The Position of Islam and the Muslim Minority in Contemporary Serbia: A case study
MA Thesis in Eastern European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Bogdan Koetsier Main Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Michael Kemper Second Supervisor: Dr. Christian Noack Month, year of completion: October 2014
Contents
Introduction p. 5
CHAPTER 1 The two rivaling Islamic Communities and their legitimacy p. 10
1.1The growing influence of religion p. 11 1.2 The Islamic Communities in Serbia p. 12 1.3 The Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS) p. 13 1.4 The Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS) p. 15 1.5 The ICiS-ICoS conflict p. 16 1.6 Legitimacy and Authority: the legal framework p. 20 1.7 Legitimacy and Authority: historical continuity p. 24
CHAPTER 2 Mosque Construction and Property Restitution p. 27
2.1 Mosque construction p. 28 2.2 Restitution of Religious Property p. 30
CHAPTER 3 The Educational System p. 32
3.1 What has been written on history school books in Serbia? p. 33 3.2 General trends in history text books and the role of the state p. 34 3.3 The representation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire in history text books p. 36
CHAPTER 4 Interreligious Dialogue p. 41
4.1 General developments in Inter-religious Dialogue p. 42
4.2 Interreligious dialogue in Serbia p. 42
CHAPTER 5 Foreign Actors p. 46
3 5.1 The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina p. 47 5.2 Turkey’s role in reconciliation of the ICiS and ICoS p. 49 5.3 Turkish foreign policy and Neo Ottomanism p. 52 5.4 Saudi Arabia and Islamic radicalism p. 58
Conclusion p. 63
Bibliography p. 67
4 Introduction
When the former communist Yugoslavia disintegrated, the new independent states, formed in the process, had to redefine their identities. Ethnicity played a central role and Serbs, derived new identity from the defeat against the Turks 1389 in Kosovo. The Serbian feudal state perished at that time and the Ottomans ruled over Serbs till 1878, when Serbia became an independent state. The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church was of paramount importance in preserving national heritage and Christian profile in spite of massive conversions to Islam. After the fall of communism the confrontation between Christianity and Islam became one of the main features in Serbian politics: consequently the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) started to play a major role again. In its constitution Serbia is defined as “the state of the Serbian people [i.e. Orthodox Christians] and all other citizens that live in it”.1 In the context of increased importance of religion it is interesting to note that in Serbia there exists a concentrated Muslim minority of mainly Bosniaks in the economically weak region of Sandžak, a region in the South-Western corner of the country. This thesis deals with the position of this minority and its relation to the Serbian state and the SOC. Given the fact that the position of the Orthodox Church, with its sheer size and number of followers2 is in a way monopolistic, the question arises what the position of other confessional communities is. My initial hypothesis was that Muslims (in Sandžak) are oppressed in various ways. However, in the course of my research this initial hypothesis proved somewhat simplistic. There is namely remarkable difference between Serbia and the other former republics of Yugoslavia when it comes to the organizational structure of the Muslim communities. The Islamic Communities in Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina all position their spiritual centre in Sarajevo, where the Rijaset3 of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICoBH) is located. In contrast, Serbia presents a more complex case as since 2007 the country has witnessed a rivalry between two Islamic Communities that both claim legitimacy based on historical continuity: the Islamic Community in Serbia (ICiS) based in Novi Pazar and the Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS) based in Belgrade. This rivalry has ever since provoked a state of strong polarization between the two communities which has led to violent confrontations between supporters of the two factions. This highly
1 Article 1, Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. 2 According to the 2011 census, out of a total population of 7.1 million citizens, 6079396 declared themselves as being Orthodox and 222828 as Muslim. 3 The highest executive religious and administrative organ in the Islamic Community.
5 political rather than religious dispute revolves around one core problem: the ICiS locates its administrative and spiritual centre in Sarajevo while the ICoS locates theirs in the Serbian capital Belgrade. This suggests that the Muslims in Serbia are divided. In order to be able to grasp the complexity of this issue the role of the Serbian state deserves a closer examination. Specifically, the ICoS was allegedly created by the state the secret services and maintains good relations with the authorities as well as with the SOC. On the other hand, the ICiS strongly criticizes the role of the Serbian authorities in the protection of religious rights and the, as they see it, obstruction of economic development in Sandžak. At the forefront of this critique stands the politically active Mufti Muamer Zukorlić (the former president of the ICiS, currently head of the Sandžak Muftiate) who closely cooperates with the ICoBH in Sarajevo. In his involvement in the public debate he aims to end the alleged continuous discrimination of Bosniaks in Serbia. On the other hand, the SOC in unison with the Serbian state authorities, has been trying to promote the Mufti Adem Zilkić, reis-ul-ulema (Grand Mufti) of the ICoS and his followers. In this thesis, I aim to answer the following research questions:
I. To what extent can we maintain that the Muslim community in Serbia is being oppressed by the state? II. What are the political consequences of the existence of the two rivaling Islamic Communities in Serbia? III. What overall conclusions can be drawn regarding the relation between the Islamic Communities in Serbia on the one hand and the state and the SOC on the other?
The goal of this thesis is twofold. My intention is to place the specific conflict within the Islamic Community in a broader general context of the position of Muslims and Islam in Serbia which is strongly related to the political-ethnic tensions and opposing national and ethnocentric narratives that have resulted from the 1990s crises. This general context in Serbia can also function as a mirror of the situation in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Hypotheses
Despite the existence of a legal framework that guarantees the protection of minority and religious rights, the development of the Islamic community is obstructed in a number of
6 ways. Nationalist sentiments, both Bosniak and Serb, are fed by the way in which their respective media are reporting. In fact, one can speak of two radically opposed perspectives. At the same time the manifestation of these views in the public debate is even stimulating polarization rather than promoting mutual understanding. My expectation is that a similar statement can be made about the way in which history is portrayed in Serbian history school books. The foundation of a second Islamic Community, the ICoS, is very likely to be an initiative (co)organized by Serbian state actors. This initiative resulted in the weakening of the Islamic community as a whole and has a number of serious implications for the interests of the Islamic community. Firstly, the initiative affects religious rights, such as the restitution of religious property and the appointment of religious teachers in public schools. Secondly, it causes absence of the ICiS in ‘interreligious dialogue’ initiatives, because they refuse to participate in any meetings with representatives of the ICoS - an, in their eyes, illegitimate organization. Furthermore, the division in the Islamic Community could be interpreted as an obstruction in the process of inter-religious/ethnic tolerance as the followers of the ICiS are forced into a position of constant conflict with the authorities.
Methodology & Structure
Considering that my research is strongly focused on the contemporary situation, literature on some of these issues has yet to been written. Therefore, apart from the study of the available literature and reports from a variety of local media, a significant part of the data that I have used is drawn from interviews conducted during work visits to Serbia in the fall of 2013 and summer of 2014. The individuals that I interviewed include: Safeta Biševac – Bosniak journalist for Danas daily newspaper Milan Vukomanović – sociologist of religion - University of Belgrade Radmila Radić – Historian specialized in SOC history – Institute for Contemporary History Belgrade Dubravka Stojanović – Historian specialized in historical revisionism and the study of school books – University of Belgrade Aida Ćorović – Former Director of the Novi Pazar based NGO Urban In, currently MP for the Democratic Party Ivan Ejub Kostić – Turkologist – University of Belgrade
7 Darko Tanasković – Orientalist and former Ambassador to Turkey and the Vatican - Professor at the faculty of Oriental Studies - University of Belgrade Jahja Fehratović – President of the Bosniak Democratic Community Edin Đerlek – Assistant to the President of the Mešihat of the ICiS (Mufti Mevlud Dudić) and spokesman for the Bosniak Democratic Community Marko Oršolić – Theologian, sociologist and Fransiscan priest involved in interreligious dialogue initiatives
Note that I am aware of the necessity to cautiously interpret the information I gathered from these interviews. I expect to come across contradictory statements which are politically motivated and therefore far from objective sources. In order to present a complete picture of the position of Islam in relation to the state and the SOC, there are a number of key issues that I will discuss in this thesis. In the first chapter I will give an introductory overview of the two Islamic Communities and their conflict and the issue of their legitimacy and authority by analyzing the claims that they make and the state’s position in this dispute. I will also shed light on the political background of the conflict because of the strong involvment of Bosniak politcal parties in this issue. In the second chapter I will turn to the question of mosque construction and property restitution. Firstly I will discuss the possible problems that Muslims in Serbia face in the construction of mosques. Another important issue in this section will concern the restitution of religious property that was confiscated under the auspices of the communist regime. In 2006 legislation was adopted in order to regulate the return of religious property but, as I will show, there are significant problems in this field when it comes to the Islamic Communities. Thirdly, I will emphasize the aspect of history schoolbooks the Serbian educational system. I will draw from the few sources that exist on the topic of history school books and the way in which they portray Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Next to the relation of the rivaling Islamic Communities to the state, I chose to dedicate an additional chapter to interreligious relations. In this fourth chapter on inter- religious dialogue I will discuss the initiatives to promote inter-religious dialogue and the obstacles that these initiatives are faced with. In the last section I will cover the foreign influence on the Islamic Communities in Serbia. Most important in this context is clearly the influence from Bosnia, which is the administrative and spiritual centre of the ICiS. Historically, not only Bosnia but also Turkey
8 is a major factor of influence. I will discuss the attitude of these foreign actors towards the split in the Islamic Community as well as the financial aid, as far as there are concrete data that Muslims in Serbia receive such aid from abroad. Additionally I will elaborate on the presence of Saudi funding networks and the issue of ‘Wahabbism’ in Serbia. In the final chapter I will give a concluding summary of the preceding chapters and will return to the initial hypotheses and discuss their plausibility based on the accumulated evidence.
9 CHAPTER 1 The two rivaling Islamic Communities and their legitimacy
In this introductory chapter I shall in the first place direct my attention towards some key issues regarding the context in which the division between the currently rivaling Islamic communities arose. These communities are the Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS) and the Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS). I will first address the growing influence of religion in contemporary Serbian society and the existence of two radically opposing Serbian and Bosniak ethno-nationalist narratives. Then I will discuss the organizational structures of the ICiS and the ICoS and will present the genesis and development of the conflict between the two communities. Finally I will address the legal framework and the question of legitimacy and authority.
10 1.1 The growing influence of religion
Religion is by many authors considered both a dividing marker of nations on the Balkans and a basic integrative element of contemporary nations. It is presented as a pier of a system of ethnic values and the primary mover of development of national consciousness. This is a common characteristic of the Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian nations where religion represents an element that in the building of the nation has an important constitutive role.4 This intimate connection between national identity and religion has led to the complete identification of these two elements in the public discourse. What follows is that a Serb can only be an Orthodox believer, a Bosniak only a Muslim and a Croat only a Catholic. In the case of Serbia, an overwhelming majority of the population expressed themselves as Orthodox believers in the last census of 2011. The census results showed that Muslims, after Orthodox and Catholic believers, constitute the third largest religious community in Serbia. In addition, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) is closely connected to the Serbian state. It is in a sense the state religion despite the fact that according to the Serbian Constitution the Republic of Serbia is a secular state and that all churches and religious communities are equal. This phenomenon is dubbed ‘political orthodoxy’ by the sociologist of religion at the University of Belgrade Milan Vukomanović. It has been gaining ground since the period in which Vojislav Koštunica from the Serbian nationalistic Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Stranka Srbije) led the Serbian government (2004-2008). According to Vukomanović, political orthodoxy is “a post-socialist hybrid that developed as a type of synergy between some more extreme and radical factions in the SOC, their para-clerical organizations such as Dveri5 and some parties that are more favorably inclined toward the SOC such as the Democratic Party of Serbia. A coalition, in the political meaning of the word, has been formed between these groups. A number of high ranking priests of the SOC have manifested themselves in political performances and they openly propagate a political position in which public, societal life and the political relations in this country are being profiled in an Orthodox way. It is a manner of interference in public politics with a normative approach.”6 This hegemonic and privileged position of the SOC in combination with its close cooperation with the state therefore
4 Denita Sarač Rujanac, Odnos Vjerskog i Nacionalnog u Identitetu Bošnjaka od 1980. do 1990, Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju 2012, p. 28. 5 Which has become a political party in the meantime. The first political party in the Serbian system that has some Orthodox connotations in their values. 6 Interview with Milan Vukomanović, 6 November 2013.
11 represents an important background to keep in mind in the analysis of the status of the Islamic communities in Serbia. Furthermore, according to Turkologist Ivan Kostić7 “there is a continuity of nationalist ideology that is fueled by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and nationalistically oriented scholars. This factor is constantly present disregarding which political party is leading the government.”8 This dominant trend has a significant impact on how Islam and Muslims are framed in the public discourse. Like in the case of the Serbian Orthodoxy, which became one of the primary carriers of the Serbian national identity, Islam has had a similar function in the Bosniak identity. The prewar turmoil, war and genocide have facilitated an historically unprecedented politicization and ‘nationalization’ of Islam.9 In the rhetoric of the ICiS, the Sandžak based community of Muslims in Serbia, the government in Belgrade is principally “pro-Serbian” and “anti- Bosniak” and is structurally obstructing the development of the region of Sandžak where the majority of Bosniaks in Serbia reside. The critique of the ICiS is in the first place aimed at the ICoS, the other community of Muslims in Serbia, as a from their point of view illegitimate organization, and in the second place at the Serbian government, which is allegedly working together with the ICoS in the repression of Bosniaks in Serbia.
1.2 The Islamic Communities in Serbia
The history of Muslim organisations in Serbia is complex. At the time of the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 two parallel Islamic communities already existed: one for Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro with its seat in Belgrade, and another for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slavonia, Slovenia and Dalmatia, with its seat in Sarajevo. In 1930 the unity on the Islamic community in Yugoslavia was established with this Law which states that “All Muslims in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia constitute one independent Islamic religious community under the reis-ul-ulema as the supreme religious leader.” The seat of the reis-ul-ulema was transferred to Belgrade. In practice this centralization did not dissolve the division of the Yugoslav Muslims. On the contrary, the division remained in the structure of
7 Currently working on his PhD on the evolution of Bosniak identity at the University of Belgrade and director of the Balkan Centre for the Middle-East. 8 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014. 9 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states, New York: Oxford University Press 2002, p. 168.
12 religious administrative organs because a medžlis10, a vakuf (Arab: waqf)11 council and a vakuf directorate were created both in Sarajevo and in Skopje despite the central spiritual authority in Belgrade.12 In 1947 with the formation of the SFR Yugoslavia the unified and centralized Islamic Community in the SFR Yugoslavia (ICiYu) was formed. It had its center in Sarajevo. The disintegration of the Yugoslavia in the 1990s into independent entities created the conditions for the formation of new organizational structures for the Islamic Communities in the successor states. This resulted in the abolishing of the ICiYu. A meeting in Istanbul in the fall of 1994 that was attended by the representatives of the newly formed mešihats13 represented the formal dissolving of the ICiYu.14 The existing split between the currently rivaling Islamic communities in Serbia, the Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS) and the Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS) goes back to this period. The predecessor of the ICiS was established in 1993. The ICoS mešihat was established in 1994. In February 2007 the ICoS upgraded itself and founded the autonomous Rijaset of the ICoS in Belgrade and claimed authority over Sandžak. There was an immediate reaction. In March 2007 the ICiS was founded which then claimed authority over Below we will look at the details of this development.
1.3 The Islamic Community IN Serbia (ICiS)
The predecessor of the current ICiS, the Islamic Community in Sandžak (ICiSa), was established in 1993 under the formal name Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Sandžak, and covered the part of Sandžak located within Serbian borders, the Montenegrin part falling under the responsibility Rijaset of the Islamic Community in Montenegro (ICiM). The ICiSa was created as a branch of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICBiH) with its seat in Sarajevo. This is clearly defined in the Constitution of the ICBiH which states that
10 Local organizational unit of the Islamic Community which often corresponds with the administrative borders of a municipality. 11 “Waqf, in Islamic Law, the act of founding a charitable trust, and, hence the trust itself. The essential elements are that a person, with the intention of committing a pious deed, declares a part of his or her property to be henceforth unalienable and designates persons or public utilities as beneficiaries of its yields.” Source: Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. XI, Leiden 2010, p. 59. 12 Emil Turković, ‘Istorijsko-pravna analiza dinamike pravne regulative Islamske zajednice u Srbiji’, in: Novopazarski Zbornik 2013, Dragica Premović Aleksić ed., Novi Pazar: Muzej Ras 2013, p. 218 13 After the rijaset, the highest executive religious and administrative organ in the Islamic Community, the second highest religious and administrative organ is the mešihat which is responsible for a designated area. 14 Srđan Barišić, ‘Institucionalizacija Islamskih Zajednica nakon raspada SFR Jugoslavije’, Filozfija i Društvo, No. 2 (2008), p. 118.
