Refugee Review Tribunal

AUSTRALIA

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: LKA17726 Country: Sri Lanka Date: 10 January 2006

Keywords: Sri Lanka – Colombo – Tamils – LTTE – Peace Process

This response was prepared by the Country Research Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

Questions

1. Please give an update to the Sri Lanka - Background to Security - Issues Paper of 9 December 2005 and include the LTTE response to the election of a new President and his alleged hard-line attitude to the LTTE and the peace process. (An LTTE announcement was expected on Heroes Day, 27 November.) 2. Please add material about the LTTE’s current attitude to the peace process. 3. Please provide an update on the situation for Tamils in Colombo, including young Tamils from the north (or east) with no ties in Colombo.

RESPONSE

1. Please give an update to the Sri Lanka - Background to Security - Issues Paper of 9 December 2005 and include the LTTE response to the election of a new President and his alleged hard-line attitude to the LTTE and the peace process. (An LTTE announcement was expected on Heroes Day, 27 November.)

On 27 November 2005, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, delivered the annual LTTE Heroes’ Day (or Martyr’s Day) speech. According to this statement the LTTE is, in the short term, prepared to “wait and observe” to see whether the newly elected Sri Lankan President, Mahinda Rajapakse, will put forward “a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people”. Presently, however, the LTTE is of the opinion that “President Rajapkse has not grasped the fundamentals, the basic concepts underlying the Tamil national question” and, if an improved framework does not materialize, Prabhakaran states that the LTTE “will, next year, …intensify [its] struggle for self-determination”. The delivery of this ultimatum was preceded by a preamble whose content suggests that the LTTE does not believe that a Sri Lankan government would ever provide such a framework. The LTTE claims not to believe in the value of the peace process in and of itself. According to this year’s Heroes’ Day address, the LTTE has entered the peace process as a consequence of strategic circumstance and the need to “win the support and sympathy of the international community” by “convinc[ing] the world community that [the LTTE] are not war-mongers”. It would thus appear that the LTTE is of a mind to build diplomatic capital in the short term the better to fight a more effective military campaign in the long term; and that it considers the possibility of a peaceful settlement in the current moment to be only a remote possibility. For a translation of the entire address see pages 11 to 15 of the October-November 2005 issue of the LTTE Peace Secretariat News Bulletin (supplied as Attachment 1). Relevant extracts follow in detail:

Even though we are deeply convinced that we cannot obtain justice from the Sinhala political leadership, but rather have to fight and win our rights, we were compelled by unprecedented historical circumstances to participate in peace talks with the Sinhala state. We were compelled to engage in the negotiating process by the intervention of the Indian regional superpower at a particular historical period and by the pressure of the international community at a later period. There were other reasons, also, that encouraged us to engage in the peace process. Constructive engagement in the peace process is a viable means to secure legitimacy for our liberation organisation as the representative organ of our people. We also wanted to internationalise our struggle and win the support and sympathy of the international community. Furthermore, there is a need to convince the world community that we are not war-mongers addicted to armed violence, but rather, firmly and sincerely committed to a non- violent peace process. Finally, and most importantly, we wanted to demonstrate beyond doubt that the Sinhala racist ruling elites would not accept the fundamental demands of the Tamils and offer a reasonable political solution. It was with these objectives we participated in the peace process.

…The boycott of the presidential elections by the vast majority of Tamil people was a concrete expression of this perspective. Our people did not participate in the election, even though they had the voting power to determine the election of a new president. The non- participation of the Tamils should not be construed as a judgement of the personalities or policies of the presidential candidates. Rather, this political boycott was an expression of the deep distrust and disillusionment of the Tamil people with the Sinhala political system.

