Observador Rural Documento De Trabalho

Observador Rural Documento de Trabalho

POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT THE NORTHERN CABO DELGADO

João Feijó and Jerry Maquenzi

Nº 76-Eng

July 2019

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POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND CONFLICT THE NORTHERN CABO DELGADO

INTRODUCTION

Under the research line on "poverty, inequality and conflict," the Observatório do Meio Rural – OMR (Observatory of Rural Areas) is conducting a research on poverty in the northern Cabo Delgado, in particular, in large extractive industry penetration areas. In a scenario of strong investment and international presence, expectations increased, but also of maintenance poverty and increasing social inequalities, the OMR intends, with a sequence of texts, understand the phenomenon of persistence and increased tension and violence in the region.

This reflection results from the analysis of several journalists pieces and scientific articles on the socio-political dynamics of the northern Cabo Delgado, and also secondary data provided by APIEX, the District Services of Economic Activities (SDAE), District Services of Education, Youth and Technology (SDEJT) of Palma, by STAE, as well as various databases established by the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace in Palma district regarding attacked villages.

These data were supplemented with other information collected through observation on the ground in the districts of Palma, Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Macomia, Quissanga and Meluco, over the last week of March and first week of April, as well as interaction with local populations among civil servants (the District Services of Education, Youth and Technology, District Services of Economic Activities, and Services District Planning and infrastructure, in Palma, and the Cabo Delgado Provincial Directorate for Sea, Inland Water and Fisheries), soldiers of the FADM, clerics and young people belonging to the Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace.

The following discussion is divided into four parts, structured as follows: 1) Poverty, investment and frustration of expectations 2) Armed insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado - a regional dimension of conflict 3) Socio-economic consequences of armed attacks in Cabo Delgado 4) Explanatory Hypotheses of the phenomenon - clues for future research

PART 1: POVERTY, INVESTMENT, EXPECTATIONS AND CONFLICTUAL TENSION

1.1. HISTORIC PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY SCENARIO IN CABO DELGADO

Despite the strong pace of investment observed in the north of the country, the reality is that poverty phenomena persists in the region. When measuring poverty rates, the National Statistics Office uses concepts of consumer poverty and multidimensional poverty. The consumption poverty is the ability to access by households to a set of basic necessities, considering "poor" those who lack such access. In this sense, a poverty line was defined on the basis of the ability to access a food basket of 2,150 calories per person per day. Based on this concept (which it defines as poverty exit criteria the simple access to food items) the last two Surveys to the Budget of Families (IOF) have shown a trend of increasing consumption poverty rate in the provinces of Cabo Delgado (where it reaches 44.8%), Niassa and Nampula.

Graph 1: Evolution of consumption poverty rate by province (2008-2014): 80 67,2 70 60,6 61 57,1 56,5 54,4 54,6 55,9 60 51,4 52,8 48,6 51,2 50 44,8 44,2 39 41 41 40 33 31,8 29,9 30 18,9 20 11,6 10 0 Niassa Cabo Nampula Zambézia Tete Manica Sofala Inhambane Gaza Maputo Maputo Delgado Província Cidade IOF08 IOF14

Source: IOF 2014/15

In turn, the multidimensional poverty refers to other dimensions of deprivation, besides consumption, that influence the well-being of families, and is calculated by the access to a set of six more stable elements: 1) at least one household member finished complete primary school; 2) access to safe water supply; 3) access to secure sanitation; 4) house roofed with conventional materials; 5) access to electricity; 6) owning durable goods. In measuring the incidence of multidimensional poverty it is considered poor the private household that meets at least 4 of the 6 mentioned indicators.

The results show a general decrease in the incidence of multidimensional poverty, especially in the extreme south of the country, although there it is still very high in central and northern Mozambique.

Graph 2: Evolution of the incidence of multidimensional poverty by province, in percentage (2008 and 2014)

100

85 83

90 82

76 75

80 73

67 64

70 62 60

47 46

50 43 40

30 23

20 18 7

10 3 1 0

IOF08 IOF14

Source: IOF 2014/15

When these welfare dimensions are disaggregated, it appears that much of northern Cabo Delgado (North of Mozambique in general) is a region strongly affected by deprivation. Map 1 shows the strong concentration of illiteracy in the region, including in the areas of greater penetration of investment, compromising thus harnessing the arising employment opportunities. The province of Cabo Delgado has only 7 technical and vocational schools (primary and secondary level), and there is no technical professional school in Palma district (Sekelekani,

October 26, 2018: 12). Most of the Palma’s local youth that attended secondary education did so in Mocímboa da Praia or Tanzania. If we consider the ratio doctor per 1000 inhabitants (map 2), we find, similarly, a contrast not only between urban centers (particularly the city of Maputo) to rural areas, but also between North and South country, and several northern districts of Cabo Delgado are quite disadvantaged in access to health care.

Map 2: Ratio of doctors per 1.000 Map 1: Illiteracy rate by district (2007) population per district and Maputo City (2013)

Source: INE (2007) Source: MISAU

National differences are particularly evident at the level of access to electricity. The Census 2007 revealed that much of the north of the country is still deprived of electricity, with particular emphasis to the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Nampula and much of Niassa (Map 3). In turn, and despite growing access to cellphone, the reality is that regional disparities persist between the north and south of the country.

Map 3: Percentage of population that uses Map 4: Percentage of population with electrical energy for lighting (2007) access to cell phone (2007)

1.2. CAPITAL PENETRATION IN PALMA, FRUSTRATION OF EXPECTATIONS AND CONFLICTUALITY

Over the past decades, the Mozambican press has been reporting several discoveries of natural resources in Cabo Delgado, as well as many investment announcements and forecasts. Although major investments in the gas industry have not yet started, the reality is that since 2009, there has been a change in the volume of investment in the province. The data on approved investment by the Investment Promotion Center (CPI) show the emergence of major economic projects that exceeded in 2014, the 600 million dollars of investment (see graph 3). The graph also shows a strong oscillation of the investments, which reveals the existence of few projects with very high values.

Graph 3: Evolution of Investment in Cabo Delgado approved by CPI annually (2003-2015) - in USD 700.000.000

600.000.000

500.000.000

400.000.000

300.000.000

200.000.000

100.000.000

0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: Centro de Promoção de Investimentos

The big investment boom had the following consequences in the province:

From the analysis of the mining cadastre portal in Mozambique (Map 5), it is clear that much of the territory of Cabo Delgado province has been awarded license ("authorization of mineral resources for construction") totalling an total area of over 13,580 km2, including to Anadarko company. The shredded character of the map illustrates the strong pressure for the exploitation of natural resources in the province, translatable into greater competition in the access to land.

