Destination Safety and Dutch Flows

A study of the relationship between geopolitics and destination security and its impact on Dutch out- bound tourism

Peter Singleton MA (Stenden ETFI) Dr. Rami Isaac (NHTV Breda) Nicholas Saffari (Student Assistant)

Executive Summary risks both real and perceived are on the increase. Acts of terrorism, political unrest, and the effects of armed conflicts have led to destinations once considered secure, being increasingly perceived as vulnerable or insecure. One of the main drivers of these increased threat levels is geopolitical instability, which has sparked intra-state wars, internal conflict, contributed to the rise of terrorist organisations, and weakened the political stability of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) destinations. The following report provides an overview of the relationship between geopolitics and destination security, and the impact security issues have had on the destination choice of out-bound Dutch tourists. In doing so it aims to achieve four main research objectives.

1. Analyse the extent to which destination security is an important issue for Dutch tourists when selecting a destination and classify which customer segments are particularly concerned with security issues and what they expect from tour operators.

2. Identify which factors contribute to geopolitical turmoil in the MENA region and Europe in order to understand how this instability affects current destination security levels. Which destinations stand to gain and which to lose from tourism flow shifts created by these instability?

3. What sort of preventive measures by airlines, airports, and other transportation services against attacks have been taken and does this have any impact on destination choice?

4. How can scenario planning and strategic foresight play a role in enabling better strategic responses to the challenges that Dutch outbound tour operators face going forward?

Destination security incidents whether they be acts of terrorism, civil unrest, armed insurgencies, sectarian violence, or the outbreak of war are game changers as they can lead to tourism flow switches with far reaching consequences. The 2015 Tunisian mass shooting by a gunman at Sousse is a case in point. Not only did this attack lead to the deaths of 38 tourists it also contributed to the swift withdrawal of European tourists from Tunisia. The country in 2016 suffered a 90 percent drop in Dutch tourist arrivals and remains classified by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a country suitable only for essential travel. Although the actual threat level of attack in Tunisia is higher than in Spain for example, there is evidence to suggest that the perceived level of threat on the part of potential tourists is disproportionately high. Due to the media coverage that such attacks attract, the image of destinations can suffer a tourism flow loss that can take months or years to recover from, whilst during the same period the actual threat in that country may have returned to lower levels. In order to address the issue of how Dutch customers have been reacting to increases in threat levels, both real and perceived, and to explore the role of the tour operators in their own destination choices, a survey of 504 Dutch respondents was conducted by European Tourism Future Institute (ETFI) and NHTV Breda with four main conclusions.

 Travel safety and security are considered increasingly important by all those surveyed. Those respondents over the age of 40 are especially concerned about security matters and thus more likely to rely on and put their trust in tour operators for information.

 Younger generations were far less likely to alter their destination choice than those over the age of 40. An equal ratio of those in the 40-49 age group were just as likely to continue their as they were to cancel. So in terms of changes in destination choice (as a reaction to security issues), over 40s are much more likely to do so than those under 40.  Respondents over the age of 40 expect tour operators to be the ‘guardians of their safety’, who should offer where appropriate practical information concerning destination security in higher risk countries.  The perception of trust in the safety expertise in tour operators varies depending on age group but is below optimal levels.

The results of research into the links between geopolitics and tourism flows reveal that countries in regions that suffer from strategic, ethnic, and sectarian divisions and who lack socially cohesive governments are likely to have higher levels of political unrest, terrorist attacks, or internal conflicts. The MENA region is an example of this and contains three traditionally popular tourist destinations for Dutch tourists (Turkey, Tunisia, and Egypt). The MENA region has been one of the most war-prone since the Second World war. From 2011 onward its instability has increased due to the lingering economic, social, and political difficulties stemming from the Arab Spring and worsening geopolitical tensions between regional powers. The combination of these forces has led to ongoing conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, geostrategic competition between Iran and for regional dominance, and the emergence of powerful trans- national terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State. Such geopolitical risks show few signs of dissipating with instability worsening in a majority of MENA countries over the course of 2016-2017 according to the Fragile State Index and the Global Peace Index. The combination of these factors has led to lower levels of state stability and destination security in MENA destinations and an even larger fall in their perceived levels of security. Turkey has witnessed numerous terrorist attacks over the course of 2015-2017; Tunisia has been categorised as unsuitable as a tourist destination by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the destination brand of Egypt has been weakened. European destinations, including the United Kingdom and France have also suffered attacks due to radicalisation and this has heightened awareness of and sensitivity to security in general. The result has been dramatic switches in tourism flows from less secure destinations to more secure destinations. In the case of Turkey this resulted last year in a loss of roughly 10 million tourists. For the foreseeable future destination security is a pressing issue and one that will remain at the forefront of the minds of tourists for understandable reasons. In plotting the current and future geopolitical trends, measuring destination security and identifying destinations that could win or lose tourism flows, research was done into a broad range of demographic, social, economic, and political factors. The report draws on a series of indices or classifications, including the Fragile States Index (Fund For Peace), the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the Global Peace Index, which monitor these factors and whether they are stabilising or weakening in individual countries. From this analysis it is possible to identify those countries with good governance, robust security and preventive measures, and high levels of social cohesion and state legitimacy. These destinations are without doubt at lower risk of security disruptions as they are more inherently stable. They are not immune from attack but are more likely to recover more swiftly from disruptions once they happen. The research carried out on preventive measures reveals that the triggers for action in this area have been the recent attacks in France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Tunisia, Egypt, and Turkey. For

example, the 2016 attack on Atatürk Airport in which 41 people lost their lives caused a tightening of preventive measure both inside and outside the airport, increases of police numbers at the airport and other areas of Istanbul. Not only was airport security stepped up but Turkish museums, shopping malls and bus terminals also underwent similar changes. Additional security measures have also been taken in Paris, Brussels and London. In London barriers to safeguard against attack from road vehicles have been installed after the June 2017 London Bridge attack. However, the presence of these measures while sensible and possibly reassuring cannot yet be said to have a big influence on destination choice as the major influence is simply the level of threat of attack in the first place. The geopolitical and destination security desk research for this report has also assisted in the production of four future scenarios for outgoing tourism flows from the Netherlands. The aim of this research was to give greater insight into strategic choices that future geopolitical instability and therefore frequency and volume of tourism flow switching will create. Dutch tour operators are advised to develop resilient strategic decision-making procedures to cope with tourism flow switching which is typical of the market now and will be in future. Based on the critical uncertainties of the future, namely geopolitical instability and environmental & health insecurity, four potential scenarios for the year 2023 were produced by the Steering Group who commissioned this research. Using these scenarios as examples of how the future might develop, participants identified direct and indirect implications of each of the scenarios, grouped them into threats or opportunities and considered actions to exploit those threats or defend the weaknesses. The comprehensive details of this process are included later in this report but the conclusions may be summarised as: invest in becoming more geopolitically aware, increase attention on security matters, consider how to inform customers about security, and most importantly for the commercial health of tour operators, embrace flexibility in all departments (contracting, marketing, customer service, product management, and public relations) as this will be the key to adapting to sudden tourism flow switches. The sum of all the research mentioned so far leads to the following recommendations:

 Instigate efforts to monitor geopolitical trends in the regions and countries offered as tourist destinations. This will help to judge more accurately which countries are currently secure or are likely to become increasingly less secure over time. This could be done by employing geopolitical monitoring services from external bodies such as SOS International, and EXOP, but it could also be achieved more cost effectively by employing teams of interns under the supervision of the tour operators’ internal crisis manager or security specialists. Greater discussion over destination security levels with destination management organisations would also be of benefit. This information can be communicated to customer support teams who deal with customer enquiries. Having this information will ensure that tour operators are well informed of current and upcoming geopolitical risks and able to use this knowledge in customer contact.  Embrace strategic foresight procedures (scenario planning) to develop more resilience and flexibility in all areas of the business. Based on the information gained through monitoring the current regional geopolitical situation and individual country situations, tour operators could develop scenarios on a yearly basis to ensure they are better able to anticipate, prepare for and cope with commercial risks caused by tourism flow switching. By involving employees in all departments of their business, action lists based on better flexibility can be drawn up and implemented. Brand image as a safer travel option (than DIY online) can be created and better bottom line performance can result.

 Improve strategic agility/flexibility in developing contingency plans based on risk of a switch of tourism flow from one destination to other. This will enable tour operators to transfer customers from one country or destination to another in the event of threats or breaches to incidents that compromise destination security. This could involve selecting a primary replacement for stricken destinations (e.g. Greece for Turkey) which has sufficient capacity to take a significant portion of clients and 2-3 secondary destinations to provide a plurality of choice for customers.  Provide where necessary access to accurate and clear information on destination security to tourists through appropriate channels. This is likely to reassure tourists and ensure they themselves are able to come to a more accurate and rational decision on the actual risks they are taking. Marketing and communications can also be used to more accurately reflect the actual threat levels on the ground which may be more secure than portrayed in the news media. Failure to provide better access to this information runs the risk of tour operators being viewed (by media channels and the public) as placing commercial interest above customer safety. Moreover, the provision of this information where appropriate would enhance the brand image of tour operators in general and provide them with a competitive advantage compared to booking via online channels.  Instigate a process of re-evaluation of agreements concerning accommodation with destinations stakeholders that are less geopolitically stable (more prone to tourism flow shifts/losses). The aim here is to examine areas of the business in order to improve flexibility and resilience to tourism flow switching.  Consider strengthening agreements with and focussing marketing resources on destinations who are geopolitically stable and are likely to benefit from tourism flow switches.  Consider a media offensive to close the gap between perception of threat to some destinations and actuality of threat. The aim would be to bring some reality and perspective into the subject of destination security. At the same time tour operators are seen by their customers as responsible for information about potential dangers. Encourage tourists to use the new BUZA App (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Travel Risk App). This gives useful up-to-date information to tourists on risks they may face direct on their smartphones.

Table of Contents 1. Introduction ...... 1 1.1. Travel Risk and Destination Safety ...... 1 1.2. Research Objectives ...... 1 1.3. Methodology ...... 2 2. Customer Survey ...... 4 2.1. Aims and Results ...... 4 3. Geopolitics and Destination Security...... 6 3.1. Introduction ...... 6 3.2. The Causes of Geopolitical Instability ...... 6 3.3. Geopolitical Stability and Destination Security ...... 12 3.4. Destination Security ...... 17 3.5. Perceived Risk ...... 18 4. Preventive Measures in European and MENA Destinations ...... 21 4.1. Introduction ...... 21 4.2. European Airports after the Brussels Attack ...... 21 4.3. France ...... 22 4.4. Tunisia ...... 23 4.5. Turkey ...... 23 4.6. Egypt ...... 24 4.7. Conclusion ...... 26 5. Scenario Planning ...... 27 5.1. Introduction ...... 27 5.2. Scenario 1: Order Destabilized ...... 28 5.3. Scenario 2: Yes We Can! ...... 29 5.4. Scenario 3: British Weather ...... 29 5.5. Scenario 4: The Perfect Storm ...... 29 5.6. Results Scenario Planning Sessions 1 and 2 ...... 30 6. Recommendations and Conclusions ...... 35 Appendix ...... 37 End Notes ...... 40

1. Introduction 1.1. Travel Risk and Destination Safety The issues being dealt with in this report revolve around the risks and perceptions of risk inherent in travel. Travel always involves an element of risk but in the last five years these risks both actual and perceived have increased significantly. The issue of destination security and how safe customers feel before or after they have booked have become a more important part of the tourist buying decision. A realisation has grown on the part of the traveller regarding new levels of threats. The all important element of destination security and order can be compromised in a variety of ways, by internal conflict, civil unrest, terrorist attacks, or by tension or conflict with neighbouring states. Once one or a combination of these factors manifests itself, the image of the destination regarding tourism is compromised and tourism flow losses and switches to other destinations perceived as more safe will occur. This phenomenon is prevalent in the outgoing tourism market at the present time and will continue to be in the future. It is this phenomenon that can prove problematic to destinations, tour operators and also the tourists themselves because these incidents can be sudden, shocking in nature and consequences are profound and immediate; both in terms of human losses and in terms of the tourism flow switching behaviour they cause. In spite of the growing risk levels global tourism shows no signs of declining. In 2017 the World Travel Monitor estimates that global outbound tourism will grow by 3.9 percent. The Dutch outbound tourism market also looks set to grow by an even larger figure of 6 percent according to the same report.1 What is however certain to decline is Dutch out-bound tourism to destinations perceived as unsafe and insecure. Although flow shifts are based on factors ranging from marketing, prices, currency exchange rates, and attractiveness it is clear that destinations which have had a recent history of political violence have suffered. Destinations that face the high threat levels are those in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region and to a limited extent those in Europe. The general aim of this research project has been to examine this phenomenon of tourism flow switching and consider the factors driving the geopolitical instability that can compromise destination security. On a more practical level the research has also examined what the reactions of Dutch tourists are to security threats affecting their tourism decisions and looked at the development of preventive measures against attacks by destinations and travel organisations. Finally, the research on the regional geopolitics of the MENA and European areas have together with the attitudes of Dutch tourists towards destination security been used as inputs into a scenario planning process involving the steering group of tour operators who originally commissioned this research, as participants. This process has focussed on macro environmental analysis, identification of key uncertainties, and the development of resilient strategies for the future.

