A THIRD LEBANON WAR

ABSTRACT

Israel and Hizbullah have applied the lessons learned from the and have been preparing for a future conflict with both sides aiming for a more decisive victory. With improved capabilities from 2006, future hostilities will be far more destructive. This paper analyzes their performance in 2006 and the lessons they have drawn to predict what a future conflict is likely to look like. The paper analyzes both parties in three categories: ground forces; rockets, missiles, and anti-armor weapons; and lastly, 's air and sea dominance and

Hezbollah's efforts to counter that dominance. Finally, this paper argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hizbullah is unlikely to become a larger regional conflict involving Syria and Iran.

INTRODUCTION

On 12 July 2006 Hizbullah fighters exploited dead space along the Israel-Lebanon border and executed a complex, IED initiated ambush on an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) mounted patrol. Three IDF soldiers were killed, three wounded, and two kidnapped. Thirty minutes later, when the IDF discovered that two soldiers had been kidnapped, they pursued the Hizbullah fighters into Lebanon with a platoon-sized element in armored personnel carriers and . Approximately two hours after the Hizbullah ambush, an Israeli Merkava hit a 440-660 kg shaped charge IED, destroying the and killing all four crewmembers.1 It was a harbinger of the ensuing 34-day conflict, which revealed significant problems in the IDF’s preparedness,

1 STRATFOR Global Intelligence, ʻIsraeli Tanks and Countermeasuresʼ, STRATFOR Analysis Online-Only (25 July 2006) n.pag training, and leadership and displayed the startling results when an unconventional force successfully blends conventional and guerilla tactics against a very capable, Western-equipped military. What the war did not reveal was a decisive winner.

The Israeli military’s intelligence on Hizbullah failed to account for a vast network of bunkers and arms caches permeating southern Lebanon. Active duty units were complacent from years of occupation duty in the and reserve forces were slow to mobilize, poorly trained, and under equipped. Similarly, IDF armor units at all levels lacked adequate training in tank warfare and were tactically unsound. Magnifying all of these shortcomings was the IDF’s poor planning and leadership throughout the conflict.

Hizbullah surprised Israeli military and civilian leaders – as well as military analysts all over the world – with their performance in 2006. No Arab military in recent history had so effectively employed modern weapon systems and so tenaciously resisted the Israeli military.2

Small rocket and anti-tank teams in the south maintained their capabilities throughout the conflict and strong point defensive positions in southern Lebanese villages proved effective at consistently inflicting casualties on IDF forces and dramatically slowing the Israeli advance.

Still, with few exceptions, Hizbullah was unable to employ their medium and long-range rockets, and strike effectively inside Israel. Additionally, Israel maintained its air and sea dominance throughout the campaign, giving IDF forces a major strategic advantage.

The case of Israel and Hizbullah provides valuable lessons for Western powers.

Hizbullah’s flexibility, effective exploitation of Israel’s weaknesses, and skillful employment of

2 For more on the implications of Hizbullahʼs success for western militaries see Biddle, Stephen and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute September 2008). (http:// www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=882)

-2- modern weapon systems have made the organization a role model for everyone from insurgent forces to large militaries all over the world.3 The 2006 conflict was particularly prescient for Iran and North Korea, both of whom have assisted in developing Hizbullah’s tactics and whose own strategies and tactics are likely to be similar.4 It is therefore essential to understand where both sides have fallen short, where they have succeeded, and what they have done to further enhance their combat effectiveness at all levels.

Since 2006, Israel and Hizbullah have been vigorously applying lessons learned and preparing for a future conflict. Both will be looking for a more decisive victory and, with improved capabilities from 2006, future hostilities will be far more destructive. Analyzing their war efforts – both strengths and weaknesses, and the changes they have made since – it is possible to estimate what a future conflict will look like. This paper attempts to do just that, by dividing those capabilities into three sections: ground forces; rockets, missiles, and anti-armor weapons; and Israel’s air and sea dominance. This paper will also address the concern that a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hizbullah could become a larger regional conflict involving Syria and possibly Iran.

This paper is not a policy prescription. Rather, it offers a foundation on which policymakers can make more informed decisions about their defense apparatus and their international political and diplomatic efforts.

3 For more on Hizbullah as the premiere non-state/hybrid actor see Michael Crawford and Jami Miscik, ʻThe Rise of the Mezzanine Rulersʼ, Foreign Affairs, 89/6 (Nov/Dec 2010) 123-134; For more on how militaries are pursuing similar tactics to Hizbullah see General James N. Mattis. Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee. United States House of Representatives. Washington D.C. (24 March 2009).

4 For more on North Korean assistance to Hizbullah see Manyin, Mark E., North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List? (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Office 29 June 2010).

-3- GROUND FORCES

At its apex Israel had approximately 30,000 soldiers committed to the war effort against

Hizbullah compared to Hizbullah’s estimated 1,000 “elite” forces. Hizbullah also has a reserve force of village guards whose numbers in 2006 ranged from an estimated several thousand to more than 10,000. These guards enhanced Hizbullah’s layered defenses in the southern villages and included members of the Amal militia, veterans from the resistance of the 1990s, and unaffiliated Lebanese who offered their assistance against the Israeli invasion.5

Hizbullah leadership had spent the years since the end of the occupation in 2000 applying what they knew about Israeli military tactics to their own training and battle plans. Thus, in

2006, Hizbullah’s intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) was thorough and evident at every layer of their defensive and offensive operations. During Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, Israel relied heavily on and air power.

Hizbullah therefore deduced that the Israeli populace would not tolerate large combat or civilian losses. Hizbullah therefore surmised that their key to victory was to retain the ability to fire rockets into Israel for the duration of hostilities and to inflict as many casualties on Israeli forces as possible.6 In the hilly, forested terrain in Southern Lebanon, they built a system of self- sustaining bunkers stocked with all necessary classes of supply capable of sustaining operations for many weeks.7 In addition, Hizbullah fighters proved skillful at thwarting Israeli manned and

5 Exum, Andrew, ʻHizbullah at Warʼ, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #63. (December 2006) 5.

6 Kulick, Amir, ʻHizbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimensionʼ, Institute for National Security Studies, Strategic Asessment 9/3 (2006) 3.

7 Blanford, Nicholas, ʻDeconstructing Hizbullahʼs Surprise Military Prowessʼ, Janeʼs Intelligence Review (1 November 2006) 3.

-4- unmanned observation platforms. Among other tactics, firing teams would, in quick succession, set up a launcher, fire a rocket, and cover the launcher with fire retardant blankets to mask its heat signature. Exploiting Israeli reliance on technology, Hizbullah retained their short-range rocket capabilities throughout the conflict and so accomplished one of their primary tactical objectives.

