel, is used in a TVA commercial power reactor, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1. Tritium is produced there by irradiating lithium-aluminate pellets with neutrons in rods known as tritium-producing burnable absorber rods, or TPBARs. The irradiated rods are then shipped to the Savannah River Site, an NNSA production facility near Aiken, South Carolina. The Savannah River Site extracts the tritium from the irradiated rods, purifies it, and adds it to the existing inventory, according to the NNSA’s Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry determined in August that the transfer of the low-enriched uranium from U.S. Department of Energy inventories to help produce tritium would serve a national security purpose. “Down-blending HEU (highly enriched uranium) to low-enriched uranium supports the Department’s defense missions and promotes national security by enabling tritium production necessary to support the nuclear weapons stockpile,” Perry said in the secretarial determination. The uranium transfers will be conducted under the USEC Privatization Act of 1996, which provides for the transfer of enriched uranium for national security purposes, as determined by the secretary. The United States does not currently have a fully domestic uranium enrichment capability, according to this week’s public notice, which was published by the NNSA in the Federal Register on Tuesday. “The U.S. uranium enrichment market consists of foreign enrichment technologies that cannot be used to meet national security requirements for enriched uranium,” said the public notice, which was signed by Philip T. Calbos, NNSA acting deputy administrator for defense programs. There are efforts to restore the nation’s domestic uranium enrichment capability, but the NNSA, a DOE agency, said it will take time to develop enrichment technologies and allow for a thorough analysis. So, NNSA’s domestic uranium enrichment strategy includes NNSA Defense Programs down- blending about 20 metric tons of highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium for use as fuel in tritium production reactors, the public notice said.
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“The uranium will be transferred to the NNSA federal partner, the Tennessee Valley Authority, only for use as fuel in a reactor producing tritium and not for resale or retransfer,” the public notice said. “TVA will pay for the value of uranium to be received. Use of this material is compliant with long- standing U.S. policy and international commitments that require LEU used for defense purposes to be free of peaceful use restrictions (unobligated). TVA is responsible for preserving the unobligated LEU to be used as fuel in tritium production reactors.” In an August press release, the NNSA said the down-blending campaign is part of a strategy to provide a reliable and economical source of unobligated enriched uranium that will run from 2019 through 2025. TVA will provide material management and storage logistics through 2040, the NNSA said. “NNSA must down-blend its unobligated HEU inventory to provide LEU for defense missions because there is no source of unobligated enriched uranium available through the open market today,” the press release said. The NNSA said the down-blending agreement with TVA that was announced in August is separate from an existing irradiation agreement that started in 2000 and is in effect until November 30, 2035 TVA has been producing tritium for the NNSA by irradiating tritium producing burnable absorber rods, or TPBARs, in Watts Bar Unit 1 since 2003. There is a possibility that tritium could be produced for the NNSA in additional nuclear power plant units, including Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2. An operating license amendment being considered by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission would allow TPBARs to be loaded into Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2, according to a public notice published in the Federal Register in June. Tritium from irradiated rods from TVA are not the only source of tritium today, according to the Fiscal Year 2018 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which was published by the NNSA in November. The primary source is “end-of-life” gas transfer system reservoirs that have been returned to the Savannah River Site, the NNSA said. Tritium production Two years ago, the NNSA announced that it wanted to be able to irradiate up to 5,000 TBPARs every 18 months using TVA reactors at both Watts Bar and the two-unit Sequoyah site, near Soddy- Daisy in southeast Tennessee. “Although near-term tritium requirements could likely be met with the irradiation of 2,500 TPBARs every 18 months, this decision provides the greatest flexibility to meet potential future needs that could arise from various plausible but unexpected events,” the NNSA said in a record of decision published in the Federal Register on June 22, 2016. “The exact number of TPBARs to be irradiated during each/any 18-month reactor core cycle will be determined by both national security requirements and TVA reactor availability.” In a notice published in the Federal Register last year, TVA said it had agreed in June 2016 to evaluate the potential for producing tritium in the second unit at Watts Bar, Unit 2. As a result of that assessment, TVA planned to submit a license amendment to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in late 2017 to authorize the irradiation of up to 1,792 TPBARs in Watts Bar 2, possibly by December 2025. If the license amendment is approved, tritium production in Watts Bar 2 could start in the fall of 2020, TVA said. TPBARs could also be irradiated at the Sequoyah site in the future, TVA said, but there are no current plans to irradiate them there.
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Tritium is a radioactive isotope of hydrogen that has two neutrons and one proton. It has been described as an essential component in every nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile. It occurs naturally in small quantities but must be manufactured to obtain useful quantities. It enables weapons to produce a larger yield while reducing the overall size and weight of the warhead in a process known as “boosting,” the U.S. Department of Energy said in an environmental impact statement about 20 years ago. But unlike other nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, tritium decays at a rate of 5.5 percent per year—its half-life is about 12 years—and it must be replenished periodically. https://oakridgetoday.com/2018/09/14/twenty-tons-uranium-used-produce-tritium-nuclear- weapons/ Return to top
US COUNTER-WMD
Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.) House Approves Bill to Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction By Dave Kovaleski Sept. 17, 2018 The U.S. House of Representatives advanced legislation last week to help the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) fight terrorist threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The House unanimously approved the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 (H.R. 6198), which enables DHS to establish the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office permanently. It now moves to the Senate for approval. “The United States faces rising danger from terrorist groups and rogue nation states who could use weapons of mass destruction to harm Americans,” DHS Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen said. “Although DHS has broad authorities to guard against radiological and nuclear dangers, we don’t have the authorities we need to do the same against biological and chemical threats. We must stay a step ahead of our enemies, and this legislation would help us do that.” Nielsen established the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office in December 2017. If this bill is approved in Congress, the office would be permanently established and be granted new authorities to combat WMD threats. Assistant Secretary James McDonnell currently leads the CWMD Office. “I applaud the House Homeland Security Committee for their leadership in developing this legislation—especially Chairman Michael McCaul and Rep. Dan Donovan—and all House members who voted to enhance our defenses against WMD threats,” Nielsen said. “I now urge the Senate to do the same—to pass this legislation and send it to the President’s desk for signature.” https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/30447-house-approves-bill-to-counter-weapons-of- mass-destruction/