Map 5: Mining cadastre mapping on the coast of North Mozambique

Source: Mozambique Mining Cadastre Portal(http://portals.flexicadastre.com/mozambique/pt/)

Impact on the population's income: in much of the northern Cabo Delgado coast, where 10 years ago lived families of artisanal fishermen with close interaction with the sea, today, there are unauthorized access spaces. Access to the sea is conditioned and in some areas prohibited for fishing. As compensation, a monthly value of 5,000 meticais was awarded to the affected families. According to a technician of the Provincial Directorate of Sea, Inland Water and Fisheries in Cabo Delgado, depending on the type of fishing, an artisanal fisherman can take a minimum daily income 500-2,000 meticais. Considering these data, local fishermen could get a revenue between 10,000 and 40,000 meticais in 20 days monthly work, so clearly superior to the current compensation.

Issues of resettlement: resettlement processes contributed to increasing social tension. Resettled population faces high levels of anxiety, fueling speculation about the timing and the practical process of compensation to be paid, the guarantee of being allocated fertile land and in sufficient quantity (Velasco, s.d.). Both the population and non-governmental organizations suspect of manipulation of consultations, and of blockages of access to information and to freedom of expression. Against a backdrop of threats made by local authorities to individuals who most question the resettlement process, there has been a growing number of people interviewed asking that their names are not mentioned, with fear of reprisals (Velasco, May 12, 2017). On the other hand, there has been an involuntary conflict between populations to resettle and the resident population in the places of destination, motivated by different compensation values (money, quality of residences). The values benefit more the displaced people than the

7 hosts, despite the latter are the ones making dispensing land. It is anticipated increased pressure on available resources, including arable land and firewood, as well as political conflicts (among traditional leaders), cultural and spiritual (resulting from loss of cemeteries, graves transfer and treatment of sacred sites). The tension inherent to the relocation process results furthermore from a traumatic collective memory of forced resettlement, during the decades of 1970 and 1980, both in terms of colonial settlements, or of communal villages, invariably with negative effects on the local socio-economic structure. These episodes remain alive in the local imaginary.

Frustration of expectations and conflict manifestations: the speeches by political and economic authorities were filled with alluring promises on jobs, access to schools and hospitals, as if they could to fruition immediately, seeking the adherence of the population. These optimistic speeches were responsible for the formation of exaggerated social expectations (Sekelekani, October 26, 2018: 9). The implementation of investment dragged on for years with periods of absence of reliable and timely information locally available, frustrating the expectations of the population. The low access to information was fueling rumors and various speculations.

Feelings of discrimination and expressions of conflicts: aggravating the situation, we are witnessing an increasing flow of migrants, representing greater competition from the "vientes" to the natives of the region. During the years 2013 and 2014, Mocímboa da Praia received from 100 to 200 migrants daily, mostly from Somalia (VoA Portuguese, January 16, 2018). Among the local youth, there has been a perception of external threat claiming that the opportunities benefited those from "South" or "Maputo" as well as "foreign". Despite the increase in investment in the region, the reality is that, locally, there is the conviction that little has been done for the local population, mostly Muslim. This discontent increases social tension and insecurity in the region.

In this scenario disorder outbreaks were recorded in different villages of the Palma district. In May 2018 more than a hundred young people gathered in the village district capital, protesting the alleged blockade to job opportunities in ongoing construction work, claiming that such opportunities were seized by South individuals, although some 53% of the labor hired by the construction company in the region was made up of natives (Sekelekani, October 26, 2018: 9). Youth groups were involved in attempts to halt the construction of social infrastructure, particularly the construction of the future resettlement village, in protest against alleged illegal dismissals and wage cuts, as well as wage discrimination for lack of education, given the lack of schools and universities. In the heat of the animosities, white construction supervisors attacks were recorded. Some strikers reported they no longer wanted to work or resettlement, but only their land back and its beaches (Sekelekani, October 26, 2018: 8).

Violence of the security forces and human rights violations: in parallel, several instances of violence by the security forces were recorded in the province of Cabo Delgado, in particular in Montepuez district. The artisanal mining of gems in this district triggered a wave of migration of thousands of young people from the whole province of Cabo Delgado, including from the provincial coast, towards the mines in Namanhumbir where they clashed with the interests of the company Mozambican Ruby Mining. The brutal practices by the company security forces and by the Rapid Reaction Force (including torture and beatings) and compulsive deporting of thousands youngsters, caused ruptures in the sources of income for many individuals (from young to well established traders) in a scenario of lack of opportunity and widespread poverty.

1.3. ILLICIT ENRICHMENT SCENARIOS

Driven by international demand, particularly from Asian markets, great euphoria has developed in the past 15 years, in the province of Cabo Delgado, around the exploitation of natural resources, including timber, and later also of ivory and precious stones. Complex international networks were constituted, in partnership with numerous local individuals, where elements close to the central and local centers of power stood out (Maquenzi and Feijó, 2019), often involved in rent seeking schemes. In the province of Cabo Delgado a far west environment emerged, marked by the State's inability to promote the monitoring of the activities, but also by widespread corruption and opportunism. In parallel, the northern region of Mozambique is now the stage of operation of a global network of heroin trafficking from Afghanistan, traversing the East African coast bound for South Africa, known as the Southern Route (Haysom et al., 2018). The network depends on a high political level of protection for accessing port and road infrastructure, with the profits of heroin playing a discreet, but identifiable role, in the financing of political campaigns of the ruling party (Haysom et al., 2018). The construction of large hotels (some remain almost empty) and other infrastructure casts suspicion that these investments constitute a form of money laundering (Haysom et al, 2018: 3.). The reality is that there is a local narrative that highlights the enrichment of important national political figures as a result of their involvement in business in timber, ivory, precious stones or even drug trafficking, in a scenario of widespread poverty, triggering the conviction that leaders use the state's proximity to their interests, rather than to the benefit of the population.

