NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD OFFICE NATIONAL DE L’ÉNERGIE
Hearing Order MH-1-2001 Ordonnance d'audience MH-1-2001
Westcoast Energy Inc. (Westcoast)
Pine River Gas Plant - Sulphur Pipeline/ Pipeline de soufre de l’usine à gaz de Pine River
Hearing held at Audience tenue à
Chetwynd, British Columbia
11 April 2001 11 avril 2001 Volume 3
StenoTran Services Inc. Les Services StenoTran Inc. Ottawa, Ontario © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada 2001 © Sa Majesté du Chef du Canada 2001 as represented by the National Energy Board représentée par l’Office national de l’énergie
This publication is the recorded verbatim transcript Cette publication est un compte rendu textuel des and, as such, is taped and transcribed in either of the délibérations et, en tant que tel, est enregistrée et official languages, depending on the languages transcrite dans l’une ou l’autre des deux langues spoken by the participant at the public hearing. officielles, compte tenu de la langue utilitisée par le participant à l’audience publique.
Printed in Canada Imprimé au Canada 1 ORDER NUMBER/ORDONNANCE No. MH-1-2001
2 Westcoast Energy Inc. (Westcoast) Pine River Gas Plant - Sulphur Pipeline
3 HEARING LOCATION/LIEU DE L'AUDIENCE
Hearing held at Chetwynd, British Columbia on Wednesday 11 April 2001
Audience tenue à Chetwynd (Colombie-Britannique) le mercredi 11 avril 2001
4 BOARD PANEL/COMITÉ D'AUDIENCE DE L'OFFICE
R.J. Harrison Chairman/Président
D. Emes Member/Membre
C. Dybwad Member/Membre
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 5 APPEARANCES/COMPARUTIONS
G.K. Macintosh, Q.C. Westcoast Energy Inc. K. Wharton G. Delisle NEB, Operations Business Unit C. Wagner Province of British Columbia, Oil and Gas Commission D. Mersereau Burlington Resources Canada Energy Ltd. M. Iliffe Enersul Limited Partnership F.C. Basham Talisman Energy Inc. M. Bell D. Embree On his own behalf R. Embree On her own behalf A. Mackie On his own behalf K. Sheen On his behalf L. Spenst On her own behalf D. Winland On his own behalf W. Winland On his own behalf C. Lasser District of Chetwynd D. Gauthier On his own behalf S. Napoleon On his own behalf D. Reinheimer On his own behalf D. Porter On her own behalf C. McKinnon NEB
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 6 WITNESSES/TÉMOINS
JOHN SEHMER, Sworn [55] PETER REID, Sworn [55] MIRIAM HACKER, Sworn [55] AL RITCHIE: Resumed [55] AL RITCHIE: Resumed [943] STAN WATCHORN: Resumed [943] DON COCHRANE: Resumed [943] GREG COSMA: Resumed [943] TODD ANDERSON: Resumed [943] ROSALINDE EMBREE: Sworn [1092] DAVID EMBREE: Affirmed [1092] CHARLIE LASSER: Sworn [1502] JOHN SEHMER, Resumed [1570] PETER REID, Resumed [1570] MIRIAM HACKER, Resumed [1570] AL RITCHIE: Resumed [1570] STAN NAPOLEON: Sworn [1744]
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 7 TABLE OF CONTENTS/TABLES DES MATIÈRES
Ex. by Mr. Mactintosh [56] Ex. by Ms McKinnon [105] Ex. by Mr. Delisle [579] Ex. by Mr. Mackie [653] Ex. by Ms McKinnon [944] Ex. by Ms Spenst [1053] Ex. by Ms McKinnon [1094] Ex. by Mr. Macintosh [1299] Ex. by Ms McKinnon [1446] Ex. by Mr. Mackie [1479] Presentation by Mayor Lasser [1503] Ex. by Mr. D. Winland [1571] Ex. by Ms Spenst [1650] Presentation by Mr. W. Winland [1688] Presentation by Mr. Napoleon [1745]
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 8 EXHIBITS/PIÈCES JUSTIFICATIVES
B-20 WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1231 [634] B-21 WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1335 [636] B-22 WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1231 [638] B-23 WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1604: Emergency Response Plan [640] B-24 WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1725 [642]
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 9 UNDERTAKINGS/ENGAGEMENTS
To provide written site monitoring plan of the area affected by September 9th fire [128]
To advise what was in the chemical extinguishers at the site at the time of the September 9th fire and if there would be any reaction with the burning sulphur [206]
To advise whether or not sensitivity was an issue surveyed in the last review in the community [316]
To clarify under what operating conditions different levels of H2S appear in the pipeline [371]
To advise if there would be any change in the emergency response plan if the level of H2S within the pipeline changed [378]
To provide an indication of what the SLAB model took into account [465]
To advise what mandatory training requirements Westcoast requires for fire fighting, et cetera. [601]
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 10 ERRATA
Reference Point Action
1:16 "the Board convened a hearing" should read "the Board set down a hearing" 2:2693 "November 7th" should read "November 8th" 2:2708 "worn valve site" should read "horn valve site"
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 11 --- UPON COMMENCING hearing on Wednesday 11 April 2001 at Chetwynd, British Columbia, at 9:10 a.m./L'AUDIENCE DÉBUTE le mercredi 11 avril 2001 à Chetwynd (Colombie-Britannique) à 09 h 10.
12 THE CHAIRMAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Bonjour, mesdames et messieurs.
13 Mr. Delisle...?
14 MR. DELISLE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members. I have a preliminary matter. I would like to clarify one item that arose out of yesterday's cross-examination.
15 At paragraph 2873 of the transcript Mr. Jansen stated that the preliminary incident report goes automatically to the Board. That is not quite correct. The preliminary incident report is attached under tab C-1-2. That is one of the three documents that Mr. Storey testified to yesterday. That document goes to the Secretary of the Board and the list of persons indicated on the document. But it does not, as stated, automatically go to the Board Members.
16 If we could make that correction, I have advised my friend and Board counsel.
17 Thank you.
18 THE CHAIRMAN: It's a clarification rather than a correction.
19 MR. DELISLE: Clarification.
20 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
21 Mr. Macintosh...?
22 MR. MACINTOSH: Mr. Chair, the environmental panel has taken the witness table. If it is convenient for the Board, I would proceed with the evidence from that panel.
THE CHAIRMAN: Please go ahead, Mr. Macintosh.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 23 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you. You will see, Mr. Chair, that Mr. Ritchie has joined the panel in case policy issues arise.
24 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
25 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Macintosh.
26 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you.
27 As I was saying, Mr. Chair, Mr. Ritchie has joined the panel in case policy issues arise, where he may be of assistance.
28 Seated next to Mr. Ritchie, Mr. Chair, is Dr. John Sehmer.
29 Seated next to Dr. Sehmer is Mr. Peter Reid.
30 Next to Peter Reid is Ms Miriam Hacker.
31 I will introduce the panel now. I can say that the evidence of the panel will include reference to three environmental reports, which are found at Exhibit B-9.
32 They include a report by a company named SEACOR. Ms Hacker is an employee of SEACOR and she will speak to that.
33 There is a report of Biosphere Solutions and a hazard assessment report by a company named RWDI. Mr. Reid can speak primarily with respect to both of those reports.
34 There is also evidence related to this panel in the responses to IR No. 2 and IR No. 4. The CVs and the resumes of Mr. Reid and Dr. Sehmer and Ms Hacker are found, as filed, in Exhibit B-17. The panel's filed evidence is part, I believe, of Exhibit B-12.
35 I would reference that filed evidence for the moment. I want to make one correction in it, Mr. Chair, if I may.
36 Dr. Sehmer, sir, I will reference your filed testimony. I am referencing page 3. At page 3 at question line 3 --
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 37 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry, Mr. Macintosh, can I just have the exhibit number again?
38 MR. MACINTOSH: Yes. I believe it is part of B-12, Mr. Chair.
39 In Panel 2's evidence, named as Panel 2, at page 3 is testimony regarding Dr. Sehmer.
40 THE CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry, Mr. Macintosh, I do not have it.
41 MR. MACINTOSH: I knew I was on too much of an evidentiary roll there, Mr. Chair. I will try and track that down. I think it is B-12, but just let me verify.
42 MS McKINNON: It is actually B-12, and there are two direct evidence panels. Panel 2 is at the back.
43 THE CHAIRMAN: We have it now. It is right after the map that we were looking at yesterday afternoon.
44 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you. I thank my friend.
45 Dr. Sehmer, I am referencing there page 3 of that evidence and the question was:
46 "Could you please state briefly the effects on people which can result from acute (as opposed to chronic) exposure to sulphur dioxide."
47 In your answer, beginning at line 5, you point out that the results of acute exposure are well recognized, that the adverse health effects reveal themselves forthwith.
48 I want to focus on the next sentence. It reads in part,
49 "Acute exposure does not lead to long term disease and does not result in bio accumulations..."
50 You would qualify that first phrase, as I understand, the phrase which says "acute exposure does not lead to long term disease," and the insert that I am putting there -- and
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 suggesting is the correct one, from your advice to me -- would be like this: Acute exposure does not lead to long term disease unless the exposure is at much higher levels than you understand were present on September 9th?
51 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
52 MR. MACINTOSH: With that qualification, the balance of that temperature would be correct.
53 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macintosh, we have not sworn the witnesses yet.
54 MR. MACINTOSH: Quite so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We can do that now.
55 MIRIAM HACKER: Sworn PETER REID: Sworn JOHN SEHMER: Sworn AL RITCHIE: Resumed
56 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. MACINTOSH:
57 MR. MACINTOSH: Mr. Reid, you are employed by Westcoast Energy?
58 MR. REID: Yes, I am.
59 MR. MACINTOSH: You have the job title of Environmental Specialist?
60 MR. REID: That is correct.
61 MR. MACINTOSH: Dr. Sehmer, you are a medical doctor, and you advise Westcoast Energy on various medical matters, among numerous other responsibilities.
62 DR. SEHMER: Yes, I am.
63 MR. MACINTOSH: Your expertise includes knowledge with respect to the impact of SO2, sulphur dioxide, on people?
64
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (Macintosh)
DR. SEHMER: Yes.
65 MR. MACINTOSH: Ms Hacker, your work is in the field of environmental engineering?
66 MS HACKER: That is correct.
67 MR. MACINTOSH: In this case, you have estimated the concentrations of sulphur dioxide as a result of the September 9, 2000 fire?
68 MS HACKER: That is correct.
69 MR. MACINTOSH: Mr. Ritchie, we know you. You may or may not be participating in this panel's evidence; we shall see.
70 Ms Hacker, as an introductory point, you used model programming to determine the concentration, in parts per million, of sulphur dioxide in the vicinity of the September 9th fire?
71 MS HACKER: That is correct.
72 MR. MACINTOSH: You are aware of the area where the buffalo were which the Embrees own in the vicinity of the fire?
73 MS HACKER: The approximate location, yes.
74 MR. MACINTOSH: At the boundary of that area where the buffalo were at that time, the boundary nearest the fire, what is your estimate of the parts per million of sulphur dioxide as a result of the September 9 fire?
75 MS HACKER: In the model we used to estimate, the concentrations at that point indicated that the concentrations would be no more than 1 to 2 ppm.
76 MR. MACINTOSH: Is it correct to say that the modelling that you used placed the plume from the fire in the direction where the buffalo would be?
77 MS HACKER: That is correct.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (Macintosh)
78 MR. MACINTOSH: Is it also correct to say that the model is designed to, if anything, overestimate rather than underestimate the ppm?
79 MS HACKER: Yes, it is considered to be a conservative model.
80 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you.
81 Dr. Sehmer, can you speak briefly, please, to the impact expected on people. Your expertise does not include veterinary work, I take it?
82 DR. SEHMER: That is correct.
83 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. So I will confine my questions with respect to people.
84 Can you speak to the impact of 2 ppm sulphur dioxide on people.
85 DR. SEHMER: Two parts per million is what is considered to be the safe level in industrial settings. In other words, this would be the threshold limit value which is standard and set in industries to specify what is safe in terms of occupational exposure for an occupational lifetime, say, working a 40-hour week for 40 years.
86 Two parts per million is the standard of what is called the threshold limit value, the level that is thought to be safe to work at without adverse health effects.
87 There are some asthmatics who might be sensitive to levels below that, but they might find they have a little bit more irritation than somebody else might.
88 But generally, two parts per million is thought to be the safe level on a chronic basis.
89 MR. MACINTOSH: As you have emphasized, that is a chronic assessment as opposed to an acute assessment?
90 DR. SEHMER: An occupation lifetime.
91 MR. MACINTOSH: Mr. Reid, you are aware of the location of the Mackie
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (Macintosh)
house?
92 MR. REID: I am.
93 MR. MACINTOSH: At that location, on the data which Ms Hacker's work produced, what is the SO2 level that resulted from the fire by your evidence?
94 MR. REID: The estimate, based on the SEACOR work, shows that that residence was below the Ministry's Level A objective, which is 450 micrograms per cubic metre, or 170 parts per billion. That would be .17 parts per million.
95 So that is the most stringent objective the government has, and that residence falls outside of that isopleth so it would be below that level.
96 MR. MACINTOSH: That level that the provincial government employs that you have described is sometimes referenced as the maximum desirable level?
97 MR. REID: The maximum desirable, that is the federal wording.
98 MR. MACINTOSH: It is below that, by your assessment?
99 MR. REID: That is correct.
100 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. Thank you.
101 Mr. Chair, those are my introductory questions.
102 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Macintosh.
103 Ms McKinnon...?
104 MS McKINNON: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Good morning, panel.
105 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS McKINNON:
106 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, Dr. Allan Legge's conclusion was that there
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
was acute, severe injury to some of the vegetation in the area of the September 9th fire.
107 However, because the fire occurred late in the growing season, there was not a significant adverse effect on plant species and that the effects were short term and plant communities will recover quickly.
108 Does Westcoast have any current plans to monitor the affected plant communities to support this conclusion?
109 MR. REID: Yes. I have been going out on a regular basis over the fall, winter and earlier, like two weeks ago, I went out. So we are keeping an eye on the condition of the vegetation. We have made some notes as to how the recovery is going.
110 MS McKINNON: Is it correct that you would have to wait for a whole season in the summer to really assess the effects?
111 MR. REID: The deciduous, the broad-leaf vegetation, it is showing signs now that it is going to be in leaf this year. The buds are there and they are starting to swell. So we should see full recovery on those plants.
112 The coniferous species, they are showing a bit of needle drop, but not all that significant. So it wouldn't be a biologically significant drop.
113 In talking to Dr. Legge, in about June or July we should see full recovery in those as well. So I am going to be keeping track of that.
114 MS McKINNON: For how long are you planning on keeping track of that?
115 MR. REID: We will keep track of that on an annual basis.
116 MS McKINNON: Every year for the life of the pipeline or going forward how many years? I am just wondering how long your monitoring program might carry on.
117 MR. REID: As long as it is necessary, really. Once we have seen a few years of growth in the deciduous trees, we can conclude that they were not affected.
118 The conifers replace their needles on about a seven-year cycle, so if after seven years we see no change, then there is really no need to go back.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
119 MS McKINNON: You are planning on monitoring the a conifers for seven years?
120 MR. REID: As a matter of course, I will continue visiting the site and assess it.
121 MS McKINNON: What activities will you be doing, just having a look at the area, taking samples? Can you explain what the monitoring program involves?
122 MR. REID: It will be mostly visual because the exposure was an acute exposure, a one-hour exposure, and there are no continued exposures at that site. It really wouldn't be necessary to go and resample the vegetation.
123 MS McKINNON: Do you have a written monitoring plan or is there anything that you could file with the Board?
124 MR. REID: No, I do not, but I could formulate a plan and file that.
125 MS McKINNON: Could you undertake to do that?
126 MR. REID: I sure could.
127 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
128 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To provide written site monitoring plan of the area affected by September 9th fire
129 MS McKINNON: If you did find that contrary to what you are predicting, if the vegetation communities don't fully recover, what mitigation measures might Westcoast be prepared to take?
130 In other words, what can you do if they don't come back as you are predicting they will?
131 MR. REID: Well, there are very few trees in that area so I expect we wouldn't do anything to mitigate that. We would simply observe.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
132 I don't expect that we are going to see any trees dying. It is a very small area that was affected by the higher concentrations. I don't contemplate that we are going to have to do any mitigation.
133 MS McKINNON: Dr. Sehmer, you provided a description of the adverse health effects on people which can result from acute exposure to sulphur dioxide; correct?
134 DR. SEHMER: Correct.
135 MS McKINNON: How does sulphur dioxide and the related substances travel to affect people? How does it get into the body?
136 DR. SEHMER: The principal route, by far, is through the respiratory tract. That includes the nose, the mouth, the mucous membranes; basically anything that is wet that is exposed to sulphur dioxide.
137 Sulphur dioxide is highly soluble in water. The parts of the eye would get irritated just from the moistness in the eye, the nose, the mouth, the respiratory tract, and the lungs themselves.
138 Most of the sulphur dioxide reacts in the upper airways, in the upper respiratory track before it even gets to the lungs.
139 MS McKINNON: Can it been ingested?
140 DR. SEHMER: Can it be ingested? It would be pretty difficult. Because it is a gas, it can be ingested as any gas can be ingested, not very well.
141 MS McKINNON: Can it be absorbed through the skin?
142 DR. SEHMER: It can be -- not the gas, but the frozen liquid sulphur dioxide, which evaporates at minus 10 degrees. If you were exposed to cold frozen liquid sulphur dioxide, it wouldn't be absorbed but you would get burns to the skin.
143 It would be a very highly unusual circumstance.
144 MS McKINNON: If you inhale sulphur dioxide, can you describe what happens to your body?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
145 DR. SEHMER: If you inhale sulphur dioxide, it is highly soluble with the mucous membranes and it reacts with water to form a sulphuric acid.
146 So it causes an acute burn to the lungs, insignificant concentrations, which would be -- certainly at 20 parts per million you can feel a little bit of irritation from that.
147 It is a material that if you are exposed to, and you are exposed to high levels of it, you want to get away from it because it burns the eyes; it burns the nose. You will know if you are being exposed to high concentrations.
148 MS McKINNON: How does the body expel the sulphur dioxide?
149 DR. SEHMER: It reacts to form sulfate, for the most part.
150 We have sulfate in our bodies anyway. It is used as a preservative. It is used in medications.
151 Sulphur is an essential element in the formation of a couple of amino acids and protein synthesis. So we have ways to break down the sulfate as we break down other sulphur materials in our diet, and it gets excreted through the kidneys.
152 MS McKINNON: So the main effect, then, is the respiratory effect?
153 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
154 MS McKINNON: Are the effects on the respiratory system aggravated by physical exertion?
155 DR. SEHMER: The whole thing with the effects of sulphur on the body is the dose. So if you get exposed to sufficient quantities of the material, say 20 to 30 parts per million and above, you are going to get irritation.
156 If you are exercising more, you are going to get a higher dose because your respiratory rate is higher. So you will get more effect.
157 MS McKINNON: The reaction to the effects, can that be a delayed reaction?
158
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
DR. SEHMER: No. You would know that you are being exposed to some pretty noxious material right then and there.
159 MS McKINNON: But if you were exposed, can the effects get worse over time?
160 DR. SEHMER: I have a patient who was involved in an industrial accident and was exposed to very high levels of sulphur dioxide, where he was left with emphysema, but he was in hospital immediately for two or three weeks. It was known right then and there he had sustained a severe injury. He has residual ongoing lung damage that has stayed there had for the last 20 years.
161 So there are long-term effects, but the worst effect is right at the time of exposure. There is nothing that is going to sneak up on you several years after exposure.
162 MS McKINNON: Are there any other substances that may have been created when the sulphur burned during the September 9th fire?
163 I would include in that question when the fire was extinguished, whether substances were created.
164 DR. SEHMER: I think Peter, in his testimony, mentioned that there was about 21 litres of fluid.
165 MR. REID: I think we are talking about other products of combustion of sulphur.
166 MS McKINNON: I think I am talking about that. I think I am talking about anything that might have burned in that fire and what kind of fumes or toxins may have been given off.
167 MR. REID: The guidance that I got from several people was that when sulphur burns, by and large you are producing sulphur dioxide. There may be traces of other sulphur compounds, so there may be sulphur trioxide, SO3.
168
Then you may have some reduced forms of sulphur. You may have H2S, carbonyl sulphide, carbon disulfide, things like that. But they are in very minute quantities, so we weren't concerned about those substances.
169
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
I have listed in the five-page summary that I wrote a number of products of incomplete combustion that we might expect. We know, for example, there was 20 litres of a mineral-based hydraulic fluid in the shack that may or may not have burned. I could not ascertain whether that was consumed in the fire.
170 MS McKINNON: That was referred to as the transmission fluid, I think, in some --
171 MR. REID: ATFI think it is called.
172 Some wiring. Yesterday I think we heard that there was a battery of some kind in there. But generally the insides of those shacks are fairly spartan, so there are not a lot of combustibles inside. So we were mainly concerned with the SO2.
173 I looked at some of the other products of incomplete combustion, and I determined that they weren't significant from an environmental perspective.
174 MS McKINNON: When the sulphur and the water combined, that is what made the SO2; correct?
175
The burning sulphur hit by water and is that what created the SO2? No?
176 MR. REID: No. It is straight combustion. So sulphur combining with oxygen in the atmosphere would give you SO2. It is fairly complete.
177
MS McKINNON: What would happen when the sulphur and the SO2 and the water mixed?
178 MR. REID: Towards the end of the fire, when they were extinguishing it?
179 MS McKINNON: Right. What happens when you take a bucket of water and throw it on burning sulphur? What is created?
180 MR. REID: No. You would extinguish the fire, so you would stop the creation of sulphur dioxide.
181 MS McKINNON: Would there be sulfuric acid created?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
182 MR. REID: Yes. It is possible that you could generate an acid. That water may be slightly acidic; that's correct.
183 MS McKINNON: Are there any health effects associated with that?
184 MR. REID: There was a very small amount of water used, as I understand.
185 MS McKINNON: There has been some debate about how much water was used. I have heard around ten gallons, or something in that order.
186 MR. REID: That is correct. That was thrown in the shack, onto the pipes and such, to solidify the sulphur at the end of the fire.
187 I was thinking some of that would probably be absorbed into the sulphur that was on the floor. Some may have run off, a very small amount.
188 But that site isn't near any watercourse. The area was cleaned afterwards, the gravel picked up.
189 So no, I do not think that runoff had any significant effect.
190 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, I don't think there was a chemical extinguisher used on that fire, but could you verify that for me?
191 MR. REID: I believe they used a number of dry chemical fire extinguishers, and that would be like a bicarbonate of soda, I believe. I am not 100 per cent sure on the formulation.
192 But I saw on the pictures they had some dry chemical fire extinguishers there.
193 MS McKINNON: There was one holding the door open. I don't know if they used it or not.
194 MR. REID: Some of the pictures I have seen show about three or four sitting outside the shack. I believe they used those to put out the majority of the fire.
195 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie, do you recall?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
196 MR. RITCHIE: Yes. I believe that the statements we had from Mr. Anderson indicated that the primary response to the fire was the use of the dry Ansul extinguishers that were brought to the site primarily by Enersul, and that there was some follow-up with water after that for cooling.
197 Also, they indicated that there were some initial attempts to maybe fight the fire with the small cans of water that were not successful.
198 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, the chemicals that are in the fire extinguishers, would there be any reaction between the burning sulphur and those chemicals?