1.2. Research Objectives 1. What are the attitudes of Dutch tourists concerning the perceived levels of threat? Are some destinations viewed as less safe than others? Are tour operators more trusted in giving information and how effectively are they fulfilling this role as guarantors of safety?

2. Identify which factors contribute to geopolitical turmoil in the MENA region and Europe. Which countries are more at risk of destination security issues and which are more likely to benefit or suffer from switches in tourism flows? 1 3. How have the increased levels of threat translated into action on the part of destinations? What sorts of preventive measures in airlines, by airports, other transportation services (against threat of attacks) have been taken and does this have an impact of destination choice?

4. In what ways can scenario planning help in developing more resilient strategies for tour operators as they deal with a market characterised by rapid and huge tourism flow switches?

1.3. Methodology This report was based on a customer attitudes survey, desk research, and inputs generated by two scenario planning sessions organised by European Tourism Futures Institute (ETFI). The analysis of both the attitudes of Dutch tourists and a review of the academic literature yielded a range of findings which should help tour operators develop a stronger understanding of the effects geopolitical risks have on the security of destinations. It is also hoped this will provide them with a greater clarity on the changing attitudes of Dutch customers and the ongoing efforts of European and MENA destinations to mitigate the effects of security risks.

1. Customer Attitudes Survey: a. In order to determine the attitudes of Dutch tourists to destination security a customer survey of 504 Dutch respondents of varying ages and educational backgrounds was carried out by NHTV Breda. b. Questions within the survey (See Appendix for list) included the effect on the role of safety in the decision making process of tourists, the perceived risk of Egypt, Croatia, Sweden, Tunisia, and Turkey, and the image of tour’s operator safety expertise. 2. Geopolitics and Destination Security: a. To provide an overview of the connection between geopolitics and destination security a review of the existing academic literature on the theoretical and empirical connections destination security, perceived risk and tourism flow changes from the field of Tourism Studies was conducted. b. Additional desk research concerning the contemporary geopolitical situation in Europe and the MENA area. Sources included the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, and academic articles from International Relations journals such as the American Political Science Review and the Journal of International Relations and Development. c. To establish the precise changes in specific destinations such as Turkey or Tunisia three indices which measure political stability and security such as the Fragile State Index, World Governance Indicators, and Global Peace Index were analysed. 3. Destination Security and Preventive Measures a. Desk research into the actions states, airports, and travel companies have taken to improve their preventive measures and security capabilities. 4. Scenario Planning: a. To develop resilience in tour operators strategic planning related to tourism flow switching two scenario planning sessions were organised and led by ETFI. b. Production of a DESTEP analysis of the macro factors affecting Dutch outbound tourism.

2 c. Creation of plausible scenarios concerning outbound tourism flows in conjunction with the steering group and ANVR. d. Development of strategic actions for tour operators to minimise detrimental commercial effects of tourism flow switching during an additional scenario planning session.

3 2. Customer Survey 2.1. Aims and Results The rash of violence since the Arab Spring across the MENA region has led to rising concern amongst Dutch tourists about travel safety and security issues. When it comes to identifying which particular segments are most concerned about risk levels a customer attitudes survey was conducted. Accordingly 504 Dutch respondents were asked a series of questions on holiday safety and security. The survey was organised by NHTV Breda by Professor Rami Isaac in January 2017 and contained questions on the following topics:

 The importance of destination safety and security when booking a holiday.  The effects of recent safety issues (terrorist attacks, MH17 crash, Tunisia and Turkey) on destination choice.  The perceived risk of travelling to (Croatia, Egypt, Portugal, Turkey, and Sweden.)  What is considered important when booking your holiday (Safety, Weather, Culture, Attractions, Price, and Nightlife?)  How effective are the following preventive measures (Embassy Registration, Travelling with a , Searching for Online Information, Searching for Information in Travel Guides etc.)  Do you believe that the tour operators channel has sufficient expertise on safety issues related to tourist destinations?  Is travelling with a tour operator safer than other means?

The objective of the survey was to firstly determine the extent to which destination security is an important issue for Dutch tourists when selecting a destination. It secondly sought to classify which customer segments are particularly concerned with security issues and what they expect from tour operators. The main conclusions drawn from the survey were the following (See supplementary report for the complete set of conclusions, tables, methodology, and questions):

 All age groups are concerned about safety and security issues. However, their importance differs across age groups with those between the ages of 40-49, 50-59 and above 60 more concerned than those below the age of 39.  The majority of those between the ages 16-39 were likely to continue their holiday plans (even though the destination suffered security incidents). However, those between 40-49 and over 60 were just as likely to choose a safer destination as they were to go on holiday in the compromised destination. Those over 40 are more sensitive to security concerns.  Males are less concerned with safety and security issues than females.  The perceived travel risk of Dutch tourists is high with destinations such as Egypt and Turkey that have a recent history of terrorist attacks considered less attractive than those that are politically stable such as Sweden and Portugal.  The majority of respondents across all age groups viewed Turkey as an unsafe location. The perception of Egypt’s safety record was slightly more positive with many respondents indicating they were neutral about its safety record.  Highly educated respondents considered cultural aspects of great importance when deciding on location. 4  Those over the age of 40 are more likely to travel with tour operators and take precautions such as embassy registration, requesting safety information, and keep a low profile. This suggests that those over the age of 40 expect that tour operators to guarantee their safety.  Tour operators are expected to be ‘guardians of their safety’ by the majority of respondents across all age groups. The perception of Dutch respondents about the actual safety expertise of tour operators was largely mixed. Many respondents viewed them as ineffective or were neutral about their safety expertise.  The most effective preventive measures of respondents were the presence of police and safety information provided by the destination itself and the delivery of brochures to tourists.

5 3. Geopolitics and Destination Security 3.1. Introduction From the survey respondents it is clear that existing security risks are likely affect future booking decisions by Dutch tourists. One of the principal causes of these threats which affect perceived risk, tourist decision making, and ultimately tourism flow shifts is geopolitical turmoil in the MENA region. Strategically located between Europe, Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa the MENA region is a hotbed of sectarian, ethnic, ideological, and strategic rivalries. Such a volatile mixture has led to it being one of the most militarised and conflict prone areas in the world since 1945. In recent years this has worsened dramatically with the region becoming engulfed in no less than four major wars (Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq) since 2011. Libya and Syria are of particular concern as their instability has provided jihadists groups with the space and resources to devise and support a series of violent terrorist attacks in Turkey, Britain, Tunisia, and France. Regional instability is however but one part of the puzzle; destinations such as Egypt and Turkey also suffer from a number of domestic political issues including state fragility, social unrest, political instability, and trans- border insurgencies which have reduced their destination security levels. These domestic risks stem from poor governance, weak state legitimacy, a growing youth bulge, high unemployment, and poor economic performance which incidentally served as the main causal factors of the Arab Spring. Such a combination of geopolitical turmoil and internal instability has led to a bleak situation for a number of tourist destinations such as Egypt which in November 2016 saw a 45 percent drop in tourist arrivals compared to the same period in 2015 due to political upheaval.2 International tourists in the MENA area have opted instead to travel to destinations perceived as safe including Lebanon and Dubai which recorded 11 percent growth and 4 percent growth respectively. Although tourism in 2017 in the MENA area is likely to rise above its current level of 54 million, tourism flow shifts will remain subject to rapid changes due to regional dynamics. Although statistical information on Dutch tourism arrivals to MENA destinations is limited from the survey and desk research it is clear that the greater frequency of terrorist attacks and political unrest have affected the perceived level of risk in MENA countries. Countries such as the or Iceland which recorded high scores in the Fragile State Index, and the Global Peace Index, which can offer safety and security during these turbulent times are more likely to gain a competitive advantage to those which are plagued with insecurities.

3.2. The Causes of Geopolitical Instability Geopolitics is a term that is frequently and interchangeably used by journalists and academics, and for this reason it has acquired a range of different definitions. Often in the context of Tourism Studies it is employed when referring to the combination of tourism and politics.3 Although this touches on one of the core elements of geopolitics, it glosses over the spatial dimension of the concept. For the purposes of this report geopolitics will refer to the ‘interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes.’4 Geopolitical analysis focuses particularly on two levels; the regional and the global. This report’s emphasis is on how regional dynamics have weakened destination security as well as on the domestic governance within countries themselves. Unlike the geographical side of the equation the political dimension is less clear as it is often difficult to determine which processes are of regional or global relevance. However, certain issues can be considered of regional rather than of solely domestic 6 importance. These include national election results, the foreign/energy/defence policies of states, referenda outcome, the composition of alliances, armed conflicts, macro-economic developments, and the activities of powerful non-state actors ranging from the European Union, NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Council, to the Islamic State and Hezbollah. Many of these developments have the potential to alter the stability of states, regional economic prosperity, and the perceived security of tourist destinations. The causes of geopolitical instability are numerous but it is clear that ethnic, sectarian, ideological and strategic tensions combined with governance issues are the underlying pressures that lead to regional turmoil. Although most regions (be it Europe with the Ukrainian Conflict since 2014, or East Asia and Sino- ASEAN tensions in the South China Sea) are embroiled in geopolitical rivalries their volatility pales in comparison to the volatility of the MENA region. The academic literature on the geopolitical situation in the Middle East points largely to the following factors as the central causes of regional instability and change:

 State borders which do not align with the various ethnic groups that inhabit the Middle East as a partial result of the arbitrary borders drawn up by Britain and France in the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. This issue has led to Kurdish separatism in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; the Israeli- Palestinian conflict and territorial disputes over islands in the Persian Gulf between Iran and the Sunni Gulf Monarchies. In the late 20th century the Iran-Iraq War, and the First Gulf War were caused to some extent by a desire by Saddam Hussein to reclaim what was considered historical territories of Iraq.5  Worsening levels of sectarian and ethnic divisions due between Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds in Iraq after the collapse of the Iraqi Government in the wake of the 2003 US Invasion. The situation in Iraq will remain fragile and a continued source of Shia-Sunni sectarianism for the foreseeable future.  Increased state fragility, repression and authoritarianism generated by the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria which has worsened state stability and enabled the growth of jihadist groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.  Ongoing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional primacy. Both states currently support opposing factions in Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq and Yemen with weaponry, funding, and advisors. The continued assistance by Saudi Arabia to the ‘Army of Conquest’ in Syria which includes Al-Qaeda affiliates and in the case of Iran to Hezbollah has contributed to the lengthening of the Syrian conflict. The prolonging of the Syrian conflict ensures that the country remains unstable and a source of extremists who have the capacity to conduct terrorist attacks on neighbouring states. Saudi-Iranian competition has also continued in lockstep with an intensifying arms race in the Middle East with arms imports increasing by 86 percent between 2012-2016. Iran’s support to the Shia forces such as the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, Hezbollah, and the Houthi Rebels in Yemen has contributed to a Sunni-Shia sectarian violence and terrorist attacks such as the June 2017 shootings which killed 17 civilians in Tehran.  A revitalised Iran looking to capitalise on the economic benefits provided by the lifting of its nuclear related sanctions in 2015 by strengthening its involvement in the Levant and Syria at the expense of its Sunni rivals. The lifting of sanctions has led to a more active regional role of Iran and has noticeable effects on its tourism industry. In 2015 Iran attracted 5.2 million arrivals a 18.3 percent increase compared to the previous year. This figure is predicted to grow to 20 million by 2025. 6