1.4. HISTORICAL TENSIONS AMONG ETHNOLINGUISTIC GROUPS

The Cabo Delgado province is a heterogeneous social space composed by different ethnolinguistic groups. Despite the migratory phenomena and miscegenation, the northern coast continues to be associated with the ethno-linguistic group Mwani (mostly Islamic), the northern part of the plateau associated with the Makonde (mostly Christians), and the South zone associated with the Macua, being the latter the majority the population (mostly Muslims). During the last century, these groups have been structuring inter-group power relations, marked by several ruptures and reconfigurations. By the century. XIX, the Islamic population of the coast of Mozambique commanded an economic role (holding an important role in the slave trade with the hinterland), while, during the century. XX, it experienced a long process of socio- economic marginalization. With the implementation of the New State (and the concordat with the Catholic Church), obstacles were created for the operation of Islamic schools and mosques, with disqualification practices and marginalization of the Muslim population in the colony (Machaqueiro, 2013). The situation eased in the 1960s, with the beginning of the liberation war, when the colonial State sought a rapprochement with Islam in order to prevent an alliance between the Muslim population and the liberation movement. However, with the advent of independence, the narrative based on the condemnation of tribalism, feudalism and obscurantism, and the creation of a New Man came into conflict with the Islamic religion, causing dissatisfaction among Muslim populations of the coast. An incident caused by Samora Machel (when entering a mosque in Mozambique Island will have disrespected the sacred Muslim rule of taking the shoes off), fueled scandal narratives among Muslims in northern Mozambique, although also of relativism and denial of the phenomenon (Macagno, 2006: 215).

In the post-independence period there was a reconfiguration of power relations in Northern Mozambique. Until then, (self)-represented as a marginalized people, oppressed and fled from slavery (West, 2004), the Makonde ethnolinguistic group, who participated massively in the liberation struggle, emerged with a new dynamic. Numerous elements of the group acquired socio-economic role (benefiting from jobs in the State, of former combatants subsidies,

9 occupying the residences in the military districts in the provincial capital) and political (assuming presence in military and security decision-making positions, or ideological mobilization of urban populations). Hitherto confined to the plateau region, with migration to neighboring Tanzania, after independence the group acquired a strong influence on territories far beyond the districts of Mueda, Nangade and Muidumbe. The group also got a strong symbolic role (at least compared with the Mwani and Macua groups), in particular at the level of recover certain aspects of Makonde culture, for example, the mapiko masks.

In turn, forms of stigmatization of the coastal population persist, mostly Mwani associated with reduced schooling and with open space defecation, reinforcing feelings of self-exclusion. Evidence shows that this discontent scenario was politically capitalized by Renamo. In fact, the northern coast of Cabo Delgado province is a penetration space of opposition to Frelimo. Considering the election results of the successive parliamentary elections, it appears that Renamo has already obtained several victories (results above 50% of the votes) in administrative posts on the coast of Islamic and Mwani majority, namely Olumbi, Palma capital, Quionga (all in Palma district), Bilibiza, Mahate and Quissanga capital (in Quissanga district), in the administrative post of Mbau (Mocímboa da Praia district) and Mucojo (in Macomia district). These results contrast with the significant victories of Frelimo in the Makonde plateau, particularly in the districts of Mueda, Muidumbe and Nangade. In fact, the election periods are moments of tension between Makonde and Mwanis. The district of Muidumbe, mostly Makonde, became famous for acts of violence against Renamo supporters (Israel, 2006: 108-110), with reports of expulsion of Mwani populations from the low areas of the district, or against trucks coming from the district and heading to Mocímboa da Praia in support of the Frelimo campaign in municipal elections. In September 2005, the result of those elections disputed the Mocímboa da Praia village, constituted the scene of violent demonstrations, which resulted in at least 12 deaths and 30 arrests, all Renamo supporters (Mbanze, November 20, 2006).

PART 2: THE PROCESS OF ARMED INSURGENCY IN NORTHERN CABO DELGADO

The previous Destaque Rural addressed the penetration processes of extractive industry in Cabo Delgado, strongly characterized by poverty, by generating phenomena of inequality and social tension. In this part we intend to characterize the armed insurgency in northern Cabo Delgado, from a regional perspective, based on the realities of the East African countries.

2.1. VIOLENT RADICALISM EMERGENCE IN EAST AFRICA

Throughout East Africa, the number of supporters of extremist version of Islam has been increasing. We are witnessing a spread of Salafist ideology, oriented from the Gulf States. Powered by the oil business and the desire to propagate a conservative version of the Wahhabi Islam throughout the Muslim world, we have been witnessing an increase in funding of mosques, madrassas, primary, secondary and higher education institutions, humanitarian and social programs in various East African countries. In Zanzibar alone, it is estimated that funding coming from Saudi Arabia has reached one million US dollars per year just for Islamic institutions (Ali-Koor, 2016: 4). Some activities supported by Islamic groups have sponsored medical treatment and provided assistance in disasters, but some groups are also responsible for supporting radical groups. In parallel, we have been witnessing a rapid growth in the number of young people from East Africa enrolled in Arab universities (see graph 3), and when returning to areas of origin, these young people carry rigid and reductive interpretations of Islam. During their training, students absorb strict identity notions about what is (and what is not) Islamic and

10 who is (and who is not) Muslim, encouraged to actively take these perspectives (Ali-Koor, 2016: 5)

Graph 3: East African Students enrolled in universities in Persian Gulf States

Source: UNESCO (cf. Ali-Koor, 2016)

The expansion of Arab satellite television has strengthened and broadcast these interpretations to a wider audience, particularly in relation to clothing, the role of women, among others. The attraction of such ideas is evident in the expansion of the popularity and influence of extremist clerics. In this context, maintaining an open dialogue on the precepts of Islam has become less and less common, we witness a growing religious intolerance and polarization (Ali-Koor, 2016). Kenya and Somalia have been the stage for Al-Shabab action, protagonist of media episodes, such as several days of kidnapping in the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi, killing more than 60 civilians and causing hundreds of injuries, or the Invasion University Garissa Kenya campus, killing 147 students.

The neighboring Tanzania is also facing Islamic radicalization phenomena. Several phenomena of appealing to violence by religious leaders, for the establishment of extremist networks, violent actions in different regions of the country (in Arusha, Tanga, Pwani, Mtwara and Lindi) as well as separatist ambitions of Islamic nature in the archipelago of Zanzibar, have been reported in the international press. While with some reluctance to reveal the level of penetration within the country since 2008, the Tanzanian authorities have associated several incidents to the radical group Al-Shabab. In October 2013, the police in southeast of Mtwara region (which borders Cabo Delgado) conducted large-scale arrests of Al-Shabab agents, confiscating firearms, knives and training and propaganda material (Counter Extremism Project, 2018). According to authorities, the suspects - all Tanzanian citizens - had been involved in military training exercises. In the same month another training camp was dismantled in Tanga region, near the border with Kenya, and 69 suspects were arrested, freeing dozens 4-13 years old recruits.

