’s Fight Against : A Critical Assessment

Kıvanç Ulusoy*

his paper aims to analyse Turkey’s anti-corruption to many officials from the Housing Development policy in the context of the country’s integration Administration (TOKI), the Ministry of Environment Twith the European Union (EU). It examines the major and the District Municipality of , high-level figures corruption scandal in December 2013 as a case to assess related to a number of important ministers in the current whether Turkey is well equipped to confront the expan- government were detained.1 The investigation found ding . It starts by setting the scene of Egemen Bağış – Turkish Minister of EU Affairs at the time the scandal of last December, arguing that after the reve- – to be a potential suspect for in conjunction with lation of the corruption scandal, the cases essentially got Reza Zarrab, an Azeri businessman with Iranian origins bogged down and had negligible political consequen- residing in and with business affiliations with ces. The scandal led to the dismissal of certain police and another Iranian citizen, Babek Zencani. Moreover, police judicial officials, but the charges against the remaining 53 found 4.5 million dollars at the residence of Süleyman suspects in this major corruption case have been drop- Aslan, general manager of , and another 750,000 ped by the Public Prosecutor. The paper seeks to explain dollars at the residence of Barış Güler, son of Muammer this corruption scandal in the context of the current le- Güler, Turkey’s Minister of Interior. The court ordered the gal anti-corruption framework, assessing the framework’s arrest of 14 people including Barış Güler, Kaan Çağlayan, inadequacies and how these could be remedied. As will Süleyman Aslan and Reza Zarrab on counts of bribery, be underlined, despite the improvement of the legal fra- corruption, fraud, and smuggling gold. mework to combat corruption, there has been little or no In total, 91 people were detained in this investigation. implementation of a series of administrative measures is- sued by governments and major anti-corruption treaties According to the Istanbul Public Prosecutor, two of signed after the economic crisis of 2001. the three probes launched on 17 December related to violations of construction laws and the coastal law. Civilians and public officials were accused of malpractice 1. An Overview of the Recent Corruption Scandal in and bribery. In the first raid, the Azeri businessman Zarrab Turkey 1 These included: Barış Güler (son of the Minister of Interior, Turkey’s political setting was recently shaken by two Muammer Güler); Kaan Çağlayan (son of Economy Minister, Zafer Çağlayan); Oğuz Bayraktar (son of the Minister of Environment and successive waves of police operations conducted by the Urban Planning, Erdoğan Bayraktar); Mustafa Demir (the mayor Financial Crimes and Battle Against Criminal Incomes of the district municipality of Fatih); Ali Ağaoğlu (a prominent Department of the Istanbul Security Directory on 17 and real estate businessman and owner of one of Turkey’s largest 25 December 2013. In the first wave, the police detained construction companies); Süleyman Aslan (the general manager of Halkbank); and Reza Zarrab (an Iranian businessman residing in 47 people and confiscated 17.5 million dollars. In addition Istanbul). * Kıvanç Ulusoy is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, Istanbul University.

