STONELEIGH HS2 ACTION GROUP

HIGH SPEED RAIL CONSULTATION - A RESPONSE FROM THE STONELEIGH HS2 ACTION GROUP

Background to the response.

Our Group, the Stoneleigh HS2 Action Group, was formed immediately following the public announcement of the Government’s plans for HS2 in March 2010 and the publication of the Command Paper. The full realisation of what these proposals would mean for the village, its residents and property values, caused anxiety and despair, a sense of disbelief that they could seriously be made, without any prior public consultation. Everything that our village and our homes meant to us in common with a wide section of the public who have an interest in the village and its setting, its buildings and heritage and its National Agriculture Centre was suddenly put in serious jeopardy. Not only would the preferred route be a catastrophe for our village but also for the countryside of which already has its fair share of motorways, trunk roads, airports and railways.

As originally proposed, the track approached from the South West, passed through the heart of the neighbouring hamlet of Stareton (which would effectively have become uninhabitable) crossing the River Avon and the historic on an elevated track before proceeding over the River Sowe (near its confluence with the Avon), over the B4115 and to the North towards

The village and the wider community and the public who visit Stoneleigh value and take pride in the village and the landscape in which it is set; it is imperative that Stoneleigh and its heritage are preserved for future generations. The Stoneleigh Conservation Area was designated in 1969, there being nearly 70 Listed Buildings within the heart of the village – the greatest number in Warwickshire, we believe. Our Church of St Mary the Virgin is nationally recognised as one of the finest examples of Norman church architecture, and Stoneleigh Bridge is a Scheduled Ancient Monument. In the immediate vicinity, Stare Bridge and the deserted medieval village of Kings Hill are also Scheduled Ancient Monuments, and Stoneleigh Abbey is not only Grade I Listed, but its grounds and Deer Park are Grade II Listed in the English Heritage Register of Historic Parks and Gardens. District Council describes the Conservation Area as “a series of distinctive open spaces following the line of the river which are extremely important to both the views out of the village and into the village and should be retained as open agricultural land.” It goes on “There are important views across the Conservation Area from the southern approaches to the village. Similarly there are important views out of the village in a southerly

1 direction.” Both the B4113 as it approaches the village from Stareton, and the B4115 from are planted with “veteran” parkland oaks.

Our village has a long history in connection with mediaeval monastic activity at the nearby abbey, and after the Dissolution it became the provider of homes for Estate workers to the Stoneleigh Abbey Estate, purchased 450 years ago in 1561 by Sir Thomas Leigh. Since that date the history of the village contains many references to legacies from the Leigh family, including the Almshouses, the school, the Reading Room (now the Village Club), the cottages for the workers and so on. They exercised a paternalistic interest in the village for over four hundred years, ensuring the well-being of the villagers and maintaining a close connection with the “big house.” The Leigh family no longer resides at the Abbey but links between the village and the Abbey are strong and the physical, emotional and historical and indeed, the spiritual roots, are intertwined. Our responses to the proposed High Speed Rail Link therefore have to be set within this context, as the way we think and react is necessarily so conditioned.

In preparing these responses our guiding principle has been: If HS2 goes ahead on the currently preferred route we in Stoneleigh feel that ,with the wider public, we are likely to lose a great deal, environmentally, economically, historically and emotionally. Would these losses be balanced or compensated for by the net gain to the economy of UK plc? That is very much an open question currently the subject of much debate and widely disputed in the media and elsewhere..

What does the route mean to us?

The Adonis Command Paper and other documents made public information in March 2010, particularly recognised the sensitivity of the published route through Stoneleigh Park and Gardens. Arup’s 2009 report at paragraph 5.22 stated:-

“The route would then pass between the grounds of the National Agricultural Centre (NAC) and Stoneleigh Village, resulting in it passing through Stoneleigh National Park and Garden. The route would be at ground level but would pass over the River Sowe and one of its tributaries. It might be possible to realign the route through the grounds of the NAC, severing it, or requiring a cut-and-cover tunnel to avoid permanent severance.”

