MEMO POLICY

THE EU, AND THE NORTHERN MALI QUESTION Susi Dennison

Algeria – whose immediate neighbours include Libya, SUMMARY Relations between the EU and Algeria have Tunisia, and Mali – has been notable in its region in recent always been dominated by the bilateral ties years for its apparent lack of unrest. However, the limited that Algeria has with a cluster of member states, nature of protests in Algiers at the beginning of 2011 belied most notably , based on strong energy a restive population that is frustrated with an aging and and security, and historical links. In early 2012, when the EU appeared to be in the ascendant, ineffective regime, and a socio-economic deal in which it offered Algeria support for growth and the proceeds from exporting oil and gas are invested only enterprise in exchange for the promise of sporadically in public goods, such as housing, in order to political reform. However, the violent Islamist buy social peace. Algeria is still the “insecure regime in an takeover in northern Mali has turned the EU unstable neighbourhood” as it was last year.1 into the demandeur in the relationship and could put the progress made earlier this year in jeopardy. France and the United States firmly However, while the regime remains insecure, the back a UN-mandated African intervention in neighbourhood has become dramatically less stable as Mali. But Algeria, which is viewed as a crucial northern Mali has come under Islamist control. After a partner, is reluctant to support intervention decade of internal armed conflict in the 1990s between because it fears that this could increase instability in its immediate neighbourhood. Islamist groups and the military-backed government in Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika promised to keep To keep Algeria engaged with the EU, member Islamists out of power. After the trauma of a decade of states should pool their resources in a joint conflict, the Algerian population largely accepted this, European approach. European leaders should even when it came at the expense of political and personal be more present and visible in Algiers and pursue the European interest as well as their freedoms. But with Islamist-dominated governments now own national interests. In particular, they in power in three of its neighbouring countries, the Algerian should work with European businesses to government’s worst fears about the Arab Awakening appear encourage Algeria to reduce red tape and tackle to be coming to life. corruption in order to diversify its economy and increase inward investment. Senior CSDP officials should also work to build trust and to manage Algerian concerns about spillover from instability in northern Mali. 1 Hakim Darbouche and Susi Dennison, “A Reset with Algeria: the Russia to the EU’s South”, European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2011, available at http:// www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR46_ALGERIA_BRIEF_AW.pdf (hereafter Darbouche and Dennison, “A Reset with Algeria”). 2 ECFR/69 December 2012 www.ecfr.eu THE EU, ALGERIA AND THE NORTHERN MALI QUESTION Algerian responsestothem. Algeria Association Agreement in 2005, Algeria has begun begun has Algeria 2005, in Agreement Association Algeria Algerian government accepted. government Algerian Mali andtheEU–Algeriarelationship 4  3 2  In the first months of 2012, EU–Algeria ties developed developed ties EU–Algeria 2012, of months first the In Last year, based on the increasing sense of isolation and the assesses this proposed strategy a year on, in light of the the of light in on, year a strategy proposed this assesses a “reset” in EU–Algeria relations. EU–Algeria in “reset” a Co-operation at a technical level also expanded considerably, genuine politicalreform–mightbeachievablewithAlgeria. engagement to support economic modernisation and and modernisation economic support to engagement energy resources – and create a more strategic partnership. democratic development. quite constructively. In May 2012, the EU was for the first the for was EU the 2012, May In constructively. quite f rcatnto sne h ety no oc o te EU– the of force into entry the since procrastination of observation mission was lenient in its assessment, but it did notably France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, as clients of its its of clients as Portugal, and Spain, Italy, France, notably relationships to enable effective spending of aid linked to to linked aid of spending effective enable to relationships with, begin to process on focus a with steps, small all were under reform domestic on Plan Action an on negotiations years after And states. member EU in experts national EU’s the of user single biggest the becoming Algeria with first the for Algeria – fraud of examples multiple reported again and – perfect from far were elections the to response reported serious concerns about fraud in the elections, elections, the in election EU The denied. fraud strenuously government the which about concerns serious reported more seriously. It seemed that, over the long term, one of of one term, long the over that, seemed It seriously. more make a series of recommendations, the majority of which the to influence the course of domestic events in Algeria, using Algeria, in events domestic of course the influence to the EU flesh out the purely transactional relationship that that relationship transactional purely the out flesh EU the the goals of the new neighbourhood policy – strengthened – policy neighbourhood new the of goals the EU the taking was Algeria that signs promising were they these Although (ENP). Policy Neighbourhood new EU’s the from Algeria, in sectors different of for training development and the support offering instrument, twinning of process gradual a in partner a as EU the accepted time time invited to deploy a mission in Algeria to observe the the observe to Algeria in mission a deploy to invited time increased tensions in the region and the European and and European the and region the in tensions increased in the municipal elections held last week the opposition opposition the week last held elections municipal the in spread the rule of law. Over the longer term, once a more more a once term, longer the Over law. of rule the spread socio-economic challenges that Algeria faced, we called for called we faced, Algeria that challenges socio-economic had developed between Algeria and member states – most – states member and Algeria between developed had push harder for political reform in Algeria. This memo re- memo This Algeria. in reform political for harder push legislative elections. Many groups within the country country the within groups Many elections. legislative Such a “reset”, we argued, would increase the EU’s ability ability EU’s the increase would argued, we “reset”, a Such functional relationship had been established, the EU could EU the established, been had relationship functional  North AfricaRelations”). ECFR62_NAPA_REPORT.pdf (hereafterWitney andDworkin,“APowerAuditofEU– Council onForeignRelations,October2012, availableathttp://ecfr.eu/page/-/ and AnthonyDworkin,“APowerAuditofEU–North AfricaRelations”,European For moreontheenergyrelationshipbetween theEUandAlgeria,seealsoNickWitney Darbouche andDennison,“AResetwithAlgeria”. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133320.pdf. Algerian PresidentBouteflika, Algiers,6November2012”,available athttp://www. “Remarks byHighRepresentativeCatherine Ashtonfollowinghermeetingwith 4 So while the conduct and and conduct the while So 2 We recommended that that recommended We 3