November 2014 COMMENTARY 19 1 was accused of running a crime ring, paying bribes to Cabinet members to cover his money transactions while securing Turkish citizenship for his relatives and affiliates participating in the alleged crime ring. Zarrab was accused of transferring gold to in exchange for money in 2012 with the help of his relations with a number of top Turkish politicians. After the money was seized in Russia, Zarrab used Turkey’s state-owned bank Halkbank to send and receive money. As mentioned above, police seized 4.5 million dollars in cash as part of a fraud and bribery raid in Süleyman Aslan’s house. According to police, the illegal transactions with Iran could amount to almost $10 million. The second probe relates Ozan Kose/AFP/Getty Images to illegal construction permits given to firms in exchange for bribes. Within the framework of this probe, police December 2013 Erdoğan had to reshuffle his Cabinet, detained Oğuz Bayraktar (the son of Environment and replacing 10 ministers. From the beginning of the Urbanization Minister, Erdoğan Bayraktar), construction investigation, the government started a purge in the tycoons Ali Ağaoğlu, Osman Ağca and Emrullah Turanlı police force, sacking dozens of police chiefs, including and public officials Sadık Soylu (adviser to the Minister of Huseyin Capkin, Istanbul’s Chief of Police. Environment), Mehmet Ali Kahraman (General Manager of the Environment Ministry), Murat Kurum (Emlak Konut Blaming the investigation on an international conspiracy GYO General Manager), Ali Seydi Karaoğlu (TOKİ Istanbul and threatening the American Ambassador in Ankara estate department head), Turgay Albayrak (Environment with expulsion, Erdoğan also accused Islamic community Ministry planning official), Yavuz Çeli (TOKİ city planning leader Fetullah Gülen of being behind the investigation. branch head) and 14 others. The third probe included The detainees of the corruption probe were subsequently allegations of construction permits given to a firm by released but the purges continued and even extended as Istanbul’s Fatih Municipality, despite reports showing that Erdoğan launched a revenge campaign targeting followers this construction would threaten the safety of the newly of the Gülen community, many of whom are said to hold built crossing the Bosphorus. Thirty-two key positions in the secret services, the police and the people including Fatih Mayor Mustafa Demir and Sevinç judiciary. While the opposition Republican Peoples Party Doğan (the owner of the RCİ architecture and design (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) accused the firm) were among those arrested. It was alleged that a government of trying to influence the judiciary to cover gang worked with the municipality to get permission for up the corruption scandal, the Justice and Development construction projects on protected natural sites within Party (AKP) proceeded to win local elections in Turkey on the municipality’s borders. 30 March 2014 and Erdoğan was subsequently elected President of the Republic on 11 August 2014. While the Another investigation was planned for 25 December. corruption scandals seem to have affected the AKP’s vote The list of suspects included Prime Minister Erdoğan’s share and Erdoğan’s popularity, as shown by the results sons, Bilal and Burak Erdoğan, and a number of Al-Qaeda of both local and presidential elections, their effects were affiliates from Saudi Arabia such as Sheikh Yaseen Al- not sufficient to create a major overhaul in Turkish politics, Qadi and Osama Khoutub. Police officers in the Istanbul let alone a full-blown government crisis. Security Directorate, newly appointed by the government after the first wave of investigations, refused to carry It seems that Erdoğan’s strategy of personalising the crime out their orders however and the Deputy Director of investigations while describing them as an international Public Prosecutions did not approve the new operation. conspiracy against his person and his party succeeded Prosecutor Muammer Akkaş, the man behind this second in convincing voters to rally behind him while the main investigation, was dismissed on the same day. Moreover, opposition parties were unable to challenge Erdoğan in at midnight on 7 January, the government removed the elections. On 22 July 2014, more than 100 members 350 police officers from their posts, including the chiefs of the police force were detained in a large-scale of the units dealing with financial crimes, smuggling operation in 20 provinces based on allegations of spying and organised crime, and prevented the prosecutor and illegal wiretapping. However, as had been the case and police from conducting their investigations. Prime previously, the operation was widely believed to be an Minister Erdoğan, claiming that he was the ultimate act of revenge by the government against the corruption target of the corruption probe, described the corruption probes as most of the police officers detained were investigations as a “judicial coup.” After their sons were involved in the major graft operation of 17 December. The detained in relation to the probe, the three ministers suspects were accused of falsifying official documents, whose names were cited above resigned and on 25 abuse of authority, illegal wiretapping, illegally obtaining