7 Western European tourists made up 23 percent of arrivals in 2016 and notably the Netherlands is a growth market of outbound tourism with 32.7 percent growth in 2016.7  A growing youth bulge (34 percent of the population in the MENA region is below the age of 15), poor governance levels in Tunisia, Jordon, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon, Iran, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, will continue to contribute to higher levels of state fragility over the coming decades. Although Tunisia has become more stable since 2016 Turkey, Jordon, Egypt, have all seen their stability worsen over 2016-17 according to the Fragile State Index. Tunisia slow return to normalcy, and a lack of recent terrorist attacks has led to the country expecting a modest recovery of tourist arrivals in 2017. In January to May 2017 it recorded 1.5 million arrivals which compared to the previous year was an improvement of 46.2 percent.8 Nevertheless, until the country has seen its stability improve and its security apparatus upgraded its long-term prospects for tourism are fragile and could swing dramatically if it suffers from a major terrorist attack or a renewed bout of political unrest.  A string of humanitarian crises originating from Syria (13.5M in need of assistance, 4.4M refugees), Iraq (10M in need), Libya (2.4M in need, 250,000 refugees) as a consequence of the ongoing internal conflicts in each country.9  Low oil prices hovering around $50USD will reduce the government budgets of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, and Libya. This is likely to put pressures on social welfare, subsidies, and economic programmes which will continue to drive up unemployment, fuel social unrest, and contribute to political unrest in these countries.  A lingering diplomatic dispute and economic boycott of Qatar since June 2017 by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, and the UAE over Qatar’s relations with Iran and its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and various terrorist organisations. Currently there are no direct flights between Qatar and the countries boycotting it. Although Dutch tourist arrivals to Qatar are negligible there is a heightened potential for Dutch tourists transiting through Doha to be subject to travel delays or disruptions.

In addition to the above factors that are in play in the MENA region the European region itself has its share of challenges but on a different far more manageable scale and for the most part enjoys far more stable governance, both at state and at the European Union (EU) level. Factors affecting EU member states include:

 On the economic scene there has been a period of years coping with the after effects of the 2008 Financial Crisis which led to a Eurozone crisis and the imposition of widespread austerity measures. Only now is the EU as a bloc returning to reasonable levels of economic growth of 2-3 percent. This bodes well for outgoing tourism. With Airbus reporting recently that air travel is doubling every 15 years the prospects are positive for further growth in the outgoing tourism market from the Netherlands.  Migration from the MENA region will be a major challenge in the coming years as unrest translates into millions seeking the relative stability of Europe. Europe with its own predominantly aging population needs controlled migration too, but the issue is integration.  The danger of home grown jihadists within Europe is a threatening scenario for EU member states. Intelligence services and police forces have had mixed results in preventing terrorist attacks.

8 Preventive measures at destinations such as Paris and London are being stepped up with protective barriers against attack by car and baggage searching in public spaces and at airports and on planes is stricter since the attacks of November 2015 and May 2017 respectively.  The very institutions holding the EU together and keeping it stable are being challenged although the election of President Macron has significantly eased this pressure. Britain’s vote in June 2016 to leave the EU along with 2016 election of President Trump raised a possibility of further populist right wing gains in other national elections in Netherlands and France. This would have served to undermine the EU as those countries shifted more towards narrow state interests. However the electorates of those countries chose otherwise and the overwhelming majority secured by President Macron in France recently has once again stabilised the EU. Still there remain important decisions for the EU to take regarding reforms and in particular now that internal security is an issue and that the funding and operations of the United Nations is questioned and criticised by the President Trump.  The ability of the EU to remain stable is linked to its governance model delivering transnational cooperation benefits (an example is the recent scrapping of EU mobile roaming charges), guaranteeing citizens’ rights, and delivering economic prosperity and stability. Whilst these factors are ongoing issues in EU debates they remain the raison d’être of the EU institutions. Cuellar defines social cohesion as the extent to which states or transnational entities such as the EU can offer citizens control over inequalities of incomes and recourse to independent justice free of corruption. As long as this scenario continues as looks likely the EU will maintain generally higher levels of social cohesion than the majority of MENA countries.

Although this is not an exhaustive list of the interlocking geopolitical and economic issues facing the MENA region and Europe they overwhelmingly illustrate that the MENA region is likely to remain a turbulent and unstable area for the coming decades. When it comes to the MENA area it is clear that regional rivalries together with worsening levels of governance, corruption, and instability are contributing causes of geopolitical instability; compromising the actuality of destination security and driving the perceived levels of risk.

9 •Turkey, Tunisia, and •The turbulent aftermath Egypt perceived as of the Arab Spring 2011 insecure by Dutch and •Saudi – Iranian rivalry Political Stability and European tourists •Mass refugee and Destination Security •Low levels of political migration flows from stability lead to longer North Africa recovery times after a •The presence of the •Increased state fragility in Turkey, crisis situation Islamic State in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt •Destination security and Syria and Iraq •Frequent and often severe terror safety have become •Turkey’s intervention in attacks in Turkey important issues for Syria •Terrorist attacks in France, the UK many Dutch tourists •Kurdish seperatism in and Germany •Politically stable, Turkey, Iraq and Syria •Political unrest and demonstrations destinations that are •Proxy wars in Libya and in Tunisia and Egypt perceived as secure such Yemen •Breakdown of social cohesion and as Sweden, Iceland, •Russian, Iranian, and US greater levels of social discontent Portugal, Italy, Spain likely to benefit from involvement in Syria tourism flow shifts •Populism and nationalism in the EU

Geopolitical Tourism Flows Developments

Figure 1. The Relationship between Regional Geopolitics, Destination Security and Tourism Flows

The connection between geopolitics, security issues, and tourism flow shifts is made clear in figures 2, 3, 4 and in the following section when the Fragile State Index and the Global Peace Index are taken in account.

Figure 2. Geopolitical Incidents in 2016 and Dutch Tourism Flow Shifts (ANVR)

10 Endangered Destinations 2017

Saudi Arabia 40% France 43% Morocco 47% Jordan 50% Tunisia 57% Egypt 63% Israel 66% Turkey 76%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Risk Level

Figure 3. Endangered Destinations 2017 (Source: World Travel Monitor 2017 IPK International)

Emerging Destinations 2017

China 16% Croatia 16% Spain 16% Netherlands 14% Portugal 13% Poland 12% Austria 12% Scandinavia 10% Australia 9% Switzerland 9% Canada 9% 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%

Fear Rating

Figure 4. Emerging Destinations 2017 (Source: World Travel Monitor 2017 IPK International)

When figures 3, 4, and 5 are compared it is possible to identify that states with low fear (perceived risk), such as Portugal and Spain, recorded growth in excess of 20 percent in 2016. While the perceived level of security and the political stability of country are not the only driving forces in a turbulent world they will become important attributes in determining which countries are likely to turn into viable and attractive destinations over the coming years.

11 Dutch Tourism Flow Changes 2015-2016 Grand Total 1,30% Netherlands Antilles 6,90% Portugal 20,20% Germany 1,30% Austria 0,40% Netherlands 5,30% Italy 7,70% -5,14% France -32,90% Turkey Greece 2,80% Spain 21,60%

-40,00% -30,00% -20,00% -10,00% 0,00% 10,00% 20,00% 30,00% Flow Changes

Figure 5. End of Year Travel Scan Booking Results (Source: ANVR)

3.3. Geopolitical Stability and Destination Security Although geopolitical turmoil has had an impact on destination security its relationship can often be difficult to plot. In order to measure the concrete effects geopolitical events have on destination security it is important to measure the fluctuations in political stability, the intensity of armed conflict, the frequency of terrorism and the occurrence of political demonstrations within specific locations. The political stability of a destination is crucial for two reasons. Firstly, political unrest, together with war, was cited by Hunter-Jones, Jeffs, and Smith as the most influential reasons for tourists altering their travel decisions.10 Secondly, the level of security in the destination is by and large related to the political stability of the country in question. No destination however stable is immune from acts of terrorism and armed crime. Nevertheless by analysing a series of indices developed by organisations such as the World Bank, the Fund for Peace, and Vision of Humanity it is easier to identify which countries are likely to face political crises, terrorist attacks, protests and outbreaks of violence. States that scored well in each of the indices are also far more likely to recover swiftly from a security incident. When it comes to measuring geopolitical stability and destination security which is linked to it, a large number of datasets and classifications exist. However, the criteria used to classify the relative stability of states overlap and they are listed below. From all of the classifications the following criteria were selected as they contained a large number of relevant indicators including but not limited to:

 Armed Conflict  Violent Demonstrations  Terrorism  Ethnic, Communal, Sectarian, and Religious Violence  Social Unrest  Political Instability 12  Political Terror

See below for the full list of each index:

Fragile State Index 2017 (Fund for Peace):  Social: Demographic Pressures, Refugees and IDP, Group Grievance, Human Flight and Brain Drain  Economic: Uneven Economic Development, Poverty, Economic Decline,  Political and Military: State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Security Apparatus, Factionalised Elites, External Intervention

Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism 2015 (World Bank)  War: Armed Conflict, Intensity of Internal Conflicts; Ethnic, Religious or Regional, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Interstate War, Civil War  Terrorism: International Tensions/Terrorist Threat, Cost of Terrorism, Political Terror Scale,  Political and Social Stability: Orderly Transfers, Violent Demonstrations, Intensity of Violent Activities of Underground Political Organisations, Intensity of Social Conflicts, Government Stability, Ethnic Tensions, Protests and Riots

Global Peace Index 2017 (Vision of Humanity):  Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict: Number and Duration of Internal Conflicts, Number of Deaths from External Organised Conflict, Number of Deaths from Internal Organised Conflict, Number, Duration and Role in External Conflicts, Intensity of Internal Conflicts, Relations with Neighbouring Countries  Societal Safety and Security: Level of Perceived Criminality in Society, Number of Refugees and Internally Displaced People as a Percentage of the Population, Political Instability, Political Terror Scale, Impact of Terror, Number of Homicides per 100,000 People, Level of Violent Crime, Likelihood of Violent Demonstrations, Number of Jailed Population per 100,000 people, Number of Internal Security Officers and Police per 100,000  Militarisation: Military Expenditure as a percentage of GDP, Number of Armed Services Personnel per 100,000 people, Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons as Recipient (Imports) per 100,000 people, Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons as Supplier (Exports) per 100,000 people, Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions, Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities, Ease of Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons

The majority of these indicators are related on the four components of destination security (armed crime, political unrest, armed conflict, and terrorism.) Although several measures in the Fragile State Index do not directly refer to security their measurement of social and economic such as poverty levels and human rights are underlying determinants of good governance and political stability. When viewed in this light the indices below can be considered as a means of quantifying and measuring risks in destinations and security threats. The following section will provide a short overview of each index and provide a series of graphs drawn from each index to illustrate the significantly higher levels of instability and insecurity that MENA region destinations face in comparison to European destinations. When compared to tourist arrival statistics it is evident that MENA countries with poor scores in all three indices are the main losers of tourism flows due to their turbulent political situations and weakening security. It is important to note 13 however these indices should be used as a starting point for further research as they do not provide historical or political context to their scores. They are best used in combination with qualitative desk research on specific countries which if done correctly will assist tour operators in making sense of the complex reality of contemporary geopolitics.