…We have now reached the critical time to decide on our approach to achieve the objective of our struggle. At this crucial historical turning point, a new government under a new leader has assumed power in the Sinhala nation. This new government is extending its hand of friendship towards us and is calling our organisation for peace talks. It claims that it is going to adopt a new approach towards the peace process. Having carefully examined his policy statement in depth, we have come to a conclusion that President Rajapkse has not grasped the fundamentals, the basic concepts underlying the Tamil national question. In terms of policy, the distance between him and us is vast. However, since President Rajapakse is considered a realist committed to pragmatic politics, we wish to find out, first of all, how he is going to handle the peace process and whether he will offer justice to our people. We have, therefore, decided to wait and observe, for sometime, his political manoeuvres and actions. Our people have lost patience, hope and reached the brink of utter frustration. They are not prepared to be tolerant any longer. The new government should come forward soon with a reasonable political framework that will satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people. This is our urgent and final appeal. If the new government rejects our urgent appeal, we will, next year, in solidarity with our people, intensify our struggle for self-determination, our struggle for national liberation to establish self-government in our homeland’ (‘“LTTE to intensify struggle for self- determination if reasonable political solution is not offered soon”’ 2005, LTTE Peace Secretariat News Bulletin, October-November, pp.1 & 8-15 http://www.ltteps.org/mainpages/images//2005/12/Novmber_2005_pdf – Accessed 20 December 2005 – Attachment 1).

2. Please add material about the LTTE’s current attitude to the peace process.

With some exceptions, commentators on Prabhakaran’s 2005 Heroes’ Day speech have generally taken a pessimistic view of what the LTTE’s intentions mean for the peace process. Moreover, as the weeks have passed and violations of the peace accord have continued to accumulate and gather in intensity, analysts have found the prospect of a return to war to be increasingly likely (for an optimistic reading of Prabhakaran’s 2005 Heroes’ Day speech, see: Sambandan, V.S. 2005, ‘Prabakaran’s ultimatum’, Frontline, vol.22: iss.25, 5-18 November http://www.flonnet.com/fl2225/stories/20051216006913400.htm – Accessed 5 January 2006 – Attachment 2; for the more prominently pessimistic viewpoint, see: Madhavan, G. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: the Twitch in the Tigers Tale’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 8 December http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1639.html – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 3; also: Schaffer, T. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Peace Process on the Ropes’, South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies website, 1 December http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam89.pdf – Accessed 6 January 2006 – Attachment 4; and: ‘Sri Lanka’s Tigers on the loose’ 2005, The Economist Global Agenda, 29 December http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5349948 – Accessed 5 January 2006 – Attachment 5; for an appreciation of the manner in which risk forecasts for Sri Lanka have taken a downturn, see: Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, ‘Country Forecast – Sri Lanka’, The Economist, 6 December http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast – Accessed 20 December 2005 – Attachment 7; and: Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, ‘Country Forecast – Sri Lanka’, The Economist, 3 January http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast – Accessed 5 January 2006 – Attachment 8).

A discussion of the source materials informing this assessment follow below.

According to Frontline’s V.S. Sambandan, Prabhakaran’s 2005 Heroes’ Day speech “was seen by leading political scientists in the island nations as ‘conciliatory’”; proving “[c]ontrary to the expectations in Colombo of a possible extreme hardline tone”. Sambandan notes that “[a] day after it was delivered, the Colombo stock market’s indices rose reflecting a sense of relief among investors”. Nonetheless, Sambandan also notes that “Prabakaran minced no words in naming Rajapakse’s main allies…as ‘Sinhala Buddhist racist forces’” or in presenting his offer of conciliation as an ultimatum. Relevant extracts follow, including Prabhakaran’s discussion of the views of Colombo University’s Jayadeva Uyangoda:

Significantly, the “next year” time-frame is open-ended and could mean any time from January 2006 to his next annual address in November 2006. Read against Rajapakse’s three- month time-frame for concluding his efforts for a southern consensus and moving towards opening discussions with the LTTE, the first quarter of 2006 is bound to be significant for the future of the peace process. On Rajapakse’s parameters for conflict- resolution, Prabakaran said the President “has not grasped the fundamentals, the basic concepts underlying the Tamil national question”.

Rajapakse sees the peace process as one of accommodating the majorities and the minorities within a multi-ethnic Sri Lanka, in sharp contrast to the LTTE’s view that it is a matter involving “self-determination of the Tamil nation”. The LTTE leader was reffering to this conceptual difference when he said that “the distance between him and us is vast”.