November 2014 COMMENTARY 19 2 documents related to state security and violations of health sectors were the most affected by corruption. communication privacy. Turkey has since become more receptive to outside pressure not only in the areas of democracy and human Since the graft operations of December 2013, the rights but also in such areas as public administration government has claimed the existence of a “parallel reform and the struggle against corruption. Before 1999 structure,” referring to Gülen community members in the there was already a sufficient legal basis to prosecute bureaucracy aiming to overthrow the AKP regime. Prime corruption in Turkey, with three legal arrangements being Minister Erdoğan appointed penal judges, referred to as of particular relevance: the Law No. 4422 (30 July 1999), “super judges,” to carry out a legal operation against them. providing measures to fight against Interest Based Crime With extraordinary powers granted through a recently Organizations; Article 313 of the Turkish Penal Code approved omnibus law introduced by the AKP, these (13 March 1926), penalising any kind of organisation judges have broad powers over investigations and the established to commit crime; and the Law No. 1918 (7 rulings of other courts. More than 40,000 police officers, civil January 1932), related to the Banning and Prosecution servants, judges and prosecutors have been reassigned of Smuggling Activities. Moreover, The Law No. 3628 on for no official reason other than their suspected links to Asset Declaration and the Struggle against Corruption the Gülen community.2 Often described by observers as a and Unlawful Actions (19 April 1990) and the Law No. “witch hunt,” the arbitrary reassignments seem likely to be 4208 on Money Laundering (13 November 1996) can also yet another example of the government’s attempt to take be considered in this context. revenge on the police cadres involved in the corruption investigation of 17 December 2013. Finally, the Public When assessed from a long-term perspective since 2001 Prosecutor, arguing that the evidence was not admissible crisis, Turkey appears to have made significant progress in court as it was not collected legally, dropped the at least in the formal policy-making and implementation charges against the remaining 53 suspects, including the realms. In addition to recognising international sons of former ministers and Turkish-Iranian businessman commitments in this area by signing and ratifying a series Reza Zarrab. of important international treaties, successive Turkish governments mainly formed by the AKP have established As the corruption scandal got bogged down in the sand, various agencies focused on the fight against corruption, it became a symbol of wider problems in combating such as the Financial Crimes Investigation Board corruption in Turkey, raising the question of whether (MASAK). In particular, the EU accession process brought Turkey is well equipped to confront the expanding Turkey’s anti-corruption strategy to the forefront of the political corruption in the country on the structural level. government’s policy agenda and pushed it to engage in reforms meant to strengthen the integrity of bureaucratic and political structures.3 Under EU pressure, Turkey 2. An Assessment of Turkey’s Fight Against Corruption entered international commitments in the fight against corruption by signing the Council of Europe Convention The formulation of a decisive anti-corruption policy in on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Turkey is particularly linked to the country’s deteriorating Proceeds from Crime as well as the Council of Europe economic and political situation in the early 1990s. Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption. Turkey also Turkey’s collapsing economy, culminating in the financial participated in the monitoring of anti-corruption crisis of 2001, coupled with the emergence of a European measures, affected by the OECD Working Group on perspective with the EU decision at the Helsinki Summit Bribery in International Commercial Transactions. Since in 1999 to officially accept Turkey as a membership 2007, Turkey has fully implemented all but one of the candidate, played an important role in this process. The recommendations made by the OECD Working Group Transition Program to a Strong Economy in Turkey, issued on Bribery by re-establishing an anti-bribery law on in April 2001, stressed the need to strengthen good corporate liability, which will hold Turkish companies governance through preventing politically motivated accountable for bribery in their international business interventions in the economy. The financial crisis was a transactions, actively enforcing the Turkish offence breaking point in Turkey’s fight against corruption. In against foreign bribery, adopting specific legislative and the aftermath of the crisis Turkey moved to ratify major regulatory provisions, including instituting new laws to international and European conventions in the area of protect whistle-blowers. Moreover, Turkey has also ended preventing corruption and increasing transparency and tax deductions for foreign bribe payments and promoted adopted anti-corruption policies in key areas such as the awareness and training courses on the dangers of banking and energy sectors. The financial crisis showed bribing foreign public officials in international business that the government, media, energy, construction and

2 Günal Kurşun, “Corruption, Police and Detentions”, Todays Zaman, 7 September 2014, http://www.todayszaman. 3 European Commission, Regular Reports on Turkey (2004, 2005, com/columnist/gunal-kursun/corruption-police-and- 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ detentions_357948.html. countries/strategy-and-progress-report.