400,000 people in 2012 and that millions of people in the the in people of millions that and 2012 in people 400,000 45 days. Under the ECOWAS intervention plan, 3,300 3,300 plan, intervention ECOWAS the Under days. 45 African States (ECOWAS), and regional partners to to partners regional and (ECOWAS), States African African troops would support the government and army in army and government the support would troops African Algeria were already complex: Algeria was a key supplier of supplier key a was Algeria complex: already were Algeria 6  5  ECOWAS expressed concerns about the likelihood of this this of likelihood the about concerns expressed ECOWAS EU memberstateshaveaverystronginterest. ECOWAS plan, the EU is drawing up plans for a Common Common a for plans up drawing is EU the plan, ECOWAS The situation in Mali is not static. The United Nations Nations United The static. not is Mali in situation The UN Resolution 2071, in October 2012, mandated the the mandated 2012, October in 2071, Resolution UN However, in the spring of 2012, Islamists took over northern Bamako. It has now been signed off by the African Union and, November that use of force must be an absolute last resort, last absolute an be must force of use that November agreement to a ceasefire had been reached, although although reached, been had ceasefire a to agreement Mali. The takeover began with a rebellion by the Tuareg, Tuareg, the by rebellion a with began takeover The Mali. violence. On 5 December, it was reported that tentative tentative that reported was it December, 5 On violence. of north the allowing arrangement an to coming to view a government of Mali, the Economic Community of West West of Community Economic the Mali, of government conflict. almost displaced has north the in fighting that estimates most the perhaps also but states member EU to oil and gas development of military plans to recover the occupied occupied the recover to plans military of development confidence in a peaceful solution before then. in underlining Ki-moon Ban Secretary-General UN despite equip Malian troops with a view to retaking the north of of north the retaking to view a with troops Malian equip of Azawad (MNLA) but with Islamist support, but control control but support, Islamist with but (MNLA) Azawad of region face diminishing food supplies as a result of the the of result a as supplies food diminishing face region northern territory of Mali. The resolution called on the the on called resolution The Mali. of territory northern the of control the break to needed be likely will response work together to develop a proposal for both the military military the both for proposal a develop to together work wave of political change. Now, as Mali has descended into into descended has Mali as Now, change. political of wave reluctant reformer in a North Africa undergoing a historical with Relations Algeria. and EU the between relationship terrorist groups. the end of the year, unless the negotiations inspire greater inspire negotiations the unless year, the of end the turmoil, Algeria has also been launched into the position of position the into launched been also has Algeria turmoil, the country greater autonomy in return for an end to the the to end an for return in autonomy greater country the institutions in Bamako pushed to their limits, some kind of kind some limits, their to pushed Bamako in institutions is expected to be approved by the UN Security Council by by Council Security UN the by approved be to expected is within process this of phases transitional and intervention in or out of control of different Islamist factions. Since Since factions. Islamist different of control of out or in spreading through large parts of the territory, and the state the and territory, the of parts large through spreading subsequently moved largely into the hands of the Islamist Islamist the of hands the into largely moved subsequently holding. In the meantime, with northern Mali largely largely Mali northern with meantime, the In holding. under Islamist control, the implementation of sharia law law sharia of implementation the control, Islamist under led by the secular National Movement for the Liberation Liberation the for Movement National secular the by led late November, Burkina Faso has been mediating in talks talks in mediating been has Faso Burkina November, late Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to train and and train to mission (CSDP) Policy Defence and Security faction Ansar Dine. This has dramatically changed the the changed dramatically has This Dine. Ansar faction being a key actor in a potential security operation in which in operation security potential a in actor key a being between Malian officials, the MNLA, and Ansar Dine, with Dine, Ansar and MNLA, the officials, Malian between at http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/mali_en.pdf. “ECHO factsheet:Malicrises2012”,European Commission,November2012,available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/11/20121111192710305682.html. “ECOWAS agreestoMali interventionforce”, 5 Week by week, there are reports of towns passing towns of reports are there week, by Week Al Jazeera , 11November2012,available 6 Alongside the the country.7 The foreign and defence ministers of France, and European efforts to isolate Iran by indicating support Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain issued an endorsement for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s backing of this initiative on 15 November 2012 and the Foreign of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad.12 Even though current Affairs Council (FAC) gave agreement to it in principle on discussions about supporting intervention at the EU and UN 19 November 2012.8 level do not involve sending troops but rather supporting a Malian and ECOWAS-led intervention with training and Given its proximity to the situation in Mali (the two countries intelligence, Algeria would prefer, if at all possible, to find a share a border of more than 1,000 km) and its historic fear diplomatic solution to the situation in northern Mali without about Islamist-dominated government, Algeria might have recourse to intervention.13 A delegation from Ansar Dine been expected to support an international effort to stabilise arrived in Algiers on 4 November for talks. Shortly after that, the situation. In fact, however, they have done the opposite. Ansar Dine began to issue statements on their willingness to Algeria’s experience in tackling armed Islamist groups from hold elections, limit the coverage of sharia law in the territory, its years of internal civil conflict and its direct intelligence on and other possible concessions.14 However, as the weeks pass, the Islamist groups involved in the takeover of northern Mali there are still reports of the implementation of extreme forms (which have strong links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb of sharia law spreading further into the region.15 (AQIM)), make it a crucial partner for any prospective operation in Mali.9 However, since March, Algeria has expressed great reluctance to put its resources at the disposal Efforts to court Algeria of intervention planning and only coolly welcomed the UN resolution in October. The diplomatic pressure that Algeria has come under to support the international community’s efforts to resolve the Theories about the Algerian government’s reluctance to situation in northern Mali has subtly shifted the balance of support an intervention in northern Mali abound. Some power within the EU–Algeria relationship in Algiers’s favour. suggest it sees Ansar Dine as a more palatable option to the The driving forces behind international attention on the separatist MNLA controlling territory adjacent to Algeria; Mali question since the summer have been France and the others argue that some instability in the area works in US. Both countries have made efforts to court Algeria. But Algeria’s favour as it excludes the feasibility of Mali exploiting although they share an interest in avoiding the potential oil sites in its north; others still say that Algeria fears that the contamination effects of an Islamist-led state of Azawad in involvement of its armed forces in any military operation the north of Mali, they have taken different approaches. would expose its relative weakness. What is certainly true is that the Algerian government is extremely nervous about Since François Hollande took over as French president in the spillover effects of the takeover in northern Mali. Already, May 2012, Algeria has enjoyed considerable attention from thousands of refugees have reportedly crossed the border the French government. A series of ministers has come into Algeria and there is a fear (based in part on last year’s through Algiers to prepare for Hollande’s state visit to Algeria intervention in Libya) that refugee inflows could increase in December 2012.16 These visits have been accompanied by a dramatically along with heightened terrorist activity in series of significant statements from French politicians about southern Algeria.10 The recent statement from the Algerian the vexed French-Algerian relationship, which have been government that it “will take the necessary measures to criticised by some at home but are likely to have won Hollande guarantee the protection of its borders at the highest possible some sympathy in Algiers. In perhaps the most significant of level” confirms this worry.11 these statements, Hollande for the first time acknowledged the attacks by French police on Algerians who protested in Algeria would be even more concerned if external – and Paris during the war of independence: “On October 17th 1961, in particular French – forces were to play a role in any Algerians who were protesting for their right of independence, intervention. Algeria’s aversion to Western interference were killed in a brutal repression… Fifty-one years after this was central to its opposition to the idea of intervention in tragedy, I pay tribute to the memory of the victims.”17 Libya and in Syria, where it has tried to cut across Turkish