…Jayadeva Uyangoda, Professor of Political Science, Colombo University, said: “Given speculation of a possible hardline speech, this appears a conciliatory gesture towards the new President”. The speech reflected two things: “The LTTE leader wants the peace process to resume. He also wants the new government to understand the political dynamics of the ethnic conflict.” Uyangoda said Prabakaran has “also quite smartly placed the burden of resuming the peace process on the new President”. The LTTE has “reiterated the language of self- determination of the Tamil people, which President Rajapakse might find difficult to ignore. In a way, the speech contributes to political stability and reduces uncertainty between the government and the LTTE for the moment”, Uyangoda said (Sambandan, V.S. 2005, ‘Prabakaran’s ultimatum’, Frontline, vol.22: iss.25, 5-18 November http://www.flonnet.com/fl2225/stories/20051216006913400.htm – Accessed 5 January 2006 – Attachment 2).

In a paper written for the South Asia Analysis Group, Geeta Madhavan argues that the ambiguities of Prabhakaran’s 2005 Heroes’ Day speech fall away with the assuredness with which Prabhakaran rejects any belief in the ability of the Sri Lankan authorities to deliver acceptable terms of settlement. The relevant extract follows in detail:

In the Heroes Days speech Mr.Prabhakaran has made clear that Our people have lost faith in a peace process that has failed to secure them a real, peaceful life; they have lost faith in a ceasefire that has failed to remove the occupation army from their homes; they have lost faith in the talks that have failed to resolve their long standing problems. Whatever ambiguity there might have been disappears with that statement.

The time frame that the LTTE leader seems to have placed before the President can also be seen as one that the LTTE intends to recover, rearm and recoup its forces after the tsunami disaster. But he clearly states rather ominously that they have decided to wait and observe. Although it seems the time is to be meant to assess the sincerity of the President to find a solution it could well be time spent to mobilize itself into a fitter and deadlier fighting force for perhaps the final showdown to which Mr. Prabhakaran seems committed to. That comes out clearly in the reference that the request to the government to come out with a framework to satisfy the political aspirations of the Tamil people as being our urgent and final appeal (Madhavan, G. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: the Twitch in the Tigers Tale’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 8 December http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1639.html – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 3).

Writing for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Teresita Schaffer notes of Prabhakaran’s 2005 Heroes’ Day speech that the “unrelenting argument about how both major Sri Lankan parties had failed to keep their promises offers little optimism that a breakthrough is likely”. Schaffer further notes that Prabhakaran has “repeatedly said that [the LTTE has] given up on Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese politicians” and “declared that the LTTE’s participation in the peace process was intended to show the international community that it stood for peace” (Schaffer, T. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Peace Process on the Ropes’, South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies website, 1 December http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam89.pdf – Accessed 6 January 2006 – Attachment 4).

The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has, in the period following the release of the November 2005 Heroes’ Day address, presented an increasingly more pessimistic outlook for security in Sri Lanka. Extracts from the 6 December 2005 and 3 January 2006 forecasts follow bellow in chronological order. On 6 December 2005 The Economist Intelligence Unit believes that Mr Rajapakse’s presidential victory does not bode well for the peace process involving the government and the LTTE, as he campaigned largely on the platform of taking a hard line against the rebel group. Furthermore, if he maintains an uncompromising stance now that he has been elected, fissures are likely to appear within the PA, as many within Mr Rajapakse’s party disagree with his hardline stance).

…Increased political uncertainty following the presidential election is already undermining investor confidence. It is also likely to deter tourist arrivals. As a result, we have revised down our forecast for average annual real GDP growth in 2006-07 from 6% in our November report to 5.8% this month (Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, ‘Country Forecast – Sri Lanka’, The Economist, 6 December http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast – Accessed 20 December 2005 – Attachment 7).

On 3 January 2006 The Economist Intelligence Unit believes that Mr Rajapakse’s victory has increased the risk that the peace process involving the government and the LTTE will collapse. Both the military and the rebel group have issued statements recently claiming that they have the capability to win should the armed conflict resume.

Increased political volatility following the presidential election is likely to have a dampening effect on the tourism industry. As a result, we have revised down our forecast for average annual real GDP growth in 2006-07 to 5.7%, from 5.8% in our December report (Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, ‘Country Forecast – Sri Lanka’, The Economist, 3 January http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast – Accessed 5 January 2006 – Attachment 8).