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Redstone Rocket (Decatur, Ala.) Missile Defense System Upgrade Meets Soldier’s Urgent Need By Cruise Missile Defense Systems Public Affairs Sept. 19, 2018 The Cruise Missile Defense Systems Project Office, in conjunction with the Armament Research and Development Engineering Center, has completed testing on a new Proximity Fuze warhead for the Stinger missile, which will lead to fielding under an urgent materiel release. With the test flights completed, the new configuration will be authorized for fielding to selected units under the urgent release directive to support the warfighter against existing and emerging aerial threats on the battlefield. The Army team, with the support of Lockheed Martin Sippican, demonstrated the proximity warhead capability on the Stinger missile during testing conducted at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, from Aug. 7-24. The new proximity capability was demonstrated by engaging nine free-flight Unmanned Aircraft Systems targets, consisting of different variants during the Soldier-fired events. The Stinger missiles were fired from the Avenger Weapon System and in the Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems configuration. The legacy Stinger Block I missile contains a hit-to-kill fuze which is effective against enemy fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The emergence of low observable UAS, increasingly being deployed by adversarial nations and terrorist groups, is a threat to the warfighter and a challenge for the legacy Stinger missile due to the very small UAS size and low heat signature. This can often result in a close miss against a UAS target. The new proximity fuze senses a near-miss situation and detonates the warhead, causing a proximity kill. This added capability allows the Stinger missile to maintain the hit-to-kill performance while improving effectiveness against varying classes of UAS. The Stinger FIM-92J missile, fitted with LMS’ Proximity Fuze warhead, is produced by Raytheon Missile Systems. “Our troops and allies need increased capability to defeat UAS of all classes, right now,” Col. Chuck Worshim, Cruise Missile Defense Systems project manager, said. “The Stinger missile with the Proximity Fuze clearly provides that additional capability to defeat multiple classes of UAS. This additional capability contributes to the modernization of Air and Missile Defense for the Army.” https://www.theredstonerocket.com/military_scene/article_1d971606-bc1a-11e8-954e- 77d1c5059278.html Return to top
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BBC News (London, United Kingdom) Skripal Case: Russian ‘Spies’ Targeted Swiss Chemical Weapons Lab Author Not Attributed Sept. 14, 2018 Two Russian men were arrested earlier this year on suspicion of spying on a Swiss laboratory investigating the poisoning of Sergei Skripal, a newspaper investigation has claimed. Swiss publication Tages Anzeiger and Dutch paper NRC said they were arrested in the Netherlands earlier this year. The Swiss lab analysed samples from the poisoning of the former Russian double agent in the UK. It has also dealt with suspected chemical weapons from the war in Syria. The two men were expelled from The Netherlands shortly after their arrest, which had not been reported until now. A spokeswoman for Swiss intelligence told the BBC that the agency had been actively involved in "the case of the Russian spies", without mentioning the laboratory at Spiez, near Bern. But Tages Anzeiger said the Swiss intelligence agency had confirmed the findings of its joint investigation with NRC. The report says the two men had equipment that could have been used to break into the laboratory's computer systems, and also alleged that they worked for Russian intelligence. Britain has said that two Russian intelligence officers carried out the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in Salisbury in March. Both survived, but local resident Dawn Sturgess died after exposure to the same nerve agent months later. NRC said the two alleged spies targeting the Swiss lab were not the same men accused of the poisoning. It is not clear exactly when the arrests were made. But British intelligence are said to have been involved in the intelligence operation, suggesting it occurred after the Salisbury poisonings. Isabelle Graber, head of communications at the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) said the agency had "participated actively in this operation together with its Dutch and British partners". The BBC understands that the British police investigation into the Salisbury poisonings was not involved. The intended target of the alleged espionage is a designated lab for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In addition to research on dangerous infections, it deals with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons research. In that capacity, it has examined samples from the Syrian conflict, where the Damascus government - Russia's ally - has been accused of using chemical weapons against civilians. Russia, meanwhile, has dismissed the reports as false. The Russian embassy in Bern, near the Spiez laboratory, told Reuters: "We consider such false statements simply absurd and nothing other than another attempt to stoke an anti-Russian atmosphere." https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45522614
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Tampa Bay Times (St. Petersburg, Fla.) White House Sets ‘New Direction’ in Biodefense Strategy By Associated Press Sept. 18, 2018 WASHINGTON (AP) — The Trump administration on Tuesday released a new biodefense strategy that it said takes a more comprehensive approach to preparing the nation for deliberate biological attacks and natural outbreaks of infectious disease. The goal of the strategy, which was required by Congress, is to more effectively prevent, prepare for and respond to biological threats, which the document said are "among the most serious threats" facing the U.S. and the world. "Biological threats emanate from many sources, and they know no borders," Trump said in a written statement. "They have great potential to disrupt the economy, exact a toll on human life, and tear at the very fabric of society." Trump said his administration's plan takes a "new direction" with a more coordinated, centralized approach based on lessons learned from past incidents such as the West Africa Ebola epidemic of 2014. The Department of Health and Human Services is designated as the lead agency in coordinating federal biodefense actions and assessing whether the plan is working. A privately sponsored group that has studied biodefense issues since 2014 applauded the White House's strategy. The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense has warned that the U.S. is dangerously vulnerable to a large-scale biological attack and has urged Washington to develop a more comprehensive strategy. "The White House made a great start with the implementation plan they included with the strategy," said Tom Ridge, the former Pennsylvania governor who is co-chairman of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel. "We look forward to the White House assigning responsibilities for each element of this plan to specific federal departments and agencies, and establishing timelines for their completion." At a White House briefing, John Bolton, the president's national security adviser, told reporters there is "no particular immediate threat" of biological attack. Alex Azar, the secretary of Health and Human Services, told reporters the threats are "very real and they're growing." He said the strategy is the first to include naturally occurring threats like the Ebola virus. Previous approaches focused on the threat of terrorists unleashing deadly germs or a nation such as North Korea launching a biological attack. https://www.tampabay.com/ap/national/white-house-sets-new-direction-in-biodefense-strategy- ap_national4c21af485a7d4ccebb22f7316b55d014 Return to top
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US ARMS CONTROL
CNN (Atlanta, Ga.) Former Launch Officer Warns Trump Strategy Fuels Nuclear Arms Race By Zachary Cohen and Sophie Tatum Sept. 19, 2018 Washington (CNN) — A former nuclear launch officer is warning that President Donald Trump's nuclear weapons strategy is encouraging an arms race that could increase the chances of a catastrophic nuclear war. He argues that the Pentagon should instead adopt a "deterrence-only" approach that phases out land-based missile systems that have served as one leg of the nuclear triad for decades. In a new report released on Tuesday, Global Zero's Dr. Bruce Blair, a former Air Force launch control officer who's a nuclear security expert at Princeton University, argues that the United States' nuclear stance is a "vestige of the Cold War" that creates instability with an unnecessarily hefty price tag. His proposal is intended to reshape the Pentagon's thinking on nuclear weapons by promoting a "deterrence-only" strategy that supplements sweeping cuts to the US nuclear force with additional options involving conventional weapons that he says are better suited to hit specific targets. "This alternate nuclear posture review is the first and only analysis in the public domain that uses credible estimates of existing US war plan target requirements and goes on to define the forces needed to meet them, and thus it challenges the Pentagon on its own terms," Blair told CNN. "It starts from the same place as Pentagon officials and nuclear war planners, offering a different perspective -- one that questions the foundation of nuclear planning. The US shouldn't base decisions on a strategy of nuclear war fighting, it should make decisions based on a deterrence-only role for the nuclear arsenal," he said. The report also dissects what Blair characterizes as the US nuclear posture's "Achilles' heel" -- the system's communication network. "Having the ability to absorb an attack and retaliate is the essence of deterrence, and yet the United States has failed to ensure presidential survival and robust communications—both vital to executing a retaliatory attack," the report said. The Pentagon's Nuclear Posture Review released in February focuses primarily on countering threats posed by Russia, and military officials are adamant their plan walks the line between maintaining a nuclear deterrence and encouraging controls on nuclear weapons. "It reaffirms that the fundamental role of US nuclear policy is deterrence and continues our clear commitment to nonproliferation and arms control," said Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan. However, Blair argues that the Trump administration's nuclear posture "promotes a nuclear arms race." "The Trump administration's nuclear posture goes beyond legitimate goals of credible national security, and actually promotes a nuclear arms race and nuclear war fighting," he added.
