Ch. 4 pp. 69-104 Self, Self-Concept, and Identity

Handbool< of Self and Identity I

Edited by Mark R. Leary June Price Tangney

THE GUILFORD PRESS New York London To Mike Kernis and Fred Rhodewalt, whose enthusiasm, warmth, and contributions to the psychology of the self are sorely missed

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Handbook of self and identity I edited by Mark R. Leary, June Price Tangney.-2nd ed . p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4625-0305-6 (hbk.) 1. Self. 2. Identity (Psychology). I. Leary, Mark R. II. Tangney, June Price. BF697.H345 2012 155.2-dc23 2011026421 CHAPTER 4

Self, Self-Concept, and Identity

Daphna Oyserman Kristen Elmore George Smith

Want a burger and fries or softly steamed lieves is true of oneself (Baumeister, 1998; fish and fungi? How about offering a bribe Forgas & Williams, 2002). In addition to to win that contract? Feel like bungee jump­ self-concepts people also know themselves ing? People believe that they do not need to in other ways: They have self-images and seriously weigh the pros and cons of these self-feelings, as well as images drawn from choices before deciding, that their identities the other senses-a sense of what they provide a meaning-making anchor. They sound like, what they feel like tactically, know who they are, and who they are directs a sense of their bodies in motion. Though their choices. In that sense, choices large these self-aspects were part of the initial and small feel identity-based and identity­ conceptualization of what it means to have a congruent. self (James, 1890/1927), they have received Identities are the traits and characteris­ less empirical attention. People feel that they tics, social relations, roles, and social group know themselves, since they have a lot of ex­ memberships that definewho one is. Identi­ perience with themselves and a huge store of ties can be focused on the past-what used autobiographical memories (Fivush, 2011). to be true of one, the present-what is true As we outline in this chapter, this feeling of one now, or the future-the person one of knowing is important even though the expects or wishes to become, the person one assumptions on which it is based are often feels obligated to try to become, or the per­ faulty. Feeling that one knows oneself facili­ son one fears one may become. Identities are tates using the self to make sense and make orienting, they provide a meaning-making choices, using the self as an important per­ lens and focus one's attention on some but ceptual, motivational and self-regulatory not other features of the immediate context tool. This feeling of knowing oneself is based (Oyserman, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Togeth­ in part on an assumption of stability that is er, identities make up one's self-concept­ central to both everyday (lay) theories about variously described as what comes to mind the self and more formal (social science) the­ when one thinks of oneself (Neisser, 1993; ories about the self. Yet as we describe in the Stets & Burke, 2003; Stryker, 1980; Tajfcl, second half of this chapter, the assumption 1981), one's theory of one's personality of stability is belied by the malleability, con­ (Markus & Cross, 1990), and what one be- text sensitivity, and dynamic construction of

69 70 I. AWAREr-iESS, COGNI-ION, AND REGULATION

the self as a mental construct. Identities are highlights what we see as important new di­ not the fixedmarkers people assume them to rections. be but are instead dynamically constructed in the moment. Choices that feel identity­ congruent in one situation do not necessar­ Setting the Stage ily feel identity-congruent in another situa­ tion. This flexibility is part of what makes A number of years ago McGuire and McGuire the self useful. As noted by William James (1988) cheerfully noted that the academic (1890/1927), thinking is for doing. People literature on the self is dull even though the are pragmatic reasoners, sensitively attuned topic is interesting; they call this the anti-Mi­ to the contextual affordances and constraints das touch. In a reversal of Rumpelstiltskin's in their immediate surroundings, though task, self-researchers somehow managed to not necessarily to the source of these influ­ spin piles of boring hay from the sparkling ences on their judgments and behavior (e.g., gold of their topic. A generation later, readers Schwarz, 2002, 2007, 2010). People do not of the literature may still search for the gold simply respond to contextual cues; rather, in vain. Self and identity remain topics of high their responses are both moderated and me­ interest not only for psychologists, but also diated by the effect of these cues on who they across the social sciences-psychologists, are in the moment (Oyserman, 2007, 2009a, sociologists, anthropologists, political sci­ 2009b; Smeesters, Wheeler, & Kay, 2010). entists, and even economists make reference In this chapter, we consider these two core to self and identity. Google Scholar yields 3 issues-the feeling of knowing oneself and million citations, and limiting focus to pro­ the dynamic construction of who one is in fessional search engines {the Web of Science, the moment. We suggest that the self is an PsyciNFO) still yields tens of thousands of important motivational tool both because articles in which self-concept or identity are the self feels like a stable anchor, and be­ included as key words. This unwieldy mass cause the identities that constitute the self includes both studies in which self and iden­ are, in fact, dynamically constructed in con­ tity are asserted as explanatory factors and text. The self is useful because people look in which something is empirically assessed to their identities in making choices and or manipulated and described as some aspect because these identities are situated, prag­ of self or identity. matic, and attuned to the affordances and So what is this self (or identity) that is so constraints of the immediate context. important? Self and identity researchers have For ease, we divide this chapter into sec­ long believed that the self is both a product tions. In the first section (Setting the Stage), of situations and a shaper of behavior in we briefly operationalize what is meant by situations. Making sense of oneself-who self and identity, drawing on other reviews one is, was, and may become, and therefore from both sociological and psychological the path one should take in the world-is a perspectives (e.g., annual review and other core self-project. Self and identity theories large summaries: Brewer, 1991; Callero, assume that people care about themselves, 2003; Elliot, 2001; Markus & Wurf, 1987; want to know who they are, and can use this Owens, Robinson, & Smith-Lovin, 2010; self-knowledge to make sense of the world. Oyserman, 2007). In the second section (Un­ Self and identity are predicted to influence derstanding Process), we consider what the what people are motivated to do, how they self is assumed to be-a stable yet malleable think and make sense of themselves and oth­ mental construct, and what gaps remain ers, the actions they take, and their feelings in how the self is studied. In the third sec­ and ability to control or regulate themselves tion (Thinking Is for Doing), we address the (e.g., for conceptual models, see Baumeister, basis for future research, and in the fourth 1998; Brewer, 1991; Brown, 1998; Carver section (Dynamic Construction), we outline & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987, 1989; Oys­ predictions about what the pragmatic, situ­ erman, 2007). ated, experiential, and embodied nature of In this section we provide a set of brief mental processing imply for self and identity. operationalizations. Our goal is to provide Our final section (Wrapping Up and Moving some clarity with a number of caveats. First, Forward) provides a bulleted summary and self and identity are sometimes used inter- 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 71 changeably and other times used to refer to et al., 2010). While theories converge on the different things. Second, what self and iden­ notion that reflexive capacity is critical to tity refer to differs both across and within having a self, theories diverge in how mem­ publications. Third, this ambiguity extends ory is considered in service of sustaining the to whether the self and identity in the singu­ self. On the one hand, the self can be consid­ lar or plural; that is, whether there is one or ered primarily a memory structure such that multiple selves, identities, and self-concepts. the me aspect of self has existence outside Relevant reviews highlighting these issues of particular contexts and social structures. from a sociological perspective (e.g., Call­ In contrast, the self can be considered pri­ era, 2003; Owens et al., 2010), from a so­ marily a cognitive capacity such that what cial identity perspective (e.g., Brewer, 1991; constitutes the me aspect of self is created Ellmers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002), and from inside of and embedded within moment-to­ a social and personality psychology per­ moment situations. From the latter perspec­ spective (e.g., Baumeister, 1998; Markus tive, what is stable is not recalled content but & Wurf, 1987; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; rather the motivation to use the self to make Swann & Besson, 2010) provide some sense meaning; memory is used but the me self is of the breadth of the topic. Our goal is not not stable. to attempt to revisit all of the issues raised While in some ways helpful, the shorthand in these reviews but rather to pro,·ide a me can inadvertently limit focus of attention working outline of the constructs in order to one way of conceiving the self-what cul­ to highlight ways forward in research. Like tural and clinical psychologists might call an McGuire and McGuire (1988) our goal is immersed individualistic sense of self. While to shed light on the gold-what makes the less studied, people can think of themselves self so indispensible to understanding how in different ways. An individualistic perspec­ people live in the world, make choices, and tive focuses on how one is separate and dif­ make meaning of their experience. ferent from others, but people can also con­ sider how they are similar and connected via relationships (sometimes called a collectiv­ Basic Operationalization istic perspective). An immersed perspective Self focuses on the self up close and from inside the mind's eye, but people can also consider In common discourse, the term self often re­ themselves in other ways. They can consider fers to a warm sense or a warm feeling that how they might look from a distance, how something is "about me" or "about us." Re­ they might look from the outside, in the eyes flecting on oneself is both a common activity of others. Each perspective highlights and and a mental feat. It requires that there is an draws attention to some aspects of "me" "I" that can consider an object that is "me." and makes other aspects less likely to come The term self includes both the actor who to mind. thinks ("I am thinking") and the object of Cultural psychologists have focused atten­ thinking ("about me"). Moreover, the actor tion on between-society differences in the both is able to think and is aware of doing likelihood of focusing on the "me" versus so. As the philosopher John Locke famously the "us" aspects of the self (Markus & Oy­ asserted, "I think, therefore I am." Aware­ serman, 1989; Oyserman, 1993; Triandis, ness of having thoughts matters. 1989). For example, Americans are described Another way to denote these three aspects as more likely than East Asians to take a "me" (thinking, being aware of thinking, and tak­ perspective (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In ing the self as an object for thinking) is to contrast, social identity researchers demon­ use the term reflexive capacity (Kihlstrom, strate that whether one takes a "me" or an Beer, & Klein, 2003; Lewis, 1990). Rather "us" perspective is not fixed by culture but than attempt to distinguish between the influenced by context (Brewer, 1991; Brewer mental content (me) and the aspects of the & Gardner, 1996; Hogg, 2003, 2006). More mental capacity of thinking (I), modern use situated approaches demonstrate empirically of the term self includes all these elements that small shifts in contexts influence wheth­ (Baumeister, 1998; Callero, 2003; Kihlstrom er anyone, American or East Asian, takes et al., 2003; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Owens on "me" or "us" perspectives (for reviews, 72 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION see Oyserman, 2007, in press; Oyserman & diet how social interactions will go, and Lee, 2008a, 2008b; Oyserman & Sorensen, self-regulate by acting in ways that facilitate 2009). Taking on a "me" or an "us" per­ future self-needs and wants. In that sense, spective influences perception and mental there is not a single me but multiple me's, or procedures more generally, as we discuss in at least multiple facets to each me. Rather the section on self-concept. than consider these multiple selves, we pro­ In addition to being able to take both a pose considering each of these as structuring separated and a connected perspective on self-concepts, as we explain next. the self, people can also consider themselves from immersed or distal perspectives (Kross, Self-Concept 2009; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). That is, people can consider themselves as Self-concepts are cognmve structures that actors buffeted by others and situations can include content, attitudes, or evaluative (Jones & Nisbett, 1972); conversely, they judgments and are used to make sense of the can take a step back and consider themselves world, focus attention on one's goals, and from a more distal perspective. People can protect one's sense of basic worth (Oyser­ consider what others might be observing man & Markus, 1998). Thus, if the self is about them, seeing themselves, as it were, an "I" that thinks and a "me" that is the through the eyes of others (Cohen & Gunz, content of those thoughts, one important 2002). Memories include both close and dis­ part of this "me" content involves mental tal perspectives, termed field and observer concepts or ideas of who one is, was, and memories by Nigro and Neisser (1983). In will become. These mental concepts are the observer memories, the actor takes the per­ content of self-concept. spective of an observer, seeing oneself from While we focus on the structural aspect of the outside; this is not the case for field self-concept (e.g., individualistic, collectivis­ memories, which are from the original per­ tic, proximal immersed, distal other), much spective of the actor. Switching perspective of the literature focuses on content and evalu­ is consequential. Thus, thinking about the ative judgment, asking what people describe self from a more distal perspective focuses when they describe themselves and how pos­ attention on one's broader goals and values itively they evaluate themselves. This focus (Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, on content plus evaluative judgment is quite 2008). It also reduces emotional investment common in research on children and adoles­ in the self, reducing both rumination about cents, and typically involves closed-ended the past (Kross, 2009) and perceived overlap rating scales in a series of domains (e.g., between the self one is now and the self one physical appearance, athletic ability, emo­ will become (Pronin, Olivola, & Kennedy, tional stability, peer relationships, family re­ 2008). lationships; see Harter, Chapter 31, this vol­ Ecologically, the two axes of self­ ume; Marsh, 1990). However, content can be perspective are likely related (Cohen & studied separately from evaluative judgment, Gunz, 2002). Taking a relational "us" per­ often with open-ended probes asking people spective on the self is likely to co-occur with to describe their current, ideal, and ought taking a more distal perspective on the self self-concepts, or their desired and undesired to include what others might be seeing (for possible selves (for a review of measurement an applied review of the interface between of possible self-concepts, see Oyserman & culture and autobiographical memory, see Fryberg, 2006). In the same way, some re­ Schwarz, Oyserman, & Peytcheva, 2010). search focuses explicitly on self-judgments However, people can be induced to take any or self-attitudes. These self-judgments are combination of these perspectiYes, including typically operationalized as self-esteem or the potentially less common combinations of self-efficacy and are a distilled evaluation of separate "me" and temporal distal observer the person's sense of worth and competence perspective, or relational "us" and close im­ in the world (e.g., Bandura, 1977, 2001; mersed perspective. Because they are able Crocker & Park, Chapter 15, this volume; to reflect on themselves over time and from Rosenberg, 1979). multiple perspectives, people can evaluate Self-concepts also differ in how they are themselves using multiple standards, pre- structured. Researchers have documented 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 73