199 MR. REID: It is quite possible there is, but I wouldn't believe those would be significant. There is a bicarbonate of soda, and those are used quite commonly to fight fires. I think that if they presented a significant harm, they wouldn't be used to fight fires, because if you are using one you can reasonably expect to be exposed to it.
200 I believe those are relatively benign, and there would be no harmful by-products.
201 MS McKINNON: Can I ask you to undertake to confirm what was in the chemical extinguishers?
202 MR. REID: Certainly.
203 MS McKINNON: And if there would be any reaction with the burning sulphur?
204 MR. REID: Sure.
205 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
206 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To advise what was in the chemical extinguishers at the site at the time of the September 9th fire and if there would be any reaction with the burning sulphur
207
MS McKINNON: Dr. Sehmer, I think you referred to the SO2 exposure
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (McKinnon)
guidelines in British Columbia. Could you just go over that again for me?
208 DR. SEHMER: Yes. There are various standards in industry that are used to decide what is a safe level of exposure and what is a level that you want to aim to as far as industrial exposures which are often different, for example, than environmental exposures.
209 There may be a standard for the environment, but there is also a standard for people who are occupationally exposed on a regular basis. It is often called a threshold limit value, often established in the States first, and we often adapt it.
210 So we talk about the American College of Government Industrial Hygienists, otherwise known as ACGIH, who establish TLVs. Their level is based on daily exposure, 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week for a 40-year occupational history.
211 What they have come up with is that two parts per million, which is the same as five milligrams per metre cubed, is a safe level to have this kind of exposure for an occupational lifetime.
212 MS McKINNON: What about higher concentrations for shorter terms as opposed to the ongoing occupational exposure?
213 DR. SEHMER: The two parts per million is the level that is thought to give no health effects.
214 There are higher levels one can be exposed to, but they are going to give health effects. They are going to give irritation of the respiratory tract, perhaps of the eyes. That is a level that you do not want your workers exposed to on a regular basis.
215 MS McKINNON: What is a high level of exposure?
216 DR. SEHMER: A high level would be certainly 20 to 30 parts per million. You are going to be pretty uncomfortable.
217 MS McKINNON: What about the 100 parts per million.
218 DR. SEHMER: You are going to want to get out of there.
219 MS McKINNON: Is that dangerous to your life?
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220 DR. SEHMER: An analogous situation would be standing in the smoke of a camp fire, directly in the line of the smoke; you do not want to be there. It burns your eyes. It is going to burn your throat. You are going to feel uncomfortable.
221 MS McKINNON: Would it not be more dangerous to breathe in sulphur dioxide than the camp fire.
222 DR. SEHMER: I really couldn't answer that with authority. It depends on what you are burning in you camp fire.
223 MS McKINNON: That could be.
224
Do all individuals react the same when exposed to SO2?
225 DR. SEHMER: Some people are more sensitive. For example, they have found that people who -- if you are not exposed sulphur dioxide on a regular basis, the odor threshold might be 0.5 parts per million; whereas, somebody who has worked around it for a long time, they have found they may not even smell it to 2 to 3 parts per million.
226 So there is a bit of tolerance that builds up to the odour with exposure.
227 MS McKINNON: You are referring to the odour, but what about the health effects? If I had asthma or some other respiratory condition, would that affect me more acutely?
228 DR. SEHMER: You might be more sensitive to it in the same way that some of us are more sensitive to cigarette smoke than other people are, in the same fashion.
229 MS McKINNON: The SEACOR report predicted maximum concentrations within 100 metres within the site of the fire to be 81.75 parts per million. Are you familiar with that?
230 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
231 MS McKINNON: Do you consider this to be to a high level of exposure?
232 DR. SEHMER: Oh, yes. I am not sure if people were exposed to that level. I think that was in the plume. I would have thought the workers would have stayed clear of being in line of the plume.
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233 MS McKINNON: Do you have any views on what the workers may have been exposed to?
234 DR. SEHMER: From the transcripts I have read and my understanding, they did have flu-like symptoms after the fire. This would be consistent with exposure of somewhere between 20 and 30 parts per million.
235 MS McKINNON: 20 to 30 parts per million.
236 DR. SEHMER: Yes, but they may have had higher exposures for a short time, or they may have with chronic lower levels. But 20 to 30 parts per million would be a plausible level given the fact that their symptoms were --
237 I think one fellow was actually diagnosed with having the flu, as opposed to having the effects of acute exposure.
238 MS McKINNON: Are there long-term effects from that or is it just the flu-like symptoms which will, as with the flu, pass over time?
239 DR. SEHMER: As long as there is no actual scarring -- and there wouldn't be any scarring expected at that level. It wouldn't be severe enough to cause an irreversible burn. Then you would expect no long-term effects.
240 MS McKINNON: We have heard from Mr. Embree, a landowner in the area, that he was actually in the plume. Do you have any information about what he may have been exposed to?
241 DR. SEHMER: No, I don't.
242 MS McKINNON: Were any of the workers considered more sensitive than the average person in terms of their reaction to sulphur dioxide?
243 DR. SEHMER: No.
244 MS McKINNON: When we talk of sensitive, we spoke of asthma. Would young people and older people or somebody with other types of respiratory problems also be considered sensitive?
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245 DR. SEHMER: If the old person was a smoker or had been exposed to this material on a regular basis, they might not be more sensitive.
246 Children, also depending on their backgrounds -- if they lived in a house with smokers or other respiratory irritants, then they would probably be no more sensitive than the average person.
247 It is really a function of what is your normal background exposure level to respiratory irritants. If you live in an environment which is very odour free and very clean, you do not have any irritants in that environment, then you could be more sensitive to exposure to sulphur dioxide than somebody who is not being exposed to respiratory irritants on a regular basis.
248 MS McKINNON: The fact that you are more sensitive to it, the way you describe it as more irritating -- for example, I don't live in a smoking household, and I find cigarette smoke highly irritating. Are the effects on my health any different from the effects on somebody who is not sensitive to the smoke?
249 DR. SEHMER: Your airways are getting irritated by those fumes -- and likely, if it was looked at under a microscope, one would see that there is some inflammation in your airways -- whereas the person who is exposed on a regular basis is less likely to have inflammation. They are less likely to feel the irritant effect. They have built up a tolerance to the material.
250 MS McKINNON: And the long-term health effects would be what? Is there any difference between the two?
251 DR. SEHMER: If you have chronic irritation of your airway, if you had chronic exposure -- is that what you are suggesting: if you had chronic exposure for a long period?
252 MS McKINNON: No. What I am saying is -- you indicated that you did not think that there were any long-term effects from the SO2. So the fact that I may be more sensitive than somebody else, would I suffer any long-term health effects while the other person wouldn't? Would there be any difference in the long-term effects?
253 DR. SEHMER: Maybe I should clarify my answer.
254 I don't think there would be any long-term effects from an acute episode of exposure to sulphur dioxide, provided there were not health effects at the time.
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255 MS McKINNON: Provided that there were no health effects at the time. But if there were health effects at the time, did I hear you to say that there would still be would no long-term effect?
256 DR. SEHMER: It is all a matter of the dose, once again.
257 If the individual was exposed to something that gave them flu-like symptoms that they recovered from and felt well, no long-term effects would be expected; they would have recovered.
258 If the individual got exposures of 1500 parts per million, very high exposures, and got very severe scarring and damage to the lungs, then there would be long-term effects.
259 MS McKINNON: The workers who were involved in the fire -- Todd Anderson was one of the workers, and he was on the stand the other day and mentioned that he did have flu-like symptoms.
260 Would he be someone who would experience any long-term effects under that scenario?
261 DR. SEHMER: No, because he recovered from that.
262 MS McKINNON: Is sulphur dioxide a carcinogen? Is there any risk of cancer from exposure to it?
263 DR. SEHMER: There is no evidence that it is a carcinogen.
264 MS McKINNON: Have there been studies done?
265 DR. SEHMER: Yes, there have been studies done.
266 MS McKINNON: What sort of studies?
267 DR. SEHMER: There have been a lot of studies in terms of exposed groups, occupational groups, say people working in gas processing plants, in oil refineries, in pulp mills, looking at health effects and cancer risk.
268
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There have also been animal studies as well, and no evidence of carcinogenicity has been identified for sulphur dioxide.
269 MS McKINNON: Is it the case that those studies had trouble concluding whether or not there was a carcinogenic effect -- if that is a word -- because of exposure to other chemicals.
270 DR. SEHMER: Some of those studies had trouble with that. There have been animal studies as well where the exposures have just been sulphur dioxide.
271 Animal studies have flaws as well when you be apply them to humans, but what you do when you look for signs of carcinogenicity -- it is hard to design a perfect study and control for everything -- is you might do a variety of studies, say with animals, with different occupational groups. You pool all the evidence, and you try to make a best possible guess based on the evidence.
272 There actually is an organization called IARC, which is an international agency for cancer research, that does appraisals of the literature on a variety of chemicals.
273 If there is the slightest bit of a doubt they will often -- they are very conservative. For example, they have now identified silica as a carcinogen. Silica is in sand. It is quite a simple material.
274 They tend to be conservative in their estimates of what is carcinogenic and what is not carcinogenic. In other words, they think if there is any kind of risk, they tend to be in favour that it is carcinogenic. And to date IARC has said that they do not feel that SO2 is carcinogenic.
275 MS McKINNON: Going back to the health effects on the workers, were there follow-up medical exams done after a period for the workers who were exposed to the
SO2?
276 DR. SEHMER: There were not. At Westcoast, because we deal with workers who are regularly exposed to sulphur dioxide, we do have an annual lung function program. We have an occupational health nurse, and I am at Westcoast half a day at a week. People are encouraged to call us or notify us if they are having adverse health problems that they feel are associated to the work environment.
277 MS McKINNON: So the onus is on the worker to come forward?
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278 DR. SEHMER: Yes. In Prince George we have a sulphur dioxide-producing plant that makes huge quantities of sulphur dioxide. We feel quite -- I don't want to say -- well, I am going to say "comfortable". We do have experience dealing with sulphur dioxide.
279 This is not a new material for us. The sulphur products plant in Prince George, we have had that for 15 years. Prior to that, it was owned by a different company. They have been doing lung function testing for a good 20 years on these people who are working in a sulphur dioxide-producing plant.
280 We are looking for health effects. We have yet to find them, but we are monitoring our workers ongoing.
281 MS McKINNON: Those workers would be exposed to chronic low levels of sulphur dioxide?
282 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
283 MS McKINNON: Is there any combined effect of long-term low exposure to
H2S in sulphur dioxide?
284
DR. SEHMER: H2S also is a respiratory irritant. They both irritate the respiratory tract.
285 One would expect the effects could be additive with time.
286 Once again, this is why we do our lung function testing.
287
MS McKINNON: Is H2S carcinogenic?
288 DR. SEHMER: No, it is not carcinogenic.
289 MS McKINNON: But it can kill you; right?
290 DR. SEHMER: It definitely can kill you. It is a very, very toxic material.
291
As an aside, when we look at H2S versus SO2, people do not want to be in SO2 because it hurts; it burns your lungs. You do not want to be there; you want to get out of there
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quickly.
292
H2S scares us more because if you are exposed to levels of above 500 parts per million, you can actually get knocked down where you are unconscious before you even know you are exposed.
293
So we view SO2 as probably being the safer of the two.
294 MS McKINNON: I would think so.
295 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
296 MS McKINNON: Are you familiar, Dr. Sehmer, with the Field Emergency Response Plan for Westcoast?
297 DR. SEHMER: I have in the past reviewed it. I am not up to date on the Pine River Emergency Response Plan.
298 MS McKINNON: I believe there is a new one, Mr. Ritchie, for the sulphur pipeline?
299 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, there is. I think we indicated that it was in the mail, and we filed a scope yesterday, I believe.
300 MS McKINNON: Dr. Sehmer, is it safe for me to conclude that you were not involved in the emergency response planning for the sulphur pipeline?
301 DR. SEHMER: No, I was not.
302 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie did you receive any medical advice regarding the plant for the ERP?
303 MR. RITCHIE: I believe that the consulting services that we used included the guidelines for exposure to SO2, yes.
304 MS McKINNON: They included the guidelines, but there was no specific consultation with medical officials?
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305 MR. RITCHIE: Not to my knowledge.
306 MS McKINNON: Are you aware, Mr. Ritchie, whether there were any sensitive people -- sensitive being people with respiratory conditions, elderly or whatever -- residing within the emergency planning zone?
307 MR. RITCHIE: I am not personally aware, no.
308 MS McKINNON: Do you know if that would have been looked at in preparing the ERP?
309 MR. RITCHIE: I believe the policy is that when we are doing the door-to-door contact with the residents, we do ask for those types of indications to be told to us so that we are aware of that, yes.
310 MS McKINNON: The list was recently updated. Is that correct?
311 MR. RITCHIE: What I heard was that the list has been updated recently, yes.
312 The policy is to update the list on a three-year frequency.
313 MS McKINNON: Would you undertake to provide us with information as to whether this specific question of sensitivity was asked when the list was being updated.
314 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, I will.
315 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
316 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To advise whether or not sensitivity was an issue surveyed in the last review in the community
317 MS McKINNON: During the fire of September 9th and based on the dispersion modelling results provided by SEACOR, Dr. Sehmer, in your opinion would it have been appropriate for Westcoast who have secured an area and/or evacuated individuals for the fire?
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318 DR. SEHMER: You are asking me to comment on the emergency response plan based on the exposures in the SEACOR report?
319 MS McKINNON: Correct. Are you able to do that?
320 DR. SEHMER: From the exposures we talked about the maximum level was 80 parts per million, which is a high level.
321 Certainly if there was a danger of that affecting local residents, if actually those levels got down to the households of people or people were working in fields nearby where there was 80 parts per million, you would want to get them out.
322 But my understanding is that that was the maximum level just around the building which was an uninhabited area. It had been raining, so dispersion would be quite quick.
323 So I think if one could be sure that there was not going to be higher levels coming from that fire than there -- if there was a visible plume going down to inhabited areas then, yes, I would be concerned.
324 But if it is just as occurred, I don't think the area should have been evacuated. But of course, that is the retrospective scope.
325 MS McKINNON: What about blocking off the road so nobody could go along the road? The road, as I understand, does go close to where the fire was.
326 Would it have been a good idea to block off the road?
327 DR. SEHMER: I really cannot comment on that.
328 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie, would you care to comment on that?
329 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, I would like to comment on that. I think that it would have been prudent to have blocked the roads off, more from a community-relations perspective than from a real health perspective.
330 I think it has created a concern, maybe in the minds of the residents, that we would not be responding properly in the event of a more serious incident.
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331 So I don't think that we were imprudent in not blocking the roads from a safety perspective. Maybe if we had done that, it might have sent a better signal to the residents.
332
MS McKINNON: Dr. Sehmer, do you know if all SO2 plumes are visible?
333 DR. SEHMER: I don't think they are actually necessarily, no.
334 MS McKINNON: So how would you know when it was necessary to evacuate the area or stay out of the area if you can't see a plume?
335 DR. SEHMER: I saw the photograph of the actual fire that was taken. I think in that situation it was visible, but certainly if it occurred at night it wouldn't be visible.
336 I think one would have to look at wind speed and all other kinds of factors. As Mr. Ritchie says, if we want to be conservative, a sensible thing might have been to have blocked off the road.
337 MR. RITCHIE: Again, just to be clear, I think that the response of our personnel at the time was right. I think they took the right steps. I think they evaluated the level of the emergency correctly.
338 What I am saying is that we probably created some concerns in the minds of the folks who travelled through the area that we were not cognizant of their concerns about being exposed. I think the response was correct.
339 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie, how would the workers know what the correct response was in an emergency if it arose in the future?
340 MR. RITCHIE: There are two primary responders in this case. There is the incident commander and there is the onsite supervisor. Between the two of them they would make an immediate call on what the level of response should be.
341 Immediately after that, if the fire had not been extinguished, for example, the level of response would continue to escalate, and more and more senior people would get involved and the correct response, in my view, would certainly happen.
342 MS McKINNON: Have the employees received training in evaluating how
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serious the fire might be or how serious the consequences might be, whether the sulphur plume is visible, those sorts of things?
343 MR. RITCHIE: I think that through the normal course of their work they have a pretty good feel for the level of emergency. In this case, in this fire, they responded correctly. They had the fire out in a reasonably short period of time, 20 minutes, thereby extinguishing the fire and removing the possibility of the generation of more SO2. I think that was the right response.
344
If the fire continued to burn, more SO2 would have been released, and I think they would have responded appropriately.
345 It is speculative. I can say, though, from experience, that we have been involved in Westcoast in some fairly major emergency responses. Our emergency response plan and our employees have functioned very well in those instances.
346 I can give you an example, if you would like.
347 MS McKINNON: I had asked if they had received training. I am not sure I heard you say they did. I think what you said was they used their judgment, but I didn't hear you say that they had been trained in recognizing that sort of emergency.
348 MR. RITCHIE: I think that they would have responded correctly. They responded to the fire; they put the fire out.
349 If they had not been able to put the fire out, the level of response would certainly have gone up. In that case we would have brought more resources to bear, and I am very confident the right responses would have been made. Their response at the time, in my view, was correct.
350 MS McKINNON: I understand that, but what training did they get to make that call? How did they get such good judgment?
351 MR. RITCHIE: Let's talk specifically about this one.
352
The fire was burning; it is generating SO2. The first response is to look after themselves and the fire. They put the fire out; therefore, the hazard disappears.
353 If the fire had continued to burn, I would expect they would have said, "This
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fire is going to continue to burn; it is going to get worse. Therefore, we should probably up the ante on this and move the response level up."
354 MS McKINNON: What training do they get under emergency response to be able to know that? What sort of training does Westcoast give its workers on emergency response?
355 MR. RITCHIE: The incident command system is the fundamental training on emergency response. All of our plans are modelled on the incident command system.
356 People who are going to be in the incident command role receive higher levels of training. The incident command system is meant to be a conservative response in the sense that we don't ask people to take risks with anybody. We ask that the response be acknowledged, that this thing may be more challenging than it appears and respond according.
357 So we should be in most instances, I would expect, overresponding in dealing with these kinds of things.
358 Again going back to this one, I think they responded correctly. If the fire had continued to burn, you would have seen that the level of response would have gone up.
359 MS McKINNON: Is there any way for Westcoast to monitor the emission levels in an emergency situation to determine what level of emergency you are facing?
360 MR. RITCHIE: This is speculative. Let's say that this fire had continued to burn and more SO2 had been generated, we certainly have the equipment to monitor levels of SO2.
361
The other thing that we have heard, in particular about SO2 -- I can verify certainly what Dr. Sehmer is saying -- is that the SO2 is a very irritating substance. There is no doubt in people's minds that they are being exposed to this. That, again, would be a pretty good indicator to people that the level of response should go up.
362 MS McKINNON: So it is a smell test, essentially?
363
MR. RITCHIE: I think for the case of SO2 exposure, smell test or the impact on the respiratory tract, as Dr. Sehmer has said, yes.
364
MS McKINNON: Do you use the smell test for H2S as well?
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365
MR. RITCHIE: You can certainly smell H2S. But as I indicated, we have measuring equipment to determine the ppm level of H2S or SO2, and we certainly would bring that to bear if the conditions warranted it.
366
MS McKINNON: Do you know what the concentrations of H2S on September 9th were?
367 MR. RITCHIE: I think we have heard that if the degasing was functioning -- and I haven't heard anything to indicate that it wasn't -- the typical levels would have been in the range of 2 ppm.
368 MS McKINNON: To follow up on that for a moment, we have heard a lot of different things about how much H2S is in the pipeline. I wonder if you could undertake to clarify under what operating conditions different levels of H2S appear in the pipeline?
369 MR. RITCHIE: Certainly, I can do that.
370 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
371 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To clarify under what operating conditions different levels of H2S appear in the pipeline
372 MS. McKINNON: In that, could you indicate how frequently the various conditions occur and how the emergency response plan and personnel training address this. Is there any response plan that would change if there are high H2S levels?
373 Maybe you can answer that right now.
374
Is there any difference in the emergency response plan if there are higher H2S levels in the pipeline?
375 MR. RITCHIE: There would be a difference in the emergency response plan if the H2S levels were higher in the environment. I don't think there would be any change in the emergency response plan if the level of H2S within the pipeline changed.
376 MS McKINNON: Perhaps you could just verify that.
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377 MR. RITCHIE: Certainly, I will do that.
378 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To advise if there would be any change in the emergency response plan if the
level of H2S within the pipeline changed
379 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
380 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie, I have another question for you, if you are ready.
381 MR. RITCHIE: Oh, sorry.
382 MS McKINNON: The Westcoast policy recommends evacuation or sheltering of the public when there are different concentrations of SO2 in the air; for example, if it exceeds .3 parts per million for three hours or 1 part per million for 15 minutes.
383 I am wondering how you would monitor that to determine whether or not there should be an evacuation.
384 MR. RITCHIE: In the event that we had a large release, we would attempt to get people into the field immediately to do that kind of monitoring, to determine what the level is and what the right course of action is for the residents, whether sheltering is the best approach or whether they have easy egress without going through an area of high concentration.
385 MS McKINNON: What is that monitoring like? How is it done?
386 MR. RITCHIE: This is using portable gas detection equipment.
387 MS McKINNON: Dr. Sehmer, based on your knowledge of the potential effects of SO2, including its effects on sensitive individuals, and based on the current exposure guidelines, do you think a single zone for emergency response is appropriate or should several zones be identified using different SO2 concentrations?
388 DR. SEHMER: I don't quite understand the question. What do you mean by "several different zones"?
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389 MS McKINNON: For example, if a fire is burning in one place, around the fire there would be a higher concentration; and, as you move out, obviously it would be getting lower.
390 Do you think that it would be appropriate to identify different zones, or should they have a single zone for emergency response?
391 DR. SEHMER: I think a single zone would be best.
392 MS McKINNON: Why is that?
393 DR. SEHMER: There is going to be an area that is at risk. Say, for example, one used portable monitors and established the perimeter of an area at risk, you would want to evacuate that area at risk.
394 MS McKINNON: But as you moved away from the site of the accident or the spill, the risk would obviously be getting lower. But would you suggest that there be an evacuation plan for the outer limit of the emergency zone?
395 DR. SEHMER: Peter, you are better at responding to that.
396 MR. REID: If I might, the zones are established for planning purposes only. So I believe that within that zone you would be treating the people equally. You are setting up that zone more or less to take account of what is in that area, and then when the incident occurs you would respond, based on your knowledge of what residents live where and treat them all equally.
397 You are just trying to establish an outer bounds of where a high concentration could take place.
398 MS McKINNON: So based on that, the people at the outer edge of the zone would probably be at lower risk but would be treated the same as people on the inner edge of the zone?
399 MR. REID: You are just trying to capture what areas should be in and what are out. They are fairly conservative, and you would base your response on that.
400
I think developing several zones would be inconsistent with all of the H2S
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planning zones in existence. For example, they all tend to treat everybody the same.
401 You develop a zone around, say, a sour pipeline, and you inventory all of the cultural features in there, the houses, and you treat them the same.
402 MS McKINNON: That is a conservative approach to it, is it, to make sure that everybody is covered off?
403 MR. REID: That is right. You are just trying to determine how far out you should be considering that there might be effects.
404 MS McKINNON: Would there be a difference in the administration of that? In the event of an accident, how would Westcoast approach it?
405 I would presume they would go to the people in the area closest and then fan out. Is that correct?
406 MR. REID: Now we are getting into the area of a response, and that is really case-specific.
407 When an emergency is taking place, quite often you can intuitively see what has to occur. You can readily observe where the wind direction is. If you can see the fire, then you can see who is in peril and who is not. People often respond appropriately on their own without any direction whatsoever.