13 „the Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Sandžak [i.e. the ICiS], the Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Croatia and the Mešihat of the Islamic Community in Slovenia are an integral part of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”15 At the central board assembly of the ICiS held on 27 March 2007 in Novi Pazar, a new constitution was adopted which was founded on the basis of the ICiSa. The proceedings were attented by reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić16, at the time the Grand Mufti of the ICBiH and supreme head of the community, and Muamer Zukorlić17 who was chosen as the president and head Mufti of the newly formed ICiS. The ICiS was now organized into four regional administrative units: the Sandžak Muftiate with its seat in Novi Pazar, the Preševo Muftiate with its seat in Preševo, the Belgrade Muftiate with its seat in Belgrade and the Novi Sad Muftiate with its seat in Novi Sad. The seat of the Mešihat of the ICiS is located in Novi Pazar, where the important administrative and educational institutions are located too: the Faculty for Islamic Studies, a two year Islamic Educational Academy where the language of instruction is Bosnian and which hosts guest lecturers from Bosnia and Macedonia regularly; the Gazi Isa-Beg medresa, an Islamic school whose male section was established in 1990 and the section for girls was established in 1996; and the International University of Novi Pazar (IUNP), a secular university created by the ICiS which is formally registered as a vakuf. These educational institutions all fall under the strong influence of Zukorlić. The issue of accreditation of the IUNP presents a specific issue of relevance for the ICiS. This educational institution which has been active since 2002 represents one of the symbols of the achievements which have been made under the leadership of Zukorlić. When the facility was built, Zukorlić enjoyed the support of the government in Belgrade but the university has however been unable to get the necessary accreditation from the state. Furthermore in 2006, the initiative to establish a state university in Novi Pazar came from the then prime minister Vojislav Koštunica. This was seen as a political tool by Sulejman Ugljanin of the Sandžak Party for Democratic Action (SDAS) (Stranka Demokratske Akcije Sandžaka) who thought it
15 Constitution of the ICBiH Article 1 (1997) 16 Mustafa Cerić was the Grand Mufti of the ICBiH from 1993 untill his successor Husein Kavazović took over in 2012. In the course of his mandate, he developed a strong relationship with ICiS Mufti Zukorlić. 17 Born on 15. February 1970 in the village of Orlje near Tutin where he grew up with his parents and two younger brothers. Elementary school he finished in his home town. Secondary school at the Gazi Husrev-Beg medresa in Sarajevo. He served in the military for one year in Gospić, Croatia. Studied Sharia Law (Usuli Fikh) at the Islamic University „El-Emir Abdelkader“ in Constantine, Algeri. Master studies in Qur'an exegesis (Tefsir) at Al-Jinan University in Tripoli, Lebanon. Speaks, writes and reads Arab language and speaks Turkish. Professor at the „Gazi Isa-beg“ medresa in Novi Pazar and for religious subjects and Arab language at the Islamic Pedagogical Academy (Faculty of Islamic Studies). President of the Mešihat of the ICiSa from 1993 to 2007 and president of the Mešihat of the ICiS from 2007 to 2013. Currently Zukorlić is the head of the Sandžak Muftiate of the ICiS.
14 could weaken the favorable position of Zukorlić’ IUNP.18 This example shows the strong political character of the ICiS and ICoS conflict. I will come back to the political background in subchapter 1.4. The Mešihat of the ICiS publishes a monthly magazine since 1996 named Glas Islama (the Voice of Islam) which deals with religious, cultural and societal issues. This is done by the active publishing house El Kelimeh in Novi Pazar, which also features a book store in the building that houses the Faculty of Islamic Studies.
1.4 The Islamic Community OF Serbia (ICoS)
The second of the two most important Islamic Communities in Serbia, which in contrast to the ICiS that is still part of the ICiBIH, is the autonomous Islamic Community of Serbia (ICoS). The Mešihat of the ICoS was formed in 1994 in Niš and covered the entire territory of Serbia, excluding Sandžak and Kosovo. On 19 February 2007, in the Bajrakli mosque19 in Belgrade, with the adoption of a new Constitution, the Rijaset of the ICoS was founded with its seat in Belgrade and Hamdija Jusufspahić20 was chosen as the reis-ul-ulema. Since 11 October 2007 the reis-ul-ulema is Adem Zilkić who succeeded Jusufspahić. Currently the ICoS is divided into three muftiates or organizational administrative units: the Serbian (Srbijanski) Mešihat with its seat in Belgrade, the Sandžak Mešihat with its seat in Novi Pazar and the Preševo Mešihat with its seat in Preševo.21 The educational institutions of the ICoS include: the Bakije Hanume medresa in Prepolje, the Sinan Beg medresa in Novi Pazar and the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Belgrade which was founded in 2011. The Faculty of Islamic Studies in Belgrade opened a branch department in Novi Pazar in that same year. At the time, according to Danas, there were 20 students taking classes in Belgrade, and 45 in
18 Aleksander Zdravkovski, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, p. 223.
19 With the retreat of Ottoman forces from Belgrade after the Great Vienna War (1683-99) all mosques in Belgrade (at least 73) were destroyed except for the Bajrakli mosque. It was torched in 2004 as a revenge for the burning of churches in Kosovo. 20 Administered the Bajrakli mosque and endorsed the Milošević regime. His son, Muhamed Jusufspahić is currently the Belgrade Mufti. Source: Aleksander Zdravkovski, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, p. 216 21 Srđan Barišić, ‘Institucionalizacija Islamskih Zajednica nakon raspada SFR Jugoslavije’, Filozfija i Društvo, No. 2 (2008), p. 124.
15 Novi Pazar.22 According to the ICoS, the ethnic composition of their followers is very heterogeneous. Their followers consist of 30% Bosniaks, 18% Albanians, and 52% Roma, Ashkali, Goranci, Egyptians, Turks and others. The fact that the ICoS emphasizes this heterogeneity is strongly related to the way in which the ICiS presents itself, as a mainly Bosniak institution.
1.5 The ICiS-ICoS conflict
The creation of the Rijaset of the ICoS in February 2007 was interpreted by the ICiSa and the ICBiH as a unilateral and illegitimate act. The core of the conflict is clearly reflected in the names of the two organizations. The ICiS gravitates towards the Rijaset of the ICBiH in Sarajevo in which it identifies its administrative and spiritual centre, whilst the independent ICoS is oriented towards its headquarters in Belgrade. The conflict is not based on any religious differences. Both organizations consist of Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi school of Islamic Law. Unsurprisingly, the proclamation of the ICoS and the subsequent establishment of its Sandžak mešihat has caused furious reactions on the part of the ICiSa. One month after the creation of the ICoS, as a reaction the ICiSa with the support of the ICBiH established the ICiS which incorporated three new muftiates into its organizational structure. Consequently, both organizations claim to be the legitimate representative organization for all Muslims in Serbia. In Novi Pazar, the ICiS mešihat, a significant complex in the center of town, is located only about a hundred meters from the ICoS mešihat office, a very small building. Both IC’s thus have officers in the same towns but exact information of the loyalty of mosque communities cannot be found. According to Ivan Kostić, there hasn’t been many changes in the loyalty of mosque communities since the initial years of the dispute. Only with the emergence of a third option23 of imams that are dissatisfied with the conflict, it is possible that something on the ground has changed. Mosques in Novi Pazar largely fall under the jurisdiction of Zukorlić which implies a majority of mosque communities are oriented towards him.24 According to Darko Tanasković the loyalty of mosque communities is of a fluid character, these loyalties change over time and are a subject
22 Slađana Novosel, 'Konzultativni Centar za Studije na Daljinu', Danas, 21 March 2011, http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/konsultativni_centar_za_studije_na_daljinu_.55.html?news_id=212057, Consulted on 27 October 2014. 23 In 2013, approximately 100 imams from both IC's have organised themselves in an alternative group to advocate for unification of the two communities. 24 Correspondence with Ivan Kostić, 9 December 2014.
16 to propaganda manipulation from both sides. To be able to assess the exact number, specific field research needs to be conducted on the spot in order to collect the necessary data.25 Later in 2007 the conflict escalated. Zukorlić described the developments in Sandžak at the time in the book Fenomen Muftija (The phenomenon Mufti) edited and partly written by Muhamed Filipović, member of the Bosniak Academy of Sciences. On 2 and 3 October 2007 when Zukorlić was on a visit to Morocco, a group of imams headed by Adem Zilkić, got to together in Hotel Tadž in Novi Pazar, where they issued the request that Zukorlić should resign as the President of the Mešihat of the ICiS, head mufti and Sandžak mufti within 6 hours. On 6 October, in a meeting attended by representatives of all the important institutions of the ICiS, unanimous support was given to Zukorlić and the actions of the ‘illegitimate’ ICoS were strongly condemned. 26 These developments sparked a range of violent incidents in and around ICiS institutions, telephone threats aimed at ICiS representatives and the repression of ICiS favoring media. The conflict also reflects the rift in local politics in Sandžak. Political life of the Bosniaks in Sandžak has been revolving around a constant rivalry between two political parties: the Sandžak Party for Democratic Action (SDAS) (Stranka Demokratske Akcije Sandžaka), which was formed as the Sandžak branch of Alija Izetbegović’ SDAS in Bosnia- Herzegovina and the Social Democratic Party of Serbia (SDP) (Socijaldemokratska Partija Srbije). The SDAS, led by the former Novi Pazar mayor Sulejman Ugljanin and former Minister without portfolio (2008-2014), the SDP by the current Serbian government Minister of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications Rasim Ljajić, who defected from the SDAS in the 1990s. Although Zukorlić used to cooperate with these two key Bosniak political players, they got into a conflict. In 1993 Sulejman Ugljanin was forced to flee Serbia, being accused of secessionism by the authorities. This created a void for the accumulation of power for Zukorlić.27 An interesting aspect of the background of the current conflict between the Islamic Communities is disagreement between two factions in the Sandžak mešihat which has been smouldering since 1998. Zilkić used to lead a group of imams in Tutin who were at the time voicing their dissaproval of Zukorlić' course.28 Much of
25 Correspondence with Darko Tanasković, 21 August 2014. 26 Muamer Zukorlić, ‘Izvestaj Muftije o Pokusaju cijepanja Islamske Zajednice’, in: Fenomen Muftija, Muhamed Filipofić ed., Novi Pazar: 2012, p. 111-112.
28 Aleksander Zdravkovski, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, p. 218.
17 my sources and interviewees, point to Ugljanin as being the key player in the creation of the ICoS with the aim of damaging Zukorlić power base and reinforcing his own political position. In 2007, when the conflict between the ICiS and ICoS arose, two cooperating blocks existed: Ljajić-Zukorlić and Ugljanin-Zilkić. Whilst the latter still exists, the first alliance has come to an end. Another good example of the political background of this issue is evident in the developments surrounding the functioning of the Bosniak National Council (BNC) at the 2010 National [minority] Council elections. The detereorating relations between Zukorlić and his former political affiliates Ljajić and Ugljanin have lead to the formation of a new Bosniak political party in 2010 which was firmly controlled by Zukorlić, the Bosniak Democratic Community (BDC) (Bošnjačka Demokratska Zajednica). Chairman of the BDC is Emir Elfić, Zukorlić' brother in law. After Zukorlić and Elfić got into a conflict, the party was however, split up with the formation of the Bosniak Democratic Community of Sandžak (BDCS) (Bošnjačka Demokratska Zajednica Sandžaka) in 2013. For the 2010 elections of the Bosniak National Council, Zukorlić led the list of the Bosniak Cultural Community (the predecessor of the BDC) and won a majority of the votes. After this victory, constituting the council was made impossible by the government in Belgrade. It introduced a new regulation on a necessary two thirds majority for doing so a day before the Council was constituted and calling for new elections. According to the Belgrade Helsinki Committee for Human Rights, this interference with the regulations followed from the authorities being unhappy with Zukorlić’ faction winning the elections.29 Zukorlić, who doesn’t recognize the BNC, believes the Bosniak minority council only represents the interests of Ugljanin and the Serbian state. What followed was the formation of a parallel BNC30, by representatives of Zukorlić. Around the same time, a heated discussion arose related to Islamic religious education in public schools.31 Mevlud Dudić (at the time rector of Zukorlić’ IUNP and currently head Mufti of the ICiS) was replaced by Adem Zilkić in the Board for Religious Education (Komisija za Veronauku) following a government decision on 29 July 2010. Before this decision was made, both IC’s - Mevlud Dudić on behalf of the ICiS and Muhamed Jusufpahić on behalf of the ICoS - and all other traditional religious communities were represented in the
29 Uknown Author, 'National Bosniak Election: Test for Serbian Government', Helsinki Committee for Human Rights Belgrade October 2010, http://www.helsinki.org.rs/doc/HB-No69.pdf, p. 3. 30 On 26 October 2014 new elections for the minority councils in Serbia took place. The BDCS, with its list 'Za Sandžak, Bošnjake i Muftiju' (For Sandžak, Bosniaks and the Mufti [Zukorlić]) accused Ugljanin and his list 'Za Bošnjačko Jedinstvo' of election fraud in Tutin (one of the municipalities where Ugljanin's party is in power). At this time, the final results of the BNC elections have not yet been made public. 31 Religious education was introduced in Serbian public schools in 2001 by the government of Zoran Đinđic, who was regarded by Zukorlić as a close partner. Apart from Zukorlić, who understandably supported this law, the SOC was one of the main lobbyists for the introduction of religious education.
18 Board.32 The ICiS consequently claimed that it was made impossible for religious teachers affiliated with this Muftiate to teach classes in a number of Serbian cities and towns. They were delibaretly replaced by representatives from the ICoS on the initiative of the Ministry of Education.33 Zukorlić also accused the SOC of having an interest in marginalizing the Islamic Community and criticised bishop of Bačka Irinej Bulović for „violence against Islamic religious education“.34 This issue remains one of the primary injustices that the ICiS is adressing in its critique aimed at the government. According to Zukorlić, in the efforts to divide the Islamic community a significant role is reserved for the Ministry of Religions35 and the intelligence services, members of the Jusufspahić family in Belgrade, the municipality administrations of Novi Pazar, Tutin, Sjenica headed by Sulejman Ugljanin, criminals and tycoons in Sandžak and some government and local media.36 Ivan Kostić is convinced that since the turbulent bifurcation of the two communities, the ICoS has been organizing bogus activities in unison with the state. He states that: “the rijaset in Belgrade is a secret service creation that has been working for the government for decades, starting from the war in the 1990s [‘the Jusufspahić dynasty']. Besides the fact that the state broke up the IC, you have therefore a force within the Islamic community that is obstructing the development of a number of processes. They have been in the Bajrakli mosque [in Belgrade] for 48 years and they have been issuing reports to the government and in the media on the building of new mosques the restitution of waqf property but this is a complete facade. How can we see that this is only a facade? The past years this was completely uncovered. It was almost funny. For every human it became clear what actually is happening. They built a medresa, with substantial funds from Azerbajdjan37, a nice building with 4 floors. An Islamic faculty, but there are no students, no professors, it simply
32 J. Čalija & S. Bakračević, 'Zilkić predstavlja Muslimane u komisiji za veronauku', Politika, 20 August 2010, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Zilkic-predstavlja-Muslimane-u-komisiji-za-veronauku.lt.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014. 33 J. Čalija & S. Bakračević, ‘Dupli spiskovi islamskih veroučitelja’, Politika, 4 September 2010, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Dupli-spiskovi-islamskih-veroucitelja.lt.html, Accessed on 10 October 2014. 34 Author unknown, 'Zukorlić optužio SPC da želi slabu islamsku zajednicu', Kurir, 2 September 2010, http://www.kurir-info.rs/zukorlic-optuzio-spc-da-zeli-slabu-islamsku-zajednicu-clanak-47236, Accessed on 10 October 2014. 35 The Ministry of Religions was replaced by the Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities in 2012. 36 Muamer Zukorlić, ‘Ízvestaj Mešihata o Napadu na Jedinstvo Islamske Zajednice’, in: Fenomen Muftija, Muhamed Filipović ed., Novi Pazar: 2012, p. 117. 37 At the time the Serbian government was cooperating with Azerbajdjan, which funded the restauration of the Tašmajdan Park in Belgrade. Kostić stresses that the funding relation to the ICoS cannot be claimed with complete certainty.
19 doesn't exist.“38 These allegations are rejected by Arabist Darko Tanasković39 who states that “unlike others that believe the ICoS was artifically created by the secret services, the main argument that is to prove the illegitimacy of the IcoS, I believe the Islamic community really divided itself. It is nonetheless in the interest of the state to have the center of the Islamic Community in Belgrade. There is no doubt that the state has given full support to the ICoS. If there was someone who supported the creation of the ICoS, it was Sulejman Ugljanin and not some government in Belgrade as Zukorlić is claiming.“40 The status quo of the division in the Islamic community is interesting although much of the allegations of the role of the state and Sandžak local political factors in the creation of the ICoS remain shrouded in mist. It is however clear that despite the efforts by Ugljanin (and the ICoS) to marginalize Zukorlić, most mosque communities in Serbia remain loyal to the ICiS. Furthermore, Zukorlić' community has been actively building an institutional infrastructure in Sandžak and controls the largest functioning Islamic educational facilities in the country. The conflict between the two communities nonetheless results in serious consequences for the development of the Islamic community in Serbia. The issue of religious property is an important issue in this regard. This will be discussed in the second chapter. First I will shed light on the state legislation with regard to religious communities, the core subject of the sub chapter.
1.6 Legitimacy and Authority: the legal framework
In a secular state, it is for the legitimacy and legality of a religious community of crucial importance that the state recognizes it. Recognition from the state and incorporation in the existing legal framework that relates to religious communities is of vital importance to these communities. This relates to the protection of religious rights and the interest of the Muslims such as the restitution of religious property that was confiscated following the coming to power of the communist regime (Chapter 2), and the supply of religious teachers in the state educational system. Furthermore, registration and recognition from the state secures subsidies. In the context of the existence of two Islamic communities in Serbia that have been in conflict over the question who is the legitimate representative organisation for Muslims in
38 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014. 39 Professor at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Oriental Studies. Former Ambassador to Turkey (1995- 1999) and the Vatican (2002-2008). 40 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014.
20 Serbia, the state's legal framework deserves a closer examination. I will therefore now turn to the Law on Churches and Religious Communities which was adopted in 2006 and regulates the legal status of religious communities. The legitimacy of the Islamic communities is next to the state legislative framework also based on the existence and activity of educational and administrative structures and the presence of followers. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities41 was adopted in 2006 and distinguishes between traditional [and other or “non-traditional”] churches and religious communities. According to the Law, traditional churches and religious communities have a “historical continuity of multiple centuries in Serbia” and include, the SOC, the Roman Catholic Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church, Reformed Christian Church and the Evangelical Christian Church, the Islamic Community and the Jewish Religious Community.42 These seven traditional communities inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. With regard to the SOC historical continuity is explained in article 11 which states that: “The continuity of legal personality acquired by virtue of the Document on Spiritual Authority (Decree of the National Assembly of the Principality of Serbia of May 21, 1836) and of the Act on the Serbian Orthodox Church ("The Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia", No. 269/1929) is recognized to the Serbian Orthodox.” An additional paragraph of Article 11 states that “The Serbian Orthodox Church has had an exceptional historical, state-building and civilizational role in forming, preserving and developing the identity of the Serbian nation.”43 Nominally all traditional religious communities enjoy equal status, but it seems that the SOC due to its historical role, national significance and the definition of Serbia in the Constitution (“The Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it […]”44) is considered to be more important. In significant state matters, political officials consult SOC foremen, and not the foremen of other religious communities. In this light, it is interesting to see how the SOC as a majority religious institution manifests itself regarding Islam as a minority religion. In January 2010, daily Newspaper Blic reported a statement by Patriarch Irinej that it is the philosophy of Islam that Muslims, when they are numerically small can behave themselves and be correct, but when they become preeminent
41 The Law has been continiously the target of critique from civil society organisations claiming that non traditional religious communities are the victim of discrimination. Religious communities that are not recognized as traditional started a lawsuit against the state claiming that the Law conflicts with the Constitution. 42 Law on Churches and Religious Communities of the Republic of Serbia (2006), Article 10. 43 Law on Churches and Religious Communities of the Republic of Serbia (2006), Article 11. 44 Consitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 1.
