THE DYNAMICS OF DEMOBILIZING UNDER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS:
THE CONTRAS, THE PARAS, AND DDR
By
Mariam Khokhar
Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Masters of Arts
In
International Peace and Conflict Resolution
Dean of the School of International Service
2008 American University Washington, DC 20016
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY UBRARY UMI Number: 1452750
Copyright 2008 by Khokhar, Mariam
All rights reserved.
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by
Mariam Khokhar
2008
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED To the victims of the Nicaraguan and Colombian conflicts, who are too often silenced
and
To my family in Nutley and DC THE DYNAMICS OF DEMOBILIZING UNDER FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS:
THE CONTRAS, THE PARAS, AND DDR
BY
Mariam Khokhar
ABSTRACT
Between a ceasefire and peace, there is a gray area which contributes to whether a cessation of hostilities will be sustainable or whether there will be a reversion to conflict.
Although disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is not a peace process, successful execution of these three elements will make peace more likely and sustainable.
Therefore, DDR is a very vulnerable stage of the transition from war to peace.
What complicates DDR further is that it is not a uniform process. The characteristics of the armed groups and the governments involved have a great impact on the DDR program.
Nicaragua and Colombia are representative cases of right-wing insurgent groups demobilizing under conservative, friendly governments in Latin America in the recent past.
So, the DDR of the Contras and the Paras under the Chamorro and Uribe administrations offer insight into the dynamics of a "right-right" demobilization.
11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to acknowledge my thesis committee: Abdul Aziz Said and Charles T. Call for all of the time they committed to helping me with this project. More than that, I would like thank Professor Said for introducing me to the field of Peace and Conflict Resolution and for being the most thoughtful mentor. Thanks also to Professor Call for giving me the confidence to focus on Latin America.
111 TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... vi
LIST OF ACRONYMS ...... vii
LIST OF TRANSLATIONS ...... x
Chapter Page
ONE INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Trajectory of the Paper ...... 1 Research Design ...... 3 What is DDR?...... 4
1WO LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 6 Civil War Termination Literature ...... 7 DDR Literature ...... 9 United Nations ...... 13 The UN and the WB: Different Approaches ...... 14
THREE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE DDR PROGRAMS ...... 16 Nicaragua: The Conflict ...... 16 Colombia: The Conflict ...... 25 Colombia: Past DDR Efforts ...... 34 Nicaragua: DDR in the Peace Accords ...... 43 Colombia: DDR in the Peace Accords ...... 63
FOUR ANALYSIS OF THE DDR PROGRAMS ...... 78 DDR: Stage by Stage Comparison ...... 78 Friendly Governments ...... 97 Rearmament ...... 106 Other Factors ...... 112
lV FIVE CONCLUSIONS ...... 121 Hypotheses ...... 121 Future DDR Programs: Lessons and Recommendations ...... 126 Points of Future Research ...... 129
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 130
v LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures Page
1: AUC blocs with weapons-to-combatant ratio less than national average ...... 84
2: Rearmament Cycle of Demobilized Paramilitaries ...... 111
Tables Page
1: Summary of Nicaraguan Peace Accords ...... 62
2: Dialogue to DDR in Colombia ...... 76
3: Weapons-to-insurgents ratio ...... 81
4: Contra demobilizations ...... 89
5: AUC demobilizations ...... 90
V1 LIST OF ACRONYMS
AD/M-19 Democratic Alliance of the 19th of April Movement (Alianza Democrdtica M-19)
AUC United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia)
BCB Central Bolivar Bloc (Bloque Central de Bolivary
BOS Southern Opposition Bloc (Bloque Opositor def Sury
CCJ Colombian Commission of Jurists (Comision Colombiano de Juristas)
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIAV International Commission of Support and Verification (Comision Internacional de Apqyo y Verification)
CIVS International Commission for Verification and Follow-up (Comision Internacional de Verificaciony Seguimiento)
CRS Socialist Rennovation Current (Corriente de &novacion Socialista)
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ELN National Liberation Army (Ejercito de Iiberacion Naciona~
FARC-EP Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Anny (Fuerz.as Armadas &volucionarios de Colombia-FJjercito def Pueblo)
FDN Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (Fuerz.as Democrdticas Nicaragiienses)