408 The case of the Solex incident a year and a half ago, the entire town was evacuated in something like 40 minutes and the horn wasn't sounded until the end of the evacuation.
409 So the response is more or less really a case-specific thing.
410 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, in Westcoast's response to our IR 4.8, they indicated that the modelling for the emergency planning zone was based on the assumption of the loss of 50 tonnes of sulphur between the two line break valves.
411 MR. REID: That is correct.
412 MS McKINNON: We heard earlier this week from Mr. Cochrane that he
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thought the valves should be removed for the better operation of the pipeline. How much sulphur would be spilled or potentially released if there was a line break without the valves in place?
413 MR. REID: I am not exactly sure, but there is substantially more sulphur that would be released if the line breaks were removed.
414 We can undertake to get the exact number. I think it might be somewhere around 100, 120, 170, somewhere around there.
415 MS McKINNON: Is the potential for the full amount of sulphur on the line to be released?
416 MR. REID: There is a low point in the line. Unless the break was right at the low point, you would have a hard time draining the entire line. If we were going to make application to remove the line break valves, we would redo that analysis and come up with a new EPZ based on the amount that can potentially be spilled.
417 MS McKINNON: Westcoast is proposing expansion of its Grizzly Valley system. Would this result in additional volumes being transported by the sulphur line, Mr. Ritchie?
418 MR. RITCHIE: No. The capacity of the sulphur recovery facilities will remain the same. The expansion will be reinjecting acid gas upstream of the plant. The total volumes will probably remain in the order of 2000 tonnes a day.
419 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, when you are calculating an emergency planning zone, could you just outline for us a few of the factors that are taken into account?
420 MR. REID: From my reading of the RWDI report, they take into account a number of factors about the characteristics of a large fire, a burning pool of sulphur. They looked at four potential spill scenarios, I believe: .1 tonnes, 1, I think it was 10, and 50 tonnes.
421 They considered how a fire would behave in all of those instances, how much air is entrained into the burning mass, and trying to calculate the molecular weight of the gas that is leaving and how it behaves.
422 They used a number of models then to predict the maximum distance away from the fire you would see that value of 15 parts per million, I believe they used. They used a number of models, and we chose the most conservative result, the one from the SLAB model.
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423 So it considers fire dynamics, the size of a burning pool, and the dispersion by the atmosphere.
424 MS McKINNON: Does it take into account other factors that could be present at the time of the fire? For example, if the surrounding brush caught fire or if there were certain weather conditions such as very high winds? Does it take into account those sorts of things?
425 MR. REID: It takes into account all meteorological possibilities, so all of the combinations of wind speed and stability. There is a matrix that they go through.
426 They consider all of the cases, and we base our EPZ distance on the worst case. So we assume that the worst thing is going to be happening during the incident, but it does not take into account things like the involvement of other substances like trees or the effect that those trees would have on downwash, and things like that.
427 The SLAB model doesn't take that into account, but it is again very conservative.
428 MS McKINNON: Would you agree that it might be a realistic scenario if there were a line break and a fire that there could be a grass fire surrounding that fire?
429 MR. REID: Certainly depending on the time of year; but that is a distinct possibility.
430 MS McKINNON: But that wasn't taken into account?
431 MR. REID: No. I think the reason for that being that the burning sulphur and the resultant sulphur dioxide are the most serious consequence of that type of fire. A forest fire would be a relatively small matter at that point.
432 MS McKINNON: Sorry, could you just expand on that. A forest fire would be a small issue?
433 MR. REID: Well, yes. There would be smoke from the forest fire, and that doesn't have as significant an effect on human health as would the sulphur dioxide.
434 You are more concerned about the most serious potential effect on human
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health, and that would be from the SO2.
435 MS McKINNON: It might have a big effect on lifestyle, however, for the people in the area. Would you agree?
436 MR. REID: A forest fire is a serious matter.
437 MS McKINNON: Could I have a moment, please.
438 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
439 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie, the sulphur pipeline has been in operation since 1994. I am wondering why Westcoast only contracted with RWDI in 2000 to assess whether or not an emergency planning zone was a good idea for the sulphur pipeline.
440 MR. RITCHIE: I am not sure early on in the development of the plan why that wasn't done. My involvement has been relatively recent in this plan.
441 MS McKINNON: Was it probably a result of the September 9th fire that you determined this would be a good idea?
442 MR. RITCHIE: I don't think there is any doubt that recent events have resulted in our taking a serious look at that possibility; that is correct.
443 MS McKINNON: So in hindsight, it would have been preferable to have done this earlier?
444 MR. RITCHIE: Probably if we were doing a new facility today, a new sulphur pipeline, we would do that as part of the original application.
445 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, I think this is for you: Can you describe, generally, RWDI's expertise and background in determining emergency planning zones?
446 MR. REID: Ian Dowsett, the fellow who is one of the principal authors of the report, he is very experienced in this type of evaluation.
447 I think he spent a number of years with the Alberta Energy and Utility Board, so he has seen a lot of this from the other side.
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448 There are a very reputable company in Canada with respect to modelling expertise. They have done a lot of work in that area. They are one of the more senior companies in Canada.
449 MS McKINNON: They have done work where there is a potential release of a H2S or SO2 in the past?
450
MR. REID: Yes, most of their work would concern H2S releases.
451
MS McKINNON: Have they done SO2 release modelling before this particular contract with Westcoast?
452 MR. REID: I am not certain, but I believe this may be one of the first where they have considered that this is kind of a new undertaking.
453 MS McKINNON: The model that they did, I think we discussed the things that they had taken into account in terms of parameters on the model.
454 Did they look at terrain as one of the matters they took into account?
455 MR. REID: I don't know if Miriam can speak to SLAB. I don't believe SLAB takes terrain into account.
456 MS HACKER: I don't have personal experience with that type of modelling, so I can't speak to that.
457 MR. REID: The ISC3 model does have the capability of taking terrain into account. I believe with the SLAB model, though, it is so conservative that the absence of terrain following considerations doesn't really impact its effectiveness.
458 MS McKINNON: What about issues such as the location of the accident and access to the area, that sort of thing?
459 We know part of this pipeline is on a very steep, relatively inaccessible site. Does it take that into account?
460 MR. REID: That is more or less part of the response, as opposed to the plan. In the modelling realm it is very difficult to consider what would happen if you had a fire, say,
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on the mid-slope. The models are more applicable to flat terrain. So in this case, I believe the flat terrain scenario is the worst scenario.
461
A fire and the production of SO2 and the dispersal of SO2 from a mid-slope fire would not be as significant as one right in the valley bottom closest to the residence. So it is applicable in that sense.
462 But it is very difficult for modelling in complex terrain. That is one of the big challenges that we face here: that the physics isn't really well handled by the models.
463 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid, I wonder if you could undertake to provide us with an indication of what the SLAB model particularly took into account.
464 MR. REID: Sure.
465 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To provide an indication of what the SLAB model took into account
466 MS McKINNON: In the model was there a discussion of where the fire would occur, or are you saying that it was in the flat terrain in the model assumptions?
467 MR. REID: I think we consider a fire at all points around the pipeline.
468 If you notice the way that the EPZ follows the pipeline, it is more or less 3 kilometres or 3.1 kilometres on either side of that whole pipeline. So it kind of follows it along and then curves around towards the end. They consider this happening at any point on the pipeline.
469 MS McKINNON: Did they take into account more than one point?
470 MR. REID: Pardon me?
471 MS McKINNON: Was it only a single point, or was there a consideration of more than one point for the fire?
472 MR. REID: I think they consider a break and then a pool in the vicinity of that break, so a single break.
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473 MS McKINNON: You mentioned that the model was conservative. Would you say that it represents a worst-case scenario?
474 MR. REID: I would. For example, if you look at the other modelling, they use the ISC3 model to come up with some predictions of SO2 from that identical scenario, and those numbers are a lot less. So the SLAB represents the highest number that they could come up with.
475 MS McKINNON: But that might change if there were a removal of the valves at two of the sites; correct?
476 MR. REID: That is right. We would expect that EPZ to grow a little bit if we had a doubling of the maximum size of the pool that we could have.
477 MS McKINNON: Mr. Ritchie, the ERP that you have mentioned is in the mail, is the zone the same? Is the emergency planning zone the same as it was in the Pine River ERP that had applied to the sulphur pipeline?
478 MR. RITCHIE: The new plan that we have just filed contains the ERP Zone for sulphur for an SO2 emission. It is think it is different than the zone for an H2S emission which was in the previous manual.
479 MS McKINNON: What is the difference?
480
MR. RITCHIE: The difference is the zone is broader for the H2S release than the SO2 release.
481 MS McKINNON: Can you speak to the risk factors that were used to determine the zones?
482 MR. RITCHIE: That's the modelling that was used.
483 MS McKINNON: The same modelling?
484 MR. RITCHIE: That's correct.
485 MS McKINNON: Westcoast has determined the hazard zones which you mentioned were specific to the sulphur pipeline because they were based on SO2 rather than H2S;
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is that correct?
486 MR. RITCHIE: That's correct. The modelling of the zone for the sulphur pipeline is based on SO2.
487 MS McKINNON: Does Westcoast have any kind of liaison or education program with response agencies, such as fire departments, medical facilities? Do they have something like that in place for both the Pine River plant and the sulphur pipeline?
488 MR. RITCHIE: The reason that we have built our plans on the incident command system is: that is in fact the typical command system that is used by responding agencies in British Columbia, so we are all working on a common platform.
489 MS McKINNON: What type of schedule for meetings or consultations or liaison does Westcoast have in place?
490 MR. RITCHIE: Typically what we do is conduct a series of exercises over the course of a year ranging from table top exercises to exercises where we would hold joint response with responding agencies.
491 MS McKINNON: Do you have one specific for the sulphur pipeline, or is it just a general response?
492 MR. RITCHIE: It would be the use of the emergency response manual, and we would select something to respond to. It could be something that happens on our system or it could be something that happens on someone else's system or in the community.
493 So you set up the exercise with some scenario in mind.
494 MS McKINNON: Is that outlined in your emergency response manual? Does an employee who picks that up in an emergency know who they should be contacting?
495 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, they do.
496 MS McKINNON: In a response to a question I posed the other day, Westcoast provided an explanation as to how it reached the figure of the estimated spill of sulphur at the September 9th fire. I don't recall who was, but they said it was 106.6 kilograms.
497
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Was it a Westcoast employee who came up with this figure?
498 MR. RITCHIE: I can't answer that. I would have to take that as an undertaking.
499 MR. REID: I can answer that.
500 That figure was prepared by Greg Cosma, and I believe that's outlined in one of the information requests, the methodology that he followed. I think it is I.R. 4.
501 But when I was undertaking to have the modelling done by SEACOR, we first had to establish how much sulphur burned because there was a flange breached, sulphur coming out of there. So there was sulphur entering; there was sulphur burning.
502 Greg undertook to give us an estimate of that, and he came up with 235 pounds or the 106 kilograms.
503 MS McKINNON: That sounds about right.
504 I probably should have asked Mr. Cosma this.
505 Mr. Reid, are you aware if Mr. Cosma visited the site to have a look when he arrived at that figure?
506 MR. REID: I am not positive. I believe he was taking witness statements on how much sulphur remained on the pad afterwards.
507 I am not sure if he actually visited that site to do that calculation.
508 But he made a number of assumptions about how much sulphur was there before the fire started, what the witnesses reported the accumulation was on the floor at the end of the fire and then the area of the floor and the burning process.
509 MS McKINNON: One part I was curious about: I think they estimate a flow rate or Mr. Cosma estimated a flow rate in the pipeline, but wasn't the pipeline frozen at the time? Was there actually flow?
510 MR. REID: I am not positive again, but I believe with the heat tracing there
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was molten sulphur that was available to come out of the flange.
511 MS McKINNON: May I just have a moment?
512 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
513 MS McKINNON: Mr. Reid or Mr. Ritchie, did Westcoast consult with the local public regarding inputs to the modelling exercise to establish the emergency planning zone?
514 MR. RITCHIE: Not that I am aware of.
515 MS McKINNON: Why not?
516 MR. RITCHIE: The modelling exercise is not subjective. The modelling exercise is based on stated parameters.
517 I am not sure what anyone else would bring to the table.
518 MS McKINNON: Did Westcoast discuss the appropriateness of the 3.1 emergency planning zone with individuals in the area before coming up with your ERP?
519 MR. RITCHIE: No, that hasn't taken place.
520 Certainly the next step will be to discuss that with the residents at the upcoming town hall meetings.
521 MS McKINNON: Is there a reason why you didn't do it before drafting the ERP?
522 MR. RITCHIE: I think we wanted to get the ERP in front of the board as quickly as possible.
523 MS McKINNON: Was that a timing consideration?
524 MR. RITCHIE: That's correct, yes.
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525 MS McKINNON: Ms Hacker, I have a clarification question.
526 The formula you gave for estimating the half hour objective in your document was: Y = B * MX.
527 I am just wondering if you could confirm what the asterisk is. Is it to the power of or a times?
528 MS HACKER: "M" to the "X" is the power of "X".
529 I'm sorry...?
530 MS McKINNON: You have "Y" equals "B" asterisk or a star.
531 MS HACKER: That's a times.
532 MS McKINNON: It is a times?
533 MS HACKER: Multiply "B" times "M" to the power of "X". That's an algorithmic curve equation.
534 MS McKINNON: It wasn't my question.
535 I want to talk about the effects of the fire on the bison herd for a moment.
536 Dr. Sehmer, are you able to speak to that?
537 DR. SEHMER: I did review the situation with a vet. I wouldn't call myself an authority on it, but I would have thought that the effect on the bison herd would be no different than the effect on humans.
538 It would cause an irritant kind of an effect to their mucous membranes. I would have thought that they would be --
539 There is no reason to expect more toxicity on the bison herd than in humans, in my opinion.
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540 MS McKINNON: They breathe in the same as people do?
541 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
542 MS McKINNON: Did Westcoast contact veterinarians and veterinary pathologists about the effects on bison?
543 I think it indicates so in one of your IR responses.
544 DR. SEHMER: Peter might be able to answer that.
545 MR. REID: To answer those questions I phoned a number of veterinarians and veterinary pathologists to try and see if anyone had expertise who could give us an opinion on this matter.
546 There have been a number of cattle studies done in Alberta, for example, on the effects of the oil and gas industry and emissions on cattle.
547 I tried to pursue that avenue to find an expert witness and could find no one who could give us any expertise specifically on bison, number one, and number two on the effects of acute one-time exposure.
548 All of the studies are directed towards long-term chronic exposures on cattle. We really could not find anyone who would be willing to lend an expert opinion.
549 One pathologist who we had asked if they could do tests could think of no test that he could devise that would actually indicate anything to us and suggested that a direct observation was the best, in that if the bison appeared healthy and normal, that they were healthy and normal.
550 The letter that has been put into evidence from the Embrees' lawyer indicates the exactly the same thing. He examined them; they appeared to be normal. So that's what he concluded.
551 MS McKINNON: Westcoast took some soil and leaf tissue samples; correct?
552 MR. REID: Yes, a number of them. I did those.
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553 MS McKINNON: You concluded that the forage species samples were not substantially different from the samples in the background. Is that correct?
554 MR. REID: That is right. They appeared to have about the approximate amount of sulfate sulphur and total sulphur, and they were not all that much different from the other plant species that we had, although we didn't have any forage species from a site upwind of the fire event.
555 When I did the sampling, I endeavoured to collect some samples upwind of the line break shack to get a point of reference, but there were not those plant species in that area.
556 MS McKINNON: How many days elapsed between the taking of the soil and leaf samples and the fire?
557 MR. REID: The fire occurred on the 9th, about midday.
558 I believe that I collected those samples on Friday the 15th, so that was six days.
559 MS McKINNON: So six days later you took it?
560 MR. REID: Six days later.
561 MS McKINNON: Would there have been any weather conditions that would have affected the samples? Did it rain? Could the rain have washed some of the SO2 away?
562 MR. REID: I think there was a rainy period, and I think there was a rain after the fire.
563 That would not affect the amount of sulphur dioxide absorbed into the plant tissue. Once that occurs, it stays there; it is fixed.
564 That might actually affect the soils, in that if there is any sulphur compounds on trees, leaves, needles, that may wash down into the soil.
565 MS McKINNON: So you would get a higher reading on the soil?
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566 MR. REID: Yes, you would.
567 MS McKINNON: Westcoast stated that it believes that if the bison herd's reproductive successes this spring are within normal or within expected rates, it would be adequate proof that there was no adverse effect on the bison.
568 Are you planning to take any steps to monitor the reproductive success of the bison?
569 MR. REID: I believe we are in a process right now with the Embrees' legal representatives, and we will be watching that quite closely. That will be one of the bases for any compensation in that case.
570 MS McKINNON: Are you aware of any other livestock or wildlife that were affected by any of the fires on the pipeline?
571 MR. REID: No, we aren't. A survey in the vicinity of the fire didn't reveal any impacts on wildlife, and there are no other animals in the region that were affected.
572 MS McKINNON: If I could just have a moment.
573 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
574 MS McKINNON: Thank you, gentlemen and Ms Hacker. I have no other questions.
575 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Delisle, do you have questions for this panel?
576 We will take our break now, but I wanted --
577 MR. DELISLE: I just have one or two, Mr. Chairman.
578 THE CHAIRMAN: If you just have one or two, why don't you go ahead.
579 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. DELISLE:
580
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MR. DELISLE: Mr. Ritchie, you mentioned several times in your evidence this morning that the Westcoast personnel responded correctly.
581 I would like to draw your attention to the Steve Potts tab and his notes. You don't have to turn it up.
582 He refers to Westcoast employees saying they used five-gallon pails to get water from the creek and a lunch bucket to collect water from potholes and that all three workers were exposed to smoke.
583 I am wondering how you reconcile that scenario with the correct response.
584 MR. RITCHIE: When the employees arrived on site, there was a fire. The correct response, as we have heard, was to put the fire out.
585
The burning of sulphur generates SO2, which creates the hazard. Getting the fire out should be the first priority and elimination of the hazard.
586 MR. DELISLE: Mr. Ritchie, that's exactly my point.
587 Shouldn't the first priority be for the employees to be careful to make sure that their own situation remains safe so they can effectively carry out their duties?
588 MR. RITCHIE: Absolutely. They should be taking those steps to protect themselves. I think they did in this case. They stayed out of harm's way.
589
They may have had some exposure to SO2, but I think what we have heard today is that that has not resulted in any long-term health effects.
590 MR. DELISLE: That brings me to my final point. Board counsel asked you on a number of occasions how much training the staff received in fire fighting exercises, and so on. I didn't really hear you answer that.
591 Could you comment a little bit more on the training that the employees had at the time and if you have any plans to make sure they get more training for the future?
592 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, I can.
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593 We have indicated that the training for employees on emergency response is based on the incident command system. All employees will receive training at the level of 100. Employees are expected to take a higher level of response, to be trained to the level of 200 and 300. We have been doing that.
594 In the case of fire fighting, employees do receive fire fighting training.
595 In the case of Mr. Anderson in this particular instance, he had not, because of a hockey injury, been able to attend the fire fighting at that time.
596 But certainly we train the employees in fire fighting. We train the employees in emergency response. We train the employees in the use of self-contained breathing apparatuses or any other equipment that they have to use.
597 MR. DELISLE: At what frequency will this training be repeated?
598 MR. RITCHIE: There is a mandatory safety program that is developed for each facility based on the needs of the facility. I can't speak specifically to each facility, but I could present you with the mandatory training requirements, if that would be helpful.
599 MR. DELISLE: If you could do that, please.
600 MR. RITCHIE: Certainly
601 --- UNDERTAKING/ENGAGEMENT:
To advise what mandatory training requirements Westcoast requires for fire fighting, et cetera.
602 MR. DELISLE: Thank you. Those are my questions, Mr. Chairman.
603 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Delisle.
604 I don't believe that Mr. Embree is in the room.
605 Mr. Mackie, are you going to have any questions for this panel?
606
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MR. MACKIE: Yes, sir, if we could take our break.
607 THE CHAIRMAN: We will take our break now, and we will resume at 11:00, if you can have your questions at that time.
608 --- (A short recess/Courte pause)
609 --- (Upon resuming/À la reprise de l'audience)
610 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macintosh...?
611 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
612 If it pleases the Board, I can have the panel respond to three of the outstanding undertakings now that arose this morning.
613 First, Mr. Ritchie, can you advise, sir, whether or not sensitivity was an issue surveyed in the last review in the community by the company?
614 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, I can confirm that that was done.
615 MR. MACINTOSH: Also, Mr. Ritchie, you have the information now with respect to the varying levels of H2S in the gas coming into the plant, as I understand?
616 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, I do.
617 MR. MACINTOSH: Can you give that information, please?
618 MR. RITCHIE: Yes. The information we have, which comes from Enersul, who monitor the H2S levels in the sulphur in the pipeline by doing a daily spot analysis using a spectrum UV analyzer, indicates that over the period of January of 1999 until January of 2000, we had one peak excursion of 46.2 ppm.
619 Our target is 10 ppm and the typical has been less than 2 ppm over that period.
620 MR. MACINTOSH: You have a related comment, Mr. Reid, I believe?
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621 MR. REID: That is right. One of the undertakings I have down is: Does the
ERP cover cases where H2S in the pipeline is greater than 10?
622 In the RWDI report, on page 3, the hazard identification, they say that the primary concern is related to the ignition of molten sulphur simply because the maximum allowable amount of H2S in sulphur from the plant is 10 ppm; an order of magnitude smaller than of 100 ppm that is used to establish the emergency planning zone for H2S.
623 Since 46 is similarly less than 100, we think that would apply. We don't have an H2S concern with the amount of H2S in the sulphur.
624 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you.
625 The final undertaking to respond to now, Mr. Chair, is with respect to the frequency of the training for firefighting. The answer is that that is repeated every three years. That was addressed in response to IR 1.1.11, attachment 2.
626 Also, if I may, Mr. Chair, I will hand in or distribute the written responses to all of the undertakings from yesterday.
627 There is only one outstanding undertaking from yesterday, which is not addressed in the materials I am distributing at present because there is no information that is needed in writing on it.
628 I am speaking to the undertaking which arose, I believe, at paragraph 356, addressing a question to Mr. Cochrane with respect to a gouge in the pipe which may have occurred when splicing failed, and there may have been injury or damage to the splicing box and the pipe.
629 Mr. Cochrane advises -- and he can speak to this when Panel 1 is recalled -- that there was no injury of any kind to the pipe. If I may, I will leave that at that for now.
630 I believe now the written responses have been handed out.
631 Thank you.
632 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Macintosh. We should mark these responses. I think they should be marked separately.
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633 THE CLERK: The responses to Westcoast undertaking at paragraph 1231 will be Exhibit B-20.
634 --- EXHIBIT NO./No. DE LA PIECE B-20:
WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1231
635 THE CLERK: The undertaking at paragraph 1335 will be B-21.
636 --- EXHIBIT NO./No. DE LA PIECE B-21:
WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1335
637 THE CLERK: The undertaking at paragraph 1604 will be B-22.
638 --- EXHIBIT NO./No. DE LA PIECE B-22:
WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1231
639 THE CLERK: The undertaking at paragraph 1637 will be B-23.
640 --- EXHIBIT NO./No. DE LA PIECE B-23:
WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1604: Emergency Response Plan
641 THE CLERK: The undertaking at 1725 will be B-24.
642 --- EXHIBIT NO./No. DE LA PIECE B-24:
WEI response to undertaking given at 2:1725
643 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mackie, when you are ready.