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Blair said some of the Pentagon's nuclear strategies are "dangerous" and contain unnecessary redundancies that may increase the chances of a full-scale nuclear conflict. "Nuclear war fighting is destabilizing. ... Once it starts, escalation is likely," he told CNN, adding that he would argue against the Pentagon's current war fighting target set and recommend scaling down to a deterrence-only strategy that threatens key targets. According to Blair, his report lays "out the steps needed to significantly reduce the risk of the use of nuclear weapons by design or accident and the risk of escalation to full-scale nuclear war if conflict happens." One such recommendation is for the Trump administration to phase out its arsenal of silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles over the next 10 years and adopt a deterrence-only model by dramatically cutting its arsenal of nuclear weapons and bomber force. Silo-based ICBMs are one leg of the US nuclear triad, which also consists of bombers and nuclear- armed submarines. According to Blair's report, five US Columbia-class submarines, backed by a reserve force of 40 nuclear-capable bombers, would be capable of retaliating with enough force if necessary, also rendering the third arm of the triad "redundant and dispensable." The Pentagon's current Nuclear Posture Review calls for at least 12 new Columbia-class submarines and 175 bombers. "The almost exclusive mission of these missiles is to engage Russia, or Russia and China simultaneously, in large-scale nuclear conflict," the report said. "Such wartime scenarios have become unthinkable. Waging war against both countries simultaneously is a contingency so improbable that US planners can safely ignore it." Blair also noted that silo locations are "fixed and known," creating vulnerabilities for the weapons. However, Defense Secretary James Mattis has reiterated the administration's support for the nuclear triad. In September 2017, Mattis argued it is a crucial form of deterrence. "I questioned the triad, and I cannot solve the deterrent problem reducing it from a triad," Mattis said, according to a report by Military Times. "If I want to send the most compelling message, I have been persuaded that the triad and its framework is the right way to go." Mattis has stressed the importance of including more conventional options as part of nuclear war planning and has worked toward overhauling US nuclear communications, a priority listed in Blair's report. For decades, the military plan for nuclear war has been known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan -- focusing entirely on a nuclear campaign. US Strategic Command, which oversees nuclear defense, is continuing the effort begun by the Obama administration to provide military plans that combine nuclear and conventional options, in order to be able to de-escalate a crisis, defense officials familiar with the effort told CNN in July. The move to include conventional options as part of planning for nuclear war took on additional importance as tensions rose with North Korea, and the Pentagon leadership was looking for a wide range of military options to offer Trump, officials said. Correction: This story has been updated to correctly attribute a quote to Bruce Blair rather than Vipin Narang of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. CNN's Barbara Starr contributed to this report.
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/18/politics/trump-us-nuclear-weapons-warning/index.html Return to top
VOA (Washington, D.C.) Envoy: US Seeking to Negotiate Treaty with Iran By Reuters Sept. 19, 2018 The United States is seeking to negotiate a treaty with Iran that will cover both its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, the U.S. special envoy for Iran said on Wednesday ahead of U.N. meetings in New York next week. "The new deal that we hope to be able to sign with Iran, and it will not be a personal agreement between two governments like the last one, we seek a treaty," envoy Brian Hook told an audience at the Hudson Institute think tank. But Hook said Iranian leaders have not been interested in talking despite statements by President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo this year that the administration was willing to meet. Trump announced in May that he was pulling the United States out of an Obama-era nuclear deal signed between Iran and six world powers. The 2015 deal was an executive agreement that was not ratified by the U.S. Senate. A treaty would require approval by the Senate. Opponents of the nuclear agreement have argued that Obama's failure to seek ratification of the deal allowed Trump to unilaterally scrap the deal in May. "They did not have the votes in the U.S. Senate so they found the votes in the U.N. Security Council. That is insufficient in our system of government if you want to have something enduring and sustainable," Hook said, without elaborating on how the administration would negotiate. Trump will chair a session on Iran during the U.N. General Assembly meetings in New York next week. In July, Trump said he was willing to meet Iran's leaders "anytime they want" prompting speculation that a meeting could occur at the U.N. meetings next week. "The ayatollah, the president and foreign minister have all indicated they are not interested in talking," Hook said, referring to Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. "We respect that though that does not change our plans. We have a sanctions regime that is underway, stronger measures are yet to come," he added. Hook said the administration was expanding its diplomatic efforts to ensure that purchases of Iranian oil were "close to zero" by Nov. 4 when Washington reimposed oil sanctions against Tehran. https://www.voanews.com/a/envoy-us-seeking-to-negotiate-treaty-with-iran/4578281.html Return to top
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Physics Today (College Park, Md.) Nuclear Theft and Sabotage Threats Remain High, Report Warns By David Kramer Sept. 14, 2018 Social unrest contributes to the US’s lack of improvement in the biennial ranking of how well countries protect against theft of weapons-usable materials. Nations must drastically improve cybersecurity protection to guard against thefts of nuclear materials or acts of nuclear sabotage, according to an exhaustive global analysis released 5 September by the nonprofit Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). One-third of the 44 countries and Taiwan that possess weapons-usable nuclear materials or have reactors, reprocessing plants, and other nuclear facilities lack even the most basic cyberprotections, the NTI reports in its Nuclear Security Index. And although the US received a high grade for its cyberdefenses, it still needs to improve its overall level of protection. The pace of cyberattacks on nuclear facilities has accelerated in recent years, according to the report. The authors cite multiple incidents that were publicly reported in 2016, including viruses discovered in computer systems at the Gundremmingen Nuclear Power Plant in Germany and the theft of tritium research from the University of Toyama’s Hydrogen Isotope Research Center in Japan. In addition, a former US Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission employee pleaded guilty to charges stemming from an attempt via spear-phishing emails to fraudulently gain confidential information from dozens of DOE employee accounts. Taiwan and 12 countries, including the US, received the highest grade from the NTI for their defenses against cyberthreats. But many other countries have not upgraded their cyberdefenses since 2016, the last time the NTI conducted its review. The report notes that nations with the largest number of sites are more likely to have cyber-nuclear regulations in place. The NTI recommends that those nations share their expertise and information on threats and vulnerabilities with less advanced countries. It also calls for countries to impose cybersecurity requirements at their nuclear facilities and to increase the number and quality of cyber-nuclear experts at sites. Among the 22 nations that possess at least 1 kilogram of separated plutonium or highly enriched uranium, the US and Russia came in 