FDN Nicaraguan Democratic Front (Frente Democrdtico Nicaraguense)
FMLN Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (Frente Farabundo Marti para la Iiberacion Naciona~
FSLN Sandinista Front of National Liberation (Frente Sandinista de Iiberacion Naciona~ vu IDPs Internally-displaced peoples
IMF International Monetary Fund
M-19 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril)
MAPP-OEA Organization of American State's Mission of Support for the Peace Process in Colombia (Mision de Apqyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia)
MAQL Quintin Lame Armed Movement (/'Jovimiento Armado Quintin Lame)
MILPAS Anti-Sandinista Popular Militia (Milicias Populares anti-Sandinistas)
NGO Non-governmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
ONUCA United Nations Observer Group in Central America
PCC Communist Party of Colombia (Partido Comunista Colombiano)
PCN National Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Naciona~
PLN National Liberation Party of Nicaragua (Partido Liberal Nacionalista de Nicaragua)
PRT Worker's Revolutionary Party (Partido &volucionario de los Trabajadores)
PRVC Program for Reincorporation into Civilian Life (Programa de &incorporacion a la Vida Civil)
RN Nicaraguan Resistance (&sistencia Nicaraguense)
SMP Patriotic Military Service Law (Servicio Militar Patriotico)
UN United Nations
UNO National Opposition Union (Union Nacional Opositora)
UNO United Nicaraguan Opposition (Unidad Nicaraguense Opositora)
UP Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica)
Vll1 us United States
WB World Bank
ZDD Demilitarized Zone (Zona de Despefe)
ZDU Centralization Area (Zona de Ubicacion)
1X LIST OF TRANSLATIONS
Aguilas Negras Black Eagles
Alianza Democrdtica M-19 (AD /M-19) Democratic Alliance of the M-19
Alta Consqeria para la &integracion High Commission for Reintegration
Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
Bloque Central de Bolivar (BCB) Central Bolivar Bloc
Bloque Opositor de! Sur (BOS) Southern Opposition Bloc
Centros de reintegracion Reintegration centers
Comision Colombiano de Juristas (CCJ) Colombian Commission ofJurists
Comision Internacional de Apqyo y Verificacion (CIAV) International Commission of Support and Verification
ComisiOn Internacional de Verificacion y Seguimiento International Commission for (CIVS) Verification and Follow-up
Contras Nicaraguan Resistance (RN)
Corriente de &novacion Socialista (CRS) Socialist Rennovation Current
Defensoria de! Pueblo Colombia's Public Advocate
Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) National Liberation Army
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL) Popular Liberation Army
E!Bogotazo The riots following the assasination of Gaitan in 1948
x Frente Democratico Nicaraguense (FDN) Nicaraguan Democratic Front
Frente Farabundo Marti para la Uberacion Nacional Farabundo Marti Front for National (FMLN) Liberation
Frente Sandinista de Uberacion Nacional (FSLN) Sandinista Front of National Liberation
Frente Sur Southern Front
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia Revolutionary Armed Forces of Ejercito def Pueblo (F ARC-EP) .Colombia- People's Army
Fuerzas Democraticas Nicaraguenses (FDN) Nicaraguan Democratic Forces
Instituto Nicaraguense de Reintegracion The Nicaraguan Institute of Reintegration
La Republica Independiente de Marquetalia The Independent Republic of Marquetalia
La Violencia Period of violence in Colombia from 1948-1958
Ley de Justicia y Paz Justice and Peace Law (Law 975)
Mision de Apqyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia Organization of American State's (MAPP-OEA) Mission of Support for the Peace Process in Colombia
Milicias def Pueblo para el Pueblo Popular Militias
Milicias Populares anti-S andinistas (MILPAS) Anti-Sandinista Popular Militia
Movimento 19 de Abril (M-19) 19th of April Movement
N ueva Generaci6n New Generation
Paras Paramilitaries
Partido Comunista Colombiano (PCC) Communist Party of Colombia
Partido Conseroador Conservative Party
Partido Conseroador Nacional (PCN) National Conservative Party
X1 Partido Uberaf Llberal Party
Partido Uberaf Nacionafista de Nicaragua (PLN) National Llberation Party of Nicaragua
Partido R.evofucionario de fos Trabc!fadores (PR1) Worker's Revolutionary Party
Polos de desarroffo Development poles
Programa de R.eincorporacion a fa Vida Civil (PRVC) Program for Reincorporation into Civilian Llfe
S andinistas Sandinista Front of National Llberation (FSLN)
S ervicio Mifitar Patriotico (SMP) Patriotic Military Service Law
Union Nacionaf Opositora (UNO) National Opposition Union
Unidad Nicaraguense Opositora (UNO) United Nicaraguan Opposition
Union Patriotica (UP) Patriotic Union
Zona de Desprje (ZDD) Demilitarized Zone
Zona de U bicacirJn (ZDU) Centralization Area
