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efforts; the approach to date has 40,000 Congolese refugees who fled providing pragmatic humanitarian consisted of fragmented and stand- North during the ethnic wars approaches to assist returnees, the alone interventions with significant of 1993 and in the aftermath of the STAREC/ISSSS plan, now in its transaction costs for coordination. 1994 .3 To date, infancy and possibly providing the no timeline has been made public best and most nuanced framework The rolling out of STAREC and concerning the closure of the refugee for moving forward with sustainable ISSSS will need to be evaluated camps within and there has return and reintegration, and a more in the coming months; it is an been little indication of spontaneous problematic Tripartite Agreement ambitious plan and some in the return to DRC. Voices from both which at the time of writing could humanitarian community would the international NGO community well be undermined by the reality argue that it is risky because it is so and Congolese civil society have of population movements over a closely aligned to the government. expressed concerns, however, porous international frontier. The On the other hand, any good that there have been spontaneous success or failure of these tools will transition programming must movements of people into stand on how far the government position the government in the and , most of whom are and donors remain committed to lead. STAREC’s success will be allegedly unable to prove Congolese durable solutions. The challenge contingent firstly on basing itself nationality and are unrecognised for the humanitarian community on good, transparent governance, by local village leaders. These will be to ensure that political and secondly on its ability to movements are already causing engagement is maintained, whilst include the whole humanitarian tensions in parts of assistance continues to go to those community, listening to both the that already experience a complex judged to be most vulnerable. target communities and NGOs; only dynamic in terms of ethnicity and through comprehensive consultation demography. Many humanitarians Fergus Thomas (fergust@hotmail. with all of the stakeholders can feel that these population movements com) is Stabilisation Coordination a durable and sustainable return are based on a political decision Officer for North Kivu with MONUSCO in North Kivu be achieved. that pays little heed to whether (http://monusco.unmissions.org) and conditions for return are right. was previously the Eastern Congo Finally, in February 2010 the coordinator for Concern Worldwide. Tripartite Agreement between the There exists, then, a set of tools 1. http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/2009_2961.html GoDRC, Rwanda and UNHCR paved and agreements aiming to facilitate 2. http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=4514 the way for the return of more than returns in North Kivu: PEAR, 3. See article by Maria Lange pp48-9. Of tripartites, peace and returns Steve Hege After international agreements covering the return of refugees to was the return of these members Equateur and North Kivu, the challenge is to create local structures of his Congolese community. In order to facilitate this process, that can make the agreements work. the March 2010 peace agreement After international agreements seek to reinforce a shift away from committed to the establishment of covering the return of refugees authoritarian decision-making styles local pacification committees which to Equateur and North Kivu, the to those of consensus.1 In DRC they are a type of LPC. The committees challenge is to create local structures face a wide range of challenges, are being progressively established that can make the agreements work. but nonetheless constitute unique in North , composed peacebuilding opportunities for these of local authorities, customary In the first half of 2010, the facilitated returns chiefs and civil society actors, Government of DRC signed two along with equal representatives separate tripartite agreements with Returns to North Kivu of all ethnic groups present in neighbouring countries and UNHCR In February, the Congolese each groupement (a territorial concerning refugee returns. Caused government concluded a tripartite subdivision). Although many efforts by distinct conflicts at opposite ends agreement with the Rwandan have been made to set up these of DRC’s vast territory, both refugee government and UNHCR to set the LPCs, they will have to address a populations have been particularly stage for the return of Congolese number of complex challenges. contentious. Moreover, these two Tutsi refugees to eastern DRC from returns processes are predicated on camps in Rwanda. The majority of Above all, there is significant concern the effective establishment of local these refugees escaped to Rwanda that the LPCs will not be able to act peace committees (LPCs), inclusive between 1994 and 1996, when over a impartially in view of the territorial bodies which aim to promote million Rwandan flooded into expansion and dominance of the dialogue and mutual understanding the Kivu provinces in the aftermath CNDP in return areas. Since their as well as to facilitate collective of the Rwandan genocide. One of partial integration into the Congolese measures to resolve problems and the principal demands of the CNDP army in exchange for Rwanda’s arrest mitigate risks of violence. LPCs rebel group2 led by of Laurent Nkunda in January 2009, 52 DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FMR 36

Finally, divergent electoral and political interests – of the government of DRC, the CNDP and Rwanda – may either lead to precipitous advances or significant hold- ups in the returns process leading up to the Presidential elections in 2011, thereby threatening the autonomy and functioning of the LPCs in North Kivu.