November 2014 COMMENTARY 19 3 deals.4 Beyond economic concerns and the necessity of moving from the rank of 61 in 2009 to 56 in 2010, but administrative reform, security concerns have also played in 2011 it returned to the position 61 out of more than a crucial role in boosting anti-corruption policy. Reports 175 countries. All these indexes and similar reports by the Department of Anti-Smuggling and Organized demonstrate that corruption has been a widespread Crime underlined that corruption takes place in two major phenomenon in Turkey and continues to be a major areas: public procurements in which public resources are problem in the country. With this score of 61 in 2011, exploited for personal gain, and corruption by criminal Turkey is still better placed compared to the Balkans states, organisations that seek to launder large amounts of Central Asian countries and some EU member states money and avoid criminal proceedings.5 such as , Italy, Romania and Bulgaria.8 However, this started to change as Turkey scored 49 in 20129 and While Turkish authorities can therefore draw on a large 50 in 2013,10 approaching highly corrupt countries. In range of institutional and legal frameworks to combat its progress report of 2013 Assessing Enforcement of the corruption in the country, the main problem still revolves OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, the Transparency around the proper implementation of these laws. Despite International situates Turkey among the 20 countries with these institutional improvements, the 2008 Global Integrity limited or no implementation category.11 Underlying that Report, providing an integrity score for countries based there have been six investigations commenced in Turkey on an analysis of twenty international datasets from the since 2009, Transparency International asks Turkey to do World Bank, United Nations, UNDP and Transparency the following: provide adequate funding and staffing International among others, scored Turkey as “69-Weak.” for enforcement activities; establish effective reporting The latest Global Integrity report on Turkey, dated 2010, channels and procedures for protection of whistleblowers shows no major change in the country’s situation, scoring both in private and public sectors; and provide for Turkey as “68-Weak.”6 The latest report underlines that independent reporting channels to build enough trust to the legal framework score of Turkey’s integrity system is receive reports from whistleblowers and from companies relatively good with a score of “75-Moderate;” however, that have been victims of extortion and solicitation of the report also shows that Turkey is particularly lacking bribes. in the implementation realm with a dramatic score of “57-Very Weak.”7 The report particularly underlines the Over the past years, however, there has been an observable extremely weak situation in terms of the media’s ability paralysis and backwards slide in Turkey’s fight against to report on corruption with a score on “55-Very Weak.” corruption, a trend that became particularly visible after The report points to the limited effectiveness of anti- the start of the accession negotiations in October 2005. corruption mechanisms in the implementation phase, This actually relates to the declining EU leverage over despite legal improvements. Turkey. As in all other areas of political reform, the open- ended nature of the accession negotiations and the The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) of Transparency referendum clause added to them have had an important International produced similar results. Turkey’s score impact on Turkey’s fight against corruption. The EU was increased from 3.6 in 2001 to 4.6 in 2008 and remained not able to recover its declining credibility among the 4.4 in both 2009 and 2010 until it decreased to 4.2 in 2011. Turkish public, and politicians benefited from this. The In its meeting held in Paris on 16-19 March 2010, the previous reforms were done under time pressure and the OECD Working Group on Bribery concluded that Turkey’s expectation of starting (and concluding) the accession progress in its efforts to combat bribery in international negotiations with the EU. Especially after the start of the business deals was impressive. This is particularly due accession negotiations, the negative signals coming from to the expanding amount of legislation related to the EU circles including the idea of offering an ill-defined fight against corruption. The CPI report shows Turkey “privileged partnership” as an alternative to full EU membership contributed to the EU’s declining legitimacy 4 “OECD: Türkiye rüşvetle mücadelede adım atıyor”, in Radikal, 26 in Turkey. The situation worsened with the suspension of March 2010, http://www.radikal.com.tr/ekonomi/oecd_turkiye_ the eight negotiation chapters in December 2006 as a rusvetle_mucadelede_adim_atiyor-987793; OECD Working Group result of the Greek Cypriot veto. Another chapter related on Bribery in International Business, Turkey: Follow-up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 & Phase 2bis Recommendations, to Turkey’s convergence towards European economic 19 March 2010, http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti- criteria was suspended by the French veto. The declining briberyconvention/44866155.pdf. 5 See reports for 2008 and 2009 in the Turkish Department of 8 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011, Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime (KOM) website: http://www. http://shar.es/1X2uga. kom.pol.tr/Sayfalar/Raporlar.aspx. 9 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, 6 “Integrity Scorecard: Turkey 2008”, in The Global Integrity Report http://shar.es/1X2ucc. 2008, https://www.globalintegrity.org/global/the-global-integrity- 10 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2013, report-2008/turkey. http://shar.es/1X2uCb. 7 “Integrity Scorecard: Turkey 2010”, in The Global Integrity Report 11 Transparency International, Exporting Corruption: Progress 2010, https://www.globalintegrity.org/global/the-global-integrity- Report 2013 Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Convention on report-2010/turkey. Combating Bribery, 7 October 2013, http://shar.es/1X27me.