21 and superior, they exert pressure. Both the ICiS and ICoS severly criticized the Patriarch for this statement.45 The next day, Irinej publicly apologized. Nevertheless, in underlines the arrogance of the SOC when it comes to a minority community like Muslims. All post-Milošević draft laws on religious communities in Serbia recognize only seven religious organizations as traditional or historical ones, while all others have to undergo a registration procedure. Such a policy towards religious communities is based on the tradition of the prewar monarchy (until 1945) and the role and place of the SOC as a state church in that political system.46 According to the 2013 US State Department analysis of religious freedom in Serbia, “the Serbian constitution provides freedom of religion but some laws place restrictions on this freedom. These restrictions generally stem from the law’s special treatment of the seven traditional religious groups. Bylaws on religious education, property ownership and social welfare also distinguish between traditional and non-traditional religious groups and their members. Although registration is not mandatory for religious communities, unregistered groups encounter difficulties in the opening of bank accounts, purchasing or selling property and publishing literature. The grants value-added tax refunds and property tax exemptions only to registered religious groups. Registered religious groups are also exempt from paying administrative taxes and filing annual financial reports.” 47 The Islamic Community is a traditional religious community based on “the continuity of legal personality acquired by virtue of the Act on Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia ("The Official Gazette of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia", No. 29/1930) [which] is recognized to the Islamic Community.” As there is only one Islamic community mentioned here, and given the fact that the Register of Churches and Religious Communities of the Government Office for Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities (Government Office for Religion, previously the Ministry of Religion) also only refers to simply the “Islamic community”, the question arises what the legal status of the two major Islamic communities exactly is. Interestingly, the Government Office for Religion has put up links on its homepage to both the ICoS and ICiS websites.48
45Author Unknown, ‘Patrijarh Irinej uvredio islam’, B92, 28 January 2010, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?nav_id=407291&dd=28&mm=01&yyyy=2010 , Consulted on 25 October 2014. 46 U.S. State deparment, 'Serbia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, 'http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222477.pdf, Accessed on 25 October 2014. 47 Ibidem. 48 Official website of the Office for the Cooperation with Churches and Religious Communities, http://www.vere.gov.rs/, Consulted on 26 October 2014.
22 Another important but confusing aspect of the Law on Churches and Religious Communities is presented by Article 19 which states that “a religious organization whose name contains the name or part of the name denoting the identity of the Church or religious community already entered into the Register or of the one who had filed the application before, shall not be entered into the Register.” According to Darko Tanasković, referring to this Article, „every traditional church [and religious community] can be only one, and not two or more. It is in the interest of the state, for example, not to have the Montenegrin Orthodox Church as a registered religious community. The state cooperates with both Islamic communities but they cannot be registered both because of the constitution.“49 Ivan Kostić on the other hand explains that „all the traditional religious communities that are recognized by this Law needed to only apply for that legitimacy. They don't need to register. It is not a new registration, they [the Islamic Religious Community] were namely registered in 1930. It is only necessary to claim the existence of historical continuity and thus legitimacy. They [i.e. ICoS and ICiS] both claim continuity from the 1930 Law on the Islamic religious community. Both the Rijaset of the ICoS and the Mešihat of the ICiS call upon that Law of 1930 and that they are thus the legal successors of that Islamic Community. Registration is only needed for 'new' religious communities, in other words non-traditional religious communities. Hare Krishna for example can only register its organisation if there is no Hare Krishna organisation registered yet.“50 The state has however refused to register Hare Krishna, as well as the League of Baptists, the Pentecostal Church and the Protestant Evangelical Church from Subotica. This hampers their possibilities to function properly. At the same time, the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches are not registered either but recognized by the state and they are allowed to operate freely.51 Regarding the „traditional“ Islamic Community, both the ICiS and ICoS appear to be de facto recognized by the state, but as I will show in the next subchapter, a state decision on the legitimacy and historical continuity of both communities has not been made.
1.7 Legitimacy and Authority: historical continuity
49 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014. 50 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014. 51 U.S. State deparment, 'Serbia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report, 'http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222477.pdf, Accessed on 25 October 2014.
23
I will now turn to the claims made by the Islamic communities that are to confirm their historical continuity and thus legitimacy. At the central board assembly of the ICiSa held on 27 March 2007, a new constitution was adopted forming the ICiS. Article 1 of the constitution states that „the Islamic community in Serbia […] is the one and unique traditional religious community for Muslims from the area of Sandžak, the Preševo Valley, Central Serbia and Vojvodina, the Muslim diaspora and other Muslims who accept it as their own.“52 Furthermore, “the Islamic community bases its legitimacy on the Qur’an, Sunnah, the historical continuity from šejhul-islam (Arab: Shaykh al-Islām) from Istanbul through menšura (Arab: manshur)53 and murasel, religious-legal and religious-educational institutions of the Muslims in Serbia, and the the will of the ulama and members of the Islamic community.54 According Tanasković, the claim of historical continuity pointing at the decisions made by the Shaykh al-Islām in Istanbul is a weak argument: “One part of the Muslims in Serbia believe that legitimacy and continuity can only follow from the Ottoman legacy [from Istanbul]. This is a weak argument because the Rijaset of the ICBiH was a Autro-Hungarian institution that was created to detach the Muslims in BiH from Istanbul. These Muslims have a moral and emotional loyalty towards Istanbul.“55 Although at the time the reis-ul-ulema and the medžlis ulema56 were chosen in Vienna, their appointment was formally confirmed by the šejhul-islam in Istanbul.57 In his hutbas – sermons delivered at the time of the Friday prayer - the reis-ul-ulema in Sarajevo would first praise the Kaiser Franz Joseph followed by the Caliph in Istanbul. The final authority however lay with the office of the šejhul-islam.58 Despite the Austro-Hungarian intention drawing the Islamic Community into its sphere of influence ‘artificially’, the ICBiH remained predominantly loyal to Istanbul. Similarly, the ICoS draws its legal foundation from the menšura of šejhul-islam. The recognition of Islam as a lawful religion of the principality of Serbia with the decision the
52 Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia, Article 1 (2007). 53 A formal document which confirms that a specific person is the legally appointed or chosen reis-ul-ulema and as such is empowered to, in terms of Sharia Law, give similar authorizations to subordinate religious officers (murasel). In the Bosnian praxis this is called menšura, a term that entered the Bosnian Islamic administration from Ottoman institutions and the Ottomans took it from preceding Muslim states. In 1930, the last menšura was issued in Istanbul. From then on, they are issued in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 54Constitution of the ICiS Mešihat, Article 2. 55 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014. 56 Council of the most prominent religious representatives. 57 Emil Turković, ‘Istorijsko-pravna analiza dinamike pravne regulative Islamske zajednice u Srbiji’, in: Novopazarski Zbornik 2013, Dragica Premović Aleksić ed., Novi Pazar: Muzej Ras 2013, p. 220. 58 Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford December 2010, p. 12.
24 State Council of the Principality of Serbia of 18 May 1868 is mentioned in the the ICoS constitution.59 Moreover, in accordance with the Law on Churches and Religion Communities historical continuity and legal subjectivity is drawn from the 1930 Law on the Islamic religious community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Tanasković was a member of a state commission with the task of determining which Islamic community has historical continuity . This working group was established in 2009 on the initiative of the Minister for Religions Bogoljub Šijaković. Its aim was to to acertain facts on the historical contiuity and legal legitimacy of the Islamic Community in the Republic of Serbia. It was an ad hoc formed internal body that filed a report to the relevant Minister. 60 Filed on 23 July 2010, the report concluded that the only the ICoS can enjoy historical contitunity and legitimacy61, but the conclusion of the Working Group was never formalized nor produced any administrative, legal or political consequences, so Tanasković. According to the orientalist, „legally speaking, one could claim that the ICoS has legitimacy and continuity because the preamble of its Statute contains a reference to all decisions made in by the Principality of Serbia as well as the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Zukorlić does not recognize these decisions and thinks these are unimportant.“ Tanasković continues saying that there was an idea to make both Islamic communities equal before the Law, and to tolerate the ICoS as a legitimate religious community in relation to the state whilst tolerating the ICiS in its relation to Sarajevo. This however wasn't realised because of fear for the consequences on the ground.62 One could say that there are three options from the state perspective: either recognize both communities, recognize only one, or let the situation simmer in its current form. Realistically speaking, Kostić says, the Serbian state is not able to tackle this issue. It has enough problems to deal with at the moment, of which Kosovo is one. There is therefore no need to let the powderkeg Sandžak explode.63 Both the ICiS and ICoS are de facto recognized by the state, but de jure a formal decision has not been made on the issue of historical continuity. Instead, since the 2010 establishment of the Working Group that determined ICoS as the legal successor of the Islamic Religious Community of 1930, no action has been taken by the state to resolve this
59 Constitution of the IcoS Rijaset, Article 3. 60 Correspondence with Darko Tanasković, 21 August 2014. 61 Aleksandar Raković, ‘Turska Inicijative i Islamska Zajednica', Politika, 29 January 2013, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/ostali-komentari/Turska-inicijativa-i-Islamska-zajednica.lt.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014. 62 Interview with Darko Tanasković, 30 June 2014. 63 Interview with Ivan Kostić 22 June 2014.
25 issue. The development and stability of the Islamic community is at the same time jeopardized by the current situation. One of the important consequences following from the existence of the rivalry is the process of the restitution of vakuf property which has consequently come to a complete standstill. This will, next to mosque construction, form the core of the following chapter.
CHAPTER 2 Mosque Construction and Property Restitution
26 One of the problems facing Muslims in Serbia is the return of religious properties that were confiscated during the crackdown of the communist regime on religious communities. The three most important institutions for Muslims were all abolished in the early phase of communism: Sharia courts, educational institutions and waqfs64 (largely expropriated and nationalized in 1945-1958).65 I will now turn to the issue of mosque construction followed by the issue of waqf restitution, one of the main points of critique of Muslims at the Serbian government.
2.1 Mosque construction
65 Hazim Fazlic, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post- Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011, p. 49.
27 Today, there are some more than 190 mosques in Serbia, of which 120 are located in Sandžak, 60 in Southern Serbia – the Preševo Valley where a siginicant Albanian minority lives - one in Belgrade, one in Niš, one in Mali Zvornik and one in Subotica. Before the Great Vienna War (1683-99), there were at least 73 mosques in Belgrade. Following the withdrawal of the Ottomans, all of them were destroyed, except for one, the Bajrakli Mosque in Belgrade’s Dorćol district 66, which is currently the seat of the ICoS Rijaset. According to the Serbian 2011 census there are 22.909 Muslims living in Belgrade.67 Clearly, the Bajrakli mosque, which with its 120 square meters only provides space for 300 believers, does not meet the demand of this significant group of believers. According to Belgrade Mufti Muhamed Jusufspahić, Muslims in Belgrade make use of a number of improvised places of worship throughout the capital.68 The IC has sent requests to the government to build new mosques in the Belgrade area but the official response was that the land had to be purchased on the open market. However, buying property for religious purposes is almost impossible, considering the heavy burden of historical and mythical attitudes.69 Considering the significant amount of Muslims in Belgrade, it is clear that there is a strong need for more mosques in the capital. The city authorities, however, have abstained from qualitative reactions to these requests, passing responsibility from one department to another.70 According to Zilkić, outside of Sandžak and the Preševo valley there is a serious lack of places of worship. Muslims have experienced similar problems in this field such as the hindrance of municipal authorities in Bačko Novo Selo as well as other towns and cities where, according to Zilkić, the Law on the building of Religious objects is not being implemented.71 Next to obstacles in the building of mosques in the larger Serbian cities, there have been instances of aggression aimed at Islamic heritage. On 17 March 2004, ethnic violence broke out in Kosovo and Metohija which resulted in the destruction of numerous
66 Ahmet Alibašić, , ‘Serbia’, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Vol. 4 (2012), p. 461-462. 67 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia 2011, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, p. 38. 68 T. Zorić, ‘Intervju: Muftija mr. Muhamed ef. Jusufspahić’, ICoS Sandžak Muftiate Official Website, ’ http://www.mesihatSandžaka.rs/vijesti/495-intervju-muftija-mr-muhamed-ef-jusufspahic.html, Accessed on 10 October 2014. 69 Svetlana Seferović, ‘Bosonogi na Betonu’, 4 December 2008, Vreme, ttp://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=764210, Accessed on 6 October 2014. 70 Hazim Fazlic, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post- Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011, p. 96. 71 [It's not clear which law Zilkić exactly means] Dževad Zejnelović, ‘Gradićemo džamije u svim gradovima gdje postoje interesi Muslimana’, ICoS Official Website,10 September 2014, http://izs.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=648:gradi%C4%87emo-d%C5%BEamije-u- svim-gradovima-gdje-postoje-interesi-Muslimana&catid=133:intervjui&Itemid=588, Accessed on 6 October 2014.
28 Orthodox churches and other places of historical and sacral value. The following day, these events provoked a surge of anti-Islamic reactions in several cities across Serbia. The retaliation that followed included the burning of mosques and other sacral buildings of the Islamic Religious Community in Belgrade, Niš and Novi Sad. A few days later the management of the Military Museum in Belgrade ordered the destruction of nišans72 from the 15th and 16th centuries. A military institution (in at the time Serbia and Montenegro) consequently also participated in the destructive acts of mostly younger citizens of Belgrade and Niš.73 Unlike in Belgrade, the Sandžak region, where Muslims form a majority, seems to experience little problems in the construction of mosques. This was underlined by Jahija Ferhatović, president of the Bosniak Democratic Community, during my visit to Novi Pazar, who was not able to mention any obstacles faced by the ICiS in this respect.74 According to Zukorlić, in the past 20 years the ICiS hasn’t been able to get any building permits for its new mosques in Novi Pazar.75 The Sandžak Muftiate appears to be building what it wants on properties that they claim to be waqf . In July 2013, the foundation for the forty-first mosque in the ICiS medžlis of Novi Pazar has been laid.76 Currently, the ICiS is building a mosque in Sjenica which is planned to feature the tallest minarets in Europe. Although little has been written in scholarly literature on mosque construction in Serbia, it appears that those regions where Muslims form a minority, and especially in urban centers, the Islamic Community is facing challenges. In Sandžak on the other hand, Muslims face little or no restrictions in the building of places of worship, despite the alleged illegality of these activities.
2.2 Restitution of religious property
Property restitution has a particular significance for religious communities in their financial stability as well as in carrying out activities of religious, educational and charitable nature.
72 Authentic and very rare tombstones that date from the Turkish period. 73 Milan Vukomanović, 'What the Church can(not) be asked about: The Serbian Orthodox Church, state and society in Serbia', Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 2005, p. 18. 74 Conversation with Jahja Fehratović, 29 June 2014 75 S. Bakračević, ‘Muftija Zukorlić gradi bez Dozvola’, Politika, 8 November 2013, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Srbija/Muftija-Zukorlic-gradi-bez-dozvola.lt.html, Accessed on 6 October. 76 Author Unknown, ‘Novi Pazar – Temelji za 41. džamiju; Muftija: ‘Nećemo stati dok ne napravimo preko 100 džamija’, SandžakPress, 19 July 2013, ’ http://Sandžakpress.net/novi-pazar-temelji-za-41-dzamiju-muftija- necemo-stati-dok-ne-napravimo-preko-100-dzamija, Accessed on 5 October 2014.
29 Furthermore, it can decrease the dependence of religious communities on the state and foreign donors as well. 77 The alleged state-led obstruction of the restitution of waqf property is one of the key injustices that the ICiS emphasizes. In 2006, the Serbian government adopted the Law on the Restitution of Property to Churches and Religious Communities which regulates the restitution of properties confiscated after 1945. The Law is firstly problematic for the Jewish Religious Community because it does not cover property confiscations during the German occupation. For the Islamic Communities, the Law has not yet produced desired results either. In January 2014, Serbian state media reported that more than 50% of religious property had been returned to the SOC, the Roman Catholic Church and the Jewish Religious Community. According to the Agency for Restitution, the speed of the process of restitution since the adoption of the 2006 Law has been satisfactory whilst emphasizing that there is no discrimination involved. Furthermore the Agency expressed the expectation that all confiscated properties will be returned in the coming four to five years. Mileta Radojević, director of the Office for the Oooperation with Churches and Religious Communities, asserted that the problem regarding the restitution of [waqf] property to the Islamic Community is that it has not yet been defined which of the two communities is the rightful heir to this property.78 Both the ICiS and ICoS have filed requests for the restitution of identical properties as they both claim to be the legitimate successor of the Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as registered in 1930.79 The division among Muslims in Serbia has therefore resulted in no restitution whatsoever for the Islamic Communities. Although the Law on Resitution forbids the selling of [waqf] properties to third parties which are due to be returned to religious communities80, there have been instances of attempts to sell these properties through the Agency for Privatization.81 Director of the Waqf Directorate of the ICiS (Vakufska Direkcija), Sead Saćirović, claims that the ICoS was created in order to give the state a motive not to work on the restitution of Islamic religious
77 Ina Merdjanova & Patrice Brodeur, Religion as a Conversation Starter’, ‘Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans, London: Continuum 2009, p. 85-86. 78 Author Unknown, ‘Crkvama Vraćena Polovina Imovine', RTS, 4 January 2014, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1487150/Crkvama+vra%C4%87ena+polovina+oduzete+imovine.html, Accessed on 6 October 2014. 79 Draško Đenović, ‘Srbija: Restitucija – Dokle smo stigli?’, 6 June 2011, http://www.centar9.info/articles/pdf/RESTITUCIJA_-_Clanak_final.pdf, Accessed on 25 October 2014. 80 Zakon o Vraćanju Imovine Crkvama I Verskim Zajednicama (2006), Article 36. 81 Hazim Fazlic, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post- Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011, p. 100.