12th and 17th, respectively, for their overall level of protections from thefts. The two nations hold the vast majority of weapons-usable materials. Factors considered in the report card besides cyberdefenses include quantities of materials and the number of sites where they are located, security and control measures, and adherence to international norms and agreements. The US is down one place on the list from 2016 due to “heightened social unrest, resignations and vacancies from key government departments, and the increasingly deep polarization of political party politics.” Changes in regulatory policies require effective governance and bipartisan support, explains Hilary Steiner, a report coauthor from the consulting firm Economist Intelligence Unit. She cites large-scale demonstrations over the past two years, including the violent 2017 rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, as examples of social unrest that could adversely affect US nuclear regulatory policy. Still, the US remains far more stable than some of the other states possessing nuclear weapons materials. “Things might have gone in the wrong direction [in the US], but they’re still in the positive category,” says Page Stoutland, NTI vice president for scientific and technical affairs. Since 2016, increased political instability, ineffective governance, pervasive corruption, and the presence of terrorist groups have elevated threats in almost the same number of countries as those
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // that have lowered their risks, the report says. “We are racing the clock to prevent an attack with catastrophic consequences,” NTI CEO Ernest Moniz says in the foreword of the report. He brings up the aftermath of the 2016 suicide bombings of the Brussels airport and subway, when authorities uncovered evidence of a well-organized effort by terrorist groups to obtain nuclear and radiological materials. Nonetheless, important security gains have been made. Ten of the 32 countries that possessed weapons-usable materials in 2012 have since disposed of them. Poland and Argentina were the latest to eliminate their highly enriched uranium, joining Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Sweden, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. In the early 1990s, more than 50 nations possessed such materials. Australia tied with Switzerland for first place in overall protections against nuclear theft. Both nations are believed to possess just 1–3 kilograms of fissile material, quantities that are insufficient to fashion a nuclear device, says Frank von Hippel, former cochair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. Besides the US and Russia, the declared nuclear weapons states ranked 11th (France), 12th (the UK, tied with the US), and 14th (China). Undeclared weapons states Israel, India, and Pakistan were near the bottom of the list, at 18th, 19th, and 20th, respectively. The states judged to be most vulnerable to nuclear theft were Iran and North Korea. Of the 44 nations and Taiwan with nuclear facilities, Finland topped the rankings in protections from sabotage, followed by Australia, Canada, Japan, and the UK. The US tied for 11th place. https://physicstoday.scitation.org/do/10.1063/PT.6.2.20180914a/full/ Return to top
Defense News (Washington, D.C.) U.S., Russia Remain at ‘Impasse’ over Open Skies Treaty Flights By Aaron Mehta Sept. 14, 2018 WASHINGTON – The United States and Russia continue to be at odds with each other over a military verification treaty, to the point where no flights have been conducted in 2018. The latest issue with the Open Skies Treaty came to light earlier this week, with Russian officials saying the U.S. has refused to clear its planes for overflight of U.S. territory. Under the treaty, 34 countries, including both the U.S. and Russia, agree to allow unarmed surveillance flights over their territory to provide information gathering about military forces. “In breach of the Open Skies Treaty provisions, the head of the U.S. delegation refused to sign the final document, without giving any explanations or reasons, and citing direct instructions from Washington,” Sergei Ryzhkov, the chief of Russia’s Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, said according to the Tass News Agency. “We insist that the U.S. side return to the Open Skies Treaty framework and demand that the current situation be explained with reference to the treaty’s provisions.” This comes on the heels of Russian news reports over the summer claiming the U.S. had dropped out entirely of the agreement, something a State Department official denied was true.
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However, that official acknowledged that there have been no Open Skies flights conducted in 2018 thanks to ongoing disagreements between the two nations. “To the best recollection of our experts, we have not denied any Russian flights that were conducted in accordance with the Treaty,” the official said. Speaking at the Defense Writer’s Group on Sept. 7, Andrea Thompson, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, said talks are at an “impasse” between the two countries. “It’s at an impasse, but we’re having discussions. There are some things that Russia needs to do to get back into compliance with that,” Thompson said then. “We’re having those discussions, they’re ongoing, so that’s the most important part, that the dialogue is occurring and to get them back in compliance. and then we’ll move forward.” In February 2016, Russia announced plans to add a new digital electro-optical sensor to its Tupolev Tu-154 aircraft used for Open Skies flights. Pentagon officials and lawmakers alike raised the alarm that the new sensors would give Russia an informational edge over what can be gathered by the equipment used by the U.S. Things got worse in early 2018, with both nations slapping each other with restrictions. Russian officials blocked the U.S. from using these designated Russian military bases as overnight hubs for its flights, while the U.S. closed two American bases from Russian crews for the same use. The goal of the treaty, proponents say, is to provide open information that can be used to confirm adherence to arms-control treaties. But the agreement has been a target of Congress in the past, who have argued the treaty gives Russia a strategic edge. Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Okla., reacted to Russia’s claim on Wednesday, tweeting out “It’s rich for the Russians to protest the U.S.’s refusal to certify one of their planes for the Open Skies Treaty when they routinely restrict surveillance flights over Kaliningrad. The Open Skies Treaty is out of date and favors Russia, and the best way forward is to leave it.” Such comments are troubling to supporters of the treaty, such as Kingston Reif of the Arms Control Association. “For several years, GOP hawks in Congress, with the support of some treaty skeptics in the Pentagon, have sought to cripple U.S. implementation of the treaty. Now it appears these voices are making U.S. policy and accelerating their efforts to kill the treaty,” Reif said. " The treaty mandates information-sharing about military forces that increases transparency among members, thereby contributing to stability and improving each participating state’s national security. " The 2019 NDAA, signed by President Donald Trump in August, requires the executive branch to fulfill certain reporting and certification requirements before money could be released for the Open Skies program. In essence, that language restricts updates for the systems used by the U.S. to track Russian nuclear sites. The language is the result of Congressional fights over whether or not the DoD should spend to upgrade the OC-135B, an aging airframe that has struggled with maintenance rates and, in at least one memorable case, had to actually make an emergency landing in Russia during an overflight mission. The Pentagon maintains the aircraft are needed to ensure overwatch of Russia’s military capabilities, with Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis writing to Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Nebraska, that the treaty is an “important mechanism” but that the U.S. could only complete 64 percent of its flights in 2017.