The Israeli preference for armored vehicles and tanks gave Hizbullah additional means of dictating the nature of the conflict. Hizbullah placed large IEDs and anti-tank mines on the high- speed avenues of approach into southern Lebanon. Because of the rough terrain in the south, IDF attempts to circumvent existing roads significantly slowed the advance and ultimately failed. As a result, the IDF was forced to rely more on dismounted maneuver and was canalized into the villages8– favorable terrain for irregular forces on the defense. In the narrow streets of southern

Lebanese villages, Israeli artillery and air power became much more difficult to employ. In the villages, many of the advantages of the Merkava tanks were nuetralized. They were more vulnerable to IEDs and anti-tank weapons, and mobile, dismounted fighters had a significant advantage. Hizbullah and village fighters fully exploited their knowledge of the villages, using holes in walls to move between houses, maintaining high ground, and generally surprising the

Israelis with their willingness and ability to effectively challenge the IDF ground forces.9

The Israeli ground invasion began on 17 July 2006 with small operations targeting the southern border villages of Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbeil, several days after the IAF had launched its aerial campaign. As a result of mined avenues of approach, a well dug-in enemy, and their attempts to avoid major roads, the IDF’s initial advance was slow. Once the IDF

8 Exum, ʻHizbullah at Warʼ, 3

9 Exum, ʻHizbullah at Warʼ, 10

-5- reached their objectives, whether southern villages or suspected caches, it was unprepared for the level of combat. In one of the conflict’s most revealing anecdotes, The Sunday Times’ Uzi

Mahnaimi described a catastrophic Hizbullah ambush that drew the Maglan reconnaissance unit into sustained conflict. An Israeli soldier involved in the incident said, “We expected a tent and three Kalashnikovs — that was the intelligence we were given. Instead, we found a hydraulic steel door leading to a well-equipped network of tunnels.”10 And though the Israelis had, in fact, expected tunnels and underground bunkers, they failed to anticipate their extent. The extent of the bunkers’ supplies made irrelevant the IAF mission of isolating Hizbullah’s southern forces from their logistical support.

The IDF also failed to anticipate the extensive use of mines and IEDs, indicating its poor enemy analysis. Hizbullah is well known to use IEDs. Israel’s highest-ranking casualty in its war with Hizbullah came in 1999 when the commander of the Golani Brigade, Gen. Erez Gerstein, was killed by a Hizbullah IED in southern Lebanon.11 Additionally, in 2006 Shia militias believed to be receiving significant Iranian support, were inflicting heavy damages against the

United States in Iraq. Not only should Israel’s enemy analysis have concluded that IEDs would factor into Hizbullah’s tactics, but Israeli planners and intelligence officers should also have considered the likelihood that tactics, techniques, and procedures would migrate (TTP migration) from the Iraq theater to southern Lebanon. Israel’s significantly slowed ground invasion showed that ground commanders failed to plan alternate routes, a fundamental element of military

10 Mahnaimi, Uzi, ʻHumbling of the Supertroopers Shatters Israeli Army Moraleʼ, The Sunday Times (27 August 2006) Web.

11 Nizar-Hamzeh, Ahmed, In the Path of Hizbullah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press 2004) Ch.5, 92.

-6- planning at the maneuver level that afforded Hizbullah time to determine the IDF’s routes and objectives, and reinforce accordingly.

GROUND FORCES: LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLEMENTED

Hizbullah’s ground fighters surprised many observers–civilian and military alike– in the

2006 war. But Hizbullah showed weaknesses that, in a future conflict, they will need to fix –

Israel will be looking to exploit them. UN Security Council Resolution 1701 increased the size of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) – the organization tasked with patrolling the southern border zone – to 11,000 personnel. Resolution 1701 also called on the Lebanese Armed

Forces to deploy to southern Lebanon adding an additional 15,000 soldiers. Their presence makes it more difficult for Hizbullah to rebuild the elaborate system of tunnels, bunkers, and pre- positioned equipment they relied on so heavily in 2006. Despite this, there are indications that

Hizbullah is making every effort to reconstitute that system. Interviews conducted by Nicholas

Blanford and reported in Jane’s Intelligence Review confirm through first-hand observation that the organization is rebuilding tunnels and bunkers as well as using villages and towns to store arms and ammunition.12 Given the extent by which Israel underestimated the sophistication of the tunnel systems, it would be dangerous to make assumptions about Hizbullah’s reconstruction efforts even in the presence of UNIFIL, the LAF, and a more robust Israeli IMINT collection effort.

One of the major weaknesses of Hizbullah’s strategy going into 2006 was that the individual elements were relatively static and were not fully capable of reinforcing other units in

12 Blanford, Nicholas, ʻReturn to Arms-Hizbullah and Israelʼs Preparations for Warʼ, Janeʼs Intelligence Review (14 January 2010) 2.

-7- contact with the IDF.13 This was partly due to the IAF’s ability to isolate objectives, but it was also a byproduct of Hizbullah’s decentralized organization and limited mobility.14 If Hizbullah hopes to retain the ability to accomplish their military goals, the organization will need to enhance maneuverability across the area of operations. There is strong evidence that Hizbullah is doing just that. Satellite images of Hizbullah’s Beit Mubarak training camp in the eastern Bekaa

Valley reveal new facilities including an IED range, a driver training track, and a training site for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT).15 It has also been suggested that, should another war break out, Hizbullah is preparing to conduct operations inside of Israel.16 In 2000 and in

2005 Hizbullah succeeded in mounting cross-border raids. The 2000 raid killed three IDF soldiers. The 2005 raid, while eventually thwarted by the IDF, is noteworthy in that Hizbullah relied on motorcycles and ATVs in order to rapidly advance on their objective. has repeatedly shown that Hizbullah does not make claims to capabilities it cannot back up.17

Their demonstrated ability to launch cross-border attacks combined with their stated commitment to conduct them in a future war should be taken seriously. The incident that sparked the 2006 conflict again demonstrated that Hizbullah is capable of circumventing Israeli border security. Israel routinely employs a wide variety of manned and unmanned surveillance platforms along their border and during a conflict one can expect a massive military buildup as well. And while this will add to the complexity of any Hizbullah operation, it will also provide

13 The IDFʼs slow advance partially compensated for this, giving Hizbullah more time to react.

14 Exum, ʻHizbullah at Warʼ, 10

15 Blanford, ʻReturn to Armsʼ, 4

16 Hizbullah veterans told Janeʼs Intelligence Review that in a future conflict it will be Hizbullah who is asked to withdraw from Israel, not the other way around.

17 Levinson, Charles (Wall Street Journal Jerusalem Bureau Chief), Personal interview (16 December 2010).

-8- them with an abundance of targets of opportunity. So it is likely that Hizbullah will attempt to operate inside Israel, and even that they will succeed. However, the attacks are unlikely to serve strategic aims beyond the psychological effect.

For its part, Israel has since 2006 adjusted its training to emphasize combat readiness, by conducting large scale, realistic field training exercises.18 The IDF was inadequately prepared for both the extent of Hizbullah’s preparations and the skill of the Hizbullah fighters. Hizbullah’s anti-tank capabilities effectively neutralized the common Israeli tactic of conducting platoon- sized raids supported by an armor component, which forced a tactical shift 19—Israel had to call up 18,000 reserve soldiers.20 These reservists and soldiers had been on occupation duty in the

West Bank and along the Gaza border, and were unprepared for the more kinetic operations in

Lebanon. In a future conflict, Israel will want to mobilize a larger number of ground forces inside Lebanon, and do so much earlier.