30 properties.82 Waqf property is a guarantee for economic stability and a catalyst of economic development in Sandžak. The ICiS has filed all the necessary requests for the restitution of these properties.83 Yet, according to Saćirović, the authorities in Belgrade are using double standards and are not implementing the 2006 Law on Restitution correctly. A claim which is frequently expressed by the ICiS, concerns the privileged treatment that the SOC is given, whilst the Islamic Community is being obstructed in its development. In the context of religious property, a popular example in ICiS spheres is the that the state has refused to cooperate in the restitution of waqf property, whilst donating Hotel Sopoćani in Novi Pazar to the SOC. Referring to regulations in the Law on Churches and Religious Communities the ICiS started its own waqf restitution initiatives in 2006 by occupying structures and putting up fences around stretches of land. It started with a building in the center of Novi Pazar, in which the Faculty of Islamic Studies is settled. When it came to the privatization of the building by trade company Uniprom, the Sandžak mešihat challenged the ownership. Despite a court verdict in favor of Uniprom, an eviction could not be realized as the bailiff is not showing up. Another example is the Novi Pazar spa which was privatized as a part of a large catering company in 2010. ICiS activists showed up and claimed that the Novi Pazar spa according to documentation in the hands of the ICiS, is waqf property. Again a court decision in favor of the new owner was not implemented.84 In the words of Mufti Zukorlić, “the destruction of waqf property will lead to the destruction of Islam and the destruction of Islam will lead to the destruction of Bosniaks and Muslims. […] It’s the duty of Bosniaks to defend waqf with their lives.”85 CHAPTER 3 The Educational System
In this chapter I will address a number of aspects of the Serbian educational system that are relevant for understanding the position of Islam in Serbia and that relate to the construction of a Serbian national and ethnocentric narrative in the past twenty years. Firstly I will give a
82 Author unknown, 'Novopazarska banja: Od romantike do propadanja', B92, 15 April 2014, http://www.b92.net/putovanja/zanimljivosti.php?yyyy=2014&mm=04&dd=15&nav_id=837070 Accessed on 25 October 2014. 83 Conversation with Sead Šaćirović and Ferid Bulić on Sandžak TV, 12 July 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfsvJfR-uWs, Accesed on 7 October 2014. 84 Slađana Novosel, ‘I Samoposluga Vakuf’, Danas, 6 July 2014, http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/i_samoposluga_vakuf.55.html?news_id=284932, Accessed on 4 October 2014. 85 Author Unknown, ‘Muftija Zukorlić: ‘Ako čujete da nam je neko oteo vakuf, znajte da smo pomrli i da nas nema!’, SandžakPress, 27 July 2014, http://Sandžakpress.net/muftija-zukorlic-ako-cujete-da-nam-je-neko-oteo- vakuf-znajte-da-smo-pomrli-i-da-nas-nema, Accessed on 7 October 2014.
31 brief overview of relevant actors that aimed to stimulate the study of educational material with the goal of creating incentives for the development of a culture of tolerance. The appearance of such initiatives is in itself significant. It reveals the existence of a culture of intolerance. Secondly I will discuss general trends in history text books and the role of the state followed by the way in which Islam and the Ottoman Empire are represented in history text books. It will become clear that the text books that have been studied are biased although sometimes in a subtle way. Ottoman practices, for example the practice of devşirme, can be viewed positively and negatively. Serbian textbooks incline to the negative interpretation. Sometimes the Ottomans are praised but only in a comparison with the local Muslim population that deserves no praise at all. In a context in which the Ottomans are seen as the eternal enemy such text books do not contribute to the development of tolerance and understanding.
3.1 What has been written on history school books in Serbia?
History textbooks for public schools in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia have attracted quite some interest from academics and civil society organizations. The Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-Eastern Europe (CDRSEE) which was founded in
32 1998 has been organizing the largest projects in this field and has recently coordinated the Joint History Project in which an effort was made to create unbiased and objective history textbooks for all the Balkan countries.86 One of the many historians involved in the project is Dubravka Stojanović, associate professor at the University of Belgrade. Stojanović is considered to be the leading academic in Serbia when it comes to the study of history textbooks. As she is one of the few, if not the only expert, in this specific field, much of the following is based on her work. Despite the existence of numerous publications on historical revisionism and the evolution of the educational system in post-communist conditions, little has been written on the specific subject of the representation of the Ottoman Empire and Islam in history textbooks. An important note to take into consideration is that some of the more recent history textbooks have not yet been analyzed properly, hence I have not been able to incorporate the most recent materials used in Serbian schools. This is particularly relevant when we take into account that the educational system has undergone some changes with regard to the state control. Although the issues discussed in this chapter are not directly linked to specific conflict between the Islamic Communities in Serbia, they certainly illuminate the manner in which Serbian citizens view the history of Serbia and the Balkans which in its turn forms the way in which Muslims, primarily Bosniaks and Albanians in and outside of Serbia, are perceived. Earlier analyses of history classes have shown that there is very little information given about the Other in textbooks and that one of the problems of the educational system is the poor knowledge of general history, especially the history of neighboring peoples of the Balkans. In this respect, it is of importance to elaborate on the way in which the Ottoman Empire and Islam are portrayed in history textbooks. However, before discussing the representation of the Ottoman Empire and Islam in Serbian history text books I shall briefly direct attention to a more general trend in the presentation of history in the Serbian system of education that has started in the beginning of the 1990s. 3.2 General trends in history text books and the role of the state
The idea and notion that we have of how we passed through history is part of the creation of an image of “ourselves” and “others”. These images strongly influence the creation of judgments about the present and in decision-making. Since 1989, Serbia has gone through
86 Dubravka Stojanović, ‘Konstrukcija Prošlosti: Slučaj srpskih udžbenika Istorije’, http://cpi.hr/download/links/hr/7008.pdf, p. 31-32
33 two waves of crude adaptations in the field of history which is reflected in the character of history text books. The first wave was ushered with the coming to power of Milošević in the end of the 1980s, when communist ideology was replaced by nationalism i.e. replacing the myth of brotherhood and unity with the myth of the fatal and eternal conflict between the Southern Slavic peoples. In a short span of time, strong stereotypical images were formed of practically all neighboring peoples, except for the Romanians and Greeks.87 This trend continued after the end of the Milošević regime and with coming to power of liberal forces in Serbian politics. The character of Serbian history changed in 2002 when the text books were again modified. According to Stojanović “when the change took place in 2002, the romanticist and ethnocentric tone which was introduced under the Milošević regime was kept. However this time the Second World war was now framed differently, adapting the position of the Chetniks88 and the Partisans. This development should be placed in a wider political context. The Second World War, which resulted in the Communists coming to power, became priority following from the new liberal government lead by Zoran Đinđić which aimed to distance itself as far as possible from the communist regime. Milošević was namely seen as a form of continuation of the communist regime. The biggest interventions in history teaching were therefore made in the context of the Second World War.89 A good example that illustrates this trend and underlines its topicality is the effort started in 2006 of a number of historians and Democratic Party members to rehabilitate the commander of the Chetniks during WWII, Draža Mihailović, who was tried and executed by the communist regime shortly after the war in Yugoslavia ended. Supporters of a rehabilitation believe Mihailović was a victim of communist repression brushing aside the claims by academics, anti-fascist platforms, media and NGO’s that he collaborated with the Nazi’s and organized the ethnic cleansing of Muslims in Bosnia.90 From the fall of Milošević onwards the state retained a firm grip on the production and publication of history text books. Stojanović states that “until a few years ago there was a Law allowing for national school subjects such as history and Serbian language only on text book. For mathematics, physics and chemistry different publishers were allowed to offer their books. But in the case of these [national] subjects only the Zavod za izdavanje
87 Dubravka Stojanović, ‘U Ogledalu Drugih’, in: Vojin Dimitrijević ed. Novosti iz Prošlosti, Belgrade: 2010, p. 14. 88 Serbian WWII nationalist monarchist movement. 89 Dubravka Stojanović, ‘U Ogledalu Drugih’, in: Vojin Dimitrijević ed. Novosti iz Prošlosti, Belgrade: 2010, p. 17. 90 Author unknown, 'Ratni zločinac Draža Mihajlović', Peščanik, 21 March 2012, http://pescanik.net/ratni- zlocinac-draza-mihajlovic, Accessed 25 October 2014.
34 udžbenika [the Office for the Publication of Textbooks], an institution subordinated to the Ministry, had the right to publish. Thus there existed complete control. Formally the development of history school books went through a process of public procurement but in practice the selection was a private matter.”91 In the past five years however, there are new developments indicating that the state is loosening its grip on the process of history textbook publication. Since 2009 a new Law on school textbooks and other teaching materials is in force which allows a free market for history text books. Currently, permission for publishing is given by the Ministry of Education and individual schools are allowed to choose the textbooks that are on offer. As mentioned in the introducing words of this chapter, the CDRSEE launched an initiative that aimed to create a neutral history text for books to be used in all the countries of the Balkans, the Joint History Project (JHP).92 In the case of Serbia, Dubravka Stojanović was closely involved in this project. The books were published in nine different languages and were created to cover the four most difficult common themes: the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of nations and nation states, the Balkan Wars and the Second World War. At first, the publishing of these alternative history books was delayed and met fierce resistance. According to Stojanović, “permission from the Ministry of Education to publish the books was only given a few years ago. Earlier, the books were forbidden. When they appeared in Serbian in 2005, there were furious reactions but two years ago, with a lot of work and the support of several ambassadors of foreign countries and different types of pressure we succeeded in getting the approval to publish.”93 Serbian critique aimed at the JHP was mainly based on the idea of the initiative being the result of a supra-national conspiracy, with the aim of restoring multinational states that existed in the Balkans and the possible imposition of the discarded idea of “brotherhood and unity”.94 Although acquiring approval from the Ministry of Education for publishing can be considered as a success, these books only function as supplementary material and the question therefore remains in how far they are being used actively. The ‘re-revision’ of history is perceived as a threat to national identity. Although changes in Serbian historiography remain minimal, in many of the Balkan countries
91 Interview with Dubravka Stojanović, 12 November 2013. 92 The publications are fully accessible on the Joint History Project website: http://www.cdsee.org/projects/jhp. 93 Interview with Dubravka Stojanović, 12 November 2013.
94 Christina Koulouri, ‘History Teaching and Peace Education in South Eastern Europe’, Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences, No. 50 (2009), p. 61.
35 (including Serbia), there exists a young generation of historians and teachers who are eager to work with materials that promote tolerance and stability in the region.95 The need for a more objective and regional presentation of Balkan history is clearly shown by the 2010 Novosti iz Prošlosti: Znanje, Neznanje, Upotreba i Zloupotreba Istorije survey which shows that the population on average is poorly educated. According to Stojanović, “under these circumstances, it’s not difficult for the political elite to change the paradigm, to change its position overnight, impose any kind of propaganda as the opinion of the majority. If during their education students would be taught about historical situations from different perspectives, and if they would be challenged to think about historical events, the creation and maintaining of stereotypical views would be challenged. A complete change of the system of values is needed in order to create a new educational model. A model based on reliable knowledge and developed critical and analytical thinking. Only then will a deep change in society be possible. 96
3.3 The representation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire in history text books
The association of the Balkan Muslims and Islam with the Ottoman Turks is so strong that not only non-Muslims of the Balkans have used the term Turks to denote them, but according to Alibašić also the Muslims themselves with a dose of pride call themselves Turks, at least until recently.97 In all Balkan countries, the period of Ottoman rule has a special historical place. For the Serbs, the Ottoman Empire represents what Stojanović calls “a historical notch that serves as an imaginary border between good and evil, as a landmark, a mythical boundary between that what we are and what the Other is, a hated and eternal enemy.” Therefore, the “Turks” have an important historical-psychological role. They form a type of excuse that can be irrationally used in the search for a solution to any real problem. They are always there when the question is posed why Serbia is undeveloped, why it has problems with democracy, why its history is dominated by authoritarian rule, why it is poor, why its economy is underdeveloped, why the streets are dirty and even why public toilets are foul.98
95 Ibidem, p. 62 96 Dubravka Stojanović, ‘U Ogledalu Drugih’, in: Vojin Dimitrijević ed., Novosti iz Prošlosti, Belgrade: 2010, p. 31. 97 Ahmet Alibašić, ‘Images of the Ottomans in History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in: Christian Moe ed. , Images of the Religious Other, Novi Sad: 2008, p. 39. 98 Dubravka Stojanović, ‘U Ogledalu Drugih’, in: Vojin Dimitrijević ed. Novosti iz Prošlosti, Belgrade: 2010, p. 27-28.
36 According to Christina Koulouri99, editor of the 2002 CDRSEE publication “Clio in the Balkans: The Politics of History Education”, the use of the Turks as the favorite enemy of the Balkan peoples, is neither new phenomenon nor unexpected one. Nationalisms in the Balkans were namely developed in the struggle with the crumbling Ottoman empire. The Ottoman Empire associated [by the Serbs] with the Orient and all its negative connotations, constituted a negative example and was seen as the main cause for backwardness of the other Balkan peoples.100 Although extensive research has been done on history textbooks in Serbia, the specific subject of Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Serbian textbooks has only been studied by Milan Vukomanović. Vukomanović has analyzed three history text books (for the second, third and fourth grades of secondary school)101 in how they present the Ottoman Empire and Islam. He identifies a positive side to the Marjanovic-Dušanić and Šuica 2005 textbook for the second grade, namely that it affirms the significance of other cultures that came into contact with and changed medieval Christian states. Although the book is not a nationalist but a national history of medieval Serbian states, it remains at the standard level of the standard history text books in Serbia namely a military-political history hardly shedding light on the social, cultural and religious history. What follows is that a young reader might miss the opportunity of learning something outside his/her own national history.102 The 2003 textbook by Perović and Novaković (8th edition) was printed for the first time in 1992, under the Milošević regime. The authors, as Vukomanović puts it, “do not escape the trap of slipping from national history into a nationalist history characterized by selectiveness, ideological bias and prejudiced, normative discourse.” Muslims or Bosniaks are hardly mentioned in the discourse about the South Slavs to which two chapters are dedicated (“The South Slavs and Their Neighbors under Foreign Rule from the 16th to the Late 18th Century” and “The South Slavs and Their Neighbors in the First Half of the 19th Century.”). The book suggests that
99 Professor in Modern and Contemporary History, director of the Research Center on Modern History at Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences (Athens, Greece), and Chair of the History Education Committee of the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (CDRSEE). 100 Christina Koulouri, ‘History Teaching and Peace Education in South Eastern Europe’, Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences, No. 50 (2009), p. 27 101 1. Perović, Milutin and Relja Novaković. 2003. Istorija za III razred gimnazije (opšti tip i društveno-jezički smer) i stručnih škola. 8th ed. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva. 2. Nikolić, Kosta et al. 2005. Istorija za III razred gimnazije prirodno matematičkog smera i IV razred gimnazije opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva. 3. Marjanović-Dušanić, Smilja and Marko Šuica. 2005. Istorija za II razred gimnazije opšteg i društveno-jezičkog smera. Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva. 102 Milan Vukomanović, ‘Images of Ottomans and Islam in Serbian History school books’, in: Christian Moe ed. , Images of the Religious Other, Novi Sad: 2008, p. 20-21.
37 South Slavs are normally Serbs and occasionally Croats. The reader, according to Vukomanović, gets the impression that the Muslims / Bosniaks lost their South Slavic identity with their conversion to Islam which supposedly placed them in some other kind of ethnic group.103 In the typical Serbian history textbooks there is an obsession with the Ottoman practice of devşirme: Local boys were taken from their families in order to become part of the Janissaries or military administration of the Ottoman Empire. This is portrayed as a form of human taxation – suggestively called a “tribute in blood” or “blood tax”. Unlike the Marjanovic-Dušanić and Šuica textbook, which abstains from the use of the term danak u krvi (tribute in blood) (the more epic equivalent of devşirme), Perović and Novaković use the term no less than three times in explaining the origin of the Janissaries. Moreover, the first illustration of this chapter deals with the institution of slavery in the Ottoman Empire. In their further explanation of devşirme the authors refer to the fictional, emotional and considerably anti-Muslim chapters of the novel the Bridge on the Drina by Ivo Andrić.104 Perović and Novaković regularly explain the relationship between the Ottomans and the Christian population in binary terms or polarizations characteristic of stereotypical representation such as Dominant – Subjected, Slave owners – Slaves, Conquerors – Freedom fighters.105 In a subchapter on Bosnia-Herzegovina under Turkish rule, uprisings of local Muslims against the Ottoman administration are noted but they are characterized as conservative and separatist. The Ottomans are presented in a more favorable and progressive light but only, according to Vukomanović, to be contrasted with the local Muslim/Bosniak population.106 The same 2008 study, “Images of the Religious Other”, also includes Ahmet Alibašić’107 analysis of the way in which the Ottoman Empire is presented in textbooks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the textbooks discussed are - at least formally - not used in Serbia108, they are interesting because of the opposing Serbian-Croatian-Bosnian narratives. In contrast to the way in which devşirme is portrayed in the Serbian textbooks, a Bosnian textbook (Enes Pelidija and Fahrudin Isaković, Historija 6, Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 2001) describes the role of this practice in the Islamization process as follows: “The spread of Islam
103 Ibidem, p.23. 104 Ibidem, p. 24. 105 Ibidem, p. 26 106 Ibidem, p. 28. 107 Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo. 108 There have however been instances of the Muslims in Sandžak using textbooks for religious education from Bosnia-Herzegovina.