The determination of Al-Shabab penetration level in Tanzania has not been an easy process, not only because of the difficulties of investigation by the authorities on the home networks and group contact points, but also due to the frequent rush to associate suspects with this radical group, despite the lack of evidence. In other cases the authorities are reluctant to connect violent attacks to Al-Shabab, although the persistence of local populations in linking the insurgents to the radical group (Counter Extremism Project, 2018). The reality is that the response of the security forces of the East African countries to these insurgent groups have been violent and often arbitrarily. For example, the Kenyan government Usalama Watch operation resulted in the arrest of about 4,000 people, most without charge.

Reports circulate about death squads sponsored by the police, designed to eliminate the radical Muslim leaders, making up for the failure of court proceedings (Koor, 2016: 6). Police arbitrariness and violence have had two consequences: on the one hand, the development of feelings of injustice, distrust and rebellion by Islamic populations in relation to State institutions, fueling membership motivation to violent campaigns (Koor, 2016: 2). On the other hand, it is reflected in the movement of extremist leaders towards to the South (Kenya, Tanzania and, more recently, for Mozambique), especially in areas where they find a socially fertile implementation space (Hanlon, cf. BBC, June 9, 2018).

In fact, the socio-economic deprivation and a sense of social inequalities in the region tend to make many Muslims receptive to more conservative and extremist narratives, as well as the construction of speeches based on otherness ("us" against "them"). Evidence shows that the levels of unemployment among young people in coastal provinces of Kenya (predominantly Muslim) are 40-50 percent higher than the national average and the rates of primary and secondary school attendance tend to be lower in Muslim provinces, where there are fewer schools and teachers per student. In Tanzania similar patterns are observed. The unemployment rate among young people on the island of Zanzibar (where the majority is Muslim) is almost double the national average. On the other hand, in the coastal areas (mainly Muslim), property rights are often poorly defined, make it more difficult to access economic opportunities and making way of land expropriation by the by the Government or bigger corporations (Koor, 2016: 5-6).

This scenario in these regions feeds the belief that education and economic opportunities are deliberately denied to Muslims.

2.2. THE BEGINNING OF ARMED INSURGENGY IN CABO

As in many other countries, in Mozambique there are different conceptions of Islam, making the subject a point of tension between different groups, which call themselves the authority of religion. The diversity of Islam conceptions in Mozambique resulted from changing historical contexts in the region (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial), with Islam being used as a way of strengthening the authority and power of local elites, with whom different currents of Islam eventually become associated. In the 1970s it began to emerge a new group, composed of senior elements in Islamic international universities, who rejected both the African Islam and the Sufi Orders, considering them as "deviations" from the "true" Islam, enacting various " religious innovations"(Bonate, 2007). This group has a more universal and transnational vision and uses modern training and media. However, this group was facing considerable resistance from the old African Islamic establishment in the north of Mozambique, not only because Islam in the region has a long deeply rooted Swahili tradition, but also by the fact that religious leaders and agents of Islamization in Northern Mozambique are historically constituted by local Africans, who were actively participating in regional Muslim debates.

However, the emergence of new concepts of Islam, in an internal political competition environment has given rise to various divisions and sub-divisions, from which emerged the group called Ahlu Sunnah Wa-jamma (Supporters of the prophetic tradition of the congregation). In 2015, failing to win the religious leadership, a group of marginalized youth, including informal vendors in Mocímboa da Praia (Mozambicans and even Tanzanians), formed small groups and began to organize around a rudimentary form of Islamic fundamentalism demonstrating feelings of dissatisfaction (Morier-Genoud, February 24, 2019). These groups have been known to enter the local mosques wearing shoes and carrying knives, intentional manifestations of disrespect for what they designated as degenerated Islam. At the end of the last decade these young people have built their own mosques, separating themselves from other

Muslims. This group had a strong anti-State attitude, opposing the secular school system, as well as the justice system, seeking to recreate their own social system. In this environment, local people began to designate these individuals of "Al-Shabab" (meaning young local in Arabic), or simply "Shababs". Over the past decade, the tension between this group and the remaining population intensified, increasing levels of violence: young radicals were expelled from certain areas by other Muslims or by the general population and their mosques were shut up (Morier- Genoud, February 24, 2019). As from the end of 2015, the group began to incorporate military cells. After successive appeals from local populations in the years 2015 and 2016, the Mozambican State intervened, destroying mosques and detaining several individuals, including young people who underwent military training on the beach. Reacting to the police arrests, in 5 October 2017 this group attacked a number of State institutions in the village of Mocímboa da Praia, including the command of the Police of the Republic of Mozambique and Correctional Services.

3.3. TRANSFORMATION AND DYNAMICS OF CURRENT ATTACKS

Despite the lack of systematic information it begins to be possible to identify some patterns and dynamics in the attacks.

a) Dimensions and locations attacked

The attacks on 5 October were the beginning of an escalation of violence that continues into the present day. A year and two months after the first attacks, the Carta de Moçambique (Omar, December 6, 2018) examined the reports on file in the national and foreign press, accounting for 45 attacks, 194 dead (including officers of the defense and security forces, civilians and insurgents), 13,000 displaced, 214 charged suspects and more than 750 homes burned and sacked. The piece draws attention to the fact that the estimates are based on reports in the media, and not all attacks were reported, especially those that occur in more remote areas. More recently, estimates reach the 1,000 homes burnt or destroyed (Pirio, Pittelli and Adam, 2019).

Initially confined to the district Mocímboa da Praia, the attacks spread gradually to other districts of the province, including Mocímboa da Praia, Palma, Macomia, Quissanga, Ibo, Meluco and Nangade, and there are reports on the province of Niassa (Omar, December 6, 2018). The attacks were continued after the cyclone Kenneth, leading to the halt of humanitarian aid in Macomia (Lusa, May 4, 2019). In June 2018, an interactive map of Zitamar News (map 6) showed that most of the attacks were concentrated in the north of the province coastline - particularly in the areas of Nagulué and Ingoane (Macomia district), Olumbe (Palma district) and Mocímboa da Praia -mostly Islamic, which concentrate the ethno-linguistic Mwani and Macua groups in Cabo Delgado. Insurgents show greater penetration difficulty the interior of the province, in particular the districts of Mueda, Nangade and Muidumbe, mainly Christian, where the Makonde ethnolinguistic group predominates.

Map 6: Mapping of attacks in northern Cabo Delgado (Oct / 17 - Jun / 18)

Source: https://zitamar.com/aswj-attack-locations/

The observation on the ground allowed confirms numerous evidence of attacks (destroyed and abandoned villages), with the highest incidence in the districts of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia, as well as higher concentration of defense and security forces in these locations. Also through the testimonies collected in the field or by reading news stories, it is clear that, in the interior districts, insurgents have faced greater difficulties in penetration.

a) Who is attacked?