Israel’s post-2006 “Dahiya Doctrine”– named after a south Beirut Shia neighborhood and

Hizbullah stronghold that Israel bombed heavily in 2006 – reflects their new emphasis on quick, overwhelming force. Major General Eizencourt, Commander of Israel’s Northern Command in

2006, put it this way: “What happened to the Dahiya neighbourhood...would happen in every village from which shots are fired in the direction of Israel. We will wield disproportionate power against them and cause immense damage and destruction.”21 Traditional military doctrine

18 Cordesman, Anthony, and Aram Nerguizian, ʻThe Arab-Israeli Military Balanceʼ, Center for Strategic & International Studies (Revised 29 June 2010) 9.

19 Drezner, Daniel, ʻHow Bad was Hezbollah Hurt?ʼ Foreign Policy (26 August 2006).

20 Harel, Amos, Ashkenazi, Eli, AP, ʻIAF Strikes Religious Building in Southern Lebanon, 4 Woundedʼ, Haaretz (21 July 2006) Web.

21 Hirst, David, Beware of Small States (New York: Nation Books 2010) Ch.14, 396

-9- calls for a 3:1 attacker to defender force ratio. Using higher estimates of Hizbullah strength in

2006 of 11,000 fighters Israel would need a force of 33,000 to maintain that ratio. And current estimates place Hizbullah strength closer to a much more daunting 20,000. Israel can make its task easier by creating an environment in which it can fully utilize all of its weapons platforms, perhaps by adopting a strategy similar to the U.S. military’s in the initial phase of Operation

Phantom Fury, during the second battle of Fallujah in 2004. Before invading that city, U.S. forces cordoned off the city and encouraged civilians to leave while preventing insurgents from doing the same. Soldiers on the ground knowingly permitted insurgents to enter the city through their checkpoints.22 If Israeli forces did the same, they would have fewer restrictions on the use of artillery and air strikes, and simpler rules of engagement for the infantry – the IDF could safely assume that people remaining in the area are enemy forces.

Israel has also dramatically increased its intelligence collection efforts inside Lebanon.

These efforts include daily reconnaissance flights over the Bekaa Valley and the border region, and increased human intelligence collection. Israel has also tapped Hizbullah’s sophisticated, internal communications network.23 However, Hizbullah discovered this, and the organisation remains frustratingly resilient to HUMINT and SIGINT collection efforts. Still, Israel’s capabilities are much better than they were just before the 2006 war. Going forward, Israel will have a better understanding of the battlefield and will not so seriously underestimate its opponents.

22 This was mentioned to the author by soldiers who took part in Operation Phantom Fury

23 Blanford, ʻReturn to Armsʼ, 10

-10- ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS

To many observers the most surprising aspect of the 2006 war was Hizbullah’s tactical proficiency. Whereas Israel began hostilities with the lofty goals of recovering their kidnapped soldiers and eliminating Hizbullah, Hizbullah’s goals were far more modest and achievable– retain the ability to fire rockets, inflict maximum casualties against Israel, and survive as an organization.24 Hizbullah’s short-range 122mm Katyusha rockets continued to be fired into Israel for the duration of the conflict. Hizbullah launched in excess of 100 rockets per day throughout the 34 days, culminating with 250 fired into northern Israel on the final day.25 Hizbullah was able to maintain their rates of fire partly because of pre-positioned stocks, which reduced their dependency on logistical trains. While the short-range rockets continued to fire, Hizbullah’s medium- and long-range rockets saw less action in 2006 than many had feared. This was likely because the IAF destroyed most in the opening hours of the war; the IAF destroyed 59 stationary launchers and an estimated two-thirds of Hizbullah’s stockpiled medium- and long-range rockets in the opening hours of the conflict.26 Hizbullah’s medium and long-range rocket arsenal at the outset of the conflict primarily consisted of the 240mm Fajr-3 with a range of 43km, the 333mm

Fajr-5 with a range of 75km, and the Zelzal-2, a 610mm rocket capable of delivering a 600kg warhead approximately 210km (See Figure 1, Select Hizbullah Targets in Israel and

Corresponding Weapons Capabilities). Hizbullah never fired it’s Zelzal-2 rockets but did launch

24 Cordesman, Anthony, ʻLessons of the Israeli-Lebanon Warʼ, Center for Strategic & International Studies (11 March 2008) 6-7.

25 Kulick, ʻHizbullah vs. The IDFʼ, 3; Blanford, ʻDeconstructing Hizbullahʼs Surprise Military Prowessʼ, 7

26 Hirst, ʻBeware Small Statesʼ, 337

-11- -12- Fajrs, starting with the 14 July Fajr rocket attack on Haifa in response to the IAF bombing of

Hizbullah targets in the Dahiya.27 Though that attack killed 8 dockworkers, Hizbullah’s short- and medium-range rockets are unguided and inaccurate. The Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 both have circular error probables (CEP) of between 1 kilometer and, in ideal conditions, 0.5 kilometers making them difficult to employ on strategic targets.28 Because of their poor accuracy, their effect on the

Israeli population was primarily psychological.29

Hizbullah’s short-range rocket tactics reflect an understanding of Israeli hunter/killer capabilities. Their inability to prevent the destruction of or successfully launch en masse their medium- and long-range rockets indicates that they had not yet mastered the tactics needed to effectively employ them. Still, Hizbullah has generally understood Israeli capabilities, and it is reasonable to assume that it is taking actions to close this gap and improve their future performance.

Hizbullah’s use of anti-tank weapons, on the other hand, was more than psychological; it had a more strategic effect. Of special interest are the AT-13 Metis-M, AT-14

Kornet-E, and AT-5 Spandrel. Hizbullah used these three weapons for the first time in 2006, demonstrating a significant leap in capabilities, particularly in how effectively they were used.

The AT-13 Metis-M is a 130mm anti-tank guided missile system (ATGM) with a range 2 kilometers and a tandem warhead designed to breach explosive reactive armor. The AT-14

Kornet-E has a maximum range of 5.5 kilometers and is equipped with a semi-automatic

27 Hirst, ʻBeware Small Statesʼ, 347

28 Cordesman, Anthony, ʻIranʼs Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanonʼ, Center for Strategic & International Studies (15 July 2006) 6-7.

29 Harari, Amnon, Brigadier General(Ret) IAF Strategic Challenges Facing the Israeli Defense Force, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (25 October 2010).

-13- command-to-line of sight laser beam-riding targeting system (SACLOS). The AT-14 is a highly sophisticated ATGM platform and significantly increases the threat to Israeli armor of all types.

Lastly, the AT-5 Spandrel is a 135mm ATGM with a maximum range of 4 kilometers. The AT-5 is equipped with a tandem shaped-charge warhead. The efficacy of shaped charge explosives against armored vehicles is well known from their widespread use against U.S. and UK forces in

Iraq, mostly by Shia militias which the UK accused Iran of arming. Given the close relationship between Iran and Hizbullah, analysts should have assumed TTP migration between the Iraq theater and southern Lebanon. These three ATGM platforms represent advanced capabilities that will continue to pose a serious threat to Israeli armor and factor in to any operational planning.

As we will see, damaging IDF armor was essential to Hizbullah’s missions of inflicting casualties and slowing the IDF advance.