38 was influenced by high-ranking officials of the Ottoman state, especially those taken into the janissary service. They received huge possessions and secured timars for members of their families. Although there was no forceful conversion to Islam, which is also a Qur’anic principle, there were those who accepted the new religion in order to make their military or political career. Through janissary recruitment (devşirme), the circle of those converting to Islam widened too.”109 Another Bosnian textbook from 2005 describes devşirme as a privilege “that enabled many to graduate from the highest schools and occupy prominent offices in the state administration and military.”110 In his analysis Vukomanović concludes that all three Serbnian textbooks he analyzed, present the Ottomans as foreign invaders coming from the East and bringing their own, rather militant religion of Islam. The overall tone of the books is far from unbiased. There is however a clear difference between the post-2000 books and the ones from the 1990s. The bias is namely much less visible in the more recent books.111 According to Dubravka Stojanović, an analysis of the most recent Serbian history textbooks has not yet been conducted. I sadly have not been able to conduct such an analysis. Given the fact that Vukomanović’s study was published in 2008, and keeping in mind that the state regulations with regard to the publishing of history textbooks have changed, it therefore remains unclear in how far the newer textbooks that are currently being used express similar messages. Of particular importance in this context are two publications. Firstly, “History for the 7th grade” by Radoš Ljušić112 presents an interesting case. This publication provoked two diplomatic notes from the Turkish ambassador in Belgrade which included accusations of hate speech and racism. Consequently, the textbook was withdrawn. The current main publication in use is “History for the 7th grade of elementary school” by Dušan Bataković of which the latest edition was printed in 2011. According to Stojanovic radical changes should not be expected compared to preceding publications.113 The 2010 research project Novosti iz Prošlosti: Znanje, Neznanje, upotreba i Zloupotreba Istorije (News from the Past: Knowledge, Ignorance, the Use and Abuse of
109 Ahmet Alibašić, ‘Images of the Ottomans in History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ in: Christian Moe ed. , Images of the Religious Other, Novi Sad: 2008, p. 8. 110 Ibidem, p 11.
111 Milan Vukomanović, ‘Images of Ottomans and Islam in Serbian History school books’, in: Christian Moe ed. , Images of the Religious Other, Novi Sad: 2008, p. 36. 112 Historian and former head of the State Office for the Publishing of Textbooks. 113 Interview with Dubravka Stojanović, 12 November 2013.
39 History) has yielded some interesting results with regard to the respondents’ answers relating to the history of the Ottoman Empire. When asked to describe this period as a whole, 76% of the respondents views this period as a “centuries long Turkish yoke” while only 23% was willing to choose the more moderate and rational answer that “like all large empires, the Ottoman has periods of ups and downs.” Only 1% of the respondents did not know the answer to this question.
CHAPTER 4 Interreligious Dialogue
I will now turn to the subject of inter-religious dialogue which is of relevance for this thesis on two levels. Firstly, the general state of inter-religious dialogue in Serbia can elucidate the position of the SOC and Islamic communities towards each other. Secondly, the fact of two parallel Islamic Communities in Serbia, both claiming to be the legitimate representatives of Muslims in Serbia has its influence on inter-religious dialogue initiatives. This follows from the ICiS´s total refusal to participate in all initiatives in which the ICoS is also involved. Besides it is important to keep in mind that religious communities in Serbia that are involved in inter-religious dialogue initiatives share common goals in the area of religious education and restitution of property.
40
4.1 General Inter-religious Dialogue developments
In the fifty years preceding 2001, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, no or very little attention was given to authentic and direct dialogue between representatives of different religious communities. Before and after the 1990s conflicts, the meetings between these representatives, scholars and experts on religion, were of a “cosmetic” character and often heavily politicized. According to Vukomanović it is clear that churches and other religious communities can do a lot more in the field of reconciliation and the healing of the disastrous consequences of the war.114 The question arises if there has been an increase in the efforts stimulating inter-religious dialogue since 2001. Ina Merdjanova and Patrice Brodeur’s 2009 study ‘Religion as a Conversation Starter: Inter-religious dialogue for Peace Building in the
114 Milan Vukomanović, Sveto i Mnoštvo, Beograd: Čigoja Štampa 2001, p. 64.
41 Balkans’is an attempt of a comprehensive analysis of development and present state of inter- religious dialogue in South Eastern Europe. Because of its general approach to the Balkans as a whole, the situation in Serbia is only partially discussed. According to Merdjanova and Brodeur, during and after the 1990s crisis, many inter-religious dialogue initiatives that were started were the result of continuous international efforts to promote multiculturalism and multi-religiosity in the Balkans. Up until now, “inter-religious relations in the Balkans have followed an uneven trajectory from stigmatization to stagnation to resuscitation.”115 However, although significant shifts occurred in the position of religious representatives since the end of the wars, self-criticism and willingness to re-reflect on the past are lacking in the postwar Balkan societies.116
4.2 The situation in Serbia
When a Serbian delegation, including SOC Patriarch Irinej and Reis-ul-Ulema Adem Zilkić visited Indonesia in October 2013, the religious leaders respectively declared that “inter- religious relations in Serbia are harmonious” and that “religious relations in Serbia have never been better”.117 This could be seen as a simplification of the situation considering that a significant number of Muslims in Serbia do not consider Zilkić to be their leader.
There have been a number of initiatives to promote inter-religious dialogue in Serbia. These were started by the German CDU funded Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) and the Belgrade office and the Belgrade Open School (BOŠ) (Beogradska Otvorena Škola)118. According to Jelena Jablanov Maksimović, KAS-led initiatives have proved to be successful. The SOC, ICoS, Jewish Community and Roman Catholic Church in Belgrade are on good terms and have participated in these efforts. The ICiS however, refuses to take part in these initiatives.119 BOŠ, a non-profit educational institution, since 2000 has a branch called the Center for the Research of Religion which has organized a number of round table discussions on the subject, but in recent years their activities have stopped. A relatively recent initiative is the Belgrade Multi-religious and Intercultural Center which (Beogradksi Multireligijski I Interkulturni Centar) (BEMIC) was founded in 2012 by sociologist, theologian and
115 Ina Merdjanova & Patrice Brodeur, Religion as a Conversation Starter’, ‘Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans, London: Continuum 2009, p. 5. 116 Ibidem, p. 47. 117 Author Unknown, ‘Inter-religious Relations in Serbia Harmonious – Patriarch Irinej’, InSerbia, 28 October 2013, http://inserbia.info/today/2013/10/inter-religious-relations-in-serbia-harmonious-patriarch-irinej/, Accesed on 7 October. 118 BOŠ is a non profit educational organisation founded in 1993. 119 Conversation with Jelena Jablanov Maksimović, 7 November 2013.
42 Fransiscan Marko Oršolić120. Oršolić can be considered one of the leading figures in the promotion of inter-religious and intercultural tolerance through ecumenism and dialogue. BEMIC was founded for a number of reasons. The activity of BOŠ has diminished in the past years. The division in the Islamic Community was one of the reasons for not creating an organisation that focuses on Serbia as a whole, but is restricted mainly on Belgrade. Oršolić stated that he did not intend to get involved in the division of the Islamic Communities. “I only cooperate with the Belgrade Mufti Jusufspahić”, said Oršolić.121
On the state level, there was the establishment of the Inter-religious Council (IRC) of the Ministry of Religions in 2010, including the archbishop of Bačka, Irinej Bulović, Belgrade's Archbishop of the Catholic Church, Stanislav Hočevar, reis-ul-ulema Adem Zilkić and Rabbi Isaac Asiel.122 Since its creation, almost no information can be found on the activities of the IRC. According to Oršolić however, “the Inter-religious Council still exists and they are still very much active, primarily in a consultative role. The Republic of Serbia takes no action on religious politics without consulting the Council.” In how far this state-led initiative has the potential effect of reconciliation remains questionable. Despite the importance of encounters between the leaders of religious communities, top-down inter religious dialogue initiatives can only bring sustainable positive changes in the attitude towards religious others if systematic efforts to empower and include the laity are included.123
Merdjanova and Brodeur acknowledge the existence of factors within the three major religious communities (Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Islamic) that emphasize the importance of inter-religious dialogue but assert that these people, in many cases, do not possess any significant and far-reaching influence. They easily get isolated and marginalized by the ‘hard-liners’ who seek to dominate and speak for their respective communities.124
120 Oršolić also founded BEMIC’s sister organisation, the International Multireligious and Intercultural Center (IMIC) which was established in 1991 in Sarajevo. 121 Conversation with Marko Oršolić, 31 August 2014.
122 Author Unknown, ‘Inter-religious Council of the Ministry of Faith of the Republic of Serbia established ’, Serbian Orthodox Church Official Website, 17 June 2010, http://www.spc.rs/eng/interreligious_council_ministry_faith_republic_serbia_established, Accessed on 1 October 2014.
123 Ina Merdjanova & Patrice Brodeur, Religion as a Conversation Starter’, ‘Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans, London: Continuum 2009, p. 4. 124 Ibidem , p. 116.
43 Within the SOC, professor Radovan Bigović125 (1956-2012) was a prominent theologian that actively promoted inter-religious dialogue. A number of my interviewees stressed that, if Bigović were still alive, they would recommend organizing an interview with him as he was considered to be the main figure representing a more liberal current within the SOC. Bigović’s views on the importance of inter-religious dialogue are clearly reflected in his posthumously published work ‘The Orthodox Church in the 21st Century’. Bigović stresses his that anti-ecumenism and religious intolerance are still on fertile grounds which is unjustifiable according to the theologian. The SOC should, according to Bigović, although it might seem not to bear any fruits or concrete results, perceive ecumenism and dialogue with Christians and non-Christians as a permanent objective and unrelenting task. 126 He believed that ecumenism and dialogue are in the very nature of the Orthodox Church. In 2006, Bigović told Merdjanova and Brodeur that “we are still waiting for that dialogue [between Christianity and Islam] to happen.”127
According to Marko Oršolić, BEMIC was partly founded in order to support Bigović’ Christian Cultural Center (CCC). The CCC was previously supported by the KAS, but the German organization “only aided the CCC up until the moment it was no longer in their interest. They are not interested in dialogue, they are interested in politics.” Instead of cooperating with KAS, Oršolić now cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.128 When I asked Oršolić about the projects initiated by BEMIC so far he responded that : “up until now, there were little initiatives from the BEMIC. We first asked the European Commission to finance a project that supports the Roma community. That’s because the dialogue that I strive for (Judeo-Christian-Islamic) will only be possible after 2016. That year a large conference will be organized in Istanbul where all sixteen Orthodox Churches will be represented by their heads. I believe that until then, Orthodoxy is not ready for a sincere dialogue. Just like the Catholic Church wasn’t ready for dialogue until the Second Vatican Council (2012). Individual believers until then participated in dialogue, but the Church as a community did not.”129 Inter-religious dialogue initiative aimed at the masses in society is very dangerous. “I create small oases, up to 30 people, Jews, Muslims, Orthodox and Catholics that I cooperate
125 Professor at the Faculty of Orthodox Theology of the University of Belgrade and founder of the Christian Cultural Center. 126 Radovan Bigović, The Church in the 21st Century, Belgrade: Foundation Konrad Adenauer & Christian Cultural Center 2013, p. 106. 127 Merdjanova & Patrice Brodeur, Religion as a Conversation Starter’, ‘Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans, London: Continuum 2009, p. 115 128 Conversation with Marko Orsolic, 31 August 2014. 129 Ibidem.
44 with.”
Clearly there are individuals and organizations that aim to promote inter-religious dialogue as a means of reconciliation, but there are several challenges ahead. Firstly, the strong link between religion and politics implies that deteriorating ethnic relations worsened inter-religious relations as well. Secondly, the countries of the Balkans possess no tradition of inter-religious dialogue. Next to that the ICiS, which represents a significant number – and the majority - of Muslims, is not involved in these initiatives at all. Furthermore, a precondition for reconciliation in South Eastern Europe is self criticism of the religious communities regarding their respective role in the conflicts.130
CHAPTER 5 Foreign Actors
In this chapter I will discuss the role of a number of foreign actors in Serbia and Sandžak in relation to the Islamic Communities. First I will describe the role that the Bosnian Rijaset plays. Then I will discuss the foreign policy of Turkey with respect to the Balkans and in particular Serbian orientalist Darko Tanasković’ interpretation of ‘Neo Ottomanism’. Consequently I will devote attention the Turkish attempts to reconcile the ICiS and ICoS. To conclude, I will discuss the role of Saudi Arabia and Wahabbi activity in Sandžak.
130 Ivan Cvitković, ‘Inter-religious relations in a multicultural society’, ed. Milan Vukomanović & Marinko Vućinić, in: Religious Dialogue in the Balkans: The Drama of Understanding, Belgrade: Belgrade Open School 2001, p. 37.
45
5.1 The Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The functioning of the ICiS under the institutional umbrella of the ICiBH implies an important role of the Bosnian rijaset as a foreign actor. Sandžak Mufti Zukorlić and the recently replaced Bosnian reis-ul-ulema Mustafa Cerić have been working together in a tandem since the beginning of the dispute between the two parallel Islamic Communities in 2007. The importance of the rijaset in Sarajevo for Bosniaks in Sandžak also follows from it being the leading institution of Islamic teaching in the region and the importance of Sarajevo in the production of educational materials. Furthermore, the ICiS, claiming to represent the
46 interests of Muslims of all ethnic backgrounds, presents itself primarily as a Bosniak institution which makes the importance of its relationship with Sarajevo evident. When reis-ul-ulema Cerić of the ICiBH payed a visit to Sandžak in May 2009, a planned rally in the town of Tutin was banned by the municipal assembly which is ran by Ugljanin’ SDA131. Cerić support of Zukorlić puts him at odds with Ugljanin despite the Serbian SDA being a branch of the Bosnian SDA (of which Cerić was one of the key founders). Banning Cerić from this rally did not prevent the reis from being able to attend a prayer in a local mosque after which he stressed that the rights of Muslims in Serbia were under attack. When he visited a well-attended rally in Novi Pazar, Cerić criticized the Serbian government for the violation of human rights in Sandžak.132 Cerić’ visit restarted numerous discussions on the collusion between religious and political fractions in Sandžak, as well as whether the Serbian government is responsible for a war which is being waged by Bosniak political and religious leaders.133 The Serbian Minister of Religions, Bogoljub Šijaković, condemned the statements that Cerić made during his visit to Serbia and stated that Cerić doesn't deserve to be welcomed in Serbia. The Minister furthermore claimed that allegations of human rights violations of Muslims are complete nonsense and that these were contradicted by prominent Bosniak political and religious figures in Serbia.134 In a diplomatic note of the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo dated on 21 April 2009 and published by Wikileaks, it is observed that Cerić has demonstrated a “willingness to use the language of ´peaceful coexistence´ to the West, and more Islamically-minded, politically- targeted, and nationalist language among his more conservative followers.” […] “His abandonment of political impartiality only serves to detract from the moral authority an institution such as the rijaset needs to wield in an environment like Bosnia.”135 In November 2012, a day before the end his mandate as reis-ul-ulema of the ICiBH, Cerić, issued a fetva (Arabic: fatwa) against reis-ul-ulema of the ICoS Adem Zilkić. In the
131 Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action) is one of the three major Bosniak political parties in Serbia. The SDA is led by Sulejman Ugljanin, one of the alleged key players in the creation of the ICoS. 132 Aleksandar Zdravkovski, Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak: Institutionalization and Feuds, in: Religion and Politics in Central and South Eastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, 2014, p. 227. 133 G. Novaković &S. Bakračević , ‘Radikalizacija Sandžaka – pretnja ili blef’, Politika 26.05.2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/dogadjaji-dana/Radikalizacija-Sandžaka-pretnja-ili-blef.lt.html, Consulted on 24 September 2014. 134 Author Unknown, ‘Šijaković: Cerić pretio Srbiji!’, Večernje Novosti, 22 May 2009, http://ww.novosti.co.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:240660-Sijakovic-Ceric-pretio-Srbiji, Consulted on 24 May 2014.
135 U.S. Embassy Sarajevo diplomatic note, ‘Cerić calls for “national Bosniak state”’ , 21 April 2009, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SARAJEVO507_a.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014.
47 document Cerić stresses that after the genocide [against Bosniaks] nobody has the right to harm the spiritual, national, cultural and political unity of the Bosniak nation. According to Cerić, „the work and activities of Zilkić fall in the Quranic category of mesdžid dirar (Arabic: Masjid al-Dirar) with which harm is done to believers.” According to Cerić “the believer should not listen to or follow Adem Zilkić because he creates divisions between believers and because his way is the wrong way. Zilkić falsely presents himself and therefore causes great embarrassment for the Muslims in Serbia and Sandžak, as well as for the entire Balkans. I therefore ask of Adem Zilkić that he unconditionally put an end to his misrepresentation. I also demand an apology from Adem Zilkić to Muslims for causing distress.”136 This move once again confirmed only the deterioration of the already bad relations between the ICoS and ICiBH-ICiS. Unsurprisingly it evoked furious reactions from the Belgrade based Muftiate claiming that this action represents an illegal intervention in the internal affairs of the ICoS. Moreover, reis Zilkić argued that Cerić abused Quranic citations and sacred norms.137 The timing of this fetva can also be described as striking, as Cerić successor as reis- ul-ulema of the ICBiH Hussein Kavazović was about to take over the position of supreme leader of the ICBiH. Cerić’s motive in this respect can only be speculated about but it seems to point out that Cerić made use of his mandate to give a last blow to the ICoS, whilst underlining ICiBH support for the ICiS, as well as “tossing the hot potato” into Kavazović' hands. Moreover, the active involvement of Cerić in the Sandžak region is not only a source of concern for the ICoS but also for the Serbian government which has had their hands full with Zukorlić up until then. Safeta Biševac, a Bosniak journalist for Danas daily, expected that the end of Cerić's mandate as reis-ul-ulema and the inauguration 15 November 2012 of Hussein Kavazović as his successor could possibly create incentives for resolving the IC conflict because the moderate Kavazović is known for his open mindedness and tolerance.138 However, this has not been the case so far. Tanasković remains sceptical about the possibility of Kavazović taking on such a role claiming that the ICiBH and ICiS continue to struggle with the heritage of Cerić. He stresses that although many moderate and reasonable Muslims were undoubtedly relieved when Cerić was replaced, it is clear that the consequences of his long lasting
136 Mustafa Cerić, “Fetva reisu-l-uleme o Ademu Zilkiću”, 13. 11. 2012, http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15320:fetva-reisu-l-uleme-o-ademu- zilkicu&catid=40, Accessed on 20 October 2014. 137 Muhamed Jusić, 'Fetva i rivalstva islamskih lidera', Al Jazeera, 14 November 2012, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/fetva-i-rivalstva-islamskih-lidera, Accessed on 19 October 2014. 138 Interview with Safeta Biševac, 5 November 2013.