Data collected in the press and from informants on the ground help determine that the targets of the attacks are heterogeneous. Firstly, the attacks began to privilege State institutions - particularly administrative offices, police commands and schools, extending in episodes of kidnapping and murder of teachers and public school principals (Achá, March 26, 2019).

Secondly, the incursions spread to settlements raids, farms and vehicles moving on the roads, setting fire to houses and murdering people. Evidence help determine that the villages are attacked indiscriminately, regardless of the religious beliefs of the inhabitants, and Christians and Muslims have been beheaded and killed.

Thirdly, in a situation where much of the population abandoned farmland to take refuge in urban centers, thus reducing food crops production, it appears that the raids extended to productive areas or to product storage locations. For example, in Palma district, the most productive areas of Pundanhar district, which ensure an important part of food supply in the district (SDAE, 2019), are becoming a prime target of attacks by individuals, themselves also deprived of food. After the cyclone Kenneth, the targets were directed to areas benefiting from humanitarian support. Journalistic pieces (Omar, May 6, 2019) show that, after setting fire to the tents that housed the refugees, the focus of the "starving" insurgents was the "food donated by humanitarian organizations and the government" (Omar, May 6, 2019). The murder of populations is accompanied by the sack of economic values and food products, so that they can then sustain the activities of insurgents1. The capital villages are guarded by the Defense and Security Forces and are not attacked, unlike the more distant villages (GS, December 4, 2018).

Finally, sixteen months after the first attacks, the international economic power also has become an insurgent target. In February 2019 there were two attacks on caravans of the Anadarko company or its sub-contractors along the road Mocímboa da Praia to Afungi having resulted in one dead and six wounded (Carta de Moçambique, February 24, 2019). Since then, the multinational company instructed that the movements of their employees are to be carried by air.

According to the people interviewed on the ground, it appears that the people attacked are culturally heterogeneous, not distinguishing Ethnolinguistic origin or religious beliefs.

a) Attack strategies

According to sources on the ground, the attack strategies also vary and different situations have been registered:

- Variable period of the attacks: according to witnesses on the ground and journalistic sources (Omar, December 6, 2018), the first attacks on settlements were initially carried out at dusk or at night, but now have been carried out at mid-morning and late afternoon;

- Car ambush: eyewitnesses reported that insurgents use sometimes semi-colletive passenger vehicles, demanding to stop at planned locations where insurgents are prepared to carry out attacks;

- Use of loudspeakers: in order to attract the population to a meeting, in order to brutally attack her afterwards, as referred to in the village of Bangala 2, in Macomia district in March 2019.

1An employee of the district education services revealed that a young man raised suspicions in Palma village for having purchased telephone credit of 20,000 meticais, allegedly for the purpose of resale, but then refused to resell when asked. Sent to the Police Command the young man confessed that the credit was intended for insurgents resident in the bush. This episode shows that the attackers have monetary values, derived (also) from sacking the people to support their activities.

a) Identity of insurgent and motivations for the attacks

A question that arises relates to the identity of the insurgents and their motivations, since public statements are not known claiming the attacks. Initial speeches referred that part of the insurgents were from the Republic of Tanzania and the East African coast, possibly repelled by the neighboring country. According to Reuters (October 21, 2018), the attackers killed several police officers and administrative officials in the province of Pwani, in Tanzania, and some killed or arrested and others fled. Those who escaped crossed the border to Mozambique, in order to establish a base in Cabo Delgado. Other analyzes focus on the role of young Mozambicans who studied theology in Somalia and Saudi Arabia and who, returning to Mozambique, brought radical conceptions of Islam and found no space in the local mosques.

The reality is that, one year after the attacks, hundreds of individuals were arrested on suspicion of involvement, which resulted in 189 accused persons, of which 139 Mozambicans and 50 Tanzanians (O País Online, October 2, 2018). The prosecution process states that members of this group were recruited from local mosques by Tanzanian citizens, who promised them large sums of money if they could incite citizens in Cabo Delgado to disobey Mozambican State institutions. The charges include murder, use of prohibited weapons, membership of a criminal organization and incitement to collective disobedience against public order. Others were accused of instigation or financing violence, including a South African citizen, two Ugandan citizens and several journalists. The fact that the evidence presented in the prosecution processes are often contradictory and unreliable, suggests not only the difficulty of investigating police forces, but also the pressure they have to show results in order to calm down criticism of their ineffectiveness. Meanwhile, the General Command of the Police of Mozambique announced a new conclusion about the origin and objectives of armed groups, stating that the group is funded by heads of illegal miners, evicted in April 2017 from Namanhumbir in an operation carried out by the Defense and Security forces. The group was involved in the traffic of precious stones to the outside, and, for revenge, resorted to the retained earnings to finance young insurgents, transferring the values through the Mpesa system (MediaFax, May 27, 2019: 1-2). Despite the growing list of seizures of the attack leading suspects in the province of Cabo Delgado, the reality is that the attacks continue.

The lack of reliable data about the attackers (ethno-linguistic group, dominant religion, age, education level, economic activity, income level, life path, etc.) makes it difficult to carry out a socio-economic characterization of this group, because the identity the attackers and their motivations are not claimed.

Either way, from informal interviews on the ground, the version that is often repeated is that the real Al-Shababs have been killed by government forces. According to these voices, the current insurgents attack people because of hunger and lack of opportunities (in the broad sense), killing people indiscriminately, regardless of religious beliefs or ethno-linguistic groups.

Journalistic sources (Abydos, December 21, 2018) reveal that many of the insurgents captured by authorities or killed in the clashes in Mocímboa da Praia "brought in their pockets large sums of money"; but the origin of the values is not clear and there is speculation that the value came from the sale of personal property, theft or financing by ringleaders. The reality is that one of the acts perpetrated by the insurgents when they attack villages consists of looting monetary values and other assets (Abibo, December 4, 2018) suggesting that the group is in need of money and food items. In this scenario, according to which (large part) of armed attacks have become also in banditry actions, motivated by material needs the hypothesis starts to make sense.

a) Reactions of the populations

The reactions of the people are of fear and uncertainty, leading to refugee movements involving thousands of individuals. On the plateau Mueda, especially in Nangade district, several interviewees reported the existence of popular militias who were in pursuit of the insurgents, as well as people's acts of revenge, who beheaded several insurgents, exposing dismembered members to their families, who are later expelled from the site. After an attack in eastern Nangade, local structures requested weapons to the local Command of the Police, which were distributed by the village leaders and later used in defense against the attacks. The reports also speak of black magic practices, in order to prevent the penetration of insurgents.