differences in which content domains are these a self-concept structure. Multiple such organized togethe , i comple"ity in how structures are available in memory for use, : � : � positive and negative mformation IS stored, though people are likely to differ in which and in the likelihood_ that strategtes_ for ac­ structures are more chronically accessible. tion are linked to self-goals. Consider first Self-concept researchers have documented the structural implications of how content that whether people focus on social roles is considered. People may organize and and relationships or individuating traits and structure their self-concepts around some characteristics· in describing themselves de­ domains that others commonly use to make pends significantly on their immediate situ­ sense of them-their race or ethnicity, their ational cues. Researchers can easily "prime" gender, their_ weight, their age, �r thei_r a�a­ (bring to mind) one way of thinking about demic standmg m_ school. If this social In­ self-concept or the other. formation is used to organize self-concept, For example, just reading a paragraph people may be said to be schematic for the with first-person singular (1, me) versus domain, which implies that they will pro­ plural (we, us) pronouns, unscrambling cess information that is relevant to it more sentences with these words, or consider­ quickly and efficiently and remember it bet­ ing differences versus similarities to one's ter than information that is irrelevant to it friends and family shifts self-concept con­ (Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982). tent (Tra.fimow, Triandis, & Goto, 1991; It also implies that people will act in ways Triandis, 1989; for a review of the evidence, that .fit their schemas (Oyserman, 2008; Oy­ see Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b). serman, Brickman, & Rhodes, 2007). Moreover, priming self-concept structure Beyond particular aspects of content, some in this way influences not only how people people may feel that all aspects of the self are think about themselves but how they think related; others may feel that many aspects generally. For example, in one experiment, of the self function independently (Linville, participants primed with me- or us-relevant 1987). Organization may hew to valence, so pronouns were shown 64 unrelated objects that a person may compartmentalize posi­ on a page and told they would be asked to tive and negative self-views such that evi­ remember what they saw. They were equally dence one is a disorganized scholar does not good at the task but us-primed participants disturb the sense that one is bound for great were better at the surprise part of the mem­ glory in academia (Showers, Abramson, & ory task in which they were unexpectedly Hogan, 1998). also asked to recall where the objects were People may have multiple self-concepts, on the page (Kiihnen & Oyserman, 2002). with some better organized and articulated Me-primed participants remembered what than others (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Ep­ they saw but not the relationships among ob­ stein, 1973; Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; jects (see also Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, Markus & Wurf, 1987; Oyserman, 2001, & Chen, 2009). 2007). Structure matters, and some self­ concepts effectively facilitate self-regulation, Identity whereas others leave one vulnerable to pre­ mature goal-disengagement and battered Erikson (1951, 1968) developed a widely used feelings of worth and competence (Oyser­ model of identity development that focused man, Bybee, Terry, & Hart-Johnson, 2004; on development of identity via exploration Oyserman, Harrison, & Bybee, 2001; and commitment. Erikson used the term Schwinghammer, Stapel, & Blanton, 2006). identity in ways synonymous with what oth­ As we noted in the section on self, peo­ ers have termed self-concept. However, the ple can consider themselves from a number term identity can also be conceptualized as of perspectives-the individualistic "me" a way of making sense of some aspect or part self or the collectivistic "us" self, the tem­ of self-concept (Abrams, 1994; 1999; Hogg, porally near "now" self or the temporally 2003; Serpe, 1987; Stryker & Burke, 2000; distal "future" self, the immersed "mind's­ Tajfel & Turner, 2004). For example, one eye" self or the observer's "eyes of others" can have a religious identity that contains self. While much of the literature terms relevant content and goals, such as what to these self, we propose considering each of do, what to value, and how to behave. 74 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION

The social psychological and sociological 2009a; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Social identity literatures contrast personal and so­ identity and identity theorists also study two cial identities, also termed collective identi­ other kinds of identities, role identities and ties (for a review, Brewer & Roccas, 2001; personal identities. Role identities reflect Hogg, 2003). Social identities, as defined membership in particular roles (e.g., stu­ by Tajfel (1981), involve the knowledge that dent, parent, professional} that require an­ one is a member of a group, one's feelings other person to play a complementary role. about group membership, and knowledge of One cannot be a parent without children, a the group's rank or status compared to other student without teachers, or a professional groups. Though this definition does not without clients or peers who recognize one's focus much on content of ingroup member­ role. Personal identities reflect traits or ship beyond knowledge, regard, and rank, characteristics that may feel separate from other definitionshave highlighted that social one's social and role identities or linked to identities include content (Oyserman, 2007; some or all of these identities (for a review, Oyserman, Kemmelmeier, Fryberg, Brosh, see Owens et a!., 2010). & Hart-Johnson, 2003). Thus, personal identities refer to content Just as there may be many self-concepts, quite isomorphic with what is typically re­ identity theorists differ in how to conceptu­ ferred to as self-concept in the psychological alize how many identities a person is likely to literature. An advantage in using the term have. Much as James (1890/1927) described identity rather than self-concept in this re­ multiple selves, predicting that people have gard is that it reserves the term self-concept as many selves as they have interaction part­ for broader perspectives, as we discussed ners, identity and social identity theorists previously-after all, being a shy person is discuss multiple identities based in mul­ likely to mean something different when tiple situations. Identity theorists (Stryker, considered as part of what makes one sepa­ 1980; Stryker & Burke, 2000) focus on how rate and different from others (individual­ cross-situational stability of identity content istic self-concept} or as part of what makes emerges. From this perspective, identities are one related and similar to others (collectivis­ distinct parts of the self-concept, the inter­ tic self-concept}. nalized meanings and expectations associat­ ed with the positions one holds in social net­ Summary works and the roles one plays. In contrast, social identity theorists (Abrams, 1999; On­ Self, self-concept, and identity can be con­ orato & Turner, 2002; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel sidered as nested elements, with aspects of & Turner, 2004) focus on cross-situational the "me"-forming self-concepts and identi­ malleability. In its strongest formulation, so­ ties being part of self-concepts. Yet schol­ cial identity theories predict that in each in­ ars often use the terms self and identity as teraction, people take on a different identity if they were synonyms (Swann & Bosson, (see Owens et al., 2010, for a review from a 2010). Sometimes the terms are used in ref­ sociological perspective). erence to the process of making sense of the In thinking about identity content and world in terms of what matters to "me" or identity function, social identity researchers to the consequences of social contexts on a sometimes focus on connection to and simi­ variety of beliefs and perceptions about the larities with other ingroup members (Brewer, self, or simply to refer to membership in so­ 2001; Oyserman et al., 2003). Other times ciodemographic categories such as gender or they focus on the distinction between the in­ social class (Frable, 1997). Other times what group and outgroup (Brewer, 2001; Spears, is meant is an implicit sense or a warm feel­ Gordijn, Dijksterhuis, & Stapel, 2004; Sta­ ing of relevance and inclusion rather than a pel & Koomen, 2001). The groups (gender, cold feeling of irrelevance and exclusion (see, nationality, race/ethnicity, religious heritage e.g., Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005; Steele, groups, or first-year psychology majors} on Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Thus, the terms which identities are based are likely to dif­ can and often are used to explain what fer in their longevity and how psychologi­ might be the process underlying outcomes cally meaningful they feel across time and but differ dramatically in terms of what, if situations (Brewer, 1991; Oyserman, 2007, anything, is assessed or manipulated. 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Ide-ntity 75