48 autocratic and explicitly politicized leadership of the ICiBH will not be easy to overcome and dispose of, neither in Bosnia, nor in Serbia.139 Furthermore, Cerić is said to have been extensively lobbying for the election of Kavazović as his successor. It can thus be expected that despite Kavazović’ statement that he planned on following a new course of a 'people's reis', Cerić will remain an important factor behind the scenes.140
5.2 Turkey’s role in reconciliation of the ICiS and ICoS
In the past five years, economic ties between Turkey and Serbia have intensified as Turkish companies have started to invest significantly in Serbia. The opening to Turkey was the result of a long term effort of the Serbian Embassy in Ankara and the Serbian government was eager to use Turkeys experience with Islam in a secular state to address the issues in Serbia’s Muslim community, including “cooling the hotheads” in the rival Islamic Communities. 141 Already in 2009, in the context of a bilateral visit of Davutoglu to discuss the possibilities of the strengthening Turkish-Serbian economic relations, a Turkish delegation consisting of Davutoglu and Mehmet Görmez, president of the Diyanet (Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs), met with Zukorlić and Zilkić in separate meetings without achieving any breakthroughs in the dispute. Following this visit, Davutoglu realized that he could no longer count on Mustafa Cerić to have a positive influence on Zukorlić because the reis in Sarajevo and the Sandžak Mufti were playing the same game of agitating Bosniaks for political gain.142 It appears that Ankara was in favor of Zilkić of the ICoS but as I will show, Turkey is currently focusing on a possible third option, circumnavigating cooperation with the the two rivaling communities. After 2009, which signaled an intensified cooperation between Serbia and Turkey, there were two more Turkish initiatives with the aim of unifying the ICiS and ICoS, in 2011 and in 2013. The initiative in 2011 was started by Davutoglu in cooperation with the Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremić and generated some hope for the resolution of the
139 Darko Tanasković, 'Islam – To Sam Ja!', in: Zoran Gutović ed., Beleži Vremena, Novi Sad: Pravoslavna Reč 2014, p. 182. 140 Author Unkown, 'Izabrani reis Kavazović miljenik Mustafe Cerića', Kurir, 23 September 2012, http://www.kurir-info.rs/izabrani-reis-kavazovic-miljenik-mustafe-cerica-clanak-424884, Accessed on 20 October 2014. 141 U.S. Embassy in Belgrade diplomatic note, ‘Serbia/Turkey: Turkish FM’s Belgrade visit heralds new era in bilateral relations’, 15 September 2009, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BELGRADE845_a.html, Accessed on 27 October 2014. 142 Ibidem.
49 dispute. Zilkić asked Zukorlić to cooperate in reconciling the communities and requested support from Cerić. Zukorlić's condition was that Zilkić was to personally announce the end of the existence of the ICoS and to publicly apologize to the Muslims in Serbia.143 Zilkić refused and the initiative ran aground. While the Serbian government has an interest in the marginalization of the influence of Zukorlić who for the authorities is a constant source of unrest, for Turkey this could mean getting into a conflict with the ICiS. Additionally, Serbia has an interest in the possibilities for Turkish investments in the country. The other way around, if Turkey would press for respecting the position of Zukorlić, it might jeopardize its bilateral relationship with Serbia. The following initiative was planned in the beginning of 2013, when a group of imams from both IC’s held a meeting with Görmez in his cabinet in Mecca. The initial idea was to create a complete merger of the two communities and to have the unified entity maintain close ties with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey. Both Zilkić and Zukorlić would then have to give up their leading positions but would be allowed to continue to function in the organization on a different level.144 However, it appears that the Diyanet gradually gave up the hope of achieving a breakthrough through cooperation with the ICoS and ICiS. Dissatisfaction among employees who deflected from both IC’s resulted in a petition that was signed by more than 100 employees from the ICiS and ICoS who have consequently been exposed to various forms of harassment by their leaderships. The exact character of these harassments remain unclear. The creation of a Fund for the financing of opponents of Mufti Zukorlić among the employees of the Islamic Community by Mehmet Görmez was sharply criticized by the Sandžak ICiS Mešihat by claiming that this “represents a reckless disregard for the autonomy of the IC and interference in its internal affairs.”145 According to an anonymous source that informed Danas, a total of 27 employees from both Islamic Communities received 300 euro’s a month each. These employees lost their jobs because they joined the initiative for unification of the IC’s. In contrast to the 2011 top down initiative by the ministers of foreign affairs of Turkey and Serbia (Ahmet Davutoglu and Vuk Jeremić) the
143 Author unknown, 'Zukorlić i Zilkić spremni za pomerenje, sporan koncept’ , Blic, 19 June 2011, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/260903/Zukorlić-i-Zilkic-spremni-na-pomirenje-sporan- koncept/komentari/3080488/komentar-odgovor, Accessed on 27 October 2014. 144 Author Unknown, ‘Inicijativa za pomirenje IZ: Odlaze Zilkić i Zukorlić?’, TRT, 14 February 2013, http://www.trt.net.tr/bosanski/news/detail/region/2/inicijativa-za-pomirenje-iz-odlaze-zilkic-i-Zukorlić/16009, Accessed on 27 October 2014. 145 Slađana Novosel, ‘Finansiranje protivnika Muftije Zukorlića’, Danas, 29.08.2013, http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/finansiranje_protivnika_muftije_Zukorlića.55.html?news_id=266826, Accessed on 27 October 2014.
50 current initiative has a bottom up character in which believers, imams and religious teachers are said to be the initiators. The source also claims that the support for this renewed initiative for unifying was asked from and given by Görmez, as well as reis-ul-ulema of the ICiBH Kavazović. 146 An interesting development occurred when in September 2013 Sandžak mufti Zukorlić sent a document to the new reis Kavazović, which deals with the conclusions that the ICiS Mešihat drew in a meeting where the Turkish initiative for talks on the restoration of unity in the IC was discussed. According to this document, the Mešihat supports every initiative that contributes to unification, but under the condition that no one who participated in the splitting of the community in 2007 can take part in it. These are former Prime minister Vojislav Koštunica, president of the Diyanet Mehmed Görmez, Sulejman Ugljanin and Rasim Ljajić [and of course Zilkić]. Kavazović is demanded to reject all pressure from the Diyanet in order to protect the IC and Muslims from these pressures. It also demands of Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to undertake all necessary measures against Görmez who abuses his position by interfering into the internal affairs of the IC. Furthermore, the Mešihat expects that the Rijaset in Sarajevo will, like the Mešihat, continue to respect Cerić 2012 fetva against Adem Zilkić. The Turkish initiative for reconciliation is characterized as malicious and destructive and Kavazović and his associates are demanded to cut all communications.147 Turkey's efforts to unify the rivaling IC's in Serbia have turned out to be fruitless. Zilkić claims to be open for unification, Zukorlić on the other hand only if Zilkić publicly announces the dissolving of the Belgrade Rijaset, and apologizes to the Muslims in Serbia. Furthermore, it seems that Zukorlić has turned his back on Mehmet Görmez, believing that the Turkish Reis-ul-ulema is after ousting the Sandžak Mufti. On the other hand, Zukorlić does not necessarily need Turkey as he enjoys the support of most of the Muslims in Sandžak and the ICiBH for now. It remains to be seen what kind of position Kavazović will take regarding Turkey's ambitions to unify the Serbian IC's and if he will continue to give staunch support to the ICiS like his predecessor Cerić. In addition to Turkey’s active role in efforts to realize a unification of the Islamic Communities, a more general debate on ‘neo Ottomanism’ was sparked by the appearance of
146 Ibidem. 147 Slađana Novosel, ‘Muftija Zukorlić uslovljava svog vrhovnog poglavara’, Danas, 20.09.2013, http://www.danas.rs/dodaci/Sandžak/muftija_Zukorlić_uslovljava_svog_vrhovnog_poglavara.42.html?news_id =267989 , Consulted on 20 September 2014.
51 Serbian orientalist Darko Tanasković’ 2012 book Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu. The thesis posed in this publication will be discussed in the following subchapter.
5.3 Turkish foreign policy and Neo-Ottomanism
The Ottoman Empire has left a huge footprint on the Balkans after its centuries lasting rule which has led to a strong connection between the Balkan Muslims and Turkey. Next to the Islamic institutions in the region that have all evolved from the Ottoman empire, the Ottoman material and cultural heritage form a prominent feature of the landscape and culture of the Balkan countries. An additional fact of importance in this context are the (forced and voluntary) migratory waves of Muslims from the Balkans to Turkey in the 19th and 20th centuries resulting in a significant diaspora of amongst other Bosniaks. Presently, most of the members of the Bosniak diaspora in Turkey are originally from Sandžak.148 Although the Muslim communities in the Balkans are far from homogenous, the region’s Ottoman legacy has enabled Turkey to use the region’s Muslim populations as anchors of its proactive engagement in the region. One aspect of this engagement that concretely deals with the subject of this thesis is manifested in Turkish initiatives to unify the two major Islamic Communities in Serbia. Before discussing these initiatives, I will turn to the general developments with regard to Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans, paying special attention to the neo Ottomanism debate sparked by the prominent Serbian orientalist Darko Tanasković with one of his latest books from 2012: Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu (Neo- Ottomanism: The return of Turkey to the Balkans). Turkey's proactive engagement in the Balkans is a relatively new phenomenon that before the late 1990s was confined to the realm of high politics and constrained by the secularist and Kemalist outlook of the Turkish republic. Around this time, this was being challenged by Islamic networks that started to operate in the region.149 Things changed around the time when Erdogan’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) (Justice and Development Party) came to power in 2002. Although the foundations for Turkey's present proactive foreign policy towards the Balkans were laid by Prime Minister and President Turgut Özal in the late 1980s and the Foreign Minister Ismail Cem in the late 1990s,
148 Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford 2010, p. 6. 149 Ibidem, p. 22-23.
52 currently the major driver behind this policy is Ahmet Davutoglu, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the current Turkish prime minister. In 2009, Serbia and Turkey signed an agreement with which TIKA (the Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Development) formally started operating in Serbia. Between 2010 and 2012, the organization has realized a number of projects in and outside of Sandžak, mainly in the field of education. Tanasković defines Neo-Ottomanism as an “in-depth ideological and value-based constant in the complete state appearance of Turkey in the international sphere.” The foreign policy doctrine of Neo-Ottomanism, so Tanasković, is “an amalgam of Islamism, Turkish nationalism and Ottoman imperialism.”150 Tanasković is convinced that Turkey has the aim of transforming the Balkans into a contemporary and stable Rumelia151, in other words into a stable part of Turkey’s sphere of influence. Xavier Bougarel and Natalie Clayer’s 2001 volume ‘Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990- 2000’ gives a slightly different definition of Neo-Ottomanism: “a current in Turkish society, highlighting certain values associated with the Ottoman Empire and its political system, including the coexistence of religions and different people in it, and wishing to return to Turkey its dignity and role in the Eurasian zone.”152 It is however significant that Serbs like Tanasković seem to view Neo-Ottomanism as a threat. According to Tanasković, Islamism as a program of societal and political action and behavior in accordance with the regulations of Islamic Law is an inseparable element of Neo- Ottomanism. In Turkey, a process of what Tanasković calls (re)islamisation, can be traced to the period starting soon after WWII. This process only accelerated after the Cold War. Re- islamization in the context of a majority Muslim community means the awakening of secularized, religiously insufficiently conscious and diligent citizens with the accompanying efforts to return an Islamic character to social and governmental institutions as well as the entire social environment. Re-islamization as understood in this way, Tanasković continues, is an essentially important dimension in contemporary fundamentalist programs in the Islamic world. Tanasković connects this term with the 1970 Islamic Declaration (Islamska Deklaracija153) of Alija Izetbegović which has the subtitle “A program of islamization of
150 Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik 2012, p. 8-18. 151 The Ottoman geographical term for the European part of its Empire. 152 Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer ed., Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post- communisme 1990-2000, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 2001 , p. 485. 153 The Islamic Declaration (1970, reprinted in 1990) was written by Alija Izetbegović (1925 – 2003), who was a member of the Young Muslims organization (founded in 1939) which was crushed by the communist regime in
53 Muslims and Muslim nations” as well as with Mustafa Cerić who according to Tanasković calls for “the reislamization of Muslims”.154 In their 2013 study ‘Les Musulmans de l’Europe de Sud-Est’, French scholars Natalie Clayer and Xavier Bougarel have asserted that the emergence and the increasing visibility of Islamic institutions in the public sphere do not present an indication of the level of religious practice of the Muslim communities. Although Islam represents a strong carrier for national and cultural identity, and despite the existence of a pious minority, the general level of religiosity of Balkan Muslims is low. Clayer and Bougarel therefore conclude that it is not possible to speak of the ‘return of Islam’ or the reislamization of the Muslim populations of South-Eastern Europe, without reserve.155 Yet, although Bougarel and Clayer may be right, Tanasković’is seen in Serbia as an authority, and his views are therefore influential. Hajrudin Somun, former ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Turkey, argues that contrary to Tanasković, he sees pragmatism as the dominant approach in Neo-Ottomanism. Although it is hard to exclude an Islamic dimension from Ottoman heritage, Somun believes that Tanasković' emphasis on ideological Islamism is exaggerated. A majority of Serbs in the Balkans still view everything coming from Turkey with an Ottoman tone, followed by an Islamic overtone.156 Tanasković interpretation of Neo-Ottomanism is largely based on the 2001 book and foreign policy program 'Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position' by Ahmet Davutoglu157. The current Turkish prime minister distinguishes between three regional priorities within the new foreign policy of strategic depth: the Middle-East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Although, according to Tanasković, most of the world media and experts dedicate much of their attention to the first two regions, it can be increasingly heard that the Balkans present in a specific way, from the Neo-Ottoman viewpoint, actually the most
1949, rejects all ideologies foreign to Islam, beginning with nationalism and secularism and propagating Pan- Islamism and a Islam conceived as a union of faith and politics. Although it does not mention Bosnia- Herzegovina explicitely, it offers offers Pakistan as a model Islamic Republic. At the turn of the 1970s and 1980s, as an echo of the Iranian revolution, the politization of the Catholic and Orthodox churches and accusations of Muslim nationalism, the Bosnian communist leaders interfered. Izetbegović and his affiliates were arrested and charged with the willingness to create an Islamic state in Bosnia. They were sentenced to 13 years of imprisonment. 154 Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik 2012, p. 10-11 155 Natalie Clayer & Xavier Bougarel, Les Musulmans d l’Europe du Sud-Est, Paris: Karthala 2013, p. 265-267. 156 Hajrudin Somun, ' Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans and “Neo-Ottomanism”: A Personal Account' Insight Turkey No. 3 (2011) , p. 39. 157 As far as I know, Davutoglu's book is only available in Turkish and I have not been able to check if his views are represented correctly by Tanasković.
54 important of these regions.158 The lack of interest in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy in South-Eastern Europe follows from a number of factors. Firstly, in contrast to the Caucasus and the above all the Middle-East, the situation in the Balkans has calmed down. This is combined with the fact that the US is currently turned to other global priorities believing that Turkey, as a symbol of moderate Islam, will do the work that is also in the interest of the US, a stable South-Eastern Europe. Based on the following quote from Davutoglu “the Ottoman Empire was in the first place a Balkan state” Tanasković constructs the Turkish prime minister’s line of argumentation in the following manner: “The Ottoman Empire was a Balkan state. Turkey is the successor of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey is a Balkan state, Balkan is Europe, Turkey is a European state. The Muslims in the Balkans are the human stronghold of the Europeanness of Turkey. With the destruction of Balkan Muslims [referring to the war in Bosnia] one wants to annul the Europeanness of Turkey. Turkey cannot watch this happen peacefully. Millions of Muslims that are originally from the Balkans live in Turkey and they require that action is taken. Turkey has the responsibility and duty to interfere and it does so.”159 When in October 2013, the then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Prizren in Southern Kosovo, he made a statement saying that “Kosovo is Turkey and Turkey is Kosovo”. This stirred up public opinion in Serbia and led to fierce criticism from the Serbian government which doesn't recognize Kosovo's independence. Consequently, President Tomislav Nikolić suspended his participation in a trilateral meeting between Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Turkey. Davutoglu at the time dismissed the controversy claiming that Erdogan's words were “taken out of the context of his integral speech and placed on a terrain that Turkey does not want.”160 For Tanasković this was again proof of Turkey's imperial ambitions.161 Neo-Ottoman politics in the Balkans systematically rely on the Muslim communities residing in the region, whose strengthening is seen as a chance to establish influence in the region and beyond. Considering that the Christian countries of the Balkans all were founded on a struggle for liberation from the Ottoman empire in the 19th century it would clearly be
158 Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik 2012, p. 86. 159 Ibidem, p. 89.. 160 Author Unknown, ‘Erdogan ‘Misunderstood’ Over ‘Turkey is Kosovo’ Claim’, 28.10.2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/davutoglu-erdogan-s-kosovo-statement-misinterpreted, Consulted on 25 September 2014. 161 Darko Tanasković, 'Turska u srpskoj politici', in: Zoran Gutović ed., Beleži Vremena, Novi Sad: Pravoslavna Reč 2014, p. 88.