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/09/14/us-russia-remain-at-impasse-over-nuclear- treaty-flights/ Return to top
COMMENTARY
The Hill (Washington, D.C.) Dealing with the Russia Factor in North Korean Negotiations By Nicholas Saidel Sept. 19, 2018 A second summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un could happen, but whether this negotiating process makes any headway in North Korea’s denuclearization depends, in part, on the actions of other states such as Russia and China. Russian President Vladimir Putin wants to be an integral part of any comprehensive agreement on the Korean Peninsula. He recently invited Kim to visit Moscow, and pledged to raise the issue of easing sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Like China, Russia already helps the Kim regime to violate sanctions — a not-so-subtle message to the United States that Russia wants in. Given that Russia shares a border with North Korea, making it difficult to detect sanctions-evasion assistance, and that it could intervene militarily to disrupt U.S. objectives, as it did in Syria, the United States should continue to punish Russia for illegal acts but also carve out a limited role for Moscow that doesn’t alter the U.S.-dominant balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. Russia typically defers to China with regard to North Korea, attempting to form a united front, where possible. Russia does not desire a nuclear-armed DPRK. There is no current threat to Russia from North Korea, but the risks associated with nuclear proliferation are of genuine concern, and a nuclear North Korea reduces Russia’s comparative military advantage in the region and lessens its own nuclear deterrent. That said, the United States must take care since Russia seeks an active role in multilateral negotiations to allow it to better pursue its goal of erasing the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula and reestablishing itself as a global superpower able to challenge NATO and the U.S.-led world order. Acting as chief arbiter and guarantor of high-stakes peace agreements is one component in restoring Russia’s prestige in the international community. Putin is deftly warming Russian ties with South Korea, as evinced by Republic of Korea (ROK) President Moon Jae-in’s trip to Russia in June, during which Moon stressed trilateral cooperation between Russia and the Koreas in economic and security spaces. Moon and Putin are emphasizing peacemaking initiatives on the Korean Peninsula, while the Trump administration concentrates on denuclearization. Russia and China support dual-track negotiations — one aimed at denuclearization and a parallel process that would formally end the Korean War and establish a peace treaty. Russia’s unique position as a state with relations with both the North and South (a policy sometimes referred to as “equidistance”) renders it a mutually trusted party in the context of inter-Korean diplomacy. The peace mechanism would be protected and enforced by the global powers involved — China, Russia and the United States. A regional security architecture would serve Russia’s interests by
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // cementing its status as an indispensable party in Korean Peninsula affairs and integrating its military, as an effort in hard-power projection, into resolving the conflict. Washington must adapt its peninsular policy to ensure that America’s united front with stakeholder allies such as South Korea and Japan, where Putin also is making inroads, is not threatened by Russian patronage. Full, vocal support of Moon’s diplomatic efforts with Kim would alleviate some of the pressure on Moon to endorse President Trump’s more antagonistic stance and stem South Korea’s drift toward Russia’s orbit on peninsular issues. Acknowledging and supporting the productive role that Russia could play in inter-Korean rapprochement also could benefit the negotiation process. With respect to China, President Trump’s economic warfare in the form of tariffs serves to strengthen ties between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, contrary to U.S. interests on the Korean Peninsula. President Trump should incentivize China to rein in Russia; the future of the Korean Peninsula is of far greater importance to China than it is to Russia, and Russia traditionally has accepted this reality. Furthermore, China historically has favored a U.S.-led dialogue on denuclearization. Calming tensions with China would serve U.S. interests as it negotiates with the Kim regime. Chinese influence is unparalleled, given that China accounts for over 90 percent of DPRK trade and provides crucial energy and food aid to North Korea. One first step to bring China into the equation that could simultaneously reaffirm America’s commitment to South Korea and undercut Russia, would be to heed Seoul’s request for the United States and China to formally end the Korean War. At the Singapore summit, President Trump reportedly promised to do so, an unkept promise that has exacerbated North Korea’s distrust of American intentions. Other carrots, in the form of trade talks and limited concessions regarding the THAAD missile defense system now deployed in South Korea, could be complemented by the soft stick of reminding Xi that destabilization on the Korean Peninsula would have immediate ramifications for China — and that the United States will hold China to task more aggressively for helping the Kim regime to evade sanctions. Moving forward, the United States should reorient China to a prominent role in negotiations with North Korea, albeit one that is subordinate to that of the United States. Russia could play a secondary role that provides it with some limelight in exchange for help in securing inter-Korean peace. Russia should neither be part of any regional security mechanism, nor be in any way responsible for verifying disarmament of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. These recommendations should all be viewed through the lens of disallowing Russia the opportunity to gain any competitive advantage over the United States during the North Korea negotiations. U.S. hegemony in the region is non-negotiable, and we must preserve the status quo balance of power. https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/406883-dealing-with-the-russia-factor-in-north- korea-negotiations Return to top
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War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.) What’s in a Name? Korean ‘Peace’ and Breaking the Deadlock By Duyeon Kim Sept. 14, 2018 Everyone wants peace on the Korean Peninsula. But what does “peace” mean and how is it achieved? This is where it gets tricky and political, dividing the hawks and the doves. It might be even more difficult for the United States and North Korea to agree on what peace means, including the meaning and implications of all of the interim steps, like a declaration ending the Korean War. The meaning of “peace” might be just as hard, if not harder, to agree on as the much-contested definition of “denuclearization.” In stark contrast from the past, North Korea under Kim Jong Un has been adamant about securing a declaration that the Korean War is over and has insisted Washington make this declaration first before it takes any further steps toward denuclearization. Amid the push-and-pull over who should make the first move, U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly cancelled Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s trip to Pyongyang and nuclear negotiations are currently at a standstill. The stalled talks have given a greater sense of urgency for South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who will meet Kim next Tuesday in Pyongyang for their third summit. His mission will be to further cement ways to improve inter-Korean relations as agreed upon in their April Panmunjeom Declaration, and to try to break the Washington-Pyongyang deadlock. A key objective from the April summit was to declare the Korean War over by the end of this year. One option policymakers are considering to move negotiations forward is to trade a North Korean nuclear inventory in exchange for a declaration ending the Korean War. Such a declaration, even a purely symbolic one, would be relatively easier for the two Koreas to make, but far more complicated for the United States because it has implications for U.S. presence and interests in the region. There are clear ways to draft a symbolic declaration that does not alter the armistice regime, which has ensured co-existence between the two Koreas without armed conflict for the past 65 years. But, if mishandled, declaring the Korean War over could open the floodgates for Pyongyang and Beijing to question the validity of the armistice and demand it (along with the U.N. Command and eventually U.S. troops in the region) be removed. Such demands, in turn, could further hold up the denuclearization process. To aid a more constructive policy debate, it is important to examine the various “peace” components, their meanings, their legal and political implications, and how they could line up with the denuclearization process. The complexities and nuances contained within could impact regional order. This understanding can also explain why many officials and experts are concerned about attaining “peace” too soon before denuclearization. Components of Korean ‘Peace’ American public discourse writ large has conflated some key terminology in the Korean “peace” lexicon, and even expert communities in key capitals have yet to agree on some definitions. For Seoul, the three main components are a declaration ending the Korean War, a peace treaty, and a peace regime. These components are related but very different, and words matter. Moon’s government (and, more or less, Pyongyang, according to officials in private) basically sees the peace process in three broad stages, each corresponding to one of those components. The first step, as agreed between Moon and Kim in April, is to declare that the Korean War is over by the end of 2018. Then comes a peace treaty that replaces the armistice, and finally the establishment of a broader peace regime.