12 Sinem Cengiz, “Turkey unnerved by Iran, Algeria deal on Syria”, Today’s Zaman, 9 September 2012, available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-291763-turkey- 7 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, Brussels, 19 November 2012, available at http:// unnerved-by-iran-algeria-deal-on-syria.html. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/133604.pdf. 13 “UN seeks Mali dialogue as AU endorses military action”, Daily Nation, 14 November 8 “Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence of France, 2012, available at http://www.nation.co.ke/News/africa/UN-seeks-Mali-dialogue-as- Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain”, Paris, 15 November 2012, available at http://www. AU-endorses-military-action/-/1066/1619632/-/exwku9z/-/index.html. diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/121114_Outcome_proposal_Final_cle821c1b.pdf. 14 Hassan Moali, “Négociations à Alger sur le Nord-Mali: Ançar Eddine lâcherait 9 For analysis on these links, see Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid Neighbour: Algeria AQMI”, El Watan, 4 November 2012, available at http://www.elwatan.com/ and the Conflict in Mali”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2012, international/negociations-a-alger-sur-le-nord-mali-ancar-eddine-lacherait- available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/22/paranoid-neighbor-algeria- aqmi-04-11-2012-191058_112.php. and-conflict-in-mali/e4kt, which traces the origins of Ansar Dine and its affiliation 15 Khedidja Baba-Ahmed, “Au Mali, l’intervention armée reste un recours ultime”, to AQIM back to Algerian government efforts to dissolve its parent organisation, the Le Soir d’Algerie, 22 November 2012, available at http://www.lesoirdalgerie.com/ GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). articles/2012/11/22/. 10 Beatrice Khadige, “Algeria may accept Mali intervention”, Morocco Tomorrow, 16  (Foreign Affairs), Yamina Benguigui (Francophonie), November 2012, available at http://www.moroccotomorrow.org/algeria-may-accept- (Trade), (Home Affairs), and (Growth and mali-intervention/. enterprise) have all visited since Hollande’s election in May 2012. 11 Amar Belani, Algerian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, in interview with Asharq Al- 17 “51 years on, France recognises ‘bloody repression’ of Algerian protesters”, Middle Awsat, 14 November 2012, available at http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4 East Online, 18 October 2012, available at http://www.middle-east-online.com/ &issueno=12405&article=704304&featghjure. english/?id=54964. 3 4 ECFR/69 December 2012 www.ecfr.eu THE EU, ALGERIA AND THE NORTHERN MALI QUESTION Algerian intelligence on the terrorist groups operating in in operating groups terrorist the on intelligence Algerian Europeanising member-stateties When Clinton travelled to Algiers in late October, political political October, late in Algiers to travelled Clinton When with Algeria European contact with Algeria. This must have invoked a invoked have must This Algeria. with contact European There is now a clear risk that Europe’s hope of making making of hope Europe’s that risk clear a now is There These US and French efforts to court Algeria appear to to appear Algeria court to efforts French and US These It seemed to be technical business as usual, while strategic while usual, as business technical be to seemed It US efforts to gain Bouteflika’s support on Mali have been been have Mali on support Bouteflika’s gain to efforts US However, intervention in Mali risks damaging the EU’s EU’s the damaging risks Mali in intervention However, again, combined with the willingness that Algiers has has Algiers that willingness the with combined again, a week later, when High Representative Catherine Ashton Ashton Catherine Representative High when later, week a visited Algiers, the focus was on €58 million worth of grants a reality before 2013. In the first half of 2012, Algeria seemed got really only mission CSDP a about Discussions Mali. also do not – so far – seem to have had to sacrifice much much sacrifice to had have to seem – far so – not do also the in themselves put having Despite prospect. the about Clinton made a visit to Algiers at the end of October with this visit to Algiers in December will be a test of the extent to to extent the of test a be will December in Algiers to visit government and continues to simply follow where France France where follow simply to continues and government discussions on the regional situation were top of the agenda; EU. the on more focus to decision earlier their question questions were mentioned in passing but largely approached capital in order to secure Algerian support. But Hollande’s But support. Algerian secure to order in capital reform in Algeria that the revised ENP aspires to over the the over to aspires ENP revised the that Algeria in reform relationship with Algeria. As an entity, the EU has only only has EU the entity, an As Algeria. with relationship the in ally strategic region withoutaskingforanythingsignificantinreturn. a play to willing is Bouteflika which while Algeria still does not overtly support the idea of an an of idea the support overtly not does still Algeria while more direct and to the point. Secretary of State Hillary Hillary State of Secretary point. the to and direct more made a greater investment in the relationship. But over over But relationship. the in investment greater a made this would be a real missed opportunity. The EU must must EU The opportunity. missed real a be would this through otherchannels. the region. It is likely that the US also asked Bouteflika for Bouteflika asked also US the that likely is It region. the of availability the is Mali in intervention an of viability the the summer, France has re-emerged as the main point of of point main the as re-emerged has France summer, the to be taking the EU more seriously as a partner as both sides indicated to work with the EU on economic modernisation, economic on EU the with work to indicated stand to able be to unlikely Bouteflika ailing an and 2014 in in the transport sector, and support for youth employment. youth for support and sector, transport the in intelligence –outofsouthernAlgeria. issue as the headline item. One of the key US concerns about strong sense of déjà vu for the Algerians and made them them made and Algerians the for vu déjà of sense strong intervention in Mali, it now protests less than it initially did have been effective in achieving their specific objective: objective: specific their achieving in effective been have longer term. in With expectedAlgeria presidential elections incremental of sort the Algerian support to the hope cannot it for leads, partner not worthwhile is EU a the as If dashed. be perceived will Algeria with progress permission to fly drones – which would provide additional provide would which – drones fly to permission underway in October, and the mission is unlikely to become position of position for the protection of cultural heritage, support for reforms for support heritage, cultural of protection the for belatedly made its voice heard on the situation in northern in situation the on heard voice its made belatedly towards Algeria, the US and France and US the Algeria, towards demandeur