PART 3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACKS IN NORTHERN CABO DELGADO

In the previous two parts we tried to understand the escalation of violence in the Cabo Delgado Province as a regional phenomenon, resulting from the persistent poverty phenomena within specific ethno-linguistic and historically disadvantaged groups, as well as from the increase in social inequalities. This framework suggests that different sectors of the coastal areas of East Africa become receptive to the penetration of radical and violent interpretations. In this part 3 it is intended to analyze the social and economic consequences of the attacks in northern Cabo Delgado to the local populations.

Since the beginning of the armed attacks in northern Cabo Delgado the following consequences were noticeable: a) Abandonment of villages and forced migration: a significant part of the villages in Palma district was literally abandoned. The Grupo de Reflexão Interdiocesana - GRI (Group of Inter- Diocesan Reflection) is in process of synthesizing information of abandoned villages, burned homes and people killed in this district, having started the process in the western area of the district with the highest concentration of Christians. Until April 2019, the group had registered 11 abandoned villages, with a total of 396 houses burned and 30 people dead (see Table 1).

Table 1: Provisional data on abandoned villages, burned homes and people killed in the western Palm district. Predominant ethno- Number of homes Number of people Village linguistic group burned killed Mpeme Makonde e Mácue 36 3 Macanga Makonde e Mácue 57 5 Nalyendele Makonde e Mácue 85 0 Ntonha Makonde e Mácue 0 1 Quissungule Mwanis 54 2 Nandimba Makonde e Mácue 0 0 Malamba Makonde e Mácue 107 4 Ntukwe Makonde e Mácue 0 0 Chicuedo Makonde e Mácue 13 4 Pundanhar sede Makonde e Mácue 14 9 Chidololo Makonde e Mácue 30 2 TOTAL 396 30 Source: GRI

The frequency of attacks to villages, the destruction of tens of dwellings and people decapitation triggered a sense of panic in the population, resulting in a refugee movement and abandonment of whole villages. In some villages of the Palma district, people have left everything they had, including agricultural produce in the fields (agricultural season 2018/19) and personal property in their homes. Local government denies the existence of refugees and seeks to prevent the establishment of reception centers, by appealing to the return to the places of origin. In this situation, the populations cannot help but to seek refuge with relatives living in the capitals of administrative posts (particularly in Pundanhar, Quionga and Palma village) or at the district capitals (Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, Ibo and Quissanga).

Until April 2019 no refugee center was formally established, involving the government or UN organizations. Therefore, the population flow was absorbed by their own families in the destination locations. The observation made in Quelimane district, located in Palma village, confirmed in interviews with members of the Government, the Church and responsible for distribution and food aid processes, there are households composed of 15 to 20 elements that previously were composed of only 4 to 5 individuals.

In July 2018, the World Food Program (WFP, 2008: 3) estimated that there were at least 20,000 people displaced by the hostilities (10,000 in Mocímboa da Praia, 5,700 in Palma and at least 4,500 in Nangade, Macomia and Quissanga), in the harvest season, thus aggravating the chronic malnutrition rate in the province, which was already the highest in the country, making the situation even more worrying. b) Decreased food production: The departure of rural populations and the abandonment of countless villages has resulted in a decline in food crops. In this scenario, the District Economic Activity Services planned, for the first season of the 2019 agricultural year, a significantly lower production than 2018, with a decrease of 56% in the tonnage of cereals, 70% of legumes and 70% of roots and tubers (see table 2). This phenomenon is particularly evident in the administrative post of Pundanhar, locally regarded as the district's "granary", which has become a recurring target of attacks.

Table 2. Production of food crops in tones. Actual Planned Planned Variation Crop production (ton) Production (ton) production (ton) (%) 2018 2018 2019 Cereals 34.437 40.127 15.243 -56 Maize 18.221 19.356 6.372 -65 Rice 10.005 15.449 7.586 -24 Sorghum 6.211 5.322 1.285 -79 Legumes 10.512 10.390 3.142 -70 Cow pea 4.131 4.832 1.841 -55 F. jugo 3.814 3.437 1.015 -73 Groundnuts 2.567 2.121 286 -89 Roots and Tubers 149.953 197.503 44.986 -70 Cassava 144.743 192.491 42.839 -70 Sweet potato 5.210 5.012 2.142 -59 Vegetables 1.647 1.767 1.170 -1 TOTAL 198.196 251.554 64.536 -67

Source: SDAE (2019).

18 c) Rising prices and food insecurity: The decrease in agricultural production substantially reduced the availability of food in Palma district, translating up including rising prices. According to the sources interviewed in Palma, a basket of cassava, which in 2018 costed between 70 to 100 meticais, currently costs 200 meticais, i.e. an increase of 135%. Likewise, a bag of 20 kg of maize meal, which in 2018 was acquired at a price between 450 and 500 meticais, nowadays costs 800 meticais, meaning an increase of 68% (see Table 3).

Table 3: Food prices variation estimation in Palma village Current price Variation in Food item Price in 2017 (March / 2019) percentage * 1 basket of cassava 70/100 meticais 200 meticais +135% 20kg of maize meal 450/500 meticais 800 meticais +68% 35/40 meticais 50/60 meticais +46% 1 kg of butter beans 420 meticais 560/600 meticais +38% 10 kg of rice

(*) The percentage change was calculated based on the average price in.

The increase in food prices is compounded by the sudden growth of households and the consequent consumption needs. In informal conversations with some residents of the village of Palma it was revealed that the populations are living in a state of concern. Although the government denied the existence of refugees, the reality is that, as early as early 2018, the administrations of Palma and Mocímboa da Praia districts submitted formal requests for assistance to the World Food Program (WFP: July 7, 2018: 3) , which began operating in Mocímboa da Praia - Palma axis where displaced people were concentrated. From field observations it was found that food distribution is facing problems of lack of food transportation to assist the displaced, exacerbating the situation of families. d) Disruption of the educational system: According to preliminary data of the District Education, Youth and Technology Services in Palma in the academic year 2019, about 18 schools in the 1st and 2nd grades were not open because of the attacks that are being reported in the district. The closure of schools affected 1,512 students and 38 teachers. In the villages of Miando and Malamba four classrooms were destroyed (SDEJT, 2019: 4-5). In interviews with teachers, it was found that the non-opening of schools (including for fear felt by teachers themselves to move to more remote villages from the capitals of administrative posts) and this is a phenomenon seen in other districts, particularly in Mocímboa da Praia. The movements of refugees to the capitals of the administrative posts translated into a high concentration of students enrolled in these schools. According to an employee of SDEJT, in primary schools in Palma capital and in Pundanhar there are classes with over 150 students. The same pressure is verified on other public services, including health units. e) Difficulty movement and isolation of populations: Because of the insecurity, passenger carriers no longer operate to the administrative post of Pundanhar, hindering the mobility of people and goods and leading to the isolation of many individuals. Insecurity on the roads has also led to an increase in the price of transport and a variation of tariffs depending on the vehicle: the open box cars continue to charge the value of 150 meticais in Palma - Mocímboa da Praia section, but the mini busses raised the price to 200 meticais, reflecting the existing risk of attack. f) Commitment of the registration process: The voter registration process was conditioned in northern Cabo Delgado. About a month after the scheduled start date, the census had not yet started in the districts of Mocímboa da Praia (in the towns of Metabate and Megule), Macomia