Zonas de S eguridad Security Zones
Xll CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Contras in Nicaragua and the Paramilitaries in Colombia are the two classic cases of right-wing insurgencies in Latin America in recent history. Despite the fact that each nation is distinctly different, both insurgent groups have undergone disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes under friendly right-wing governments - Violeta
Chamorro in Nicaragua and Alvaro Uribe Velez in Colombia. This particularity sets these two cases apart from others in Latin America. By comparing the cases of the DDR processes of the Contras and the Paramilitaries in Nicaragua and Colombia, it can be seen that getting to negotiations is easier under friendly governments, but the DDR process is not automatically less complicated. In fact, many problems were encountered in both countries during each phase of DDR, eventually leading to the rearmament of factions of the Contras and the Paramilitaries.
Trajectory of the Paper
This thesis is divided into five central chapters: (1) introduction, (2) literature review, (3) historical context of the DDR of the Contras and the Paramilitaries, (4) analysis of both DDR programs under friendly governments, and (5) conclusions. This first chapter, besides
1 2
presenting the research question, will also explain the research design of this paper. Next the terms "disarmament," "demobilization," and "reintegration" will be defined as a basis for the remainder of the discussion.
The second chapter will review what existing literature says about DDR and will place this thesis within this continuum of work. Because there is not much writing on the DDR of right-wing versus left wing groups, specifically, or the process under a certain type of government, the literature that will be consulted will cover general ideas about DDR.
The third chapter will focus on the historical backgrounds and wars that led up to the
DDR processes of the Contras in Nicaragua and the Paramilitaries in Colombia. It is important to look at this historical context in order to see the DDR processes as part of a continuum rather than isolated events. Then, the previous DDR programs in Colombia will be presented, also to provide further background for the demobilization of the
Paramilitaries. Finally, the third chapter will present the agreements and accords in which the
DDR processes of the Contras and the Paramilitaries were defined.
The fourth chapter of the thesis will then provide comparative analysis of each stage of
DDR in both cases. By looking at each stage and seeing its successes and failures, the weaknesses and strengths in the overall processes can be pinpointed. This section will also look at the links between the governments in power and the insurgents that demobilized under them in both cases. Next, the rearmaments in each case will be examined and the possible factors that caused the rebels to take up arms after demobilizing under friendly governments will be considered.
The fifth chapter will offer conclusions and will sum up the major discoveries of the paper. It will also make projections as to the likelihood of these trends repeating themselves 3
in the case of right-wing insurgent forces undergoing DDR under conservative governments in Latin America and elsewhere in the future, making policy recommendations for these instances. Finally the last section will discuss possible points of research in the future.
Research Design
This paper is a qualitative study carried out through looking at two heuristic case studies:
Nicaragua and Colombia. These two cases were selected because they are representative of right-wing insurgent groups that have undergone DDR in Latin America under conservative governments. Although there are many differences between the two countries and the demobilization of their respective insurgent forces, this underlying commonality is the basis of this research project. The demobilization of the Contras and the Paramilitaries are, in essence, two different cases of the same phenomenon. So, by examining these two heuristic cases, general hypotheses will be generated. These hypotheses, in turn, can be tested in similar cases in Latin America and elsewhere.
The research relies both on primary sources as well as secondary sources. The secondary sources consulted this thesis include books, journals, newspaper articles, and reports issued by truth commissions, NGO's, and international organizations. Personal interviews were also conducted in order to supplement the reports, books, journal articles, and newspaper pieces. Several individuals interviewed are NGO workers or activists in Nicaragua or
Colombia. Also, some interviewees represent governments or international organizations.