The biggest surprise regarding Hizbullah’s missiles was their anti-ship capabilities. On 14

July 2006 Hizbullah fired two C-802 guided anti-ship missiles, striking and disabling the Israeli

Navy’s flagship, the INS Hanit, sailing 10km off of the coast of Beirut.30 Hizbullah had clearly made efforts to diversify their offensive combat power and diminish Israel’s monopoly of force in arenas outside of ground conflict.

Numerous weaknesses in Israel’s readiness came to light in 2006 as a result of

Hizbullah’s rocket and anti-tank capabilities. Short-range rocket attacks were the one Hizbullah tactic Israel was unable to stop or even slow. As we will see, improvements to Israeli armor can help mitigate a threat, but proper planning, IPB, and training can prevent a threat from fully materializing in the first place.

30 Hirst, ʻBeware of Small Statesʼ, 347

-14- ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS: LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPLEMENTED

In a future war, Hizbullah’s rocket and missile capabilities will be the key element for both sides. For Hizbullah, repeating their success with short-range rockets will continue to be important. But translating that success to their medium- and long-range rocket and missile arsenal will be even more important. Conversely, for Israel, neutralizing Hizbullah’s long-range capacity will be critical, especially their guided missiles (if intelligence regarding their acquisition of such missiles is correct). Hizbullah has a substantial target deck inside Israel that, if not protected, could impact the course of the war.

In order to eliminate the need for extensive supply lines throughout the country during an

Israeli air offensive, Hizbullah will want to position their shorter-range rockets and anti-tank weapons strategically in southern villages and bunkers. UNIFIL reports strongly suggest that

Hizbullah is doing just that, despite the UN presence and clear prohibitions laid out in 1701.

UNIFIL has reported two separate instances of caches exploding in southern villages and a third report of digging activity in a privately owned valley that Hizbullah had sealed off with armed guards.31 The IDF says it has detailed imagery of Hizbullah’s pre-positioned weapons throughout south Lebanon.32 This corroborates the analysis that Hizbullah is preparing a similar strategy of forward deployed equipment, forcing the fight into cities and villages, and exploiting the survivability of fortified tunnels and bunkers, thereby allowing the southern fight to be sustained

31 Blanford, ʻReturn to Armsʼ, 3

32 “Hezbollah Warns Israel: We Have List of IDF Targets for Future War.” Haaretz (7 November 2010).

-15- throughout an invasion. This strategy also ensures that Israel will never have a defined front and their own supply lines will be vulnerable to Hizbullah attacks.

On 3 November 2009 the Israeli Navy intercepted the Francop, a cargo ship sailing from

Egypt to Syria, the third in a series of Iranian arms shipments believed to be destined for

Hizbullah. The shipment contained approximately 800 122mm rockets, 9,000 rounds,

20,000 hand grenades, over 500,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition, and 3,000 106mm recoilless rounds – enough to supply Hizbullah for a month or more, according to the Israeli

Navy.33 Though this shipment likely represents a small portion of Hizbullah’s rearming, both in terms of size and technological advance, a key element of the seized weapons, as Nicholas

Blanford points out, are the 106mm recoilless rifle rounds. These are unable to penetrate Israeli armor but might be able to overwhelm both the Trophy and Iron Fist active protection systems

(APS), both of which detect and intercept incoming ATGMs34 (more on these in the next section). Hizbullah’s acquisition of these 106mm recoilless rifle rounds to compliment their more advanced AT weapons indicate their institutional learning and tactical adaptation.

Hizbullah’s success at disabling or destroying Merkava tanks and inflicting heavy casualties on the crews was widely publicized as a major Israeli failure and Hizbullah success.35

According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 41 of the 119 IDF soldiers killed in action

33 Quoted from Klein, Aaron J, ʻIsrael Claims Iran Weapons Shipmentʼ, Time Magazine (4 November 2009) n.pag.

34 Blanford, ʻReturn to Armsʼ, 2

35 For examples see Schiff, Zeʼev, ʻThe Warʼs Surprisesʼ, Haaretz (18 August 2006); Katz, Yaakov, ʻIsraeli Military Studies Hezbollah Resilienceʼ, USA Today (13 September 2006); Greenberg, Hanan, ʻWhy Did the Armored Corps Fail in Lebanonʼ, Ynet News (30 August 2006).

-16- (34.4%) during the 2006 conflict died as a result of Hizbullah’s anti-tank weapons.36 Though 25 of the 41 AT related KIA (61%) were against tank crews and a result of armor penetrations,

Hizbullah also employed their ATGMs against dismounted IDF taking cover in buildings.37

In the future, Hizbullah will use similar tactics for their anti-tank teams as it did in 2006, but with a few crucial differences. Individual AT teams will still consist of two to four men, a well-trained pair to operate the missile and one or two less experienced fighters to assist with employment and security. Assuming that Hizbullah plans to use the 106mm recoilless rifle to overwhelm the Merkava’s APS, their AT teams will need to also contain a detached gun team, similar to a support-by-fire position. This will require that Hizbullah fighters be able to reliably communicate within their small units. It will also require Hizbullah to either successfully canalize Israeli armor into pre-established ambush positions or to maintain their freedom of movement across the battlefield. It is likely that they will aim to accomplish both.

Hizbullah will use anti-armor IEDs in order to slow and canalize Israeli armor. They successfully employed anti-armor IEDs in 2006 forcing the IDF to create alternate routes and place armored D-9 bulldozers as the lead vehicle. Hizbullah knows the Merkava’s capabilities and will want not only mine existing avenues of approach, but will also prepare ambushes and

IEDs on likely alternate avenues. Hizbullah anti-armor IED capabilities mean that Israel will have to advance slowly and deliberately. In Iraq, in 2006-2007, the U.S. military’s rate of IED discovery increased dramatically (as opposed to detonation) when speed limits were decreased to

20 mph during daylight hours and 10 mph at night. Furthermore, when a route clearance element

36 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism +from+Lebanon-+Hizbullah/Israel-Hizbullah+conflict-+Victims+of+rocket+attacks+and+IDF+casualties +July-Aug+2006.htm

37 Ibid.

-17- was in the lead – as would be the case with the armored D-9s – travel speeds were even slower.38

The U.S. military, however, was not also facing a sophisticated ATGM threat, and the IDF’s challenges are more complex. Slowing their movement will decrease the likelihood of an IED detonation but will afford Hizbullah time to set up and execute ambushes. Hizbullah AT teams will either use an IED detonation to stop convoys and trigger complex attacks or, in the absence of a properly emplaced IED, will target lead and trail vehicles first in order to limit maneuver.

Despite Hizbullah’s very publicized successes against Israeli armor in 2006, the Merkava performed well. Between 350 and 400 tanks participated in the 2006 war and, by Israeli estimates, endured a few thousand anti-tank missiles.39 Fifty tanks were hit by anti- tank missiles with 22 of them sustaining armor penetrations,40 a 44 percent penetration rate.