Returns to Equateur A second tripartite agreement was reached in June 2010 for the return of over 115,000 refugees who fled to the Republic of Congo – Brazzaville (RoC) as a result of an insurgency which rocked the western province of Equateur

UNHCR/K Barnes starting in mid-2009. The agreement calls Repatriation from Zambia to Moba, Katanga, DRC, May 2009 for an amnesty as well as the “urgent the CNDP has quadrupled the terrain will not be monitored by UNHCR establishment of an inter-community under its exclusive control and defied which is only mandated to deal with reconciliation mechanism.”5 This orders to be re-deployed outside the those in camps. There have been LPC was already established in . Despite a formal dismantling credible signs already that CNDP August and has achieved some of their much-criticised parallel officers have been facilitating the progress in promoting dialogue, civilian administration, the CNDP movement into the Kivus of Rwandan but it faces challenges equally as continues to exert control over all citizens claiming to be spontaneous daunting as those in North Kivu. aspects of life in many areas still off- Congolese returnees. While the LPCs limits to other Congolese authorities. should be able to handle the camp Foremost among these will be the This reality is likely to compromise population, controversies about the socio-economic tensions between the the LPCs’ capacity to achieve nationality of other populations may Lobala and Boba tribes which gave consensus around the returns very well overwhelm their capacities.3 rise to the insurgency. The Lobala’s process in an autonomous fashion. historic homeland is Dongo Sector Violent conflict over land will but the Boba have progressively The next critical challenge for also certainly pose a significant assumed administrative and the LPCs in North Kivu will be challenge to the LPCs in North Kivu. economic power in the capital determining the nationality and Often at question are large farming city of Dongo Centre. As a result, origin of the potential returnees. concessions as well as smaller plots Lobala political leaders supported After years of Rwandan backing that sold off at bargain prices the rebellion in the hope of forcing of proxy rebel groups following its in their rush to flee for Rwanda. the national government to make all-out occupation of eastern Congo While some spontaneous refugee socio-economic concessions to their (1998-2002), many Congolese are returnees have peacefully re- tribe. In late October 2009, after deeply fearful of perceived attempts purchased their old land, non-Tutsi calling on all Boba to vacate the to re-populate the Kivus with farmers have been the victims of a city, rebel forces attacked Dongo communities loyal to the CNDP pattern of land expropriations. While Centre, burning down half of all the leadership and some of its supporters customary leaders have historically homes and killing over 300 people.6 in Rwanda. The CNDP and the played an important role in land Rwandan government have defended allocation, the CNDP now defends The extensive trauma and claims that there are over 150,000 dubious land titles which were personalisation of the violence in non-registered refugees outside obtained during the war and never Dongo Sector will be no easy task to the camps whose potential return harmonised with traditional practice.4 overcome. Deep-seated animosities DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 53 FMR 36

led many Lobala residents of Dongo Precisely because they rely on mitigate and address the numerous Centre to participate in the October ‘soft’ power though, LPCs remain obstacles to a durable return in attack and many fled to the RoC to vulnerable, particularly to being both North Kivu and Equateur hide among their families in the co-opted or distorted by national provinces. These include inter- refugee camps. As the amnesty actors and local spoilers. While community tensions, ongoing called for in the tripartite agreement some radicals can be brought on socio-political conflicts, amnesties, would not cover the perpetrators of board, LPCs must expose and land conflicts and questions of the massacres at Dongo Centre — insulate themselves from hidden nationality. The contributions of considered mass atrocities under agendas aimed at undermining their LPCs are thus critical but their international law – the LPC will also independence. Similarly, ongoing roles all the more vulnerable. struggle to mitigate the fallout of a efforts must be made in both North limited exoneration for returnees. Kivu and Equateur to ensure broad The LPCs in the Congo will not be local and national buy-in for the operating under ideal circumstances Furthermore, despite the fact that credibility of LPCs as the security and consequently will require the rebel leader, Odjani Mangbama, and political contexts evolve. significant external support not only has already surrendered