UNCLASSIFIED and EXEMPLAIRE N* COPY m

ORIGINAL; ENGLISH FATO OFORgg- 16th Docotabcr, 1957 StrI - ARY R CORD 0-6(57)82

Suirroary Record of a meeting of the Council held at the PaIaic de Chaillot. Paris XVIe., on Ifeth Ueccivbcr. 1957 a t 12 .nqen _r.nd 3 «30 .P .m.

PRESENT

President : H.E. Ii. Joseph BECH (Luxembourg) Chairman and Secretary General: II. P.-H. SPAAK

BEX-GIU!!

H.E. Er. A. van Acker (Prime Minister) H.L. Er. V. Laroclc (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E. Kr. A. Spinoy (Minister of National Defence) , H.E. Er. K. Liebacrt / (Minister of Finance) H.E. Er. A. de Staercke (Permanent Representative)

CANADA

The Rt. Hon . J.G. Diefcnbaker (Prime Hinister) The Hon. s.E . Smith (Secretary of State for External Affairs) The Hon. G. R. Poarkos (Minister of National Defence) , The Hon. D. M. Fleming (Minister of Finance) H.E. fir. L. D. '-Vilgross (Permanent Representative) DErmARK '•

H.E. Hr. H. C. Hansen (Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs). H.E. Er. P. Hansen (Minister of Defence) DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED H.E. Hr. J.0 . Krag (Minister for External Economic , Affairs) • . . -o. ii. ..i.Er . il. v/assard (Permanent Representative)

KATO CDQRBg- FRANCE H.E. Mr. P. Gaillard (Prime Minister) H.E. Mr. C. Pineau (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E. Mr. Chah an-De Imas (Minister of National Defence) H.E. Mr.. Pflimlin (Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs) H.E. Mr. E. de Crouy-Chanel (Permanent Representative) GERMANY H.E. Mr. K. Adenauer (Federal Chancellor)- HrffE. Mr. H. von Brentano (Federal Minister for Foreign », Affairs) H.E. Mr. P. J. Strauss (Federal Minister of Defence)

- ,•%• H.E. £.r%. P. Etzel (Federal Minister of Finance) H.E. Mr. H. Blankenhorn (Permanent Representative) m GREECE H.E. Mr. C. Karamanlis (Prime Minister) H.E. Mr. Ev . Averof-Tossitsas (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E. Mr. A. Protopapadakis (Minister for National Defence) H.E. Mr. Gr. 'Cassimatis (Representing Minister of Co-ordination) H.E. Mr. M. Melas (Permanent Representative)

ICELAND H.E. Mr. H. Jonasson (Prime Minister) H.E. Mr. G. J. Gudraundsson (Minister for Foreign Affairs)

H.E. Mr. A. Kl. Jonsson (Ambassador for Iceland to Francei Mr. H.G-» Andersen (Permanent Representative)

ITAIY H.E. Mr. A. Zoli (Prime Minister) H.E. Mr. Pella (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E. Mr. p.:E . Taviani (Minister of Defence) DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED H.E. Mr. G. Medici (Minister of Finance) H.E. Mr. A. Alossandrini (Permanent Representative) LUXEMBOURG

H.E . Mr. P. Werner (Minister of Financej Minister Defence) H.E . Kr. H. Hommel (Permanent Representative) NETHERLANDS H.E . Dr. W J Drees (Prime Minister) TS.T , H.E . I -rX . J.M.A.H. Duns (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E . Mr. C. Staf (Minister of Defence) J onkheer E. van Lennep (Treasurer General) H.E . Mr. E.N. van Kleffens; (Permanent Representative) NORWAY H.E . Iir. E. Gerhardsen (Prime Mini s t er) H.E . Mr. H. Lange (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E . Mr. Nils Handal (Minister of Defence) H.E . Mr. A. Skaug (Minister of Commerce) H.E . Mr. J. Boyesen (Permanent Representative) PORTUGAL H.E . Prof. M. Caetano (Prime Minister) H.E . Prof. Dr. P. Cunha (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E . Col., Santos Costa (Minister of Defence) H. o. the Count de Tovar (Permanent Representative) TURKEY H.E . Mr. A. Menderes (Prime Minister) H.E .. Mr. P.A. Zorlu (Minister for Foreign Affairs) H.E . Mr. S. Yircali (Minister for Information) H.E, M. Esenhel (Secretary General.'Ministry of Foreign Affairs) H.E,. Mr.- S. Sarper (Permanent Representative) UNITED KINGDOM DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED The Rt. Hon. H. Macmillan (Prime Minister) The -Rt. Hon. Selwyn Dloyd (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) The Rt. Hon. D. Sandys (Minister of Defence) Sir Prank: Roberts (Permanent Representative) -E-

UFITED STATES H.E. Mr. D.D. Eisenhcwer (President, of the United States) H.E. Mr. J. Poster Dulles (Secretary of State) H.E. Mr. E.H. McElroy (Secretary of Defence) H.E. Er. E.B. Anderson (Secretary of Treasury) H.E. Mr. E.R. Burgess (Permanent Representative)

INTERNATIONAL STAEE Baron A. Bentinck (Deputy Secretary General) Er. A.•Casardi (Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs) Mr. P.D. Gregh (Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance) Mr. E.H. Meili (Assistant Secretary General for Production and Logistics) The Eord Coleridge (Executive Secretary) ALSO PRESENT Major General T.'.V. Parker (Standing Group Representative) DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED CONTENTS

Item Subject Paragraph Nos. I. Opening addresses • 1-2

II. The principal problems facing the Alliance 3 - 160 III. Programme of work 161 - 162 DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED NATO RESTRICTED I. OPENING ADDRESSES 1. The PRESIDENT Of the Council welcomed, the Heads of Government and other Ministers to the meeting and made the opening address of which the text has heen circulated in a press release dated 16th Decemher3 1957. 2. He v/as followed hy Mr. GAILLARD (Prance) and President EISENHOWER (United States) whose addresses form the subject of press releases of the same date. /The. Council then adjourned until 3.30 p.m., at which time the CHAIRITAN of the Council conducted the business of the Plenary Session// NATO SECRET

II. THII PRIi'CIPAD PROBLEMS FACING THE ALLIANCE 3. Mr. SPAAK, the Chairman of the Council, in opening the first Plenary Session, emphasised the exceptional importance of the present meeting. ' hat did the NATO peoples expect of this meeting? A message of peace and hope, but also a manifestation of unity, composure, strength and confidence in their destiny. It was high time for the Western world to recover its composure and to reassert with quiet conviction the justice of its cause and its •strength. k. The Alliance was desired by the member countries only because its necessity was imposed by events. At the close of 'Iorld V'ar II, they had believed in disarmament, and, the most powerful among them had disbanded their armed forces beyond the point justified for security. They believed in the United Nations They not only believed in peaceful coexistence, but thought that friendship v/ith the Comnunist world v/as possible. It v/as only in face of the consistently hostile policy of the latter that they realised the danger which threatened them. 5. The basic aim, collective security against attack, had been achieved. But the Alliance must continue, and i-t must become rn.ore comprehensive, closer and more powerful, through constant development and adaptation to changing' circumstances. 6. There v/ere rumours of a crisis in the Alliance. He did DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED not believe it. It v/as true that the member countries were not always in complete agreement on all problems, but this v/as in itself proof that it was an association of free countries. These divergencies were, however, of lesser importance when weighed against the agreement of all member countries on basic issues,,

-6- r 7. One of the tasks of the present conference would he to review the world political, situation. The most important event of the last few months was probably thè rejection hy the USSR of the Western disarmament proposals. The' value and- significance of these proposals had heen confirmed recently In the United Nations General Assembly hy a vote of approval hy more than 50 nations. They had been carefully prepared after discussion with all the NATO countries and were an excellent illustration of the method of political consultation. Their rejection by the Russians left the Alliance facing further problems, for the USSR chose that same moment to announce to the world the advances it.had.made in the development of the latest weapons. 8. Could NATO accept a position by which the USSR would have the monopoly in Europe of nuclear weapons? This would be the result of accepting the suggestions in the recent letters from Kr. Bulganin. On the contrary, the forces of the West must be as well equipped as possible, and its defensive system must be as powerful and efficient as it could be made.