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Simply put, a peace treaty is a legal agreement, or set of agreements, that would eventually replace the military armistice agreement signed in 1953 by the U.S.-led United Nations Command, the (North) Korean People’s Army, and China’s volunteer troops (which Beijing claims were not “regular” combat forces). The armistice was signed to cease fire, but the two Koreas are still technically at war in military terms. A peace treaty is a critical component of a peace regime, which is a comprehensive system of norms, institutions, and rules that ensures lasting peace. South Korean administrations have largely believed that a peace treaty is not enough to sustain peace, which is why they see the need for a peace regime. The last two steps — peace treaty and peace regime — could take place simultaneously or with some overlap depending on how their detailed components are configured. Parts of the peace regime can even begin before signing a formal peace treaty. As for how these steps relate to denuclearization efforts, Washington believes a peace treaty or regime should come only after denuclearization. South Korean officials say a peace treaty is impossible without denuclearization, but the Moon administration has not yet made its position clear in public. The difficulty of sequencing the various steps toward peace alongside denuclearization was illustrated during the previous progressive South Korean administration of President Roh Moo- hyun (2003-2008) to whom now-President Moon was chief of staff. According to former Foreign Minister Song Min-soon’s 2016 memoir “Glaciers Move,” the idea of a war-ending declaration was first discussed in the fall of 2006 between Roh and President George W. Bush in the context of the overall denuclearization and peace processes. Song writes that although Bush conflated the various components of the peace process, he was prepared to make peace and end the war after denuclearization. He says that officials who were proponents of negotiations within the Bush administration were willing to begin discussions about a war-ending declaration after the disablement stage was completed, Pyongyang submitted a declaration of its uranium program, and the issue of nuclear ties between Syria and North Korea was resolved. American negotiators at the time say (in this author’s interviews) Pyongyang was not interested in declaring the end of the Korean War or in a peace treaty during the Six Party Talks, but rather, focused on lifting sanctions and receiving light-water reactors for energy. Nevertheless, the two Koreas agreed in their October 2007 summit to “work together to advance the matter of having leaders of the three or four parties directly concerned to convene on the Peninsula and declare an end to the war.” Song recounts that he and “others” in the Roh administration (who can be deduced as some in the Blue House, the National Intelligence Service, and the Unification Ministry) disagreed on the purpose and sequencing for this war-ending declaration. Song believed it should proclaim the start of a negotiating process that eventually declares the end of the Korean War after a detailed denuclearization roadmap was agreed upon, while the “others” (some of whom are currently in the Moon administration) believed declaring an end to the war first could trigger progress in denuclearization. The latter view is similar to the view held by some progressive South Korean thinkers today who believe a war-ending declaration would induce denuclearization. Roh eventually decided, Song writes, that denuclearization should come before a war-ending declaration and a peace treaty. The Six Party Talks, after having disabled 11 key plutonium-producing facilities, collapsed in 2008 over disagreements on a verification protocol and with time running out for the Bush administration’s second term. A war-ending declaration was not a significant issue during Kim Jong Il’s leadership nor in the public discourse, but it has become a key objective for the two Koreas today. Elements — and Pitfalls — of a Declaration Ending the War
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The Moon administration sees the war-ending declaration as including four components: First, the relevant heads of state would symbolically declare that the Korean War is over. Second, the two Koreas, and the United States and North Korea, would each pronounce an end to bilateral hostilities. Third, the U.N. Command and Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) would remain in place until a peace treaty replaced the armistice. Fourth, relevant parties would sign a peace treaty and normalize diplomatic relations. If a trade involving a war-ending declaration to break the deadlock is still on the table, there needs to be a crystal-clear agreement among Washington, Pyongyang, and Seoul on the definition, conditions, and intentions. But if history is any guide, chances are high that Washington and Pyongyang could walk away with their own interpretations, which would widen the existing abyss and create more hurdles for the road ahead. Moon defined the signatories of this declaration as the two Koreas and the United States, and so far, there is no evidence to suggest Pyongyang disagrees, although China’s participation remains in question. The political nature of this envisioned document means the executive branches would likely take the lead in negotiations (for example, the U.S. State Department), not the militaries. However, it is important to consider potential pitfalls to this plan if it occurs before substantial denuclearization takes place. First, Pyongyang’s motivations for seeking a war-ending declaration need to be assessed. The regime seems to see this as a tangible step in “establishing new relations” with Washington — the first of four points agreed upon at the Singapore summit. Some experts (according to this author’s interviews) believe Kim needs this declaration for domestic political purposes to justify de-escalating with the United States, or that it can induce Pyongyang to take credible denuclearization steps. But many skeptics believe it is simply a ploy to weaken the armistice, induce an early peace treaty before denuclearization that eventually reduces or withdraws U.S. troops and ultimately break the U.S.-South Korean alliance. After all, Kim in his New Year’s Day address called on all Koreans around the world to rally around the North Korean flag in his “revolution” against American power in the region. Second, there are clear ways to symbolically and politically declare the Korean War is over without changing any part, or key parts, of the armistice. This also means no change to the DMZ (which was established to prevent armed clashes and has prevented full-scale conflict for the past 65 years), the U.N. Command (which ensures the implementation of the armistice and would manage the command and control of multinational forces sent during renewed hostilities), the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command (the main force that defends South Korea), and U.S. troops in the region. Such a statement would need an explicit condition or caveat that the armistice remains entirely intact (or, that key mechanisms and functions remain intact) until a peace treaty replaces it at an appropriate time. It could also proclaim that the state of active war as it was in the early 1950s no longer exists today. If the armistice remains intact, the U.N. Command would remain untouched. While such a declaration would not rescind U.N. Security Council Resolutions 82 through 88 regarding the Korean War and U.N. Command, it might have to state this in writing for clarity. Thus, such a declaration carries no legal or material implications for the armistice agreement and U.S. troops. This does not mean the North Korean nuclear-missile threat (to South Korea, Japan, and the United States) has vanished, which means it does not erase Washington’s rationale for its own deterrent. Even if Washington agrees to such a symbolic and conditional declaration, the bigger question is, would North Korea accept a statement that explicitly upholds the armistice? And would it live up to the letter and spirit of such a declaration? If so, the trickier task would still be for the Trump administration to manage the domestic and global perceptions, interpretations, and political implications of even a symbolic declaration. There would need to be a clear agreement with Pyongyang, Seoul, and Beijing that a war-ending declaration does not alter the armistice (or key