The Economist Global Agenda has recently stated, on 29 December 2005, that the LTTE “show signs of gearing up for renewed fighting” and that the “fragile ceasefire…is close to breaking-point after a string of recent attacks by the Tamil Tiger rebels”. The report notes that “[o]n Thursday December 29th the head of the ceasefire-monitoring team, Hagrup Haukland, gave a warning that, if the spate of violence were not halted, ‘war may not be far away’”; that “the Tigers are suspected of having used the ceasefire to rearm and regroup”; that “last month [Prabhakaran] gave a warning that there would be a return to war if the government did not offer an acceptable settlement within the next year”; and that while “Sri Lanka’s economy has held up well since the tsunami, its stockmarket has plunged in recent days on fears that a return to war is imminent”. Details of the recent attacks listed by this report follow below:

In the most serious of the recent attacks, 12 Sri Lankan soldiers were killed in a landmine attack in the Jaffna peninsula on Tuesday and, four days before that, 13 sailors were killed with mines and rocket-propelled grenades in a rebel attack in the north-west of the island. On Sunday, a parliamentarian linked to the Tigers was assassinated at a Christmas mass in Batticaloa. So far, however, the Sri Lankan military has largely held back from retaliating against the rebels’ renewed assault, hoping that condemnation by Sri Lanka’s foreign aid donors will pressure them into returning to ceasefire.

…Pressure from donor countries may yet persuade both sides to return to serious negotiations. But with every rebel attack it becomes harder for the government to resist sending its forces to strike back (‘Sri Lanka’s Tigers on the loose’ 2005, The Economist Global Agenda, 29 December http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5349948 – Accessed 5 January 2006 – Attachment 5).

The preceding article represents a distinct change in outlook to the views expressed in an Economist publication of 24 November 2005, which expressed the view that ““the status quo – neither peace nor war – is likely to persist” (‘Tigers and a hawk’ 2005, The Economist, 24 November http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5220582 – Accessed 20 December 2005 – Attachment 6).

In the month which followed the completion of this research response, on 14 February 2005, the following advice was received from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in regard to the security situation Sri Lanka:

A. Has the security environment in Sri Lanka deteriorated to any significant degree in recent months?

The security environment in Sri Lanka has deteriorated further since early December 2005 with over 200 people killed, including almost 100 members of the security forces. The majority of the security forces were killed in mine attacks – in Jaffna, Mannar, Batticaloa, Vavuniya and Trincomalee – as well one suicide bomb attack against a navy vessel in Trincomalee.

2. Civilians in the north and east have also been affected by ongoing violence. Civilians have been killed in tit-for-tat reprisals between rival groups, and cross-fire incidents between the LTTE and security forces. The deaths of two Tamils at the hands of a mob in the Muttur District in early December 2005, led to heightened tensions between Tamils and Muslims in that area, with several Muslims killed in reprisal attacks. The UN advised us on 12 January that some Tamil civilians in Muttur had also relocated out of the district and into LTTE controlled areas to avoid harassment by the security forces. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM – www.slmm.lk), which monitors the implementation of the 2002 ceasefire agreement, do not believe Government forces have been systematically harassing Tamils, though there have been isolated retaliatory incidents against Tamil people.

3. In addition to attacks against security forces and civilians, tit-for-tat killings between LTTE and rival Tamil paramilitary groups continue, particularly in the East where the LTTE’s break-away Karuna faction is located.

4. Colombo, and the central and southern districts have been largely unaffected with life on- the-whole proceeding as normal. The presence of security forces has increased and there was increased tension in the Tamil community when police rounded up and questioned large number of Tamils in January. A number of small explosive devices detonated in Colombo on 24 January. No one was injured in the attack. The announcement of talks on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the Government and the LTTE on 25 January has led to a reduction in the levels of violence compared to the previous six weeks.

B. Have any recent events made the possibility of a future deterioration in the security environment in Sri Lanka more likely?

5. The violence described above has all occurred since the 17 November 2005 Presidential election. The elected President, Mahinda Rajapakse, aligned himself with southern nationalists opposed to compromising with the LTTE. Upon election, Rajapakse stated his commitment to finding a lasting solution to the conflict. 6. On 25 January 2006 the Government and the LTTE agreed to hold talks on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement 22 to 23 February in Geneva. Since the announcement violence has reduced (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 448 – RRT Information Request: LKA 17726, 14 February – Attachment 19).