9-. But more than this was now expected from the Alliance. Since in the military sphere it was not possible to relax their vigilance, they must assume the offensive in the diplomatic/ sphere. The Western countries must try to put- forward proposals, even though they had good reason for doubt as to how these would be received. It should not be impossible t'o prove by a concrete offer that whenever an opportunity arose for relaxing international tensions, the NATO countries would readily seize that opportunity. 10. The idea of the present meeting arose during the talks in October between"President Eisenhower and Kr. Kacmillan. In these talks, both statesmen had emphasised the need for- interdependence between all the countries of the Alliance. " Ke believed that it was now for the NATO Council to give concrete form to the hopes inspired by their declaration and to convert these principles into practical realities. The task would not be easy. " During the coming three days, it would not be possible to complete the studies which had been initiated and to settle all the details, but the resolutions resulting from the meeting should be sufficiently clear for the outside world to understand that NATO was really embarking on a new course. This new course should also enable the Alliance, while leading its own peoples to safety, to discharge its great responsibilities towards certain economically less developed countries. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED iu ^^hU^EN i IAL

11. At the close of the meeting, the whole world should understand that the Atlantic Alliance was. not merely a great mili- tary defensive organization, hut that it was also an assembly of fifteen nations which wished to huild their economic and social future together? and to offer the benefit of their wealth and capabilities to' all those throughout the world, who, like them- ; selves, desired to live.in peace. 12. Dr. ADENAUER (Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany) said that hardly ever before had the longing of all the nations for peace heen stronger. It had always been the chief aim of the Atlantic Alliance to preserve peace and to establish an order of peace ensuring to all men of goodwill a life free from fear, distress and danger, This order of peace was only conceiv- able if the division of the world could be overcome. A decisive step towards peace would be accomplished by general disarmament under international control. Unfortunately, the results of the efforts of the Alliance to achieve this aim had not been encourag- ing during the past year. The differences between East and West could not be bridged, although there had been no lack of goodwill and constructive proposals on the part of the West. Although the Western proposals for disarmament had heen endorsed in the General Assembly of the United Nations by the overwhelming majority of 56 to 9, the Soviet Union had consistently rejected these proposals. Wor did the political developments of the past few months justify any hope of a. slackening of tension. The intervention of the Soviet Union in the Middle East had led to a serious crisis.

13. The Alliance had been founded to meet the dangers of Soviet expansion and it had fulfilled this task. But nothing done or said in the Eastern bloc in recent months would permit any hope that the threat had disappeared. Communist world revolution was still the goal of the Soviet bloc. This had recently been reaffirmed by the leaders of twelve Communist countries in Moscow. 11+- 'Therefore;, the RATO statesmen meeting in Paris to review the tasks of the Alliance in the face of continually changing pro- blems, must do their utmost to make the Alliance as strong, compre- hensive' and efficient as possible. He welcomed the expression of the principle of interdependence in the Anglo-American Declaration of 25th October. He emphasised, in particular, the political importance of this principle. The Alliance must have a common policy on decisive questions, if it were not always to lag behind Soviet initiatives. It was obvious that there could be no intention to enforce co-ordination, as in the Moscow-dominated . Eastern bloc, but NATO must, more than in the past, work out common aims on a voluntary and equal basis. In this connection, he had DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED primarily in mind political consultation. It was indispensable to agree on certain common basic policies leading to concrete pro-. grammes for the solution of the problems existing in various parts of the world. He was thinking in particular of Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Only thus would the Alliance he enabled i to react quickly in critical periods. Only thus could the United . -Q-

States, as the leading power of the Alliance, act immediately if speedy action were called for, the other NATO members being imme- diately informed of the action taken. The procedure he would suggest to develop common policies was that the Permanent Council, possibly assisted by qualified experts, might make constructive" "" proposals, for example, on the economic relations -of NATO with the satellites, or for strengthening the economic ties between the free world and the nations of the Middle East.

15» In this connection, he would also mention the problem of the reunification of Germany, which was one of the main causes of tension» The Soviet Government should be reminded, that, at the first Geneva conference, they undertook to permit free elections for the re-establishment of a united Germany. The West should also insist that the Soviet Government fulfil their promise to implement the 17 points regarding East/West contacts agreed at the Geneva Conference, He also asked that NATO should devote attention to the status of Berlin. 16. The Western countries should not allow themselves to be put on the defensive by the propaganda of the Eastern bloc. Bu't why should they not themselves show more- activity and imagination in canvassing support for their own aims among world public opinion?

17. He had .read with great attention the .letter addressed to him by Mr. Bulganin. A considerable part of it was familiar -from ' other letters and statements by the Soviets in the past. • It con- tained a number of vaguely worded proposals on which it was imposs- ible to comment at present. Ee saw no objection, ho vre ver, to attempting to enquire from the Soviet Government through diplomatic channels what was the precise basis of these proposals. 18. As long as the Western efforts to create a viable order of peace made no progress and as long as the Soviet threat persist- ed, the military strength of the Alliance must be so organized as to be ready to meet aggression at any time. For this purpose the Alliance as a whole must be equipped with advanced weapons equal to those of their potential enemy. Thisi however, would require a better consolidation of resources, and organizational improve- ments.. The Federal Government had submitted proposals to this effect to the Council. An improvement of. the command structure of the Alliance would, also be necessary. All these questions • required thorough study by the Permanent Council and a decision by a Ministerial meeting in the Spring.

19. He was glad that at the present meeting time would also DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED be devoted to a preliminary discussion on methods of promoting science and research. The main objective would not be to pool large numbers of specialists and technicians in certain fields of armament development, but to promote basic research, improve scientific training, .foster exchanges between the various countries and create institutions where scholars from all countries of the -10- IATO 0^5(37782

free world, could, compete T/ith each other. He was also thinking of the young people of the non-committed countries. If they wished to" "take part in the work of the West5 he. thought that to aid them was a major obligation for the NATO countries. Ke appreciated the proposals for promotion of scientific research made hy the NATO Task Force, and considered that the proposed Scientific Committee should begin its work as soon as possible, to consider the many proposals put forward and to develop an overall plan to be submitted to governments for decision.

20. In dealing with the important and difficult tasks of the next few months, better progress would be made by intensifying the exchange of views within the Alliance. NATO was not only a defensive Alliance, but a Community whose main function was to create favourable conditions for the peaceful coexistence of all nations. They should therefore not merely continue their efforts to ease tension between the East and the West, but should endeavour to create confidence in their relations with the non-committed world, so that friendly economic and cultural co-operation could be developed. " ' .

21. Dr. DREES (Prime Minister of the Netherlands) recalled that the Alliance had been founded nine years ago under' the threat of Soviet expansionist policy. During these nine years, a common defence organization had been built up. The fact must be faced that this organization did not yet constitute a sufficient protective shield. It must be developed, within the limits of countries' resources. The progress of science called for a much greater degree of planned and integrated effort, and so far the members of the Alliance had not been sufficiently conscious of their dependence upon each other. Each country must perform its share, and share the results of its efforts with its allies. 22. He expressed great satisfaction, that Presi'dent Eisenhower the. leader of the most powerful, of the NATO member "countries, was present at the meeting. He also wished to express sincere appreciation of the fact that the United States and Canada con- tinued to maintain important forces in Europe. Their presence was essential to convince the Russians that even a limited action in Europe could not be carried out without unleashing total war. This was the only thing that could contain them..

23. With regard to political co-operation, he felt strongly that an intensification of this institution was essential to strengthen the Alliance. As the Secretary General had pointed ,out it involved a fundamental change in traditional diplomacy. At the moment,, it did not appear that the Soviet bloc wanted war. He DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED thought that the great danger confronting the West was that it would be weakened indirectly by subversion in many countries, and by a deterioration, through Soviet action, of its relations with Asia and Africa. This was one reason why political consultation was of such paramount importance. In this connection, he wished to draw the attention of the Council to the very serious situation in Indonesia. NA C-R ( 57) 82'

24. He recalled the developments in Indonesia since the inde- pendence of the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed in 1945* and the negotiations leading to. treaties under the auspices of the United Nations, These agreements were, however, progressively sabotaged by Indonesia, and finally declared null and void in 1956, The breaking of these international treaties hardly caused a ripple In the United Nations. 25. He emphasised that the aim of the Indonesian Government was to drive out all Western influence, and not merely that of the Netherlands, from Indonesian territory. .Therefore, given the great strategic and economic importance of Indonesia, the present situation was one which closely concerned the whole Western world. The Indonesian situation was first discussed in the NATO Council in May 1956, and the question was raised again by the Netherlands Permanent Representative on 7th December, 1957.. The Netherlands Government greatly appreciated the assurances of solidarity given by their partners. The importance of a common attitude of all the Western powers, in face of the challenge which the action of . the Indonesian Government constituted to orderly international, relations, could not be over-estimated. 26. Indonesia was heading for political disintegration and economic ruin, and he thought that Java at least was in grave danger of being lost -to Communism. He trusted that the Netherlands would be able to overcome the severe blow which the severance of their commercial, industrial and financial relations with Indonesia would, mean. But there might be consequences for their general position. He hoped that these consequences would be limited, but affecting as they v/ould the economic, financial and foreign exchange position of the Netherlands, it might be that at some later stage his Government would have to re-examine their external commitments to some extent. 27. A problem of equal importance for the Alliance was the situation in the.Middle East. He hoped that the powers'mainly concerned would be able to adopt a constructive and co-ordinated policy, which should be directed towards giving Israel as well as the Arab countries the security to which they were entitled, 28. Referring to the letters from Mr. Bulganin to several of the NATO leaders, he thought that although full account should be taken of Soviet duplicity, it might be appropriate to explore the proposals made therein and. even to undertake talks with the Soviet Government, 29. In conclusion, he confirmed the Netherlands Government's DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED concurrence in the decision taken in December 1956 concerning', political consultation. They agreed further that a conference should be held at Ministerial level in March 1958. He' suggested that the Council should agree that a study be initiated of the possibilities and means of formulating a common doctrine on the method-s ,to be employed to counter the Soviet economic offensive. G-R(57)82

The Netherlands were prepared to try to find a solution to the problem of the production and distribution of .new weapons. They accepted and were prepared to implement the principle of inter- dependence, Ke expressed very strongly the hope that all these questions would receive general approval from the Council, since it would be disastrous if the decisions taken fell short of the great expectations that had been raised.