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // components) in any way, shape, or form and contains no ambiguity for international lawyers to argue various interpretations. Otherwise, Pyongyang could demand a peace treaty that questions the presence of U.S. troops in the region before taking denuclearization steps and shift the regional balance of power in its favor. A practical point that would still need to be addressed for a symbolic war-ending declaration is North Korea’s force posture near the DMZ and its artillery. About 70 percent of North Korea’s forces are in offensive posture between the DMZ and Pyongyang, while U.S. forces are not in offensive posture and are stationed further south of Seoul. South Korean forces are in defensive positions between the DMZ, Seoul, and the Han River. Third, even after a seemingly clear agreement is reached on a symbolic declaration’s contents, there is a risk that Pyongyang could still take a big victory lap, advertising the declaration as a defeat of the United States. Perhaps this is a propaganda show that some members of the administration might be willing to brave if they will receive a meaningful denuclearization measure that significantly moves nuclear negotiations forward. But in a North Korea where international politics trump legal fine print, a political declaration could still give the regime cause to argue for abolishing the armistice and the U.N. Command, altering or even withdrawing U.S. troops in South Korea and Japan, and making revisions to the Northern Limit Line (the de facto maritime border with the South where bloody naval skirmishes have occurred in the past). Or Pyongyang might simply demand a peace treaty next, a savvier route to ridding the peninsula of U.S. presence and influence. A Peace Treaty and Peace Regime: Opportunities and Risk From a nonproliferation perspective, the best scenario for a peace treaty, the next step in the peace process, would be to sign one after denuclearization or after substantial dismantlement is completed. However, relevant parties could consider beginning formal or informal discussions on a peace treaty after dismantlement has begun. This would constitute parallel nuclear dismantlement- and-peace negotiations and can occur regardless of whether a war-ending declaration is made. A peace treaty would be a far more complex endeavor than a war-ending declaration, loaded with numerous legal interpretations and ways of drafting the contents. First, there is considerable debate about who would sign the treaty. In the past, Pyongyang was opposed to Seoul being a signatory, but the regime under Kim has so far shown no public opposition, as evidenced by the Panmunjeom Declaration and peace offensive toward the South. This should be acknowledged as a major and most welcome shift in Pyongyang’s position. Seoul envisions the signatories to be the two Koreas (the principal parties to lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula), the United States, and possibly China. Legal experts point out (in this author’s interviews) that China technically would not be required to sign a peace treaty because its volunteer forces signed the armistice agreement, Beijing has continued to claim they were not regular combat forces, and Chinese troops have not been stationed on the Korean Peninsula since not long after the Korean War ended with a ceasefire. Today’s political considerations, however, may justify China as a signatory, and Beijing has made it clear that it sees itself as an essential party. Beijing views Korean peace and reunification as a regional order issue affecting its national interest. Pyongyang sees Washington as a signatory because the U.S.-led U.N. Command signed the armistice. Second, a peace treaty to replace the armistice could comprise one treaty, several treaties signed by different parties or all four parties, or one overarching treaty and several subsequent agreements. At some point — whether in a peace treaty or peace regime — an agreement on conventional arms control would be needed. Depending on the timing, situation, and needs, a peace treaty or treaties could even keep certain elements of the armistice agreement intact.
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Third, many lawyers (in interviews with the author) say the conditions on the Korean Peninsula would determine the status of the U.N. Command and U.S. troop presence — another source of debate. If denuclearization was achieved, some legal experts argue that the signatories, and under certain circumstances the U.N. Security Council, would have to decide whether North Korea’s conventional, chemical, and biological weapons are enough to merit retaining the U.N. Command in some form. There are conflicting views as to how to abolish the U.N. Command. With some exceptions, most lawyers argue that this would be an American decision because U.N. Security Council Resolution 84 put the “unified command” under U.S. command vis-à-vis North Korea, although Washington would likely consult with Seoul. The abolition of the U.N. Command would not affect U.S. Forces Korea and the Combined Forces Command with the South Korean military because U.S. forces are dual-hatted with the U.N. Command. All U.S. troops fall under America’s bilateral Mutual Defense Treaty with Seoul, which does not specify “North Korea” as the basis for their presence, but rather, threats in the Pacific region. The dissolution of the U.N. Command would, however, require the United States and Japan to replace their bilateral Status of Forces Agreement with a new agreement to keep seven U.S. bases in Japan that are mandated to support South Korea’s defense during wartime. Lastly, a peace treaty is also complex for the two Koreas themselves because it would require constitutional amendments. Both constitutions claim sovereignty and ownership over the entire peninsula and the Korean peoples. A Possible Compromise? There are various ways to configure a tradeoff in negotiations. Peeling away sanctions for each meaningful denuclearization step would be reasonable. But if Pyongyang will not yield on a war- ending declaration, Washington would still need a proportionate concession from Pyongyang because of the implications associated with the declaration. There are various measures the regime could take that would constitute credible and meaningful denuclearization steps. But if a nuclear- missile inventory is the only acceptable first step for Washington, one of three plausible scenarios may result: One, Pyongyang would not hand over an inventory because it would mean verification requirements. Transparency is the kiss of death for the heavily controlled regime, both because it undermines national sovereignty and because Pyongyang may be embarrassed if its technological achievements fell short of its public pronouncements about them. Two, Pyongyang might hand over an incomplete list because of secrecy, because uncertainty would preserve its deterrent, and perhaps because of fear that such information would be used for targeting purposes. Even an incomplete inventory would still begin a process that can probe for more. At the least, Washington should insist that North Korea disclose all fuel-cycle-related facilities anywhere in the country. The aim would be to verify this declaration and, as a first step, halt the production of fissile material. This arrangement would block future production pathways and keep intact Pyongyang’s existing deterrent until a more comprehensive declaration could be made, followed by verification and the eventual dismantlement of all programs. The risk surrounding any nuclear inventory, however, is a potential “ticking time bomb” if discrepancies were found or if the list were to be treated as a litmus test of Pyongyang’s seriousness. In this scenario, the U.S. administration might call it quits too soon or some forces might try to derail the diplomatic process. Three, Pyongyang could revert to “salami tactics” by slicing an inventory into small parts — perhaps by location, type of weapon, or facility — and demanding big U.S. concessions for each piece, leading to a long period of uncertainty and protracted negotiations. If the bar is too high for both sides to trade a nuclear inventory for a war-ending declaration, one reasonable compromise might be to revisit the idea floated over a decade ago: The relevant countries could proclaim the start to a process that eventually declares the end of the Korean War