Algiers but invest in Algeria as energy clients rather than than rather clients energy as Algeria in invest but Algiers Algiers in the field of training and defence equipment sales. equipment defence and training of field the in Algiers A functioning EU–Algeria relationship also matters for the for matters also relationship EU–Algeria functioning A Algeria does not see the utility of partnership with the EU EU the with partnership of utility the see not does Algeria 20 19  18  21  EU–Maghreb strategy that is currently being developed in in developed being currently is that strategy EU–Maghreb EU’s broader strategy towards North Africa and the Sahel. The The dividends of increased economic integration are likely to EU strategytowardsAlgeria. weight, significant have states member these Together, In March 2012, the Algerian government signed a deal deal a signed government Algerian the 2012, March In How can the EU make itself matter to Algeria again? The The again? Algeria to matter itself make EU the can How Paris, and Rome. These member states have strong ties with and democratic development. Mario Monti’s recent trip to Algiers was focused on a joint a on focused was Algiers to trip recent Monti’s Mario Minister Prime Italian approach. EU collective a of part as an economic success, it should draw on the complementarity demonstrate to Algeria that it is not only a technical partner country,mostsignificantitsofone economies, certainlyand one of its crucial security actors. of the countries in the region: energy from Algeria and Libya; naval frigates. Alongside this deal, the Algerian government two for ThyssenKrupp with million €400 than more worth when thereisaseriousstrategicdiscussiontobehad. without Algeria on board. Algeria is the biggest Maghreb Maghreb biggest the is Algeria board. on Algeria without function not simply will it But region. the of regeneration regional trade, is viewed as a vital component of the economic h Gra nv fr esne uig hs equipment. this using personnel for navy German the the region. Supporting greater Maghreb integration therefore the corridors of Brussels, which is focused on increased intra- include a growth in competition and consequent reduction in speaks to two of the EU’sobjectivestheregion:ofthe twospeaks economicinto key lies in its capitals – above all Berlin, London, Madrid, Madrid, London, Berlin, all above – capitals its in lies key institutions beyond technical advantage. If the EU is to to is EU the If advantage. technical beyond institutions has signed a contract worth €12 million for training from from training for million €12 worth contract a signed has show that they have a common interest as part of a genuine a of part as interest common a have they that show project between the Algerian and Italian governments to to governments Italian and Algerian the between project protectionthathas bolstered thedeep state manyinparts of labour from Egypt and Morocco; and skills from Tunisia. from skills and Morocco; and Egypt from labour punch at its real weight with Algeria, member states need to for Italy. for for co-operation that is sidelined by the real global players global real the by sidelined is that co-operation for build a second gas pipeline to ensure continuity of supply supply of continuity ensure to pipeline gas second a build but they do not use it to a European advantage. As a result, a As advantage. European a to it use not do they but  1342553874/Algeria+orders+2+Frigates+from+Germany. available athttp://www.network54.com/Forum/211833/thread/1342347565/last- “Algeria orders2FrigatesfromGermany”,World ArmedForcesForum,15July2012, Audit ofEU–NorthAfricaRelations”. For moreonthebenefitsofMaghrebUnion, seeWitneyandDworkin,“APower economic-cooperation.html. al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/09/maghreb-union-moves-toward-greater- Free-Trade Zone”,Al-Monitor See, forexample,SoumiaYousfi,“MaghrebUnionTakesFirstStepTowardCreating html. algeria/2012/11/14/Italy-Algeria-Monti-Algiers-focus-economic-exchanges_7791728. November 2012,availableathttp://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/en/news/nations/ “Italy–Algeria: MontiinAlgiers,focusoneconomic exchanges”, 20 Berlin is also developing significant links with with links significant developing also is Berlin , 20September2012,availableathttp://www. 18 For a Maghreb Union to be ANSAmed, 14 19 21