Fragile State Index 2017 100 90 80 70 60 50 89,8 89,4 86,6 40 80,8 76,5 72,978,9 74,374,9 76,274,2 66,1 65,9

STATE FRAGILITY STATE 30 62,6 53,7 57,5 50,6 45,2 20 38,6 37,9 43,7 33,5 29 10 22,5 0

COUNTRIES

Figure 6. Fragile State Index 2017 (0 Least Fragile/100 Most Fragile) (Source: Fund for Peace)

Out of the three indices the Fragile State Index (FSI) is the most comprehensive. Based on the Fund for Peace’s Conflict Assessment System Tool it draws on the combined results of the analysis of media, academic, and professional articles and reports in addition to a numerous quantitative datasets and qualitative assessments. The integration of three separate streams of information is then used to build a series of twelve indicators grouped into social, economic, and political categories. The FSI is a useful tool for gauging, for example, whether a specific destinations has a strong record of political stability and if it faces threats from sectarianism or factionalism. Notably it also includes an indicator which directly measures the strength of a country’s security apparatus. This particular indicator which falls under the political and military section judges a country’s response to security threats, the level of professionalization in its police forces, and the presence of guerrilla forces. The closer the score is to 10, the more insecure the country is likely to be. This indicator closely mirrors the overall score of state fragility (e.g. Turkey 80.8) with states with high levels of fragility also suffering from ineffective security apparatuses (Turkey 8.3). This trend of weakening security is particularly concerning in light of the preventive measures implemented in Tunisia and Turkey as a response to the June 2015 and the 2016 terrorist attacks respectively as both countries have seen their security apparatus score weaken. Prior to the Arab Spring in 2011 Tunisia had a score of 6.6 which has now risen to 8.3. Turkey has a poor level of security of approximately 8.3 but what is more concerning is its level of group grievance (10.0) suggesting that its 14 conflict with Kurdish rebel forces in south-east Anatolia are likely to contribute to fresh waves of unrest and continued terrorist attacks.

Security Apparatus 2015 2016 2017 Turkey 7.7 7.8 8.3 Tunisia 7.8 7.9 8.3 Egypt 8.2 8.3 8.1 UAE 3.1 2.8 3.1 Iran 8.0 7.7 7.5 Morocco 5.7 5.4 5.8 Figure 7. Security Apparatus (1.0 Most Secure/10 Least Secure) (Source: Fund for Peace)

Taken as a whole the FSI is an straightforward way of quickly getting a snapshot idea of the general political, social, and economic health of country. If a country, such as Turkey, is witnessing year on year increases in terms of its overall score it should warrant further investigation about the risks that may appear. Scores particularly above 70 in the FSI should give pause for thought. Likewise a country such as Iran or the UAE which is witnessing an uptick in security and is also rapidly attracting European tourists should give tour operators an idea of possible alternative locations for existing trouble spots.

Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism 2015 1,5 1,27

1,04 1 0,87 0,87 0,76 0,580,54 0,4 0,5 0,34 0,27 0,29 0,21 0,02 0,01 0 -0,03

-0,23 -0,2 -0,5 -0,34

-0,6

ABSENCE OF TERROR/POLITICAL STABILITY TERROR/POLITICAL OF ABSENCE -1 -0,87 -0,96 -1,12 -1,28 -1,5 -1,34 COUNTRIES

15 Figure 8. Political Stability and Absence of Terrorism 2015 (-1.5 Least Stable/1.5 Most Stable) (Source World Bank)

The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators is a second classification that could provide a beneficial guide to judging the current political stability of a country and its future trajectory, the Political Stability and Absence of Terror Indicator is however but one of six different measures, the others five being:

 Voice and Accountability  Government Effectiveness  Regulatory Quality  Rule of Law  Control of Corruption

In contrast to the FSI the Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism are updated less frequently but nevertheless provides a broad overview of the current political situation in a specific country. It is based on a range of sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report and Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators. Like the FSI the Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism indicator is an effective way for tour operators to rapidly get an idea on where risks are geographically concentrated and to assist them in determining which countries are becoming more or less stable. Like all three indices it should be used as a broad comparative tool rather than an instrument for analysts as little context on a country is provided. Global Peace Index 2017

3 2,707 2,777 2,583 2,646 2,5 2,211 2,286 2,0842,072 2,133 1,94 2,004 2,019 1,977 1,944 1,839 1,85 2 1,737 1,6311,665 1,568 1,5 1,258 1,009

1 LEVEL OF PEACE OF LEVEL

0,5

0

COUNTRIES

Figure 9. Global Peace Index 2017 (-1.5 Least Stable/1.5 Most Stable) (Source: Vision of Humanity)

The Global Peace Index (GPI) is a final index that is of note in measuring the political stability and the level of security of destinations and crucially regions as a whole. On a regional level the MENA area has remained 16 the least stable and secure for the last five years.11 In measuring which states and regions are likely to be the most stable and secure the most important aspects according to the GPI are based on whether a country has a ‘Well-Functioning Government, Low Levels of Corruption, Acceptance of the Rights of Others, and Good Relations with Others.’12 When these measures are considered Europe remains the most peaceful region although France and Turkey and the Nordic countries have seen their scores negatively affected by the impact of terrorism. The main strength of the GPI is its inclusion of diplomatic relations with others as this is a crucial determinant of geopolitical rivalries. The Global Peace Index specifically refers to the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia as a contributing force to the ongoing conflicts in Yemen and Syria. Taken as a whole the GPI is an excellent means of establishing the impact geopolitical developments have on state stability. If used with the more country specific FSI and Political Stability/Absence of Terrorism indices tour operators will be better placed to decide on which countries to monitor and develop contingency plans for.

3.4. Destination Security Now that the relationship between geopolitics and internal political stability has been established it is important to turn to the impact declining geopolitical stability and worsening levels of state fragility have on destination security. Destination security has received a great amount of attention by journalists and academics in recent years due to the rising number of instances where tourists have either been killed or seriously injured. Conceptually, destination security refers to the protection of tourists from the deliberate actions of others including terrorist attacks, political unrest, crime and armed conflict.13 This is in contrast to destination safety which concerns cases of accidental harm caused by infrastructural, environmental, and health issues.14 Although much of the analysis of destination security examines how internal political and security dynamics affects the security of , , and tourist attractions; external or geopolitical developments such as the rise of trans-national terrorist groups and intra-state wars are also of great importance. For example, the presence of the Islamic State in Libya, Syria, and Iraq continues to constitute a grave threat for terrorism in numerous European and MENA destinations. Their lethal and well- orchestrated terrorist attacks in Turkey, France, and Tunisia have already reduced tourism flows to each of these countries over the past two years. Since the November 2015 mass shooting in Paris, France has been in a state of emergency and witnessed a 5 percent drop in Dutch tourist arrivals during 2016. Turkey On a regional level an armed conflict which draws in great powers, trans-national terrorism and diplomatic crises are all potential catalysts for a reduction in tourism flows. Turkey is a particularly vivid example of the effects that geopolitics can have on destination security. In response to Turkey’s military intervention in Syria against the Islamic State the country has suffered frequent and often severe terrorist attacks which have led to several hundred civilian fatalities from 2015 onward. Attacks such as the January 2016 suicide bombing at Sultanahmet square which killed 10 German tourists and a successive attack in June 2016 at Atatürk Airport which caused 48 fatalities substantially increased the perceived risk of travelling to Turkey. During the same period Turkey lost an estimated 5.5 million Russian tourist arrivals as a consequence of Russian economic sanctions; put in place after the shooting down by the Turkish air force of a Russian SU-24 bomber in November 2015. Turkey’s annual tourism arrivals subsequently fell from an estimated height of 35.8 million in 2015 to 24 million in 2016. This trend shows few signs of abating as Turkey continues its involvement in Syria against the Islamic State and the YPG. A moderate recovery is possible in 2018-2019 but the perceived risk of travel to Turkey for Dutch tourists has been hindered by high levels of perceived risk, the growing authoritarianism of 17 President Erdogan, and the weakening political stability of the country. Turkey’s attractiveness has also suffered due to the deterioration of Turkish-Dutch diplomatic relations in the first half of 2017. In real terms this diplomatic incident appears to be limited to the cancellation of several hundred Dutch tourists according TUI Nederland and Thomas Cook.15 However, it illustrates the growing care tour operators have to take as diplomatic crises are likely to lead to the imposition of negative travel advice which could effectively block all tourism to a country for a limited time period. Although all destination security risks are likely to hamper tourism, terrorism has undoubtedly received the most attention. Terrorism's effects on tourism in contrast to the other destination security threats is of greater unpredictably as much depends on the frequency, severity, location and the political stability of the state in question. These factors shape the effect the length of time the tourist industry in the affected state will decline and secondly the length of time it will take for the state to recover. According to Abraham Pizam the frequency of terrorist attacks is of greater importance than their severity.16 The more severe and the more frequent the terrorist attack on a specific destination, the higher is a person’s perceived risk and the greater is the negative impact on tourist demand. In a study of terrorist attacks in Israel between 1991 and 2001 Pizam and Fleischer confirmed that if a state suffers from frequent terrorist attacks it is far more likely to suffer from a substantial decrease in tourism than a state which has a single severe attack.17 Irrespective of the severity a reduction in tourist arrivals is generally noticeable around two months after the attack and will likely continue for at least 6 to 12 months before the destination enters a recovery phase.18 This recovery period can however be reset if there is a second terrorist attack; leading to a situation such as Egypt’s where over the course of the last few years it has gone through periods of decline, recovery, and then decline due to sporadic reoccurrences of terrorism and political violence.19 Terrorism is however but one destination security risk that tourist face. Threats such as armed conflict are of equal if not more importance for tourism flows as it is almost certain that a conventional war will result in the destruction of tourist infrastructure and destroy the safety and security image of the destination. In 2010, one year prior to the outbreak of war Syria received approximately 8 million tourists.20 By 2015 it had fallen to 2.5 million, and despite the best efforts of the Syrian Tourism Board it is unlikely to recover before 2025 at the earliest.21 Armed conflicts, particularly in the cases of Libya and Syria also provide the opportunity for jihadist organisations to gain combat experience, recruits, and small arms to plan and stage terrorist attacks. Unlike armed conflict and terrorism political unrest, in the form of demonstrations, riots, and strikes, is usually the consequence of domestic rather than international developments. Although it usually leads to short term declines in tourist arrivals, in the medium term it can have positive effects as it can be used as a marketing tool for tourist boards. Since the tumultuous events in Cairo during the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 Tahrir Square has been branded as ‘The Square That Rocked the World’ in a bid to attract tourists to sites of political and historical importance. Unlike the other three major security risks crime seems to have the least effect on tourist arrivals but does if frequent enough contribute to the tarnishing of the image of the country as a whole if the crimes in question are against life rather than simply property.22

3.5. Perceived Risk Worsening levels of destination security as a consequence of geopolitical events and internal turmoil are undoubtedly important for the welfare of tourists. However, what is even more noticeable is the effect the phenomena have on the relationship between perceived risk and tourism flows. Several scholars from the 18 field of Tourism Studies including Galia Fuchs, Arie Reichel, and Abraham Pizam have surveyed the topic of perceived risk at length. According to these researchers there is a clear consensus that the perception of destination security issues has a decisive impact on the behaviour of tourists.23 This trend continues to be of relevance in 2017 with a recent Travelzoo survey of 6000 respondents illustrating that 97 percent of potential tourists harbour concerns about their safety and security whilst on holiday.24 This result was confirmed in our own survey but the actual effects on tourism decision making were mixed. Perceived risk is a thorny issue for tour operators and for developing tourism industries of the MENA region. The region, especially due to its recent history, is viewed by Western tourists as one of violence, danger and plagued by insecurity. Such essentialist perspectives are all too often reinforced in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.25 The tendency of tourists to view the region unfavourably is due to what can be called the ‘generalisation effect’ which is simply the threat of terrorism in one country being extrapolated to the entirety of the region.26 This has even led to cases where destinations such as Morocco, which last suffered an attack in 2011, being perceived unfavourably and avoided by French tourists due to events in Tunisia.27 This phenomenon particularly affects tourists who have not visited a location before as they appear likely to exhibit greater levels of concern about destination security risks than those who are familiar with the destination.28 A second source of high levels of perceived risk is through the propagation of ‘alternative facts’ and distorted narratives through tabloid newspapers such as the British Daily Mail, the Express, Breitbart News, or the Dutch Telegraaf. In February 2017 the Telegraaf published an article that claimed the Islamic State was planning ‘large scale’ terrorist attacks in Spain against tourists.29 This story was also published by the Daily Star and the Sun despite the Spanish Government insisting the stories had limited to no credibility.30 Such a situation where a general threat against European states is turned into a supposed threat to a specific tourist destination is likely to generate disproportionate levels of fear amongst tourists. Although Spain is likely to attract in excess of 3 million Dutch tourists in 2017 the proliferation of ‘fake news’ articles spread through social media channels is a worrying concern which has the potential to decrease demand to destinations which are otherwise relatively safe. Although combating ‘alternative facts’ and ‘fake news’ is a task primarily for news outlets, DMOs and national governments have also worked to dispel these images. More importantly they have developed a range of innovative tactics to reduce their negative perception to attract tourism. This has included them stepping up efforts to soften their image through focusing on the landscapes, attractions, and hospitality of a country or ridiculing the stereotypes it is possible to improve tourism flows. Rebranding is another effective tactic with destinations such as Eilat, setting itself apart from Israel and the Middle East by stating it is part of the Eastern Mediterranean area.31 The current advertising campaign run by the Israel Tourism Office highlights a two city trip: Tel Aviv and Jerusalem without once mentioning Israel as the destination. Tour operators and travel agents also have the capacity to reduce the level of concern of tourists either by reassuring them through unbiased information of the security and safety of a holiday destination.32 A multi- pronged approach that combines effective communication with customers together with the production of counter narratives which debunk articles claiming the high threat level exists would be of benefit for tour operators. There is however a limit on the effectiveness of such communication strategies as tour operators are either legally or commercially obliged to follow the advice set forth by their respective country’s travel advisories and in nearly all cases do. Travel advisories produced by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) have a significant bearing on insurance prices, travel