30. Mr0 ZOLI (Prime Minister of Italy), emphasised the identity of convictions and aims of all the peoples represented at this conference. They all aspired to peace and liberty. The only guarantee of peace and' liberty lay in the co-operation of free . peoples.

31. The present meetings while reaffirming the principles underlined in the Alliance, had also been called with the purpose of reviewing its organization to see whether it was still effective to meet the Soviet menace. It was clear .that the military threat still remained very serious. The Soviets' great superiority in conventional weapons had hitherto been counterbalanced by the nuclear superiority of the West. Soviet progress in technical developments now threatened to wipe out the Western advantage.

32. The. Italian Government was convinced that a lasting solution to the threat of war could only be found in the framework of comprehensive and controlled disarmament. If, however, the Soviet Union still maintained its uncompromising attitude, in spite of the concessions offered by the Western countries, it was essential that NATO, while still remaining ready to discuss any constructive proposals, should make every effort not to lose the global military superiority it had enjoyed hitherto. To this end, co-operation must be strengthened, so that the best use could be made, of available resources. The main effort should be made in the following directions: (a) reinforcement of the nuclear deterrent, and increased effectiveness of the NATO forces by equipping them with modern weapons; (b) closer integration of the armed forces of the member countries; (cj collaboration in scientific research and in the production of new weapons.

33« The ItalianGovernment greatly'appreciated the statement DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED by President Eisenhower on the need to reinforce the defensive potential of the Alliance. They were ready to make every possible effort, within the limits of their resources. They we're ready to consider the proposals for closer integration and interdependence on the military plane, and for the more effective deployment of existing forces. They were prepared to contribute to the common effort in scientific research and the production of modern weapons. -13-- imisJmmmimBEmi

34. Turning to the political aspect, he noted that the present phase was one of vigorous initiative hy the Soviets, with the aim of political and economic penetration,, This was likely to develop towards a situation which would he even more critical for the West. The fact must he faced that tho Western Povrers had often shown no initiative in countering Soviet moves, and that they were not always ahle to agree even on the analysis of the situation. He was convinced that in the years to. come, they would often he faced with situations of grave danger, and it was essential that all the Western countries should make the maximum effort to he ready to meet these developments. He did not think there was need to transform the Alliance radically, hut political and economic co-operation should he increased and an attempt should he made to eliminate some divergent attitudes. i 35» He emphasised the need for continuing consultation so that the EATO countries might De ready, as far as possible, in advance to meet the situations which were likely to arise. Consul- tation on political and economic questions should take place with a view to agreement at Ministerial level on a broad plan of common action to counter the Soviet offensive, which could be kept up-to- date by means of special meetings. 36. The strengthening of the defensive power of the Alliance and the intensification of political consultation on matters closely concerning the NATO countries were not the only matters which should be considered at the present meeting. The cause of NATO was that of the free world, and closer relations should be developed between the Alliance and other countries which, like many of the South American states, exercised considerable influence on world opinion and were the object of close attention by. the USSR. In zones most directly threatened by Soviet economic penetration, the Western countries when offering economic aid should be more active in making their ideals of human and social progress known.

37. Mr. GERIiARDSEN (Prime Minister of Norway) emphasised that if the expectations raised by the present meeting were to be ful- filled, at least in some degree, it was necessary to look at the international situation in a realistic manner, and to appraise the Atlantic Organization, what it had done and what it could do, soberly and without prejudice. Nearly nine years ago, the fear of losing their freedom and independence had brought the NATO countries together in a defensive alliance. Its primary objective was to secure peace in their part of the world. They had so far succeeded in this because of their solidarity and their joint defence efforts. The defensive character of the Alliance had

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED always been clearly demonstrated by the military posture, and great care had been taken to avoid any steps which could be called aggressive or provocative. -12^ IlHA II '-Wj, NA TC" SECRET C-R 057") 82

38. As regards the military questions before the meeting, the Norwegian Government would consider with an open.mind the •various proposals for further integration of the NATO defences. These proposals required further elaboration, and there would be an opportunity to discuss them at a Ministerial meeting in the Spring, In this connection, however, he must recall that ever since the foundation of NATO it had been the policy of the Norvregian Government not to admit foreign forces on their territory, except in .case of attack or when threatened by attack. They saw no rea son to change this policy. Nor did they plan to allow atomic stockpiles to be established on Norwegian territory or to construct launching sites for intermediate range ballistic missiles.

39« In this connection, he recalled an idea which had lately . been the subject of public debate in many countries, of an area in- Europe where there would be a thinning out of military forces so as to reduce tension. Such suggestions had received considerable public attention .in Norway also. All the implications and possi- bilities of these ideas required careful study before any pronounce- ment could be made, but it might be worthwhile to examine whether they contained certain elements which could be used in a constructive policy for peace. ij-0. He had had no opportunity to study closely or discuss with other governments the recent letters from Mr. Bulganin.

41. On the question of launching sites for intermediate range ballistic missiles, the Norwegian Government considered, that the decision should be postponed. The matter had important military and political aspects v/hich governments had not yet had time to consider. Postponement need not hinder practical pre- parations. The time which would in any case elapse before any existing plans could be implemented might be used to examine the possibilities of renewing negotiations with the Soviet Union on disarmament. The Soviet Government would thus be given an oppor- tunity to show their willingness to enter into serious negotiations. 42. It seemed to be generally agreed that there was no immediate danger that the Soviet leaders would risk provoking a major war, but the West was still faced with a threat which raised problems both of a political and military character. Where, as in the non-committed countries, Soviet advances were primarily of a political or economic character, the measures adopted hy NATO should also be mainly political and economic. If, as they all hoped, wrar did not break out, the outcome of the struggle would be DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED decided in the political field and in the economic field. The democratic nations must therefore find the right balance in the use of their resources so that they could act more effectively than in the past in these fields.

-14- ^TPT^ ^NA TQ ^S ECRE T^- 1^¾ g^r TtTH C-R(57)82

1+3. At the same time military preparedness must "be sufficient to prevent the balance from tipping decisively in favour of the Soviets. This dual task wruld require great efforts on the part of all member nations; and in the Norwegian view, the continued strengthening of solidarity within the Alliance was indispensable to this end. In particular, the habit of consultation between the member nations should be further developed. It was not possible to have a common policy on all international questions, nor should they try to conceal the fact that there v/ere divergent views on some important matters. But through consultation, they should be able to reach a point where all countries, in taking their decisions, wmld be fully aware of the views of the other member nations.

l+U. On disarmament, the Alliance should stress its desire to reach a solution through negotiation-. T'hey should continue to stand on the disarmament proposals put.forward in the United Nations, not as an ultimatum but as a basis for discussion. If necessary, a solution should be sought through direct diplomatic negotiations between the two principal military powers. 4-5« As regards technical and scientific co-operation, it was generally agreed that there was room for increased inter- national effort in this field. The Norwegian Government would consider the various proposals in' the hope that methods of co-operation could be worked out which would yield positive results . 46. There were many reasons for satisfaction with the growth of the Alliance since 1349- But the development of military technology had created a new situation, in which they must show themselves capable of taking the right decisions for the future . 47. Mr. VAN ACKBR (Prime Minister of Belgium) said that his Government would support any resolution serving to strengthen the bonds uniting the members of the Alliance. It welcomed the principle of inter-dependence as formulated in the Washington Declaration.. His Government agreed upon the principle of political co-operation anc. believed in the need, for prior consultation as.defined in the Report of the Conmittee of Three. With respect to the limitation implied by such consultation, and in particular the limitation outlined in paragraph 43 of the • Report of the Comrrdttee of Three, it was self-evident that every government must, after prior consultation with its partners, DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED accept responsibility for its own decisions. Advice received from the North Atlantic Council was not mandatory, only advisory, to be taken into account when making decisions for which the government was answerable to parliament. This was the rule of conduct adopted by the Belgian Government. I4.8. With respect to defence problems, the Belgian Government considered that the requirements as defined hy the NATO military authorities should he the subject of a detailed examination by governments. This examination should be based on an estimate of the risks of aggression, and the need to coordinate the defence effort with the economic and financial capabilities of each country. These two tasks properly belonged to the civilian authorities, who would be required to base their assessment on information from the military authorities, and from diplomatic sources. Governments should immediately inform the Council of any signs of a possible crisis.

49- It would be of course wrong to give priority to military requirements to the detriment of economic stability and social progress. Experience showed that communist propaganda met v/ith the firmest resistance in those countries where general prosperity was most assured, and where economic and social progress was most vigorously pursued. 50. The Secretary General had made'very interesting sug- gestions with respect to Western economic co-operation. Aid to less developed countries outside NATO was of obvious importance in present world competition. This aid should be better organized. The idea of setting up a special body, either within or outside NATO, v/ould seem one worthy of consideration.

51. The Belgian Government considered it important to study closely the economic, financial and social aspects of the foreign policy of the USSR. 52. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the present conference would not be presented to world opinion as an essentially military one. Important decisions had. to be taken for strengthening common defence, but it would be a mistake to make it seem as if these consultations were aimed at a new start in the armaments race.