3. Please provide an update on the situation for Tamils in Colombo, including young Tamils from the north (or east) with no ties in Colombo.

Recent news reports and advice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) indicate that the situation for Tamils in Colombo has changed significantly in recent times. The final weeks of 2005 saw the arrest of a large number of Tamils in Colombo in a broad security operation which detained over 100 persons on 17 December 2005 and over 900 persons on 31 December 2005. TamilNet has reported that “[i]ntelligence agencies were questioning the arrested persons to establish and document ‘valid reasons’ for their stay in Colombo”. The Peace Secretariat of the LTTE has claimed that “[n]ew security checkpoints and road barricades were also created by the” Sri Lankan Army on 17 December. Although these operations have generally been reported as taking place without incidents of violence, and with the vast majority of the detained persons being released, TamilNet has reported that “[t]wo of the youths who objected the arrests, were beaten by the soldiers” on 31 December. In the following week, on 6 January 2006, a protest against the actions of the Sri Lanka authorities was staged in Colombo. The demonstration reportedly involved hundreds of protestors but was without incident (for the most recent advice made available by the DFAT, see: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 433 – RRT Information Request: LKA 17714, 6 January – Attachment 9; see also: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 448 – RRT Information Request: LKA 17726, 14 February – Attachment 19; for information on arrests of 19 December 2005 and the establishment of new checkpoints, see: ‘More than 100 Tamils arrested in Colombo during SLA cordon and search’ 2005, Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam website, 19 December http://www.ltteps.org/?view=1049&folder=2 – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 10; see also: ‘107 Tamils arrested in Colombo’ 2005, SiberNews Media website, 19 December http://www.sibernews.com/the-news/sri-lanka/107-tamils-arrested-in-colombo- 200512193128/ – Accessed 8 January 2005 – Attachment 11; for information on the arrests of 31 December 2005, discussed in the context of the deteriorating security situation, see: Senanayake, S. & Sengupta, S. 2006, New York Times website, 1 January http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/international/asia/01lanka.html – Accessed 6 January 2006 – Attachment 12; for information on the violent incident reported by TamilNet, see: ‘920 Tamils arrested in major cordon, search operation in Colombo’ 2005, TamilNet website, 31 December http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16702 – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 13; for information on the protest of 6 January 2006, see: ‘Protest in Colombo over indiscriminate arrests of Tamils’ 2006, TamilNet website, 6 January http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16770 – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 14).

As regards the specific situation of young Tamils from the north (or east) with no ties in Colombo, no information, directly addressing this issue, could be found within the reportage of the presently developing situation. Nonetheless, the focus of the recent sweeps – on ensuring that ethnic Tamils in Colombo have a legitimate reason for being in the capital – would seem to suggest that young Tamils arrived from the north would be persons of interest for Sri Lanka’s security authorities. The US Department of State, in its most recent report on human rights practice in Sri Lanka, has noted that “[t]he war with the LTTE prompted the Government to impose more stringent checks on travelers from the north and the east and on movement in Colombo, particularly after dark” (US Department of State 2005, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004 – Sri Lanka, 28 February http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41744.htm – Accessed 2 March 2005 – Attachment 15).

A discussion of the source materials informing this assessment follow below.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade DFAT supplied RRT Country Research with the following advice on 6 January 2006. The advice is sourced from “a Tamil lawyer and Presidents Counsel (equivalent to a QC)”.

We spoke to a Tamil lawyer and Presidents Counsel (equivalent to a QC), regarding the situation faced by Tamils living in Colombo.

The Tamil lawyer said that Government of Sri Lanka’s (GOSL) security forces had recently started rounding up Tamils indiscriminately. The state of emergency, imposed after the assassination of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar on 12 August 2005, remains in force. This gives security forces additional powers to search properties, vehicles and individuals, and of detention without charge for periods of up to 90 days. The Tamil lawyer said that over 100 Tamils had been arrested and taken into custody this week in Colombo. One of those arrested, Mr B. Parathipan, was a prominent journalist and lawyer who was arrested along with two other Tamil colleagues after being stopped at a Government checkpoint. The three were reported to have produced their national identity papers and press cards as requested, and released upon the intervention of a Tamil parliamentarian. Less connected Tamils would likely have spent longer in custody.