These harsh statistics, however, don’t reflect a shortcoming in the Merkava tank, but the poor state of the IDF’s readiness. Rather than exploiting the tanks’ speed and ability to simultaneously fire and maneuver, armored units were often left in static positions and Hizbullah “underscored the tank’s weakness, leading to heavy damages.”41 Since then, Israel has made two important improvements to its armored divisions. The first and most important is a renewed commitment to large-scale, combined arms training exercises aimed at improving the IDF’s ability to fight and maneuver across Lebanon. Central to this training program is teaching tank crews to analyze terrain in order to identify high threat areas.42 Still, Israel will have to contend with the threat of

38 Drawn from the authorʼs experience in Iraq from 2006-2007.

39 Greenberg, Hanan, ʻWhy Did the Armored Corps Fail in Lebanon?ʼ, Ynet (30 August 2006) n. pag.

40 Statistics vary on this but the numbers result in a range from 15-22 armor penetrations, 32-47 percent of tanks hit were penetrated.

41 Greenberg, ʻWhy Did the Armored Corps Fail in Lebanon?ʼ

42 Katz, Yaakov, ʻNew Training Aims to Help Tanks Cope in Hostile Territoryʼ, Jerusalem Post (31 August 2007).

-18- both Hizbullah AT teams as well as anti-armor mines and IEDs. Even when equipped with v- shaped hulls and under belly armor, armored vehicles and tanks are especially vulnerable to center-line mines and IEDs. The most effective way for the IDF to counter the dual threat to its tanks will be to act quickly. Similarly, tank units will want to retain their momentum throughout the duration of their movement. The risks of slowness were on display in 2006 when an armored column moving into Wadi Salouqi was delayed for almost 48 hours, allowing Hizbullah ample time to lay in an ambush; 11 tanks were hit and 8 crewmen killed. While the reason for the fatal delay at Wadi Salouqi is not publicly known, in general the best means for preventing tactical missteps of that sort are detailed planning and thorough rehearsals at all levels, especially combined arms rehearsals (CAR) involving all the major elements taking part in an operation.

Again, integral to these plans will be route planning. Identifying secondary and tertiary routes will afford the IDF more flexibility and make it far more difficult for Hizbullah to predict routes and objectives.

Beyond readiness improvements, the IDF has also added countermeasure systems to their

Merkava tanks. The Trophy is an anti-tank missile defense system which incorporates an EL/M-2133 WindGuard Radar and the launch apparatus. The ELM-2133 is a four-faced distributed phased-array Pulse Doppler radar capable of tracking AT rockets, guided missiles, and tank rounds from 360°.43 Once a round is detected, Trophy automatically calculates the optimal trajectory, fires a like projectile, and intercepts the threat. Testing done by both Israel and United States proved the Trophy to be an effective AT countermeasure.

However, while the Trophy system’s radar provides 360° coverage the launch apparatus does not.

43 Cited from Israeil Aerospace Industriesʼ website on 1 December 2010: http://www.iai.co.il/ 34475-41105-en/Groups_ELTA_SystemsSensors.aspx?btl=1

-19- Therefore multiple launchers must be installed on each vehicle in order to fully protect it.

Additionally, it is not field re-loadable, which means that once a forward deployed tank has fired its Trophy system it is no longer protected. This will factor strongly into Hizbullah’s strategy for defeating the Trophy system through swarming tactics. The IDF has also approved Israeli

Military Industries’ Iron Fist active protection system for deployment on their Infantry

Fighting Vehicles. Iron Fist is similar to the Trophy system but has an integrated infrared detection system that provides higher resolution information, increasing accuracy. Like Trophy, however, the system cannot be reloaded in the field, making it susceptible to Hizbullah’s swarming tactics.

The primarily psychological effect of Hizbullah’s 122mm Katyusha rockets is substantial.

An estimated 500,000 Israelis fled northern Israel during the war in 2006. The roughly 300,000 who remained were reliant upon public bomb shelters and generally chose to remain in them, some for the entire duration of the conflict. As reported in David Hirst’s Beware of Small States, one French philanthropist was astonished at the “shouting and brawling” that occurred when he came to distribute basic essentials like food, oil, and milk.44 Because of the minimal strategic impact of Hizbullah’s short-range rockets it has since been pursuing longer range rocket and missile capabilities to deter another full scale Israeli campaign, specifically implementation of the Dahiya doctrine, which could significantly erode domestic support for Hizbullah.45 Of course, Hizbullah will aim to repeat their success with short-range rockets, employing the 2006 strategies described above. But Hizbullah must also translate some of these successes to their use

44 Hirst, ʻBeware of Small Statesʼ, 350

45 Exum, Andrew, ʻThe Next War: Hizballah vs Israelʼ, Abu Muqawama. Center for New American Security (17 September 2010).

-20- of longer-range rockets, which are larger, more difficult to conceal, and take more time to prepare for launch. In addition, Hizbullah will require more accurate weapons if it hopes to be able to reliably target civilian and military infrastructure as well as population centers. It will also need to deploy a large number in depth in order to ensure survivability.

Hizbullah has succeeded in rearming themselves with both short-range artillery rockets and large numbers of long-range rockets and missiles. Analysts believe that Hizbullah’s largest rocket is the 610mm Zelzal-2 (described earlier).46 Despite only being accurate within several kilometers of its target, the rocket’s long range will magnify the effects that shorter-range rockets had on northern Israel in 2006. Aiming at large cities such as Haifa, which is 63.7 square kilometers, Hizbullah can inflict significant damage. It is likely that Hizbullah has also acquired the Iranian made Fateh-110 (or the identical Syrian M600). The Fateh-110 has an intertial guidance system and delivers a 500kg payload out to a range of 250km, capable of reaching Tel

Aviv from the Northern Bekaa. The missile’s 100m CEP means it will be very effective for reliably striking strategic targets inside Israel. The system requires a sizable launch platform and would require sophisticated planning – for which Hizbullah has demonstrated the capacity – in order to deploy while evading the IAF. In January 2010 the Washington Post reported – corroborating what most analysts believe – that Hizbullah has, in fact, dispersed much of their rocket and missile arsenal to sights deeper in Lebanon’s interior and the northern Bekaa Valley.47

In addition, Jane’s recently reported that US intelligence sources claim Hizbullah is using truck-

46 Cordesman & Nerguizian, ʻThe Arab Israeli Military Balanceʼ, 48

47 Schneider, Howard, ʻHezbollahʼs Relocation of Rocket Sites to Lebanonʼs Interior Poses Wider Threatʼ, The Washington Post (23 January 2010).

-21- mountable, modified shipping containers in order to employ these systems.48 Assuming that

Hizbullah is able to overcome the problems of employing this larger, more complex platform, sheer numbers are likely to work in their favor. Hizbullah had an estimated 13,000 rockets going into 2006. They and the IDF claim they now have approximately 40,000– including the Zelzal-2 and Fateh-110.

In 2006, the IAF was confident its destruction of 54 long-range rocket launchers in the opening hours of the conflict meant the total obliteration of Hizbullah’s long-range launch capabilities.49 In a future war, their task will be significantly more difficult and time-consuming.