53. NATO's role could no longer be exclusively military in character. It should consist mainly in elaborating common policies in dealing with the countries of the Eastern Bloc and in working tov/ards an international control of armaments. , 54. One of the main aims of NATO should be to win back by peaceful means those countries which had been taken by force. Por this it was necessary to have a- unified and resolute policy hacked by increased concrete action and contacts and exchanges with East European peoples. The Atlantic Alliance must be DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED represented to these peoples, as also to the peoples of Asia and Africa, not only as an organization for defence, but also as a great peaceful force in the world. 55. The realisation of this fact by the subjugated countries would mark the end of those dangers that threaten the security of the Alliance. 56. Mr. EISENHOWER (President of the United States) recalled that the North Atlantic Treaty had been conceived as a collective defence organization. However, it should always be made evident that its signatories would seek to end the need for great military establishments and to release large resources for the welfare of mankind. The United States disarmament proposals of 29th August, which were developed after the fullest consultation with the Council and after prolonged negotiation with the Soviet Union, have now been approved by the United Nations General assembly. Every effort should be'made to end the armaments race, whilst at the same time assuring the security of the free world.

57. He suggested that the Council establish a technical advisory group to keep such matters under continuous study. The Soviet Union would inevitably realise the importance of stopping the nuclear arms race which would mean the stopping of theproduction and- development of nuclear weapons material, and.the establishment of a system which would exclude the risk of a massive surprise attack. 58. He reiterated the United States' determination that Germany should be peacefully reunited in freedom. He recalled the common concern of the Alliance over the status of Berlin. The rights of the Western Powers must be maintained. Any sign of Western weakness could be misinterpreted with grievous consequences.

59« It was important to'prepare adequately for collective self-defence. Although this would be difficult in a period of rapid scientific and technological advance, he considered NATO's defence planning continued to be valid. It must however be kept under continuing study and review. NATO's determination to use force, if necessary, for self defence must however remain constant. He solemnly assured the Council that the United States'would come at once and with.all appropriate force, to the assistance of any NATO nation subject to armed attack. Equally, he believed that each member nation would Similarly respond, should the United .States or another member' nation be attacked. 60. The United States, .shared the view that. political consul- tation should be developed and broadened in the Council and supported the principles embodied in the Report of the Committee

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED of Three. Although the practice of political consultation had made progress it should be improved.' The United States proposed for its part to keep its Permanent Representative fully informed of all United States policies'which might affect their NATO• associates, and he would attend and participate in meetings of the Cabinet and National Security Council when in the United. States. . He would be privy to- all the purposes of the United States Government. 61. Differences between two or three member states were not always mors readily resolved if debated around.the Council table and sometimes more' intimate and restricted negotiations would produce better results. There must also be a capacity to react' quickly to what'might-be probing operations from outside since any delay might have serious consequences. Habitual consultations would prevent, except in most extreme urgency, any nation- from being surprised.

62, The Soviet challenge was economic as Yvell as military. A Soviet compaign of trade and financial assistance was being directed against' selected less developed countries of key political importance, with a view to seeking their adherence- to Communism. If HATO was to save these peoples from Soviet penetration and domination, the time had come for an enlarged individual and co-operative effort to advance the development, trade and well- being of the less developed countries of the free world. The United States was proposing to increase the economic resources which could be made available to the less developed countries of the free world, and to improve trade and financial conditions. The United States Congress would be asked' to increase the Development Loan Fund from its present figure of 300 million dollars by an additional .625 million dollars, and to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank by an additional 2 billion - dollars:. The "United States had proposed and would participate in the expanded technical assistance programme of the United Nations. Congress would also be asked to extend the Reciprocal Trade Agreement legislation for another five years.

j 63. NAiTO, although it was created in response to a military threat, should not always be primarily a collective defensive organization. The Atlantic Community with its common traditions, should continue to work together as a growing community and v/ith increasing intimacy. In this way it would permanently serve to promote harmony, not only between the members of the Alliance but • also between the Alliance and other peoples and areas of the • world.

6k. Mr. DULLES (United States Secretary of State) recalled that the major deterrent to Soviet aggression was the maintenance of retaliatory power of such capacity as to confirm the Soviets that such aggression v/ould result in their own destruction. Such power rested in the United. States Strategic Air Command and in other nuclear striking forces. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 65, The shield.of NATO ground, sea and air forces was also an integral part of the deterrent and NATO should therefore continue its efforts to strengthen the shield, which should increasingly include a nuclear capability. This capability-, which the United States Forces in Europe possessed was being extended to the other NATO forces.

66. The United States had already established programmes of approximately three-quarters of a billion dollars for modern weapons for its ILiTO allies. Personnel of several NATO countries -18-. MMTf% J^Q^gSfigST. were being, trained in the maintenance, operation and deployment of these weapons systems.. In this connection the United States ' endorsed the idea for a NATO Missile Training Centre. It remained to ensure that nuclear warheads would readily be available to NATO forces in event of hostilities. To this end the United States was'' also prepared, if the Council so wished, to participate in a NATO atomic stockpile whereby nuclear warheads would be deployed under United States custody in accordance with NATO defensive planning and in agreement with the nations directly concerned.

67. The United States was prepared to make available to other NATO countries Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles for deployment in accordance with the plans of-SACEUR. Nuclear warheads for these IRBMè would become a part of the NATO atomic stockpile system. Such IRBM deployment would be subject to agreement between SACEUR and- the countries directly concerned, and to agreement between each such country and the United States with respect to material, training and other necessary arrange- ments. Delivery of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles could be expected as soon as the NATO nations were ready to receive them.

68. The United States suggested that a co-ordinated programme of research, development and production of a selected group of modern weapon systems including Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles might be initiated in Europe through a temporary NATO ad hoc group .consisting of highly qualified scientists, engineers and production experts who, in conjunction with the NATO military, authorities would be responsible to the North Atlantic Council for :

(1) .recommending an initial group of modern weapons or "weapon systems suitable for NATO military planning for production in Europe; (2) recommending which countries should be responsible for the development and production of specific weapons through principal manufacturers and sub- contractors for critical components; thus, later improvement in the initial designs would be developed and produced in Europe under NATO supervision;

(3) recommending measures to provide a market for the weapons produced., 69. The United States was willing to assist these endeavours DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED by means of its Mutual Weapons Development Programme, Sample Weapons Programme and Facilities Assistance Programme.- While maintaining the modern weapons production base in the'United States," the United States would support the weapons base in Europe by procurement for the United States forces as well as for United States military assistance programmes.. - -20- IATi C-R(57)82

70. • The United States supported the establishment of an appropriate permanent NATO mechanism to ensure adequate studies "in planning in the field of weapons systems and to relate this programme to scientific endeavour in the military field. It would "operate in conjunction with NATO military authorities and the proposed NATO Science Committee.

71. The defensive and retaliatory power of the NATO forces must he established at a level sufficient to meet the growing power of international Communism and each NATO partner must do its utmost to meet the established NATO force requirements, including front line divisions. 72. The United States would continue to contribute a fair share in maintaining and strengthening the collective forces of the Atlantic Community. The United States Government would also continue its military assistance programme.

73.' The United States believed that the members of the Alliance should share more information as to military nuclear matters. , Legislative changes were being proposed to the United States Congress that would permit the exchange of information to accomplish this. By working from a common fund of knowledge and • a common set of assumptions, it should be possible to develop plans for effective and discriminating use of nuclear weapons, and countries would be more likely to reach agreement, in an emergency, as to the employment of this force. 74. . NATO'Was not the only collective response to the present challenge. There were other organizations, pacts and bilateral and trilateral arrangements covering the whole world, and reinforcing each 'other, so that if war came in one area, it might not be possible to confine it to that area. 75. The United States considered that it would be useful if these various regional groups could gain a better understanding of the problems and situations faced by each other. A start might be made with an exchange of experience and appreciation of the world political situation. It was suggested, therefore, that the Secretary General and the North Atlantic Council should explore developing closer ties between these collective defence organizations. He was not, however, suggesting any merger of existing organizations or any extension- of the North Atlantic Treaty area. 76. With respect to political consultations in. NATO, it was

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED possible that in certain circumstances NATO governments could be more quickly and fully informed if the Foreign Minister of a particular capital were to explain his government's policy or actions to the NATO ambassadors there. As far as the United States Government was concerned, their* authorities in Washington would'be prepared to .meet NATO ambassadors there with respect to any situation which seemed to.lend itself to that type of exceptional treatment 'as a supplemènt to, but not in derogation of, the functioning of the Permanent Representatives in Paris,. 77. The United States Government supported the establishment of an overall NATO Science ConiLiittee -responsible to the Council to commence -its work as soon as possible. • They also urged the appointment of a Science Advisor to the Secretary General. - The task of this•Committee and the Science Advisor would be to review the different proposals which had been made including those made in the NATO Parliamentary Conference and by the NATO Scientific Task Force, and to make specific recommendations to the North Atlantic Council for action to increase scientific manpower and facilitate co-operation in research and exchange of military and civilian scientific personnel. '-/here possible action should be carried out through the mechanism of existing institutions such as the OEBC. 78. The United States Government would be prepared to parti- cipate and cbnt-ribute to an annual talent development programme for 500 pre-doctoral and post-doctoral scientific .fellowships and to assist in an expanded, programme of suoner studies institutes in Europe. They would, also be v/illing~~to" join in expanded programmes for .the exchange and translation of scientific information.