19 costs, and diplomatic relations.33 In a bid to offset these negative effects the Tunisian government has lobbied hard to relax the current of the FCO which advises against all essential travel. The current level is seen as the primary reason for the 90 percent reduction in British tourist arrivals since 2015.34 The Tunisian Ambassador to the United Kingdom in May 2016 explicitly referred to the phenomenon of perceived risk as he stated that the travel warning applied inhibits the ‘the impression that this is not a safe country, and take into account all the progress made’ in improving destination security.35 In the wake of the Dutch-Turkish diplomatic crisis in March 2017 the Netherlands and Germany also increased the threat level to Turkey Little can be done by tour operators in this situation to encourage tourists to return but in cases where a tourist destination has higher levels of perceived risk there are a myriad of tactics which tour operators can consider applying. These can range from focusing on tourists under the age of 29 who are less likely to heed travel warnings, providing clear security instructions, and regularly updating the travel warnings to higher risk locations.36 Elaborating on security issues and developing clear safety guidelines requires tour operators to be well versed in the existing political and security threats within unstable regions. Predicting the course of international relations is an impossible task but a careful analysis of the existing geopolitical situation on a regional level and the individual drivers in specific destinations will aid the efforts of tour operators to improve their communication strategies and reassure anxious clients. A greater awareness of the improving preventive measures and capabilities of individual locations would also be advantageous for tour operators when it comes to supplying relevant information to clients.

20 4. Preventive Measures in European and MENA Destinations 4.1. Introduction In the aftermath of events such as the May 2017 attacks in London or the deaths of 23 tourists in Morocco in 2003 governments have done their utmost to improve their security measures to prevent future attacks. Failure to do so ensures that vulnerabilities remain and the perceived image of a location as a safe and secure one suffers. According to Sönmez & Graefe perceived safety refers to the condition of being ‘safe’ and being protected against the risk posed by any non-desirable events.37 Individuals engage in tourist activities are locked into a constant quest for novelty, excitement and adventure, while simultaneously enjoying the security of unhindered mobility. Accordingly, the growth and development of the tourism sector in this context is largely dependent on environments that are risk-free and politically stable. A number of studies have indicated that tourists’ safety perceptions are specific to destinations and can affect their destination choices and travel plans.3839 Tourists may want to visit a destination for various reasons, such as weather, cultural resources, natural scenes, beaches, and sport facilities. However, as aforementioned survey results indicated safety and security nowadays are becoming more and more important for destinations attributes.40 In recent years, popular destinations such as Paris, Brussels, Istanbul, Izmir, Berlin, Sharm Al-Sheikh and Tunisia have been the direct target of terrorism. The frequent occurrence of terrorist attacks in tourism destinations around the globe not only increase individuals’ terrorism-related risk perceptions but also reinforces and intensifies the role of safety in individuals’ travel decision-making process.41 As already pointed out in this desk research and the customer attitudes survey, the element of safety is one of the most significant elements of the tourist offer which influences on the decision of tourists when choosing a tourist destination. The basic preconditions of appearance of tourist are a certain level of everyday settlement of basic physiological needs and adequate level of safety. Accordingly this section will analyse the preventive measures destinations and airports in both Europe and the MENA region have put in place in the wake of a terrorist attack. The provision of relevant information on the measures high risk destinations have taken could be used to restore the confidence of tourists in a destination which has suffered from a recent attack.

4.2. European Airports after the Brussels Attack After the two blasts in the public areas of Zaventum Airport on March 22 2016, serious questions were raised about the vulnerability of airport reception areas and entrances in the EU. Numerous airports including Brussels Airport as they prepared to partially resume passenger flights stepped up their efforts to improve the security measures at Belgian airports. In Britain, a spokesman at the Heathrow Airport stated that an increased police presence is currently in place but it was too early to talk of long-term changes. For the first time in Ireland armed police were deployed at Dublin Airport and Dublin Port in response to the attacks. Prior to the Brussels attack, there had been no armed guard presence at either location illustrating the vulnerabilities of destinations which have not had a recent history of terror attacks. Although France has already been in a state of emergency since the attacks of November 2015 an additional 1,600 police were deployed to airports, sea and rail transit hubs, and border crossings following the Brussels attack. Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Minister of Interior, stated that striking the balance between security and efficiency is a growing issue. This is particularly clear in the case of airport security as lengthy security checks can block flow of pedestrian traffic at airports; in turn creating queues in front 21 of airports and potential targets for terrorists. Conversely, armed police presence can also deter further attacks. In addition, to improved measures at airports (which reduce efficiency but through the presence of armed police deter future attacks), and stop and search measures, access to the French public systems has been restricted to only those are carrying tickets and/or ID cards. France is not an exception to this coordinated effort to improve security measures. Germany has also increased security measures at airports and railways stations. Spain has raised its ‘terror alert level’ 4/5 and improved security at airports. The Spanish government has additionally produced a catalogue of operational measures whose goal is to reinforce security at airports. A spokesman for the Ministry of Safety and Defence of the Netherlands stated that following the Brussels attacks, they are increasing security measures at main airports in the Netherlands. In the public zones, there is now a stronger and more visible police presence. Armed police in terminals, both outside and inside and police are checking in strategic points. There are also additional security measures at train stations where international trains arrive, along with bolstered security at the southern border of Netherlands. In a 2017 study by NBTO-NIPO Research it appears that 45 percent of the Dutch respondents put terrorist threats, as the most important risk factor when deciding for a holiday destination, in contrast to other risk factors. Austria, Switzerland, the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark have also seen more police at airports and on terminals to ensure travellers feel secure. Security measures and threat awareness at Croatian airports have been raised following the events in Brussels. Thomas Renard, researcher at the Egmont Institute for International Relations in Belgium, said that security at Charles de Gaulle and Europe’s other major airports had been ‘pushed to a very high level.’ Overall, it has become extremely difficult for terrorists to execute coordinated mass shootings or suicide bombings or attacks, they could have planned 15 years ago; this does not however make it impossible but does significantly reduce their success rate. Many security measures in airports, such as body scanners and liquids restrictions have been introduced in response to changing tactics of terrorists. Benno Baksteen, a member of the Dutch Expert Group on Aviation Safety, said that ‘while the level of security in European airports in general is quite high’, it would be ‘impossible to run a society’ with 100 percent security. He also said that rushing through changes to security procedures could do more harm than good, pointing out that while they could ‘give you the illusion of control’ they make normal operations almost impossible.’ In addition to practical efforts to bolster security and improve preventive measures EU has also devised a stringent set of rules for airport security and carries out regular inspections The EU currently has the power to haul national governments which fail to meet these security standards before European courts. For example, the European Commission in 2015 sued Germany for failing to regularly monitor all aviation security measures at some German airports. But Theiry Vanelslander, research professor at the transport economics department of University of Antwerp, said although security systems ‘improve day by day,’ such as in areas of radiation detection, ‘not all airports apply the same kind of system.’42

4.3. France Since the attacks in Paris in November 2015 numerous European governments have continued to impose increased security measures, wrestle by the day with new threats, and conduct neighbourhood shoot-outs during raids to catch suspects. The Belgian government warned of ‘serious and imminent’ threat of a Paris- style (Rodriguez, 2016) attack in Brussels, and the city was placed on high alert, triggering the cancellation of football games and concerts while stores, museums and galleries all closed early. The government warned residents and tourists to avoid crowded areas, as well as shopping centres, airports and train 22 stations. The British government has advised its citizens to exercise caution in public places and follow the advice of local officials; French authorities have heightened security measures due to a risk of further attacks. Systematic control checks have been implemented at the entry points into Paris. Tourism companies reckon visitor numbers will fall by four to five percent this year due to deadly militant attacks. The French Prime Minister Manual Valls has worked to improve measures by convening a government committee on tourism to grant about 43 million Euros to fund security, an advertising campaign, and ramping up measures to assist and hotels. Many analysts do however fear that the extended state of emergency will further discourage international travellers and that many conferences for businesses and organizations will shift to other tourist centres such as London, Amsterdam, or Milan.

4.4. Tunisia TUI (Thompson Holidays in UK) and the Tunisian police have been criticized by an investigation into the death of holidaymakers in the terror attack at a beach in June 2015. Tunisian authorities concluded the police had no plan to counter a terror attack, were not professional, did not do their duty and showed a chaotic and slow response. Local security units had ‘deliberately slowed down to delay their arrival’ the inquest at the Royal Courts of Justice heard. An unnamed official from the interior ministry told the judge’s investigation that security units ‘had the ability to put an end to the attack before the police arrived but wasted a considerable amount of time getting to the hotel’. The court was provided with evidence related to booking and security at the hotel will be heard in the week February 6 and ‘it is generally critical to TUI according to the counsel. Holidaymakers caught up in the attack stated that they have expressed concerns before travelling but were told they had nothing to worry about. The families said that they contacted Thomson (part of TUI) on more than one occasion for reassurance before they travelled. They were concerned after the terror attack at the Bardo National Museum, Tunis, in which 20 tourists died including one British woman. Tunisian authorities made much of the arrests of cell behind the Bardo terrorists a week after it happened, but many were quietly released two months after the Sousse attack.