644 MR. MACKIE: Mr. Chairman, thank you.
645 I first would like to go back to one question I had yesterday on the 1600 litres of glycol that leaked to the ground. The hazard incidents responses on May 17, 2000, changeover from steam to glycol 1644 litres leak to ground was reported. I presume that was to
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the Board.
646 I would like, at some time or other, to get from the Board a response and any pertinent paperwork as to where this glycol and ground was disposed -- not right at this time, sir.
647 THE CHAIRMAN: We will have counsel and staff look at what report, if any, was filed with the Board, Mr. Mackie, and we will advise after the break.
648 MR. MACKIE: Okay.
649 THE CHAIRMAN: It may be in the record.
650 MR. MACKIE: It was just indicated at the side of the hazard incident report that it was reported. I am assuming it was reported to the Board since this is the heating system for the sulphur pipeline, at the top.
651 THE CHAIRMAN: Maybe you could discuss it with the Board staff at the break, and we will report something on the record after lunch break.
652 MR. MACKIE: Okay, thank you.
653 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. MACKIE:
654 MR. MACKIE: I hope I don't go too far back and forth here.
655 Mr. Ritchie, your quote was that your first response is to look after themselves, as far as your employees. Clearly this was not done, so how can we accept their response to the rest of it as being correct?
656 In my opinion, throwing a five-gallon pail on a fire, you have to get pretty close to a fire to throw that; especially throwing it inside a door, with sulphur coming out the door.
657 MR. RITCHIE: In my judgment, looking at the events, I am stating that the response was correct. We may have to get Panel 1 back up here so we can speak again with the folks who were actually at the site.
658 MR. MACKIE: In your opinion, they are not looking after themselves if
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they do not have the proper respiratory equipment and so on to fight this fire. Is that correct?
659 MR. RITCHIE: No. I think in the case of this one that their response was correct and they did take the right steps.
660 MR. MACKIE: They are supposed to have either Scott packs or respiratory equipment when SO2 is --
661 MR. RITCHIE: If they are going to be exposed at high levels.
662 I think what we have heard here this morning is that the levels that they were exposed at were not going to result in any long-term health effects. The workers were careful.
As soon as they detected the presence of SO2 in significant quantities, they did move out of the way of the airstream.
663 I think we have also said that we are going to be positioning breathing equipment down at that location so that it is more readily accessible in the event of a need of going further.
664 MR. MACKIE: Dr. Sehmer then, their exposure to this 84 parts per million we have seen in reports, does that not take years off their life when they reach 60 or so on?
665 DR. SEHMER: There was no evidence that they were exposed to 84 parts per million. The maximum concentration of the plume is estimated at 84 parts per million, but that would be -- from the pictures I have seen of the fire, this was smoke that was blowing off the top. This is hot gas that rises up into the air.
666 So I don't think they would have been exposed to that amount. I think it would be more likely around 20 to 30 parts per million, given the symptoms that they got, which were flu-like symptoms.
667 I think one of the fellows wasn't even clear that it was related to his exposure. He was wondering if it was related to a flu bug that he had. So these were mild symptoms that certainly were not consistent with exposures of 84 parts per million.
668
MR. MACKIE: Does SO2 not stay close to the ground?
669 DR. SEHMER: Not when it is hot. Not when it is burning.
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670 MR. MACKIE: I had another question there, but I have lost it somewhere.
671 Mr. Reid, was the water tank checked for the amount of water that was used?
672 MR. REID: I can't answer that question. I wasn't part of the response.
673 Again, that might be something that we can direct to Panel 1. There was a person on Panel 1 who was at the fire, but I was no part of the response.
674 MR. MACKIE: You visited the site, I take it?
675 MR. REID: I visited the site for the first time on the 14th. That was the Thursday following the fire.
676 MR. MACKIE: This equipment was still at site, I take it, then? You are just going on pictures otherwise, as far as the fire itself?
677 MR. REID: I haven't seen any pictures of the fire previous to Monday. We relied on witness statements as to the behaviour of the smoke.
678 The investigation of the incident, looking at the firefighting response or the amount of water left in the tank, that really wasn't part of my duty. I wasn't part of that incident investigation. I was focused strictly on environmental matters.
679 MR. MACKIE: Are you not air quality and environment, sir?
680 MR. REID: I am an air quality specialist. That is my specialty, and I am an environmental specialist.
681 But there would have been an incident investigation team to look at all aspects of the incident, looking at the behaviour of the personnel and that. I was no part of that.
682 MR. MACKIE: You looked into what was in the smoke, I presume?
683 MR. REID: Yes. I provided an opinion on that.
684
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MR. MACKIE: There would be steam coming off of this fire from the water. Would that not be included into the smoke that would rise?
685 MR. REID: Yes. Presumably there would be some of that water that would be turned into water vapour. That is correct.
686 MR. MACKIE: Ms Hacker, what pertinent or meteorological data was provided to you to form your report?
687 MS HACKER: The meteorological data that was provided to us included measurements that were taken at the monitoring station that is approximately a kilometre north of the fire site.
688 We were also given information based on observations that were taken at the site at the time of the fire.
689 MR. MACKIE: Can you tell me what that was, please?
690 MS HACKER: The discretion is between wind direction measurements. There was a measurement taken at the meteorological station that indicated that the wind direction was in a -- I need to look, sorry.
691 It was estimated that the wind direction was from a 233 degree direction. But based on observations taken at the time of the fire by personnel at the fire, we used a wind direction of 280 degrees.
692 MR. MACKIE: Are you familiar with tunnel effect?
693 MS HACKER: Tunnel effect. Not specifically. What are you referring to?
694 MR. MACKIE: Roadways, rights-of-way?
695 MS HACKER: Yes.
696 MR. MACKIE: Would that not change wind direction?
697 MS HACKER: That was accounted for in the modelling. What was done to account for that was the use of building inputs that are used in the ISC3 model.
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698 What that did was emulate buildings or structures that would cause the plume to be directed otherwise than it would be if there was nothing there.
699 MR. MACKIE: If you have a west/southwest wind, you have an open area to the northeast.
700 MS HACKER: Yes.
701 MR. MACKIE: You are taking your tunnel effect from west/northwest, prevailing winds are west/southwest. Once that reaches that open area, does not the west/southwest wind prevail and blow that smoke right out into that field instead of into the trees, as your model predicts?
702 MS HACKER: It could have.
703 However, the model is not going to be able to handle anything besides the direction that is put into it for a one-hour scenario.
704 MR. MACKIE: So it doesn't handle variance?
705 MS HACKER: Not in that situation, no.
706 MR. MACKIE: Therefore, your model is not acceptable?
707 MS HACKER: Well, it is a one-hour scenario. This is the best that could have been done in that instance.
708 MR. MACKIE: Yes. But you are impacting animals, people; correct?
709 MS HACKER: I understand that. I understand that.
710 The model is used as an estimation only; it is not saying that this is what happened. It is an estimation of what happened.
711 MR. MACKIE: Well, that is not what we received from Mr. Peter Reid at our town meetings.
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712 MR. REID: Perhaps I can speak to that issue. We have confronted that before in our public meetings.
713 We have a meteorological station north of the fire site. We are fortunate enough to have actual meteorological data for that time interval.
714 Based on the skill of David Prey and Miriam Hacker, we have come to the conclusion, considering meteorological theory and the effect of terrain, that inputting the 233 direction into the model would be incorrect, that we needed to modify that because the terrain modifies the wind flow in that area.
715 Searching for a better input, we relied on some of the witness statements and on the pattern of foliar injury.
716 The thing is that we wanted to come up with a correct estimate of the concentration of SO2 in the vicinity of the fire and downwind in that field, and I think we have taken the model as far as it can go in providing a good and accurate estimate of that; a conservative estimate.
717 The work of Dr. Legge, looking at the vegetation takes us the rest of the way in that his findings are able to modify and corroborate what the model showed.
718 He has done that. He has said: Yes, indeed, as the model shows the highest concentrations were immediately next to the shack.
719 His analysis of the vegetative impacts show that he doesn't think we had an hourly average of 82 parts per million because we would see a lot more damage on the lodgepole pine if that were the case. So he has modified that finding.
720 In the matter of the field where the bison were, he has also said that the impact area was larger than the model shows and that the estimates that we have, 1 to 2 parts per million, are more or less correct. He has not modified those.
721 The model does have its limitations, but that doesn't rule out its effectiveness as a tool for us. It has taken a good way of the way towards the answer that we wanted.
722 The model is not going to agree with witness observations exactly because, as the fire burns, each individual puff of smoke tends to take a random walk downwind; more or less like when you are blowing bubbles with a child's toy.
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723 Generally, the model will show the area that would be affected by that, but it is not going to describe each individual discrete puff of smoke as it goes downwind. We have conceded that the smoke went other places than were described by some of the witnesses.
724 But we are confident in the quantity of sulphur dioxide that we have estimated, and that has been corroborated by Dr. Legge's work. He would see more foliar injury downwind in the bison paddock if there was higher than 2 parts per million.
725 So we are pretty confident in his work.
726 MR. MACKIE: You are bringing up Mr. Legge. We will go to his report then. When did he come to the site? Dates?
727 I believe it was the 27th and 28th.
728 MR. REID: Just let me check on that. I believe that is a good approximation of the dates.
729 MR. MACKIE: Do you know of the weather conditions prior to those dates after the fire?
730 MR. REID: Let me confirm the date first. I can't find it. Let's just accept that it was the 27th and 28th.
731 MR. MACKIE: It was the 27th and 28th. We had experienced snow, frost. From my speaking with Mr. Embree, who accompanied Mr. Legge in his, whatever you want to call it, he found that a lot of the attributed damage to foliage was to frost.
732 If he had been there at an appropriate time before the frost, I submit that he would have found more damage attributed to the sulphur because I was there on the next day. My eyes still watered, but we were only travelling through. I got out for a brief minute, and then we travelled through into the buffalo field.
733 I saw the damage from this smoke, so I don't think that his report is even acceptable because of frost damage to the foliage.
734 MR. REID: I disagree.
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735 MR. MACKIE: I will point out one thing --
736 MR. REID: Can I rebut what you said before you carry on? You have raised a number of points, and I would like to respond to them.
737 MR. MACKIE: Go ahead.
738 MR. REID: Dr. Legge is a world-class authority on sulphur dioxide damage to vegetation. He can tell the difference between the damage to a leaf because of the normal senescence that occurs in the fall. The deciduous leaves start to die in the fall.
739 So there are some very specific patterns of leaf injury that can be attributed to
SO2, and these can be differentiated from the normal damage of when leaves die in the fall.
740 The effect of the fall weather did not impair his judgment as to what was occurring in that field, and he quite clearly took a number of us through and showed us damaged vegetation very close to the site and then showed it diminishing downwind to the point in the field where it was not apparent any more.
741 So I don't think his ability to do this was impaired in the least.
742 MR. MACKIE: All right. I will bring up one more point. He was shown a bush -- I believe it was just before you entered the pasture or it may have been down the pasture line -- and he attributed it to natural phenomena until it was reported to him that the National Energy Board inspector had already seen that bush and had attributed it to sulphur poisoning.
743 How do you respond to that?
744 MR. REID: I would submit that Dr. Legge is more of an authority on sulphur dioxide damage to vegetation that the NEB inspector. Dr. Legge is a world-class authority. His CV is in there, and this report stands.
745 He is an authority on this. He has published numerous papers. He has written chapters in books, and he can discern sulphur dioxide damage from other types of damage on vegetation. It's quite apparent to him, where you and I might not be able to distinguish these subtleties.
746 As well, the sampling that we did in our vegetation -- the samples that we
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took of leaf tissue -- corroborate that as well. There was a very dramatic decrease in sulphur dioxide concentration as you go downwind, and it agrees perfectly with what Dr. Legge saw in the vegetation.
747 So there is no disagreement whatsoever.
748 MR. MACKIE: But we had had no frost to that point, sir.
749 MR. REID: On the 9th. There was a snowfall on Labour Day weekend, and there were cold temperatures prior to the 9th.
750 MR. MACKIE: Not enough to kill the alfalfa, which is the first to die from frost, sir.
751 MR. REID: I will disagree again. The climatological measurements that we take, for example, are taken at a height of a 1.6 metres. We have the weather records for that period from Fort St. John, and I can't remember exactly if we did have a temperature that went below zero degrees in that period.
752 But temperatures on the ground are often significantly lower than they are at 1.6 metres. You can have frost on the ground and still have temperatures above freezing at 1.6 metres. That is a really well-known phenomenon in climatology, that the ground can get colder than the air above the ground.
753 Dr. Legge concluded that the damage that he saw in the field was from normal leaf senescence after a frost. This was September the 9th, after all.
754 MR. MACKIE: You just stated that this was taken from the Fort St. John weather station?
755 MR. REID: That is right. That is the closest site, I think, where we have readings that would be of any use to us.
756 MR. MACKIE: From my experience, in the ten years that I have lived in the valley, we have anywhere from 20 to 30 degrees difference in temperature between our place and Fort St. John.
757 MR. REID: That is true, and I was not trying to claim that Fort St. John was perfectly representative.
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758 However, the evidence there of the senescence, the leaf damage that Dr. Legge identified as being related to the frost, is evidence enough that there was a frost, and we did have quite a significant snowfall on the 9th. Snow is colder than zero degrees.
759 MR. MACKIE: I realize we had had frost before the date that he arrived which, yes, there would be damage to leaves due to the frost. But he was not there early enough to make his determinations before the frost, is what I am saying.
760 MR. REID: Again, I will just repeat that I don't think that impaired his ability to perform a good judgment of what the extent of the damage was.
761 MR. MACKIE: Was there a determination of other hazardous materials in the file? I know you have talked about 20 litres of transmission fluid.
762 What about the plastic from the pail, plastic from wiring; the battery, whether it is a sulfuric battery, a dry-cell battery, plastic, lead, any mercury, and so on?
763 Was this taken into effect? I have heard you say that this was minimal but --
764 MR. REID: I considered in this analysis that I wrote, the five pages, the possibility that other products of incomplete combustion might have had an effect.
765 We determined that sulphur dioxide was the substance of concern, and it is my opinion that all of the other products of incomplete combustion -- it is impossible to know all of them and what quantity they were in.
766 That is something that would take a lot of experimentation to determine. We have looked at some of the probable expected products of incomplete combustion, and the opinion that I have rendered here is that these are brief and not of any significance.
767 The PICs, the particulate matter, the aromatic hydrocarbons, and other substances that might have been in the smoke are equivalent to what one might experience in everyday life, from something like going to a restaurant and being exposed to cigarette smoke or campfire smoke, which contains all of these same products of incomplete combustion.
768 Wood smoke contains aromatic hydrocarbons. There is particulate matter. There is carbon monoxide. There are any number of substances in wood smoke that are equivalent to this.
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769 So sulphur dioxide is clearly the substance of concern.
770 MR. MACKIE: Is sulphur considered a hydrocarbon or does it contain hydrocarbons?
771 MR. REID: No.
772
MR. MACKIE: What about the H2S?
773 MR. REID: Hydrogen and sulphur. There is no carbon in it.
774 MR. MACKIE: Is there anything else in the sulphur line when it comes down from the plant that might contain hydrocarbons?
775 MR. REID: No. It is my belief there is no hydrocarbon. The sulphur from a sulphur recovery plant is noted in the chemical industry for its purity. It is much more pure than sulphur that you could mine. What we are doing is converting hydrogen sulphide into sulphur.
776
So as we said, we have a few ppm of H2S, and essentially that is it.
777 MR. MACKIE: In a newspaper advertisement, C-7-5, page 8 of 26, you talk about emissions into atmosphere, VOCs, et cetera.
778 What do you class as "et cetera"? This is your Environmental Protection Notice, C-7-5.
779 MR. REID: I don't have that available right here. Is that for the Kwoen facility?
780 MR. MACKIE: Yes.
781 MR. REID: I didn't even realize that was in here. Can someone help me find it?
782 I am familiar enough with it.
783
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MR. MACKIE: What are the VOCs, et cetera? This was in your advertisement in a public newspaper.
784 MR. REID: I don't see how the Kwoen facilities --
785 MR. MACKIE: What I am getting at is: Emissions to atmosphere, are they not coming off of this plant, too?
786 You also take your wind direction as south/southeast. Is there a wind monitor there? Do you have an air monitor in this area?
787 MR. REID: I am trying to find the reference to VOCs. Is that on the first page?
788 MR. MACKIE: Page 8 of 26. I believe this is your application for a permit under the provisions of the Waste Management Act.
789 MR. REID: I see what you are looking at.
790 This is a standard form provided by B.C. Environment when you are applying for a permit for discharge to air, and they have asked here for significant contaminates; and under there, it is listed SO2, NOx, NO2, CO, VOCs, et cetera.
791 So they are giving you examples of the type of things they want to see there.
In this facilities application, I have listed sulphur dioxide and NO2 as the two pollutants of concern to the Ministry.
792 I haven't cited there a VOC discharge from that facility, so that is what we have cited in our application.
793 The reference here to the air dispersion modelling results asks for the maximum predicted concentration and the wind direction. That was an analysis that we had done using wind direction and wind speed data from another site.
794 But this is in another valley. I don't see how this is pertinent.
795 MR. MACKIE: Where did you take your wind directions from? Do you have an air monitor at this location or near this location?
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796 MR. REID: I don't see how the Kwoen facilities application is pertinent to this hearing but I will still answer it.
797 The analysis that we did on the Kwoen facility used the meteorological dataset that we took from Tumbler Ridge. We collected data in Tumbler Ridge in 1995, and we have taken that dataset, and we have used it to model our proposed Kwoen gas plant on the Sukunka forestry road.
798 Rather than simply using a screening meteorological dataset, we endeavoured to use a dataset from a site that we had maintained; an historical site about 25 kilometres to the north.
799 We adjusted the wind directions consistent with practice, and we have used these to get an estimate of what our maximum impact is.
800 The Ministry is quite content, I think, with the modelling that we have done, and we are going to set up a meteorological site at that plant to further corroborate this.
801 So this is simply an analysis based on the best data that we could come up with. That's entirely consistent with modelling practices.
802 MR. MACKIE: Are you familiar with the wind directions as pertaining to the plant site, the Pine River gas plant, prevailing winds?
803 MR. REID: The plant site location?
804 MR. MACKIE: Yes.
805 MR. REID: Yes, I am.
806 MR. MACKIE: What are those?
807 MR. REID: That site is on top of a mountain, Commotion Mountain. Above that site the winds are predominantly from the southwest. That is a fairly good indication of the fact that it is almost in the free troposphere on the west coast of North America. The prevailing winds aloft are normally from the west. That is what we see at Pine River.
808 It is actually quite unusual to have a wind direction from one direction so
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consistently, but that is what we have at Pine River.
809 MR. MACKIE: Are not the winds that we are getting from the west/southwest, down over top of the plant, coming right out of the Hasler Valley, which is the same winds that you get at the plant?
810 MR. REID: Essentially the winds in the valley are quite different from the winds on top of Commotion Mountain. In meteorological terms, we call that a decoupling. The valley is sheltered from the prevailing winds quite a bit of the time so the systems are essentially not coupled.
811 You can have a southwesterly wind aloft and you can have an easterly wind in the valley. It is not at all unusual to have the winds in the valley run counter to the winds aloft.
812 We wouldn't endeavour to use wind speed and direction data from the Pine River gas plant in the Hasler Valley. That is entirely inappropriate.
813 We are trying to fit data to situations where they are applicable. If we didn't do that, the reviewing agencies would cite us for that and they wouldn't allow us to use it.
814 MR. MACKIE: Getting back to Mr. Legge's report. Have you been to this pine tree that he refers to and you referred to several times as to its damage?
815 MR. REID: Yes. I am the one that collected the vegetation sample from the tree.
816 MR. MACKIE: Have you been back there since?
817 MR. REID: I was back there two weeks ago, and I have been back a few times over the winter.
818 MR. MACKIE: I have one that Mr. Legge looked at. What did you find as far as foliage damage to this tree?
819 MR. REID: The pine closest to the fire site, it showed some damage immediately after the fire, consistent with SO2 exposure. Some of the leaves showed some browning. I think there are some pictures in Dr. Legge's report.
820
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In consultation with Dr. Legge, I have gone back to the site a few times afterwards, and we have seen a bit more needle drop since the time of the fire. That is more or less consistent with what he expects.
821 What might be discernible to the trained eye at some time in the future would be that this tree would have like a bottle brush type appearance. In that the second, third, and fourth year needles may be missing, but the new growth will be at the end of the branch.
822 After about three or four years, for all intents and purposes, it will resemble a perfectly normal tree.
823 MR. MACKIE: Right now, at least, the tree that I was shown was 20 feet up from its base. On the north side of the tree, there are no needles left on it. How do you account for that on the north side of the tree?
824 MR. REID: North side. Let me get my directions straight before I answer that.
825 MR. MACKIE: It is just across the road from the fire, I believe, is it not, on the north side of the road?
826 MR. REID: Okay. You mentioned the north side of the tree. Is that the side of the tree that faces north?
827 MR. MACKIE: Yes.
828 MR. REID: Is that what you are referring to?
829 MR. MACKIE: Yes.
830 MR. REID: I think the west side of the tree is the side of the tree that would have been most exposed to sulphur dioxide.
831 There is kind of a curious effect, that when sulphur dioxide moves through a vegetative stand the upwind vegetation is more affected than the downwind vegetation.
832
In fact, the effect of SO2 can be quite spotty. You will see a tree over here that is affected, yet five metres away you will find a tree, a similar tree, that is not affected.
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833 So it is not strange at all to see one side of a tree with more damage than another, or even one half of a tree that has more damage than another.
834 But generally, overall, the tree looks reasonably healthy. We are talking about one pine tree.
835
MR. MACKIE: It was stated that pine trees are acute to SO2 poisoning. Is that not correct?
836 MR. REID: They are reasonably sensitive. I think the deciduous vegetation is more sensitive. Something like a spruce would be less sensitive to sulphur dioxide.
837 MR. MACKIE: The pine trees would show the damage as it progressed into the tree, is that not right, because the needles won't curl up?
838 MR. REID: In the Legge report, if you look at one of the figures of the site, it shows the contrasting colours between a healthy pine needle and one that has been affected by
SO2.
839 MR. MACKIE: That is right. It is burned on the end, but that will still continue on down the needle, will it not?
840 MR. REID: That is right. We are not contesting the fact that certain aspects of the tree will be damaged and that there will be leaf-drop. Generally, overall, we expect the tree to recover.
841 MR. MACKIE: That answered my next question, then.
842 Are you aware that residents saw the smoke down the valley the next day, 24 hours after this fire? It covered the whole valley?
843 MR. REID: I have not heard that.
844 MR. MACKIE: You didn't look at the pictures, and so on, that are in the tables of evidence?
845 MR. REID: Actually, I saw some pictures that I believe were taken shortly after the fire.
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846 MR. MACKIE: This is right after the fire. I didn't take the picture from my place of residence. This is A-7. I haven't taken a picture from my place of residence, but I saw the smoke across the whole valley.
847 That is obviously particulate matter of some sort. Is there not a chance of residents further down the valley being exposed to some level, being minute or whichever?
848 MR. REID: We considered modelling with the area that was most impacted by the fire. Once we get out beyond an area where we are well below the Level A objective the Ministry cites, we are less interested in that area.
849 The Ministry objectives are really clear that we have no measurable effect on human health or the environment below this Level A.
850 No, we do not believe that it is possible that you could get a higher concentration at some distance downwind.
851 You made reference, as well, to the possibility that smoke might hang around for 24 hours. There is no possible way that could happen. The meteorological data we have shows that there were reasonably moderate winds for that entire interval.