79. With respect to atomic energy, there was already a good basis for co-operation and the' United States looked forward to co- operating v/ith the agencies that had already been set up. The United. States was planning to seek the necessary legislative authority to p.ermit co-operation with NATO countries in the develop- ment of atomic submarines. If the necessary legislation was obtained,- the United States would be able to co-operate with interested members of NATO in the development, production and fuelling of nuclear propulsion and power plants for submarines and other military purposes.- This v/ould also facilitate co-operation in the field of nuclear merchant ship propulsion. • 80. In conclusion, he expressed the appreciation of his country for the contribution being made by the other members of the Alliance. - Although the'price might be high, it v/as less than if each nati.On stood alone. Efforts were being made to disrupt and divide the Alliance, but these v/ould fail and the Alliance would achieve the gains which flow from establishing the principle and practice of collective security.

81. Mr. GAILLAPJ) (Prime Minister of France) said, that the need that had been generally felt for a meeting of the Heads of Government of the various countries of the Alliance was in itself a proof that some renewal of the Alliance was necessary, to enable 'it to deal nore satisfactorily. with the new problems of both a political and military nature which had. arisen and which would arise DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED in the future.

.=. 82. The Alliemce had been created because the remaining countries of free Europe, after the war, had become conscious of the threat from the Soviet bloc which had retained its military power and was using it to back up methods of internal subversion to which one .by one the countries of Eastern Europe had fallen. 'The United States, which at that time was out of range of all the known weapons and which thanks to the atomic bomb enjoyed over- whelming military superiority, decided to guarantee free Europe against aggression and to make this guarantee effective by maintain- ing American forces in Europe.

83. What was the situation now after eight years? Soviet Russia was still in a state of mobilisation. Any improvements in the standard of living of the people had been sacrificed to an immense effort of scientific-and technical development. In the nuclear domain, she now- seemed to have achieved equality with the most advanced of the NATO countries. She had gained superiority in the domain of ballistic missiles and artificial satellites. Hence- forward, no territory of the NATO countries was safe from a surprise attack. At the same time Soviet diplomacy, having been arrested in its subversive action in Western Europe, had turned its attention to the rest of the world. China and half of Indo-China had fallen into the Comiaunist camp. 8b. Elsewhere Soviet propaganda had greatly contributed to the hasty creation of new -states which were encountering enormous difficulties in organizing their independent existence. Europe vras being driven out of its last strongholds in these areas and the influence of local Communist parties was being vastly increased. Soviet action in the Arab world was such as to cause even greater anxiety, since this region was essential' to the economy of Europe and was the door to Africa.

85. Unless the Atlantic Alliance could renew itself, it would, within its present geographical, military and diplomatic limits, become as outmoded and useless as fixed defences in a war of movement. Europe was outflanked, at the same moment when for the first time in history the United States was directly threatened. In the face of this world-wide threat, the NATO countries had not so far been capable of organizing their defence on a world-wide basis. 86. There was a danger that public opinion in the countries .of the Alliance, after having been lulled into a sense of-security by the sup e riority of the free world. light now give way to excessive pessimism which would tend to undermine the moral strength of. the Alliance and its determination to make a common stand against any attempted aggression. The spectacular character which the USSR was deliberately giving to its scientific achievements, the

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED manner in which the Western disarmament proposals v/ere rejected and the cynical contrast between Soviet actions and Soviet propaganda,, v/ere all directed towards internal subversion and the disruption Of the. Atlantic Alliance. No public opinion was unaffected by this propaganda. In some cases,, it might lead to a policy of isolation, in others to neutralism. 87. In these circumstances, the primary need, was-for a vigorou reaffirmation of confidence in the Alliance, 'and of the firm will of its members to take collective action in the event of aggression against one of them. 88. Such a reaffirmation would he valueless unless concrete measures were taken to reinforce the Alliance. The French Govern- ment considered that such concrete measures should be applied in the domain of scientific co-operation and armaments and in that of economic co-operation. Above all, they should be'd.irected towards greater political cohesion within the Alliance, without which all other efforts would be fruitless.

89. It was clear today how closely defence was linked, with scientific development. After the war, Soviet Fussia had. under- taken a vast effort in this domain, of which the results could now be seen, whereas the Western world had immediately on cessation of hostilities'broken off the close co-operation which had been established during the war. The French Government considered that this fruitful co-operation on both sides of the Atlantic should be renewed immediately and applied to as wide a field as possible. •To this end, they proposed that a "Western Foundation for Scientific Research" should be set up, on the lines of the detailed proposals in Annex C/2 to document RDC/57A28. c 90. A similar organization should be set up for the develop- ment in common of'technical and applied research and the production of new weapons. France had also made concrete proposals in this sense.

91. In this connection, he wished to emphasise two important considerations. In the first place^ it was obvious that fruitful co-operation could not be established, if the principles adopted hitherto of non-communication of scientific information and manu- facturing know-how continued to be applied. The application of these principles, which had led a number of countries to undertake, simultaneously research in the same fields, were the cause of a great dea 1 of unnecessary expense and of delays which were to the disadvantage of all. Moreover, it had done nothing to slow down Russian progress and had resulted in the paradoxical situation that information which was already in the possession of the potential enemy was. refused by one ally to another. Co-operation which was not based on a very wide exchange of information could"give very-little result.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 92; Secondly, France, and he thought most European countries, were very anxious that the principle of equality between members of the Alliance should be respected, particularly in allocating weapon production among countries. Co-operation in this field, could not be based on discrimination. Research and development in the production of modern weapons should lead'to standardisation and the rational utilisation of technical and industrial resources, with a view to economising talent, time and money. Therefore, the Governments of Germany, Italy and Prance had agreed on the principle of co-operation in this field. They would, of course, welcome the co-operation of other members of the Alliance and, in particular,'other members of Western European Union, and they hoped that close collaboration could be established with the United States.

93. Such co-operation between countries would give more meaning to the offer by the United States to assist in setting up production in Europe of intermediate range ballistic missiles. Prance, for her part, was willing to put at the disposal of her allies a technical testing centre, arid a missile training centre.

Sh. These, however, were long-term'proposals. There was the immediate problem of providing effective means for the defence, of Europe. This raised, the question of equipping the NATO forces in Europe with intermediate range .ballistic missiles. and that of" ; stocks.of atomic weapons. Prance had earlier put forward a /• suggestion for a NATO atonic stockpile and was grateful to the' United States for having adopted this-idea.

95. The dis eussions which had already taken place in the NATO Council had, shown' that the whole question raised serious diffi- culties of an essentially political nature, and. for which, so far, no overall solution appeared to exist. It seemed., therefore, that' on this point only very general decisions could be taken, and that the individual problems would have to be worked out through bilateral negotiations.

96. The French Government also considered that the Alliance should be strengthened by closer co-ordination in the economic field. The development of joint programmes of research and production would, necessarily lead to closer economic and. financial co-operation. But the countries of the Alliance should also consider the part which they could play by uniting their immense economic , resources, in those regions of the world which lay outside the. Treaty area. The resources of the Soviet Union were less than those of the West, and her economic action was 'specifically directed to further her imperialist aims. Nevertheless, the political influence of this action was out of all proportion to Its economic impact. Since the danger confronting the Western countries seemed now to have shifted to the economic domain, it must be combated in this field. Therefore, the French Government would not be.'opposed

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED to creating, for example, a fund for economic action, to be used'by NATO in the interests of defence in certain countries outside the NATO area. ' "" "

97. With this question was linked that of the political strengthening of the Alliance which in the view of the French Government was the most important matter before the meeting. Since the threat was continually changing in nature and in location, the Alliance could not operate effectively if confined to a strictly limited geographical area. On the other hand, certain member countries might not wish to accept new obligations. He would emphasise that, whatever the importance of certain regional defence pacts, the Atlantic Alliance should be considered, as fundamental to the free world because its purpose v'us to ensure the security of a. group of peoples who had a. •common civilisation, a.similar standard of living and basic common interests. The policy of all the member states should,, be directed towards harmonisation, at least in those regions of the world where experience had shown that the lack of a common policy seriously endangered the vital interests of some member countries- and threatened the solidarity of the Alliance. The inability of the v NATO countries to agree on a common policy in the Middle East had already resulted in a dangerous increase of Soviet influence in that area. . These countries who had responsibilities in Africa were attempting to prepare the peoples in their charge to assume the conduct of their own affairs. At, the same time, at enormous cost, . they were developing the natural resources of these territories and thus raising the standard of living of the peoples. The situation could be saved in the Middle East, and a great victory could be won in Africa if in these regions all the countries of the Alliance followed a closely co-ordinated policy. NATO should not stand aside from these problems, but should provide a forum for the elaboration of this common policy. 98« Therefore, the French government believed that if in any part of the world outside the NATO area''the members of the Alliance had divergent or opposing interests, a procedure of prior, consultation and conciliation should be established. If the problem affected all the member countries, a meeting of the Council should be called. If only a small number of countries were concerned, the representatives of these countries should meet, for example, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General, who would act as mediator. The adoption of this proposal would tend greatly to strengthen -NATO, by establishing a procedure for continuing consultation which would make of the- Alliance a genuine community, with a permanent political General Staff composed of members of the various governments.