19 and Palma (Uatanle, April 25, 2019) and the Government placed the registration posts under the supervision of the defense and security forces in some strategic areas, to enable the registration of families who fled their home areas. g) Strength of the defense and security forces and fear of the people: The North of Cabo Delgado is quite militarized. In Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, and Macomia (particularly Mucojo) and in small villages in these districts the presence of a major military apparatus is noticeable. Along the roads small barracks of elements of the military defense forces of Mozambique are observable. Increased insecurity is felt also by the performance of the defense and security forces. National and international organizations of human rights have expressed concern over the violation of human rights by the Defense and Security Forces in their response to the attacks that have been perpetrated by armed groups. In late 2017, the newspaper O País (see Hanlon, January 8, 2018) stated that security forces conducted a helicopter raid and bombardment from warships on the village of Mitumbate in Mocímboa da Praia district, which allegedly have killed 50 people, including women and children. The newspaper reported a significant number of people with injuries received at the rural hospital in Mocímboa da Praia. In late 2018, a press release from Human Rights Watch (HRW, December 4, 2018) gave account of arbitrary arrests, ill-treatment and summary executions of dozens of individuals suspected of belonging to armed groups. The government has been rejecting accusations of human rights abuses in Cabo Delgado carried out by the defense and security forces (Lusa, March 3, 2019), alleging the lack of evidence. The reality is that journalists have been arrested in the course of their duties, imprisoned for months without charge, including in military barracks. There has been a great distrust of researchers and a permanent alert around their work by the military themselves. On the other hand, 189 individuals were charged and are being judged at close door, for security reasons against the provisions of Article 65 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Mozambique, which defines that "criminal case on trial hearings shall be public, unless the protection of personal, family oy social privacy, of morality, or reasons of security of the audience or of public order find it prudent to exclude or restrict advertising". The Carta de Moçambique (Abydos, December 21, 2018) reports several episodes in Macomia district where certain elements of authority threaten local economic agents (mostly the Sunni Islamist group) accusing them of belonging to the group of insurgents and to benefit from funding. Fearing reprisals, they eventually disburse large sums of money. The Carta de Moçambique (GS, December 4, 2018) describes a social scenario in Palma where it is not safe to walk at night, with routine patrols of soldiers who extort money or goods to citizens and complicate their movement, as per popular reports on the ground, sometimes confirmed by observation. Stories of appropriation of peasant property and physical aggression in case of refusal are circulating. The reality is that, deployed to remote locations and with access conditioned, the military tend to suffer from the same logistical supply problems, and try to meet their needs from local populations.

Other sources reveal the hiring of security forces, with recognition, information and combat capability, by the multinationals, to ensure business interests.

PART 4. HOW TO DEAL WITH THE PHENOMENON OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN CABO DELGADO? - FINAL THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS

Over the previous parts we tried to contextualize the emergence of violence in northern Cabo Delgado, not only on the basis of the poverty scenarios, inequality and frustration of the expectations of the peoples, but also phenomena of regional expansion of Islamic radicalism, especially of stigmatized coastal populations. Afterwards, we tried to introduce some socio- economic consequences of the attacks in the northern Cabo Delgado. In this last part we intend not only to present a final set of reflections on the phenomenon in question, but also provide clues and suggestions for a sustainable solution of this problem.

4.1. MULTIFACETED CAUSES OF VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN CABO DELGADO

The emergence of Islamic extremism phenomena is a complex and multifaceted process, and to understand it, it is important to consider a number of aspects:

1) The big euphoria provided by the discovery of natural resources in areas marked by poverty precipitated population movements of thousands of young people to the areas where these resources are concentrated. The exploration of timber, ivory and precious stones take place in a “far west” environment, marked by the weakness of the state in monitoring the phenomenon and widespread opportunism, involving the very agents of public administration. The permeability of borders and customs inefficiency powers the establishment of international circuits involving trafficking in resources to Tanzania and South East Asia.

2) The repressive supervision of the exploitation of natural resources and ruptures on the sources of income, particularly in the mines in Montepuez, affected thousands of young people from across the province and outside the country, as well as prominent business men had consolidated in the region, fueling feelings of antagonism towards the State.

3) The increase in investments and the rush of migration generated a strong pressure on land and food, accounting for inflation and increased inequalities. In contexts marked by illiteracy, lack of educational institutions and vocational training, better employment opportunities and investment have been taken advantage by individuals from outside the related districts, leading to the idea that the beneficiaries are from the South or foreign. The delay of the investments was increasing anxiety of the population. As the gas production in the region will not happen before 2022 (and the beginning of government revenues in later years), the delay in government revenues will compromise the timely realization of investments in social infrastructure in the region. In this scenario it is expected prolongation of the social tension.

4) Over the past decades there has been a reconfiguration of power relations in the province. The post-independence period resulted in the socio-economic emergence of certain ethno-linguistic groups. From the slave escaped people confined to Mueda plateau, as of 1975 the Makonde ethnolinguistic group (mostly Christian) came to be represented as a privileged group. Conversely, the people of the northern coast of the province (where the large gas reserves are concentrated), mostly Islamists, suffered stigmatization processes, locally associated with illiteracy or practices such as open defecation. This dichotomy is reflected in a social stress, particularly noticeable at election time, during which a significant portion of the coastal population was involved in support to Renamo, and episodes of violence were registered.

