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Think by Simon Blackburn Think by Simon Blackburn Chapter 4b Free Will/Self The unobservability of the self David Hume, the Scottish empiricist we met in connection with his critique of Descartes’ method of doubt, is very skeptical of the notion of a self. His argument (p.122) is just that the self is unobservable. When we introspect the only thing we can become aware of is some experience or other. We are never aware of some “I” that is some how the bearer of all those experiences. Empiricism Hume’s argument is typical of classical empiricism: if you can’t see (or, more generally, sense), it doesn’t exist. But this argument against the self is actually a very poor one for the 21st century. The reason is very simply that today we acknowledge all sort of things that are beyond sensation. If we only believed in what we can see in touch, then we would have to regard virtually of the phenomena of contemporary science (molecules, atoms, subatomic particles, charges, forces, electromagnetic radiation, dark matter, black holes, etc.) as fictions. David Hume did not believe in the soul because A. Hume was a rationalist and the soul can not be rationally proven. B. Hume was an empiricist, and he did not think that the soul was observable. C. Hume was a determinist and was skeptical that a soul could be free. D. Hume actually did believe in a soul. The self and morality Like free will, the idea of a persisting self is central to our moral intuitions. Basically, the idea here is that holding people responsible for things over time requires the assumption that they are the same people over time. In fact, we often do here arguments that someone should not be held responsible for something he did 20 years ago, because he is really not even the same person. The simplicity of the self Philosophers like Thomas Reid (a contemporary of Hume) have insisted that the self is not only real, but indivisible. (p.123). The point here is that we really can’t identify the self with our body or some part of our body, because our body can be theoretically chopped up into little pieces. And it’s silly to suggest that each little piece would be entitled to it’s share of the estate or be held responsible for it’s share of the harm done by the entire body. Simplicity and immortality As Blackburn points out (p.124) there is an interesting connection between the assumption of simplicity, and immortality. Dying, after all, is just a form of change. But the only kinds of things that can change are things that have parts. So if Reid is right that the self is simple, then it cannot change, which means that it must be immortal. Thomas Reid believed that the self is simple because A. simple things are easier to understand. B. the self is indivisible, and only simple things are indivisible. C. the self is immaterial and only immaterial things are indivisible. D. non simple things can not transfer their properties through epicyclic parameters. Locke’s on identity I John Locke had some of the most interesting insights into identity. He approached the question of personal identity for human beings by asking first what is the basis of identity for non human beings. His answer is interesting. Locke asks us to consider an oak tree from it’s ‘birth’ as an acorn to it’s death 350 years later when it topples in a storm. We are inclined to say that it is the same tree the entire time, but obviously it changes dramatically in physical terms. According to Locke, the oak is not the thing you see before you at any given time. The oak is that physical process through time. Locke says that it continues to be the same oak insofar as it “partakes in the same life.” Locke on identity II Locke’s view has relevance for our understanding of human beings as well. Even though science can not countenance the existence of souls, it is not thereby committed to the idea that your are merely an assemblage of particles. Like the oak you are a “functional unity”. At any given moment we see only a very small part of you. The “real you” is not an immaterial object, for the simple reason that you are not an object at all. Human beings, like oaks, are processes through time. This way of looking at living things gives Locke a nice way of saying what it means to be the same being over time. Specifically, to be the same being is simply to be participating in the same process. Growth and change do not undermine identity as long as the functional organization remains. Locke believed that since human beings are not made of the same physical stuff through time they are not self-identical through time. A. True B. False The Ship of Theseus The Ship of Theseus (or Neurath) is an excellent story for dialing in the problem of characterizing a functional entity in terms of what it’s made of. Imagine that Theseus (legendary King of Athens) sails his ship on a voyage so long that every part on the ship is replaced due to wear and tear. When he returns to port, is it the same ship? Now add to this the assumption that someone is following the ship throughout it’s voyage and gathering all the discarded parts. He assembles them into their original form. Now who has the Ship of Theseus? Locke’s answer is straightforward. The true Ship of Theseus is the one that Theseus returned on. This is not because Theseus returned on it, but because the ship is not what it is made of, but the entire temporal process by which it’s functional integrity is maintained. Locke’s critique of the immaterial soul Locke has established that ships, oaks, and animals can remain self-identical despite having all their matter replaced. This gives him an interesting basis for criticizing the view that human self-identity is due to a single, simple immaterial soul. His point is extremely interesting (p. 128) : Even if we accept the idea of an immaterial soul, how do we know that a single, simple self-identical substance persists through time? Locke’s question elaborated Remember, Locke has just shown us that a being can be identified with a physical process, where the actual matter is constantly in flux. So, why couldn’t a soul just be an analogous immaterial process, where the “soul stuff” is constantly in flux? Kant’s elastic balls The German philosopher Kant imagines a different possibility (p. 129) using an analogy with perfectly elastic balls. We know, he says, that when one rolling ball hits another stationery one, it imparts it’s momentum to it. How do we know that the self isn’t like this? Why couldn’t it be that during your lifetime a multiplicity of immaterial substances is simply transferring the contents of your consciousness from one to the other in the way that elastic balls transfer their momentum? Self 1 Self 2 Self 3 Self 4 Argument from ignorance redux Recall Schopenhauer’s powerful point that our belief in freedom is largely the result of our ignorance of the causes of our actions. Kant’s point is very similar. As Blackburn emphasizes, we assume that the self is simple because that’s the way it appears from within. But for all we know our immaterial substance (if there is any such thing) gets replaced every night with a new one that has all our memories and experiences recorded on it. Both Kant and Locke believed that the self is due to a single immaterial substance persisting through time. A. True B. False Human beings vs. persons. Interestingly, Locke held that the criteria of identity he developed for oaks and human beings (partaking in the same life) is not sufficient for persons. For Locke, a person is "...a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and different places." In other words, a human being is a person to the extent that it is self-conscious, able to reflect on its memories and experiences. The prince and the cobbler Although Blackburn does not discuss it here, Locke arrives at his criterion of identity for persons through a thought experiment. He asks us to imagine a prince and a cobbler who exchange souls in their sleep. Hence, the body of the cobbler wakes up in a hovel with all the memories of a prince, and the body of a prince wakes up in castle with all the memories of a cobbler. Locke thinks it is obvious that the cobbler as human being is still in the hovel, but the cobbler as person is now living in a castle and in a prince’s body. Hence, Locke argues that the criterion of identity for persons is not a function of it’s physical nature, but of its consciousness. To be the same person through time is to possessed of the same memories. Locke’s motivation As a Christian, Locke believes in a soul that survives bodily death; but as a scientist and a philosopher he knew that there is no way to know the soul of another man. Hence, while he puts the thought experiment in terms of changing souls, he does not see personal identity in terms of the soul at all.
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