99. Mr. KARAMANLIS (Prime Minister of Greece) stated that the importance of the Alliance had never been so strongly felt before because the danger menacing the free" world had never been so great. To protect the free world was therefore the main'task of the meeting, but to do this it was necessary to start by assessing the weaknesses of the Alliance. Fundamentally, these weaknesses stemmed from a lack of unity in aim and of consistency in principles. NATO was not only a military alliance but also a union of free nations and it was therefore essential to give concrete form and expression to the principles which held it together. While they all understood DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED that decisive measures were needed to strengthen the Alliance, it was perhaps not so'clear that these measures should extend to every field of allied activity.- 100. Nevertheless, it was encouraging to note that there had been a willingness to move towards the integration of the armed forças of the countries of the Alliance. He, believed that in striving towards unification of the «

-26-

military effort, member countries should be governed by the principle that the sacrifices and obligations which they were called upon to undertake in the military field should' be of a .general and uniform ^character. It was in the light of this principle that the question of supplying members of the Alliance v/ith long and inter- mediate range' missiles should be approached. The organization should also aim at taking only purely military considerations into account in establishing stocks of atomic warheads and equipping the minimum essential shield forces with special tactical weapons. Further efforts should also be made towards greater co-ordination of defence by means of unification of the command structure, while *ällowing for any specific national requirements. 101. In the field of logistics, co-ordination and common financing of production together with the standardisation of weapons should lead to a more economical form of defence.• Similarly, co-ordination should be extended in the scientific and technical fields in order to ensure that all countries within the Alliance should be able to contribute their talents and.to benefit by sharing in the results. 102. The Community must be based on closer economic co-operation, v/ith a particular understanding of the serious problems of the economically weaker members,. It should also , be so organized that it v/ould be able to devote an increasing volume of resources to the development of weaker nations all over the world. In this con- nection there were two issues which he wished to place before the Council: first, the necessary military assistance could be made more effective by the distribution of allied military production in such a way as to ensure the fullest possible use of existing installations in the less developed countries. -. Secondly, the best means to strengthen, the .Community would be to establish a European Development Authority endov/ed with the necessary 'collective resources, and able to offer sufficiently strong incen- tives, to induce business activity to move towards the less developed European countries.

103. Once the Alliance decided to adhere to fundamental principles more consistently, it would be far easier to secure unity in the other aspects of hitherto divergent national policies. He appreciated the section in the Secretary General's report regarding the institution of closer political consultation: unfortunately, the case of the disarmament proposals, when the Council had shown that it could consult with great rapidity and DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED efficiency, stood virtually alone-. While*? it was, of course, difficult to request full consultation on all major problems, the Alliance should do more towards achieving this goal, 104. Turning to the question of relations with a vast number of un- committed peoples, Mr .Karamanli's stated that it should be- the conscious ObjectirveimSf the Alliance to win both their friendship and confidence. • -27- ^AIQ SQMWBNmL G-RüPmrlj ' "

This could, only he done hy approaching then with understanding and hy offering the harmony and progress achieved within the KATO Community as examples. It was important to fight Communism not only as a war machine hut as an ideology. Positive results could perhaps he obtained in this direction hy setting up some machinery to_disseminate the beliefs of the Vfestern world in a direct and simple manner, thus counteracting misleading Communist propaganda.

105. Mr'. H.C. HANSEN (Prime Minister of Denmark) stressed that the present meeting was the focal point for the whole world, and recalled that last December the Council had met in the shadow of the Soviet actions in Hungary which had so tragically defeated -hopes for a relaxation of international terjsions. Since then the world had been spared similar actions by the Soviets but there was no indication that the basic aim of Soviet policy had changed,- and populations -would .look to the present meeting in the expectation of an answer to the vital questions affecting the future of human life and culture. He had' studied the proposals now before the Council for strengthening the Alliance and increasing its efficiency with great interest and with an open mind. He did not propose to comment in detail on these problems at present, however, except to refer to the attitude of his Government regarding non-acceptance, under the present circumstances, of atomic"warheads on Danish soil, an attitude which was well Icnovm and which applied also to the question of the establishment on Danish soil of sites for missiles of intermediate range. In these circumstances it was natural for him -to associate himself with what his Norwegian colleague had just said in this respect. 106. Turning to political consultation -his Government thought that some progress had: been made during the past twelve' months. They had welcomed the setting up of the Conmittoe of Political Advisers and favoured an evolutionary process in the field of con- sultation rather than the drawing up of new and rigid rules. The principles suggested by the Comrriittee of Three offered a valuable basis for a further development of co-operation in this field. Discussion of any differences between member states was of paramount importance, and such discussions should be held at the earliest possible moment. However, smaller countries would often find themselves unable to contribute towards the -solution of. problems which arose, and they could therefore hardly be expected in such cases to assume part of the responsibility..

107. As pointed out by the United States Government, a primary objective of the NATO Governments was to promote the well-being of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED their peoples, which required vigorous economic growth and. rising standards of living. As a means of achieving this objective the United States Government had rightly pointed to an expansion of international trade by reducing trade barriers. 108. Since the end of the war, Europe had seen many efforts for an integration of Mîuropean economy, and much was expected of the plans for a European Free Trade Area." He stressed that efforts to achieve more liberal terms of trade would he greatly strengthened if the overseas NATO countries would take the lead in breaking down the barriers hampering economic integration in the NATO countries.

109. Turning to the general political situation, he said that there were few present who doubted that great anxiety prevailed among their populations after the latest development in the field of missiles. More and more frequently the question was asked whether the stage had been reached when the slightest occurrence might have the most serious implications, where any miscalculation might prove fatal. It was therefore of decisive importance that NATO build up its military posture in such a way as to demonstrate clearly that NATO's military forces served two purposes only; to deter aggression and, if necessary to defend member countries and their liberty, and to retain the possibility of negotiations having as their ultimate aim: relaxation of tensions, disarmament and understanding between East and West. Continued armament did not, in itself, lead to a solution of the issues dividing East and West and it was, therefore, essential to promote a relaxation of inter- national tensions, and in particular to pave the way for a'" resumption of the disarmament talks and for negotiations about such problems as involved a constant risk of conflict. In spite of all setbacks attempts to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union should not be abandoned oven if such efforts demanded both time and patience. His Norwegian colleague had proposed that final decisions on the acceptance of IRBMs bo deferred so as to allow time to probe the possibilities in the field of disarmament. This idea.deserved serious consideration. Populations must rest assured that while preserving their rights and ideals no opportunity would be neglected to ease international tensions. Any offer to reach an understanding between East and West should therefore be carefully considered.

110. Only in the conviction that this v/as NATO's firm and unshakeablo will, would the Alliance be able to retain the strongest weapon of all: the determined will of each individual to defend his freedom.

111. Professor "CAETANO (Portugal) conveyed Dr. Salazar's regrets that he was unable to be present. He went on to say how glad he personally v/as to see President Eisenhower at the meeting, not only because he represented a country which had done so much DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED for the Organization but also because it enabled him to renew the expressions of admiration v/hich had been shown by the people of Portugal during President Eisenhower's visit to his country in 1952. 112. although the meeting took place at a moment of consider- able anxiety, the Council should endeavour to establish a realistic programme based on a cool-headed examination of the problems before it. Only thus could they restore the confidence, which had perhaps been somewhat shaken, in relations between members of the Atlantic Community. One of the fundamentals of NATO policy was ' the conviction that the free world should be -strong in its efforts to prevent Soviet aggression; but this aggression took so.many forms that the West must aim .at being strong on every plane and especially on'the moral plane. -In this connection, Professor Gaetano. thought that the Council might be interested in two passages from a speech by Dr. Salazar, delivered 'on Ist Novem- ber-, 19-57., In that speech the Prime Idnister had-.pointed out that the development of war industries appeared to have made it unlikely that the'Russian leaders would, resort to a third world .war as a method of expansion. It was for this reason that they themselves had proclaimed that the reduction on military expenditure would, of itself, be a step to the improvement- in the standard of living of many peoples. Unfortunately, a military agreement with the Russians still seemed, far off, since the Russians had proved so untrustworthy that it would, be difficult for them to find grounds on which to negotiate. As a consequence, the struggle for power would be carried on by other means. Where Soviet id.eology did not triumph or .armed force failed to achieve power there would be underground intrigue, econoiaic pressure and rebellion. In these circumstances it was essential that the Aest should, have a single line of policy and the resolution to maintain it.

113. The Portuguese GoVerniiient noted with satisfaction that efforts were being made to co-ordinate the policies of members of the Alliance by means of prior consultation. It was important that whenever possible Council resolutions at ministerial level should be preceded by exchanges of view's, conversations and preparatory studies. It would be most unfortunate if It appeared that decisions of principle were taken hastily and without adequate preparation. In this respect, the Secretary Generalis report made a valuable contribution to strengthening the Organization and to providing the means by which this might be achieved.