Algeria needs a strong relationship with Europe. It has A European approach to Algeria repeatedly asked for European help to diversify its economy as it recognises that its energy reserves are not In order to construct a more coherent European approach to infinite. The huge bureaucratic barriers that businesses Algeria, the EU, and not just France, must be more present face are preventing development of home-grown enterprise and visible in Algeria. More EU member states need to be or foreign investment. As the take-up of the twinning involved at a senior level in political relations with Algeria, instrument shows, Algeria is aware that France is not the both on domestic questions and on Algeria’s strategic role only option. Its agreement to begin negotiations on an ENP in the region. For the EU’s direct relationship with Algeria, Action Plan suggests a recognition that it may be worth key member states – particularly Germany, Italy, Spain, and discussing a roadmap to political reform in exchange for the UK – as well as the EU institutions need to invest more European support. However, Algeria is pragmatic about time in relationship building with Algeria and be seen in whether to work with the EU institutions or with key Algiers. Each meeting that officials from member states hold member states. If the EU can give Algeria the benefits that in Algeria should include a component on the European its member states offer, it will be interested. If, however, it interest rather than just the national interest. can access as much through bilateral ties, and the member states do not stipulate that their interests are cognate with By 2014, the EU should aim to have sufficiently robust ties those that the EU sets out, it will naturally continue to focus to allow an election observation mission to build on the on national capitals. progress made on acceptance of the process of peer review in the 2012 legislative elections and give a frank and credible Finally, France – and in particular Hollande’s government – assessment of the conduct of the presidential elections as cannot afford to be the only European demandeur towards a contribution to the gradual establishment of genuine Algeria if it does not want to sacrifice too much capital at democratic institutions in the country. This would send the altar of intervention in Mali. Each concession made in a clear message that, while Europe recognises and values the war of words about the colonial relationship is currently Algeria’s strategic role on questions like the crisis in Mali, it being met by a request from Algiers to go further. This is has not abandoned its commitment to political reform but politically unsustainable for Hollande. Greater European rather intends to work with Algeria as a partner. The EU’s leadership on negotiations with Algeria over the situation in Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Mali would depoliticise the discussion and focus attention region, Bernardino Leon, who has been closely associated on the current instability in the region rather than on with EU efforts to support political reform in Tunisia and historical grievances. The trust between the EU and Algeria Egypt, is well placed to underline this message to Algiers. that will come as a dividend of the increased partnership will be important for future co-operation, which might The EU offer to Algeria needs to be set out more clearly to impact on Algeria’s regional role in the longer term. continue to incentivise engagement. Algeria wants support to modernise its economy, and while the EU’s financial More broadly, the particular relationship between France support for developing transport structures and training and Algeria has long outlived the reality of the benefits to through the EU’s twinning instrument are helpful steps both sides. France is no longer Algeria’s only significant forward, this strategy could be expanded to encourage European energy client; Algeria is now far from being business-to-business contact in a wide range of sectors. The France’s only strategic interest in the region. Thus a strong immediate interest for Algeria is to encourage European EU relationship with Algeria, in which France continues to businesses – from a larger number of member states – to go play a leading but not directorial role, is in the interests of and look at the possibilities in Algeria. In the long term, the both sides. France should support the EU’s broader aim to greater presence of international businesses should lead to a build up a partnership with Algeria over the longer term, trickle-down effect in their demand for greater predictability making a conscious effort to ensure that their bilateral ties and order in their operating environment. This in turn could do not always trump the European message. Hollande’s visit have wider ramifications in establishing the rule of law in to Algiers on 19 December, at which he intends to herald the country. a new era in French-Algerian relations, is an opportune moment to begin to set out this new vision of a special A first step to encourage this could be for the EU delegation to connection between two countries that still play a leading host an event for representatives from European businesses, role in their respective regions. particularly those from member states with fewer bilateral links to key sectors in Algeria. This would enable businesses with a potential interest in Algeria to directly raise concerns about barriers to investment, including corruption and red tape around foreign ownership, and demonstrate the potential advantages of tackling these obstacles. One of the themes of this conference, and of EU engagement more broadly, could be to encourage Algeria to increase trade with its neighbours and focus on breaking down barriers to greater intra-regional trade, including normalising relations 5 6 ECFR/69 December 2012 www.ecfr.eu THE EU, ALGERIA AND THE NORTHERN MALI QUESTION African presenceintheintervention. 22 (in which case the concern is complicated by her close links close her by complicated is concern the case which (in complicated is concern the case which (in ministers French The EU’s engagement with Algeria has never been been never has Algeria with engagement EU’s The The EU also needs a new approach to Algeria on its strategic This collective concern has largely been communicated by by communicated been largely has concern collective This It is not in the interest of either the EU or Algeria to lose lose to Algeria or EU the either of interest the in not is It and good communication is vital to keep relations moving moving relations keep to vital is communication good and on depend will Mali in intervention of success the and Mediterranean would give support to Ashton on CSDP CSDP on Ashton to support give would Mediterranean gets underway, to manage Algerian concerns about a non- a about concerns Algerian manage to underway, gets early in 2013, as the EU mission supporting Malian forces forces Malian supporting mission EU the as 2013, in early general as a Special Security Representative to the Southern constructive input from Algeria. Given the history of mutual role, this representative could begin with a visit to Algiers Algiers to visit a with begin could representative this role, role in the region. The FAC has regularly discussed the the discussed regularly has FAC The region. the in role new the with ties neighbouring governmentsinTunisiaandLibya. strong developing and Morocco with when there are signs of improvement after years of impasse. matters in the region. the in matters the momentum that was created at the beginning of 2012, 2012, of beginning the at created was that momentum the moment a at complex more even become has picture the to technical co-operation). The appointment of a three-star a of appointment The co-operation). technical to straightforward, but with the political instability in Mali, Mali, in instability political the with but straightforward, situation in Mali – but always from the perspective of Algiers. understanding between the EU and Algeria, a clear strategy clear a Algeria, and EU the between understanding forward. by historical and political baggage) and Catherine Ashton Ashton Catherine and baggage) political and historical by  See WitneyandDworkin, “APowerAuditofEU–NorthAfricaRelations”, p.68. 