Thereafter, we as a Group collaborated with representatives of Stareton urging this alteration to the preferred route. In September 2010 a revised route was published showing that indeed the line had been rerouted along its southern approach to the NAC, away from Stareton and through the National Agricultural Centre/Stoneleigh Park before crossing the River Avon to the North. This alteration did not however involve a cut-and-cover tunnel through the NAC (concerning which please see below) so that the NAC would be severed, thus threatening the future viability

2 of the Showground activity and the number of agricultural, equestrian and commercial activities carried on day to day and the employment of many earning their livelihoods there. The owners of the Showground have or had the ambition and the vision to develop the Showground as a centre of excellence for research and as a specialist training centre and exhibition venue for Agricultural and associated subjects and, providing significantly increased and much-needed employment in the area.

To the north of the Showground the route would then cross over the River Avon by viaduct and subsequently the fields up to the A46 where it passes under the road, crossing under the B4115 before it does so. This latter road is tree lined and undulating; it has connections with Roman and earlier settlements and was used as an ancient drovers’ road.

To allow the route to pass at ground level through the Showground would evidently involve rerouting Stareton Lane at its junction with the B4113 with associated bridging works at or close to the main showground entrance. The road would need to be elevated at least 8m to clear the route, and this junction would probably then need to be illuminated. This would introduce a destructive visual element into the landscape which was originally remodelled by Humphry Repton, with some noble examples of veteran parkland oaks. In passing so closely, the rail would seriously damage the visual impact of the lovely Stare Bridge, a fifteenth century monastic bridge (Listed as Grade II*) associated with Stoneleigh Abbey, and it may demolish, the Abbey’s East Lodge (also a Listed Building). The elevated road would cause further noise pollution from passing traffic.

With the rail line proposed to run over the surface, what mitigation was proposed to ensure that there would be adequate sound and visual screening was and remains of considerable importance to us and the residents of Stareton and Stoneleigh Park, the new development at Grovehurst Park and other sites there including in Stoneleigh Abbey itself. No details have been provided at this stage, apparently intentionally, so that we are disappointed that we cannot comment on these. Our concerns extend to the residents of Crew Lane to the north of the River Avon and, further to the north, those living in Dalehouse Lane, both particularly vulnerable

Given our obvious concern about the potential effects that the proposed route would have on the Showground, with the adverse visual and noise effects which the southern approach to and through the Showground could be expected to have, we liaised with Stoneleigh Park Residents Association (SPRA) (representing residents of Stareton) and made joint representations to HS2 Ltd for a cut-and-cover tunnel through the southern approach to and through the Showground up to the River Avon north of the Showground and the proposed viaduct over it. This proposal was submitted to HS2 Ltd in January 2011 and it was followed by a meeting between representatives of our Group and SPRA with members of HS2 Ltd’s engineering team. At this meeting we

3 believe our joint proposals were favourably received and we understood that it was accepted that they represented a sound engineering solution to the problems that the preferred route represented to Stareton, the Showground and to the Stoneleigh area. After the Consultation period commenced we were, with SPRA invited to submit our proposals as formal responses in the Consultation. Along with SPRA we therefore resubmitted these proposals as formal Consultation responses. We now wish to re-emphasise our strong support for this proposal should the decision be made to proceed with HS2 on its currently preferred route. However, the fact that we made this proposal in no way implied or now implies our support for the route, but to urge that this Green Tunnel should be incorporated as essential mitigation in the detailed design if the ultimate decision is to proceed with HS2 to the Construction stage on this route. (Please see the correspondence attached in Annex 1 hereto for details of our proposal for the Green Tunnel).

In summary, the Green Tunnel as proposed would have the following merits:

1. It would limit the damage to and the threat to the viability and the future development of the Showground as a potential place of employment and a centre of agricultural research and excellence; 2. It would obviate the need to alter the road layout and bridging works at the junction of Stareton Lane and the B4113 and to the South entrance to the Showground; 3. It would preserve the historic connection between the village and Stoneleigh Abbey; 4. It would help to protect wildlife including protected species; 5. It would substantially mitigate the adverse visual and noise effects of HS2 and be less damaging environmentally and to the properties and quality of life of nearby residents.