That said, theories converge in assuming in one's handwriting, signature, bodily pos­ that self, self-concept, and identity come from ture, and physical stance (Kettle & Hiiubl, somewhere, are stored in memory, and mat­ in press). Thus, as early argued by James ter. We term these three core notions about (1890/1927), at its core, the self is physical self and identity mental construct, social and material. product, and fo rce fo r a�tion, and discuss The emerging field of social neuroscience . _ them in turn m the followmg secnons. Thus, has attempted to pinpoint where in the brain self, self-concept, and identity are mental the self resides, demonstrating different lo­ constructs that are shaped by the contexts cations for self-relevant processing that is in which they develop and influence action. associative versus conscious and reflective We address each of these core notions next. (Beer, Chapter 29, this volume; Lieberman, To accommodate this heterogeneity and still 2007). While specificity of activity in partic­ move forward in considering how self and ular neural regions is not a necessary feature identity may matter, in the rest of this chap­ of the self, the prefrontal cortex has been as­ ter we use the phrase self and identity when sociated with conscious processes, and the this more general and vague usage is a better medial wall is hypothesized to support pro­ fit with the literature we are citing, and spe­ cesses related to introspection-aspects of cific terms (e.g., identities) where relevant. what the self is assumed to be and do. Thus, current research programs point to frontal lobe activity as involved in cognitive pro­ Self and Identity Are Mental Concepts cesses related to the self. Activation in the Self and identity theories converge in assert­ anterior cingulate cortex is associated with ing that self and identity are mental con­ reflecting on whether a trait is self-relevant structs, that is, something represented in or not (Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Ban­ memory. This capacity develops early. When field, & Kelley, 2004) and with reflecting on shown their faces in a mirror, many children one's own performance (Bengtsson, Dolan, age 18 months and nearly all children age & Passingham, 2011). Medial prefrontal ac­ 24 months touch their foreheads to remove tivity connected to self-representation tasks a smudge unobtrusively produced by smear­ may be visual modality-specific, at least for ing some paint on their foreheads (Lewis & sighted individuals (for a review, see Ma & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). This response is in­ Han, 2011). That is, among sighted indi­ terpreted to mean that children know what viduals, medial prefrontal activation and en­ they look like and know a smudge should hanced functional connectivity between the not be on their foreheads. This image-based medial prefrontal and visual cortices occurs self-recognition is not limited to the face; at during self-judgments (compared to other­ this age toddlers also notice a sticker secretly judgments) when trait words are shown placed on their legs (Nielsen, Suddendorf, & rather than heard (Ma & Han, 2011). Slaughter, 2006). However, self-concept research typically Thus, children seem to have stored a vi­ focuses on semantic memory rather than sual image of who they are in memory. This localization in the brain. Children rapidly image is likely to be quite fine-grained. For develop both language and cognitive ca­ example, people prefer the visual image of pacities, and with these capacities come themselves they are used to seeing (mirror language-based autobiographical memories image) to a nonmirror image (Mita, Dermer, (Fi,·ush & Hammond, 1990). Organizing & Knight, 1977). Other senses are also in­ their memories with social norms of what volved in mental representations of self in matters and how to make sense, children memory. Consider that infants begin to ex­ can begin to create a semantic rather than perience the self as physically distinct from visceral sense of self-what one does, what context and as motorically acting in space one is supposed to do (Fivush & Hammond, (Bronson, 2000). This visceral sense of the 1990; see also Harter, 2003; Harter, Chapter self as a physical object having body parts 31, this volume). Self-concept research has and controlling action is not unique to early typically focused on children's capacity to development (Botvinik & Cohen, 1998; describe and rate themselves across multiple Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, dimensions. For example, by second grade 2007). Traces of the self are believed to exist children can report on multiple dimensions 76 I. AWAR"=N=ss. COGNITiON, ANO REGULATION of their self-concept (Marsh, Barnes, Cairns, (1934). Cooley's description of the looking & Tidman, 1984). Teens are able to articu­ glass self encapsulates James's (1890/1927) late that they act and feel differently about insight that how others see the self matters, themselves in different roles and contexts suggesting that reflected appraisals, whether (Harter, Bresnick, Bouchey, & Whitesell, they reinforce or undermine one's self im­ 1997; McConnell, 2011). The method used, ages, are important building blocks for the rating scales, implies that the mental con­ self. A large body of research has examined cept being studied is a set of ratings. Indeed, this assumption. Results support the social much self-concept research assumes that construction of self by showing that people explicit self-report of the self as an attitude do generally incorporate what they think object is useful, implying that self-concept others think of them in the self, though self­ is stable, chronically accessible in memory, views are typically more positive than others' and accessed in the same way across situa­ views (for summaries and original research, tions. However, as discussed in the third sec­ see Felson, 1993; Shrauger & Schoeneman, tion (Thinking is for Doing), each of these 1979}. assumptions is open to question (Schwarz, Generally speaking, self and identity are 2007; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). social products in at least three ways. First, people do not create themselves from air; rather, what is possible, what is important, Self and Identity Are Social Products what needs to be explained all come from Self and identity theories converge in ground­ social context-from what matters to oth­ ing self and identity in social context. Con­ ers. This means that people are likely to de­ textual effects on the self may be distal­ fine themselves in terms of what is relevant parenting practices, schooling, the culture, in their time and place: Group memberships the time and place in which one lives, the (e.g., religion, race, or gender), family roles, experiences one has had early in life. Con­ looks, school attainment, or athletic prow­ textual effects on the self also may be prox­ ess should matter more or less depending on imal-the psychological implications of the what is valued in one's culture and in one's immediate situations one is in (e.g., for re­ place within social hierarchy. Second, being views, see Hogg, 2003, 2006; Oyserman & a self requires others who endorse and re­ Markus, 1993, 1998; Tajfel &Turner, 2004). inforce one's selfhood, who scaffold a sense Models differ in what context refers to. Some that one's self matters and that one's efforts focus on macro-level contexts, especially the can produce results. This means that people historical epoch, society, and culture within should feel better about themselves, more ca­ which one lives. Empirical analysis of effects pable of attaining their goals, and so on, in at this level can involve historical and cross­ contexts that provide these scaffoldings than group comparisons but is also amenable to in contexts that do not. Third, the aspects experimental priming techniques (see, e.g., of one's self and identity that matter in the Oyserman & Lee, 2007, 2008a, 2008b; Oy­ moment are determined by what is relevant serman & Uskul, 2008). Contexts can also in the moment. be at a middle level; these contexts include Because getting others to endorse one's family, school, and neighborhood, and the identities matters, people change their be­ family processes and socialization practices havior to get others to view them as they with which one grew up. Here, too, analy­ Yiew themselves (Oyserman, 2007, 2009a, ses may be descriptive, comparative, or ex­ 2009b). A clear way to signal an identity so­ perimental (see, e.g., Chen & Chen, 2010; cially is to act in ways that are (stereotypi­ Oyserman & Yoon, 2009). Finally context cally) congruent with it. To test whether this may be more micro-level, the day-by-day, happens, researchers can look for or create moment-to-moment situations one experi­ situations in which an important identity is ences because of these structures and insti­ ambiguous or actively undermined and see tutions. if people are more likely to act in ways that Each of these levels of analyses has roots fit stereotypes in these circumstances. For in both psychological and sociological per­ example, black children who are worried spectives as described early on by James that they are not viewed as African Ameri­ (1890/1927), Cooley (1902) and Mead can and Asian Americans who are worried 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 77 that they are not viewed as Americans may identities. British undergraduates reported choose to act in ways that help them fit in. intending to drink less alcohol and to engage To test this prediction, in one set of stud­ in healthier eating during the coming week ies, the in-class behavior, friendship choices, after being induced to think of themselves and school grades of African American and as British rather than American or as Brit­ Latino American middle school students ish people rather than college students (the were assessed (Oyserman, Brickman, Bybee, latter groups were stereotyped as unhealthy; & Celious, 2006). The prediction was that Tarrant & Butler, 2011). American under­ children who did not believe they looked like graduates reported that they had consumed ingroup members would be more likely to less alcohol after being exposed to flyers act in ways {stereotypically) congruent with that depicted graduate students (negatively their racial/ethnic identity because by acting stereotyped as nerdy) as heavy alcohol users like a (stereotypical) ingroup member they (Berger & Rand, 2008). could convince others that they held the iden­ tity. Indeed, compared to dark skin-toned Self and Identity Are Forces for Action African Americans, light skin-toned African Americans reported feeling less socially ac­ A common theme among self and identity cepted. This felt lack of acceptance translat­ theorists is that the self matters for behavior. ed to action; their report cards showed poor­ Yet demonstrating that how one thinks about er academic attainment and teachers rated oneself produces action rather than simply them as misbehaving in class more. Similar being associated with it has proven difficult. effects were found for Latino children who A clear way to demonstrate that the self does said they did not look Latino. These chil­ influence behavior is to manipulate whether dren chose less academically oriented peers and how people think about themselves, and as friends, attained worse grades, and were to show that this influences their subsequent more likely to misbehave in class. Friendship behavior. To make the self salient, partici­ choice mediated effects of "looking Latino" pants are asked to sit in front of a mirror on academic performance. Fitting into the (Carver & Scheier, 1978) or to do something group they perceived as "acting" (stereotypi­ else to bring the self to mind, such as sign­ cally) like the ingroup mattered. ing their name (Kettle & Haubl, in press), Rather than focus on school behavior, an­ describing what makes them similar or dif­ other set of studies focused on food choices ferent from others (Markel, 2009; Tra.fimow (Guendelman, Cheryan, & Monin, 2011). et a!., 1991), or circling first-person singular To test the prediction that people will act pronouns (Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; in ways that (stereotypically) .fit an ambigu­ Sui & Han, 2007). Each of these paradigms ous or undermined identity, these authors shifts responses, but the specific nature of randomly assigned Asian American college the consequences of making the self salient student participants to either be welcomed for action depends on the interplay between to the study without comment or to first be which aspects of the self are brought to mind queried as to whether they were American. in the context and the task at hand (Oyser­ The query regarding their American identity man, 2007). mattered. Asian Americans who were first To examine these processes more closely, asked if they were American chose more pro­ researchers often manipulate the salience totypically American foods to eat and said of a particular aspect of the self. For ex­ they liked these foods more than those who ample, in one study, participants were pro­ were not first asked if they were American. vided with rigged feedback to induce them This occurred even though the American to believe that they were generally compe­ foods were less healthy than the Asian ones. tent or incompetent. This influenced their Thus, the answer to one of our opening ques­ self-esteem, and their self-esteem influenced tions-"Want a burger and fries or softly their subsequent prejudicial responses to steamed fish and fungi?"-was not fixed but others (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997, Study 1). instead depended on how Asian American In another study, researchers reminded par­ identity was constructed in context. ticipants of their identity as psychology stu­ Effects are not limited to minority groups dents, then, using an elaborate cover story, and can involve undesired as well as desired led them to believe that psychology students 78 I. AWARE NESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION are neater (or less neat) than a comparison as gender (Elmore & Oyserman, in press) or, group (economics students). Students acted for college students, one's major (Smith & in ways that fit how their psychology student Oyserman, 2011). identity had been presented to them, coloring For example, in a number of studies we more neatly after reading stories about neat­ asked students to complete a novel math task ness ostensibly written by psychology stu­ either before or after we asked them about dents and more messily if these stories were their racial/ethnic identity (what it is, what it attributed to economics students (Spears et means in their everyday lives). In these stud­ al., 2004). ies, African American, Hispanic and Na­ Some researchers go beyond documenting tive American (American Indian) children effects of context on self-concept or of self­ mostly described their racial/ethnic identity concept on behavior to predict that context in terms of connection to the ingroup. Some affects behavior by affecting self-concept also described a connection to larger society content (self-concept change mediates the in­ generally or specifically reported that school fluence of context on behavior). For example attainment was part of their racial/ethnic Jiang, Cho, and Adaval (2009) manipulated identity. Those who did describe connec­ context by exposing Hong Kong Chinese tion to larger society and school attainment participants either to words and numbers worked harder on the math task, especially related to having luck (e.g., "lucky," number if they did the task after first considering strings containing 8) or to not having luck their racial/ethnic identity (Oyserman et al., (e.g., "unlucky," number strings contain­ 1995, Study 2; 2003, Study 2). The results of ing 4) either subliminally or supraliminally this experimental manipulation of identity with a variety of cover stories. They demon­ salience were replicated with Arab Israeli strated that both a self-rating "I am a lucky middle and high school students (Oyserman person" (Studies 1 and 2) and a risk prefer­ et al., 2003, Study 3). ence (e.g., preferring a chance to save money over a sure thing; Study 3) were significantly higher for participants randomly assigned Understanding Process to the lucky versus the unlucky condition. Moreover, when both self-rating and a risky As demonstrated in the previous section, behavior choice were measured at the same effectively demonstrating that the self in­ time, the effect of condition on risk prefer­ fluences action often involves manipulat­ ence (e.g., willingness to pay to participate ing which self-concept or identity comes to in a gamble) was mediated by a change in mind. Perhaps one of the reasons that few self-rating (Studies 3 and 4). Experiments such studies of this nature exist is that many such as these clarify that small changes in theories assume that the self is relatively sta­ contexts do shift at least some aspects of ble. Stability can be assumed to emerge from self-views and so are a promising trend for early plasticity; that is, social contexts may the field. While necessarily artificial and shape the self as it is developing, but once de­ not attempting to articulate what exactly is veloped, the self may be difficultto change. meant by use of the terms self or identity, Stability can be assumed even in theoretical experiments of this type demonstrate how perspectives that articulate self-concept and contexts influence momentary perceptions identity as memory structures that are up­ about the self and identity. dated and revised with each use. In this sec­ To increase ecological validity, some ex­ tion, we consider people's experience of the perimenters conduct field research on the self as stable and ask what evidence there is effect of identity in context. One way to ex­ for malleability and dynamic construction. amine effects of context on behavior is by asking people to consider an identity either Experienced Stability before or after they engage in an identity­ relevant behaYior (Oyserman, Gant, & A conundrum for the study and understand­ Ager, 1995, Study 2; Oyserman et al., 2003, ing how self and identity operate is that even Studies 2 and 3). Another possibility is to if self and identity change, people can still subtly prime a particular behavior as either have an experience of stability, so self-report relevant or irrelevant to a core identity such may not be helpful. Consider Plato's analogy 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 79 of a ship whose owner mends and repairs it, (e.g., generous) to predict behavioral consis­ replacing planks as needed. Eventually all tency of individuals over time (Aioise, 1993; the planks are replaced. Is it the same ship? Kalish, 2002; Rholes & Ruble, 1984). Depending on what the questioner means, Once established, the notion of essences the answer could be "yes" or "no." That is, feels intuitively obvious, and adults are quick the ship functions as always, so it is the same to infer the existence of enduring disposi­ ship, even though all the components are tions motivating people's behavior (Ross, new, so it is a different ship. The self may be 1977) and to infer traits from their behav­ considered in the same way. Over time self ior (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994). People and identity do their job. Like Plato's ship often describe themselves in terms of stable that keeps its owner above water while get­ traits (e.g., sincerity) and actions (e.g., giving ting him where he needs to go, self and iden­ loose change to homeless people) (Cousins, tity do their job of making meaning, focus­ 1989; English & Chen, 2011; Semin, 2009). ing attention, and sustaining goal-focused This essential sense of self appears univer­ self-regulation. But at the same time, like the sal although whether people use adjectives ever-changing planks, what self and identity or action verbs to describe their traits, and mean may be dynamically constructed. As whether they assume their traits apply with­ a result, what one focuses on, what one's in particular situations or across situations goa ls appear to be, and how one works to­ may vary cross-culturally (English & Chen, ward them changes as well. Self and identity 2011, Semin, 2009; see also Cross & Gore, continue to function, thus feeling the same, Chapter 27, this volume). even though the content changes dramati­ cally. Thus, a feeling of stability can emerge Is the Self Stable? whether people have a motivation to perceive the self as stable or not. Separate from people's perceptions, it seems reasonable to ask whether the self is a stable mental construct. Most comprehensive social The Self as a Stable Essence science theories of the self articulate both People assume that people, themselves in­ stability and fluidity as aspects of the self. cluded, have a stable essence or core that Thus, identity and social identity theories predicts their behavior, that who they are describe the self as including both a stable matters for what they do, and that what they set of evaluative standards and a fluid, ever­ do reflects who they are (Arkes & Kajdasz, changing description in the moment (Turner, 2011; James, 1890/1927). The assumption 1956). In some formulations, both stability that deeper essences constrain surface fea­ and changeability have been viewed as part tures or psychological essentialism is a basic of maintaining a stable and positive sense of cognitive organizing schema that is at the self-esteem (Tesser, 1988; Tesser & Camp­ core of categorization (Medin & Ortony, bell, 1983) or a stable sense of self more gen­ 1989). erally (Swann, 1983; Swann & Buhrmester, Even preschool children, age 21h, infer Chapter 19, this volume). Since maintaining stability of traits in inanimate and biologi­ a self-image requires doing "face work" to cal categories from as little as one example convince others of one's self-presentation (for reviews, see Gelman, 1999; Gelman & (GoHman, 1959), proponents of some socio­ Diesendruck, 1999). For instance, they infer logical perspectives have argued for stability that flamingos but not bats feed their young of the self over time as a result of stability mashed up food after learning that flamin­ of social interactions (Serpe, 1987; Stryker, gos and blackbirds are in the same category 1980). There is some support for this inter­ (birds) and being told once that blackbirds pretation. For example, Serpe (1987) found feed their young mashed-up food. By age 5 that college students did not vary in how they children infer that both biological (e.g., has rated six college role identities (e.g., course­ melatonin) and psychological (e.g., likes work, dating) over three data points in their looking pretty) characteristics transfer across first semester of college, presumably because instances of a social category (Diesendruck the context (college) remained the same. & Eldror, 2011). By age 10 children are as One way to ask this question is whether a willing as adults to use personality traits healthy or effective self is essentially stable 80 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION and invariant across time and situations. and later adolescents rather than middle ad­ Some psychologists have argued that this is olescents (Marsh, 1989; Marsh, Craven, & the case, noting that the self protects itself Debus, 1998). from change (for reviews, see Greenwald, Research on identity development (Erik­ 1980; Markus & Kunda, 1986), changing son, 1951, 1968) assumes growth toward only when the conditions of life require it stability; that is, though children have iden­ (Gecas, 1982; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984; tities, the adolescent to adulthood transition Rosenberg, 1979; Swann 1983, 1985). If is theorized as involving reexamination of this is the case, then there should be indi­ important identities. After trying on various vidual differences in self-stability, and these possibilities, adolescents and young adults differences should be consequential. Indeed, are predicted to stake a claim to an identi­ Kernis and colleagues (Kernis, Cornell, Sun, ty that then remains stable. Although cog­ Berry, & Harlow, 1993; Kernis, Paradise, nizant that identity is a context-dependent Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000) mental construct, research in this tradition present evidence that people differ in how manipulates neither social context to test ef­ stable their self-esteem is and that stability is fects on identity nor identity to test effects on associated with well-being. Feeling that the behavior. Instead, the focus is on empirically self is not stable is in fact one of the diagnos­ testing whether identity changes over time as tic criteria for borderline personality disor­ expected and, once an identity is committed der (Lieb, Zanarini, Schmahl, Linehan, & to, whether it is stable. Researchers focus Bohus, 2004). on operationalizing the process of commit­ To examine resistance to change, research­ ting to an identity and testing whether this ers can manipulate feedback experimentally process is best described linearly (progress or follow people over time or compare re­ toward identity commitment) or cyclically sponses of people across age groups to make (exploration and commitment followed by re­ inferences about time. Experimental meth­ turn to exploration; e.g., Bosma & Kunnen, ods typically involve two steps. Researchers 2001; Waterman, 1999). Rather than test first obtain self-ratings, then provide unex­ for stability by assessing the extent to which pected feedback. The goal is to see whether children, adolescents, and young adults rate people refuse ro accept feedback that does their self-concepts of abilities in various do­ not fit their self-image. Nonexperimental mains consistently over time, these research­ methods also involve more than one step. Ei­ ers use closed-ended scales of self-reported ther the researcher tracks the same partici­ extent of exploration and engagement either pants over time or samples participants at in specific identities (e.g., ethnic identities; different ages or points in their life course to Ong, Fuller-Rowel!, & Phinney, 2010) or in make inferences about stability. identity as a whole (e.g., Crocetti, Rubini, & Experiments typically indicate that people Meeus, 2008). go ro great lengths ro protect the images they So-called "stage theories" of identity de­ have of themselves, ignoring or reinterpret­ velopment posit a fixed attitude about the ing contradictory information and distanc­ self, something that is difficult to document ing themselves from the source of such in­ in the attitude field as a whole (on attitudes, formation (Markus, 1977; Swann, 1983, see Schwarz, 2007). Indeed, these theories 1985). Similar stability is inferred from have generally failed to find support when longitudinal and cross-sectional studies. tested over time (Cross, Smith, & Payne, For example, Marsh and his colleagues have 2002). That is, people who seemed to be at examined the stability of domain-specific one stage of identity development often re­ self-concepts, asking children, adolescents, port being at an earlier stage at later points and young adults to respond to a battery of in time (Cross et al., 2002; Strauss & Cross, self-report measure ratings of their abilities 2005). However, stage theory research con­ in a number of domains (e.g., school, peer tinu_es. For example, research on racial and relationships, and problem solving). Reports ethnic identity commonly asks whether ado­ are relatively stable in that the participants' lescents move from exploration to commit­ relative ranks remain similar over time. They ment, as would be predicted by the theory also show some fluctuation, such that higher (e.g., Kiang & Fuligni, 2009; Matsunaga, ratings are reported on average by children Hecht, Elek, & Ndiaye, 2010). 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 81