Hizbullah will likely make good on their threat to target infrastructure comparable to what Israel strikes. During a 17 February 2010 speech on al-Manar TV, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan

Nasrallah said that Israeli strikes on the Dahiya would bring Hizbullah counter strikes on Tel

Aviv. The same, he said, can be expected in response to Israeli strikes against Beirut’s Rafiq al-

Harriri Airport, Lebanese ports, oil refineries, electrical grid, and factories.50 Hizbullah will also target major roads heading into northern Israel in order to further complicate Israel’s reserve mobilization and logistical efforts.51 The direction that Hizbullah’s rearmament campaign has taken suggests that this is not just rhetoric, but a real public statement of strategy.

The Israeli response to the increased rocket and missile threat has focused on defensive measures and civil preparedness. Organizationally they created the Home Front Command in order to manage the domestic response to attacks inside Israel. Israel has also conducted

48 Blanford, ʻReturn to Armsʼ, 3

49 Ynet, ʻHalutz: ʻMr PM, We Won the Warʼʼ, Ynet News (27 August 2006).

50 Middle East Media Research Institute, ʻHizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah Threatens to Bring Down Buidings in Tel Aviv and Hit Ben-Gurion Airport in Future Warʼ, (17 February 2010).

51 Katz, Yaakov, ʻIDF Expects Hizbullah to Target Roadsʼ, The Jerusalem Post (22 August 2010).

-22- multiple, large-scale civil drills simulating attacks of varying types and degree. Targets of military value within range of previously existing weapons systems are already hardened to some degree,52 but Israel will need to further harden a large number of high-value military and critical infrastructure targets. To mitigate the likely targeting of IDF logistics hubs, the military has also begun to decentralize its most important classes of supply-ammunition, POL, and spare parts.53

The major additions to Israel’s defensive capabilities are two missile defense systems, and the Arrow Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. The Arrow TMD is a high altitude ballistic missile interceptor capable of covering a range of 90 km, with a maximum altitude of 50 km. Iron Dome, a mobile air defense system, complements the Arrow TMD by targeting short- range, low trajectory rockets and artillery. Both systems have been proven effective in testing and the Arrow TMD is already operational at multiple locations in Israel. Iron Dome became operational in early April 2011 and on 7 April 2011 intercepted a Grad rocket fired out of Gaza.

It has since had a number of successes intercepting rockets from Gaza. While both of these systems have their critics,54 both are important additions to Israel’s defenses against Hizbullah.

The Arrow TMD, while untested in battle, has successfully intercepted ballistic missiles in

14 tests, though it remains uncertain how the system will hold up against multiple incoming

52 Beeston, Richard, and Nicholas Blanford, ʻHezbollah Stockpiles 40,000 Rockets Near Israel Borderʼ, The Sunday Times (5 August 2009).

53 White, Jeffrey, ʻIf War Comesʼ, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #106 (September 2010) 10.

54 Reuven Pedatzur, a Tel Aviv University professor and former IAF fighter pilot, says that because Arrow is not 100% effective, and only one nuclear weapon poses an existential threat, the system as a whole is useless. Regarding Iron Dome, his issues center on the short flight time of a Kassam rocket (14 seconds) from Gaza to Sderot. Iron Dome reportedly takes 15 seconds to identify a launch, acquire a target, and launch. Effectively meaning that Iron Dome is useless against anything fired from within 5 km. In addition, says Pedatzur, each Iron Dome missle costs $100,000 compared to relatively cheap rockets of both and Hizbullah. (Cited from Hartman, Ben, ʻIron Dome Doesnʼt Answer Threatsʼ, Jerusalem Post (9 May 2010).

-23- threats. It is currently estimated that Israel has three Arrow batteries deployed in Israel, one in the south, one near Tel Aviv – probably in the vicinity of Palmachim Airbase – and a third south of

Haifa. Each deployed battery consists of between four and eight mobile launchers, each with six launch tubes. Each battery has an estimated 50-100 Arrow missiles and the tubes can be re- loaded in approximately one hour. Rather than relying on hit-to-kill technology like both the

Patriot and THAAD systems, Arrow is equipped with a proximity fuse which will direct fragmentation toward the target at a maximum radius of 50 m. Israeli defense engineer Uzi

Rubin, using Iran’s Shahab missiles as an example, claims that a target fired on by a salvo of six ballistic missiles, each engaged by one Arrow anti-ballistic missile (ABM) will have a near

100% chance of survival. However, there is a precipitous drop-off in survivability if the missiles have separate targets–six targets fired on by six missiles and each engaged by one Arrow missile have an approximately 27% chance of survival. Estimating a platform’s success based on peacetime testing, however, is unreliable. Perhaps a better indicator of the Arrow’s potential success is the U.S. Army’s experience in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The United

States deployed a total 40 Patriot units to the theater armed with both the PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile variants. The Patriot missiles had confirmed kills on eight of the nine enemy ballistic missiles fired into areas under Patriot protection – the ninth is classified only as a probable success due to insufficient data.55 The Patriots in OIF, however, were not tested with multiple incoming threats. Though the primary motivation for the ABM system is the Iranian nuclear threat, Israel has said that Hizbullah acquiring long-range missiles would be a game-changer,

55 United States Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance (Washington D.C. January 2005) 1.

-24- indicating something less than total confidence in the Arrow TMD.56 Even if Arrow performs as advertised, if Hizbullah is able to mass fires on a single target they are likely to be successful.

However, the Arrow TMD, when coupled with the IAF’s aggressive hunter/killer efforts and initial targeted air strikes could significantly degrade Hizbullah’s long-range missile threat.

Iron Dome, on the other hand, is likely to be far more susceptible to Hizbullah’s swarming tactic. IDF tests have shown the system to be effective against multiple rocket barrages, even being capable of distinguishing between rockets destined for viable targets and those on trajectory for open fields. Israel currently has two Iron Dome batteries57 with a third planned for

July 2011 and an additional three forecasted for the end of 2012.58 Each battery consists of three launchers armed with 20 anti-missile missiles each – 60 per battery.59 Assuming that Hizbullah maintains their average launch rate from 2006 of 150 rockets per day, using the 2006 25% rate of impact in built up areas60 and assuming that Iron Dome is 100% effective at distinguishing between off-target and on-target rockets, the IDF will be firing approximately 38 anti-missile missiles per day. If the system works perfectly it is still estimated that it will only successfully intercept its target 80% of the time. In a perfect scenario for the IDF and Iron Dome that leaves

10 well-targeted Hizbullah rockets striking their target each day. But if the IDF estimates that

56 Levinson, Charles, ʻSyria Gave Scuds To Hezbollah, U.S. Saysʼ, Wall Street Journal (14 April 2010).

57 The U.S. Congress voted on 20 May 2010 to approve President Obamaʼs request to fund ten more Iron Dome batteries.

58 Yagna, Yanir, Anshel Pfeffer, ʻIsrael Speeds Up Third Iron Dome Battery in Wake of Gaza Attackʼ, Haaretz (12 April 2011).

59 Ben-David, Alon, ʻIron Dome Advances to Meet Qassam Threatʼ, Janeʼs Defence Weekly (23 August 2006) 1.

60 Rubin, Uzi ʻHizballahʼs Rocket Campaign Against Northern Israel: A Preliminary Reportʼ, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 6/10 (31 August 2006) 1.