As the rail crosses the River Avon it would pass within 700m of Wentworth House, the first house on the Western side of the village, and itself a building with enormous historical importance. As a result, further attenuation methods over the viaduct and going north of it need to be considered since it is likely that noise would be reflected off the surface of the water. Sound barriers and additional bunding along this section of the route would provide acoustic and visual screening and again we urge that such means are incorporated if ultimately it is decided that HS2 should proceed on this route.

As to the transmission of noise, the residents of the Village very well know that at show-time, for example the defunct Royal Show, and at other occasional activities, noise, eg from music and public address amplification carried on the prevailing wind is, at times, annoyingly intrusive as far as Road in Stoneleigh, a distance of at least 1000m. Accordingly we were not

4 impressed with the acoustic booths which HS2 provided at recent local roadshows (noise of passing trains appeared to us to have been significantly downplayed) and we remain unsatisfied that any detailed acoustic modelling by HS2 Ltd has taken account of the effects of air-stream on the transmission of noise.

We add here that the absence of any satisfactory information in the Consultation documents concerning noise levels at varying distances and appropriate mitigation is very much to be regretted as indeed is HS2 Ltd’s insistence on using average decibel levels per day. What people need to know is what decibel level will be caused at varying distances from the line by each passing train, particularly because of the numeracy of train passes on an hourly basis planned for HS2.

High Speed Rail: Our Observations

There appear to be two principal arguments put forward by the Government in support of its proposal for the development of a High Speed Rail network:-

· Estimated growth in rail travel in the long term cannot be accommodated by the existing rail network, even with possible increased capacity;

· High Speed Rail travel would transform the North/South divide and promote economic growth and employment, particularly in the North East and away from the South East.

Much has been written and said on the relative merits of a High Speed Rail network on the one hand and further improvement and development of the existing inter- city rail network on the other. Those who argue for High Speed Rail claim that although the estimated cost (at 2009 prices) is dauntingly great, it would be worth it, having regard to the benefits in terms of employment, increased economic activity and wealth creation, whilst at the same time any room for development of the existing network will not be greatly less expensive and in any event would not resolve the ultimate capacity issue (an assertion which has been fiercely challenged).

We as a Group have not been persuaded by the case for High Speed Rail, certainly not in the form of HS2 as currently being consulted upon. Our reasons are as follows:-

1) We believe that a High Speed Rail network, however it is planned, will necessarily have, on account of the speed requirement, restricted direct travel destinations; in the case of HS2, to Birmingham, those two destinations only. What the vast majority of rail travellers require, however, are the greater range of destination options afforded by the existing inter city

5 network. It is true that the speed of a journey between London and Birmingham will not be so fast once you are on the High Speed Train but when account is taken of the time required to get to a High Speed Train terminal or for onward travel from a destination reached by High Speed Travel, existing inter-city timetables offer greater flexibility. As an example a traveller from London to, say, after 6:00 pm on a weekday will get a direct service by inter- city rail in a journey time of 1h 49mins. If alternatively HS2 is available to him he reaches Curzon Street Birmingham in 49 minutes, he then has to transfer to New Street Birmingham and wait for a connection to Wolverhampton, which could well, including waiting time take, say, 60 minutes. The journey to Wolverhampton will then take a further 20 minutes resulting in an overall journey time of 2hrs 9 mins. Even if his transfer and connection does not take as long, the direct inter- city journey would be more convenient to him.

Additionally we believe that inter-city services as we know them, and the destinations they serve, will be downgraded and suffer a lack of investment and from curtailed subsidy in consequence of the initial cost and running expense of High Speed Rail, as has been experienced in France.