The Self as Context Sensitive tastes and preferences as being different or just like others. If the researchers had only though lay and theoretical perspectives Even measured the number of "me" responses, on stability, it is possible that a stable focus these results would support the prediction necessarily an effective self is not self. To that self-concept is stable. Indeed, most evi­ the extent that the self is a tool for meaning dence that self-concept is stable comes from making, maintaining sense of worth, and repeated assessment using a measure such as regulating behavior, then an effective self that used in this study. should be sensitive to new information and But the researchers in this study also ob­ so be malleable and variant across change tained reaction time (how long it took to re­ in features of the external (time, situation) spond "me" or "not me"). The manipulation and internal (motivation) environment. The did influence speed of response. Participants appearance of stability in empirical studies made to feel similar to others were faster to may be deceptive. Self and identity may ap­ endorse "me" words relating to being dis­ pear quite stable or quite changeable depend­ tinct. What comes to mind quickly may well ing on how they are assessed. For example, influence behavior in the moment more than if features of the situation matter and if the what comes to mind more slowly, so that situation is stable, self and identity will ap­ reaction time may matter in real-world set­ pear stable, making it impossible to learn if tings. Yet if the goal of research is to make they are context-dependent. Moreover, since predictions about how the self and identity people tend to experience the self in context, function in real ecologies, it might be useful they may experience stability even though to study real situations rather than artificial which aspects of the self are salient may de­ ones. pend on what makes one distinctive in the Studying context sensitivity in school, moment (McGuire & McGuire, 1988), what for example, would require sampling stu­ makes one similar to others in the moment dents as they enter varying situations (e.g., (Brewer, 1991), and one's immediate feelings the hallway, homeroom, afterschool activi­ about being similar or distinct (Markus & ties, see Oyserman & Packer, 1996) or move Kunda, 1986). through their social networks (e.g., Kinder­ Empirically, it is possible to disentangle mann, 1993). Naturalistic studies often find situation-based invariance from situation­ surprising stability in self-concept content based variance by manipulating situations and high predictive power of this content prior to assessing self and identity. Effects over time. For example, Altschul, Oyser­ can be subtle. In an early test, Markus and man, and Bybee (2006) found both stabil­ Kunda (1986) used an elaborate cover story ity and predictive power in their assessment to manipulate whether their white, female, of three elements of racial/ethnic identity American college student participants ex­ (connectedness, awareness of racism, em­ perienced their tastes and preferences (e.g., bedded achievement) over four measure­ about colors, objects, clothes) as being dif­ ment points. Their data collection covered 2 ferent from or just like the tastes and prefer­ school years and the transition from middle ences of others like them. They were then to high school. Not only were the three el­ shown words and asked to click a button ements of racial/ethnic identity stable over marked "me" if the word described them time, but higher endorsement of these three and a button marked "not me" if it did not. elements of racial/ethnic identity predicted Mixed with neutral words were words evok­ better performance over time (controlling ing difference (e.g., unique, different) and for prior performance). In another study similarity (e.g., average, follower). Last, (Oyserman, 2008), content of racial/ethnic participants were asked to provide their as­ identity in ninth grade predicted academic sociations to six words-three relevant to performance and in-class behavior 4 years being different, and three relevant to being later (controlling for prior performance and the same as others. The manipulation did behavior). not influence how people rated themselves. These studies clearly demonstrate that self They chose just as many similarity words and identity matter for behavior, but do they and just as many difference words as "me" also mean that self and identity are basically whether they had just experienced their stable and not context sensitive? We argue 82 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION that naturalistic studies typically do not self-concepts stored in memory. But it could allow inferences about context sensitivity (or also be that people dynamically create a new context insensitivity). It is possible that ra­ self-concept each time one is called for. While cial/ethnic identity as assessed in these stud­ appealing to a lay sense that the self must be ies is highly sensitive to context but that the a single entity, a single-structure model does contexts did not feel psychologically differ­ not fitwell with how memory and cognition ent even though assessments were obtained work generally (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; across different classrooms, schools, and Wyer & Srull, 1989), as we consider in the school years. Experiments allow research­ third section. Therefore, rather than focus ers to manipulate those aspects of context on how a single self-concept might be struc­ predicted to be psychologically meaning­ tured in memory, much of the literature now ful; natural settings do not. Thus, natural­ focuses on "working," "online," or "active" istic and experimental research on identity self-concept, one's salient theory about one­ provide information on different questions: self in the moment; or focuses on a particular Does the self appear stable, and can the self self-concept content rather than attempting be made to change? to study all self-concepts (e.g., for reviews, see Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Oyserman, 2007; Smeesters et al., 2010; Wheeler & De­ How Strong Is Empirical Support? Marree, 2009). By rooting their formulation A rich array of social science theories as­ of the self in situated and social cognition sumes that the self matters for life choices perspectives (Schwarz, 2007, 2009, 2010; and behavior, but a similarly robust body Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007; Wyer & Srull, of evidence that this is so has yet to be as­ 1989), these theorists attempt to leverage so­ sembled. The theory-evidence gap means cial science knowledge about how the mind that, to date, self and identity theories may works to make predictions about the self as or may not provide robust models of what a mental construct (Oyserman, 2007; Oys­ self and identity do and how they function. erman & Destin, 2010; Wheeler, DeMarree, This problem has been noted in some (e.g., & Petty, 2007). Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Baumeister, 1998; Markus Wurf, 1987) but not all reviews & Social Comparison as Contrast (e.g., Callero, 2003; Stets & Burke, 2003). However, given the large number of publica­ A large body of research has examined the tions evoking self and identity as explana­ contextualized nature of self-evaluations by tory factors, failing to attend to the theory­ setting up social comparisons. Early formu­ evidence gap means that the field as a whole lations assumed that people generally con­ has not made as much progress as might be trast themselves with others and that this hoped in understanding self and identity as can lead to better or worse self-evaluations mental constructs and as forces for action. (for reviews, see Blanton, 2001; Collins, This means that context effects on self and 1996). A large number of experiments ran­ identity may or may not work as theories domly assigned people to a no-comparison describe them, and self and identity may be control, an upward comparison condition more or less powerful as meaning-making (someone more successful), or a down­ lenses and motivators of action than theories ward comparison condition (someone less describe. At worst, the self may not matter successful). Compared to no-comparison at all. participants, those in the upward compari­ While research on autographical memory son condition reported more negative self­ is continuing to grow (Fivush, 2011), the evaluations (Mussweiler, Ruter, & Epstude, structure of self-concept(s) in memory is less 2004; Taylor & Lobel, 1989), while those understood (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989; Mc­ in the downward comparison conditions Connell, 2011). A main tension is between reported more positive self-ratings (e.g., Pel­ theories that assume a single hierarchically ham & Wachsmuth, 1995). organized self-concept and theories that do These results fitwith social identity theo­ not. The alternative to a single self hierar­ rists' argument that downward outgroup chically organized in memory could be that comparisons contribute positively to social people have multiple, only loosely associated identity (Tajfel, 1981) and imply that people 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 83 may be motivated to find downward com­ imagine someone they knew who was suc­ . parisons. But, as It turns out, people do ceeding in school and how they were simi­ not always contrast themselves with oth­ lar to this student (assimilate positive) or to ers. Consider the experiments conducted by imagine someone they knew who was failing Lockwood and Kunda (1997), who random­ in school and how they were different from ly assigned participants to either read mate­ this student (contrast negative). Effects were rials about a 'superstar' student or not, and less clear for girls, who seemed more likely then judge their current and future selves. If simply to include others in their self-ratings, people always contrast themselves to others, reporting less optimism when considering then the superstar comparison should have others who were failing and more optimism resulted in more negative self-evaluations when considering others who were succeed­ whether considering oneself now or in the ing. future. Indeed, students in the superstar One possibility is that the girls were more condition did rate their current self more likely to perceive themselves as connected negatively. However, these same students and related to others (i.e., have a relation­ rated their future possible self more positive­ al self-concept; Cross & Madson, 1997; ly. Why were the results different when con­ Markus & Oyserman, 1989). This interpre­ sidering one's future possible self rather than tation was supported in a number of studies one's current self? One possibility is that in with college students in which women tend­ the present, participants could clearly see ed to incorporate others' academic outcomes that they were not like the superstar, so the into their academic identities (Kemmelmeier superstar was then a comparison standard. & Oyserman, 2001a, Studies 1 and 2). However, in the future, the superstar might Women, whether sampled from an urban be a role model; that is, participants might campus with predominantly first-generation become like the superstar, so the superstar college students or from an elite public uni­ could be included in their self-judgment (see versity, rated their academic identities more also Tesser & Collins, 1988; Tesser, Martin, negatively if they were randomly assigned & Cornell, 1996). firstto consider their similarities with some­ one they knew who had failed (rather than consider their differences from this target Incorporating Others into the Self other or make no comparison at all). These Rather than assume that people contrast effects were especially strong if the compari­ themselves with others, a more appropri­ son other was also a woman. Effects were in ate question is under what circumstances the same direction but weaker for men. are people likely to contrast themselves with To test the possibility that these effects others and under what circumstances are were due to relational self-concept, Kem­ they likely to include others in their self­ melmeier and Oyserman (2001b) assessed judgments? Consider the social context of participants' relational self-concept (sample school. In many urban school districts, fail­ item: "My close relationships are an impor­ ure rates are so high that students are likely tant reflection of who I am") before assign­ to be aware of many other students who are ing them to either an upward comparison doing poorly in school. If people routinely condition or a no-comparison control. The contrast themselves with others, then stu­ expected gender difference in relational self­ dents in these schools should have plenty concept was obtained (females reported being of downward social comparison opportuni­ more relational than males). However, what ties and consequently judge themselves quite previously seemed to be a gender effect was positively. Oyserman and colleagues (1995, really a relational self-concept effect. Rela­ Study 3) tested this prediction in a sample of tional self-concept fully moderated the effect students attending an urban middle school. of upward comparison. Among participants Boys in the control condition (not assigned low in relational self-concept, those in the to a social comparison) did indeed judge experimental condition ("Think of someone themselves quite positively, rating them­ who is succeeding in school") rated them­ selves as highly likely to succeed in school selves more negatively than those in the con­ in the coming year. Academic identities were trol (no-comparison) condition. The reverse just as highly positive for boys assigned to occurred for participants high in relational 84 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION self-concept; those in the experimental con­ summarized evidence that people sometimes dition rated themselves more positively than assimilate others into their self-concepts and those in the control condition. identities, at other times contrastingly com­ These effects were replicated using a prim­ pare themselves to these others, and at still ing paradigm {Stapel & Koomen, 2001). other times seem to do neither. Thus, the After circling the words I, me, and my in a real question seems to be not whether con­ paragraph or unscrambling sentences includ­ text influences self-concept and identity, but ing these words, participants were quicker to how this happens. To address these issues, focus on differences between themselves and we return to the notion that thinking is for others. The reverse occurred after circling doing and articulate what is known about the words we, our, and us in a paragraph social cognition as relevant to the task of or unscrambling sentences including these predicting how and when contexts construct words; then participants were quicker to online identities, and how these identities focus on similarities between themselves and shape behavior. others. When primed to consider themselves relationally, participants included negative as well as positive information about the Thinking Is for Doing other in their self-judgments. When primed to consider themselves individualistically, A recurrent theme within social psychology participants excluded positive as well as neg­ is that cognition is pragmatic, contextual­ ative information about the other from their ized, and situated; that is, people think in self-judgments. Thus, effects did not seem to order to act-how one thinks is profoundly be motivated by a desire to enhance or feel shaped by the options available and what good about the self. one is trying to do (Fiske, 1992). People Outside the laboratory, people may auto­ think in contexts that are made up of others, matically include others with valued attri­ human artifacts, physical spaces, tasks, and butes in self and identity. For example, Cial­ language (Smith & Semin, 2004). People are dini and his colleagues (1976) tracked college sensitive to meaningful features of their im­ students over a series of football weekends. mediate environment and adjust their think­ On weekends in which the team won, stu­ ing and doing to what seems contextually dents were more likely to wear school-theme relevant (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Fiske, clothing and refer to their university as "we." 1992). Taken together this means that, far On weekends in which the team lost, stu­ from being easily predictable from prior at­ dents were less likely to wear school-theme titudes and judgments, human judgment is clothing and were more likely to refer to their greatly influenced by the information ac­ university as "they." People have been found cessible at the moment of decision making to include in the self successful sports teams and what that information is taken to mean (Bernhardt, Dabbs, Fielden, & Lutter, 1998; (Schwarz, 2007). Like other judgments, Boen, Vanbeselaere, & Feys, 2002), win­ judgments about oneself are situated. ning politicians (Boen, Vanbeselaere, Pande­ Moreover, mental construal matters; peo­ laere, et al., 2002), and successful marketers ple act based on how a situation feels and (Arnett, German, & Hunt, 2003). While in what it seems to be "about" (Cesario, Grant, these studies people include successful and & Higgins, 2004; Higgins, 1998; Schwarz, not failed others in their self-concepts, as we 2007; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & Winkiel­ noted earlier, when made to feel connected, man, 2003; Schwarz, Sanna, Skurnik, & people do include both positive and negative Yoon, 2007). This implies that which iden­ features of others in the self. tity comes to mind and what it means is dy­ namically constructed. While experiments manipulate salient information to test par­ Summary ticular processes, outside the laboratory, Self and identity have been argued to be information can become accessible through stable, as well as context sensitive. Evidence rapid, associative networks and spread· for both predictions is available. Yet simply ing activation, as well as through delibera· providing supporting evidence does not ad­ tive reflection on images, semantic content dress questions about process. We have just goals, rules, and feelings (Lieberman, 2007 4. Self, Self-Concept, and ldenttty 85