November 2014 COMMENTARY 19 4 emphasis on anti-corruption policy in Turkey also was immunity rights granted to deputies and senior officials, affected by this negative climate in Turkey-EU relations.12 financing political parties and funding elections continue to be the central themes of corruption allegations.15 In addition to the lack of progress in the implementation Conclusion of two major sets of GRECO recommendations on “Incrimination” and “Transparency of Party Funding,” there While the ambiguous character of relations between has been no progress concerning the transparency of Turkey and the EU negatively affected Ankara’s efforts financing political parties, their auditing still remains very in the anti-corruption realm, there are other reasons weak and there is no legal framework for auditing election caused by the particularities of Turkey’s politics and campaigns or the financing of individual candidates.16 political structure as well. We can underline the Devoting significant space to the latest corruption cases following points: lack of coordination among the major and the importance of a proper and fully transparent institutions responsible to fight corruption; very strong investigation into the corruption allegations in its latest immunity regulations for leading public officials making conclusions on Turkey, the European Commission it impossible to hold them legally accountable for their stated that “the response of the government following actions; asset disclosure records of officials unavailable to allegations of corruption in December 2013 has given rise public; virtually non-existent whistle-blower protections; to serious concerns regarding the independence of the and the intimidation and harassment of journalists judiciary and separation of powers.”17 investigating corruption.13 Currently, the role of the media in overseeing the government’s activities, which was a In conclusion, we also have to underline the lack of crucial matter in the aftermath of the 2001 crisis in order coordination among the bodies dealing with combating to set the agenda for clean and good governance, has corruption, causing major loopholes in this context. In been extensively weakened. The gradual consolidation Turkey, the chief executive bodies dealing with anti- of the one-party government led by the AKP was the corruption policies are various and include the Inspection primary reason for the political involvement in the cases Boards in the Prime Ministry and the Ministry of Finance, reaching such extreme levels. There are various symbolic the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Interior. There are cases that illustrate how the AKP government “fights” special branches in the State Planning Office and the State corruption by systematically forcing the opposition Supervision Institute in the President’s Office. Currently media outlets into a blackout, which often comes in the the Prime Ministry’s Inspection Board is responsible for form of self-censorship. investigating major corruption cases. Nearly every state agency has its own inspector corps responsible for Furthermore, the parliament can establish investigative investigating internal corruption. However, as underlined commissions to examine corruption allegations above there is actually no real centre for anti-corruption concerning Cabinet ministers for the Prime Minister. policy like we see in some accession countries to the A majority vote is needed to send these cases to the EU in Central and Eastern Europe. The central problem Supreme Court for further action. This particularly appears to be the lack of coordination among the existing highlights the problems related to the Financial Crimes mechanisms and bodies of anti-corruption. This prevents Investigation Board (MASAK) and other inspection the formulation of a coherent strategy and decisive agencies: almost all the public institutions have to governmental effort towards this specific goal. preserve their own integrity. In its assessment of Turkey published in October 2011, the EU underlines that “there was no increase in the strength or independence of institutions involved in the fight against corruption, which are not sufficiently staffed.”14 Together with the extensive

12 Interviews conducted by the author with public officials in the 15 Transparency International, Overview of Corruption and Anti- EU branches of various ministries in Ankara. Corruption in Turkey, 27 February 2014, http://shar.es/1X24Tg. 13 “Integrity Scorecard: Turkey 2010”, cit. 16 European Commission, Turkey 2011 Progress Report, cit., p. 19. 14 European Commission, Turkey 2011 Progress Report 17 European Commission, Enlargement Strategy and Main (SEC(2011)1201), 12 October 2011, p. 19, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ Challenges 2014-15 (COM(2014)700), 8 October 2014, p. 27, http:// legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52011SC1201. eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=celex:52014DC0700.

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