852 A wind of 5 kilometres an hour, for example, during the period of the fire, and for several hours after the fire, would indicate that all of the air in the valley is now 15 or 20 kilometres away. While it is travelling, it is also being dispersed by turbulent processes.
853 A report of a cloud 24 hours later I would suggest is from something else. This fire lasted about 40 minutes and that smoke was dispersed very soon thereafter.
854 MR. MACKIE: I am sorry, I would have to disagree with you on that one.
855 On your RWDI report, can you tell me what was supplied to this business as far as pertinent information, meteorological, and so on?
856 MR. REID: The RWDI report, I believe, is based on a screening meteorological dataset. That is quite common in the industry, to use a screening dataset instead of an actual data. What you are simply trying to do is you are trying to figure out what can happen under the worst possible circumstances.
857
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We don't have to monitor meteorology at a site where we don't have good records to know that there is going to be a period of time where there is going to be very stable conditions and almost no wind. That happens everywhere. So we can expect that that is going to happen.
858 We use that screening dataset when we do the model. If that is the condition that produces the worst effect, then we assume that that is going to happen at our site. That is what we have done.
859 I believe, also, RWDI used a pine dataset and a Fort St. John dataset to run ISC3. ISC3 produced results somewhat less than the SLAB model did. We have gone with the SLAB results in our EPZ.
860 We are pretty confident that the meteorological dataset in our assumptions are representative; they are valid.
861 MR. MACKIE: Why were they not supplied data from the Hasler air monitor, as far as wind direction, at least?
862 MR. REID: The modelling that they have done for the SLAB, we assume that not only does the worst thing always happen, but that it happens in all directions. So knowing what the prevailing wind directions are at that site are really irrelevant.
863 The EPZ implies that the smoke can go in any direction, and we take it to a maximum. So we have determined that that number is about 3.1 kilometres. We assume that that happens all the time, that the wind can go anywhere.
864 So the real wind data in this case wouldn't yield any improvements.
865 MR. MACKIE: Were they supplied topographical maps? It doesn't show in the book there.
866 MR. REID: I am not positive if they considered terrain. That is one of the things we have undertaken to provide information on later.
867 MR. MACKIE: You obviously didn't read this report very closely then, Mr. Reid, because it states in there they took it from a valley three kilometres wide. So obviously they had some type of topographical map.
868
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MR. REID: Okay, they do have a map.
869 MR. MACKIE: I would like to tell you that the valley is not three kilometres wide. I own two quarters. I go from one side of the valley to the other. That is only one mile, sir, which is 1.6 kilometres.
870 Would that not totally change their report?
871 MR. REID: No, I don't believe that affects the outcome. We are making certain assumptions about valley width just to determine how the model behaves. I think we can get RWDI to clarify this point here.
872 MR. MACKIE: I also a copy on page 2 of their hazard identification -- sorry, maybe it is not page 2.
873 At the No. 2, Hazard Identification, it says:
874 "It could be argued that ignition of a release is unlikely, but for the current hazard assessment, the frequency of such an event is not considered..."
875 You have had I don't know how many fires from ignition from your heat tracers. Why was that not considered?
876 MR. REID: I believe we have assumed that it will catch fire in this analysis.
877 MR. MACKIE: Yes, but this was done on a sulphur pool, not on pressure under at least 1600 pounds.
878 Does that not make a difference from what they have considered a break in the line which, to your statement, was they took it from a break in the line and a sulphur pool?
879 MR. REID: That is right.
880 We are making an assumption here that the worst-case scenario is a large pool of a sufficient area of burning sulphur. That is the approach that we have taken. We are confident that that represents a worst case.
881 I think you could imagine different scenarios of sulphur spewing out of a
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pipeline and catching fire, but I don't think that that substantially alters the conclusions that we have reached on the EPZ.
882 MR. MACKIE: I talked to Ms Claire Serdula. I am not exactly sure how it is pronounced. She is the primary engineer on this report. She was quite surprised to know that there had been this many fires as a result of ignition from your heat tracers.
883 I presume from her response that you had no idea of the number of fires that you had already had.
884 MR. REID: Your point being?
885 MR. MACKIE: Why was she not informed of heat tracer fires?
886 MR. REID: We have made the assumption in the RWDI report that this sulphur does catch fire. So I don't see what other pertinent information she could have been offered. We are assuming that it catches fire.
887 MR. MACKIE: Yes. What I am getting at is: If it is under pressure, is there not more hazard to the environment and people from something under pressure than from a pool?
888 You have taken the 50-tonne scenario, and we have not been able to get an answer from any of the previous people to you as to what constitutes an emergency response.
889 MR. REID: I think in our undertaking we can ask RWDI to clarify that.
890 But I have to disagree that we have not taken the worst case into consideration in our hazard identification. If we do change the configuration of the pipeline, we will take into consideration a larger fire.
891 MR. MACKIE: Are you going to comment on that, Al?
892 MR. RITCHIE: I am not sure what the exact question is. Let me clarify, again, the emergency response plan.
893 It is designed to be an all-hazards plan, which means it should be designed to respond to any incident in any Westcoast facility.
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894 Further to that, the plan is based on the incident command system to ensure that we can provide a coordinated response, along with any other responders within the province. It is a very standard approach to it.
895 We do conduct these tabletop and simulated exercises. That is part of the process of people understanding how to set alert levels within the plan.
896 Let me give an example of 2000 at Pine River. There have been four exercises in this area. There was one on May 3rd of 2000 which is a tabletop exercise simulating a pipeline rupture by the hospital in the community. There was a refresher exercise on that same event in November of 2000.
897 On November 29th of 2000, there was a tabletop exercise simulating a logging truck accident at the sulphur pipeline crossing.
898 December 15th, 2000 there was a full-scale simulation exercise, again simulating the logging truck and damage and release of the pipeline.
899 During those events, you conduct the simulation to give people experience and practice in how to set and how to determine the level of response.
900 We also talk in there about the public safety issues which are defined by the EPZs.
901 Again, let me go back to the specific event that we are talking about. What we have been talking about in the EPZ is the release of 50 tonnes of sulphur and what the emergency planning zone would be and what the response would have to be.
902 The event that we are talking about, the one that we have been questioned on, is a release of a few hundred pounds of sulphur.
903 So the response of the people to that release and fire clearly would be different than the response to the major release of 50 tonnes of sulphur and the resulting fire.
904 MR. MACKIE: One other question on the RWDI: In B-4 of the evidence, it relates to toxic blast and heat radiation were not considered until after the September 9th fire.
905 Why were they not considered in the RWDI?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (Mackie)
906 MR. REID: Again, I can't --
907 MR. MACKIE: Or blast at least.
908 MR. REID: I can't speak to that directly, but that is something we can put to RWDI or perhaps someone who has a bit more knowledge of the facility in question.
909 MR. MACKIE: Now we will go to the emergency response plan and public awareness survey.
910 You said that your surveys were done on a three-year basis. We have been at our location for ten years, but the residents of Hasler change dramatically within a three-year period.
911 You can have probably at least ten families move in and move out again, and they are not informed of any of this.
912 I don't remember myself, but when was the last public awareness survey done?
913 MR. REID: Actually, that was one of our undertakings. Joe Szydlik had just told me before today that the last survey was June 20th of this year, this past year, 2000, and it ended in early July sometime.
914 So there was a revisit in June and July of 2000.
915 MR. MACKIE: What I am trying to get at is that I just couldn't remember what year he was here, whether he was here last year or the year before.
916 Last year both myself and my wife had pneumonia. I got it in the spring; my wife got it in August.
917 Then right after your fire, she contracted a virus which is, according to her doctor, attributable to dust or particulate matter in the air.
918 Can you comment on that as a doctor? I am not sure of the correct term. I think it has something to do with the oesophagus.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (Mackie)
919 That was in the terminology or the word.
920 DR. SEHMER: I would have to know more about the medical information but I can say that if it was thought to be a virus, there are all kinds of reasons why people can get a virus. It can be from getting cold. It can be from getting run down. It can be from a lack of sleep. It can be because of blood problems. It can be due to respiratory irritants.
921 In my experience, in 20 years of practice, I can't think of viruses where I could attribute them to one specific cause such as dust or a particulate matter. I can't think of any.
922 Besides an acute inhalation of some dusts and problems there, where there is a direct history of high dust exposure, I can't think how you could really attribute a diagnosis to that specific entity.
923 MR. MACKIE: The doctor said that this particular virus attacked soft tissue: heart, lungs, kidneys, liver. She was put on a steroid.
924 DR. SEHMER: If you wanted to share more detail with me at another time, I would be happy to review the file and take a look at it.
925 MR. MACKIE: That's all right. I just wanted to see if you had any possible answer.
926 With this public awareness survey, what I am looking at is the timeline, the three years. I don't think that that is appropriate, given the number of residents -- I am not just speaking for myself -- that move in and out of the area, particularly Hasler Flats.
927 Thank you, sir.
928 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Mackie.
929 Mr. Embree, are you ready to proceed with your questions of this panel now?
930 MR. EMBREE: I have no questions of this panel.
931 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (Mackie)
932 Mr. David Winland is not here.
933 Mr. Wayne Winland...?
934 MR. W. WINLAND: I have nothing for this panel.
935 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I understand that Mr. David Winland will have questions of this panel but will not be available until this afternoon.
936 MR. W. WINLAND: About 2:30, 3:00.
937 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
938 Mr. Macintosh, I think what we will do is stand this panel down for the moment, and I understand that Ms McKinnon had some questions arising from the undertakings of Panel 1.
939 Would it be convenient to proceed that way at the moment?
940 MR. MACINTOSH: Yes, thank you.
941 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. You will be called back this afternoon.
942 MR. RITCHIE: Thank you.
943 AL RITCHIE: Resumed STAN WATCHORN: Resumed DON COCHRANE: Resumed GREG COSMA: Resumed TODD ANDERSON: Resumed
944 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS McKINNON:
945 MS McKINNON: Panel, I just have a couple of questions arising from the undertakings that were provided to us.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (McKinnon)
946 You know, Mr. Watchorn, that you used torches on the valves in the past, but you have ceased to use torches on the valves during this period, I think is what you said.
947 You have developed a procedure not to use Tiger torches on the valve; correct?
948 MR. WATCHORN: That is correct.
949 MS McKINNON: Can you describe the process that you used to ensure the staff will follow the procedure?
950 MR. WATCHORN: We have a process that involves direct communication to each employee via e-mail, and we keep the notification on our G drive, and we direct all our employees to that drive to read and understand that procedure.
951 MS McKINNON: What about the operations manual? I don't know if staff actually read that, but is it in there?
952 MR. WATCHORN: Yes. Actually, the operations manual is maintained on the G drive as well.
953 MS McKINNON: I was going to ask you if you know how the staff access the operations manual. Do they actually look at it?
954 MR. WATCHORN: Yes, they do.
955 MS McKINNON: Are they aware that there were changes made to it?
956 MR. WATCHORN: I believe so.
957 MS McKINNON: Mr. Freeborn wasn't, however.
958 MR. WATCHORN: Yes, I understand that is what he said.
959 MS McKINNON: The second undertaking that I had a question on is the one concerning the voltage on the MI tracers.
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960 Mr. Cosma, are you the appropriate person to answer that, or Mr. Cochrane?
961 MR. COSMA: Both of us, probably.
962 MS McKINNON: The rewiring of the heat trace system at Kilometre 1.5 and the terminus building was done in contravention of CSA certification. I think we established that the other day.
963 The question was whether this had been reviewed by tech services, and the undertaking answer was that yes, it had.
964 I am wondering why tech services did not pick up the fact that there was a violation of the CSA standards?
965 MR. COSMA: Yes, I understand the question.
966 Consistent with an answer I gave yesterday, there was an error made by technical services at Pine River plant.
967 MS McKINNON: Were any steps taken to ensure that this type of error is not committed again?
968 MR. COSMA: Nothing specific to the findings of this series of investigations on this incident. However, there was talk about a process we call "management of change", and that talk is going on.
969 We have a management of change process. I think managing it and supervising it and ensuring it is done properly is something that we have to do, not only for this incident, but for the operation of the plant in general.
970 MS McKINNON: Is this a review-and-learn type of process? Could you tell me a little bit about the process so that we may understand what it is?
971 MR. COSMA: In general, management of change process begins with someone identifying a need for a change, and it continues on through investigation of the justification for the change, the viability of the change and the details of implementing the change. We have that process, and we are going to use it.
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972 MS McKINNON: What change would arise, then, from the fact that tech services did not catch the CSA contravention?
973 Is there a change that is going to go through this process?
974 I am not quite clear on that.
975 MR. COSMA: If you are asking me if it is possible that in the future an error can be made, the answer is that it is always possible.
976 The intent of the procedure is to minimize that chance and make sure that it doesn't happen.
977 MS McKINNON: So in respect of this particular issue, did someone identify the need for a change and ask that the problem be put through this process?
978 MR. COSMA: I was not at the plant when it happened. All I am getting is hearsay information or third-hand historical information about what happened.
979 My understanding was that the tech services was advised that there was a need for a change. The heat being input at the relevant building was insufficient. There was freezing going on, and tech services was asked to increase the heat.
980 The way they did it was to increase the voltage on the wire. From a physics point of view, what that does is increase the current density and the power output on the wire. From a CSA point of view, the rating of the wire was exceeded.
981 MS McKINNON: Now you have got me confused, because when you say "this change process", was the change that you are referring to the correcting of the mistake that tech services made, or was the change that you are referring to the increase of the voltage on the heat tracing?
982 MR. COCHRANE: The management of change process involves identification of the need for a change, and that was identification of the need to increase the heat input to the pipe, yes.
983 MS McKINNON: So your process that you are describing is the very process that resulted in this error occurring, is it not?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (McKinnon)
984 MR. COSMA: No, it was a mistake. It was an error made by an individual in his implementation of his redesign.
985 MS McKINNON: My question is: What steps have you taken to ensure that an error of that type is not made again?
986 MR. COSMA: We will be reviewing and reactivating, re-implementing, re-educating on the existing management of change process.
987 MS McKINNON: So you are going to review the change process to ensure what, that there is a second opinion given on something like that?
988 How would you put into place a process -- whether it be peer review or management review or something -- to ensure that errors of that nature are not made again?
989 MR. COSMA: I think all of those elements -- the word I am looking for is keenness or thoroughness by individuals, is probably the best answer to that question.
990 MS McKINNON: So there would not be a peer review? It would be a --
991 MR. COSMA: I am not saying there would not be a peer review. I suspect there probably would.
992 That is something that we use throughout our technical services and engineering business.
993 MS McKINNON: Mr. Watchorn, do you have any comments on this issue?
994 MR. WATCHORN: No, I don't.
995 MS McKINNON: Do you agree that the problem that gave rise to the contravention of the CSA presents a process problem within Westcoast?
996 MR. WATCHORN: It may present a process problem, and it is something that we will review.
997 Just like all the rest of our processes, we do review them from time to time,
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (McKinnon)
and we make changes as required.
998 MS McKINNON: Are you aware of the specific changes that were made as a result of this particular error?
999 MR. WATCHORN: No, I am not familiar with the specific changes here.
1000 MS McKINNON: May I just have a moment?
1001 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
1002 MS McKINNON: Just a point of clarification, Mr. Cosma: Is this change process that you refer to with respect to this particular contravention, is this something that you are going to be doing or something that you did do when you realized the error?
1003 In other words, it was pointed out in this hearing process that this error was made. I think you may have been aware of it prior to that because of the inspector's report.
1004 When did Westcoast react with its change process with respect to the particular error of the CSA contravention?
1005 MR. COSMA: As soon as we found out about it there was a Westcoast inspector -- a professional engineer in Westcoast identified the problem, the problem that we had too much voltage on a piece of wire, and we changed it right away.
1006 MS McKINNON: Was that after or before the NEB inspector was there?
1007 MR. COSMA: I'm sorry, I don't know that.
1008 MS McKINNON: You do not?
1009 Thank you, gentlemen.
1010 MR. WATCHORN: Could I make one more comment, please?
1011 In your reference to Mr. Freeborn not being aware that we have an operations procedures manual, I think that there was a misunderstanding there.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (McKinnon)
1012 Mr. Freeborn, as the operations team leader, has authored a good portion of the procedures contained in that manual.
1013 So I believe that he clearly misunderstood your question or something to that effect, because he has authored a lot of the procedures that are in that manual.
1014 MS McKINNON: I guess my surprise was with respect to the fact that he did not know the manual had been amended in November.
1015 MR. WATCHORN: Yes. That may not surprise me, because during that period he and Mr. Hunszinger, who is the assistant team leader of the operation, were working in concert.
1016 This revision could have been done by Mr. Hunszinger.
1017 Also during that period, I am not sure if he was on site or on vacation, but I would leave that to him to comment on.
1018 MS McKINNON: This is a bit of a difficult conversation here with Mr. Freeborn not here to speak for himself.
1019 But I would think that the person responsible for operations in the plant would be aware that there is a new operations manual.
1020 MR. WATCHORN: Yes, I would think that maybe that should be, and I think perhaps under different circumstances he would probably answer it differently.
1021 I think he was very nervous, and he perhaps did not understand the question.
1022 MS McKINNON: I didn't think the question was particularly confusing, but we will leave it at that.
1023 Thank you, gentlemen.
1024 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Macintosh, do you have any redirect arising from that?
1025
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (McKinnon)
MR. MACINTOSH: No, thank you.
1026 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms McKinnon, are there any outstanding undertakings due from this panel?
1027 MS McKINNON: I don't believe there are from this panel. I am a little bit unsure if there were any from 1A.
1028 Mr. Macintosh, I know you provided some. Were there any outstanding from 1A?
1029 MR. MACINTOSH: No, I believe not, Mr. Chair, Ms McKinnon. I believe there were only a few from this morning's first panel.
1030 MS McKINNON: Mr. Chairman, we have not yet had the opportunity to review the materials provided by Mr. Macintosh for the second panel. We may have some questions on those undertakings, and there may be some from the panel this morning.
1031 THE CHAIRMAN: The panel that is seated now is --
1032 MS McKINNON: We are done.
1033 THE CHAIRMAN: We are done?
1034 Gentlemen, thank you. You can be released.
1035 MR. ANDERSON: Could I add one thing, please?
1036 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Anderson.
1037 MR. ANDERSON: Just for the day of the fire, during the emergency response there, when we approached the fire the direction of the wind that day was in a northeastern direction which was away from the public and us at that time.
1038 And I heard some comments on the first panel about roadblocks, but we were using this access to go back and forth to the creek to get the water.
1039
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (McKinnon)
There was the three of us there, and anyone who tried to go through would have been stopped.
1040 One particular individual wanted to go through, and he was told not to go through.
1041 The access was left open for the water trailer to come in there, and after everything was in there and under control, we did ribbon off the area. There were people there to stop people from coming in.
1042 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Anderson.
1043 MR. ANDERSON: Thanks.
1044 THE CHAIRMAN: Do you have anything arising, Ms McKinnon?
1045 MS McKINNON: I don't have anything, although I imagine you might want to ask the intervenors if they had any concerns.
1046 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Embree, do you have anything arising from Mr. Anderson's last comment?
1047 MR. EMBREE: No, I don't.
1048 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Mackie...?
1049 MR. MACKIE: No, sir.
1050 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Spenst...?
1051 MS SPENST: Yes, I do.
1052 THE CHAIRMAN: Come forth.
1053 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS SPENST:
1054
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (Spenst)
MS SPENST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and panel.
1055 My question is for Todd Anderson.
1056 Todd, who told me not to go through the fire?
1057 MR. ANDERSON: A gentleman named Jeff Spenst was wanting to drive through the fire, and he was told not to by a Westcoast employee.
1058 MS SPENST: Who told him not to?
1059 MR. ANDERSON: Jerry McGrath.
1060 MS SPENST: Were you there to hear it?
1061 MR. ANDERSON: I was there. I did not hear it, but Jerry did tell him.
1062 MS SPENST: Then how can you comment on it if you did not hear it?
1063 MR. ANDERSON: I am was just saying that I was aware that people were not told that they could go through there -- and they were told.
1064 MS SPENST: Who was driving the car?
1065 MR. ANDERSON: I did not see the car go through the smoke.
1066 MS SPENST: Okay, thank you.
1067 MR. ANDERSON: We only saw the one vehicle, and that was Jeff during the fire.
1068 MS SPENST: You did not see me drive through the fire?
1069 MR. ANDERSON: I did not see you drive through the fire, no.
1070 MS SPENST: Okay, thank you.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (Spenst)
1071 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms Spenst.
1072 Thank you, gentlemen.
1073 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
1074 THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and gentlemen, we will review where we are in the order of proceedings.
1075 Mr. Winland has some questions for the Environmental Panel, but my understanding is that he is not available before 2:30.
1076 My suggestion is that we adjourn now for lunch, that we reconvene at 1:45 to allow everyone time for lunch, and that we start at that time with the intervenor panels.
1077 Mr. Embree, you could proceed with your evidence at 1:45. Would you be available then?
1078 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1079 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. So we will adjourn until 1:45 and begin with Mr. Embree's evidence.
1080 --- (Luncheon adjournment/Pause-midi)
1081 --- (Upon resuming/À la reprise de l'audience)
1082 THE CHAIRMAN: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Bonjour, mesdames et messieurs.
1083 Ms McKinnon...?
1084 MS McKINNON: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Mackie, before the break, had asked us to undertake to provide a copy of a report to the Board by Westcoast regarding a glycol spill.
1085 I have been advised by our staff that this report is not readily available. There
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 1, ex. (Spenst)
would have to be a search of the NEB database in this respect.
1086 We will undertake to do that search and provide the report to Mr. Mackie once it is discovered.
1087 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms McKinnon.
1088 Mr. Embree, are you ready to proceed?
1089 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I am.
1090 THE CHAIRMAN: Could you come forward now.
1091 If you would go over to the witness table, the court clerk will swear you both in, Mr. and Mrs. Embree.
1092 ROSALINDE EMBREE: Sworn DAVID EMBREE: Affirmed
1093 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. and Mrs. Embree, we just have to go through a couple of formalities to get your evidence onto the record. Ms McKinnon will lead you through those.
1094 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS McKINNON:
1095 MS McKINNON: Mr. Embree, the evidence that you prepared for this hearing is contained in Exhibits C-7-1 to C-7-4. That includes your intervention; a letter dated 26 March 2001 to the Minister of Environment, Lands, and Parks; a letter dated 30 March to the National Energy Board regarding environmental degradation and the trucking of sulphur; a letter dated 1 April 2001 to the National Energy Board regarding waters, atmosphere, forests, wildlife and fisheries.
1096 Have you had an opportunity to review these documents?
1097 MR. EMBREE: Could you repeat the last one?
1098 MS McKINNON: It is a letter dated 1 April 2001 to the National Energy Board regarding waters, atmosphere, forests, wildlife, and fisheries.
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1099 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1100 MS McKINNON: Do you adopt this evidence contained in these exhibits, under oath, as part of your evidence in these proceedings?
1101 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I do.
1102 MS McKINNON: Mrs. Embree, you have had an opportunity to review the same documentation?
1103 MRS. EMBREE: I know some about them.
1104 MS McKINNON: Are you familiar enough with them to adopt them under oath in these proceedings, or would you prefer not to adopt those and allow your husband to do that?
1105 MRS. EMBREE: I will allow my husband to do that.
1106 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
1107 I am sorry, there was another page of evidence. I will just lead you through that; and I assume, Mr. Embree, that you will be the one adopting it.
1108 That consists of written evidence totalling 26 pages that was submitted on April 9th to the record. Are you familiar with that document?