-25- Hizbullah is now capable of launching as many as 600 rockets a day are correct then the IDF would be firing approximately 200 anti-missile missiles every day with an estimated 40 on-target rockets penetrating the defense system daily. Finally, Israel’s Iron Dome capacity is not sufficient to cover all of northern Israel, meaning that Iron Dome’s protection will have to be placed strategically along the border. This will factor into Hizbullah’s targeting and further increase the number of rockets that reach their target. The number will be higher still if Hizbullah is able to reduce Iron Dome’s efficacy through large-scale barrages. Israel can expect that Hizbullah will target both Iron Dome and Arrow batteries as well.

HIZBULLAH’S CHALLENGE TO ISRAELI AIR AND SEA DOMINANCE

Israel has had air dominance over Lebanon in every battle it has fought there. This has been critical to the IDF’s strategy, allowing for a heavy reliance on tactical and preparatory air strikes before ground incursions, increased freedom of movement across the battlefield using rotary wing aircraft–especially useful for deep penetrating raids by special operations forces, and more recently, saturation of the skies over Lebanon with intelligence gathering platforms–both manned and unmanned. Hizbullah’s attempts to acquire surface-to-air missile (SAM) capabilities are not new. In the 2006 war Hizbullah employed both the SA-7 Grail and the SA-14 Gremlin, though with limited efficacy 61. Nonetheless, Hizbullah’s limited SAM capabilities still proved to be an effective deterrent in 2006, causing the IDF to limit its use of AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra gunships. Though reports that Hizbullah has acquired the SA-18 and SA-24 are unconfirmed, their introduction into Hizbullah’s arsenal would enhance the SAM threat faced by the IAF. The

SA-18 Grouse and SA-24 Grinch are both man-portable air-defense (MANPAD) systems that

61 Hizbullah did shoot down a CH-53 using an anti-tank missile, the only aircraft it successfully shot down during the conflict.

-26- mesh well with Hizbullah’s small unit, decentralized tactics. The SA-18 and SA-24 are shoulder fired, modern, low altitude weapons considered to be effective against rotary wing aircraft.

Though neither the SA-18 or SA-24 pose a significant threat to Israel’s F-16 and F-15 aircraft, the threat to rotary wing aircraft would be significant. Despite this, the presence of advanced

SAM capabilities on the battlefield should still be cause for concern for the IAF and could force pilots to be more conservative in the skies over Lebanon 62.

More significantly, effective targeting of IAF helicopters will pose a serious threat to the

Israeli war effort. The psychological impact of downed aircraft and the resulting threat to air superiority would have a significant impact on the IDF and the Israeli populace. The IDF has enjoyeded air superiority in all of its recent conflicts and have not trained for the alternative.

Rather, in response to shortcomings in 2006, they have enhanced their air-ground integration.

Reduced close air support for ground operations, particularly in urban terrain, removes a big advantage for the IDF. As was the case in the battles for Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jbeil in 2006, limited air support allowed Hizbullah fighters to more easily exploit their intimate knowledge of the narrow streets and buildings in order to maneuver on the IDF.63

Special operations forces will also have a critical role in the opening hours and days of a future conflict to rapidly disable Hizbullah’s long-range rocket and missile threat. Because intelligence on these sites is incomplete, reliance on fixed wing air strikes alone is insufficient.

Deep penetrating air assaults by special operations forces will play a prominent role in targeting those capabilities as well as C3I nodes–including headquarters facilities, high-value targets

62 In 1999, during NATOʼs air campaign over Serbia, a U.S. F-117 was shot down by antiquated Serbian SAM capabilities. In addition, a U.S. F-16 was downed by a Serbian SA-3.

63 Blanford, ʻDeconstructing Hizbullahʼs Surprise Military Prowessʼ, 4-5

-27- (HVT), and leadership. If IDF special operations forces do not have reliable air superiority then the ability to air assault deep into Lebanon and the northern Bekaa valley will be curtailed and

Israel will be primarily reliant on fixed wing air strikes, effective on known targets but less effective if targets have to be sought out or if weapons are successfully covered and concealed.64

Special Operations are preferred in strikes on HVTs, allowing them to be detained for questioning. They are also important for battle damage assessment (BDA) in order to ensure that targets are in fact neutralized. Without accurate BDA the IDF can’t reliably say whether or not it destroyed a specific capability.

Critical to a successful air campaign will be a deep target deck to rely on. One of the problems the IAF had in 2006 was that poor IPB had given pilots relatively few strategically important targets within Lebanon. The resulting airstrikes caused significant damage to the

Dahiya and Lebanese infrastructure but had minimal impact on Hizbullah’s C3I or combat effectiveness. As was previously discussed, Israeli intelligence gathering efforts have been significantly increased since 2006, and Israel likely has a larger target deck than they did in

2006. What remains to be seen, and will be significant to continued IAF effectiveness, is if they are capable of developing a secondary and tertiary target list to use once their initial phase is complete.

Hizbullah’s introduction of anti-ship capabilities threatens to further degrade key nodes of

Israeli combat power. Israeli coastal operations during 2006 filled multiple functions, including interdictions on Lebanon-bound ships, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

64 As an example of air strikes and indirect fire being insufficient, in 2006 Hizbullah repeatedly launched rockets from a densely forested hillside between the southern villages of Naqoura and Alma al-Shaab. Multiple air-strikes and indirect fire missions were unable to stop the launches which continued throughout the war.

-28- support, naval gunfire support, and as a launch pad for special operations missions. In addition to challenging Israeli air superiority, Hizbullah will want to challenge the Israeli Navy’s sea dominance as well. The C-802 is a sophisticated anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), which delivers a 165 kg warhead out to a maximum range of 120 km. The missile boasts a 98% hit probability due to the guidance system’s effective anti-jamming capabilities, its minimal radar reflectivity, and low altitude flight making it extremely difficult to intercept. The Israelis attribute the successful attack on the INS Hanit to the crew’s failure to comply with standard operating procedures and have deployed upgraded missile defense systems. However, the C-802 is considered one of the most advanced anti-ship cruise missiles in the world, rivaling the United

States’ AGM-84 Harpoon. If Hizbullah has a deployable stock of C-802 ASCMs, then it will place strategically significant operational constraints on the Israeli Navy in a future conflict. It will also monopolize fixed wing and special operations resources in the opening days if Israel hopes to neutralize the threat.

OPERATION CAST LEAD

Analysis of Israeli performance during Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 indicates they have learned from their failures during the 2006 conflict. Ground-air integration was more seamless and effective due in part to the integration of Forward Air Operations officers in every brigade.

The strategic use and tactical performance of armor units reflected a better understanding of the battlefield and took full advantage of the Merkava’s strengths–speed and firepower. Armored columns advanced into Gaza with rotary wing aircraft and UAVs providing CAS and real time visual feeds of the battlefield. From the outset, the IDF chose alternate avenues of approach,

-29- often creating their own using bulldozers to destroy buildings. And, perhaps most importantly, improvements to the collection and exploitation of intelligence were significant. As a result of a vast human intelligence (HUMINT) network inside of Gaza the IAF began Operation Cast Lead with a long list of strategic and tactical targets of import–they hit 180 targets in the first 10 minutes, including weapons storage facilities, training camps, rocket factories, and C3I infrastructure– and the IDF went into Gaza with a nearly complete picture of Hamas’ forces.65

Thorough planning allowed the ground forces to move quickly and Gaza City was enveloped after only three days.