4.5. Turkey Suicide bombers have targeted Turkey’s capital Ankara and its largest city, Istanbul, including an ISIS bombing on Sultanahmet Square in January that killed nearly a dozen German tourists. It was the deadliest attack on Germans abroad in 13 years and has caused scores of Germans to cancel trips to Turkey amid safety concerns. Çetin Gürcün, secretary of TURSAB, the Association of Turkish Travel Agents, says ‘tourists are asking about security measures, what we are doing about that. And I can tell them, Turkey is doing its best for security. But global terror, you know, it can happened anywhere, at any time’. Turkey is fighting the growing perception it is no longer safe, rocked by the spill over violence from neighbouring Syria. The Turkish government is fighting an escalating battle on two fronts, against ISIS and Kurdish rebels. Shop owners and restaurants state there is a heavy police presence on the square, with armoured vehicles making regular patrols, but it has done little to calm the fears of European tourists, who no longer flock here. Atatürk International Airport is reported to have a tighter security system in place than most other airports around the world, where travellers are required to undergo two security screenings: one before entering the international terminal and one after they pass through control. In the tourist magnet of Istanbul, all museums and shopping malls have airport type security x-ray scanners for bags. Popular tourist attractions such as the Blue Mosque, in the Sultanahmet district, however, are not said to have any 23 security scanners. But the Turkish government told the FCO that there has been increased security in cities since January’s suicide bombing. In addition, Turkish authorities have successfully disrupted attack planning in the recent past. The Turkish authorities have said that security has been tightened in response to recent attacks. Nevertheless, further attacks are likely, could be indiscriminate and may target or affect places visited by foreigners, according to the travel advice from the FCO. More than 2,500,000 British nationals visit Turkey every year and it is generally safe to travel but the FCO warns ‘the threat from terrorism remains high’ and advises ‘you should take additional safety precautions. You should be alert to your surroundings and remain vigilant in crowded places popular with tourists.’ The FCO also warns against all but essential travel to parts of Şırnak, Mardin, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Diyarbakir, Kilis and Hatay provinces in Turkey as well as Siirt, Tunceli and Hakkari. It strongly advises British tourists elsewhere in Turkey to stay indoors, avoid public places, and remain vigilant. Security will soon be tightened at Turkey’s bus terminals, as new safety measures have been introduced to make it mandatory for bus companies to check passengers’ identity card numbers and reorganize terminals for additional security, Turkish daily Akşam has reported. The list of new arrangements, which were decided upon after consultations between the Transportation Ministry and the police, will make it compulsory for bus companies to check each passenger’s identity card and note their identity number in order to prevent incidents similar to the June 28 2016 attack on Istanbul Atatürk Airport. With the new measures each passenger will only be issued one ticket for themselves, as one person from a family will no longer be able to purchase tickets for all family members. The companies will be asked to note the identity card numbers for all their customers, while it was being debated whether those numbers would also be printed on paper tickets. Bus companies are set to be fined if they are caught carrying passengers without tickets and the police are expected to tighten security checks at terminal entrances and exits to intervene against such incidents. The structure of bus terminals was also subject to change, as two checkpoints were expected to be set up at each terminal. Just like at an airport, relatives and friends of passengers will also be subjected to security checks when they arrive at the terminal to bid farewell. Tickets will be controlled at a second checkpoint and persons without a ticket will not be able to cross. This measure was intended prevent people other than passengers from approaching the vehicles. Accordingly, more police officers, private security guards and plainclothes officials were set to be on duty at terminals. Turkey has been targeted by a series of terror attacks over the past year, the latest at Istanbul Atatürk Airport blamed on the Islamic State that killed 45 and wounded hundreds of others. While there was an increased police presence at Atatürk Airport on Wednesday, other areas of the city had already seen an expanded police presence following the earlier attacks. Security measures at Atatürk were already considered stronger than at many other airports, as travellers must go through two security screenings and there is a vehicle checkpoint near the international terminal, though only suspicious vehicles are stopped.43

4.6. Egypt In November 2016, several countries issued warnings against travelling to Egypt following the Russian Metrojet plane crash in October 2015. The government of Egypt has been trying to convince these countries, including Russia and the UK to cancel such warnings after security measures were enhanced at Egyptian airports. Germany, one of the main markets for Egypt’s tourism industry, updated its travel advice following the Hurghada attack to recommend that its citizens do not visit the . In an interview 24 at J. Walter Thompson (2016), the agency recently appointed to take charge of promoting tourism in Egypt and to show the world how Egypt’s safety and security measures are among the best in the world, Egypt ECO and Chief Strategy Officer MENA, Amal El Masri discussed major incidents. She stated a pre-event agenda to be able to face the crisis is vital since we can take an immediate view of the situation and make effective decisions. The biggest challenge is that negative view of safety and security in Egypt and the region as a whole. She believes that changing this negative perception must be a priority at this stage since the current view of the situation in Egypt is not good, so she works on that at the moment. Regarding safety and security, she stated that security should be tangible, especially by tourists. This certainly reflects on the overall security of the country and thus should take the highest priority in the governmental agenda. The agency is working closely with the Ministry of Tourism and coordinating with the Egyptian Tourism Authority regarding their efforts to restore security in Egypt as a major step to revive tourism. In recent times, Egyptian government announced allocating 32 million dollars to enhance and improve the security measures in the country and key resorts. Egypt is constantly nowadays striving to provide a great deal of security to tourists visiting the country, the stated. The additional security measures to be taken place and to be implemented in 2017 include the purchase of metal detectors and new scanners, recruiting more security personnel in the tourism sector, and deploying more police dogs. Mohammad Osman, who heads the Luxor travel agent association, said that something happens in Egypt every two months and that they are prepared for shocks like this. He also pointed out those two large monitors that receive live feeds from the security camera network installed all over the city at the west bank of Nile. He also stated that the outside perception is changing because of the efforts made to enhance the security measures. Furthermore, tourism officials in Egypt said that steps to improve security measures at airports including Sharm el-Sheikh, with the help of a British security firm recruited to deliver a new aviation security programme for the country’s airports and historic sites in the country are being implemented and that Egypt is safe. The firm Restrata with its ‘deep understanding of airport security and operations, new technology and aviation regulation’ and experience working with airports around the world including London Heathrow, will advise Egypt’s Falcon Group International, the private firm appointed by the Egyptian government to provide security across the country’s airports, to train 7,000 new security staff over the next six months.44 The UK Ambassador to Egypt said that for months, Egypt has been working hard to upgrade security at its airports and the partnership with Restrata is another step towards the goal of creating a world class airport security system that provides the safe and secure environment that visitors demand. He also added, ‘working closely with our international partners we continue our efforts to demonstrate that our airports are ready to welcome tourists back to one of the world’s most popular destinations’. Sandra Carvao, communications chief at UNWTO, said that ‘the capacity of Egypt to recover is relatively strong, even though the situation is a little bit complicated.’ 45 Hisham Zaazou, Egypt’s former Minister of Tourism, promised additional security measures to protect tourists and authorities were reported to have been planning to spend 250 million Egyptian pounds, on more CCTV cameras, sniffer dogs and X-ray machines at tourist resorts. In addition, a new security installations is earmarked for the ancient temples at Luxor, which targeted by an attempted suicide bomber attack June 2015. A spokesman of Thomas Cook in Britain said the ‘volatile geopolitical backdrop’ was causing some customers to postpone booking their holidays, leading to lower booking levels. He added the business had moved flights away from turmoil in Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt, in favour of increased demand for travel to the Western Mediterranean such as Portugal and Spain. In 2015, Telegraph Travel’s Chris Moss joined a group of British and French travellers on a Nile cruise down to Luxor – a section that

25 has been almost completely closed for two decades because of security fears. He said it would be wrong to say, though that visitors coming now would notice no difference from five years ago. There is, generally a higher security presence, for example on the road to Cairo airport. Russian experts visited Egypt in recent months to implement all Russian security demands soon. Russian experts during their visit asked the Egyptian authorities for a number of additional measures, which have been implemented for the most part. Russian Transport Minister said that Egyptian authorities were planning to complete the security measures to ensure security at airports by the end of 2016. Egypt’s new Minister of Tourism Yehia Tashed announced a 6x6 Tourism Impact Plan to boost tourism in the country over the next six years, and the final goal of this plan is to bring a huge number of tourists back to Egypt. But Euromonitor International’s Kinda Chebib now doubts that these ambitions are attainable. Although Egypt is known for quickly bouncing back from different crisis, she believes that the recent events will slow down ambitions of the local government to achieve the target of 20 million tourist arrivals by 2020. Travellers are likely to remain ‘very hesitant’ to travel to this part of the Middle East, opting instead for the Gulf countries or places in North Africa, such as Morocco, she said, adding that ‘the series of terrorist events hitting Egypt since 2015 raises further concerns about security at airports in the country. In December, 2016 Thomas Cook UK and Ireland decided not to offer package holidays to Sharm el-Sheikh for 2017. The UK government ordered the suspension of all commercial flights since November 2015. In a blog on the Thomas Cook website, stated that they have regularly been asked when the operator will resume trips to Sharm el-Sheikh from the UK. Thomas Cook answered in their blog that ‘the decision ultimately rests with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office which issues expert security advice for UK travellers.’

4.7. Conclusion In conclusion it can be said that whilst the levels of terrorist attacks are higher in MENA countries Europe is certainly not immune. Preventive measures are in a process of improving across the board but in general are of better quality in European states, as regulations are stricter. In terms of the relative effects on tourist buying decisions then this is difficult to quantify, as tourists only experience the preventive measures as they travel but do not have any effective way of comparing preventive measures of different destinations before they decide on which destination to select. For this reason the increase in preventive measures do not play a role in destination choice in the short term but their longer term effect in reducing the success of attacks and therefore their frequency will be a factor. Another factor which should be mentioned is the need for international cooperation to take preventive measures and in this respect organisations like the EU are better organised to do this than other regions.

26 5. Scenario Planning 5.1. Introduction Scenario planning was chosen as a means of focussing more practically on two vital aspects of this research. Using the conclusions of the investigations into customer reactions and links between geopolitical stability and security as input steering group members were invited to consider what the biggest uncertainties will be that confront the outgoing market for tourism in the Netherlands. The preparation for this discussion was an in detail DESTEP analysis (see appendix for details of DESTEP) which provided detail on the macro environment confronting the market. The steering group selected “Geopolitical Instability” and “Environment and Health Insecurity” as the two axes of the scenario cross. That is to say, they found these aspects as the most important largest uncertainties they expect to deal with in the coming five year period. Both of these factors are likely to generate significant commercial risk for tour operators over the coming five years and beyond.

•Study of the geopolitical, economic, demographic, Desk Research and political trends of the last two decades in the Middle East and Europe

•Seperation of developments DESTEP Analysis into Demographic, Economic, Social, Technological, Ecological, and Political categories

•Consulation with key First Scenario stakeholders to identify the Planning critical uncertainities e.g. Session Geopolitical Instability and Environmental/Health Insecurity

Production of •Creation of four scenarios based on Scenario Cross the two critical uncertanities

•Feedback on Second Scenario the four scenarios and Planning preliminary Session strategic planning

Figure 10. Scenario Planning Process

27 Environmental & Health Insecurity

British Weather The Perfect Storm  Desertification, flash Environmental  Extreme weather in the flooding, and epidemics MENA region and MENA in the Sahara. migration flows  High levels of social and  Breakdown in MENA political unrest in MENA social cohesion and  Effective aid response regional turmoil from EU/US/China  Disunited EU

 Lower levels of tourism  Calls for security flow switches based information

around weather &  Tourism flow switch

environment increase/move to safer

destinations &

Convergence Divergence Geopolitical Instability

Yes We Can! Order Destabilised  Fragile but conflict free  Worsening US-China MENA relations 

Health Security Rising tensions between  Unified EU Saudi Arabia and Iran  Declining number of  IS defeated but still terror attacks carries out terror attacks  Stable MENA and Europe  Declining global and Americas economic growth  Mass tourism returns to  Tourism flow switches the MENA region remain high between

 Lower levels of tourism stable and unstable flow switching destinations   Doubts regarding

Environmental & Health Security

Figure 11. Scenario Cross 5.2. Scenario 1: Order Destabilized An unpredictable US Administration is swiftly raising geopolitical uncertainty in the MENA and Asia Pacific regions during the early 2020s. US relations with China are deteriorating leading to high levels of Chinese- US brinkmanship in the South China Sea and the Korean Peninsula in 2023. US-Russian involvement in the Saudi-Iranian geopolitical rivalry and over the post-war statuses of Syria and Libya contribute to the constant threat of escalation in the Middle East. The Islamic State has lost all of its territory but together with the PKK and TAK continues to stage terror attacks in Turkey, across the Middle East, and Europe. Emerging and developed economies are gradually shifting towards renewable energy sources and there are only low to moderate effects of extreme weather and international public health concerns. Incoherent US fiscal policy, the slowing of the Chinese economy and the rise of trade protectionism in the European 28 Union are increasingly pointing to a reduction in global economic growth. Although the actual risks of tourism remain moderate, the perceived risk of tourism to the MENA region remains high due to political and economic instability. Global tourism still enjoys moderate, albeit reduced, growth, but sudden tourism flow switches in the MENA region linger due to high levels of political risk generated by the existence of a myriad of global geopolitical flashpoints and acrimonious great power relations.