22 Given Algeria’s significant regional significant Algeria’s Given Acknowledgements About the author the About Within ECFR she would like to thank Julien Barnes-Dacey, Julien thank to like would she ECFR Within Jacqueline Schoen for their expert editing. ECFR would also East andNorthAfricaprogramme. The author is grateful to all the policymakers and analysts analysts and policymakers the all to grateful is author The International on human rights in EU Foreign Policy and and Policy Foreign EU in rights human on International Richard Gowan, Daniel Levy and Nick Witney who provided Susi Dennison Susi accession to the EU. She is the author of several publications issues, policy of range a on advising Treasury, UK the at and Norway for their ongoing support of ECFR’s Middle Middle ECFR’s of support ongoing their for Norway and very valuable comments and input, and Hans Kundnani and the EU’sSouth on Foreign Relations. Previously she worked for Amnesty Amnesty for worked she Previously Relations. Foreign on who shared their insights during the research for this brief. this for research the during insights their shared who including migration in the run-up to the 2004 wave of of wave 2004 the to run-up the in migration including programme, including like to extend their thanks to the governments of Sweden Sweden of governments the to thanks their extend to like for ECFR on human rights questions and within the MENA the within and questions rights human on ECFR for (withHakimDarbouche,2011). is a policy fellow at the European Council Council European the at fellow policy a is A ”reset” with Algeria: The Russia to Among members of the European Council on Foreign Relations are John Bruton (Ireland) Hanzade Dog˘an Boyner Hans Hækkerup (Denmark) former prime ministers, presidents, Former European Commission (Turkey) Former Chairman, Defence European commissioners, current Ambassador to the USA; former Prime Chair, Dog˘an Gazetecilik and Dog˘an Commission; former Defence Minister and former parliamentarians and Minister (Taoiseach) On-line ministers, public intellectuals, Heidi Hautala (Finland) Ian Buruma (The Netherlands) Andrew Duff () Minister for International Development business leaders, activists and Writer and academic cultural figures from the EU member Member of the European Parliament Sasha Havlicek states and candidate countries. Erhard Busek (Austria) Mikuláš Dzurinda (Slovakia) (United Kingdom) Chairman of the Institute for the Former Foreign Minister Executive Director, Institute for Strategic Danube and Central Europe Dialogue (ISD) Asger Aamund (Denmark) Hans Eichel (Germany) President and CEO, A. J. Aamund A/S Jerzy Buzek (Poland) Former Finance Minister Connie Hedegaard (Denmark) and Chairman of Bavarian Nordic A/S Member of the European Parliament; Commissioner for Climate Action former President of the European Rolf Ekeus (Sweden) Urban Ahlin (Sweden) Parliament; former Prime Minister Former Executive Chairman, United Steven Heinz (Austria) Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Nations Special Commission on Iraq; Co-Founder & Co-Chairman, Affairs Committee and foreign Gunilla Carlsson (Sweden) former OSCE High Commissioner on Lansdowne Partners Ltd policy spokesperson for the Social Minister for International Development National Minorities; former Chairman Democratic Party Cooperation Stockholm International Peace Annette Heuser (Germany) Research Institute, SIPRI Executive Director, Bertelsmann Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Maria Livanos Cattaui Foundation Washington DC Chairman of the Board, Crisis () Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Management Initiative; former Diego Hidalgo (Spain) President Former Secretary General of the (Denmark) Co-founder of Spanish newspaper El International Chamber of Commerce Chairman, Baltic Development Forum; País; Founder and Honorary President, Giuliano Amato (Italy) former Foreign Minister FRIDE Former Prime Minister; Chairman, Ipek Cem Taha (Turkey) Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna; Director of Melak Investments/ Steven Everts (The Netherlands) Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Chairman, Istituto della Enciclopedia Journalist Adviser to the Vice President of the Italiana Treccani; Chairman, Centro European Commission and EU High (The Netherlands) Studi Americani Carmen Chacón (Spain) Representative for Foreign and Security Former NATO Secretary General Former Minister of Defence Policy Gustavo de Aristegui (Spain) Danuta Hübner (Poland) Diplomat; former Member of Charles Clarke Tanja Fajon (Slovenia) Member of the European Parliament; Parliament (United Kingdom) Member of the European Parliament former European Commissioner Visiting Professor of Politics, University Viveca Ax:son Johnson Gianfranco Fini (Italy) Anna Ibrisagic (Sweden) of East Anglia; former Home Secretary President, Chamber of Deputies; Member of the European Parliament (Sweden) former Foreign Minister Chairman of Nordstjernan AB Nicola Clase (Sweden) Jaakko Iloniemi (Finland) Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Joschka Fischer (Germany) Former Ambassador; former Executive Gordon Bajnai (Hungary) former State Secretary Former Foreign Minister and vice- Director, Crisis Management Initiative Former Prime Minister Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Germany) Chancellor Toomas Ilves (Estonia) Dora Bakoyannis (Greece) Member of the European Parliament Karin Forseke (Sweden/USA) President Member of Parliament; former Foreign Chairman, Alliance Trust Plc Minister Robert Cooper Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) (United Kingdom) Lykke Friis (Denmark) Chairman, Munich Security Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland) Counsellor of the European External Member of Parliament; former Minister Conference; Global Head of Professor of Economics at the Warsaw Action Service for Climate, Energy and Gender Equality Government Affairs Allianz SE School of Economics; former Deputy Prime Minister Gerhard Cromme (Germany) Jaime Gama (Portugal) Minna Järvenpää (Finland/US) Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Former Speaker of the Parliament; International Advocacy Director, Open Lluís Bassets (Spain) ThyssenKrupp former Foreign Minister Society Foundation Deputy Director, El País Maria Cuffaro (Italy) Timothy Garton Ash Mary Kaldor (United Kingdom) Marek Belka (Poland) Anchorwoman, TG3, RAI Professor, London School of Economics Governor, National Bank of Poland; (United Kingdom) former Prime Minister Daniel Daianu (Romania) Professor of European Studies, Oxford Ibrahim Kalin (Turkey) Professor of Economics, National University Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister Roland Berger (Germany) School of Political and Administrative of Turkey on foreign policy and public Founder and Honorary Chairman, Studies (SNSPA); former Finance Carlos Gaspar (Portugal) diplomacy Roland Berger Strategy Consultants Minister Chairman of the Portuguese Institute of GmbH International Relations (IPRI) Sylvie Kauffmann (France) Massimo D’Alema (Italy) Editorial Director, Le Monde Erik Berglöf (Sweden) President, Italianieuropei Foundation; Teresa Patricio Gouveia Chief Economist, European Bank for President, Foundation for European (Portugal) Olli Kivinen (Finland) Reconstruction and Development Progressive Studies; former Prime Trustee to the Board of the Calouste Writer and columnist Minister and Foreign Minister Gulbenkian Foundation; former Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) Foreign Minister Ben Knapen (The Netherlands) Chairman, Prime Minister's Economic Marta Dassù (Italy) Former Minister for European Affairs Council; former Prime Minister Under Secretary of State for Foreign Heather Grabbe and International Cooperation Affairs (United Kingdom) Carl Bildt (Sweden) Executive Director, Open Society Gerald Knaus (Austria) Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu (Turkey) Chairman, European Stability Initiative; Institute – Brussels Carr Center Fellow Henryka Bochniarz (Poland) Foreign Minister President, Polish Confederation of Charles Grant (United Kingdom) Aleš Debeljak (Slovenia) Director, Centre for European Reform Caio Koch-Weser (Germany) Private Employers – Lewiatan Poet and Cultural Critic Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group; Jean-Marie Guéhenno (France) former State Secretary Svetoslav Bojilov (Bulgaria) Jean-Luc Dehaene (Belgium) Founder, Communitas Foundation and Director of the Center for International Member of the European Parliament; Conflict Resolution, Columbia Bassma Kodmani (France) President of Venture Equity Bulgaria Ltd. former Prime Minister Executive Director, Arab Reform University; former Deputy Joint Special Initiative Ingrid Bonde (Sweden) Gianfranco Dell'Alba (Italy) Envoy of the United Nations and the CFO & Deputy CEO, Vattenfall AB Director, Confindustria Delegation League of Arab States on Syria Rem Koolhaas to Brussels; former Member of the Elisabeth Guigou (France) (The Netherlands) Emma Bonino (Italy) European Parliament Vice President of the ; former EU Member of Parliament and President Architect and urbanist; Professor at the Commissioner of the Foreign Affairs Committee Graduate School of Design, Harvard Pavol Demeš (Slovakia) University Senior Transatlantic Fellow, German Fernando Andresen Guimarães Stine Bosse (Denmark) Marshall Fund of the United States David Koranyi (Hungary) Chairman and Non-Executive Board (Bratislava) (Portugal) Member Deputy Director, Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Head of the US and Canada Division, Center of the Atlantic Council of the Kemal Dervis (Turkey) European External Action Service United States Franziska Brantner (Germany) Vice-President and Director of Member of the European Parliament Global Economy and Development, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg Bernard Kouchner (France) Brookings. (Germany) Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Han ten Broeke Former Defence Minister (The Netherlands) Tibor Dessewffy (Hungary) Ivan Krastev (Bulgaria) Member of Parliament and President, DEMOS Hungary István Gyarmati (Hungary) Chair of Board, Centre for Liberal spokesperson for foreign affairs and President and CEO, International Strategies defence Centre for Democratic Transition

