Henri Tajfel's 'Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice' and the Psychology Of
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171 BritishJournal of Social Psychology (2002), 41, 171– 188 © 2002The BritishPsychological Society www.bps.org.uk HenriTajfel’ s ‘Cognitive aspectsof prejudice’ andthe psychology of bigotry Michael Billig* Department ofSocial Sciences, LoughboroughUniversity, UK Thispaper pays tribute to Tajfel’ s classicarticle ‘Cognitiveaspects of prejudice’ and re-examines itscentral arguments. Tajfel’ s paperis important for outlining a social cognitiveapproach to the study of prejudice and also for refuting of whatTajfel called the‘ blood-and-guts’approach. Taking Tajfel’ s propositionthat social psychology is not value-free, thecurrent paper examines the moral andpolitical view of‘ Cognitive aspects’and also the gaps in its approach to the study of prejudice. It is suggested that thiscognitive approach has difficulty in accounting for extreme bigotry,at least withoutrecourse to the motivational themes that the approach seeks toexclude. In particular,there wouldbe limitations in applying this approach in order tounderstand theHolocaust. Indeed, Tajfel did notattempt to do so, for reasons that are discussed. Tajfel’s SocialIdentity Theory (SIT) has similar limitations.The paper also examines Tajfel’s useof the term ‘depersonalization’, whichhe described asa ‘milder’form of dehumanizationof out-groups. Later socialidentity theorists have tended touse ‘depersonalization’differently, shifting their attention to in-groups. Their perspective movesaway from understandingthe topic of prejudice in the way thatcan be foundin Tajfel’s ‘Cognitiveaspects of prejudice’ . Finally,the present paper suggests how extreme prejudicemight be studied without returning to the motivational ‘ blood-and- guts’approach that Tajfel so cogently criticized. Itwillsoon be 20yearssince the death of HenriTajfel. H isinflue ncethroughout social psychologypersists, e speciallyin work on socialidentity (Robinson, 1996).A sBrown and Capozza(2000) have shown, interest inSocial I dentity Theory (SIT)continuesto grow,with anincreasingnumber of studies beingpublished yearly.Aswith any major figurein the socialscie nces,T ajfel’s writingsrepay careful study and reinterpretation. Thisarticle ex aminesthe rhetoric and argument of HenriTajfel’ s classicarticle ‘Cognitiveaspec ts of prejudice’,whichwas first published inthe Journalof Biosocial Sciences in1 969and which has beenreprintedanumberof timessince.Thearticle featuredasakeychapter inT ajfel’s book Human groupsand social categories (Tajfel, 1981). Thereare a numberof reasons for re-examining‘ Cognitiveaspec ts of prejudice’. Most notably,the articlere mainsone of the most brilliantpiec esof writingin the history of socialpsy chology.Writtenbefore socialpsy chology’scognitiveturn inthe *Requestsfor reprints should be addressed to Michael Billig, Department of SocialSciences, Loughborough University, LoughboroughLE11 3TU, UK(e-mail:[email protected]). 172 MichaelBillig 1980s,‘ Cognitiveaspec ts of prejudice’outlined the principlesof cognitivesocial psychologywithout specificallyusing the term ‘socialc ognition’. Eiser(1996)has arguedthat current assessments of Tajfel’s legacytend to concentrate on SocialI den- tity Theory at the expense of hise arlierwork insoc ialjudgment. T ajfelproduc ed ‘Cognitiveaspec ts’at akeypoint inhis inte llectualdevelopme nt. Itwas written asa culminationof hiswork insocial judgme nt, but before he developed SocialI dentity Theory.The articlewas publishedjust asT ajfelwas embarkingon the minimal intergroup experiments that wereto laythe basisfor hislater intergroup theorizing (Tajfel,1970; T ajfelBillig,B undy,&Flament,1971). A ssuch, ‘Cognitiveaspe cts’ combinesthe themesof socialjudgment with those of intergroup conflict, asTajfel arguedthat the principlesof cognitioncan illuminate the psychologicalnature of prejudice. Overand abovepay ingtribute to Tajfel’s enduringinte llectuallegacy ,there is another reason for returningto ‘Cognitiveaspe cts of prejudice’.Thisis to understand the nature of prejudice.Itisnot suggestedthat ‘Cognitiveaspe cts’holds allthe keys, nor eventhat weshould follow rigidlythe messagethat Tajfelwas advocatingthere . Farfrom it,the strategy isto examinec riticallythe omissionsin the article.Thisis not to downgrade the importanceof ‘Cognitiveaspe cts’. In the socialsc iences,works of the highestintellec tualquality alwaysrepay criticalre- examination,for eventhe ir limitationsand omissionscan berevealing.T hisis what separatesthe first-ratefrom the merelycompe tent. The omissionsin ‘ Cognitiveaspe cts’, itwill be suggested,enable us to understand the contextof Tajfel’s theorizing,espec iallyin relation to hisbac kground. They are alsothe oreticallyre vealing,inasmuch as they point towards