The Tamil lawyer said that had we spoken to him four months ago, he would have said that Tamils in Colombo were able to conduct their daily lives and were for the most part free of persecution by the Army. The arrests mentioned above are a relatively recent development, reminiscent of the 1996-98 period, during the conflict, when Tamils in Colombo were persecuted by GOSL security forces.

The Tamil lawyer said persecution of Tamils living in the Colombo region by the LTTE was very rare. The strong presence of GOSL security forces would make persecution by the LTTE difficult (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 433 – RRT Information Request: LKA 17714, 6 January – Attachment 9).

The Events of 17 December 2005 The Peace Secretariat of the LTTE has stated that, during “the evening of 17 December”, “[t]he Sri Lankan Army (SLA) conducted sudden cordon and search operations in Colombo that resulted in the arrest of more than 100 Tamils”. The Peace Secretariat of the LTTE also claims that, in addition to searching “homes, offices, hotels, shops and vehicles”, “[n]ew security checkpoints and road barricades were also created by the SLA”. The report continues:

The search operations were conducted in the areas of Wellawatte, Kirulappanai, Narehenpitiya, Bampalapitiya and Havelock Town. Arrests were carried out crudely and those arrested were not given reasons for their arrests. Ninety-five percent of those arrested had national identity cards and employment identity cards. One police inspector who wished to remain anonymous is reported to have said that the arrested people were not in possession of illegal items.

Residents expressed anger that they were being treated like cattle. Those arrested were initially taken to the local police stations of their district. At about 10:00 pm they were taken to the police headquarters in Bampalapitiya, where they were videotaped, had photographed and thoroughly questioned. The inquiries at the police headquarters continued until the following morning at 6:00 am. Those arrested were then taken back to local police stations and held in custody there until 10:30 am.

The employer of the journalist and computer specialist of the media centre requested that they both be released, but police officials refused to release them.

The search operations were reported to Tamil politicians, who went to police stations demanding the release of those arrested and some people were released. There is heightened tension among the Tamil people in these areas (‘More than 100 Tamils arrested in Colombo during SLA cordon and search’ 2005, Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam website, 19 December http://www.ltteps.org/?view=1049&folder=2 – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 10). Prominent amongst those arrested on 17 December 2005 were a number of Tamil journalists. Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF; or Reporters Without Borders) has stated that “B. Parathipan, a lawyer and renowned journalist working for the Tamil language daily Thinakkural and two other staff at the newspaper, Kulukulan and Prameshwaran, were held in custody overnight after being stopped at a Colombo checkpoint”, on 17 December 2005, “[e]ven though they produced their identity papers and press cards issued by the authorities”. Further details follow:

Police officers took fingerprints and photos of B. Parathipan and his two colleagues without giving them any explanation. They were only released after the intervention of a Tamil parliamentarian (‘Tamil journalists suffering repeated arrests and harassment’ 2005, Reporters Sans Frontières website, 20 December http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15953 – Accessed 6 January 2006 – Attachment 16).

In a paper for the South Asia Analysis Group, R. Hariharan notes, of the “sudden security search operations on night of December 17, 2005”, that the rounding up of “over 100 ‘suspects’… from Tamil areas” and “[t]he arrest of three Tamil journalists of the pro-LTTE daily ‘Thinakkural’ in Colombo on the same night also indicated that the search and arrest operations were specifically to send a warning to Tamil population”. The relevant extract follows in detail:

It is clear that LTTE’s brazen escalation of attacks is rapidly reducing the space for peace manoeuvres and subtle moves. The President’s tight ropewalk in the face of these provocations is getting even more difficult. SLSF command will have to exercise tight control on its troops to prevent them from indulging in large-scale reaction to the Pesalai killings particularly in areas where they operate very close to civilian population. Otherwise the Pesalai killings may well become yet another touch off point for yet another infamous pogrom against Tamils as in 1983 elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Media reports state that Tamils in Colombo were subjected to sudden security search operations on night of December 17, 2005, when over 100 ‘suspects’ were rounded up from Tamil areas of Bambalapitya, Wellawatte etc in Colombo. The arrest of three Tamil journalists of the pro-LTTE daily “Thinakkural” in Colombo on the same night also indicated that the search and arrest operations were specifically to send a warning to Tamil population. According to the well-known columnist DBS Jeyaraj, the appointment of the retired Deputy Inspector General MKGD Kokkadeniya, known for his extreme right Sinhala attitudes and mass round up of Tamils, as defence advisor has already unnerved the Tamils (Hariharan, R. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Seeding the Clouds of War’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 26 December http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes3%5Cnote288.html – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 17).

The Events of 31 December 2005 According to the New York Times, “[t]he house-to-house sweep on Saturday [31 December 2005] was carried out primarily in the Tamil enclaves of Colombo by about 2,400 police officers, backed by 2,000 soldiers, sailors and air force personnel”. Looking “to root out what they called suspected separatist rebels”, the security forces arrested “920 people, most of them ethnic Tamils”. All but 53 were later released. The report notes that, of the many significant incidents which have escalated tensions in Sri Lanka in recent weeks, this was the first incident of note to have occurred in Colombo itself. Further details follow below:

By the end of the day, only 53 remained in custody; the police said 5 were members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam guerrilla group. The rest, charged with minor crimes, were released on bail.

…It was also among the first signs of tension to be felt in Colombo, the capital. Political assassinations, grenade attacks and bombings have largely been restricted to the Tamil- majority north and east of the country, near the areas controlled by the Tamil Tigers… .

…“The policemen asked us if there was anyone living in the house for less than one year,” said S. Joseph, a retired teacher and a Tamil living in a predominantly Tamil neighborhood called Wellawatte.

He said the police were cordial and explained why they were there. “But it did bring back memories of the frequent searches we were compelled to go through before the cease-fire,” Mr. Joseph said. “I guess we may have to go through more of these in the coming days” (Senanayake, S. & Sengupta, S. 2006, New York Times website, 1 January http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/international/asia/01lanka.html – Accessed 6 January 2006 – Attachment 12).

Also reporting on the arrests of 31 December 2005, TamilNet reports that, according to “informed sources”, those “arrested were taken in busses to 8 different police stations and were being photographed, finger-printed and videoed by the Sri Lankan Intelligence agencies”; “[i]ntelligence agencies were questioning the arrested persons to establish and document ‘valid reasons’ for their stay in Colombo”. TamilNet also states that, according to eyewitnesses, “[t]wo of the youths who objected the arrests, were beaten by the soldiers in front of Roxy Cinema Theatre in Wellawatte”; and that, of the Tamil persons arrested in the round ups of the preceding weeks, “[o]nly five persons, from the earlier search operations were still in custody, the Police sources claimed” (‘920 Tamils arrested in major cordon, search operation in Colombo’ 2005, TamilNet website, 31 December http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16702 – Accessed 8 January 2006 – Attachment 13).

Tamils of “Colombo’s Wellawatte area” informed The Australian’s correspondents that residents “were forced to remain indoors for over five hours and prevented from getting on to the street as searches were carried out mainly by armed soldiers” (‘Troops hunt rebels house to house’ 2005, The Australian, 31 December http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,17701735%255E23109,0 0.html – Accessed 8 January 2005 – Attachment 18).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources: Government Information & Reports US Department of State website http://www.state.gov United Nations (UN) UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) website http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/home UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) website http://www.unhchr.ch Non-Government Organisations Amnesty International website http://www.amnesty.org/ Human Rights Watch (HRW) website http://www.hrw.org/ Reporters Sans Frontières website http://www.rsf.org International News & Politics BBC News (World Edition) website http://news.bbc.co.uk/ Center for Strategic and International Studies website http://www.csis.org New York Times website http://www.nytimes.com Time Asia Magazine website http://www.time.com/time/asia/ Region Specific Links Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTEPS) website http://www.ltteps.org/ Siber News Media website http://www.sibernews.com South Asia Analysis Group website http://www.saag.org Sri Lanka News website http://www.lankapage.com/ Sri Lanka Online News website http://www.colombopage.com/ Tamil Guardian website http://www.tamilguardian.com TamilNet website http://www.tamilnet.com/ Search Engines Google search engine http://www.google.com.au/ StaggerNation website’s Google API Proximity search engine http://www.staggernation.com/cgi-bin/gaps.cgi Internet Archive WayBackMachine search engine http://www.archive.org/ Online Subscription Services Colombia International Affairs Online (CIAO) website http://www.ciaonet.org/ The Economist website http://www.economist.com Janes Intelligence Review website http://jir.janes.com University Sites University of Maryland – Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) website http://www.cidcm.umd.edu