5) The armed insurgency phenomenon that occurs in northern Cabo Delgado takes regional characteristics. Despite the long tradition of coexistence without violence between religions, along the East African coast we witness the penetration and spread of radical Islamic feelings in areas marked by poverty. Somalia and Kenya, then Tanzania, and more recently in Mozambique, radical Islamic groups have started forming in regions historically discriminated against, given the inertia of the State, including of the investigation and security services. The violent actions were succeeding, unpunished by the police and judicial system. This was followed by arbitrary arrests and repressive forms of elimination of suspects, often in an extrajudicial manner. In the north of Cabo Delgado, faced with the difficulty of defeating an "invisible" enemy, Military State is created with repression of civilians (including Islamic businessmen, attacked rural populations and journalists) in violation of a set of fundamental rights and increasing the sense of insecurity of the population. With the extension of the conflict it becomes increasingly evident the State's inability to give an effective military response. The fragility of the security forces is evident by the number of armored cars damaged in Mocímboa

21 da Praia, as well as the recurring use of civilian vehicles (including semi-collective passenger transport) for circulation of the military. Locals guarded by the army do not cease to be attacked by insurgents.

6) Existing analyzes maintain that the violence carried out by security forces in several East African countries was fueling resentment in population sectors responsible, not only for the extension of social bases of support for insurgent movements, but also for the escape of radicals to neighboring countries, spreading the movement to the south.

7) In Mozambique, although the conflict remains confined to the coastal northern Cabo Delgado, the reality is that the action of the insurgents expanded over a radius greater than 200 km. If, initially, the attacks took a strong anti-secular State component, now there is evidence of transformation into banditry phenomena in search of food, consumer goods and revenge. The extension and aggravation of this phenomenon, despite the arrest of hundreds of suspects by security forces, suggests the consolidation of social bases of support, where insurgents are hidden by their families. Compared to the most remote areas of the coast (e.g. in Nangade, mostly Makonde and Christian), on the coast a clear involvement of the population in the identification and elimination of the insurgents, in collaboration with the security authorities, is not found.

8) Making an analogy with the explanatory phenomenon of fire (Figure 1), it may be concluded that these violent radical movements, of regional dimension, function as the ignition in an environment marked by poverty and socially flammable, fed, in turn, by (historical) social inequality and frustrated expectations. Phenomena of poverty, inequality and frustration of social expectations are a common reality in many parts of the country (especially in large cities which concentrates youth unemployment, but also in mining penetration areas). These social spaces become socially flammable and the evidence (urban riots recorded in 2008 and 2010) show that the emergence of riots only awaits for a spark (such as sudden increase in transport services prices or food prices). The strong presence of security forces in these places, during this ignition process, demonstrates the State's awareness of the strong social tension and risk of insurgency by the population.

Figure 1: Explanatory Triangle of the conflict in northern Cabo

9) The armed conflict is having a strong impact on the breakdown of the district's economy, in terms of disruption of economic activity, generating food insecurity situations and making the management of public services problematic, particularly in education, health or the electoral census.

4.2. HOW TO REVERSE THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE? SOME SUGGESTIONS

The reversal of the phenomenon of violence in the north of Cabo Delgado will involve a series of concerted actions, which may encompass the following measures:

- Further development of multidisciplinary research on the subject. It is essential to understand the external and internal factors driving this phenomenon, seeking to better understand not only the motivations, but also the penetration levels of extremist ideologies. It is therefore important to promote analysis that emphasize the historical dimensions related to poverty phenomena, inequalities and disruptions in local power structures, as well as to the regional dimension of these phenomena, given the volatility of the border, too artificial and inconsistent with the local ethno-linguistic realities.

- From the socio-historical understanding of the coastal populations feelings of marginalization, it is important to promote social inclusion policies. Sustained interruption of armed insurgency phenomena cannot simply consist in the combat ‘ignition’ (in this case the extremist identity and violent movements), but must include the elimination of all the 'fuel' concentrated in the region (social exclusion scenarios) and its ‘oxygen’ (promoting the satisfaction of legitimate social expectations and reducing inequalities). Such policies could go through: i) strengthening of humanitarian assistance to the populations affected by the conflict, hosted and host; ii) accompanied by serious investment in technical and vocational training; iii) as well as in health facilities and strengthening of existing health facilities; iv) support for local economic activities (agriculture, livestock, transport services, mechanical, construction, etc.) seeking to improve employment levels; v) clarification and consolidation of the rights of use and exploitation of land, protecting populations against expropriation by the government or by large companies; vi) creation of mechanisms to increase the political participation of local populations, by promoting meetings and local forums for public discussion of community problems. These policies of socio-political inclusion for historically stigmatized populations may generate feelings of trust and contribute to the reduction of socio-religious tensions.

- Emphasizing local traditions of tolerance. The modern radical Islamic narrative, appealing to violence and disobedience against the authorities, are in contrast with the long history of religious tolerance that existied in the region, hence this route should be emphasized by political leaders (of different parties) and by leaders religious (Christian and Islamic), and by other civil society organizations. It is therefore important to initiate efforts to promote dialogue between religions, highlighting the benefits for all involved.

- Promote the organization of forums involving government and non-governmental institutions (with the participation of religious organizations), to analyze complaints and reflect on joint solutions, and prevent the escalation of conflicts.

- Search for regional solutions: A problem that has a regional dimension can only be tackled through regional alliances and in a holistic way, involving not only the governments of several countries (improving social networking and exchange of information between security services, and also between judicial services), including among the organizations of civil society themselves (transnational research organizations, networks of religious, cultural organizations, journalistic investigative bodies, among others). In terms of research, debate, the combination of

23 criminal investigation efforts, defense and security, in the border patrol it is vital to set up regional partnerships to share resources and information.

- Inspection of religious organizations funding and of money laundering processes. Governments in the region should adopt transparent and consistent forms of regulation of external financing processes, originating from conservative Islamic institutions. It is important to create mechanisms to prevent the financing of election campaigns by economic groups associated with illegal activities or money laundering.

- Institutional strengthening of organizations concerned with criminal investigation and justice, avoiding unjustified and arbitrary criminality by Islamic groups. The authorities should concentrate on gathering evidence and on developing criminal investigation capabilities, in a transparent and credible manner, to constitute strong evidence to submit at trial. Capacity building may include training the police, security forces and other State actors in order to fulfill their duties in accordance with international standards of human rights in contexts of conflict. This training can be conducted in partnership with independent organizations, including representatives of religions, and include the abuses caused by multinational mining companies. It is important to abandon the violent extrajudicial measures taken by the police and security forces, as well as investigate these complaints and promote surveys, to be released at the end in a transparent way, in order to restore confidence in the Government. Thus, feelings of persecution and victimization will be avoid, which could constitute social support bases to violent movements.

- Finally, it is important to rethink the strategy of investing in a single solution: the military. The continuity of the repressive intervention by the security forces will lead most likely to further radicalization and tension, threatening the maintenance and worsening of violence. Creating incentives and amnesties for the surrender of insurgents (through training and socio-professional rehabilitation programs) can also be an attractiv