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // in exchange for a detailed denuclearization roadmap that also factors in the components of the peace process. This idea would not fare well in Seoul because it does not accomplish a key agreement in the Panmunjeom Declaration by this year and because of its originator, former Foreign Minister Song, who became controversial among progressive South Koreans who were concerned the release of his memoir might negatively impact then-candidate Moon’s chances during the last presidential campaign. The need and desire for peace on the Korean Peninsula is indisputable. But a failure to operate on the same page regarding all the components of peace and their relationship with an agreed-upon denuclearization roadmap will further tangle northeast Asian relations. A protracted lull in negotiations could also complicate matters geopolitically. Both Moon and Trump have domestic time pressures: Moon needs to achieve his peace agenda within his five-year term, which means he needs progress between the United States and North Korea to lift sanctions, to enable him to connect railways and roads through North Korea, Russia, and Europe and achieve his vision of regional economic integration. Trump may also want to leave a peace legacy of his own. Time may appear to be on the side of Kim, who is playing the long game. In fact, though, time may not actually be on Kim’s side because Trump’s actions after the November midterm elections are unpredictable, and he may be the only American president who is willing to deal directly with Kim. But perhaps the better question is: Whose patience will run out first? https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/whats-in-a-name-korean-peace-and-breaking-the- deadlock/ Return to top
The Washington Post (Washington, D.C.) New Book Offers Vital Background on the Iran Nuclear Deal By Jason Rezaian Sept. 13, 2018 Wendy Sherman may not have the highest name recognition outside of Washington — but that’s what you might expect from a former top State Department official whose job included delicate negotiations with old adversaries and rogue states. Now she has just come out with a new memoir that fills a valuable gap in recent history by providing a detailed look at the talks that led to the Iran nuclear deal. Sherman was the lead negotiator for the U.S. side during much of that process. Particularly compelling are her descriptions of secret negotiations facilitated by the sultan of Oman between the United States and Iran starting in 2012. She joined those talks when they were already underway. “We never would have concluded a comprehensive deal with the other P5+1 nations or without the review by Congress. Rather, our need for secrecy was principally based on our lack of trust in Iran,” Sherman writes in “Not for the Faint of Heart.” “Confidentiality allowed the two teams to explore new ideas without exposing them to criticism from partisans in our respective countries who would be looking to sabotage any deal, no matter the merits.” Those discussions laid the foundation of the 2015 deal between Iran, the United States and a group of leading powers that aimed to curtail Iran’s nuclear program. That agreement was abandoned earlier this year by President Trump. In Sherman’s recounting of all the efforts that followed those initial contacts in 2012 — building a negotiating team, learning through encounters with Iranian officials, bridging differences with the
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// USAF CSDS Outreach Journal Issue 1333 // ministers of the other powers involved, and cultivating a political strategy that would allow it to survive challenges in the United States — she offers a vivid reminder that diplomacy is about hard work, persistence and the accumulation of experience. In other words, contrary to the current administration’s approach, negotiating isn’t about showing up somewhere, taking some pictures and pronouncing it a success. She draws frank character portraits of her Iranian negotiating counterparts, Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, and his deputies, Abbas Aragchi and Majid Takht Ravanchi. Even though she knows they represent a regime that is fundamentally at odds with the idea of America, she also understands that the deal will be as tough a sell in Tehran as in Washington. Her sense of sympathy for her Iranian counterparts will make for awkward reading in Tehran. And that’s a good thing. The fact that this particular author happens to be Jewish and a woman will raise even more eyebrows among Iran’s ideological attack dogs. Our strength as a nation has much to do with the fact that someone such as Sherman could ascend to being our top negotiator — in stark contrast to the rigidity of the Iranian system. Sadly, the Trump administration’s decision to depart from the agreement with Iran means we’re neglecting an opportunity to exploit our natural advantages. After years of accumulating valuable information about the ins and outs of the Iranians’ political behavior, we decided to abandon the process from one day to the next. “Whether we bought the Iranians’ political culture or not, we needed to understand the dynamics of it, and we needed a glue to bind them to a process and keep them coming back to the table,” Sherman writes. “We had to understand where they were coming from.” This is a theme that permeates the book, and it serves as an important reminder that the process she led for years amounted to the most sustained high-level contact we’ve had with Tehran since Jimmy Carter was president. Sherman’s narrative works because it’s honest. She lays bare what got her from one point to the next, in her personal life and in this massive negotiation. You can disagree with her all you want, but it would be difficult to simply discount the historical document she has provided. It’s a devastating reminder of just how much the United States invested to build a consensus with allies and adversaries alike, only to have it dismantled by people with a fraction of Wendy Sherman’s experience in international matters. People will and should continue to debate the wisdom of President Barack Obama’s outreach to Tehran for decades to come. But sooner or later — unless the Iranian regime falls apart first — the United States will have to talk to the Iranians again. (Indeed, the Trump administration continues to stress that it’s eager to start talks with the Iranians — though why they should indulge the current White House after its abrupt withdrawal from the deal is less clear.) At one point, when the negotiations seemed destined to fail, Sherman writes that then-Secretary of State John F. Kerry made an observation that seems especially apt today: “Sometimes you have to meet and not get anywhere in order to one day get somewhere.” When that time comes, the American leadership will have the choice of starting from scratch — or consulting the people involved in the long and sustained process that resulted in the original nuclear deal. Either way, those future decision-makers can give themselves a huge head start simply by reading this book. For the time being, though, Sherman’s memoir will remain the definitive account of the nuclear negotiation with Iran. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/09/13/new-book-offers- vital-background-on-the-iran-nuclear-deal/?utm_term=.ad894d496f95
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ABOUT THE USAF CSDS The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation. In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology. In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic. The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."
DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.
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