Databases: Public FACTIVA Reuters Business Briefing DIMIA BACIS Country Information REFINFO IRBDC Research Responses (Canada) RRT ISYS RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. RRT Library FIRST RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments

1. ‘“LTTE to intensify struggle for self-determination if reasonable political solution is not offered soon”’ 2005, LTTE Peace Secretariat News Bulletin, October-November. (http://www.ltteps.org/mainpages/images//2005/12/Novmber_2005_pdf – Accessed 20 December 2005)

2. Sambandan, V.S. 2005, ‘Prabakaran’s ultimatum’, Frontline, vol.22: iss.25, 5-18 November. (http://www.flonnet.com/fl2225/stories/20051216006913400.htm – Accessed 5 January 2006)

3. Madhavan, G. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: the Twitch in the Tigers Tale’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 8 December. (http://www.saag.org/papers17/paper1639.html – Accessed 8 January 2006)

4. Schaffer, T. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Peace Process on the Ropes’, South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies website, 1 December. (http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/sam89.pdf – Accessed 6 January 2006)

5. ‘Sri Lanka’s Tigers on the loose’ 2005, The Economist Global Agenda, 29 December. (http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5349948 – Accessed 5 January 2006)

6. ‘Tigers and a hawk’ 2005, The Economist, 24 November. (http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=5220582 – Accessed 20 December 2005)

7. Economist Intelligence Unit 2005, ‘Country Forecast – Sri Lanka’, The Economist, 6 December. (http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-Forecast – Accessed 20 December 2005)

8. Economist Intelligence Unit 2006, ‘Country Forecast – Sri Lanka’, The Economist, 3 January. (http://www.economist.com/countries/SriLanka/profile.cfm?folder=Profile- Forecast – Accessed 5 January 2006)

9. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 433 – RRT Information Request: LKA 17714, 6 January.

10. ‘More than 100 Tamils arrested in Colombo during SLA cordon and search’ 2005, Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam website, 19 December. (http://www.ltteps.org/?view=1049&folder=2 – Accessed 8 January 2006) 11. ‘107 Tamils arrested in Colombo’ 2005, SiberNews Media website, 19 December. (http://www.sibernews.com/the-news/sri-lanka/107-tamils-arrested-in-colombo- 200512193128/ – Accessed 8 January 2005)

12. Senanayake, S. & Sengupta, S. 2006, New York Times website, 1 January. (http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/international/asia/01lanka.html – Accessed 6 January 2006)

13. ‘920 Tamils arrested in major cordon, search operation in Colombo’ 2005, TamilNet website, 31 December. (http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16702 – Accessed 8 January 2006)

14. ‘Protest in Colombo over indiscriminate arrests of Tamils’ 2006, TamilNet website, 6 January. http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=16770 – Accessed 8 January 2006)

15. US Department of State 2005, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004 – Sri Lanka, 28 February. (http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41744.htm – Accessed 2 March 2005)

16. ‘Tamil journalists suffering repeated arrests and harassment’ 2005, Reporters Sans Frontières website, 20 December. (http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=15953 – Accessed 6 January 2006)

17. Hariharan, R. 2005, ‘Sri Lanka: Seeding the Clouds of War’, South Asia Analysis Group website, 26 December. (http://www.saag.org/%5Cnotes3%5Cnote288.html – Accessed 8 January 2006)

18. ‘Troops hunt rebels house to house’ 2005, The Australian, 31 December. (http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,5744,17701735%255E 23109,00.html – Accessed 8 January 2005)

19. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2006, DFAT Report 448 – RRT Information Request: LKA 17726, 14 February.