Strack & Deutsch, 2004). As we discuss in from the self may be cued by information the section on dual processing, repeatedly that is non-normative or extreme, and by accessed identities may become part of the information referring to a particular in­ associative network and so become rapidly stance or exemplar rather than tO a broader accessed; however, features of the immedi­ category. Given that a specific other person ate situation influence which other elements is not oneself, people include specific others of the associative network are cued. Thus, in their self-judgments only if the other feels what an identity actually means is likely to close or similar to oneself. differ from situation to situation. Consider a person listening to a lecture. Cognitive and behavioral adjustments to She begins to wonder about herself: To what what contexts seem to be about are often au­ extent has she been successful in life so far, tomatic and outside of conscious awareness and how likely is she to succeed in the fu­ (Smith & Collins, 2010; Smith & Conrey, ture? Whatever comes to mind is likely to be 2010; Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). This used in her self-assessments. As reviewed in means that people may experience self and Bless and Schwarz (2010), the direction of identity as stable, failing to notice sensitive the contextual influence can be classified as adjustment of identity to pragmatics of the assimilation or contrast. Assimilation occurs situation. However, the effects of contextu­ when the implication of salient information ally salient information on judgment can be has a positive relationship with the resulting profound (Schwarz, et al., 2003; Wyer & judgment. Contrast occurs when the impli­ Srull, 1989). Implications for self and iden­ cation of salient information has a negative tity research are addressed throughout this relationship with the resulting judgment. and the finalsection. Returning to our example, contextually salient information may influence either what she understands success to mean in Inclusion-Exclusion the moment (the standard of comparison) In the previous section, we reviewed evi­ or which self-attributes come to mind in dence that people sometimes compare them­ making the judgment (aspects of the tar­ selves to others and incorporate others into get). Information that informs the standard identity. People were assumed to use others results in a mental process of contrasting automatically as a standard of comparison. the target with the information that comes Yet the evidence did not support this as­ to mind. For example, the speaker may be sumption; people sometimes included and boring or interesting; the audience may be sometimes excluded others from their judg­ following along avidly or nodding off apa­ ments. To understand when people include thetically. If she is at or above the standard contextually salient information into their set by the focus of her attention, she will judgments about themselves and when they see success as likely for her and recall her exclude this information, using it to form a past as being pretty successful as well. In­ standard against which to judge themselves, formation that informs the target results in we now turn to the social cognition litera­ a mental process of assimilating the target to ture. The inclusion-exclusion model makes the information that comes to mind. In this predictions for when each process is likely to case, the same speaker and audience traits occur (Bless & Schwarz, 2010; also termed will be included into her own judgment. For the assimilation-contrast model-Blanton, example, the audience may include students 2001; Schwarz et a!., 2003). from her cohort or her major; the speaker The inclusion-exclusion model makes the may be an alumnus of the same undergradu­ general prediction that information that feels ate institution as she is or they may share relevant to the judgment task can be used in other attributes (a birthday, initials, favorite formulating either a standard for judgment color) that facilitate assimilation. Then the or the target of judgment itself. People are speaker's vitality and the audience's capacity likely to include social information into self can inform her about herself. Thus, whether judgment unless the social information is a person uses contextual information as a marked as different enough from the self contrasting standard on which to judge the that it becomes excluded and is used as a self or assimilates contextual information contrasting standard. Sufficient difference into self-judgment is not a feature of the in- 86 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION formation but rather a result of how the in­ attributed to fluency and disfluency matters, formation is construed in the moment. One and fluency and disfluency have different ef­ important way in which this has been stud­ fects on judgments about self and identity ied is by demonstrating that people are more depending on how these feelings are inter­ likely to assimilate when primed to use a col­ preted. What feels right in the moment often lectivistic (relational "us") self-concept and takes on the characteristics of a percept; are more likely to contrast when primed to that is, because it is effortlessly experienced, use an individualistic (separate "me") self­ it feels necessarily true. This feeling of ef­ concept. Online sense of identity is impor­ fortlessness, in turn, leads to a sense that tantly influenced by whether information in one has accessed a "true" aspect of self or the situation is included or contrasted with identity, with the implication that the self the identity. is stable. As outlined in the next section on dual-processing models, this feeling of effortlessness may arise as a result of asso­ Metacognitive Experience ciative (System 1) reasoning rather than the Metacognitive experiences-the feelings "truth" value of the online identity. Impli­ that emerge while thinking, and one's in­ cations of mental construal for identity are terpretation of these feelings-are another drawn out in detail in the section "Dynamic major source of construal. People assume Construction." that feelings of fluency (ease) or disfluency (difficulty) that arise in the judgment con­ Dual-Processing Models text are informative for the judgment itself. Often this may be the case. However un­ While not used in theories of self and identi­ less provided a reason to consider source, ty, dual-processing models of automatic and people are not sensitive to the source of their controlled cognition have been proposed in metacognitive experiences. This means that nearly every other domain of psychology they are likely to use even irrelevant meta­ (Chaiken & Trope 1999). Dual-processing cognitive experiences to inform judgment models distinguish between two processing (Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). systems, one that is effortful and controlled For example, if people experience difficul­ and another that is effortless and automatic ty thinking of reasons they are satisfied with (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The effortless re­ their marriage, they infer that they are not flexive system involves associative links that satisfied; if they experience difficulty reading are turned on via spreading activation. The a recipe, they infer that it is more difficultto effortful reflective system involves system­ make; if they experience difficulty reading atic and sequential processing of informa­ a question, they infer that they are not con­ tion (Lieberman, 2007; Strack & Deutsch, fident of the answer (Schwarz 2004; Song 2004). These systems have been variously & Schwarz, 2008a, 2008b). While these labeled System 1 and System 2 (Stanovich & inferences may often be correct, in these West, 2000), intuition and reasoning (Kah­ experiments, difficulty was manipulated to neman, 2003), and impulsive and reflective be external to and irrelevant for the judg­ (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), among other ment: Sometimes the print font was difficult terms. to read, other times participants were asked Earlier formulations often postulated that to list many reasons-a standard deviation thinking occurs in one or the other system. more than the average person otherwise This left open the question of how thinking would. This was difficult. However, unless would shift from one system to the other. their attention was drawn to the extraneous Emerging evidence clarifies that thinking source of their experienced difficulty, people occurs simultaneously in both systems; that assumed that their metacognitive experience is, System 1, the reflexive system, is always was informative. at work. System 2, the reflectivesystem, may Much as metacognitive experience influ­ or may not be active. It becomes active when ences judgment in other domains, meta­ one has the time, resources, and desire to cognitive experience is likely to matter in consider carefully (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). judgments of self and identity. The meaning When both systems are working, each pro- 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 87