2) We do not accept the argument that High Speed Rail, whether between London and Birmingham, or as developed in the suggested Y network, can have a transformational effect on the economies of the regions it connects with. Some experts have warned that reverse effects can be expected and that the capital will benefit most. This appears to be happening in France where the Paris to Lyon high speed rail initially took businesses from Paris to Lyon but more recently businesses that moved to Lyon for the perceived benefits of relocating from the capital are now returning to Paris. Lille has been cited as an example of how High Speed Rail has brought economic benefit and employment to Lille but in fact it appears the reverse is the case, Lille having suffered higher unemployment rates than other comparable French cities. Thus, High Speed Rail may well create nodal economic hotspots (i.e. ends of route) but, by concentrating growth into congested areas, will not benefit the overall regional economies. This point does not seem to have been considered properly, not only for the London-Birmingham section but for the Y network and beyond to Scotland.

3) An analytical study of and report of the relative merits of High Speed Rail and the development and upgrade of the existing inter-city line, trains and services proposed in the report known as Rail Package 2 (RP2) should be carried out before a decision by Government about High Speed Rail is taken. The alternatives should be subjected to an independent examination. Furthermore the reasons for the selection of High Speed Rail as a solution to the problems of WCML should be reexamined. There may be merit in proposing a fee-earning dedicated freight network, which would have the following benefits:

i) It would fit to existing transport corridors,

6 ii) It could help to capture more freight market (currently 9% of transport miles of freight overall) by careful siting of access points etc and take lorries off the roads, iii) It would then free up the existing rail network to permit speed increases.

4) We do not have faith in the Business Case for High Speed Rail or rather HS2. Having regard to the daunting capital cost of HS2 estimated on 2009 prices and the significant uplift for inflation before work could start, our concern is that the assumed Benefit to Cost ratio is as low as it is and over the period since March 2010 we believe the Government’s forecasts have had to be downgraded. This must reflect on the credibility of the figures and what the BCR can be expected to be, positive or negative, by the time that construction work is scheduled to commence, let alone when the project is completed.

5) Similar doubts arise over the predicted number of travellers HS2 is likely to attract. The experiences of HS1 and in Europe do not inspire confidence in the forecast of passenger numbers and those who are likely to transfer from other travel options to HS2. We refer to the reports that Spain is to axe the High Speed line between Toledo, Cuenca and Albacente, the report attributed to the President of SNCF that ‘we risk having longer and longer high speed lines which are used less and less’, and to Reuter’s report that ‘The Dutch high speed train operator could face eventual bankruptcy unless steps are taken to boost its viability, after little more than a year of full services’.

6) A further aspect of the Business Case is the Government’s assumption that travel time is non-productive and that High Speed Rail travel is to be preferred for that reason. As any rail traveller knows, a great deal of work is done on trains by the business traveller. Many regard the time spent on a train as a useful period of the working day, as preparation time or otherwise productive. Accordingly the economic savings for lost travel time ascribed by the Government at £25 billion out of a total of £37 billion of benefits attributed to HS2 is simply not credible.

7) There is also the need to consider alternative rail links and other modes of transport, how they will compete against HS2 and how they will be likely to develop in the 15 years or so before HS2 is completed. Technology improvements, e.g. fibre optics, may also reduce the need for business miles travelled.

8) To date, the forecasts made in respect of HS2 are based on demonstrably flawed models.

7 Route Options and their Consequences

The preferred route is very clearly a function of the specification for a track design speed of 400 kph (250mph) which dictates a straight track (radii at 7200m) and a fairly level one too. Aside from the issue of whether HS2 is the correct solution to the transport requirements of the WCML and of the travelling public, we question the need for these sorts of speeds. Because they are attainable (or may shortly be so) does it mean they are correct for the UK’s geography? HSR is by nature going to be selective: too many stops and the system does not achieve what its supporters want from it, which they argue is to promote “modal” shift from road and air to rail. That is in itself no small target. (See ‘The Economic Case’, below).

We question the design specification of this level of speed and see the design speed throwing up the following problems:

(i) An inability to fit the rail route within the landscape without extensive mitigation;.

(ii) The higher consumption of energy to move the trains; we understand that compared to HS1 there will be a projected 50% increase in energy consumption at the projected speeds for HS2. Where will the power come from to run the system?