55 hard to expect that for example Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs would welcome Turkish influence based on Ottoman heritage. According to Davutoglu, it is of the utmost importance that Turkey relies on two fundamental and traditional backbones of Ottoman Turkish Balkan politics, the Bosniaks and Albanians. Leaving the complete Eastern part of Bosnia to the Serbs could be harmful for the balance in Bosnia and in the Balkans. If the connection between Kosovo, Sandžak and Bosnia would be cut in half, the Bosniaks would fall under Croatian influence, and Sandžak and Kosovo exclusively under Serbian influence. During the Yugoslav crisis Turkey vigorously and persistently supported the Bosnian Muslims/Bosniaks. According to Tanasković, that bias is interpreted by Turkish officials and authors as a reaction to the disruption of regional balance with an unequal war between the Serbs and Bosniaks, and later the Serbs and Albanians.162 Tanasković is considered to be one of the most prominent orientalists in the Balkans and therefore has substantial influence on public opinion. His theory is nonetheless challenged by numerous academics. From the Bosnian perspective, there have been a number of individuals that joined the debate. Former ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Turkey Hajrudin Somun asserts that “neo Ottomanism is predominantly a pejorative term by which Turkey’s actual regional policy is being called by those who oppose or have at least are suspicious towards that policy.” Discarding the ideological character of Neo Ottomanism, Somun defines Turkish foreign policy or “neo Ottomanism” as “a very pragmatic and realistic endeavor to secure the ground under its own feet by establishing a peaceful environment around its borders and creating opportunities for its economy to progress.” Tanasković believes that there actually exists an ideological Neo-Ottomanism instead of only pragmatism.163 On the fact that Turkey has changed its perspective on foreign policy over the past few decades and the Balkans becoming one of the countries priorities in this respect exists widespread consensus. Yet, the idea that the Balkans form the most important part of Turkish foreign policy, as Tanasković suggests, is strongly disputed by Belgrade based Islamologist Ivan Kostić. He is convinced that Turkey’s priorities clearly lie in the Middle- East, the Caucasus and Central Asia region. An analysis of Turkish foreign policy which is solely based on Davutoglu’s work ‘Strategic Depth’ without taking into consideration the role of other factors in Turkish politics cannot be taken seriously, so Kostić.164 Furthermore, it is telling that according to multiple sources, Tanasković has a reputation for being an
162 Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik 2012, p. 92-94. 163 Ibidem, p. 38 164 Interview with Ivan Kostić, 22 June 2014.
56 Islamophobe and has had his part in the creation of an anti-Islamic atmosphere in public opinion (for example see: (N. Cigar (1994)165, F. Karčić (1995)166, P. J. Cohen (1997)167). I will direct more attention to the role of Serbian academics in the discourse on Islam in the last subchapter on Saudi Arabia and Islamic fundamentalism. The constraints that existed in the sphere of Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s have given way to a proactive Turkish involvement in the region, both on the governmental and non-governmental levels. Several organizations have intensified and diversified their activities in the past decade. Institutions that are subordinate to the Prime Ministry (Diyanet, TIKA) have been active in projects “geared at consolidating the official Islamic Unions— possibly with a medium-term goal to bring them into the fold of the emerging Mešihat — and restoring Ottoman architectural and religious heritage”.168 Next to the matter of Ottoman heritage, there exists a strong historical link between the mufti’s on the territory of the former Yugoslavia who have been appointed by the shayh ul islam in Istanbul which is being upheld by the interference of the Diyanet in Serbian religious affairs. Furthermore, Turkey has significantly stepped up its efforts to profit from economic opportunities in Serbia
5.4 Saudi Arabia and Islamic radicalism
Previous security-driven studies have suggested that Saudi Arabian funding networks have been active in the Balkans, the region supposedly being a hotbed for the development of Islamic radicalism. These ideas have been fed by the involvement of the mudžahedin (Jihadi warriors) during the Bosnian civil war and the 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. Yet, the activity of these foundations in the Balkans has significantly decreased the since the end of the 1990s. Őktem's research suggest that although certain publications and public debates on ‘Islamic Extremism’ emphasize the existence of radical Islamic factors in the Balkans, the actual number of Saudi sponsored ‘Wahabbi’ groups has
165 Norman Cigar, ‘Serbia's Orientalists and Islam: Making Genocide Intellectually respectable’, The Islamic Quarterly, No. 38 (1994), pp. 147-170. 166 Fikret Karčić, 'Distorted Images of Islam: the Case of the Former Yugoslavia', Intellectual Discourse, No 2. (1995), pp. 139-152. 167 Philip J. Cohen, ‘The Ideology and Historical Continuity of Serbia’s Anti-Islamic Policy,’ Islamic Studies, No. 2/3, Special Issue: ISLAM IN THE BALKANS (1997), pp. 361-382. 168 Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford December 2010, p. 41.
57 declined significantly.169 The years following the 2001 attacks in New York has led to squeezing out of the Balkans all organisations with even the faintest connection to Arab Islamic networks and Salafi forms of Islam.170 Already in 1999, Bougarel came to a similar conclusion. He argued that radical Islamist currents present minority currents in the Balkans and that they have only managed to overcome their own marginality when political and ethnic tensions allowed them to instrumentalize the national and political frustration of Muslim populations.171 Saudi influence in the region has been to a large extent taken over by governmental and non-governmental organizations from Turkey, as mentioned in preceding chapter on Turkey's activities in the Balkans. Another good example of this is the creation of the Eurasian Islamic Council in 1995, which gathers the Islamic Communities in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, an initative led by Turkey. It constitutes a reaction to the establishment of the Islamic Council for Eastern Europe under the auspices of the Muslim World League (Rabita al-`Alam al-Islami) with the support of Saudi Arabia.172 The end of the brief period of Saudi influence in the Balkans, in Őktem's words the „Wahabbi Intermezzo“, does however not mean there are no radical religious organisations active in the Balkans at all. According most of my interviewees, finding concrete information on Saudi influence in Serbia and more specifcally Sandžak is impossible as most funding activities are private and all are conducted under the radar. In how far Saudi funding relates to Serbia in the current situation is therefore very hard to uncover. Although Őktem's research seems to point out that in western scholarship the idea of the Balkans as being a hotbed for Islamic radicalism has lost significant ground, the discourse in Serbia is of a different character. Already since the 1980s, in academic and intelligence circles the thesis was posed that there exists a threat of Islamic fundamentalism in the Balkans with the aim of forming an Islamic state along the line of Istanbul, Kosovo, Sandžak and Sarajevo. This idea became widely known as the zelena transverzala (“Islamic Diagonal” or “Green Axis”) thesis and should be placed in a wider context of Serbian media and academics constructing a negative image of Islam.
169 Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford December 2010, p. 18. 170 Ibidem, p. 21. 171 Xavier Bougarel, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLDEVLEARN/Resources/Islam_and_Politics.pdf 172 Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik 2012, p. 95.
58 According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade, by relying on this thesis, the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo that were initiated by Milošević were promoted through the media and prepared a moral atmposphere to legitimize „settling the scores“ with the Muslim population of Bosnia and Kosovo.173 Ivan Kostić stresses that among the driving forces behind the creation of this discourse were Darko Tanasković and Miroljub Jeftić174.175 They have presented in the daily press Islam as inferior, backward and violent. A specific theme in this context was the betrayal of Bosnian Muslims who converted from Orthodoxy to Islam under the Ottoman Empire [‘betraying their Serbian brothers’]. When it became clear that Bosnia-Herzegovina would no longer be a part of Yugoslavia, the Bosniaks opted for help from Turkey. This was interpreted by Tanasković as: “a tacit return to the position of poturice (converts to Islam) from past times, and for Serbs, a poturica is worse that a Turk”.176 Apart from Turkish solidarity with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina which was expressed through humanitarian aid177 and the unrestricted admission of Bosniak refugees, Turkey also developed diplomatic initiatives, lobbying for an intervention in the conflict. In order to convince the international community of the necessity of an intervention, Turkey adressed the issue in a number of regional and international organisations such as the UN, OSCE, NATO and the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation). Not wanting to act unilateraly, considering that the interest of protecting the Bosnian Muslims would not justify the political cost, Turkey solely operated in the cadre of international initiatives.178 Not only are there many indications that support the overrated character of the zelena transverzala thesis, the heterogenity of Muslim communities in the Balkans constituted by lingustic, ethnic and theological differences, so Őktem, make this theory additionally
173 Author Unknown, ‘Radikalne grupe na Balkanu: Slučaj Vehabije Jašarevića’, Helsinki Comitee for Human Rights in Belgrade, Bulletin No. 84 (2011), p. 7. 174 Professor at the Faculty of political Sciences of the University of Belgrade. According to Fikret Karčić, Professor at the Faculty of Law and of Islamic Studies in the University of Sarajevo, as well as President of the Constitutional Court of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “Jeftić is unremarkable for his scholarship, but much more known for his interviews to nationalistic papers.” Source: Fikret Karčić, 'Distorted Images of Islam: the Case of the Former Yugoslavia', Intellectual Discourse, No 2. (1995), pp. 139-152. 175 Interview with Interview with Ivan Kostić, 22 June 2014. 176 Author unknown, ‘Podgrejavanje Antiislamizma u Srbiji’, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade Report (May 2007), p. 2. 177 Between 1991 and 1997, Turkey has supported Bosnian Muslims by sending 8300 tons of medical supplies, clothing and other materials of a value of 16 million dollars. Source 178 Sylvie Gangloff, 'La politique balkanique de la Turquie et le poids de passé ottoman', in: Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer ed., Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990-2000, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 2001, p. 337-339.
59 unconvincing.179 The idea of an Islamic Diagonal suggests the that the Muslims in the Balkans form a homogenous population and ignores the complexity of the region as well as the different transformations that the Balkan Islamic Communities went through. It is of importance to note that in the Balkans and elsewhere in the public discourse terms like ‘Wahabbism’, ‘Salafism’, ‘Jihadi terrorism’, ‘Takfiri Islamism’ are all used indiscriminately and refer to almost anything connected to Islam.180 The vehabije (Wahabbi’s) in Serbia are most numerous in Novi Pazar and Priboj but are also located in Sjenica. In other words, in Sandžak. The exact number of members of this group is unkown. There have been instances of them causing problems in mosques, interfere with religious ceremonies and try to impose their way of prayer.181 The group first appeared in Sandžak in 1997 and became active after the fall of Milošević. An International Crisis Group Report indicated that the Wahabbis in Sandžak came from Sarajevo and that they are being aided financially by Saudi Arabia, through funds that were located in Vienna.182 According to Safeta Biševac, there is a rumour that a mosque in Vienna forms the main link for Saudi funds that end up in Sandžak. The journalist emphasized that these rumours can be doubted saying that a serious country such as Austria would immediately investigate such a case if there were any concrete leads.183 The phenomenon of Salafism, Wahabism, Jihadi Terrorism in the Balkans is a managable security issue. Transnational networks of jihadi fighters that came to Bosnia from the Arab world and Iran in the 1990s have been largely
179 Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford December 2010, p. 5. 180 “These four terms all have a different meaning: Salafism is based on a strict and purist interpretation of Islam, whose adherents seek to live like the disciples of the prophet during his lifetime. While this conservative lifestyle often comes with austere clothing and life arrangements, and is promoted by many Saudi foundations, it is not, per se, violent. Neither is Wahhabism, which shares many of the tenets of Salafism, but has become the dominant form of Islam in the Arab peninsula due to its adoption by the ruling elites of the Al-Saud royal family of Saudi Arabia. ‘Takifiri Islamists’ are particularly exclusive Islamists that declare dissenters as ‘apostates’ (takfir) who can be legitimately killed. Takfiri thinking is at the root of violent Islamist movements and also widespread among ‘Jihadi terrorists’ like Al Qaeda and related networks. Many fighters, who joined the Bosniak war effort were also Jihadis (religious fighters), but only some of them were violent takfiris.” Source: Ibidem, p. 18. 181 Author unknown, ‘Ko su vehabije?’, RTS, 29 October 2011, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/981266/Ko+su+vehabije%3F+.html, Consulted on 29 September 2014. 182 Author Unknown, ‘Radikalne grupe na Balkanu: Slučaj Vehabije Jašarevića’, Helsinki Comitee for Human Rights in Belgrade, Bulletin No. 84 (2011), p. 10.
183 Interview with Safeta Biševac, 5 November 2013.
60 dismanteled.184 In the case of Sandžak too, there are few Muslims conforming to this interpretation of Islam and they represent a marginal group. According to Aida Ćorović, former director of the NGO Urban-In in Novi Pazar185, the Wahabbis in Sandžak are mostly young individuals that came from the sphere of crime, human trafficking and weapon trade. At the very beginning, it was Zukorlić' ICiS that provided its logistical capacities – or at least tolerated their presence. Ćorović claims that there exists a strong tie between the Wahabbis and the ICiS saying that they recruit terrorists from the ranks of ICiS muftiate. According to Ćorović, Zukorlić has been getting money from Wahabbi centers in Vienna and Rome, as one informant has described. This individual testified that he, in several cases, functioned as a courier bringing Wahabbi funds to the ICiS. According to Ćorović, although the exact character of the relation between Zukorlić and the Wahabbis is unclear, these developments show that the ICiS tolerates the group considering the amount of money involved. 186 In a 2006 police action it was confirmed that a group of Wahabbis from Sandžak planned the liquidation of Zukorlić of which the exact background was not discovered. When in 2007 and 2008 in the area of Novi Pazar, two groups of wahabbis were arrested by the police, one of the accusations was the planning of this attack. Zukorlić has repeatedly claimed that Wahhabism is a deviant phenomenon in Islam. After a number of incidents in mosques, Zukorlić banned the group of Wahabbis from ICiS mosques. Since then, they have been praying in their homes. Ćorović claims that the attempt to liquidate the Sandžak mufti stems from Zukorlić decision to keep the funds that came from Vienna for his own activities, while this money was intended to be spent jointly.187 On 28 October 2011, Mevlid Jašarević, born in Novi Pazar in 1988, fired shots at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo. In the public discourse this event was again confirmation that there is a concrete threat of terrorism – and for some even a sign that the threat of the zelena transverzala has not yet been overcome. Muhamed Filipović, member of the Bosniak Acadamy of Science and Arts, and a close partner of Zukorlić, emphasized that all imaginable motivations for this attack should be taken into
184 Kerem Ȍktem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford December 2010, p. 18. 185Currently MP for the Demokratska Stranka (Democratic Party). Ćorović in December 2013 decided to distance herself from her position at Urban-In because she has been subjected by death threats, allegedly from the ICiS as well as wahabbi’s. After she and Zukorlić became public enemies, Corovic was forced to live under police protection for some time. 186 Branka Trivić, ‘Ko Štiti Vehabije u Sandžaku?', Radio Free Europe, 31 October 2011, http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/ko_stiti_vehabije_u_Sandžaku/24377308.html, Consulted on 28 September 2014. 187 Ibidem.
61 consideration, including the possible role of Serbian intelligence services.188 According to the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade Jašarević’ attack was not part of an organized plan but stresses that the zoung Wahabbi was a lone wolf.189 It is clear that the influence of Saudi Arabian funding networks has had a highpoint in 1990s but has lost ground with the increasingly prominent Turkish influence. Regardless of the specific influence and penetration of Arab (Wahabbi) and Iranian Islam in the Balkans during and after the wars on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that cannot be ingored, serious foundation and unbiased scientific assessment agree that Turkey remains the first adress in the Islamic world for the Balkan Muslims.190
Conclusion
In the first chapter of this thesis I described the background of the two Islamic communities in Serbia, the ICiS and the ICoS. Their history is a history of competition and is clear that the struggle between the two communities weakens the position of Muslims in Serbia. Undoubtedly personal ambitions play an important role but the role of the Serbian state is interesting. Although the ICiS represents the majority of Muslims, most of whom live in
188 Author Unknown, ‘Radikalne grupe na Balkanu: Slučaj Vehabije Jašarevića’, Helsinki Comitee for Human Rights in Belgrade, Bulletin No. 84 (2011), p. 5. 189 Ibidem, p. 12. 190 Darko Tanasković, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkanu, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik 2012, p. 86.
62 Sandžak and the Preševo Valley, the Serbian state usually supports the ICoS. Let us consider a number of examples. As we have seen, on the one hand the state supported the foundation of a secular university in Sandžak (IUNP), more or less an ICiS initiative. On the other hand, the IUNP had difficulties being accredited and in 2006 Belgrade decided to establish a competing state university in Novi Pazar. At the same time dubious private universities in Belgrade, closely tied to the official state institutions, seem to get their accreditation without any problems. In 2010 the government got rid of the representatives of the ICiS in the Board for Religious Education making it impossible for teachers affiliated to the ICiS to teach in a number of Serbian cities. In the Act on Islamic Religious Community of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 1930 only one Islamic Community is mentioned. Apparently from the point of view of the government this creates unsurmountable problems for the registration of the religious Islamic communities now: there are two of them now and only one is mentioned in the law. And not being registered means that at any time an official may decide that certain rules do not apply. The existence of the two communities creates problems in many respects. Outside Sandžak and the Preševo Valley there is a serious lack of mosques. The authorities and the Serbian population are not cooperative in this respect as we have seen in Chapter II. The problem is made worse because the existence of two communities of Muslims makes the restitution of religious properties that were confiscated after 1945 apparently impossible. Which of the two communities should get the property back? The government is incapable or even shows no interest in solving such issues. At the same time, there where the ICiS is in control properties that according to the ICiS ought to be restituted are simply taken back illegally. These specific problems all occur in a wider context. That is why I devoted three chapters to, respectively, the educational system, inter-religious dialogue and foreign actors. A look at the educational system as we had in Chapter III is enlightening. Since 1989 Serbian history text books show that under Milosević the communist myth of brotherhood and unity (bratstvo I jedinstvo) was replaced by its opposite: the Serbs have always been and are still threatened by other Balkan nations. Although in Serbia state control of the publishing of history text books has diminished the existing research shows that Serbian history text books contain subtle biases with respect to the Ottoman Empire and the Bosniaks. Attempts to introduce neutral history text books by, for example, the Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-Eastern Europe (CDRSEE) are viewed with suspicion and are not very successful.