the limitationsof the cognitiveapproac hfor understanding extremeprejudic e.Inthis respect, the present tribute to ‘Cognitiveaspe cts’is also an argument.To argue, howe ver,is not necessarily to reject, but to develop.A sTajfel(1981) e mphasized,no socialpsy chologyis value - free,for allsocial psy chologyreflec ts the culturalc limatein which it isproduced. That was why he arguedthat itwas vitalto havemultiple pe rspectivesinsocial psy chology (Tajfel,1981, p. 6).The political climate of today isdiffe rent from that of the late196 0s and early1 970s,when Tajfelwas developinghis ide as.So must socialpsy chology reflectthesechanged times. T oday’ssocialpsy chologyc annot be amerere petition of that whichwas formulated ageneration ago.Tajfel may have argue dthat motivational themesshould be put to one side,but, by consideringone of the finest piecesof writing,it will be suggestedthat suchthemescannot, and should not, be excluded entirelyif one wishesto understand extremepre judice. Imageof humanity Theopening paragraphs of ‘Cognitiveaspe cts’illustrate Tajfel’ s intellectualsty le.He does not start with acareful reviewof previousex perimentalstudie son prejudiceand socialjudgment. That sort of reviewcan be found inhis contribution to Thehandbook ofsocial psychology ,whichwas publishedinthe samey ear(Tajfel,1969b) but which Tajfeldid not includein Human groupsand social categories .Tajfelnot only read widelyin othe rdisciplinessuch ashistory ,anthropology and politicalsc ience,but also usedthis readingin his social psy chology(se e,for instance,hiscomme nt inthe interviewwith Cohen(1977,p. 306)about hisreading). The M arxist philosopherand cricketwriterC.L.R.Jamesadaptedasayingfrom Rudyard Kiplingin the prefaceto Cognitiveaspects of prejudice 173 his book Beyond aboundary :‘‘What do theyknow of cricketwho only cricket know?’’(James,1964, p. 11).A further adaptation would fit Tajfel’s own academic practice,aswe llas hisinte llectualposition: ‘‘What do they know of socialpsy chology who only socialpsy chologyknow? ’’ ‘Cognitiveaspe cts’begins with socialanthropology and an assertion of the com- monalityof humans. Tajfelwrites that the viewsof earlysocial anthropologists suchas Rivers,who believedinthe culturaland psychologicaldefe ctivenessof non-Europeans, arenow rejected. Tajfelillustrated this with alongquotation from Leévi-Strauss’s Thesavage mind .Inthe quotation, Leévi-Strauss was arguingthat so-calledprimitive cultures havedeve loped asophisticated practicalscie ntificknowledge. A llforms of agriculture,the makingof pots, the use of poisons inwarfare or ritual,and so on, depend upon an empiricalattitude and adesirefor knowledge.Tajfelthen commented that: ‘‘animageof Manemergesfrom theseconsiderations’ ’ (1981,p. 128;quotations aretake nfrom the version of ‘Cognitiveaspec ts’included in Human groups ; here, and insubse quent quotations, no attempt willbe madeto alterTajfel’s use of masculine nouns and pronouns to denote humanity ingene ral).The image depic ts humans as beingessentially rational be ings,who seek,above all, to understand their world.The sameimage, T ajfelcomments,is to be found inthe work of FrederickB artlett, who stressedthe human ‘effort aftermeaning’. AsTajfelre alized,such imagesof humans cannot be provedby experimentation. Evidencec anbe brought from experimentalpsy chology,and from history,socialanthro- pologyand so on to support the image,but ultimately,the imageste msfrom awider politicaland moralperspec tive.B ecausesocial psy chologyand othersocialscie ncesare not value-free,such animagewill conve ymoraland politicalvalue s.I nthis way,Tajfelat the start of ‘Cognitiveaspec ts’was declaringa politicaland moralposition, just as Leévi-Strauss was doingwhe nhe appliedthe rationalimage ,not to modern Europeans, but to the verycultures that Europeans had for centuries dismissedasirrational. Typically,an academicargument is dire cted towards arivalposition. Therefore, to understand the meaningof an academicposition, not only must one determinethe specificcase that isbe ingadvocate d,but one must alsoknow what positions arebeing arguedagainst (B illig,1 987a).T ajfel’s assertion of acommon rationalhumanity was an argumentagainst a counter-position. Ashe noted, when observers try to explain human socialactivity ,especiallywarfare, they discard the rationalimage of humanity, adopting instead ‘‘ablood-and-guts modelfor socialphe nomena’’ (Tajfel,1981, p.128).D uringthe 1960s,the blood-and-guts modelof conflictwas prominent inboth popular and academicwriting: it had been‘‘blessedand speeded on its way by a numberof books, someof which havequic kly becomebest- sellers’’ (p. 129).T ajfel had inmind populist versionsof Freudianand ethologicaltheories that postulatedan instinctfor aggression.F oremost amongst the blood-and-guts writers was the Nobel prize-winningethologist,