7 Aleksander Kwas´niewski Daithi O'Ceallaigh (Ireland) Stefano Sannino (Italy) Vaira Vike-Freiberga (Latvia) (Poland) Director-General, Institute of Director General for Enlargement, Former President International and European Affairs European Commission Former President Antonio Vitorino (Portugal) Mart Laar (Estonia) Christine Ockrent (Belgium) Javier Santiso (Spain) Lawyer; former EU Commissioner Minister of Defence; former Prime Editorialist Director, Office of the CEO of Telefónica Europe Andre Wilkens (Germany) Minister Andrzej Olechowski (Poland) Director Mercator Centre Berlin and Miroslav Lajcˇák (Slovakia) Former Foreign Minister Marietje Schaake Director Strategy, Stiftung Mercator Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Dick Oosting (The Netherlands) (The Netherlands) Carlos Alonso Zaldívar (Spain) Minister CEO, European Council on Foreign Member of the European Parliament Former Ambassador to Brazil Alexander Graf Lambsdorff Relations; former Europe Director, Klaus Scharioth (Germany) Amnesty International Stelios Zavvos (Greece) (Germany) Dean of the Mercator Fellowship CEO, Zeus Capital Managers Ltd Member of the European Parliament Mabel van Oranje on International Affairs; former Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Samuel Žbogar (Slovenia) Pascal Lamy (France) (The Netherlands) Germany to the US EU Representative to Kosovo; former Honorary President, Notre Europe and Senior Advisor, The Elders Foreign Minister Director-General of WTO; former EU Pierre Schori (Sweden) Commissioner Marcelino Oreja Aguirre (Spain) Chair, Olof Palme Memorial Fund; Member of the Board, Fomento de former Director General, FRIDE; former Bruno Le Maire (France) Construcciones y Contratas; former EU SRSG to Cote d’Ivoire Former Minister for Food, Agriculture Commissioner & Fishing Wolfgang Schüssel (Austria) Monica Oriol (Spain) Member of Parliament; former Mark Leonard (United Kingdom) CEO, Seguriber Chancellor Director, European Council on Foreign Relations Cem Özdemir (Germany) Karel Schwarzenberg Leader, Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green (Czech Republic) Jean-David Lévitte (France) Party) Foreign Minister Former Senior Diplomatic Advisor and Ana Palacio (Spain) former Sherpa to the President of the Member of the Council of State; former Giuseppe Scognamiglio (Italy) THE EU, ALGERIA AND THE NORTHERN MALI QUESTION French Republic; former Ambassador to Foreign Minister; former Senior Vice Executive Vice President, Head of Public the United States President and General Counsel of the Affairs Department, UniCredit S.p.A Sonia Licht (Serbia) World Bank Group Narcís Serra (Spain) President, Belgrade Fund for Political Simon Panek (Czech Republic) Chair of CIDOB Foundation; former Vice Excellence Chairman, People in Need Foundation President of the Spanish Government Juan Fernando López Aguilar Chris Patten (United Kingdom) Radosław Sikorski (Poland) (Spain) Chancellor of Oxford University and co- Foreign Minister Member of the European Parliament; chair of the International Crisis Group; Aleksander Smolar (Poland) former Minister of Justice former EU Commissioner Chairman of the Board, Stefan Batory Adam Lury (United Kingdom) Diana Pinto (France) Foundation CEO, Menemsha Ltd Historian and author Javier Solana (Spain) Monica Macovei (Romania) Jean Pisani-Ferry (France) Former EU High Representative for the Member of the European Parliament Common Foreign and Security Policy & Director, Bruegel; Professor, Université Secretary-General of the Council of the Emma Marcegaglia (Italy) Paris-Dauphine EU; former Secretary General of NATO CEO of Marcegalia S.p.A; former Ruprecht Polenz (Germany) President, Confindustria George Soros (Hungary/USA) Member of Parliament; Chairman of the Founder and Chairman, Open Society Katharina Mathernova (Slovakia) Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Foundations Senior Advisor, World Bank Lydie Polfer () Teresa de Sousa (Portugal) ´ Member of Parliament; former Foreign Iñigo Méndez de Vigo (Spain) Minister Journalist Secretary of State for the European Union Goran Stefanovski (Macedonia) Charles Powell Playwright and Academic David Miliband (Spain/United Kingdom) Director, Real Instituto Elcano Rory Stewart (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Member of Parliament Member of Parliament; Former Andrew Puddephatt (United Secretary of State for Foreign and Kingdom) Alexander Stubb (Finland) Commonwealth Affairs Director, Global Partners & Associated Minister for Foreign Trade and Ltd. European Affairs; former Foreign Alain Minc (France) Minister President of AM Conseil; former Vesna Pusic´ (Croatia) chairman, Le Monde Foreign Minister Michael Stürmer (Germany) Chief Correspondent, Die Welt Nickolay Mladenov (Bulgaria) Robert Reibestein Foreign Minister; former Defence Ion Sturza (Romania) Minister; former Member of the (The Netherlands) President, GreenLight Invest; former European Parliament Director, McKinsey & Company Prime Minister of the Republic of Dominique Moïsi (France) George Robertson Moldova Senior Adviser, IFRI (United Kingdom) Paweł S´wieboda (Poland) Former Secretary General of NATO President, Demos EUROPA - Centre for (France) European Strategy Finance Minister; former Minister for Albert Rohan (Austria) European Affairs Former Secretary General for Vessela Tcherneva (Bulgaria) Foreign Affairs Spokesperson and advisor, Ministry of Nils Muiznieks (Latvia) Foreign Affairs Council of Europe Commissioner for Adam D. Rotfeld (Poland) Human Rights Former Minister of Foreign Affairs; Teija Tiilikainen (Finland) www.ecfr.eu Co-Chairman of Polish-Russian Group Director, Finnish Institute for Hildegard Müller (Germany) on Difficult Matters, Commissioner of International Relations Chairwoman, BDEW Bundesverband Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft Luisa Todini (Italy) Norbert Röttgen (Germany) Chair, Todini Finanziaria S.p.A; Member Wolfgang Münchau (Germany) Minister for the Environment, of the Board of Directors, RAI President, Eurointelligence ASBL Conservation and Nuclear Safety Loukas Tsoukalis (Greece) Alina Mungiu-Pippidi (Romania) Olivier Roy (France) Professor, University of Athens and Professor of Democracy Studies, Hertie Professor, European University Institute, President, ELIAMEP School of Governance Florence December 2012 Erkki Tuomioja (Finland) Kalypso Nicolaïdis Daniel Sachs (Sweden) Foreign Minister (Greece/France) CEO, Proventus Professor of International Relations, Daniel Valtchev, (Bulgaria) University of Oxford Pasquale Salzano (Italy) Former Deputy PM and Minister of Vice President for International ECFR/69 Education Governmental Affairs, ENI 8 Also available A Global China Policy Europe and the Arab Revolutions: A Power Audit of EU-North Africa from ECFR François Godement, June 2010 A New Vision for Democracy and Relations (ECFR/22) Human Rights Nick Witney and Anthony Dworkin, New World Order: The Balance Susi Dennison and Anthony Dworkin, September 2012 (ECFR/62) of Soft Power and the Rise of Towards an EU Human Rights November 2011 (ECFR/41) Herbivorous Powers Strategy for a Post-Western World Transnistria: A Bottom-up Solution Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, Susi Dennison and Anthony Dworkin, Spain after the Elections: the Nicu Popescu and Leonid Litra, October 2007 (ECFR/01) September 2010 (ECFR/23) “Germany of the South”? September 2012 (ECFR/63) José Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark A Power Audit of EU-Russia The EU and Human Rights at the Leonard, November 2011 (ECFR/42) Why the Euro Crisis Threatens the Relations UN: 2010 Review European Single Market Mark Leonard and Nicu Popescu, Richard Gowan and Franziska Four Scenarios for the Reinvention Sebastian Dullien, October 2012 November 2007 (ECFR/02) Brantner, September 2010 (ECFR/24) of Europe (ECFR/64) Mark Leonard, November 2011 Poland’s second return to Europe? The Spectre of a Multipolar Europe (ECFR/43) The EU and Ukraine after the 2012 Paweł Swieboda, December 2007 Ivan Krastev & Mark Leonard with Elections (ECFR/03) Dimitar Bechev, Jana Kobzova Dealing with a Post-Bric Russia Andrew Wilson, November 2012 & Andrew Wilson, October 2010 Ben Judah, Jana Kobzova and Nicu (ECFR/65) Afghanistan: Europe’s (ECFR/25) Popescu, November 2011 (ECFR/44) forgotten war China 3.0 Daniel Korski, January 2008 (ECFR/04) Beyond Maastricht: a New Deal for Rescuing the euro: what is China’s Edited by Mark Leonard, November the Eurozone price? 2012 (ECFR/66) Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of Thomas Klau and François François Godement, November 2011 the Putin Succession Godement, December 2010 (ECFR/26) (ECFR/45) Time to grow up: what Obama’s Andrew Wilson, February 2008 re-election means for Europe (ECFR/05) The EU and Belarus after the A “Reset” with Algeria: the Russia Dimitar Bechev, Anthony Dworkin, Election to the EU’s South François Godement, Richard Gowan, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Balázs Jarábik, Jana Kobzova Hakim Darbouche and Susi Hans Kundnani, Mark Leonard, Defence Policy and Andrew Wilson, January 2011 Dennison, December 2011 (ECFR/46) Daniel Levy, Kadri Liik and Nick Nick Witney, July 2008 (ECFR/06) (ECFR/27) Witney, November 2012 (ECFR/67) Ukraine after the Tymoshenko Can the EU win the Peace in After the Revolution: Europe and verdict Jordan Tremors: Elusive consensus, Georgia? the Transition in Tunisia Andrew Wilson, December 2011 deepening discontent Nicu Popescu, Mark Leonard and Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, (ECFR/47) Julien Barnes-Dacey, November 2012 Andrew Wilson, August 2008 (ECFR/07) Nicu Popescu and Nick Witney, March (ECFR/68) 2011 (ECFR/28) European Foreign Policy Scorecard A Global Force for Human Rights? 2012 An Audit of European Power at European Foreign Policy Scorecard February 2012 (ECFR/48) the UN 2010 Richard Gowan and Franziska March 2011 (ECFR/29) The Long Shadow of Brantner, September 2008 (ECFR/08) Ordoliberalism: Germany’s The New German Question: How Approach to the Euro Crisis Beyond Dependence: How to deal Europe can get the Germany it Sebastian Dullien and Ulrike Guérot, with Russian Gas needs February 2012 (ECFR/49) Pierre Noel, November 2008 (ECFR/09) Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard, April 2011 (ECFR/30) The End of the Putin Consensus Re-wiring the US-EU relationship Ben Judah and Andrew Wilson, Daniel Korski, Ulrike Guerot and Mark Turning Presence into Power: March 2012 (ECFR/50) Leonard, December 2008 (ECFR/10) Lessons from the Eastern Neighbourhood Syria: Towards a Political Solution Shaping Europe’s Afghan Surge Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, Julien Barnes-Dacey, March 2012 Daniel Korski, March 2009 (ECFR/11) May 2011 (ECFR/31) (ECFR/51)