63 In Chapter IV we briefly discussed inter-religious dialogue in Serbia. Here too the existence of two Islamic communities in Serbia creates problems. Now it is the ICiS that refuses to participate in all initiatives in which the ICoS is involved. More generally the initiatives to promote inter-religious dialogue have not gotten very far. Because the ICiS is spiritually oriented towards Sarajevo one expects Bosnia to play a role in the conflicts. And it does. In 2012 the Bosnian reis-ul-ulema Cerić issued a fatwa against the reis-ul-ulema of the ICoS. Obviously such acts only reinforce the existing oppositions. It is interesting that Turkey attempts to play a different role. The economic ties between Serbia and Turkey have become stronger in the past five years and Turkey will have realized that the opposition between the two Muslim communities is harmful. However, so far Turkey’s attempts to reconcile the ICiS and the ICoS have failed. Yet in agreement with the Serbian government Turkey is realizing educational projects in an outside of Sandžak. Turkey’s actions could be interpreted positively but Serbia would not be Serbia if such moves were not viewed with suspicion. The prominent Serbian orientalist Darko Tanasković argues that Turkey is driven by Neo Ottomanism which he views as an amalgam of Islamism, Turkish nationalism and Ottoman imperialism. The starting point of this research project consisted of three questions:
To what extent can we maintain that the Muslim community in Serbia is being oppressed by the state? Given the relatively small number of Muslims in Serbia the existence of the two rivaling Islamic Communities in Serbia is remarkable. What is the impact of this fact on the position of the Muslim community in Serbia? What overall conclusions can be drawn regarding the relation between the Islamic Communities in Serbia on the one hand and the state and the SOC on the other?
Although I cannot, based on my sources, firmly conclude that Serbian Muslims in general are directly being oppressed by the state, there are numerous indications that point in that direction. The Serbian state is not neutral in its treatment of the Muslim communities and has a strong interest in keeping the region of Sandžak under its control. Especially the politically active Muftiate in Novi Pazar is a serious security concern for the Belgrade authorities. The lack of positive government engagement in Sandžak generating in incentives for social and economic improvements further complicates this issue.
64 It turned out that the existence of the two rivaling Islamic Communities in Serbia is in this respect highly relevant and that the first two research questions are very much related. A good example concerns the restitution of property that was confiscated by the communists. Despite the fact that both the ICiS and ICoS are de facto recognized by the state, the problem is that there hasn’t been any decision on which community is the legitimate successor of the Islamic Religious Community as it was recognized in 1930 in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
The division in the Islamic Community is in the first place a political conflict which reflects the rift in the major Bosniak political parties. This is of crucial importance in understanding the conflict. There seems to be little doubt about the important role SDA leader Sulejman Ugljanin and his supporters played in the creation of the Belgrade rijaset with the intention to marginalize Zukorlić power base in Sandžak. In the process, former affiliates of Zukorlić, including Zilkić, defected from the ICiS and took up functions in the new rijaset. In how far exactly the role of state intelligence services formed a cornerstone in this issue is hard to determine. But there are clearly conscious attempts to fight the influence of the ICiS – and more specifically the influence of Zukorlić - such as the decision of the Ministry of Human and Minority Rights to change the conditions for constituting the Bosniak National Council in 2010 after Zukorlić’s Bosniak Cultural Community had won the elections. The accumulation of these issues seem to show the existence of a well-organized effort to reduce the ICiS’ influence in the political, educational and economic spheres along the principle of “divide and rule”. Furthermore, these developments have only had a destabilizing effect of polarization and the sharpening of ICiS nationalist rhetoric, including the (political) interference of the former Bosnian reis-ul-ulema Cerić. Leaving speculations on possible motives aside, it is clear that the issue has destabilized the development of the Muslim community in Serbia. Presently, only a unification of the rivaling communities could dissolve much of the problems but such a solution would only be possible if it would live up to the main ICiS condition: the annulment of the Belgrade rijaset. The ICiS, having the allegiance of most mosque communities in Sandžak – and therefore in Serbia – including the formal support of the ICiBH, can afford the intransigent position that it is taking in these developments. My aim was to connect the specific issue of the conflict between the ICoS and ICiS to a more general level of the general position of Islam as a minority religion, in a country which is predominantly Orthodox. It goes without saying that the crisis of 1990s still forms a vivid memory in the Serbian public discourse. Although religion was definitely not the cause
65 for the wars, Islam and Orthodoxy were instrumentalized for political purposes, of which the consequences are still very much visible: two opposing ethnic narratives which are maintained through education and media. The religious form of these political narratives is very much present, especially taking into consideration the continuous overwhelmingly political involvement of the ICiS (religious) leaders. In this light, it is interesting to see the character and influence of inter-religious dialogue initiatives which can be characterized as marginal. Within the SOC, as the dominant religious institution, there are only very few factors that advocate ecumenism and dialogue. Furthermore, in the initiatives for inter- religious dialogue the ICiS is absent, which is according to a majority of my sources the largest and best organized Muslim institution in Serbia. An overall conclusion is the following. There is not only an increasing gap in the understanding between the ICiS and the state, but also between Sandžak Muftiate and the SOC.
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66 Alibašić, Ahmet, ‘Serbia’, Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Vol. 4 (2012) Alispahić, Fatmir, Reisofobija, Tuzla: OFF-SET d.o.o. 2010 Antić Velizar & Veković Marko, Odnos Islamske Zajednice BiH prema Islamskim Zajednicama u Srbiji, (2012) – (The relation of the ICoBH with the islamic communities in Serbia) Barišić, Srđan, Institucionalizacija Islamskih Zajednica nakon raspada SFR Jugoslavije, Filozofija i Društvo, No. 2 (2008), pp. 117-127. – (Institutionalisation of the Islamic communities after the disintegration of Yugoslavia) Bigović, Radovan, The Church in the 21st Century, Belgrade: Foundation Konrad Adenauer & Christian Cultural Center 2013 Bougarel, Xavier & Nathalie Clayer, Les Musulmans de L’Europe de Sud-Est: Des Empires aux Etats balkaniques, Paris: Karthala 2013 Bougarel, Xavier, Clayer, Nathalie ed., Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990-2000, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 2001 Cvitković, Ivan, ‘Inter-religious relations in a multicultural society’, ed. Milan Vukomanović & Marinko Vućinić, in: Religious Dialogue in the Balkans: The Drama of Understanding, Belgrade: Belgrade Open School 2001, pp. 29-42 Fazlic, Hazim, ‘Islam in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia – Religious Changes in the Post-Communist Balkans from 1989 to 2009’, Doctoral Thesis University of Birmingham 2011 Filipović, Muhamed , Fenomen Muftija, Novi Pazar: El Kelimeh 2012 Sylvie Gangloff, 'La politique balkanique de la Turquie et le poids de passé ottoman', in: Xavier Bougarel, Nathalie Clayer ed., Le Nouvel Islam Balkanique: Les Musulmans, acteurs du post-communisme 1990-2000, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose 2001, pp. 317-356. Koulouri,Christina, ‘History Teaching and Peace Education in South Eastern Europe’, Hitotsubashi Journal of Arts and Sciences, No. 50 (2009), pp. 53-63. Kuburić, Zorica, 'Images of the Religious Other in Serbia',in: Christian Moe ed. , 'Images of the Religious Other', Novi Sad: 2008, pp. 167-200 Merdjanova, Ina & Brodeur, Patrice, Religion as a Conversation Starter’, ‘Interreligious Dialogue for Peacebuilding in the Balkans, London: Continuum 2009
67 Perica, Vjekoslav, Balkan Idols: Religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states, Oxford 2002 Sarač Rujanac, Đenita, Odnos Vjerskog i Nacionalnog u Identitetu Bošnjaka od 1980. do 1990, Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju 2012 Ȍktem, Kerem, New Islamic Actors after the Wahabbi intermezzo: Turkey’s return to the Muslim Balkans, European Studies Centre University of Oxford December 2010 Somun, Hajrudin, ' Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans and “Neo-Ottomanism”: A Personal Account' Insight Turkey No. 3 (2011), p. 33-41. Stojanović, Dubravka, ‘Konstrukcija Prošlosti Slučaj srpskih udžbenika istorije’, Genero No. 10 (2007), pp. 51-61. - (Constructing the past: the case of Serbian history school books) Stojanović, Dubravka, Ulje na Vodi: Ogledi Iz istorije sadašnjosti Srbije, Beograd: Čigoja Štampa 2010 Stojanović, Dubravka, ‘U Ogledalu Drugih’, in: Vojin Dimitrijević ed. Novosti iz Prošlosti, Belgrade: 2010, pp. 13-31. Tanasković, Darko, Belezi Vremena, Novi Sad: Pravoslavna Reč 2014 Tanaskovic, Darko, Neoosmanizam: Povratak Turske na Balkan, Beograd: Službeni Glasnik: 2010 Turković, Emil, ‘Istorijsko-pravna analiza dinamike pravne regulative Islamske zajednice u Srbiji’, in: Novopazarski Zbornik 2013, Dragica Premović Aleksić ed., Novi Pazar: Muzej Ras 2013, pp. 209-224. Vukomanović, Milan, Sveto I Mnoštvo: Izazovi Religijskog Pluralizma, Beograd: Čigoja Štampa 2001 Vukomanović, Milan, Images of Ottomans and Islam in Serbian History school books, in: Christian Moe ed. , 'Images of the Religious Other', Novi Sad: 2008, pp. 17-38. Vukomanović, Milan, 'What the Church can(not) be asked about: The Serbian Orthodox Church, state and society in Serbia', Belgrade: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights 2005 Zdravkovski, Aleksander, ‘Islam and Politics in the Serbian Sandžak’, in: Sabrina P. Ramet ed., Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe: Challenges since 1989, Palgrave Macmillan 2014, pp. 212-239.
68 II. Legal and official documents
Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia 2011 Constitution of the the Islamic Community of Serbia Consitution of the Islamic community in Serbia Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia-Herzegovina Law on Churches and Religious Communities (2006) Law on the Restitution of Confiscated Property and Indemnification (2011) U.S. State deparment, 'Serbia 2013 International Religious Freedom Report’' (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222477.pdf), Accessed on 25 October 2014.
III. Internet
Bakračević, S., ‘Muftija Zukorlic gradi bez Dozvola’, Politika, 8 November 2013, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Srbija/Muftija-Zukorlic-gradi-bez- dozvola.lt.html, Accessed on 6 October Bougarel, Xavier, 'Islam and politics in the Post-Communist Balkans', http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTGLDEVLEARN/Resources/Islam_and _Politics.pdf Consulted on 27 October 2014. Čalija J. & Bakračević S., ‘Dupli spiskovi islamskih veroučitelja’, Politika, 4 September 2010, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Dupli-spiskovi- islamskih-veroucitelja.lt.html, Accessed on 10 October 2014. Čalija, J. & Bakračević S., 'Zilkić predstavlja Muslimane u komisiji za veronauku', Politika, 20 August 2010, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Drustvo/Zilkic-predstavlja-Muslimane-u- komisiji-za-veronauku.lt.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014. Cerić, Mustafa, “Fetva reisu-l-uleme o Ademu Zilkiću”, 13. 11. 2012, http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1532 0:fetva-reisu-l-uleme-o-ademu-zilkicu&catid=40, Accessed on 20 October 2014.
69 Đenović, Draško, ‘Srbija: Restitucija – Dokle smo stigli?’, 6 June 2011, http://www.centar9.info/articles/pdf/RESTITUCIJA_-_Clanak_final.pdf, Accessed on 25 October 2014. Jusić, Muhamed, 'Fetva i rivalstva islamskih lidera', Al Jazeera, 14 November 2012, http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/fetva-i-rivalstva-islamskih-lidera, Accessed on 19 October 2014. 1 Interview with Safeta Biševac, 5 November 2013. Novaković, G. & Bakračević, S. , ‘Radikalizacija Sandžaka – pretnja ili blef’, Politika 26.05.2009, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/dogadjaji- dana/Radikalizacija-Sandžaka-pretnja-ili-blef.lt.html, Consulted on 24 September 2014. Slađana Novosel, ‘Finansiranje protivnika Muftije Zukorlića’, Danas, 29.08.2013, http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/finansiranje_protivnika_muftije_Zukorlić a.55.html?news_id=266826, Accessed on 27 October 2014. Novosel, Slađana, ‘I Samoposluga Vakuf’, Danas, 6 July 2014, http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/i_samoposluga_vakuf.55.html?news_id= 284932, Accessed on 4 October 2014. Novosel,Slađana, 'Konzultativni Centar za Studije na Daljinu', Danas, 21 March 2011, http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/konsultativni_centar_za_studije_na_dalji nu_.55.html?news_id=212057, Consulted on 27 October 2014. Novosel, Slađana, ‘Muftija Zukorlić uslovljava svog vrhovnog poglavara’, Danas, 20.09.2013, http://www.danas.rs/dodaci/Sandžak/muftija_Zukorlić_uslovljava_svog_vrhov nog_poglavara.42.html?news_id=267989 , Consulted on 20 September 2014. Raković, Aleksandar, ‘Turska Inicijative i Islamska Zajednica', Politika, 29 January 2013, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/ostali-komentari/Turska- inicijativa-i-Islamska-zajednica.lt.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014. Seferović, Svetlana, ‘Bosonogi na Betonu’, 4 December 2008, Vreme, ttp://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=764210, Accessed on 6 October 2014. Trivić, Branka, ‘Ko Štiti Vehabije u Sandžaku?', Radio Free Europe, 31 October 2011,
70 http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/ko_stiti_vehabije_u_Sandžaku/24377 308.html, Consulted on 28 September 2014. Author Unknown, ‘Crkvama Vraćena Polovina Imovine', RTS, 4 January 2014, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ sr/story/125/Dru%C5%A1tvo/1487150/Crkvama+vra%C4%87ena+polovina+ oduzete+imovine.html, Accessed on 6 October 2014. Author Unknown, ‘Erdogan ‘Misunderstood’ Over ‘Turkey is Kosovo’ Claim’, 28.10.2013, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/davutoglu-erdogan-s- kosovo-statement-misinterpreted, Consulted on 25 September 2014. Author Unknown, ‘Inter-religious Relations in Serbia Harmonious – Patriarch Irinej’, InSerbia, 28 October 2013, http://inserbia.info/today/2013/10/inter- religious-relations-in-serbia-harmonious-patriarch-irinej/, Accesed on 7 October. Author Unknown, ‘Inicijativa za pomirenje IZ: Odlaze Zilkić i Zukorlić?’, TRT, 14 February 2013, http://www.trt.net.tr/bosanski/news/detail/region/2/inicijativa-za-pomirenje-iz- odlaze-zilkic-i-Zukorlić/16009, Accessed on 27 October 2014. Author unknown, 'Izabrani reis Kavazović miljenik Mustafe Cerića', Kurir, 23 September 2012, http://www.kurir-info.rs/izabrani-reis-kavazovic-miljenik- mustafe-cerica-clanak-424884, Accessed on 20 October 2014. Author unknown, ‘Ko su vehabije?’, RTS, 29 October 2011, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/11/Region/981266/Ko+su+vehabije%3F +.html, Consulted on 29 September 2014. Unknown author, ‘Muftija Zukorlić: Ako čujete da nam je neko oteo vakuf, znajte da smo pomrli i da nas nema!’, SandžakPress, 27 July 2014, http://Sandžakpress.net/muftija-zukorlic-ako-cujete-da-nam-je-neko-oteo- vakuf-znajte-da-smo-pomrli-i-da-nas-nema, Accessed on 7 October 2014. Author Unknown, ‘Novi Pazar – Temelji za 41. džamiju; Muftija: ‘Nećemo stati dok ne napravimo preko 100 džamija’, SandžakPress, 19 July 2013, ’ http://Sandžakpress.net/novi-pazar-temelji-za-41-dzamiju-muftija-necemo- stati-dok-ne-napravimo-preko-100-dzamija, Accessed on 5 October 2014. Author unknown, 'Novopazarska banja: Od romantike do propadanja', B92, 15 April 2014,
71 http://www.b92.net/putovanja/zanimljivosti.php?yyyy=2014&mm=04&dd=15 &nav_id=837070 Accessed on 25 October 2014. Author Unknown, ‘Patrijarh Irinej uvredio islam’, B92, 28 January 2010, http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?nav_id=407291&dd=28&mm=01&y yyy=2010 , Consulted on 25 October 2014. Author unknown, ‘Podgrejavanje Antiislamizma u Srbiji’, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Belgrade Report (May 2007), Author Unknown, ‘Radikalne grupe na Balkanu: Slučaj Vehabije Jašarevića’, Helsinki Comitee for Human Rights in Belgrade, Bulletin No. 84 (2011) Author unknown, 'Ratni zločinac Draža Mihajlović', Peščanik, 21 March 2012, http://pescanik.net/ratni-zlocinac-draza-mihajlovic, Accessed 25 October 2014. Author Unknown, ‘Šijaković: Cerić pretio Srbiji!’, Večernje Novosti, 22 May 2009, http://ww.novosti.co.rs/vesti/naslovna/drustvo/aktuelno.290.html:240660- Sijakovic-Ceric-pretio-Srbiji, Consulted on 24 May 2014. Author unknown, 'Zukorlić optužio SPC da želi slabu islamsku zajednicu', Kurir, 2 September 2010, http://www.kurir-info.rs/zukorlic-optuzio-spc-da- zeli-slabu-islamsku-zajednicu-clanak-47236, Accessed on 10 October 2014. Author unknown, 'Zukorlić i Zilkić spremni za pomerenje, sporran koncept’ , Blic, 19 June 2011, http://www.blic.rs/Vesti/Politika/260903/Zukorlić-i-Zilkic- spremni-na-pomirenje-sporan-koncept/komentari/3080488/komentar-odgovor, Accessed on 27 October 2014. Zejnelović, Dževad, ‘Gradićemo džamije u svim gradovima gdje postoje interesi Muslimana’, ICoS Official Website,10 September 2014, http://izs.rs/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=648:gradi%C4 %87emo-d%C5%BEamije-u-svim-gradovima-gdje-postoje-interesi- Muslimana&catid=133:intervjui&Itemid=588, Accessed on 6 October 2014. Zorić, T., ‘Intervju: Muftija mr. Muhamed ef. Jusufspahić’, ICoS Sandžak Muftiate Official Website, ’ http://www.mesihatSandžaka.rs/vijesti/495-intervju-muftija-mr-muhamed-ef- jusufspahic.html, Accessed on 10 October 2014.
72 IV. Other
Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. XI, Leiden 2010 U.S. Embassy Sarajevo diplomatic note, ‘Cerić calls for “national Bosniak state”’ , 21 April 2009, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SARAJEVO507_a.html, Accessed on 20 October 2014. U.S. Embassy in Belgrade diplomatic note, ‘Serbia/Turkey: Turkish FM’s Belgrade visit heralds new era in bilateral relations’, 15 September 2009, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BELGRADE845_a.html, Accessed on 27 October 2014.
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