5.3. Scenario 2: Yes We Can! The reduction of great power assertiveness and robust multi-lateral cooperation over Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Libya lead to a series of ceasefires and a conflict-free, albeit fragile, Middle East in 2023. Refugee agreements with Turkey and Libya, strong Franco-German relations and slow-moving but effective European security integration reduce the EU’s external vulnerabilities and bolster the bloc’s strategic autonomy. Germany becomes the main driver of economic growth and political integration in the EU but a multi-speed EU materialises as the Visegrád Four refuse to transfer sovereignty to Brussels. Terrorist attacks still occur in Europe and the MENA region infrequently but international intelligence sharing efforts considerably reduce their efficacy. The lack of major epidemic outbreaks, the global transition towards renewable energy, and the meeting of the COP 21 targets ensures that global environmental and health security remains positive. Strengthened Chinese-US bi-lateral ties and a reset of Russian-US relations lower great power tensions in East Asia and the Middle East respectively. A stable geopolitical environment in the Middle East, leads to the improvement of destination security and a decrease in the perceived risk of travel to the majority of Middle Eastern destinations. Mass-tourism returns to Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt and new destinations in the Black Sea region emerge to accommodate for upsurge in tourist arrivals in the short-haul area. Regional tourism flow switching in the Middle East and Southern Europe remain low as a result of high levels of destination security.

5.4. Scenario 3: British Weather Desertification, flash flooding, crop failures and water scarcity and the emergence of epidemics in the Sahel region during the early 2020s continue to harm state stability, and strengthen migration flows via North Africa to the EU. Environmental and health risks spread into the Middle East and North Africa, contributing to demonstrations, social unrest, and political instability and lead to higher than normal regional travel risks. These threats harm the economies and tourism sectors of numerous MENA states but a benign international environment ensures that they are contained and gradually resolved by the influx of development aid and international assistance via the EU/US/China and UN Agencies by 2023. The actual and perceived risks for tourists to the MENA area remain high in the immediate aftermath of the environmental disasters but are quickly declining. Environmental, health and political risks ensure that tourism flow switches in the MENA area and Europe are flattening but are still at relatively high levels due to the high potential of a fresh environmental or health crisis.

5.5. Scenario 4: The Perfect Storm In 2023 the worsening effects of climate change are contributing to MENA countries increasingly suffering from extreme weather effects, food shortages, epidemics, and high levels social unrest. The unstable political situation substantially increases migration flows to the EU, leading to a breakdown in social cohesion and sparks intra-state conflicts over remaining water resources in the Middle East and North Africa. A fragile EU is unable to effectively cope with the problem effectively or attract assistance from the 29 US, Russia, or China due to the three great powers continued embroilment in geostrategic competition in the Middle East, East Asia, and Eastern Europe. The high levels of geopolitical uncertainty are increasing perceived and actual travel risks rapidly and reducing global tourism flows. In response to the especially high travel risks in the MENA region extreme levels of tourism flow shifts away from the crisis-blighted countries to safer destinations in Northern Europe are becoming ever more noticeable.

5.6. Results Scenario Planning Sessions 1 and 2 In the second scenario planning the steering group considered the four scenarios and were asked to identify the most important changes that will be caused by each of the four scenarios (see figure 11), so the question here was: what does this scenario actually mean for the business? Along with the changes caused also come business implications. The next step was then to group these changes and implications into whether they are desirable changes/implications or undesirable, or in other words whether they are opportunities or threats (see figure 12). Those factors were then ranked in order of importance and from these two groupings strategic actions were identified (see figure 13):

30

Figure 12. Threats and Opportunities (Wenselijk, Onwenselijk) ranked in importance.

31

Figure 13. Tactical and Strategic Actions

The listing and ranking of threats and opportunities based on plausible and realistic visions of the future revealed some interesting and thought provoking results (see table). The results also beg the question: what tactical or strategic actions are necessary in order to minimise threats and maximise opportunities? The grouping of threats and opportunities can be seen below: 32 Threats Opportunities A. Competition on safety (4) 1. Global partnerships (5) B. Limited mobility (5) 2. Different holiday periods (5) C. Higher distribution costs (2) 3. Development of accommodation and D. Migrant flows (5) infrastructure on existing ‘good’ E. But shit keeps happening (4) destinations (5) F. Culminating xxx (2) 4. Development of new destinations (5) G. Less paxes, less turnover (2) 5. Expectation management by tour H. BLN/... Venice and Amsterdam scenario operators; media offensive (5) (2) 6. Continual rise of number of destinations I. We get used to unsafety (business as (4) usual) (1) 7. High flexibility tour operators (4) J. Border controls within EU (1) 8. Information role of the government; data K. Prices of insurances increase (1) destinations (3) L. Disappearance of Euro what does it 9. Tour operators will do more to mean for NL? (1) protect/inform paxs’s pax will expect M. Economic recession (1) more N. Countertrend against help/aid (1) 10. New business models (3) O. Less turnover (1) 11. Cooperation on safety issues (3) P. Closed borders (2) 12. Customer wants security (2) Q. Increased pressure on destinations (2) 13. New modes of cooperation (2) R. Less turnover (1) 14. Humanitarian tourism (2) S. Less purchasing power (1) 15. New business models (2) T. Less destinations (1) 16. Flexibility is most important (2) U. Less spendable/elasticity (1) 17. Economic growth (2) V. More conflicts with airport slots, available 18. More Euros; margins? (2) accommodation, etc. 19. Different yield management (1) W. Decrease of supply (1) 20. Privacy? (1) X. Rise of insurance costs (1) 21. ‘Different’ instead of ‘less’ (1) 22. Shift of destinations 23. More resorts, hide people from misery (1) 24. Customers do not want to be confronted with refugees (1) 25. More camping holidays (1) 26. Less pre-paid accommodation in ‘unsafe areas’ (1) 27. Development of new/alternative destinations (1) 28. Privacy laws (1) 29. Safety as USP (1)

Actions Combining Opportunities Threats Lobby towards government to Different holiday periods (2) Increased pressure on stop with staggering of holidays destinations (Q) More and better information Customer wants security (12) We get used to unsafety – about destinations business as usual (I) Customers have to provide more Privacy (20) Closed borders (P) 33 personal data, this gives more Flexibility is most important (16) insights in who is travelling, and Privacy laws (28) borders can stay open/flexible Customer wants security (12) Invest in IT and e-commerce New business models (10) Higher distribution costs (C) European travel advice Cooperation on safety issues X (11) Renegotiate accommodation in High flexibility tour operators (7) Shit keeps happening (E) unstable areas; Less pre-paid accommodation in prepayments/guarantees go ‘unsafe areas’ (26) down Increase attention to security, in Tour operators will do more to Competition on safety (A) cooperation. protect/inform paxs’s pax will Ultra safe resorts. expect more (9) More resorts, hide people from misery (23) Global partnerships (1) Security consciousness/risk New business models (10) Flexibility is most important (16) analysis and travelling safer Media campaign: security risk in Expectation management by More conflicts with airport slots, perspective; different holidays tour operators; media offensive available accommodation, etc staggering preferred; more (5) (V) flexibility needed (slots etc.) Customer wants security (12) Different holiday periods (2) High flexibility tour operators (7) Tour operators will do more to protect/inform paxs’s pax will expect more (9) Scouting session and research Development of new Less destinations (T) destinations (4)

Figure. 14 Opportunities and Threats ranked in level of importance.

It is clear that from the listings the overall picture is that tourism given will continue to increase and that the geopolitical situation will give rise to dramatic tourism flow switching based on destination security. This gives rise to opportunities and threats for tour operators. In the main the areas for attention are the changing buying decisions of the customer (based on security) and how the tour operators can adapt to sudden tourism flow shifts. Therefore flexibility (on the part of tour operators) is mentioned and the way customers are dealt with and informed (related to security) is mentioned. Beyond that the perceptions around security or lack of it give rise to opportunities in terms of new resorts or focussing on protected or ultra-safe resorts.

34 6. Recommendations and Conclusions

Moving to conclusions this report asserts the following:

 That threat levels in relation to security in destinations has increased and will continue to be high. Both the actual threat and the perceived levels of threat have increased due to geopolitical instability and domestic turmoil in the MENA region, but not confined to it. The perceived levels of threat are disproportionately high compared to actual threat. This reality gap comes about through lack of understanding of geopolitical reality but also due to the sensationalised presentation of security issues in the media. The issue is further highlighted by recent attacks in Europe.  There is a clear proven link between geopolitical instability and compromised security levels. Many examples have been detailed in this report and the classifications quoted prove the link.  The criteria in the classifications link political, social, and economic factors as criteria which impact on geopolitical stability or lack of it and in turn reflect on security. Those countries with high levels of social cohesion, good governance, state legitimacy, and democracy score well in terms of being stable and are more secure destinations.  All the above has given rise to the phenomena of tourism flow switching from destinations perceived as insecure to those perceived as more secure which has massive disruptive power and causes shifts of millions of tourists with serious business implications for tour operators.

Moving to recommendations and actions for the industry to consider:

 Instigate efforts to monitor geopolitical trends in the regions and countries considered unstable and offered as tourist destinations. This will help to monitor which countries are likely to become increasingly less secure over time. This could be done by employing geopolitical monitoring services from external bodies such as SOS International, and EXOP, but it could also be achieved more cost effectively by teams of interns under the supervision of the tour operators’ internal crisis Manager or security specialists. Greater discussion over destination security levels with DMOs would also be of benefit. This information can be communicated to customer support teams who deal with customer enquiries. Having this information will ensure that tour operators are well informed of current and upcoming geopolitical risks and able to use this knowledge in customer contact.  Embrace strategic foresight procedures (scenario planning) to develop more resilience and flexibility in all areas of the business. Based on the information gained through monitoring the current regional geopolitical situation and individual country situations, tour operators could develop scenarios on a yearly basis to ensure they are better able to anticipate, prepare for and cope with commercial risks caused by tourism flow switching. By involving employees in all departments of their business, action lists based on better flexibility can be drawn up and implemented. Brand image as a safer travel option (than DIY online) can be created and better bottom line performance can result.  Improve strategic agility/flexibility in developing contingency plans based on risk of a switch of tourism flow from one destination to other. This will enable tour operators to transfer customers from one country or destination to another in the event of threats or breaches to incidents that 35 compromise destination security. This could involve selecting a primary replacement for stricken destinations (e.g. Greece for Turkey) which has sufficient capacity to take a significant portion of clients and 2-3 secondary destinations to provide a plurality of choice for customers.  Consider a media offensive to close the gap between perception of threat to some destinations and actuality of threat. The aim would be to bring some reality and perspective into the subject of destination security. At the same time tour operators are seen by their customers as responsible for information about potential dangers. Encourage tourists to use the new BUZA App (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Travel Risk App). This gives useful up-to-date information to tourists on risks they may face direct on their smartphones  Provide where necessary access to accurate and clear information on destination security to tourists through appropriate channels. This is likely to reassure tourists and ensure they themselves are able to come to a more accurate and rational decision on the actual risks they are taking. Marketing and communications can also be used to more accurately reflect the actual threat levels on the ground which may be more secure than portrayed in the news media. Failure to provide better access to this information runs the risk of tour operators being viewed (by media channels and the public) as placing commercial interest above customer safety. Moreover, the provision of this information where appropriate would enhance the brand image of tour operators in general and provide them with competitive advantage compared to booking via online.  Instigate a process of re-evaluation of agreements concerning accommodation with destinations stakeholders that are less geopolitically stable (more prone to tourism flow shifts/losses). The aim here is to examine areas of the business in order to improve flexibility and resilience to tourism flow switching.  Consider strengthening agreements with and focussing marketing resources on destinations who are geopolitically stable and are likely to benefit from tourism flow switches.