IlLj.. The Portuguese Government intended to continue its support for the efforts of the Ailliance in whatever form these might take. Unfortunately, it "was clear that there were certain . limits to the assistance which Portugal could offer to the Alliance: Portuguese territory was scattered throughout Africa and Asia, and entailed serious responsibilities which were not. within the NATO DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED framework. The development of Portugal's overseas territories required continued efforts and sustained investment. The Council should, therefore, not be .surprised that Portugal could, only envisage a symbolic contribution to any agency which it considered establishing to assist other underdeveloped territories. In passing, he wished to emphasise that his Government doubted sincerely whether it was desirable that aid of this nature should be offered by NATO. It should not be forgotten that- the political problems affecting the African continent had a direct bearing on the vital interests of western Europe, even when these problems originated in countries which v/ere not members of the Atlantic Community. Portugal's extra-European responsibilities also had military consequènces since the Portuguese Government was compelled to Liiaintain forces which could be directed to any part of its overseas territories in case of need. So far as its financial contribution was concerned, Portugal had gone as far as wisdom allowed. Nevertheless, at this time of serious trial for the West, his country would refuse no sacrifice; and Portugal wished to take this opportunity of reaffirming its complete belief in the aims of the atlantic Alliance and its desire to collaborate in their achievement.

115. Mr. JONASSON (Prime. Enister of Iceland) said that the overwhelming majority of the Icelandic, people were not only very much interested in the principal problems, military, political and economic, facing the Alliance, but also sincerely hoped that a real solution could be found.

116. As regards the military aspect, Iceland had of course no military forces and, consequently, did not expect to make, any contribution on the military side. That, however, did not mean that she did not have a very real interest in .this matter. He recalled the reasons why Iceland had joined NATO and why NATO troops had been stationed in Iceland for some years. He emphasised that although it never had been intended that such forces should be stationed in Iceland In time of peace, the world situation had made this necessary. All the political parties •forming the.. Icelandic Government recently had declared their support' of this policy.

117. The strengthening of the collective effort through the integration of forces and the consequent increase in the nuclear deterrent would certainly also be to the benefit of Iceland.

118. Iceland realised the present danger and the indispensa- bility of collective defence, but also firmly believed that it .was increasingly evident that NATO should become much more than a military alliance, as indeed had always been envisaged in Article 2. His Government had welcomed the recommendations of the Committee of Three Ministers which had lead to real progress in the field of

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED non-military co-operation.

119. He agreed with the principles of full political consul- tation which, in his view, was not necessarily a question of having the same policy in all matters, but rather of full consul- tation in advance of final action. imi u oiLiyti C-R( 57)02

120. - In conclusion, he expressed, the wish for economic co-opera- tion, in which field., together with educational and scientific co-" operation, real solidarity for peaceful" progress could most success- fully he pursued. It was sometimes .said that economic co-operation could better take place in organizations created primarily for that purpose. However, he thought that such co-operation should take place in "both fields since entirely different considerations were sometimes involved. 121. It was not enough to hase the Alliance on the fear of military attack and the consequent pooling of military resources. In addition positive co-operation for peaceful endeavours, which was the real foundation of the Alliance, should be built up based on common ideals and interests. 122. Mr. DIEFENBAKER (Prime Minister of Canada) stressed that the primary purpose of the present meeting was to reinforce the Alliance, to assure its continuing unity, to reinvigorate its basic objectives, and in particular to ensure that the NATO defence struc- ture first erected to meet the needs of 194-9 was now adapted to meet the demands of 1957.

123. In organizing collective resources to safeguard the defensive capacity of the Atlantic Community in the nuclear era, Canada wholeheartedly supported the principles of trust and inter- dependence enunciated by the President' of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom following their meeting in • Washington last October.

124. NATO was an indispensable bastion of freedom against the potential forces of aggression and the basis of Canada's security. Therefore, NATO membership was one of the basic elements in Canada's foreign policy. 125. It had been hoped that the current year would see a considerable degree of agreement, reached with the Soviet Union on measures of disarmament. Those hopes had been frustrated by Russian intransigence, resulting in the need to strengthen the military position of the Alliance and ensure that, until negotiation was possible, the necessary strength to maintain security and a strong position from which to negotiate was preserved.

126. Particiilarly frustrating was the lack of. co-operation by the Soviet Union in the field of disarmamentj public feeling was very strong on this issue, which demanded high priority if and when negotiations could be resumed. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 127. Recent Soviet advances in the field of military technology had given added urgency to reconsideration of our collective security arrangements. Certain additional proposals were under consideration for the strengthening of the military side of our Alliance, one of which was to form a NATO stockpile of atomic warheads. This followed logically from the decision taken in 1954 to organize forces in Europe on the understanding that they would be able to use such weapons to repel an attack. 1 dJfl/PTfcKIATf^ NlAWiSdEO'r' --.î-.-'SECRET;:;/-- ,i. -¾« £ u-es-' &nk ' -32- NATQ^CfijMClPENTIAL S2ir

128. He stressed however that the implications of stationing such new weapons in Europe would require careful consideration and these, together with the other proposals of the Supreme Allied Commanders, should he carefully studied early next year.

129. His authorities fully supported the suggestion of holding a Ministerial meeting to. deal with these problems as soon as the preparatory work had heen completed. 130. The Canadian Government helieved that the best way for the Alliance to build up the collective military strength required by 'its defensive strategy was for each member country to make the type of contribution best suited to its resources and capabilities, a funda- mental principle long accepted by NATO as a doctrine and which' in fact guided the Canadian effort.

131» There was still a pressing need for even greater integra- tion of individual efforts, and a striking example was the arrange- ments recently made between Canada and the United States for an inte- grated Air Defence System in North America ("NORAD"). This should result in a more efficient and economic defence for the retaliatory forces based in North America. This integrated force was an integral part of the NATO military structure in the Canada-United States region, and would report to the Standing Group and the NATO Council in a manner similar to the other NATO military Commands. 132. In this, as in other fields, effective methods of co-opera- tion with the United States had been elaborated that respected mutual interests and national integrity, while achieving the substance of common objectives.

133. The need to pool technical knowledge was more than ever acute and it was most important, for reasons of security and economic welfare, to increase support for scientific research.

134» The most promising avenue for NATO scientific co-operation lay in the field of applied research and technology and NATO should be able to play an important rôle in promoting the co-ordination of national programmes.

135« There was also an obvious need for active collaboration in the development of new arms and equipment extending to the sharing of work on major weapons systems. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 136. Article 2 of the Treaty pledged members to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and to encourage . economic co-operation, and NATO should pay more attention to this undertaking, with particular reference to relations with under- developed nations whose needs could not be overlooked. -33- IMOxJQQMBmmiAi C-B(57)82

137. A situation whereby one half of mankind was starved invited Communist mischief. Although standards of living had heen rising in many underdeveloped areas, they had not heen rising fast enough, and offers of aid from the Communist hloc could not fail to attract people striving for economic advance. 138. Members of NATO were already being képt informed of Soviet activities and were thus guided in their plans and programmes of economic aid; here it was essential for all to march in step in promoting the welfare of their peoples and the defensive power of the Alliance. 139. National policies should aim at promoting economic growth and stability, bearing in mind the interests of the allies. 140. He underlined, the necessity for early political consul- tation which should occur as a matter of habit; firm policy stands or major political announcements that might affect the interests of NATO partners should not be made until after full consultation. Briefly, there could be no commitment by countries asked to support policies outside the NATO orbit without consultation. 141. NATO could not live in isolation and all should bear in mind the vital importance of enlisting the goodv/ill of uncommitted countries, which implied joint assessment of collective and national policies towards them even though members chose to carry them out independently or in other agencies. 142. Referring to the letter from Mr. Bulganin received, by many of the Heads of Government present just prior to the present meeting he recalled that on the occasion of a proposal by Mr. Khrushchev made early last November he had stressed that no country should .shut the door on any proposal that might offer the prospect of a solution to major problems or to a decrease of international tension. In the light, however, of the earlier refusal of the USSR to partici- pate further in the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations, a meeting with the Soviet Union would- not necessarily lower international tension but might, in fact, create a sense of false security.

143. Much, however, could be done to further understanding with Russia in the spheres of human, scientific and cultural relations and if enough progress could be made in this and other ways, further negotiations on matters of substance might take place at a later date with greater understanding and confidence, ' once the USSR gave evidence of a serious desire to reach agreement. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 144. Willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union must con- tinue to be demonstrated, necessitating qualities of flexibility and a readiness to meet a challenge on a front much wider than that covered by the NATO Alliance itself. 145. It would be the duty of NATO, however, while maintaining its solidarity and strength, to reassess the essential requirements 3k- NêTC

of Western security, and "by vision and an imaginative approach, to seek through negotiation a settlement of its differences with the Sovier Union. 146. Mr. MSIIDERSS (Prime Minister of Turkey) noted with grati- tude the proposals made "by member countries for strengthening the Alliance. Ho said that all the problems facing the Alliance could be related to the simple theme of action to counterbalance the Soviet attempt to dominate the world. It had been hoped that the collective leadership which took the reins of power in the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin would be more moderate than the previous dictatorship. Events had unfortunately proved these hopes to be vain, and in order to appreciate the position in which the Western world now found itself .it was perhaps • desirable to recollect the history of the last ten years. Immediately after ^ the second World Vfer, Russia had succeeded in dominating many countries and had only been partly foiled in Berlin, in Korea and in Indo-China. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Austria, a false impression had gained ground that the Russian leaders were content to maintain a status quo round Europe.