But notwithstanding these improvements, it would be dangerous to assume that the improvements on display in Gaza in 2008 would lead to such an overwhelming success in a future conflict with Hizbullah. As Ron Tira, a former pilot and author on Israeli defense policy puts it, “If Hizbullah is the Delta Force, then Hamas is the National Guard.”

Operations in Gaza present a far different problem set for military planners and tactical units. In 2008 Hamas attempted to replicate Hizbullah’s tactics, using tunnel systems, IEDs, and establishing ambush positions and defensive strong points throughout Gaza. Hamas, however, lacks the training and combat experience that Hizbullah has amassed over the years. In 2006,

Hizbullah’s training and experience, when coupled with the advanced weapons technology it had acquired–something Hamas also lacked – created a battlefield synergy. Similarly, the tables were turned in 2008 in terms of preparation. Whereas Hizbullah had been preparing for war with Israel

65 Matthews, Matt M, ʻHard Lessons Learned: A Comparison of the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War and Operation CAST LEAD: A Historical Overviewʼ, Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD. Ed. Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquhar. (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press 2009) 26-27.

-30- since 2000 and Israel was unprepared for the engagement in 2006, Hamas was caught unprepared for war in 2008 and Israel had had ample time to plan.

Nor is it clear that Israel has dramatically improved its intelligence collection in Lebanon.

As this paper has demonstrated, Israel has saturated the skies over Lebanon with IMINT platforms. However, Hizbullah has proven nearly impossible to penetrate with HUMINT assets and, thanks to an organic, internal fiber optic network, has been resilient to SIGINT as well.

Israel’s ability to compensate for minimal HUMINT and SIGINT assets will be a crucial part of their success in a future war with Hizbullah.

Policymakers and military leaders in Israel have good reason to be pleased with the military’s performance in 2008, but it is important to remember that south Lebanon is a more complex battlefield with a far more sophisticated enemy. Meanwhile, Hizbullah watched

Operation Cast Lead closely and is certain to have revisited their IPB and refined their defensive tactics accordingly.

POTENTIAL FOR A BROADER CONFLICT

In 2006 Hizbullah received logistical support from Syria throughout the conflict. Since

2006 Syria has been instrumental in helping rearm the organization through logistical support for

Iranian arms transfers, direct Syrian arms transfers, and training.66 If Israel endeavors to permanently end Hizbullah’s military activities it will need to end the logistical support it receives from Syria and Iran. In a future conflict, analysts posit that Israel would likely strike locations and facilities in Syria being used to support Hizbullah – the most obvious ones being

66 White, Jeffrey, ʻIf War Comesʼ, 20-21.

-31- airfields, depots, and roads used for resupply. As Israel’s 2007 airstrike on Syrian facilities near the eastern town of Deir al-Zur demonstrated, Israel will not have a difficult time establishing air dominance over Syria. A concerted air campaign over Syria, however, will add a significant intelligence and resource requirement on an Israeli military already committed to a demanding campaign in Lebanon. Syria is not going to be eager to get involved in a protracted military conflict either. In light of recent domestic political upheaval both Syria and Israel will want to avoid any conflict that will further destabilize the Assad regime. Syria has generally demonstrated itself to be a rational actor and, despite its historically close ties with Hizbullah, is unlikely to jeopardize its own stability to come to the organizations rescue.67 Lastly, frustrations among the Iranian government with the economic and political costs of supporting Hizbullah could influence Tehran to do what it can to prevent a future war between Israel and Hizbullah from escalating into a regional one.68 Now that Hizbullah’s efficacy against Israel has been demonstrated, it is in Tehran’s interest to maintain Hizbullah’s presence there and not do anything to disrupt the current balance. Suggestions of Iran’s attempt to exert increased control over Hizbullah can be found in Hassan Nasrallah’s August 2006 interview with Lebanon’s New

TV, which amounted to an apology to the Lebanese populace. In the interview Nasrallah said had he known the Israeli response would have been so catastrophic he would not have ordered the attack that sparked the war. Iran’s active involvement in the reconstruction and distribution of aid in southern Lebanon as well as a recent visit by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is

67 Sharp, Jeremy M, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations. (Washington D.C: Congressional Research Office. 26 April 2010) 9-10.

68 Hokayem, Emile, ʻIran and Lebanonʼ, The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy. Ed. Robin Wright. (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press 2010) 181.

-32- more evidence that Iran is attempting to exert more control over Hizbullah69 with the hopes of preserving a key part of its own deterrence against Israel.

CONCLUSION

Hizbullah’s performance in the 2006 war with Israel is the archetypal example of an unconventional military successfully exploiting the weaknesses of a better-equipped conventional force. By successfully blending conventional infantry tactics with unconventional guerilla tactics, Hizbullah was able to completely halt the IDF’s forward advance. The military buildup that Hizbullah has undertaken since further indicates that the organization continues to learn and adapt their tactics to their enemy’s strengths and weaknesses.

The Israeli experience in 2006 revealed significant gaps in readiness and training.

Fundamental failures on the part of the IDF further contributed to enhancing their enemy’s strengths. Like Hizbullah, Israel quickly identified its tactical shortcomings and has taken substantial steps to correct them, a critical characteristic of an effective military. Many of those lessons learned were on display during Operation Cast Lead, though how they will carry over to operations in southern Lebanon against Hizbullah is by no means certain.

The military buildup that has occurred in both Israel and Lebanon since the end of hostilities in 2006 is a result of that war’s ambiguous results. Despite the buildup, the border region has been relatively quiet since 2006, with the rhetoric on both sides suggestive of a form of deterrence taking hold. Israel and Hizbullah are both increasingly prepared for war though neither seems particularly eager for one. If a war does break out both sides are likely to bring to bear the extent of their available combat power in what promises to be a far more ruinous war

69 Cambanis, Thanassis, A Privilege to Die (New York: Free Press, 2010) 210-211 ; further analysis taken from an interview with Cambanis, Thanassis. Personal interview (10 Dec. 2010).

-33- than 2006. Despite the scale of a future war, it would not be in the interests of Syria, Iran, or

Israel to broaden the conflict into a regional one. While some strikes may occur in Syria to prevent significant logistical support to Hizbullah, Syria’s own instinct for self-preservation is likely to prevent the war from escalating.

Finally, an important takeaway for regional and Western governments is the extent to which a small, well armed, well trained – though numerically and technologically inferior – force can challenge an ostensibly dominant military power. Given the close relationship between Iran and Hizbullah, Western powers should assume that Iran would use similar tactics – if not exclusively, at least partially – in a conflict with U.S. or NATO forces. North Korean assistance with the construction of bunkers, and Hizbullah’s training should also suggest similar tactics would be used in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. As with the proxy wars of the Cold War, the conflict between Israel and Hizbullah is essentially one of U.S. military technology against the technology and tactics of its most likely enemies in the near future. It therefore warrants close analysis and consideration in order to ensure that the applicable lessons learned on both sides can be implemented in the U.S. and NATO militaries.

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