1109 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I am.
1110 MS McKINNON: The videotape and photo disc that you submitted to the Board?
1111 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1112 MS McKINNON: Do you also adopt this evidence?
1113
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MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1114 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
1115 THE CHAIRMAN: That completes the formalities, Mr. and Mrs. Embree.
1116 Did you have a statement that you wanted to make to the Board?
1117 MR. EMBREE: Yes. I just want to read a little brief here.
1118 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, go ahead.
1119 MR. EMBREE: Our name is Pine River Bison Ranch. I would first like to give the Board a brief history about our operation in the Hasler area.
1120 I will then show a video of my observations of the bison herd after the September 9th fire. In this video are observations of the pipeline and other matters concerning the movement of molten sulphur.
1121 In 1995, my family started preparing our land base to raise bison. Bison were purchased in 1995. We raise bison to sell for consumption to the public. We promote a healthy, clean product.
1122 We are distributors for the Canadian Rangeland out of Rimbey, Alberta. We sell bison meat from our home and at local farmers' markets throughout the area.
1123 When we had the oil spill in the river on August 1st, 2000, with the assistance of Pembina Oil Company, we moved our bison to the upper pastures to keep them away from the perceived contaminations in the Pine River waters.
1124 After that, we advertised at the local radio station in Chetwynd that the animals had been moved away from the river's water. This is to follow in the lines of our healthy product. We were not willing to deal with contaminants.
1125 It was at this time that I again questioned what I believe to be a threat to my ranch, and that would be the leak at the building at 3.2 on the sulphur pipeline.
1126 We have contacted vets and other bison producers concerning the changes in
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our herd since the fire on September the 9th.
1127 The main consensus now is to observe and not to stress these animals. This seems to be what the veterinarians are talking about.
1128 The vet said, when he visited the ranch back in September, I believe, that they look fine and basically to keep watching them and monitoring them.
1129 Continuous observations have picked up a loss of hair pattern that had not been observed in this herd in the past. We have had this herd since 1995, so that would be six years, I believe, we have had them.
1130 Right about now, we are looking forward to the spring calves that should be born in about two weeks, and we are hoping that this will be positive.
1131 The bison photos that are in this video were taken between September and October. The marks on the bison/buffalo started to appear in midwinter. That would be November, December and January.
1132 I would like to go through the photo discs now.
1133 THE CHAIRMAN: Go ahead, Mr. Embree.
1134 Mr. Macintosh, can you see those well enough?
1135 MR. MACINTOSH: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
1136 MR. EMBREE: This is a photo from the main gate. It would be about 200 yards from the monitoring building at 3.2. This is looking from the west to the east. That smoke in the photo is what concerned us in the beginning.
1137 This is the hair pattern that is showing up on the animals. I think around Christmastime we started to pick this up.
1138 Actually, this is the building in the pre-meeting we had with Del Reinheimer. That is the building that had leaked that we met with Westcoast about, and MELP. We were concerned about it because the roof was apparently rotting away on it, and it had a really bad odour around it.
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1139 This is the end result of that on September the 9th, the fire.
1140 This is a photo again of the building. I think it is August the 10th that the photo was developed.
1141 It is one of the construction trucks that I believe, after September the 19th, was brought in to service. You will see the cables and that on it that they were going to put this pipeline back together with.
1142 This is the March 14th fire, I believe it was. I really do not know anything about this fire. I just heard that somebody had had a fire, and so I phoned Mike Kosick -- he is the landowner next to me -- and he said go on down and take a look and see what you could see, so I did.
1143 This is a picture of the work that Westcoast is doing around the building at Enersul. This would be the terminus building. It shows a picker truck.
1144 This is a Budget truck that was there. It had insulation and piping and that around the -- you see, we are concerned about this because we do not know anything that is going on around the valley.
1145 Once that fire happened September the 9th, I started to be a little more interested in what is going on around me to protect my property and family and livestock.
1146 This would be that September the 8th fire that I saw Blaine Ethier come out of the building. I talked to them at the building and asked if they minded if I took some photos of the material to prove that this thing would burn. They told me that that would be fine.
1147 The thing here is if you have smoke, you have fire. If you have fire and you have gas, you get an explosion. This is what I was trying to convey to anybody that I could convey it to.
1148 Could we go back to that one. There are quite a few bags of material there. I don't know how many fires they had here, but I don't know. It is just that there are quite a few bags.
1149 This is the fire again on the 9th.
1150
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This would be the photo right after the fire, I think, on the 9th. That is some buffalo down there.
1151 I found out afterwards that that is 239 yards from the main gate, because I had a friend of mine come in. He had a -- what do you call those things? -- a range finder. He likes to hunt lots.
1152 I would have been putting that down at around a couple of hundred yards on my paperwork.
1153 I can't see red very well, so there is a pick-up in that photo. He is trying to herd the buffalo out of that field. He had gone through the fire to get them out of there.
1154 You do not know buffalo, or animals, until you experience things with them. Buffalo tend to group up in a ball when they are threatened. He could not make them move out of that field, so he was going to get out of the pick-up and actually try to chase them. That is not a good idea when you have 57 of the things.
1155 So he was down there for awhile, but eventually they did move into the bush.
1156 This is another photo of that 3.2 building.
1157 This is a buffalo pasture. You will see where the "east" name is there. Then off to the left-hand corner, at the very top, you will see how it is buck brush. These buffalo, before this, were more active at the main gate. That was one of our problems with them. You couldn't get in the pasture because they liked to lay at the front gate there and the calves would play with the padlock on it.
1158 When they go into a new pasture, they will take up their residence. It will be a bedding zone. So where the "west" word is there, that is where they were normally hanging around at, up to the west end there. Mind you, it is not far enough up yet.
1159 What I am going to try and say here is that everything changed after that fire on the 9th. They started to bed down to the very left point there. I don't know if I am going to get a shot of this, but they moved their bedding position.
1160 That is an aerial view of the building at 3.2. That is the firefighting equipment there that Westcoast used at the building. If you go straight east of there, on the right-hand side where the field starts, is where the bedding area was. This is where I would suspect those buffalo were because we had been there before.
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1161 Like I say, they were always hanging out there. They were there that day that we had MELP and Westcoast Energy with us, and this is why we showed concern that day.
1162 This is one of the marks on one of the buffalo. That is another mark on the buffalo.
1163 I am not saying all of the buffalo have these marks. There is about a dozen out of them out of 57 that have these marks on the side of them.
1164 That is another mark on the side of them.
1165 I went on the Internet and I looked for parasites and lice, and everything else that I could try to find out what this mark could be.
1166 Jed Willis phoned me the other night from Willoughby Auctions in Beaverlodge. He stated that he wants to buy our bull stock off of us. I told him I wasn't really too sure yet of what to do with them.
1167 I mentioned these marks to him. He said that he marketed 550 bison this winter at his auction sale, and not one of them had a mark like this on it. So we are just going to keep looking at them.
1168 Now we are getting into the molten sulphur, and the way they move it through Hasler. There seems to be too much of it showing up on the highways.
1169 This is 97 right above Hasler, and it seems a truck has developed a leak coming back from Prince George. I think it is probably still on the highway.
1170 This is the same photo.
1171 This is Abigail, one of my granddaughters. She likes to eat snow, so we are going to be a little more pushy when it comes to sulphur and that around Hasler in the future.
1172 This is one of my cows; I think it is No. 28. She's one of my black cows.
1173 I think about October the 6th they started to get real frothy mouths, and it would bubble out of their mouths and I didn't know what it was. I phoned a vet, and he did not know what it was. I talked to everybody else, and they did not know what it was.
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1174 This is the same cow, but you can see that physically she's in good shape -- physically.
1175 This is another form of stuff that started to show up in their mouths. I think it only lasted three or four or five days. It would be about the same time period, October the 6th.
1176 These are tankers that broke in half, I believe, on the 19th of September and the 26th of September at 10 Kilometre and 9 Kilometre on Westcoast's road.
1177 I tried to get the RCMP to investigate this and the vehicle inspectors to have a look at it. Because it is an off-highway, they said this was okay.
1178 This is the same tanker.
1179 These tanks are full of liquid hot sulphur. If one ever broke on you and you were around it, it would not be very healthy.
1180 Can you go back one more, and one more?
1181 This is a shot looking to the north. It was taken of that farthest tanker to the north.
1182 In the video you will see that about 150 feet to the south of this tanker there is an area where children play. It is called the Ivor Johnson Memorial Park, I believe. It has material in it for kids to play on. I believe that lid of that tanker is open, and that, to me, is neglect.
1183 This is a tanker that I had reported a leak, on the Hasler road, about two and a half kilometres, I believe it was, where I saw a line of sulphur travelling down the road. So I phoned Bob Dempsey at Enersul, and I told him about that.
1184 They did not send me a paper. Normally they will send me a paper to verify that I have done this. They did not do that this time, and a week later this one tanker ruptured. I believe this is from when they hauled it down the road to bring it back home again.
1185 That is the same shot.
1186 There came a time when I did not look at the sulphur pipeline. It is not my
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business to run the pipeline. Now I am looking at the pipeline.
1187 You will see that the pipeline is slid on its -- I think they call that a "saddle", but it is shifting around.
1188 This is another shot of that.
1189 And another shot.
1190 Those other shots meant the pipeline had moved laterally. This one means the pipeline has moved also horizontally, which means it is moving up. I think it moved down the hill.
1191 But it is moving both laterally and horizontally which is -- I don't know if that is normal.
1192 This is a shot -- it would be northeast of the 3.2 building, of the plume area.
1193 This shot would be looking probably southeast of the 3.2 building.
1194 I believe this shot is looking from east to west from my main gate, about halfway up from the main gate looking back towards the 3.2 building, and it is another shot of the plume area.
1195 This is the same shot, but closer to the main gate. But it is looking -- I think of it as east/west because of the property line, but this is where I believe the plume came around the corner and rolled down that road and rolled right into the field.
1196 This is right by the main gate. It is an old snake rail fence that the former owner had put in there. It is probably 30 feet from the main gate, 40 feet. This is another one of those buffalo marks.
1197 I don't know what this is. That cable there, I don't know if it is an electrical cable or what. Maybe it could get hooked on to some vehicle or something. I don't know. It is just lying out there out in the open. It is on the above-ground sulphur pipeline. I believe this is at 3.2 kilometres, about 400 feet from my gate.
1198 That is just another shot of how I believe it was repaired.
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1199 I don't know what this is. It is part of the pipeline that is lying alongside the pipeline at 3.2; again, 400 feet from my main gate.
1200 Off to the left there I think there should be some blue smoke. Do you see blue smoke there?
1201 MRS. EMBREE: I don't.
1202 MR. EMBREE: They were doing some welding in there. Maybe we do not have the right picture in there.
1203 I took a shot of this. I was in there watching the buffalo, and I just took a shot of that just to let people now how close this thing actually is to these animals and our ranch.
1204 That is part of their new bedding location. That would be about 2500 feet to the east of the main gate. They have started to bed down at the extreme corners, as far away from the 3.2 building that they could find.
1205 This is a photo of how they reacted after the fire. They would not go up past this corner.
1206 That corner now I know is 239 yards away from the main gate, and what they would do is they would work their way up there, and it shows in the video that they did not want to go past that corner.
1207 They would cut in there. There is an old white boat in there, and they would cut in at that boat and work their way into the back of this pasture, but they would never go up to the front after that.
1208 Okay. This is another one of the marks.
1209 That is another mark, too. It is probably on the same animal.
1210 They are awfully hard to get pictures of. You have to sit there for a long time. We realize we have a problem with them. We are just going to keep an eye on them.
1211 Right up at the top there it says "Buffalo Pasture". If you see that corner in the buck brush, that is where they were found. That is their new bedding location.
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1212 At the bottom of the photo, across from the south line, is where the main gate is. So to us, that means they are bedding down at the extreme point that they can get away from this gate. But that is also where they came in from the river pasture. We brought them in on August the 16th, and they went immediately back there, and that means they want out.
1213 That is some of the work that was done on the pipeline, and we were never informed of anything like this.
1214 The picture down there is Jeff trying to move them out again with his pick-up.
1215 Can you go back there?
1216 What bothers me is the 107 kilograms of sulphur that burned. I don't know if this is the right place to say this or not, but that valley, normally you can look down there and you can see the mountains coming into each other.
1217 If that 107 kilograms does that, we cannot afford to have 50,000 kilograms burned, I don't think. We just cannot have that.
1218 This is sulphur along the Hasler road. I think its around nine or ten kilometres just lying in the ditch.
1219 This would be one of the sulphur trucks that broke in half. It has adhered itself to the cement, and I believe it is still there -- one of them is, I think.
1220 This is another one. It might be another shot from a different angle, but it is in the same area. The two of them broke in half there.
1221 There is maybe a problem in the road there, how they reacted.
1222 The old boat would be to the right-hand side of the photo, and they would go through a trail, and they would work their way back into that part of the pasture to avoid this front end up here after the fire.
1223 That smoke there is -- CANFOR started to burn about a week later after the fire. They burn their log and slashes, like their brush piles and that.
1224 That is the same photo, but it gives you an idea that they are hanging back.
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There is something wrong up in the top end of the pasture.
1225 I don't know if they got scared out of there, gassed out of there, or how they got out of there, but they do not want to have anything to do with the top end of this pasture any more.
1226 That is a picture of a tree that is -- I think it's 25 feet from the main gate. You might be able to see those buffalo way back in there. It is part of the plume kill.
1227 Okay. That is it.
1228 I would like to show that video now, and we can have a look at that.
1229 --- (Video Presentation/Présentation vidéo)
1230 MR. EMBREE: This is looking from the east to the west, and my pick-up is parked -- would be the east end of the pasture. I am showing a close-up here of where the plume came through. That is the main gate right there.
1231 This will give you an idea of how the buffalo reacted after the fire.
1232 They want to go up there. They will be in the next frame, I think.
1233 I think they are about 250 yards down in the field. You will see that white thing there is an old boat of my brother's that we dragged into there.
1234 What I noticed in their pattern was that they would go up that far, and then they would stand there forever, and then they would slowly work their way into the bush and kitty-corner across into the back of that pasture.
1235 This takes about 15 minutes. If anybody wants to rush this procedure along, it doesn't matter to me. We can fast forward or we can sit and watch it.
1236 THE CHAIRMAN: However you want to present it, Mr. Embree.
1237 MR. EMBREE: I'm sorry...?
1238
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THE CHAIRMAN: That is all right. If there are parts where you would just like to fast forward, just indicate.
1239 MR. EMBREE: One of the problems with the buffalo is they like to roll and everything. They roll their bodies all the time, so you will see one or two or three of them start to roll in the dirt.
1240 Normally these things are a little more active than this. They can be awfully quiet or awfully explosive.
1241 They are awfully quiet right now in this picture.
1242 I am just taking a picture at the bush there to kill the boredom while I wait for them to finish this procedure.
1243 Maybe just fast forward it a bit. Okay, that is good there.
1244 There is one rolling there now.
1245 Could you fast forward it, please? Unless somebody wants to watch this, fast forward it.
1246 It takes them a while yet to go in there.
1247 They just don't want to go up there. That is not normal.
1248 It is just abnormal behaviour that I noticed in them. That is all I am going to try and...
1249 They went in there finally.
1250 Could you stop it?
1251 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Embree, if their behaviour was more normal, what would we be seeing?
1252 MR. EMBREE: They would have went right up to the gate. They went
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straight up to where the boat was from where I was watching them, but there seems to be something up there by that gate in that 240 yards they don't want to get near.
1253 That is all I am trying to indicate here, is their behaviour pattern has changed.
1254 They cut through there at the boat and they go to the top end of the pasture, but these ones, they are going to do something different here.
1255 What I did is: I went right around. Down where they are at right now, I followed along the pasture and went straight to the north and came around to the main gate. Those buffalo, all they did was go in there at the boat. I don't know how far they came in, but they came right back out about 2500 feet down to the east. That was their typical grazing pattern.
1256 That is just another shot of them down there that shows you the distance that they are down there; 2600 feet down to the east.
1257 This would be that new bedding location where they came into the pasture at from the river pasture down on the bottom. They have taken up a new location.
1258 I had Brian Terrane, a veterinarian come out. He looked at this video, this piece right here, and he said this is normal behaviour for calves. I haven't showed it to any buffalo producers yet.
1259 If you want to see some real excitement with buffalo, you should go to an auction.
1260 I took a shot of this calf because he showed disorientation. I didn't know what I was looking for, so I figured I would videotape it and maybe show it to a veterinarian.
1261 This was their normal action after the fire. They were really sluggish. I just put that shot of the fence in there because we pay, I think it is, about $5300 a mile for these fences. We have 12 and a half miles of fences on the farm.
1262 This is a shot where they -- no, that's okay. What I am showing here is these animals roll around a lot, and there has been rain, and they have rolled around and picked it up all over their bodies. The hair loss started to show up on them.
1263 I took a picture of that one to show that they have horn damage around their
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necks from rubbing like that. There are marks on their necks, but I assumed it was from the horn damage.
1264 That would be hair loss on that one.
1265 That is another thing, too. I have run a registered trapline for a long time; 26 years in this area. This time of the year these animals are growing fur; they are not losing it. It should be all brand-new fur coming in.
1266 That is another calf that didn't seem to know what he was doing. I will always try and rationalize things out. He could have just gotten up maybe or did something.
1267 --- (A short pause/Courte pause)
1268 MR. EMBREE: This is just more photos of what they look like rolling around in the mud and picking up the dirt.
1269 I wasn't too sure. I just wanted to get them on video. They never looked like this before, so I am just going to keep watching them.
1270 That is one in the back, I think we saw a still frame of her where she is slobbering. The whole herd did that for a little while, and I never ate my supper anyway after watching them. But they got over that.
1271 The herd has never lost any physical size in the past six months. The physical part of the bodies and that have been good. We fed them really good this winter.
1272 They are a little deceiving because you have to watch them when the hair comes off them because they are such a heavy-hided animal. That is when you will start to see whether they are skinny or their hips are sticking out. We are going to keep watching them for that.
1273 If there were any contaminants in the soil, they would roll it onto their bodies, and I would suspect that is where the marks would come from, and the hair loss maybe. I don't know.
1274 That cow there -- do you want to roll that back, if you can -- you will see up on the top of her back she has a pretty good spot on her.
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1275
They groom themselves like this. If they had any SO2 on them, or whatever, they would lick it off. They also lick spots on them, but they can't lick it off their stomachs.
1276 These are just pictures of the plume kill that rolled down along that side into the pasture.
1277 This is parts of the pipeline. Maybe the hydroshock of September 19th may have broke that off. They cut it off and replaced it.
1278 Could you turn the volume up, please?
1279 If I sound a little frustrated in this video, I hope you just take into account that we are living around here, and we want to stay in business. So we are going to try and get this sulphur cleaned up and the fires stopped.
1280 That is back at that 3.2 building looking to the east. We don't know if we should be worried about that type of thing on the pipeline.
1281 Bob Dempsey told me that Westcoast is responsible for the sulphur until it gets into his plant. I was not aware. So I have been getting hold of Bob Dempsey at Enersul on this. I have been talking to the wrong people.
1282
If sulphur gives off SO2, would there be an explosive mix inside these trucks down in Hasler, in the community? I would wonder if those will blow up. I just do not think it is a safe procedure.
1283 This is just a buffalo I took a picture of. I was looking at her eye. She had a mark on the side of her there.
1284 I'm suspicious by nature. I see a small mark developing off on the left-hand side of her. I just took a picture of her. I never noticed. I have a lot of pictures of these things. Then I took a picture of her eye because it was running.
1285 That is hair from I don't know where. These are the ones we seen on the CD disc of the slobber.
1286 You can turn the volume up on these ones. This shows the herd, I think, about mid-December.
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1287 This isn't December; this is back in October. Those December photos are coming up yet.
1288 They talk to each other all the time, these buffalo, and this herd never grunted for about three weeks, I think it was. October the 10th they started to grunt back and forth to their calves again.
1289 So it just shows that the herd was quiet, sluggish, and never talked to each other, and then they started it again. I tried to get that in this video here, this grunting of the animals; that eventually came back. It is just another observation of them.
1290 This would be the December and January months. That's when these marks started to show up, I think.
1291 I put that in there to show you that the herd is not dead. Those are the two breeding bulls in the herd. There is still one more.
1292 They got into it a lot more after that, but we cut it out. We should not have done that. We should have left it in there. It was a good fight. That is just the marks that we see on the CDs.
1293 That is the end of the tape.
1294 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Embree, is that the end of your evidence?
1295 MR. EMBREE: That is the end of my presentation.
1296 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
1297 Mr. Macintosh, did you have any questions?
1298 MR. MACINTOSH: I have a few, Mr. Chair, thank you; I don't think too many, but we will see.
1299 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. MACINTOSH:
1300 MR. MACINTOSH: Mr. and Mrs. Embree, if you can get a few pieces of
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paper in front of you, please, so you don't have to scramble for them during the questioning.
1301 One of them is a letter from the vet to you dated January 25th of this year. That is part of Exhibit C-7-5.
1302 MR. EMBREE: I have that.
1303 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you, sir.
1304 And a couple of others, if you could dig them out: There is a letter that you wrote to the NEB on March 30th. That is C-7-3.
1305 MR. EMBREE: We don't have that one in front of us.
1306 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. Could that be arranged in some fashion? I am afraid I don't have an extra copy.
1307 MS McKINNON: What was the exhibit number, Mr. Macintosh?
1308 MR. MACINTOSH: That is C-7-3. That is the letter from Mr. Embree to the Secretary of the Board of March 30.
1309 I was also going to ask for C-7-4, which is his letter to the Board of April 1st.
1310 My friend has just provided copies for me which I can give to Mr. Embree.
1311 The only other one that I believe I may refer to is your letter -- it is Exhibit A-7, it is part of A-7, and it is your letter, Mr. Embree, to the Board of March 15, 2001.
1312 MR. EMBREE: We don't have that one either.
1313 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. We will have to dig that one out from somewhere. Thank you.
1314 MS McKINNON: Could I get another description of that letter?
1315
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MR. MACINTOSH: Yes. The two things that I can tell you is that it is part of A-7, and it's a letter dated March 15, 2001, Mr. Embree and family to the Board.
1316 MS McKINNON: That is to the NEB?
1317 MR. MACINTOSH: That is correct.
1318 MS McKINNON: I have it here.
1319 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you very much.
1320 MR. EMBREE: Thank you.
1321 MR. MACINTOSH: So Mr. Embree, as I understand, you obtained the letter from the vet, which is the letter dated January 25 of this year; is that right?
1322 MR. EMBREE: Yes, it is.
1323 MR. MACINTOSH: That is Brian Terrane?
1324 MR. EMBREE: Terrane.
1325 MR. MACINTOSH: Terrane? He was the man you mentioned when you were showing the video. You were showing the video of the calves.
1326 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1327 MR. MACINTOSH: You quoted him as saying that the calf behaviour was normal that was shown in the video?
1328 MR. EMBREE: Yes, that is correct.
1329 MR. MACINTOSH: It appears from the letter that he saw the herd on September 25th.
1330 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
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1331 MR. MACINTOSH: You had said a moment ago that the herd was appearing sluggish until October 10 or so.
1332 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1333 MR. MACINTOSH: Don't worry, I am not trying to be Perry Mason here to suggest any contradiction. I want to get his picture of the herd from the letter of when he saw it September 25th.
1334 MR. EMBREE: Brian Terrane came out to see the buffalo, and the first thing that Brian said was that he didn't know too much about buffalo.