147. However, the activities of the Soviet Union in the Middle East for the past two years should be considered merely the beginning of an onslaught on Western Europe itself,- the final citadel of resistance to Communist ideas. The Soviet Union, once established in Syria, could concue r the Middle East without fighting and could thus endanger North Africa, the Mediterranean and Western Europe itself. He warned the Council that if a. thoroughgoing Cbifimunist regime had not been established in Syria this was only a tactical device by the Soviet Union to enable it more easily to ensnare other countries when the time was ripe. His Government believed that I the Russian intrigues in Syria were only the beginning of an extremely dangerous movement to encircle Turkey and to threaten Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-bearing lands of the Middle East. The Council should be under no delusion: if the Soviet Union consolidated its bases in Syria, none of these countries would be able to resist determined pressure for long. In these circumstances, the Middle East problem was of the greatest signifi- cance to NATO and the situation was complicated by the failure to settle the frontier disputes between Israel and the Arab countries. It was wrong to believe that the Moslem countries had any special capacity to resist Communism, as could be seen from the examples of Afghanistan and Syria. Members of the Alliance should re- • examine their policies in the Middle East in the light of this experience and adopt suitable measures accordingly.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 11-1-8. He thought that the Alliance should recognise that it was faced by full-scale aggression in the Middle East and consequently must organize itself in such a way as to act before rather than after the event. Moreover, it must distinguish between short-term and long-term measures, and not refuse to take short-term measures on the grounds that long-term decisions were still pending. 11+9. He "believed that one of the most important reasons which had'led to the defeat of the Alliance in the Middle East was the failure sufficiently to support the Baghdad Pact, While his country was grateful hoth to the United States and to the United Kingdom for their encouragement and assistance to the Pactj and to the United States for military assistance to Turkey herself, it would he far better if some permanent relationship were esta- blished between HATO and the Baghdad Pact Organization, In view of the immense pressure exerted by the Soviet Union on countries in the Middle East, adherence to the Baghdad Pact should be con- sidered a serious undertaking. It was of the utmost importance that the'Alliance should come to the support of those Middle Eastern countries which had shown their willingness to resist Communist aggression. In this connection he wished to pay tribute to the Secretary General whoso suggestions could well be taken as a basis for further action in this field.

150. Turning to the purely military problems facing the Alliance, Mr. Menderes hoped that the great progress made by the Soviet Union in the development of new weapons would cause the HATC countries to undertake fresh efforts in the defence of their ideals. Many NATO countries had no weapons with atomic warheads, and this was causing considerable anxiety, particularly to those having common frontiers with the Soviet Union or the satellite countries. They felt that they now had no means of retaliation in the event of a surprise attack; in consequence, they believed that the strategic stockpiling of atomic weapons would be one of the soundest ways of reinforcing the Alliance and deterring aggression. Atomic warheads should be kept in a state of readiness, and in certain circumstances the right to use them should be vested in senior NATO Commanders. -While intermediate range ballistic missiles could play a great part in the defence of the West, they would need to be distributed in large numbers throughout the NATO countries if the launching sites were not to be destroyed in the opening; days of an all-out Soviet offensive. In this connection, it would be appropriate to increase the number of NIKE and similar air defence weapons installed in Europe. He wished to thank the United States for making .available two batteries of NIKE missiles, together with the training of the crews, as part of their 1958 military aid programme. The construction of the launching sites might well come within'the NATO infrastructure programme, and joint training arrangements should be made in the countries where these weapons were now heing installed.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 151. The balance.between shield and retaliatory forces had long been under discussion, but his Government did not believe that there could be any reduction in the shield forces until the Soviet Union and the satellite countries reduced their vast hoMings of conventional weapons. Indeed, if the shield forces could not be increased, their fire power must be raised by equipping them with modern nuclear and tactical weapons. -36- im MJO .gp!

Despito great sacrifices over the whole period since Turkey joined the Alliance, Turkey's forces wore, regretfully, still not up to the desired status either in Quality or quantity. It was indeed only too clear that the Turkish forces could not carry out any action likely to counter an attack hy the. Soviet Union either on Turkey or on her allies. He hoped that if the Ministers of the Alliance met to discuss the balance of forces in the Spring of 1958 » they would "bear Turkey's position'in mind.

152. Mr. MACMILLAN (Prime Minister of the United Kingdom) said that when he and President Eisenhower had made their declaration of common purpo_se in Washington on 25th October, 1957? it had been in the hope that they would be'able to discuss it with other Heads of Governments. He was, therefore, very satisfied that it had been possible to hold this historic meeting of what should be considered the cabinet of the Alliance. They had come together to discuss the policies which all their countries should, apply.

y I53. NATO's achievements in the past eight years had been very, great, and he firmly believed that the reasons for success would bc found in the underlying principle that an attack on one was to be •considered an attack on all. He wished to remind the Council, however, that the object of the Alliance was to prevent war and. avoid war, not to wage war. Looking to the future, he believed that the most they could hope for was to roach reasonably soon a state of co-existence,, and in the far future peace based on justice, as contrasted'with the injustices represented, for example, by the division of Germany.

154. The Alliance was a political and not a military Alliance. The task of the statesmen forming the Council was to re-assess the problems from time to time and he was glad that the opportunity for a re-apnraisal of the Alliance's defence position would occur'in March", 1958.

155. They had to face four distinct threats;- military aggression, economic pressure, political subversion, and efforts to wear down the spirit of resistance. 156. While the Alliance had not the apparent strength of totalitarian Organizations, he believed that freedom-gave to those who enjoyed it a real strength denied to totalitarian systems. They must, therefore, meet the totalitarian forces by a greater degree of flexibility in their methods of working together. This flexibility had been christened, "interdependence".

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED 157. Militarily speaking,, the Alliance was moving into a. period when over a large area of the world, purely national concepts of defence would no longer be effective. -The Alliance had taken practical action in this respect in connection with Air Defence and Early Warning Systems, and he paid tribute to. the United States/ Canadian example of a joint agreement for the deployment of a common effort. -The real test was, however, whether the forces contributed by any country added as greatly as possible to the strength of the Alliance. Por example, the United Kingdom considered that its naval contribution ^might be more .effective if concentrated on measures fcf'defeat the vast'Soviet submarine fleet, and less on the strike . rôle-for which other countries might be better fitted. Similarly, the Alliance should see whether there were other tasks which could not be better tackled than at present by a joint agreement to_assign thernto countries capable of handling them. He "had in mind the example of the need for tackling the high flying reconnaissance aircraft with which the potential enemy would soon be"provided. 158. Turning to the fields of research, development and production Mr. Macmillan believed that the offer generously made by Mr. Dulles was of the greatest importance because it provided a way of overcoming the financial problems which had hitherto impeded any real progress.- The concept of interdependence also applied in the economic field where,, in addition.to the Common Market and the Free Trade Area, there were proposals put forward, hy the Prime Minister of Italy in which he had been interested.,

159. Mr. Macmillan believed that a serious position would arrive if an economic slump occurred in any NATO country through.bad financial arrangements; and. in this respect, the assurances that the United States would continue to lend dollars to the rest of the world through the Export/Import Bank were of the greatest importance. Similarly, the declaration that the United States intended to -follow liberal trade policies by .revision of " the Foreign'Trade Agreements Act was of the greatest psychological significance, . Defence, like peace, should be indivisible and the United States and Turkish references to the relations with other defence organizations were well worth-pursuing. 160. All the Ministers gathered together in the Conference were representatives of democracies whose governments only existed by depending on the ..feelings of their people. It v/as, therefore, vital that the Conference should make people aware that in tackling the lorig-term probTem" 'of defending t'heilHvay'öf life nothing had been Tef t" undone. In reply to the latest series'"of ' !Bttfel5S" from Mr. Bulganin 'he would thus be prepared to' discuss and 'to debate every - reasonable proposition until it was clear beyond doubt that they had done, all that honourable men could do to

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED preserve, and if possible improve, their defensive position,' Even if they failed, they would at least have lent strength to those measures which they intended to take. In the words of Sir Winston Churchill "We aim to parley, we aim to talk; and in the long run - some day - to settle". But they could not parley effectively unless they armed, unless they reaffirmed their strength' and, by discussion of their -special problems, took the initiative in what was after all mainly psychological warfare. -38-

MATO SECRET

III. EROG-EAEEE OE WORK 161. Mr.. HACMILLiiN proposed that the Foreign Ministers should meet on the morning of Tuesday. 17th December, to consider the preliminary papers prepared by the Secretariat and to identify problems for further discussion. Thereafter the Heads of Govern- ment could examine these problems and prepare the way for a series of declarations of purpose and intent of a political character. He realised that this procedure might mean continuing the Conference until Thursday; if this 'were so, an announcement might be made at once to avoid creating the idea that the prolongation was due to disagreement between countries. 162. The COUNCILi (1) took note of the statements made in the course of discussion;' (2) agreed that Foreign Ministers should meet in Restricted Session with a maximum of six persons per delegation at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday, 17th December; (3) invited Foreign Ministers to consider further the following questions which had been raised during the discussion:- the reunification of Germany, the Middle East, relations' with other defence organizations Africa, relations with underdeveloped countries, the letters from Mr. Bulganin, • political consultation,

and to report to a meeting of Heads of Government on Tuesday afternoon;

(4) agreed that delegations should be.individually . responsible for releasing texts or extracts of . statements by their representatives for publication. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE LECTURE EN - MISE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ DISCLOSURE - PUBLIC DECLASSIFIED