(iii) The return for expending the energy in making the trains go faster will be a dominant airborne noise component (over track and engine/ carriage noise) as speeds rise in excess of 300 kph. We have not been satisfied, based on the sound booth demonstration offered to the residents of Kenilworth at the road-show there that the noise issue has been properly addressed and indeed has been downplayed;

(iv) The consultation document stated that a route following M1 and M6 would involve a journey time of 51 minutes but it is understood that this was later revised to a difference of only 5 minutes or a 54 minute journey time from Euston to Curzon Street. Such a difference is quite immaterial. Further there is evidence that a speed of 180 mph, which is approximately equivalent to high speed train speed in the rest of Europe, would result in a loss of 2 minutes only on the London to Birmingham journey time over the preferred route;

(v) The operating hours of the track, as the proposed stem of a Y shaped section, will mean that the continual traffic on this route will cause long term interference and nuisance to many thousands;

8 (vi) Although we understand that the design for HS2 as currently envisaged is not capable of carrying freight, ambiguous answers have been given to us by HS2 staff so we would also like reassurances that the track will not be used for freight, which could then run at night when the passenger routes stop.

In more general terms:

Existing railway or motorway links would provide possible routes, for example, the line of the West Coast Main Line or the M1 and M6 routes would present opportunities. Such existing corridors were found for HS1 and Germany has successfully used them for recently constructed high speed lines. Undoubtedly the impact of noise compared with a route through open landscapes and green belt areas will be heightened. Slower speeds would also significantly reduce the energy requirement whilst having immaterial effect on overall journey times.

An added reason for speed reduction may well be the recent experience in China which involved a reduction in speed of trains capable of c.400kph because of the requirement for costly daily inspection and repair of lines and rolling stock. Is it reasonable to suppose that this country’s experience with HS2 and running up to 18 trains an hour at up to 250 mph would be any different even allowing for advances in technology?

It seems that no detailed examination of alternative route options has been carried out or reported on. We believe that closer and independent examination of the alternative routes which reduced speed would make possible should be carried out and made available to the public before any decision is reached on the preferred route for HS2.

The Economic Case: Further Observations

In our opinion the proposal for HS2 and the preferred route represents loss to the residents of Stoneleigh and its neighbourhood by the present and real devaluation of our properties and the potential, less quantifiable, harm to the wider environment, such as, loss of natural habitat, invasion of tranquillity and other environmental impairments. If the ease of commuting to London from /Warwick is reduced, what compensation will there be? (Admittedly hard to quantify but surely this should be counted as a cost?). Are these consequences justified by a compelling need for HS2 in the national interest?

We remain totally unconvinced of this need. During the launch of the Command Paper and then the Public Consultation there has been a rally of opponents and proponents over the Business Case. We read that the Benefit Cost Ratio (BCR) estimates vary from a value of 1.6 to 2.6 depending on over what sections it is considered and the forecasts of passenger demand based

9 on demonstrably flawed models. We refer you to the detailed and convincing argument put forward by our local Member of Parliament, Mr Jeremy Wright, against the Business Case in his response to the Consultation available on his web-site. He also refers to the fact that the business model takes no account of the competition to HS2 from other lines and their likely responses to the HS2 proposal that may encourage a price war which could undermine further the Government’s projections of the BCR.

The aim of HS2 to encourage “modal shift” is also ambitious but is not necessarily target- specific. Given that above 90% of all transport movements occur on road, we question whether rail could reduce this balance. In the absence of a properly designed national transport strategy High Speed Rail can be considered as a possible solution only once this has been thought through.

We accept that problems with the WCML may arise but we are aware that there are other solutions, such as RP2. We also wonder if the passenger growth rates upon which the model for HS2 is based are sustainable. In any event, the time to deliver HS2 may mean that elements of RP2 will need to be adopted. RP2 has the merit of being capable of introduction incrementally as need arises. Some commentators claim that overcrowding of commuter and inter city lines at peak travel times is attributable to a great extent by ticket pricing structures, modification of which, with improved management, would significantly resolve peak-time overcrowding. These issues need investigating before a blank cheque is provided.