1335 I know the buffalo herd, and you can't drive up to the buffalo herd and park in the middle of it with a pick-up.
1336 So Brian came along and said that they looked fine. They did look fine that day.
1337 MR. MACINTOSH: He said that the overall health of the herd appeared to be within normal limits?
1338 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1339 MR. MACINTOSH: He said that they all appeared to be bright and alert with none of them showing any evidence of gross clinical disease?
1340 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1341 MR. MACINTOSH: He said that, on further observation, the animals all appeared to be in good bodily condition?
1342 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1343 MR. MACINTOSH: He said that the hair coats were shiny with evidence of self-grooming occurring.
1344 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
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1345 MR. MACINTOSH: And then he advised that he had talked to several veterinary toxicologists and veterinarians who have conducted research on the effects of exposure to gas field by-products, and it would appear that if obvious signs of clinical disease have not manifested themselves within the first two months, it is unlikely that any will.
1346 That is what he advised you?
1347 MR. EMBREE: Yes, it is.
1348 MR. MACINTOSH: The marks that you showed us in the pictures, you advised that they didn't first appear until four months or five months later, until January, December, around Christmas of 2000 or January of 2001?
1349 MR. EMBREE: Yes, that is correct.
1350 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. You were here this morning when Dr. Sehmer testified about the effects on people, and it was similar in the sense that from these acute exposures, like a one-shot time, like from the fire, usually the symptoms are shown soon or not at all.
1351 Did you hear that?
1352 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I think I did.
1353 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. As I understand the letter here, the vet is appearing to say that, among veterinarians, the same conclusion seems to be the case with buffalo?
1354 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1355 MR. MACINTOSH: Regarding the trucks, in the photographs that you showed there were first some slides on the screen there, and we saw the trouble that you photographed with regard to the movement of the molten sulphur on the road, because you showed some harden sulphur on the pavement?
1356 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I did.
1357 MR. MACINTOSH: Then you showed some tankers broken in half?
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1358 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I did.
1359 MR. MACINTOSH: Then you showed some what appeared to be, I think, sulphur from the tankers that had spilled the sulphur running into the watercourse?
1360 MR. EMBREE: No, what I showed there was that -- what part of the CDs are you talking about? The sulphur that was stacked on the road or the sulphur that was adhered to the road up in the ditch?
1361 MR. MACINTOSH: No, I was going to reference that as well.
1362 In the pictures that you showed on the screen to your immediate left there, the slides, as I call them, there was a picture of some water -- I think it was water in a ditch or a stream of some kind.
1363 Do you recall that?
1364 MR. EMBREE: No, I don't.
1365 MR. MACINTOSH: I see. That's right because I don't need to go back to it necessarily.
1366 You showed also though, as you indicated, some sulphur on the road, on a ditch of the road.
1367 Do you remember that?
1368 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I did.
1369 MR. MACINTOSH: And you showed, of course the videos and the photographs of the trucks that had cracked?
1370 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I did.
1371 MR. MACINTOSH: In the letters that you wrote to the Board on March 30 and April 1 -- and that is Exhibit C-7-3 and C-7-4 -- you complained, as I read the letters, about the effects of poor handling of sulphur on the trucks or at least sulphur falling from the trucks
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and requiring clean-up?
1372 Is that right? It is in the March 30th letter.
1373 Do you have that?
1374 MR. EMBREE: Could you read that to me what you are talking about?
1375 MR. MACINTOSH: You bet. In the March 30 letter, which is C-7-3 --
1376 Do you have that handy?
1377 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I do.
1378 MR. MACINTOSH: You reference to the Board -- I say "complain". It appears in the nature of a complaint, but you say:
1379 "A continuous strip of the Hasler Creek forest road is covered with adhered Sulfur 5 feet wide from leaking Sulfur Trucks."
1380 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I did.
1381 MR. MACINTOSH: And you go on to ask what I call critical questions with regard to the transportation of the sulphur by truck.
1382 Fair enough?
1383 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1384 MR. MACINTOSH: Similarly, in a letter of April 1 to the Board, you talk about this road being subjected to a cleaning, but that didn't get carried out properly, as I read your letter, because you say that the brush truck was doing the brushing, and the sulphur was cleaned up at the expense of the environment.
1385 MR. EMBREE: Yes, it was.
1386
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MR. MACINTOSH: So you and I were in agreement, if I may suggest, that there were several difficulties for the environment associated with the trucking of the sulphur.
1387 Fair enough?
1388 MR. EMBREE: Yes, it is.
1389 MR. MACINTOSH: On another point: On the 9th of September of 2000, Mrs. Embree --
1390 Which do you prefer? People have different preferences.
1391 MRS. EMBREE: It does not matter.
1392 MR. MACINTOSH: I am told by Corky Weightman that he called you about midday -- his note was 11:44 -- but around noontime about the fire. Do you recall that?
1393 MRS. EMBREE: Yes.
1394 MR. MACINTOSH: He tells me that when he phoned you at that time he advised that it was best to stay out of the area until it was known better what the picture was.
1395 MRS. EMBREE: My conversation with Corky that I can recall -- I had already known about the fire. By the time he phoned me, I was aware that the fire was out.
1396 I find it was closer to a quarter after 12 when I talked to Corky, and I was already aware that the fire was out. He was to get back to me.
1397 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. His note, which he showed me, which I can show you -- and if need be, I can call him. I don't think we have to get into that -- is 11:54.
1398 I take it you don't have a note of the time. It could have been 11:54.
1399 MRS. EMBREE: I have the note at home.
1400 MR. MACINTOSH: And your note is 12:15?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (Macintosh)
1401 MRS. EMBREE: Let's say between 10 to 12 to quarter after 12.
1402 MR. MACINTOSH: We'll call it a -- we won't have you bring the note.
1403 Ten to 12:00 might include 11:54. Anyway, he tells me that he phoned you, more or less, first thing when he thought the fire was under control to advise you about the fire.
1404 MRS. EMBREE: Yes, and I felt Corky's phone call was a little late, knowing that we knew the fire happened around 11:20. When Corky phoned, we had already talked to other people, I would say, about it.
1405 MR. MACINTOSH: So you already knew about the fire?
1406 MRS. EMBREE: Yes, it was over, as far as I knew.
1407
MR. MACINTOSH: You talked to him about whether it was H2S or SO2, and he said it was SO2?
1408 MRS. EMBREE: I can't remember that. I remember asking him I did need to know what was in the fire because of my family and our animals.
1409
MR. MACINTOSH: Sure. I am told that he advised that it was SO2 and it was not H2S. That makes sense?
1410 MRS. EMBREE: Yes. I presume that, yes.
1411 MR. MACINTOSH: A last thing: The letter that you wrote, Mr. Embree, to the Board on March 15, that is A-7 -- do you have that handy?
1412 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I do.
1413 MR. MACINTOSH: In the evidence you gave earlier this afternoon, when you were speaking to the Board at the time of your photographs on the screen --
1414 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1415
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (Macintosh)
MR. MACINTOSH: -- notes that you said this: "I don't really know anything about the March 14 fire."
1416 MR. EMBREE: No, I don't. I don't know anything about the March 14th fire. I just know that they had one.
1417 MR. MACINTOSH: So you didn't know how tiny it was or how big it was?
1418 MR. EMBREE: It doesn't matter if you a burn a cup of sulphur today, you can burn a 5-gallon tomorrow, and you can burn 100 gallons a day after, and you can burn me, and I have had enough of that.
1419 MR. MACINTOSH: Excuse me, Mr. Embree. The first question I asked you on that, sir, was: You didn't know how big it was.
1420 Correct?
1421 MR. EMBREE: No, I didn't.
1422 MR. MACINTOSH: You didn't phone anybody at Westcoast before you complained to the NEB to find out the size of the fire, did you?
1423 MR. EMBREE: I have been trying to stop the fires.
1424 MR. MACINTOSH: You didn't phone and find out whether it was a controlled fire with someone standing there with a fire extinguisher in the course of doing some work on a 1-inch drain pipe, did you?
1425 MR. EMBREE: No, I didn't.
1426 MR. MACINTOSH: All you did, instead of phoning Westcoast and finding out anything at all, you heard some story about a fire and so you sent off a complaint letter to the NEB?
1427 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1428 MR. MACINTOSH: That is over 20 letters that you have written, as I read the record, in the last few months.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (Macintosh)
1429 MR. EMBREE: I don't know of that. I guess I have written 20.
1430 MR. MACINTOSH: You say in the letter to the NEB -- we know the next day the NEB closed down the work on the line, and we know that there were two pieces of information the Board had. One was your letter and one was Mr. Mackie's letter. There may have been other information, but I don't know.
1431 In your letter to the NEB on March 15, you say that the forest east of the site shows extensive discolouration similar to the fumigation evidence.
1432 I thought you were suggesting to the Board that the March 14 fire might have been responsible for that.
1433 Were you not saying that?
1434 MR. EMBREE: I didn't know what was going on.
1435 MR. MACINTOSH: Sir, before when you complained to the NEB -- and you say here:
1436 "We would request that this sulphur pipeline be shut down."
1437 I suggest to you that perhaps it wouldn't be bad to just phone Corky or someone else before you ask for the line to be shut down to see what the circumstance was on that day.
1438 Is that not a possibility?
1439 MR. EMBREE: Yes, it is.
1440 MR. MACINTOSH: All right. Thank you, sir.
1441 Thank you, Mr. Chair.
1442 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Macintosh.
1443
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (Macintosh)
Ms McKinnon, do you have any questions for this panel?
1444 MS McKINNON: If no other party has questions, I am ready to proceed.
1445 MS McKINNON: I just need a moment.
1446 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS. McKINNON:
1447 MS McKINNON: Mr. Embree, just a matter of clarification on the last question posed by Mr. Macintosh: I understand you were involved in some litigation with Westcoast regarding the damage you claim happened to your buffalo herd?
1448 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1449 MS McKINNON: Was there any indication from Westcoast that they would not speak to you about issues surrounding the sulphur pipeline while the litigation was proceeding?
1450 MR. EMBREE: No.
1451 MS McKINNON: I just wanted to clarify that. So there is no reason why you couldn't speak to Westcoast?
1452 MR. EMBREE: No.
1453 MS McKINNON: Mr. and Mrs. Embree, what would it take, from your perspective, for Westcoast to satisfy you that the pipeline could be safely operated, if anything?
1454 MR. EMBREE: Could you ask that again?
1455 MS McKINNON: What would it take, from your perspective, for Westcoast to satisfy you that the pipeline could be safely operated?
1456 MR. EMBREE: Start by maybe changing the management. I don't know.
1457 They have had too many fires, and they just seem to start small and escalate, and -- I don't know.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (McKinnon)
1458 I just want to live in the valley and ranch. I don't want to have to worry about the pipeline.
1459 MS McKINNON: If Westcoast could assure you they weren't going to have fires, would you feel safer on your ranch?
1460 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I would.
1461 MS McKINNON: Is that your main concern, the fires?
1462 MR. EMBREE: Yes, it is.
1463 MS McKINNON: What kind of public consultation process would you like to see between stakeholders, like yourself, and Westcoast?
1464 MR. EMBREE: I would like to hear from them when they are going to be doing anything on the pipeline.
1465 We had a similar problem with blasting up in the mountains at a coal mine, and now they come and drop a piece of paper off when they are going to set these blasts.
1466 As long as we are aware of what is going on, there is not a problem.
1467 MS McKINNON: So you want to be kept up to date on things that are going on on the pipeline?
1468 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I do.
1469 MS McKINNON: And incidents that happen?
1470 MR. EMBREE: Yes.
1471 MS McKINNON: Anything else?
1472 MR. EMBREE: No, no.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (McKinnon)
1473 MS McKINNON: Thank you.
1474 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. and Mrs. Embree.
1475 I think that is all, and you may step down.
1476 Sorry, just a moment.
1477 Mr. Mackie, were you indicating you had a question?
1478 MR. MACKIE: Yes, sir. I would like to make one of my own personal observations, plus a couple of questions, if that is all right.
1479 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. MACKIE:
1480 MR. MACKIE: Prior to these animals being moved across the river, they resided on the north side basically beside our property because we join together.
1481 These animals spent the majority of their time at my end of the field, which is within 100 feet of our house, so we saw them more than the Embrees.
1482 From my observations -- I went with Dave on the Sunday after the fire to check out the buffalo to see how they reacted. He wanted my opinion -- and they definitely did not act the same whatsoever because when they were at our place, you could go out to the fence and they were gone.
1483 They would not stay anywhere near you. If you moved away from the fence, they would come back to the fence, but if you stayed right at the fence, they would not come back.
1484 We went over on Sunday and looked at the buffalo, and you could basically walk right in amongst them and they would not move. We drove right through them and watched their interactions, and it was totally different.
1485 I do have some questions here.
1486 Mr. Macintosh made reference to ditches along the Hasler Road, Dave.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 D. and R. Embree, ex. (Mackie)
Where do those ditches drain?
1487 MR. EMBREE: Into the Pine River.
1488 MR. MACKIE: Into Hasler Creek, and then --
1489 MR. EMBREE: Into Hasler Creek and then into Pine River.
1490 MR. MACKIE: Were you and myself and other residents not informed by Westcoast at the last resident meeting that they would contact us regarding any incident on the pipeline?
1491 Is that not correct?
1492 MR. EMBREE: Yes, I believe so.
1493 MR. MACKIE: Thank you very much.
1494 Thank you, sir.
1495 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Mackie.
1496 Thank you, Mr. and Mrs. Embree.
1497 Mr. Mackie, you have not filed any evidence as such, so normally we wouldn't need to call you as a witness.
1498 Were you proposing to give any evidence?
1499 MR. MACKIE: No, I am not, sir, just a summation.
1500 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
1501 I believe that none of the other intervenors have filed any evidence, but we understand that Mayor Lasser wishes to make a statement. I am wondering if now would be the appropriate time to deal with that before we recall the environmental panel.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 Mayor Lasser
1502 CHARLIE LASSER: Sworn
1503 --- PRESENTATION BY/PRÉSENTATION PAR MAYOR LASSER:
1504 MAYOR LASSER: As an introduction, I will give my background. I first started on elected bodies in 1958 in the Fraser Valley. I then spent 12 years on council, came up in 1974, finished off in 1974, was elected in 1976 mayor of Chetwynd, and I have been out two terms in that period of time, which is five years.
1505 What I would like to say is that, first off, before I start, I have dealt with Westcoast from the days of the hearings that we had for the plant to go in to now.
1506 The local people we have here and in Fort St. John, I have nothing but good results, good working relations with them.
1507 Through my ranch I have about five miles of pipeline. They have been very good on that end of it. Anything they want to go through, they get permission, et cetera, so I have no complaint with the local people.
1508 It is the head office which is completely different than they were 20 years ago. Twenty years ago you could take their word. Today a handshake with the president of the company means nothing to the vice-presidents.
1509 One thing before I start in on this, the oil spill we had last year has traumatized the whole area. It was the worst inland oil spill in Canadian history. We didn't know what to expect. It was just unreal.
1510 Yet Pembina Pipelines, right away, their general manager and vice-president came up. They said they will take full responsibility. They had public meetings. They let everyone know exactly what was going on. Where people were very upset at the start, every week they had meetings to keep people informed.
1511 That is the big thing today. People want to know. They will not just take the words there "is nothing to worry about". That is a thing of the past.
1512 So they went ahead and met with people, explained, they went to talk to property owners, and they have had a good rapport. I would say there are still some problems, but nothing very much.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 Mayor Lasser
1513 Westcoast, on the other hand, I am very surprised that the head office did not realize that there was a problem.
1514 It doesn't matter how big or how small of a problem. It could be a small problem to the company, but to an individual you do not know what to expect.
1515 If like Mr. Mackie, who has animals there and Mr. Embree, your animals -- and I know, I have a large herd of cattle -- they are not just animals; they are friends. You know them individually and you are very concerned.
1516 I would like to say this: I have only had about 55 years experience with cattle, so maybe I don't know as much as a vet, but I will say this: you can get an animal that will have pneumonia when it is young, and the tips of its ears, over the heat, will come off. You will not see any sign of that animal -- any harm at all to that animal. But next winter, or the following winter, all of a sudden it gets pneumonia, its lungs are gone, and it is a dead animal.
1517 So it doesn't necessarily mean that you can see a result right away on what happens to animals.
1518 I can understand. I saw just from those pictures of the hair coming off in patches. That is not normal in buffalo or in cattle. If it is, it is a problem.
1519 The people in the area, after that oil spill -- and I never want to go through another thing like that again the rest of my life, because that was just unbelievable to everybody. We didn't know what was going to happen.
1520 Then something like this comes along. For the Embrees: You are in an awful position. So this is one of the problems.
1521 As far as sulphur, we have a plant up there which is permitted to put 20 tonnes of sulphur a day into the air every year. That has been going on for over 20 years.
1522 Our doctors are very concerned, not with these fires and that, but before that. Our doctors are very concerned that we have an extremely high respiratory problem in the Chetwynd area. We have an extremely high case of cancer compared to other areas in the province.
1523 I have asked for an investigation at this point to see what goes on. My wife just had a cancer operation, so I know it is not something that you want to see in your area.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 Mayor Lasser
1524 So we are very concerned.
1525 Enersul, in their statement, they had a letter there about the air monitors. We have asked for more air monitors to find out if there is a problem, what the cause of the problem is.
1526 I read every month at least once in some of the agricultural periodicals where somewhere in Alberta or Saskatchewan there are cases where farmers are realizing that their animals are dying, and they want to know why.
1527 There has been cases now settled out of court because the companies realize there is a problem.
1528 In this area, we do not mind the extraction of minerals; that is fine. But all we ask for is safety. On this side of the Continental Divide, we send 38 percent of the revenue to Victoria. We are lucky if we get 5 percent back.
1529 We do not want to be just hewers of wood and drawers of water. We want to make sure that there is safety for our people.
1530 As I say, there is no way we want to see that plant shut down, but we want to see that it is made as safe as possible for the residents of the area.
1531 We have a unique situation here. We have the District of Chetwynd, and we have satellites. So the pulp mill, about 20 miles to the east of us, that is satellited, and so is the scrubbing plant and so is Enersul and the new coal mine. They are all part of our municipality.
1532 The new plant that is proposed up at Sukunka, which is referred to as the Kwoen plant, we support that because of the reinjection into the ground, so there is going to be no static, and the sulphur will be handled safely. That is what our big concern is again: safety.
1533 This valley here is a sink. Anything coming over draws down and then the current goes up on the edge of the hills.
1534 You can take hang gliders and jump off one area. If you cross the valley, you can have the longest hang glide in all of Canada, maybe 100 miles to Fairview.
1535 If you come to try across the valley, you will be sucked down into one of my
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 Mayor Lasser
fields because it just comes down like this.
1536 So whatever comes down the hill, a good chance is that a lot of it will remain in the valley.
1537 We are pleased to see that Kwoen plant and glad to support it for the reinjection.
1538 But what I say is that we have a problem with the head company. When they made their application to you people, in the application was that the construction camp would be in Chetwynd using our water and sewer facilities.
1539 Now I was just told this morning that that camp is going to be at the site. So I can't believe them. I can't trust them.
1540 That hurts me to say that because at one time I knew all the senior vice-presidents of Westcoast, and they were all honourable men.
1541 As I say, we are concerned with not only the people in the area, but also for our animals.
1542 In cattle, I find that after the plant came in -- before then we never had to worry about selenium in cattle. Selenium is what makes the muscles work.
1543 I understand that sulphur binds the selenium in the cow, and when the calf is born, there is a lack of selenium. So we have to give every calf a shot or else the calf will just lie there limp and it will just bawl, but it can't move. If you give it a shot, then it is fine. If you do not do it, it will die. So we are concerned with that.
1544 I am concerned as well that on my place I used to have a sawmill. I could cut 20 trees down and probably 16 I could cut saw logs out. Today we stripped ours before it starts to rot and blows down. On about a 40- to 50-log load I could maybe get two or three that was good.
1545 Something, I am not saying what it is, something is prematurely killing the trees. If there is a problem, the first thing it will show up in is the vegetation.
1546 As I say, I am concerned with the head office. It seems to be more now as it is a larger company. They are more interested in profits than in the area residents.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 Mayor Lasser
1547 As I say again, people will no longer be silent. They want to know what is going on. I think, looking back at it now and listening to all the evidence, that had the company done the same as Pembina with their pipeline break, had meetings with people, explained what is going on -- when I came to the meeting, that was the first time I heard that it was only apparently about a tonne that was burnt. We didn't know.
1548 That is hard because we should know. Our council should have been informed of what it is because if a provincial emergency program kicks in, the mayor is the one responsible to see that it is carried out in the area. So if it is an emergency, that is part of my responsibilities.
1549 What I would like to say is that we require proper information and, above all, safety to our people and to our animals.
1550 There was a question that said: "What would you like to see done about it?" There is a simple answer: Let Westcoast put up a cash bond. So in case anything happens like this, they don't have to go to court to sue for what money would be made available. It could be made through a three-party group; people that could get together to work that out because it is hard.
1551 It is hard for an individual, any one of these people here, to go up against Westcoast. You can't do it. If you want to sue them, you may as well go sue the wind because they can put you in court for years and break you. That has been done before by companies.
1552 Mr. Macintosh had a question: Why did they go right to you people rather than Westcoast? Why didn't they inquire from Westcoast?
1553 It is not up to an individual to inquire what has happened. It is up to a company, any company, to let people know what is going on. You fear what you do not know. If we had proper information, we wouldn't have to be here today. So that, I think, is very important.
1554 Again, I want to say that we want that plant to keep on operating. It brings a good payroll. It gives us a real good quality of workers in the area. We are proud of them, but we want to make sure that we have safety in the area.
1555 I am sure that with all the technology that Westcoast has, there is no reason that they can't make a pipeline and put it in and make it successful to carry that out.
1556 Trucking is not the answer. We have seen on the pictures. I know my boy
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 Mayor Lasser
years ago, before they put the pipeline in, had a truck on and it went over as well. So you cannot haul off that mountain successful all winter long with the big trucks that they have.
1557 So, we want to see a pipeline in. We want to see a safe pipeline in, and Westcoast has the expertise to put it in.
1558 Thank you.
1559 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mayor Lasser.
1560 Mr. Macintosh, did you have any questions of Mayor Lasser?
1561 MR. MACINTOSH: I don't have questions, but I am sure that many of the mayor's comments would be -- I would want to thank him on behalf of the company. Obviously I don't have instructions on that, but I think those are a lot of helpful comments.
1562 MAYOR LASSER: Very good.
1563 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.
1564 Thank you, Mayor Lasser.
1565 MAYOR LASSER: Thank you.
1566 THE CHAIRMAN: We will take a break at this point and resume for the further cross-examination of the environmental panel. We will reconvene in 20 minutes, at five to 4:00.
1567 --- (A short recess/Pause)
1568 --- (Upon resuming/À la reprise de l'audience)
1569 THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. David Winland, I think we are ready for your questions of this panel.
1570 MIRIAM HACKER: Resumed PETER REID: Resumed
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (D. Winland)
JOHN SEHMER: Resumed AL RITCHIE: Resumed
1571 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MR. D. WINLAND:
1572 MR. D. WINLAND: Ms. Hacker I would like to address first off.
1573 Have you done the testing on which way the wind direction went?
1574 MS HACKER: Yes, we did some dispersion modelling to estimate concentrations downwind.
1575 MR. D. WINLAND: The pictures that the National Energy Board took of the growth and the trees and stuff, did you take that into consideration in part of your scaling?
1576 MS HACKER: When we performed the model, we were given some photographs conducting the modelling, and we did take into account the information that we had at the time, yes.