cesses with its own style, and whether a judg­ fortfully consider who they are, what their ment or action is produced by the processing goals are and, therefore, what they should outcome of System 1 or 2 will depend on do in the moment (reflective, System 2 pro­ whether action takes place immediately or cessing). However, it also seems likely that later among other constraints. people often go with the flow-the typically Associative, reflexive thinking, the re­ timid may suddenly agree to bungee jumping sults of System 1 reasoning, feels intuitive, if the associative network firing of the mo­ spontaneous, and effortless. These are the ment include both "me" and "not like that "I just feel it in my gut" kinds of thoughts. old fogey" (reflexive, System 1 processing). In contrast, reflective thinking, the results Since System 1 is always working and Sys­ of System 2 reasoning, feels effortful, like tem 2 takes effort, people under cognitive the result of thinking about and applying load often process only with System 1 unless a set of rules or explicit strategies to solve they are motivated to do otherwise, perhaps a problem. Although intuitiYe reasoning is if a particularly important self-goal comes sometimes associated with heuristic process­ to mind. ing, with errors in judgment or reasoning, Dual-processing models make predic­ and with emotion-based and with noncon­ tions for moment-to-moment processing of scious processing, the two systems differ not information. At any moment in time, both in consciousness or accuracy but in speed, reflexive and reflective processing may be flexibility, and, it seems, in the neural net­ occurring. Intentions to act in accordance works involved (Kahneman, 2003; Lieber­ with one's identity are unlikely to be carried man, 2007). out unless they come to mind in the mo­ Because reflexive processing seems to ment. While planned intentions to act are occur without intention or effort, it has been likely part of the reflective system, behavior called natural assessment (Tversky & Kah­ can arise from either system. Generally, per­ neman, 1983). Natural assessments include cepts (either external or internally imagined) assessment of physical properties (e.g., size, effortlessly and automatically cue a cascade distance, loudness) as well as assessment of of spreading activation to percepts stored in some abstract properties, including similar­ memory and associatively linked to the cur­ ity, causal propensity, surprisingness, affec­ rent percept. What comes to mind is likely tive valence (e.g., whether something is good to depend on which associative links have or bad), and mood (Kahneman & Frederick, been recently activated. For example, seeing 2002). These natural assessments are im­ a homeless woman can cue images of one's mediately available as bases for choice and own mother, a feared future image of oneself action. without tenure, or fears of crime. Both the In contrast, in the reflective system, be­ reflexive and reflective systems are involved havior is elicited as a consequence of a deci­ in processing this information. While the self sion process. This decision process is often was initially predicted to be located only in assumed to take on an expectancy-value neural systems involved in the reflective sys­ framework (Feather, 1982). Thus, before tem, the neural evidence now suggests that acting, a person can bring to mind how the self is located in neural systems involved much an outcome is valued and how likely with both reflexive and reflective process­ action is to produce the outcome of choice. ing as dual-processing models would predict This formulation is consistent with a number (Lieberman, 2007). Sometimes people effort­ of psychological theories about goal pursuit, fully consider whether an identity describes including theories of reasoned action (Ajzen them-drawing content from memory and & Fishbein, 1977), theories of planned be­ planning behavior that fits whothey are and havior (Ajzen, 1988), theories of goal pur­ who they want to become. Other times, ef­ suit (Gollwitzer, Fujita, & Oettingen, 2004; fortful processing does not occur or is beat­ Gollwitzer & Kirchhof, 1998), self-efficacy en to the punch line by quicker associative theories (Bandura, 1977, 2001), and expec­ processing. In these situations, an identity tancy-value theories (Eccles et al., 1983) that associatively cued through spreading activa­ describe how the self is involved in action. It tion will lead to a behavior that feels right is certainly likely that sometimes people ef- in context. 88 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION

Summary Dynamic Construction Pragmatic, contextualized, and situated ap­ We began our chapter with a number of proaches make two critical points. First, core precepts, noting that self and identity cognitive processes are context-sensitive theories converge in asserting that the self, and, second, context sensitivity does not self-concept, and identity are mental con­ depend on conscious awareness. Thinking struals, social products, and forces for ac­ and action are influenced by what comes tion that feel stable yet are malleable. We to mind and feels relevant in the moment. outlined how the terms have been used, pro­ What comes to mind is a subset of all one's vided examples of the evidence marshaled existent knowledge. This means that psy­ for each, and called into question the field's chologically meaningful situations influ­ ability to move forward if it does not better ence cognition: "Cognition emerges from integrate with emerging understanding of moment-by-moment interaction with the en­ how the mind works, as outlined in the pre­ vironment rather than proceeding in an au­ vious section, "Thinking Is for Doing." In tonomous, invariant, context-free fashion" this section, we consider the possibility that (Smith & Semin, 2004, p. 56). Thinking is self-concepts and identities are not only mal­ influenced by the context in which it occurs, leable but actually dynamically constructed including physical and social features of the with each use, and the implications of this external context, as well as the experience possibility for the impact of self-concepts of thinking itself. Human thinking is not and identities on how people think and what invariant and context free; rather, people they do. We summarize our thoughts using think flexibly and are responsive to the im­ the identity-based motivation model as our mediate environment. The context sensitiv­ organizing framework (Oyserman, 2007, ity highlighted by situated approaches does 2009a, 2009b). not depend on conscious awareness of the impact of psychologically meaningful fea­ tures of situations on cognition. Not only do Identity-Based Motivation situational effects not require explicit justifi­ People interpret situations in ways that are cation, but also drawing attention to the po­ congruent with their currently active iden­ tential influence of context can change the tities, prefer identity-congruent actions over response (e.g., Fiske, 1992; Schwarz, 2007, identity-incongruent ones, and interpret any 2010). difficultiesthey encounter in light of identity The pragmatic, contextualized, and situ­ congruence. When action feels identity con­ ated nature of cognition and its reliance on gruent, experienced difficulty in engaging in dual processing has a number of important relevant behaviors simply highlights that the implications for self and identity. First, what behavior is important and meaningful. Con­ people think about themselves is influenced versely, when action feels identity incongru­ by meaningful features of their immediate ent, the same difficulty suggests that engag­ environment. Like other judgments, judg­ ing in these behaviors is pointless and "not ments about the self are formed in the mo­ for people like me." These perceptions have ment. Features of the environment simulta­ important downstream effects on meaning neously cue associative and more systematic making and behavior both in the moment processes, both yielding clues as to who one and over time. is and why that matters in the moment. Sec­ The identity-based motivation model has ond, the behavioral consequences of salient three core postulates that can be termed dy­ aspects of identity are influenced by what namic construction, action and procedural the situation seems to be about. Both the readiness, and interpretation of ease and content and behavioral implications of an difficulty. From the first postulate (dynam­ online identity are dynamically constructed ic construction) comes the prediction that in the moment. The implications of dynamic which identities come to mind, what these construction for how self-concept and iden­ identities are taken to mean, and therefore, tities matter are articulated in more detail in which behaviors are congruent with them the next section. are dynamically constructed in context (even 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 89