David Bayliss, the Director of The RAC Foundation, gave evidence to the Transport Select Committee that of all transport miles covered in the UK 7% only represents passenger movements on rail and this figure rises to 9% for freight. Of the 7% of all transport miles covered, approximately one third is long distance, so that the HS2 proposal addresses at best measure between 1% and 2% of the total passenger market for rail travel.

When we combine the business case with its variable and questionable Benefit Cost Ratio with the likely spend for such a small proportion of the travelling public, we again remain unconvinced that this project is worth the investment and feel that the HS2 project is a misplaced use of limited resources, especially given the state of the nation’s finances.

Looked at from a local perspective, there is no perceived benefit to rail users in Stoneleigh. Our closest train station is Coventry on the WCML, a distance of approximately 3 miles, producing a commute time by car of approximately 15 minutes though very much longer by bus due to the absence of a direct bus connection and an irregular service. If commuting to London, the only comparable journey to HS2, the journey time is currently 62 minutes to Euston.

10 Our other option is to travel to Warwick Parkway station, again by car (no bus connection), over a similar distance and with a journey time of 80 minutes, arriving in Marylebone. Cost of tickets rises as the travel date approaches, but generally the Chiltern Rail route is more competitive and offers better value. Improved speeds are being promised in the immediate future. Commuting from this area on HS2 would involve a 20-30 minute drive to a 7000 space car park (then allowing time to find a parking space) and then a suggested travel time of 49 minutes and an uncertain ticket price (but likely to be higher as a perceived premium service). This is not an attractive or viable proposition to a commuter from our village, or indeed from any other part of Warwickshire from which Coventry, or Warwick railway stations are the more convenient departure and return points.

If we then consider that a subsidy for the WCML and the current frequency of three trains an hour will reduce to one, then there will be a diminution of service and consequently a net loss. Indeed for a commuter needing to travel from London to other than central Birmingham or to the Parkway station at Bickenhill, the existing inter-city service will almost certainly provide a better option than HS2.

As to the transformational effects claimed as a benefit which HS2 would bring, this is highly questionable and might well adversely affect the economy of Coventry by attracting commercial and other businesses away from the City to the regional centre of Birmingham or even to London.. Also, if a consequence of HS2 is that services to and from Coventry are reduced then there will be a net economic loss to Coventry and other cities such as Wolverhampton. This is already happening. Thus, in Coventry, the Friargate development in the vicinity of the railway station - a major commercial, retail and residential development - was due to commence and demolition had started on the site when the Command Paper introduced the HS2 proposal. Work has now stopped since businesses are anxious that fewer trains will bring fewer people to Coventry, resulting in a real economic downturn for a city which is renowned for its skilled, innovative and new enterprises and its engineering and manufacturing skills.

Specification and the Appraisal of Sustainability.

This we found one of the most disappointing aspects of the Consultation document. It is accepted that a full evaluation takes time and money, but if this project is being held up as worthy of serious consideration, then the documents that have been offered do not support that point of view at all. Perhaps the explanation is that this is an open consultation including as to the proposed route making it impracticable to prepare a full EIS until the route is decided upon.

There are many areas where the Appraisal is deficient, e.g.:-

11 i) A serious consideration of energy consumption, generation, distribution (e.g. power lines, substations: none indicated) factoring in of economic considerations to the future of energy prices and the security of supply;

ii) Noise contours and details of likely attenuation;

iii) The use of the word sustainability itself is questionable and lacks rigour;

iv) Embodied energy consumption from the construction phase appears to have been overlooked. We assume that if this project proceeds, these areas will be addressed, whether by an EIA or a more detailed set of proposals area by area.

Whilst true that some of the Roadshow staff were more knowledgeable than others there was very little help on environmental issues, particularly about noise. Further the noise booths were less than informative, indeed they were misleading. Inadequate and/or contradictory answers were provided to a range of questions.

Compensation.

It would have been preferable for the Government’s proposed additional compensation scheme to be a part of the consultation documentation rather than offering a range of options which will be the subject of a consultation at a later date. Property blighted by proximity has affected individuals since March 2010 and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future; the resultant uncertainty is causing huge stress.