to Republic to provide guidance and technical of Congo (RoC) authorities, he has LPCs must also be wary of assistance but also to bolster and not been extradited to the DRC. The establishing themselves as protect them from numerous threats Dongo LPC will additionally have alternative decision-making bodies. related to facing these challenges. to overcome entrenched patterns When LPCs have been given too While these LPCs cannot alone of dispute resolution substantially much power, they can easily be be expected to compensate for based on pay-offs to local leaders, transformed into competitive the shortcomings of the political which neglect underlying political arenas, thereby undermining contexts in which they operate, with and socio-economic issues. Finally, their distinctive role as facilitators sufficient national and international as Equateur province has been a of dialogue and consensus. backing to mitigate certain risks bastion of political opposition to Furthermore, when national actors they can contribute positively. President Kabila, any intervention fail to settle explosive structural They are not panaceas but LPCs in by the national government is challenges, although local leaders the DRC do represent important potentially viewed with suspicion may have unique insights, it is opportunities to accompany these and mistrust. unrealistic to overwhelm LPCs with complex returns processes. the task of resolving deeply-rooted Limitations and keys to causes of conflict. As such, LPCs in Steve Hege (stevehege@ success for LPCs Congo should be wary of the extent peaceappeal.org) is an associate Extensive research has demonstrated to which they are tasked with issues with the Peace Appeal Foundation that the success of LPCs is critically beyond their means or required (http://peaceappeal.org/), and dependent on a number of factors.7 to deliver judgments, be they on is also a member of the Group First, LPCs are most appropriate in land and nationality in North of Experts for the DRC appointed settings where local government Kivu or politico-administrative by the UN Security Council. structures are too weak, politicised arrangements in Dongo Sector. or lacking sufficient legitimacy to Reports of the Group of Experts tackle intricate issues. LPCs should Finally, LPCs have been seen to for DRC: http://www.un.org/sc/ also only be established when flourish when there is a strong peace committees/1533/egroup.shtml the context is suitable to softer agreement which most local actors approaches to peacebuilding and consider to reasonably reflect their Index of UN Security Council where the forceful implementation principal interests and concerns. publications on DRC: of political agreements would risk However, neither return process in http://tinyurl.com/UN-DRC-docs inciting further conflict. As such, the DRC is set to take place in such 1. Andries Odendaal and Retief Olivier, ‘Local Peace LPCs appear to be quite appropriate a context as both rebellions were Committees: Some Reflections & Lessons Learned’, responses to complex return halted by the opaque surrender Academy for Educational Development, 2008. http://tinyurl.com/Odendaal-Olivier-LPCs processes in fragile environments or capture of the principal rebel 2. National Congress for the Defence of the People such as in Equateur and North Kivu. leaders by neighbouring countries. (Congrès national pour la défense du peuple) No peace deal exists in Equateur 3. Refugees International, ‘DR Congo: Unstable Areas Endanger Returns’, 20 April 2010. Moreover, it is crucial that LPCs and the March agreement appears http://tinyurl.com/RI-DRC-April2010 maintain a balance between to simply be the public version of 4. IRIN, ‘DRC-Rwanda: Land rows complicate refugees’ moderates and radicals in their veiled promises to the CNDP. returns’, 2 July 2010. http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=89708 composition. Important more See also article by Baptiste Raymond pp20-1. extreme positions must be included Conclusion 5. DRC Tripartite Agreement with UNHCR & RoC, 5 but tempered by community Most refugee returns require a June 2010. http://tinyurl.com/RoC-Tripartite 6. Refugees International, ‘DR Congo: Spotlight on the leaders who are respected across commitment to often imperfect Equateur Crisis’, 31 March 2010. conflict lines and capable of mechanisms to confront lingering http://tinyurl.com/RI-DRC-March2010 anchoring and stabilising the local tensions as well as to facilitate 7. Personal and email communications with Andries Odendaal, Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the US dialogue process. The LPCs in practical aspects of the reintegration Institute of Peace, March 2010. North Kivu and Equateur must of large populations. DRC has See also http://www.mefeedia.com/watch/31185424 bolster the leadership of participants handed significant responsibility with these unique qualities. to formal local peace structures to