though identities feel stable and separate gation is associated with content of racial/ from contexts). From the second postulate ethnic identity (Oyserman & Yoon, 2009). (action and procedural readiness) comes the Living in a neighborhood with higher than prediction that identities cue readiness to act city-average segregation was associated with and to make sense of the world in terms of less endorsement and living in a neighbor­ the norms, values, and behaviors relevant to hood with lower than city-average segrega­ the identity. Which actions are relevant and tion was associated with more endorsement what sense to make of situations depends on of the three components of racial/ethnic identity content, which itself is dynamically identity relevant to academic performance constructed. (connectedness, awareness of racism, and The third postulate, interpretation of ease embedded achievement). and difficulty, involves two aspects. With On the other hand, what racial/ethnic regard to the metacognitive experience of identity is taken to mean is also actively con­ ease, the prediction is that ease in bringing structed in the moment, as demonstrated to mind an identity or in performing a be­ in the following study. In this study, also havior will be interpreted as affirming the involving low-income students, researchers centrality of the identity and the identity rel­ randomly assigned children to attend their evance of the behavior. "If it feels right, it regular elective class or an alternative elec­ must be the true me." Unfortunately, impor­ tive twice a week over the first weeks of tant identities are not always easy to bring to the fall marking period (Oyserman, Bybee, mind, and persistently engaging in identity­ & Terry, 2006). Children in the alternative relevant behaviors is rarely simple. Thus, a elective participated in group activities de­ straightforward prediction from the identi­ signed to dynamically create a feeling that ty-based motivation model is that, all things school-focused possible identities were con­ being equal, people will often fail in their gruent with other important identities and a pursuit of self-change. Whichever identities means to attain desired and avoid undesired come to mind in the moment and whichever adult identities. As predicted, the school­ behaviors are easily linked to them are the focused possible identities and congruence ones a person will pursue. However, the sec­ of these identities with racial identity in­ ond aspect of metacognitive experience is creased in intervention, not control youth, the interpretation of experienced difficulty. and these school-focused possible identi­ An identity-based motivation model predicts ties predicted change in behavior. Increased that the consequence of experienced dif­ school-focused possible identities predicted ficulty will depend on the questions an ex­ more in-class participation, more time spent perience of difficulty is used to answer, as doing homework, and better grades and at­ detailed next. tendance. Another set of studies, also involving low­ income African American and Latino chil­ Dynamic Construction dren, directly tested the impact of dynami­ The identity-based motivation model pro­ cally creating a sense that school-focused poses that people are motivated to interpret possible identities are a means of attaining situations and act in ways that feel congru­ desired possible selves (Destin & Oyser­ ent with their identities. But identities are man, 2010, Studies 1 and 2). In a first study, dynamically constructed, so what an iden­ low-income students were asked to consider tity means depends on how it is comes to themselves 10 years in the future. Responses mind in the moment and what difficulties were content-coded for whether they report­ working on it are taken to mean. Consid­ ed attaining their future self as dependent on er racial/ethnic identity. On the one hand, or independent of school. Students who saw identity content is associated with larger their future self as depending on school suc­ social structure. For example, a study of cess worked harder in school and got better the relationship between neighborhood rela­ grades. In the second study, a new sample of tive segregation and racial/ethnic identity low-income students was randomly assigned among low-income African American and to receive either Census information show­ Latino youth in Detroit found that segre- ing the connection between educational at- 90 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION

and average earnings in their state tainment of identity on health (Oyserman, Fryberg, & or Census information on average earnings Yoder, 2007). In a series of studies we (Oy­ for top athletes �nd entertain�rs-the future serman et al., 2007, Studies 1 and 2) dem­ selves described m Study 1 as mdependent of onstrated that minority and majority groups school success. As predicted, compared with held the same baseline beliefs about the ef­ children in rhe education-independent future ficacyof a healthy lifestyle in reducing health self condition, children in the education­ risks. Nevertheless, minority group members dependent future self condition not only were more likely to identify unhealthy be­ said that they would spend more time on haviors such as eating fried foods, drinking homework that night but they were also soda, and adding salt as ingroup behaviors eight rimes more likely to actually hand in and less likely to identify as ingroup-defining an extra-credit assignment. healthy behaviors such as flossing teeth or Thus which identities come to mind and exercising as an adult. These differences what they mean in context is a function were striking because participants were col­ of both chronic and situational cues, with lege students at an elite private university. some situations more likely to cue particular More important, their perceptions of what identities or constellations of identities than is or is not an ingroup thing to do made their others. People's interpretation of cued iden­ correct baseline beliefs about the efficacyof a tities (or identity constellations) depends on healthy lifestyle vulnerable to identity-based the pragmatic meaning of these identities in motivational concerns. the particular context. . . In follow-up studies, we primed minority The identity-based mouvat1on model (e.g., Latino, African American, or Ameri­ shares with social identity (Tajfel & Turner, can Indian) and low-income identities and 2004}, self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, found that when these identities were sa­ Oakes Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), and lient, participants' access to information symbolic self-completion (Wicklund & Goll­ about health and belief in the preventive ca­ wirzer 1981) theories the notion that people pacity of health behaviors was undermined. act to increase felt similarity to salient social Latino and African American children identities, particularly when membership randomly assigned to consider their social might feel threatened. Like many theories in identities reported higher fatalism about cultural psychology (Triandis, 1989, 1995), their future health as adults than children rhe identity-based motivation model predicts in the control group (Oyserman, Fryberg, et that differences in identity expression reflect al., 2007, Study 3). They were also less suc­ differences in the relative salience of orga­ cessful in accessing their health knowledge, nizing self-concept structures, including in­ making more mistakes on a health knowl­ dividual and collective self-concepts. edge quiz than children in the control group However, by arguing for dynamic con­ for whom social identities were not primed struction the identity-based motivation (Oyserman, Fryberg, et al., 2007, Study model m�ves beyond these prior formula­ 4). Moreover, smoking, weight gain, and tions in a number of ways. It predicts that high sugar consumption were rated as les� what an identity means and, therefore, likely to negatively influence health among what is congruent with it, is dynamically African American and Native American constructed in the moment and can mo­ participants randomly assigned to a social tivate both positive and self-undermining identity-salient condition rather than a con­ or even self-destructive behaviors. It also trol condition (Oyserman, Fryberg, et aL predicts that when behavior feels identity 2007, Studies 5-7). congruent, the experi nc of difficulty in � � . working on the behavwr IS likely to be m­ terprered as meaning that the behavior is an Action and Procedural Readiness important part of the process, not an indi­ When an identity is cued, what comes tc cation that the behavior is impossible or un­ mind is not simply the content of the iden· necessary. tity but also relevant actions and ways o: Evidence for the firstpremise comes from a thinking about the world. Consider researd series of studies examining the shifting effect demonstrating that chronic or momentaril) 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 91

primed relational ("us") self-concept results versed it. These gender differences mapped in assimilating others' characteristics as onto differences in performance on tasks part of the self (Kemmelmeier & Oyserman, that involved rotation of objects in three­ 2001a; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). More gen­ dimensional space. erally, priming people to consider themselves Markus and Oyserman (1989) proposed as separate and distinct influences how they that self-concept structure could pre­ process information generally. The idea is dict these effects. Although both men and that what comes to mind when an identity is women can have social identities based in cued is not simply content but also a general gender, men and women may differ in the way of making sense of the world. Recall propensity to use social and relational infor­ that self-concepts can be structured to focus mation in articulating identities and there­ on "me" or "us," to focus on the actor's per­ fore in the likelihood of accessing "me" or spective "mind's eye" or the observer's per­ "us" self-concepts. Men were predicted to spective "eye of another." Identities take on be more likely to define the self as separated these structural aspects. from contexts and relationships, and women Thus, identities are predicted to include were predicted to be more likely to define not only content but also a mindset or way the self as embedded in contexts and rela­ of making sense of the world. People asked tionships. Gender differences in self-concept to describe how they are separate and dis­ structure should have implications for which tinct from their family and friends or to cir­ cognitive procedures are accessible, and this cle singular "me" or plural "us" first-person in turn should predict differences in spatial pronouns in a paragraph do not just describe tasks benefiting from different cognitive relevant personal or social relational self­ procedures. In particular, separate "me" traits and characteristics, they also apply the self-structure should make separating cogni­ primed mindset or self-concept structure to tive procedures generally accessible, which other tasks (Oyserman et al., 2009). Those should make context easier to ignore and primed with a collectivistic mindset are bet­ therefore tasks involving three-dimensional ter at tasks in which integrating helps-they rotation in space easier. remember where objects were located in Whereas Markus and Oyserman's (1989) space better than those primed with a indi­ argument was based on a review of the gen­ vidualistic mindset. Those primed with an der literature on cognitive style, subsequent individualistic mindset are better at tasks in focus shifted to cross-national differences which separating helps-they are quicker at arguing for cultural differences in personal Stroop tasks requiring that one ignore some versus social focus of self-concept (Markus perceptual cues while processing others & Kitayama, 1991). At the same time, (saying out loud the color in which the word cross-national differences in judgment and red is printed requires ignoring the semantic decision making that were also emerging meaning as irrelevant). seemed to parallel the previously described Of course, everyone has an array of identi­ gender differences in self-concept structure ties; some personal "me" self-concepts and (for a review, see Oyserman, Coon, & Kem­ others social "us" self-concepts. At the same melrneier, 2002). For example, European time, as discussed in previous sections, there Americans seem to focus on the figure and is some evidence of chronic between-group ignore background in processing visual in­ differences in the propensity for "me" and formation generally, whereas Chinese (Nis­ "us" self-concepts to be well articulated. bett, 2003) and Japanese (Kitayama, Duffy, Markus and Oyserman (1989) reviewed and Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003) people seem to synthesized the extant literature on gen­ focus on the relationship between figure and der differences in mathematical and spatial background, congruent with a social identi­ abilities. Men and women, they found, dif­ ty focus on the self as connected and related. fered in how they navigated and made sense While none of these models directly tested of three-dimensional space. Men were more mediation, all implied an important role of likely to report mental imagery separated self-concept structure. from their own perspective, seeing the world Triandis and his colleagues (Trafimow et as the crow flies rather than as they tra- al., 1991; Triandis, 1989) provided an initial 92 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULAT ION

demonstration that these effects may be due 2002, 2004, 2010). Images of oneself having to dynamic construction of identity. They current and future identities are inextricably demonstrated that they could reliably predict linked with feelings of ease or difficulty, and whether people would use more personal or what these feelings mean depends on the social identities to describe themselves by question one asks oneself in regards to the shifting participants' in-the-moment focus feeling. If the question is "Is this important on themselves as similar to or different from to me?" then experienced difficulty may be friends and family. They also showed that interpreted as meaning that the answer is once a personal or social identity focus was "Yes, this is important to me. Otherwise, cued in one situation, it was likely to be used why am I working so hard?" Conversely, if again in another situation. In the past 20 the question is "Is this the real me?" then years, this basic finding has been replicated experienced difficulty may be interpreted using a variety of situational cues, showing as meaning that the answer is "no" because that people in the East and the West describe feelings of ease are commonly interpreted as themselves using more or fewer social identi­ truth and genuineness. ties depending on which is cued in a given Common interpretations of felt difficulty situation (for a review, see Oyserman & Lee, are that if it is hard to think of or hard to do, 2008a, 2008b). then it is less likely to be true (Higgins, 1998; How identity is cued matters for behav­ Schwarz & Clore, 1996). This would imply ior. The answer to one of our opening ques­ that the experience of metacognitive diffi­ tions-"How about offering a bribe to win culty can easily be understood to mean "not that contract?"-has been demonstrated to true for me." However, a number of studies vary depending on whether people consid­ have documented that other interpretations ered the question after being primed with are possible (Schwarz, 2004, 2010). Sports a "me" or an "us" self-concept (Mazar & stories abound with reinterpretation of the Aggarwal, 2011, Study 2). People were ran­ meaning of experienced difficulty (e.g., "No domly assigned to read a paragraph and pain, no gain") and the need to keep try­ circle "me" first-person singular or "us" ing (e.g., "You miss 100% of the shots you first-person plural pronouns. They took on don't take"). Similarly, when attempting to the role of a sales agent competing against attain a school-focused identity, the meta­ other agents to win a contract and had to cognitive experience of difficulty is generally decide whether to offer or not to offer a interpreted as "not the true me" but could bribe. Those in the "me" condition were less be reinterpreted to mean other things. Dif­ likely to do so. This replicated the authors' ficulty can be viewed as a normative part of secondary analyses of large cross-national the process (e.g., "Success is 1% inspiration datasets showing that bribery is more com­ and 99% perspiration"). Difficulty can also mon in collectivistic compared to individu­ provide evidence of progress (e.g., "The im­ alistic countries (Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011, portant things in life are the ones you really Study 1). Thus, shifts in identity focus shift have to work for"). If difficulty and failures readiness to act, even in ways people gener­ along the way are viewed as critical to even­ ally view as dishonest. tual success, then difficulty is evidence of striving. This means that interpretation of difficul­ Interpretation of Difficulty ty is critical if identities are actually to in­ This formulation of identity as including fl uence behavior over time. Consider the be­ both content (what one thinks about when haviors required to attain a "good student" one thinks about oneself) and interpretation identity or a "healthy person" identity. To be of accompanying metacognitive process (re­ or become a good student, one would need flection on how thinking feels) first appeared not only to pay attention in class, bring home in the writing of William James (1890/1927). and do homework, take notes and study for More recently, social cognition research has exams, but also to forsake or at least limit demonstrated the importance of considering activities that might interfere with these both the content of thoughts and the mean­ choices. What difficulty means depends on ing attributed to feelings of ease or difficulty the questions the experience of difficulty is associated with these thoughts (see Schwarz, assumed to answer. Consider the "good stu- 4. Self, Self-Concept, and Identity 93