36 Appendix 1. DESTEP Analysis - Scenario Planning Demographic – Population Composition, Density, Infrastructure, Geography  The Middle East is currently experiencing a youth bulge with nearly 65% of the population in the region under the age of 30. Unless economic situations improve in MENA countries this is likely to fuel discontent which will lead to increased recruitment rates for terrorist organisations, anti-government protests and widespread unrest. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Iraq and Syria are especially at risk  The EU as a whole has seen positive population growth of around 1.5 million per year and the Netherlands has witnessed population growth of around 3-5% since 2013  The continued development of the $1.4 trillion Chinese led One Belt, One Road project will contribute to the development of rail, road and maritime infrastructure across South-Eastern Europe, Turkey and the South Caucasus over the next 5 years. OBOR is aimed at developing multi-modal transport corridors between China and Europe which are certain to boost regional development, tourism and commerce flows across Eurasia  The Baku, Tbilisi, Kars (BTK) railway is scheduled to be completed in late June 2017. This will significantly boost regional connectivity, tourism, and trade potential between Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey Economic – Growth, Inflation, Purchasing Power, Economic Climate  Major economic reforms are unlikely to have a significant effect in Egypt during the next 12 months, inflation will continue to rise (currently 30%) The Egyptian pound has started to recover from its drop from 0.11 to 0.055 against the USD in November 2016  Egypt has started to cut energy subsidies, will increase VAT to 14% by 2018, has floated the pound and managed to secure a $12bn IMF loan package which will lead to positive results by 2018 if the country follows through with the necessary reforms and austerity measures  Tunisia secured an IMF financing package linked to reforms in April 2016. Over the course of 2017 it will implement austerity measures to cut the deficit and reduce debt to 50.9% by 2019. Austerity measures will likely lead to growing discontent amongst the population over the next 6-12 months  Iran’s economic position likely to strength as it continues to reintegrate into the wider global economy after the cessation of the nuclear-related sanctions in 2015.Growth of 5% predicted and inflation likely to increase slightly to around 10%  The GCC (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman) is moving towards implementing economic reforms to reduce the impact of the current low oil price. These include the imposition of 5% VAT by January 2018  The MENA GDP growth rate will remain stable at 2.4% for 2017 before rising to 3.2% in 2018. Inflation will continue to rise in the region of 4-5% across 2017 primarily due to upturn in energy prices  All EU member-states will continue their economic recovery around the 1.7% mark. Inflation will pick up and stay at the level of 1.8%  The macro-economic situation of the Netherlands is expected to remain strong with growth likely to exceed 2% in 2017. This will have run-off effects for disposable income and travel spending levels due to reduced unemployment figures Social-Cultural – Standards & Values, Communication, Behaviour, Lifestyle

37  Islamophobia and xenophobia will continue to present problems for European governments across 2017. In the wake of the EU Referendum in 2016 England and Wales have witnessed the rise of hate crimes by around 41%  A similar narrative of Islamophobia is observable in the Netherlands, France and Germany with approximately 99 reported incidents targeting mosques in 2015 across the EU. This was up from 2 reported incidents in 2009  Populism, based largely on nationalist tendencies, is likely to remain a worrying trend in 2017. Although Marine Le Pen is unlikely to win the French elections in May the growth in membership and support for nationalist parties will shift the political agenda and debate towards nativist, anti-migration, euro-sceptic, and protectionist stances  Destination safety and security are currently of great significance with 97% surveyed in a recent Travelzoo poll stating that personal safety is a key factor when choosing a destination  Within a Dutch context there are statistically significant relations between age and the importance of destination safety with younger generations less concerned about security concerns in unstable countries than older generations  The dwindling flows of European and Dutch tourists to destinations such as Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt will likely lead to these destinations looking to attract intra-regional and domestic tourists instead Technological – Innovation, Trends, Technical Problems  The March 22 portable electronics ban will prohibit travellers for the foreseeable future from bringing devices on flights from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia on UK bound flights  The rapid development of consumer-grade virtual reality devices could start to have an impact on tourism in the next 5-10 years. This could lead to greater opportunities for the tourism industry to market tours to particular destinations more effectively by providing a clearer representation of a destination. Secondly, they could enable tourists to ‘virtually’ explore unsafe destinations from the safety of their home Ecological – Nature Resources, Energy, Emissions, Waste and Safety  Morocco has suffered repeatedly from the adverse effects of climate change such as flooding, including in 2014 where 32 people died in its southern region. In February 2016 Morocco also experienced major disruptions in the Tanger-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region due to heavy rainfalls  Oil production cuts after the signing of the November 2016 OPEC-Russia agreement have contributed to a slow rise in crude oil prices. By 2018 $60 is like to be the new average price of oil. These prices will contribute to increased inflation across the MENA region  The increased risk of extreme weather, rising temperatures and decreased water availability due to climate change are likely to have an impact on food and environmental security across the Middle East and North Africa over the coming decades  Environmental insecurities and problems have the potential to drive conflict, increase migration flows to Europe and reduce destination security in locations such as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt Political – Legislation, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, Political Plans  Egypt will continue to suffer from insecurity particularly in the Western Desert due to the problems in Libya, and secondly in the Sinai Peninsula where the Islamic State – Sinai Province is based (Responsible for the Metrojet Flight attack in 31 October 2015)

38  The Islamic State is likely to continue to stage terror attacks in Turkey, Western Europe and potentially Tunisia and Egypt even as its conventional capabilities are eroded by Iranian, Turkish, and Coalition offensives in Syria and Iraq  The Islamic State will likely cling on to its territories in Syria including its capital, Raqqa until the end of 2017 at the earliest  Even when the Islamic State loses all of it territory it is likely to remain pose a threat to regional stability due to its ability to stage operationally complex and lethal terror attacks in Europe and the Middle East  Increased risk of terrorism in Tunisia and Western Europe as foreign fighters from the Islamic State will begin to return home during the next 12-18 months as the Islamic State weakens  The war in Syria will continue and solidify into a Turkish-Iranian/Russian proxy war over 2017 and 2018. This could lead to Iran funding Kurdish groups such as the TAK or the PPK to stage terror attacks within Turkey  Current Iranian president Rouhani will face difficulties in being re-elected due to pressure from conservative factions in Iran. However, likely to win the May 19th elections due to the need for a moderate faction in power to ensure that the nuclear sanctions are not snapped back into place  Turkey will shift towards a presidential system if the population votes in favour of constitutional reform on April 16. Success not guaranteed but protests and unrest will almost certainly occur no matter which way the vote goes  Tunisia has continued to face growing demonstrations over the course of 2016 and early 2017. In December 2016, approximately 1200 demonstrations were held illustrating the fragility of the current political situation  April 5 chemical weapons attack could significantly change US policy in Syria as Trump has threated unilateral action which could significantly change US-Russian dynamics if the U.S if acted upon  The unpredictability of the current US administration and its focus on securing tactical military objectives in Syria and Iraq and not long-term stabilisation objectives will harm the prospects of regional stability returning to the Levant  Russia’s willingness to deploy special forces and deepen its commitment to support General Haftar who opposes the UN-backed government based in Tripoli will reduce the chances for peace in 2017 and ensure Libya remains a source of regional instability in North Africa for the foreseeable future

39 End Notes

Front Cover Images: BBC.com 1 ITB World Travel Trends Report 2016/2017, IPK International, November 2016. 2 World Tourism Barometer Advance Release, UNWTO, January 2017. 3 Michael Hall, Tourism and Geopolitics; the Political Imaginary of Territory, Tourism and Space, 2017. 4 Saul Cohen, Geopolitics. The Geography of International Relations, 2nd edition. Pentagon Press, 2010, 5 Benjamin Miller, Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity, Security Studies, 2006. 6 Maysam Bizaer, Iran’s Sector Growing, But is it Enough?, Almonitor, August 17 2016. 7 Ozgur Tore Iran’s Tourism Double-digit growth continues, FTNNews, January 23 2017, 8Tunisia: 46.2% increase in tourist arrivals, but long-term visibility is not clear, African Manager, June 4 2017. 9 Anthony Cordesman, Risks and Instability in the Middle East and North Africa, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2016. 10 P. Hunter-Jones, A Jeffs, and D Smith, Your Way into Crisis: An Exploratory Study into Perceived Risk and Tourists Behaviour amongst Young People. Journal of Travel & Tourism Marketing, 23 (2/4). 11 Global Peace Index 2017 Report, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017. 12 Global Peace Index 2017 Report, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017. 13 Galia Fuchs and Abraham Pizam, The Importance of Safety and Security for Tourist Destinations, 2011. 14 Galia Fuchs and Abraham Pizam, The Importance of Safety and Security for Tourist Destinations, 2011. 15 Janene Pieters, Hundreds of Dutch vacationers cancel trips to Turkey, NLTimes, March 17 2017. 16 Abraham Pizam and Aliza Fleischer, Severity versus Frequency of Acts of Terrorism: Which has a Larger Impact on Tourism Demand, Journal of Travel Research, 2002. 17 Abraham Pizam and Aliza Fleischer, Severity versus Frequency of Acts of Terrorism: Which has a Larger Impact on Tourism Demand, Journal of Travel Research, 2002. 18 Abraham Pizam and Aliza Fleischer, Severity versus Frequency of Acts of Terrorism: Which has a Larger Impact on Tourism Demand, Journal of Travel Research, 2002. 19 Shrabani Saha, The Modern Effects of Political Instability and Terrorism on Tourism Development: A Cross Country Panel Analysis, 2014. 20 World Travel & Tourism Council, Travel and Tourism: Economic Impact 2015 Syria. 21 World Travel & Tourism Council, Travel and Tourism: Economic Impact 2015 Syria. 22 Abraham Pizam, A Comprehensive Approach to Classifying Acts of Crime and Violence at Tourism Destinations, Journal of Travel Research, 1999. 23 Galia Fuchs and Abraham Pizam, The Importance of Safety and Security for Tourist Destinations, 2011. 24 Study Finds Security Tops Tourists Concern in Holiday Choice, Reuters, March 2017. 25 Eli Avraham, Media Strategies for Attracting Tourism to Middle East Countries, Current Issues in Tourism, 2013. 26 Shrabani Saha, The Modern Effects of Political Instability and Terrorism on Tourism Development: A Cross Country Panel Analysis, Journal of Travel Research, 2014. 27 Heba Saleh, Moroccan tourism suffers as visitors way of terrorism abroad, Financial Times, November 23 2015. 28 Shrabani Saha, The Modern Effects of Political Instability and Terrorism on Tourism Development: A Cross Country Panel Analysis, Journal of Travel Research, 2014. 29 IS Heft Mogelijk Spaanse Costa in Vizier, Telegraaf, 13 February 2017. 30, Spain Denies British Tabloid Reports of Imminent Islamic State Terror Attacks on Tourist Beaches, The Spain Report, February 14 2017. 31 Eli Avraham, Media Strategies for Attracting Tourism to Middle East Countries, Current Issues in Tourism, 2013. 32 Galia Fuchs and Abraham Pizam, The Importance of Safety and Security for Tourist Destinations, 2011. 33 Galia Fuchs and Abraham Pizam, The Importance of Safety and Security for Tourist Destinations, 2011. 34 Tunisia tourism: Ambassador urges FCO to travel warning, BBC News, 24 May 2016. 35 Tunisia tourism: Ambassador urges FCO to travel warning, BBC News, 24 May 2016. 36 Galia Fuchs and Abraham Pizam, The Importance of Safety and Security for Tourist Destinations, 2011. 37 Sevil Sönmer and Asan Graefe, Influence of Terrorism risk on Foreign Tourism Decisions, Annals of Tourism Research, 1998.

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38 Andy Milman, Foard Jones, Susan Bach, The Impact of Security Devices on Tourists’ Perceived Safety: The Central Florida Example. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 1999. Sirakaya, E., Sheppard, A.G., & McLellan, R.W. Assessment of the Relationship between Perceived Safety at a site and Destination Choice Decisions: Extending the Behavioral Decision-Making Model. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Research, 1997. 40 G.I. Crouch, Destination competitiveness: an analysis of determinant attributes. Journal of Travel Research, 2011. 41 Larsen, Svein, et al. Effects of sudden and dramatic events on travel desire and risk judgments. Scandinavian Journal of Hospitality and Tourism 11.3, 2011. 42 Jim Brunsden, Europe’s airport safety system in spotlight after Egypt Air crash, Financial Times, May 2016. 43 Tiffany Ap, How did the Istanbul airport attackers get past security, CNN, June 2016. 44 Soo Kim, Egypt to Increase Security in Sharm el-Sheikh and other Airports, The Daily Telegraph, 29 June 2016. 45 New Security Measures: Egypt Invests $32 Million in Tourism Safety, Tourism Review.

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