In principle it must be right that those affected by proximity to the preferred route should not bear any financial loss, realised or otherwise, on account of the HS2 proposals. Where properties were not the subject of compulsory purchase of land required for the line or its facilities the existing statutory compensation scheme under the Land Compensation Act 1973 is quite inadequate because no claims can be made for 15 years or more and even then effectively will be limited to the effects on property values of physical factors only, principally noise, light pollution and vibration. Whilst the Secretary of State may recognise this problem, a satisfactory scheme is yet to be put into place, whilst people suffer from loss of property value occasioned by these paper proposals. The plight of the blighted property owner should be relieved as a matter of urgency.

It is accordingly disappointing that no appropriate scheme has so far been published despite earlier assurances that it would. The absence of an appropriate scheme will also affect the cost of HS2 and the Government’s estimated BCR as it appears that no credible estimate has been made

12 of the overall cost of compensation and indeed cannot be made until a satisfactory scheme has been proposed.

Our view is that the guarantee or bond scheme as advocated by HS2AA (see Annex 2) offers the best choice. Such a scheme is more likely to be acceptable to affected property owners and prospective purchasers so as to allow local property markets to function normally in the circumstances.

It is also essential that an appropriate compensation scheme should not be subject to the qualification based on hardship suffered by individual claimants but should be open to all property owners whose properties are adversely affected. Further, the compensation scheme should continue during any period of further consideration of a high speed rail project whether on the preferred route as published or any other route alternatively considered and indefinitely until or unless liability under the guarantee or bond is satisfied or the current preferred route is cancelled or abandoned.

The possibility that the HS2 line might at some future stage be used for carrying freight is of serious concern to us. Whilst we understand that there is no present intention of running freight trains, we also understand that it is the intention to construct the HS2 line to freight bearing capability. Accordingly the possibility that a future Secretary of State or new administration could revoke the expressed intention cannot be ruled out. In that case, if a freight service is introduced, freight trains would inevitably run overnight. Accordingly the compensation scheme should cover this eventuality, whether by amendment to the Land Compensation Act 1973 or other suitable statutory or other binding provision allow for the payment of additional compensation to an affected owner-occupier who suffers loss or further loss in consequence of use of the line by freight trains.

Nevertheless any compensation scheme involves the drawback that the would-be buyer of blighted property acquiring the benefit of a bond or right to compensation may still be put off a purchase by the inevitable uncertainty associated with a purchase of the affected property on account of the element of uncertainty and the prospect of a wrangle with the Government over values. Accordingly in our view it cannot be taken as certain that any choice of compensation package will ensure the proper functioning of an affected property market.

We wholeheartedly support the comments made by our MP, Jeremy Wright, on the subject of Compensation options.

13 Conclusion

As a proposal we cannot see an overwhelming business or local case for HS2 as proposed between London and Birmingham in phase one. Given the paucity of information about the Y development we cannot comment on that other than to say that it seem totally inappropriate to have a consultation which concentrates on the ‘easy’ Euston to Birmingham section of the proposed route before any further details are provided about the route beyond. The total cost is overwhelming, especially in the context of so many other demands on the nation’s debt-ridden resources.

We in Stoneleigh do not believe that any benefit will accrue to us from the introduction of HS2. Warwickshire is already criss-crossed by motorways, railways, major trunk roads and air traffic; a huge project like HS2 feels like far too big an additional burden for residents to bear.

We hope that the Government will heed the statements of the Office for Budget Responsibility when considering the announced likely and the possible, but very likely, additional costs of such a major project.

On the evidence presented to date by HS2 Limited, the Department for Transport, and others, we support the Institute for Economic Affairs’ conclusion that “the economic case for HS2 stretches belief beyond breaking point”.

Prepared by Martin Smith, David Vaughan, Margaret Wallis and Sheila Woolf on behalf of the Stoneleigh Action Group, July 22nd 2011

Issued by Martin Smith on behalf of the STONELEIGH HS2 ACTION GROUP c/o 23 Birmingham Road Stoneleigh Warwickshire CV8 3DD tel 02476 690906. e-mail: [email protected] dated 22 July 2011

signed and endorsed on behalf of the group......

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