dent" identity. A student experiencing diffi­ Summary culty in schoolwork might ask a number of Identity-based motivation is the readiness to questions. If the question is "Have I studied engage in identity-congruent action {Oyser­ enough?" then difficulty could be taken to man, 2007; Oyserman, Bybee, et al., 2006; mean that one had not studied enough. In Oyserman, Fryberg, et al., 2007) and to use this case, difficultyshould result in increased identity-congruent mindsets in making sense effort. But if the question is "Is this really of the world (Oyserman et al., 2009). Al­ the true me?" then difficultycould be taken to mean that one cannot become a good stu­ though often experienced as stable, identity dent. In this case, difficulty shouldresult in is highly malleable and situation-sensitive, so which aspect of identity comes to mind is reduced effort. To test this notion, elementary school chil­ a dynamic product of that which is chroni­ dren in an afterschool program for children cally accessible and that which is situation­ with difficultiesin school were randomly as­ ally cued. Moreover, because what is cued is signed to one of two conditions (difficulty a general mindset rather than a specificcon­ without interpretation, difficulty withinter­ tent list, identity's impact on action and pro­ pretation), asked to describe their possible cedural readiness is likely to occur outside of selves for the coming year, and given a novel conscio�s awareness and without systematic math task (Novin & Oyserman, unpub­ processmg. lished data). All children were reminded that When situations cue an identity (e.g., fe­ they were participating in the afterschool male), what the cued identity carries with it program. In the no-interpretation condition, is not a fixed list of traits (e.g., warm, ener­ children were asked to give an example of getic). Rather, the cued identity carries with a time that a school task was difficult for it a general readiness to act and make sense them. In the interpretation condition, chil­ of the world in identity-congruent terms, dren were asked to give an example of a time including the norms, values, strategies, and that a school task was difficult for them but goals associated with that identity, as well they kept trying because school is important as the cognitive procedures relevant to it. to them. As predicted, interpretation mat­ What exactly this readiness looks like is de­ tered. Children in the interpretation condi­ pendent on what the cued identity comes to tion described more possible selves and were mean in the particular context in which it more persistent at the novel math task. is cued. Being female is likely to mean dif­ The common interpretation of difficulty ferent things in different contexts-a job as meaning low ability fits well with Ameri­ interview, a date, an appointment at a hair cans' belief that intelligence and many other salon. This does not imply that identities do abilities are fixed rather than malleable not predict behaviors over time but that the (Dweck, 2002). For effort to matter, one predictive power of an identity depends on must believe that ability is malleable and the stability of the contexts in which it is can be incrementally improved rather than cued. Because differing contexts cue differ­ believe it is a stable trait or entity (Dweck, ent aspects of an identity and differing inter­ 2002). Students holding incremental theo­ sections with other identities, the identity­ ries are more likely to persist over time, behavior link may be opaque. The effect of as do students convinced to hold an incre­ an identity will be stable over time to the mental theory (Dweck, 2002). The identity­ extent that individuals repeatedly encoun­ based motivation model provides a frame­ ter psychologically isomorphic situations work within which to understand entity and because in each instance the situation will incremental formulations as naive theories engender readiness to take the same actions explaining what difficulty means. If effort (for a related discussion of the stability of matters (incremental theory of ability), then attitudes see Schwarz, 2007). Once a choice difficulty is likely to be interpreted as mean­ becomes identity linked, it is automatized. ing that more effort is needed. However if If it feels identity-syntonic, it feels right and effort does not matter {an entity theory of does not require further reflection. On the ability), then difficulty is likely to be inter­ other hand, if it feels nonsyntonic to iden­ preted as meaning that ability is lacking, so tity, it feels wrong and this feeling also does effort should be suspended. not invite further reflection. 94 I. AWARENESS, COGNITION, AND REGULATION

Wrapping Up self-efficacy research dominated American and Looking Forward self-concept research for many years but the field has now broadened substantially. We began this chapter with the proposition Self-concept structure has been studied in a that self and identity feel stable though they number of ways, but two main lines of re­ are probably not really stable in the way search focus on what we term mindsets and people experience them. Rather, identities hierarchy. Hierarchy research starts with are dynamically constructed in context. We the assumption that diverse content about argued that both experienced stability and the self must be ordered in some hierarchy context-based dynamic construction are and focuses on factor analysis of evalua­ helpful. Experienced stability allows people tive judgments about the self in an array of to make predictions based on their sense that content domains. The goal is to determine they know themselves and increases their whether self-concepts are nested, overlap­ willingness to invest in their own futures. ping, or basically orthogonal (independent of one another). Other research on structure At the same time context-based dynamic examines structure of positive and negative construction facilitates sensitive attunement self-concept content and complexity or num­ of behavior to contextual affordances and ber of self-perceived self-concept domains. constraints. We articulated how this might While not uninteresting, we find hierarchy happen by using the identity-based motiva­ research currently less exciting than the sec­ tion model. ond main branch of research on self-concept We also summarized core terms, noting structure, which we term mindset research. that while self and identity are often used in­ Mindset researchers assume that people terchangeably, some clarity can be attained have multiple self-concepts distinguished by by considering them as a series of nested con­ differences in organizing frame, content, and structs, with self as the most encompassing downstream consequences for judgment, term, self-concepts being embedded within perception, and behavior. This research is self, and identities being embedded the dominated by the study of individualistic within self-concepts. The self has a reflex­ compared to collectivistic self-concepts, but ive capacity, the ability to consider oneself also includes research on perspective taking as an object and to become aware that one is (immersed, distal) and temporal focus (near, doing so. Like other object categories (cats, far). Research on mindsets is a particularly tables), the self is a fuzzy construct. This exciting new frontier for self researchers be­ means that people have a sense that they cause it demonstrates that people have multi­ know what their self is, even though what ple self-concept structures available to them exactly it refers to differs from situation to that can be easily cued but differ in their situation. Just as cats vary-some are softer content and consequences. For example, and more friendly than others but they all an individualistic mindset entails not only share an essential "catness"-people do not using more abstract language to describe always act the same but are in some essential oneself and thinking of oneself as separate way still the same. Though one may be dis­ and distinct, but it also has consequences appointed in the antics of one's messy, rude, for perception and mental construal. Spe­ or disorganized self, or surprised at the abili­ cifically, an individualistic mindset increases ties of one's self under fire and even say "I the likelihood that objects in the world will did not know I had it in me," one still refers be perceived as separate rather than related, to some essence of "me." Firmly separating and that contextual information will be oneself into truly different entities, having used as a standard of comparison or ignored multiple personalities, is rare and is consid­ completely rather than assimilated into self­ ered a form of mental illness. judgments. The mental content included in the various Moving to what is meant by identity, we "me" selves can be called self-concept. Self­ suggested that identities include content concepts include content as well structure and readiness to act and employ mindsets and evaluative judgment. These evaluative to make meaning. Personal identities are judgments about the self are typically termed a person's traits, characteristics and attri­ self-esteem or self-efficacy. Self-esteem and butes, goals and values, and ways of being. 4. Self, Self-Concept, and ldent1ty 95

Confusingly, these are often termed selves identity unless there is reason to use it as a in the social science literature. Social identi­ standard of comparison for the identity. ties are a person's roles, interpersonal rela­ Returning to the Midas touch that makes tionships and group memberships, and the self, self-concept, and identity feel interest­ traits, characteristics, attributes, goals, and ing, we recommend three avenues for fu­ values congruent with these roles, relation­ ture research. First, self, self-concept, and ships, and memberships. identity are interesting because they seem To better understand where these iden­ to predict behavior over time. How does tities come from and how they matter for this actually happen? Second, self-concept judgment and behavior both in the moment and identity are interesting because what­ and over time, we proposed a better integra­ ever comes to mind feels real and stable yet, tion of study of the self, self-concept, and as we have demonstrated, self-concept and identity with the study of mental processes. identity are highly malleable and can even Three core predictions emerge from this be dynamically constructed in the moment, integration, which we term dynamic con­ so stability often is more seeming than real. struction, action and procedural readiness, How do these two experiences coexist and and interpretation of ease and difficulty. As under what circumstances does awareness of clarified by modern dual-processing models shifts, malleability, and dynamic construc­ of cognition, thinking involves both reflex­ tion improve well-being? Third, self-concept ive and reflective processing. Reflexive, Sys­ and identity are interesting because the self tem 1, processing is rapid and effortless, the exists over time. People can and do imagine result of spreading activation of associative the self continuing over time and from child­ networks. This form of processing is posited hood can imagine some desired and unde­ always tO be operating in the background, sired future identities. Though people some­ yielding quick responses that feel fluent. The times invest current effort to attain these other form of processing, reflective, or Sys­ future identities, often they underperform, tem 2, processing is slower and more effort­ failing to attain their aspirations perhaps ful, the result of systematic consideration of because they misinterpret feelings of diffi­ content and application of rules. This form culty as meaning that goals are impossible of processing operates when people have the or feelings of ease as meaning that they do time, motivation, and mental capacity to en­ not need to try. What predicts current in­ gage it. vestment in the future self, whether particu­ Given that people have a large store of lar future identities or the well-being of the autobiographical knowledge in memory, future self more generally (e.g., savings for almost any associative network is likely to retirement, practicing healthy lifestyles to eventually link to some aspect of autobio­ reduce future risk) is thus a third important graphical knowledge. This implies that re­ venue for future research. fl exive processing is likely to yield an asso­ ciation with some aspect of self, so that an identity or aspect of identity will frequently Acknowledgment come to mind as part of ongoing System 1 processing whether or not System 2 process­ The funding support of the Alexander von Hum­ ing is engaged. However what that identity boldt Foundation to Daphna Oyserman is grate­ means in the moment depends in large part fully acknowledged. on what else also comes to mind in this mo­ ment of reflexive processing. Most informa­ tion is assumed to be relevant and people as­ References similate whatever comes to mind into their online identity judgments, using this infor­ Abrams, D. (1994). Social self-regulation [Special mation as a standard to judge the self only issue: The self and the collective]. Personality under certain circumstances. That is, once and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 473-483. an identity comes to mind through reflexive Abrams, D. (1999). Social identity and social processing, what it means depends on the cognition. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), other information that comes to mind in Social identity and social cognition (pp. 197- context. This information is included in the 229). Malden, MA: Blackwell. 96 I. AWARENE5S, COGNITION, AND REGULA"';IOI\

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