1577 MR. D. WINLAND: Because there seems to be a discrepancy as far as which way that plume of smoke went.
1578 From my point of view, seeing the pictures, it is quite obvious.
1579 I am wondering: Was there something else that changed there that we are not aware of?
1580 MS HACKER: The only information that we had at our disposal was the observations of the vegetation and the observations of the personnel that were on site at the time of the fire and, as well, some meteorological measurements that were taken at the monitoring site one kilometre away.
1581 All of those factors were taken into account.
1582 MR. D. WINLAND: So the major amount of the plume, are you still saying it went down the Westcoast pipeline and into the tree area?
1583 MS HACKER: That is where the model estimated that the plume did go.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (D. Winland)
That is an estimation, and it is possible that the plume may have varied more than it was estimated.
1584 MR. D. WINLAND: Because you would think if that was the case, that there would be a lot more damaged vegetation in that area.
1585 MS HACKER: From what we have seen of Dr. Legge's work, he seemed to corroborate the direction of the plume, according to the vegetation damage that he saw.
1586 That is what I have read. I don't know anything other than that.
1587 MR. D. WINLAND: The next question is: The fall-out circle for the emergency response plan, is there somebody who is here who can address that?
1588 MR. RITCHIE: Yes, I can speak to that.
1589 MR. D. WINLAND: How did you determine that radius?
1590 MR. RITCHIE: The original plan, which contains the --
1591 MR. D. WINLAND: That is this map that we have here. Is that the current one that we have?
1592 MR. RITCHIE: I am not sure of the date of that one. There would be one that shows an impact or an emergency planning zone for an H2S release.
1593 Contained within that, if that is the most recent, would show one for a sulphur release from the pipeline and a subsequent fire.
1594 MR. D. WINLAND: What I am wondering is: The testing and stuff that you did to determine that, how old is that? When did you do that testing to determine this fall-out circle?
1595
MR. REID: We are talking about the H2S emergency planning zone or the SO2 one?
1596 MR. D. WINLAND: Are they both pretty well similar? Which one has the most potential to carry?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (D. Winland)
1597 MR. REID: They more or less overlap.
1598 I think the diagram that is back there -- they are pretty well overlapped. I think that the EPZ for the SO2 falls outside of the H2S one for awhile, and then at other times it is contained within it.
1599 MR. D. WINLAND: Okay.
1600 MR. REID: The RWDI report has a fairly good explanation of how that was calculated, how we arrived at 3,100 metres as being the maximum distance at which you may be able to see a concentration of 15 parts per million SO2, and that is in the RWDI report.
1601 MR. D. WINLAND: The reason I was asking that is because: When you did these studies, did you take into consideration that the Dokkie area has a school.
1602 From living there most of my life and the brush piles that are burned there, looking at the smoke that does travel, it travels right down to Chetwynd.
1603
Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems that this SO2 or H2S would also travel that far. In your planning for this zone you have here now, I was wondering if you did take into consideration that school.
1604 MR. REID: The process that they go through to come up with the emergency planning zone, the distance to which you should be considering planning for is based on the modelling.
1605 What we are trying to establish is a maximum distance at which we may experience 15 parts per million. That is not to say that the sulphur dioxide won't travel farther than that, but past that point we are down to 10 or 5 parts per million and farther still we are down well below that. So we are trying to establish a zone where we can reasonably expect an impact that is significant enough that we should plan for, and then everything that falls within that area is under consideration of that plan.
1606
So we are not saying by putting a line there on the map that SO2 won't travel beyond that line. We are saying: Past that point, in all probability, you are not going to see a concentration high enough to be of concern.
1607 I think that we have captured more or less the entire community of Hasler in that EPZ.
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (D. Winland)
1608 MR. D. WINLAND: You have, I believe, in that.
1609 MR. REID: That says that if there is a significant incident involving sulphur dioxide, that the entire community of Hasler falls within that plan.
1610 MR. D. WINLAND: But as far as like the crow flies, from the plant to Dokkie school is not very far. You are sitting up on top there. The way the smoke goes, it is just like a funnel. It shoots right down there and then opens out.
1611 I was wondering: If you took into consideration all of these factors, and in those factors the extensive logging that has taken place here since the plant has been built -- the data that you have is probably -- your wind testing, your balloons that you had sent out when you first built the plant, is that some of the data that you are using?
1612 MR. REID: No, I don't believe they used that information. I am not really aware of what was done in the very early permitting process for the plant.
1613 But the slab model was designed to model evaporation and a large area source, so a pool of something like hydrocarbon that is giving off a vapour and how that travels.
1614 They have adapted that for use with us because the pool of sulphur, if it caught fire, would behave like an area source. It conservatively estimates the downwind concentration.
1615 I mentioned earlier this morning that we ran another model that takes into account more the terrain effects and the effects of obstructions and things like that. The value that that model produces is somewhat less than 15 ppm.
1616 So we decided to go with a more conservative model, a model that produces a higher result and gives us a bigger EPZ.
1617 So if the slab model has some flaws, if it is a course tool, we have compensated for that and it compensates for that in the fact that it is very conservative.
1618 We are pretty confident that out to 3 kilometres we should be able to encompass any situation, a funnelling effect or anything like that.
1619 MR. D. WINLAND: Your modelling effect, to what degree is it efficient?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 WEI Panel No. 3, ex. (D. Winland)
1620 If I am basing my opinion of your modelling scale from that of SEACOR's of the way that plume of smoke went and the vegetation damage that we could see, we kind of have a bit of a conflict there as to what actually did go on there.
1621 Is that the kind of modelling scale that you would have, something like that?
1622 MR. REID: Yes. We have heard a lot of criticism today of the models and the model outputs. I think we are losing the point a little bit in that: the model is not to be judged on how it mimics an observer's behaviour. The model is simply a tool to give us a concentration that we can use for other purposes to assess if we have had any kind of an impact on the environment or on people's health.
1623 To criticize the model because the plume doesn't curve or it should be wider really misses the point.
1624 I think we could have taken the modelling after we got Dr. Legge's work and manipulated the model so that it perfectly matched Dr. Legge's work, but what would the purpose of that be? I don't think we have learned anything by doing that.
1625 Dr. Legge's work looked at the biological end point that we were interested in and answered the questions about the receiving environment, about vegetation.
1626 I would be getting less of a rough ride here if we actually did go back and manipulate the model so that it looked nicer. But, to me, that skirts on that.
1627 There is some ethical issues there; it is like we are pulling the wool over our eyes. I think the model is a really good tool. It has done the job that we wanted it to do, and Dr. Legge's work took over at that point and gave us the answers we wanted, like as to where the model fell down.
1628 MR. D. WINLAND: I went up and actually looked at the site, and we still have a conflict. But we will move on here.
1629 Back to the evacuation procedures that you do have set up here about phoning people, my phone went out Friday afternoon sometime and didn't come on until Monday at 2:00 p.m., I think it was. So it was out for quite a few days there.
1630 If Westcoast would have had to get hold of me in an emergency, they would have had to drive out.
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1631 The time frame there is what I think we are looking at.
1632 These same things I am talking about here now I have brought up in our Hasler meetings with Westcoast, and they seem to fall on deaf ears. They weren't addressed.
1633 We were told that: Our procedures are good. They might get need a little bit of improvements here or there, but we have this system where we have a binder where we can phone somebody and get hold of you real quick like. If not, we will have somebody drive out or contact the RCMP.
1634 I believe one of the investigators went to see if they could find a copy of that book, and it took a while to find a copy of that book. There again, we are dealing with time. There was supposed to be these books in pickups, from what we were told. I believe there are none in the pickups.
1635 What I am trying to get here is: We have been told so much stuff, for a better sense of a word -- to use "crap", you know.
1636 We keep bringing these issues up in meetings and, like I said, they seem to fall on deaf ears.
1637 You ask why Dave Embree didn't phone Westcoast. It is because he probably would have got a story that: "Everything is okay", another phrase, "It won't happen again" come up.
1638 We have to go to a meeting like this to actually be heard as citizens. It really is quite upsetting.
1639 MR. RITCHIE: I think those are fair comments. I believe that we need to do a better job. We need to get you inside the process in terms of understanding how the emergency response plan works.
1640 We have heard that previously members of the community were actively involved in it and had some roles during the response. I think we need to go back and review all of those things, and you need to understand it. We need to understand your concerns, and I think we need to develop something that everybody believes is the best we can do under the circumstances.
1641 MR. D. WINLAND: That is what was told to us before.
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1642 MR. RITCHIE: I can only speak for myself. I am certainly committed to do doing that, and I know that Stan Watchorn is also committed to doing that, and the plant staff, many of whom have attended, are also committed to doing that. They are also residents of this community.
1643 MR. D. WINLAND: Another thing I will bring out is: Through all of this it is -- I will leave it there for now.
1644 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
1645 THE CHAIRMAN: Thanks, Mr. Winland.
1646 Just to be sure we have not left anyone out, are there any of the registered intervenors who had any further questions for this environment panel before we move on?
1647 MS SPENST: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
1648 THE CHAIRMAN: Ms Spenst...?
1649 MS SPENST: Thank you.
1650 --- EXAMINATION BY/INTERROGATOIRE PAR MS SPENST:
1651 MS SPENST: My first question is for Dr. Sehmer.
1652 Doctor, you state that plumes should be avoided. You stated that earlier, I believe?
1653 DR. SEHMER: Yes.
1654 MS SPENST: Were you aware that my family was allowed past the fire, myself, my husband and my two and a half year old daughter, and we were allowed in the plume?
1655 DR. SEHMER: When I meant "plume", I meant the visible plume of smoke that was coming out of the --
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1656 MS SPENST: Yes, we were there. We drove through probably 10, 15 minutes after the start of the fire.
1657 DR. SEHMER: I was not aware.
1658 MS SPENST: Mr. Reid, my next question is for you.
1659 Were all of the witnesses of the September 9th fire questioned to help with the SEACOR report or any other investigations?
1660 MR. REID: I took some guidance from what some of the witnesses had said about the fire, and also from the patterns of foliar injury that we could see and, as well, from the wind direction and the wind speed measurements that we had in the middle of the valley.
1661 From that point on, I was allowing the modellers their own discretion to come up with a scenario that would tell us what happened at that fire.
1662 So I was not relying exclusively on the witnesses' description of the smoke.
1663 MS SPENST: Do you not think that it would have been helpful for you to question myself and my husband and my father? We were one of the first ones there. We pulled off the road to let the Westcoast Suburban by us.
1664 MR. REID: Actually, that wouldn't have been as helpful as you might think, because the descriptions I have heard were many and varied.
1665 I heard from Mr. Embree in fact that the smoke was over the top of our plant, which is about 13 or 1400 feet above the valley bottom. I don't think from such a small fire that is possible.
1666 MS SPENST: I understood it was a huge and a big fire.
1667 MR. REID: We burned 106 kilograms of sulphur.
1668 If that were the case, if we could take that as being a fact that the smoke did go 1200 feet in the air, it would actually produce a smaller effect on the ground than we have modelled.
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1669 In fact, you might not even see an effect on the ground if the plume went that high. That was not particularly helpful information.
1670 At that point we were going, I would say mostly, on the pattern of vegetative damage, on the meteorological data from the middle of the valley and let the modellers do their job.
1671 MS SPENST: What would you consider to be a huge fire? Maybe 50 tonnes? A hundred would not be a big fire for you? I am sorry, I don't work around sulphur and
SO2 and I don't have fires every day. I am new to this.
1672 I know that that fire was very massive and it scared to me to death.
1673 Doctor, I have another question for you. What is the lung capacity of a buffalo?
1674 DR. SEHMER: I can't answer that question.
1675 MS SPENST: Earlier you stated that a human and a buffalo would respire the same, I believe.
1676 So if you do not know the lung capacity of a buffalo, how can you make that statement?
1677 DR. SEHMER: I mentioned that in both humans, and likely in the buffalos, the effect is mainly in the upper respiratory track for low-level exposure, because it reacts with the mucous membranes.
1678 That is different than in a rat, for example, because in a rat the actual pathway down to the lower lungs is much closer. It goes much less distance.
1679 In a human, they have done tests for this. Most of the sulphur dioxide, particularly the low level, goes into the upper respiratory tract. Simply because the distance is that much greater to get down to the lungs.
1680 The only thing I am concluding or assuming with the buffalo lung is that the upper respiratory tract is going to be just as long, if not longer, than in humans.
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1681 MS SPENST: Would they not breathe in more than what a human would?
1682 DR. SEHMER: They would breathe in more. They would breathe in more.
1683 MS SPENST: Thank you very much.
1684 Those are my questions.
1685 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Ms Spenst.
1686 Mr. Wayne Winland...?
1687 Mr. Wayne Winland, did I see you indicating you had a question?
1688 --- PRESENTATION BY/PRÉSENTATION PAR MR. W. WINLAND:
1689 MR. W. WINLAND: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I only have one more question. It is more just an observation of what I have heard in the last three days. I don't know who wants to answer this, or if anyone needs to answer it.
1690 I just want it in the record that all of what has transpired in talking about safety, one of the things that has not been talked about much is the stress. In today's technology with health, they are finding out more and more of how stress is another real basic or a real concern in today's society with the pressures and with all of the things happening.
1691 I just wanted it to be brought to everyone's attention that this is another safety issue because of stress related to all the things that has happened.
1692 I was not a witness to the fire or any of that that went on there. I was working or probably wasn't around at the time. I am a witness to the last several months of the stress levels in the people that I frequently see and talk with.
1693 The stress level has been very high. That is what I am a witness to.
1694 I just wanted that to be stated so everyone knows and that can be taken into consideration because that is part of health.
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1695 We do not see that because stress does not show up until a heart attack takes place or whatever. Being in the workplace all my life, I have started to realize, and the doctors are, I think, and everyone, that stress is a big related issue that was overlooked before. It is a level or something we need to look at.
1696 That is all.
1697 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Winland.
1698 I do not see any other indications of intervenors having any further questions.
1699 Mr. Macintosh, did you have any further redirect?
1700 MR. MACINTOSH: No, I do not.
1701 Thank you, Mr. Chair.
1702 There is one undertaking which can be responded to orally. I could do that, if that is convenient to the Board.
1703 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, go ahead.
1704 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you.
1705 Mr. Reid, for you, sir: You were supposed to report back with respect to the SLAB model, which was produced by RWDI. You may have touched on some of this in your recent evidence.
1706 The outstanding question is: What did the SLAB model take into account with respect to matters such as terrain and so on?
1707 MR. REID: Thank you. I undertook to call Claire Serdula, the project manager of this particular report, at RWDI earlier today. I was asking her some questions about page 11 of the RWDI report, Section 4.2, called "Local Terrain Considerations". That section deals with this effect of the valley walls.
1708 First of all, I confirmed that SLAB is a flat terrain model. That is, it does not
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 consider the effects of the valley walls.
1709 Second of all, it says that complex terrain, especially valleys, can have the effect of limiting the lateral dispersion relative to flat terrains, meaning that the valley walls could confine the plume and thus concentrate it.
1710 It says:
1711 "The potential for enhancement can be evaluated by comparing the plume spread to the valley width. Typically an enhancement would be expected if the valley width is less than 2.5 times the standard deviation of the lateral spread of the plume."
1712 So the amount that the plume would spread outwards.
1713 In Table 4.1, they identify some distances beyond which the valley walls could limit dispersion based on a valley width of 3 kilometres.
1714 I believe Mr. Mackie made reference to the fact that the valley is not 3 kilometres wide at this point.
1715 Just consulting a topographic map, that may be a valid point. We are looking at somewhere between 2 and 2.5 kilometres right at the position where the pipeline is.
1716 We can have RWDI redo this with the 2-kilometre width instead of 3 kilometres.
1717 Just looking at the distances here, until they run it, we will not know for certain, but the revised report will have that in it. I am expecting that it will not change their conclusion much in that you will not see the plume impacting the walls within the EPZ distance, which is 3.1 kilometres.
1718 The closest the plume impact to the wall comes is 7.5, according to the model. So we will redo that with a two-kilometre width.
1719 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Reid.
1720 Ms McKinnon, I understand you may have some further questions arising
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 from the undertaking.
1721 MS McKINNON: I think I undertook to advise Mr. Macintosh, and I can do so now, that we will definitely have a few questions on some of the undertakings, so I would propose that we do that tomorrow morning.
1722 MR. MACINTOSH: I am sure that is fine, Mr. Chair. Is that with regard to both Panel 2 and this panel?
1723 MS McKINNON: It is with respect to this panel.
1724 MR. MACINTOSH: All right.
1725 MS McKINNON: I will advise you on Panel 2. I do not think it is likely, but I will let you know.
1726 MR. MACINTOSH: Thank you.
1727 THE CHAIRMAN: I think that means, ladies and gentlemen, that you can stand down for the moment, but you are not yet released. Thank you.
1728 MR. RITCHIE: Thank you.
1729 THE CHAIRMAN: Again, in the interests of making sure we have not missed anyone, are there any of the registered intervenors who we have not heard from yet who wanted to give evidence as distinct from making final argument?
1730 I can indicate that we will probably be adjourning in a few moments, with a plan of reconvening tomorrow morning at 8:30 for hearing of argument. Ms McKinnon will have a few questions just before that.
1731 Following that, tomorrow morning we would commence with argument from Mr. Macintosh. Then each of the intervenors will have an opportunity to make their final arguments following that.
1732 Before we adjourn, are there any of the intervenors who wanted to give evidence rather than make argument?
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 1733 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, sir. Is it Mr. Napoleon?
1734 MR. NAPOLEON: Yes.
1735 THE CHAIRMAN: Come forward, Mr. Napoleon.
1736 Did you want to give evidence, Mr. Napoleon, or just make argument or a final statement? Can you, please, indicate?
1737 MR. NAPOLEON: I was going to ask some questions of the environmental panel; however, they are gone.
1738 What we could do here is I could just make a short presentation as to how I am affected by this whole --
1739 THE CHAIRMAN: I am sorry, Mr. Napoleon. I did ask if anyone else had any further questions for the panel. I am sorry if I missed you.
1740 MR. NAPOLEON: I thought I was going to be called up.
1741 Whatever is appropriate for you, whether it is tomorrow morning, or however it is going to be done. It is going to be short anyway.
1742 THE CHAIRMAN: Why don't you come over and sit at the table and we will have you take an oath, if that is okay, and then you can make your statement?
1743 MR. NAPOLEON: Okay.
1744 STAN NAPOLEON: Sworn
1745 --- PRESENTATION BY/PRÉSENTATION PAR MR. NAPOLEON:
1746 MR. NAPOLEON: I did not see any reference made by any presenters here today with regard to the wildlife, which is my basic concern here.
1747 I entered here with intervenor status on the fact that I have a trapline a stone's
Order MH-1-01 Order MH-1-01 S. Napoleon
throw away, east of the concerned area. I wasn't let known if there was any environment studies on the part of this wildlife.
1748 As you know, being a Native person, I have a vested interest in the areas like the wildlife, the fur bears, the fish, and the ungulates, and the waterfowl. I have been accustomed to -- the ungulates would be of a moose nature.
1749 I have heard through a series of presentations here all of the respiratory aspects of this nature, where the lungs and everything were talked about.
1750 From my experience, I can't very well pinpoint it against Westcoast, but on a cumulative basis, they have to be part and parcel of what I have to bring out here; especially the moose. When you open them up, the liver parts are infested with white spots. Also, when you open the lungs, you can see there is some tumours that are in the lungs there and different colorations of the lungs, as opposed to the healthy moose.
1751 I don't know if this is from the emission of the sulphur itself or from the smoke and the fire that has been talked about here, but I would like to know if there are any kind of environmental studies.
1752 If they are, where are these studies? When did they take place? Where? Where is the data? So my argument is very limited because I didn't get to see any of this.
1753 My basic understanding, too, is that the smoke doesn't represent any kind of harm to anybody. I beg to differ on that because there are laws now you can't even smoke cigarettes.
1754 We smoke meat to make dry meat. So, hence, I do not think sulphur is a good sort of thing to smoke, for that matter, even as an inhalant.
1755 I understand that the sulphur does not dissolve in water. I understand it almost has no taste to it. I also understand from the reading that I took from the encyclopedias that sulphur burns very quickly and emits sulphur dioxide, a colourless gas.
1756 With that being said, I know Westcoast took precautionary measures by putting signs up for the rest of us to read as to whether it is a dangerous area or not. But I believe that most of the wildlife that I know of do not read these things. So they have no way or any kind of measures as to stay away from these affected areas.
1757 I am not only talking about the bigger aspects of the wildlife, but let's talk
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about this sulphur that I have seen going up to the gas plant, because the road goes past there where I go to my trap lodge cabin. I have seen the spillage.
1758 I think Mr. Embree's video verifies the fact that these trucks do spill, have some point of spillage of sulphide on the road right-of-way.
1759 I do not think there have been any studies taken by anybody as to how insects are infected, mice; who are, in turn, the food chain of other species of wildlife.
1760 I believe that it is safe for me to say that since the building of the gas plant itself, before that we used to have a good supply of fur with good quality. Today I barely trap at all around that area because the quality of fur is not as good as what it used to be.
1761 To drink that water, the oil spill really scared the heck out of me. With this new threat of this burning with the fires of the sulphur, I don't know how those happened. We were always told, whether it is by the oil company or any industry that wants to do things, it is 99.9 percent safe, until it really happens; like what happened with the oil spill.
1762 We go through these presentations being made by these companies who said, "Don't worry about anything".
1763 We are lead to believe that we have nothing to worry about until some major things happen. It only takes the oil spill to let us know that these things are for real. If there is no trained personnel to look after these things immediately and deal with it promptly, then we have a problem here.
1764 From what I understand from the presenters, it seems to me that there is no trained personnel to put out these fires. It would appear to me that these people who had these five-pound buckets were exposed to what could be harmful to them.
1765 It is so that it became a "I don't care" what happens to them. Let's put the fire out, without the professional help being there" -- kind of thing.
1766 Where were the extinguishers? Where were these mechanisms now that should put these things out that is supposed to guarantee us that everything is going to be safe?
1767 I live in Moberly Lake. I am a stakeholder of a trapline east of there, but I also have relatives and friends who are from Chetwynd who could be affected.
1768
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With that being said, if there is any kind of study being done on the environment, if so, where is it at? I would like to study that so I will have a better presentation.
1769 I am not a scientist. I am not a biologist. I am not any kind of "gist" at all, but I am a concerned citizen and also a concerned stakeholder being around that.
1770 The right-of-way there, I have seen three, four of those deer. They couldn't jump over the pipeline itself. Were any measures taken to alleviate any kind of a passage from A to B? How do the ungulates get over it?
1771 That is what I am getting at.
1772 This seems to be like their corral. They should be able to have a right-of-way, too. I do not know why that pipeline is not buried. Nobody has given me any kind of reasoning why it is not buried.
1773 There should be a passage with wildlife, especially the bigger animals.
1774 I think that is about all I have to say. I was going to make it short and sweet, but I am ill-equipped with what I have to bring up because I thought this whole discovery was to be for the plant itself, but I got the understanding it is only for the pipeline. But still, to me, if there is a concern, it has to be addressed.
1775 With that, I thank you.
1776 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Napoleon.
1777 Mr. Macintosh, did you have any questions for Mr. Napoleon?
1778 MR. MACINTOSH: No, thank you, sir.
1779 THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Napoleon.
1780 I believe, with that, we can adjourn for the day and resume at 8:30 tomorrow morning. There will be a few questions for the environment panel and then we will commence argument with Westcoast.
1781 Thank you.
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1782 --- ADJOURNMENT AT 4:37 P.M./AJOURNEMENT A 16 H 37
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