A Power Audit of EU-China Relations Egypt’s Hybrid Revolution: a Bolder How the EU Can Support Reform John Fox and Francois Godement, EU Approach in Burma April 2009 (ECFR/12) Anthony Dworkin, Daniel Korski and Jonas Parello-Plesner, March 2012 Nick Witney, May 2011 (ECFR/32) (ECFR/52) Beyond the “War on Terror”: Towards a New Transatlantic A Chance to Reform: How the EU China at the crossroads Framework for Counterterrorism can support Democratic Evolution François Godement, April 2012 Anthony Dworkin, May 2009 (ECFR/13) in Morocco (ECFR/53) Susi Dennison, Nicu Popescu and The Limits of Enlargement-lite: José Ignacio Torreblanca, Europe and Jordan: Reform before European and Russian Power in the May 2011 (ECFR/33) it’s too late Troubled Neighbourhood Julien Barnes-Dacey, April 2012 Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson, China’s Janus-faced Response to (ECFR/54) June 2009 (ECFR/14) the Arab Revolutions Jonas Parello-Plesner and Raffaello China and Germany: Why the The EU and human rights at the UN: Pantucci, June 2011 (ECFR/34) Emerging Special Relationship 2009 annual review Matters for Europe Richard Gowan and Franziska What does Turkey think? Hans Kundnani and Jonas Parello- Brantner, September 2009 (ECFR/15) Edited by Dimitar Bechev, June 2011 Plesner, May 2012 (ECFR/55) (ECFR/35) What does Russia think? After Merkozy: How France and edited by Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard What does Germany think about Germany Can Make Europe Work and Andrew Wilson, September 2009 Europe? Ulrike Guérot and Thomas Klau, (ECFR/16) Edited by Ulrike Guérot and May 2012 (ECFR/56) Jacqueline Hénard, June 2011 Supporting Moldova’s Democratic (ECFR/36) The EU and Azerbaijan: Beyond Oil Transition Jana Kobzova and Leila Alieva, Nicu Popescu, October 2009 (ECFR/17) The Scramble for Europe May 2012 (ECFR/57) François Godement and Jonas Can the EU rebuild failing states? A Parello-Plesner with Alice Richard, A Europe of Incentives: How to review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities July 2011 (ECFR/37) Regain the Trust of Citizens and Daniel Korski and Richard Gowan, Markets October 2009 (ECFR/18) Palestinian Statehood at the UN: Mark Leonard and Jan Zielonka, Why Europeans Should Vote “Yes” June 2012 (ECFR/58) Towards a Post-American Europe: Daniel Levy and Nick Witney, A Power Audit of EU-US Relations September 2011 (ECFR/38) The Case for Co-operation in Jeremy Shapiro and Nick Witney, Crisis Management October 2009 (ECFR/19) The EU and Human Rights at the Richard Gowan, June 2012 (ECFR/59) UN: 2011 Review Dealing with Yanukovych’s Ukraine Richard Gowan and Franziska The Periphery of the Periphery: The Andrew Wilson, March 2010 Brantner, September 2011 (ECFR/39) Western Balkans and the Euro Crisis (ECFR/20) Dimitar Bechev, August 2012 (ECFR/60) How to Stop the Demilitarisation Beyond Wait-and-See: The Way of Europe Lebanon: Containing Spillover Forward for EU Balkan Policy Nick Witney, November 2011 from Syria Heather Grabbe, Gerald Knaus and (ECFR/40) Julien Barnes-Dacey, September 2012 Daniel Korski, May 2010 (ECFR/21) (ECFR/61)

9 ABOUT ECFR

The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first pan-European think-tank. Launched in October 2007, its objective is to conduct research and promote informed debate across Europe on the development of coherent, effective and values-based European foreign policy.

ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements that define its activities:

•A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a distinguished Council of over one hundred Members - politicians, decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s member states and candidate countries - which meets once a year as a full body. Through geographical and thematic task forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities within their own countries. The Council is chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, Joschka Fischer and Mabel van Oranje.

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• A distinctive research and policy development process. ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to advance its objectives through innovative projects with a pan-European focus. ECFR’s activities include primary research, publication of policy reports, private meetings and public debates, ‘friends of ECFR’ gatherings in EU capitals and outreach to strategic media outlets.

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ISBN: 978-1-906538-69-9

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