The individuals interviewed were given the option to have their names used in the paper or to remain anonymous in order to ensure that they could be as candid as possible. 4
What is DDR?
Before delving further into the existing literature on the subject and the Nicaragua and
Colombia case studies, it is important to understand what these terms mean. Without a clear understanding of the terminology, these significant concepts cannot be properly analyzed.
The most often-cited and well-respected definitions are those employed by the United
Nations (UN); as such, the UN definitions of DDR are briefly discussed below.
Disarmament refers to the process of collecting, documenting, controlling, and ultimately, disposing of "small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants." Disarmament initiatives can also extend to the civilian population in a society.
In addition, comprehensive disarmament should include the initiation and development of further arms management programs.
Demobilization is "the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups." It is a complex process that can range from the complete disbanding of armed units to just the reduction in their overall size. The United
Nations organizes demobilization into two stages. The first stage comprises the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the gathering of groups of combatants for this objective. The second stage of demobilization involves the "support package" given to the demobilized combatants, known as reinsertion. Reinsertion - the assistance offered to ex-combatants -is the last stage of demobilization, but something that occurs prior to reintegration, which is a longer-term process. The transitional aid offered during reintegration, which can last up to a year, is to help pay for the basic needs of ex-combatants 5
and their families, including safety, clothing, food, medical services, tools, training, employment, and short-term education.
Reintegration is "essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame" through which ex-combatants once again become civilians and find lasting employment and a sustainable salary. Though this process primarily takes place at the local level in communities, it often requires long-term financial assistance by external actors, without which reintegration can become unsustainable.1
1 United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center, ''What is DDR?," http:/ /unddr.org/whatisddr.php (accessed October 3, 2007). CHAPTER 1WO
LITERATURE REVIEW
Between a ceasefire and peace, there is a gray area which determines whether a cessation of hostilities will be sustainable or whether there will be a reversion to conflict.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are at the heart of turning conflict to peace. Successful execution of these three elements will make peace more likely and more sustainable. Failed DDR processes, on the other hand, will likely contribute to the maintenance and, at times, escalation of conflict. Therefore, DDR is a very vulnerable stage of the transition from war to peace. Because of this, the proper implementation and verification of the process is fundamental.
Literature on the DDR process, though growing, is relatively new. So, as Humphreys and Weinstein suggest, the study of DDR should begin with a review of civil war termination literature.2 From this, there is a natural transition to the more recent debate on
DDR. The United Nation's creation of its online "UN DDR Resource Center" has helped to consolidate the existing literature on DDR. This theoretical debate has been further solidified with an abundance of literature on particular case studies of DDR - of which Latin
American cases have been consulted for this research.
2 Macartan Hwnphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Disentangling the Determinants of Successful Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," Center for Global Development Work.mg Paper no. 69 (February 2005): 5. 6 7
Civil War Termination Literature
An important aspect in the debate is the idea of a "security dilemma" - a term attributed to John H. Herz.3 Central to the realist concept of a security dilemma is "uncertainty as to others' intentions" in an international system ruled by anarchy. That is, a party's defensive preparedness may be taken as an offensive measure, causing a second party to feel threatened, and thus enter into armed conflict. So, a building up of arms can be a means of protection and security for a group or state; on the other hand, it can also be a means of harming another group or state, leading to insecurity. 4 This uncertainty of intent can not only cause a civil conflict, but, as proposed by Caroline A. Hartzell, is often prevalent at the end of conflict and during the ensuing peace processes. Hartzell contends that the security dilemma for actors within a single state is even greater than for interstate conflicts precisely because the parties involved will have to deal with each other long after the conflict has ceased.5
Another important contribution of civil war termination literature to the debate on DDR is Stephan John Stedman's idea of "spoilers." Spoilers can be characterized as leaders or groups ''who believe that peace emerging &om negotiations threatens their power,
3 The term was first used by Herz in his 1951 book called Political Realism and Political Idealism.
4 Paul Roe, "The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy."' Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 2 (March 1999): 184-185.
5 Caroline A. Hartzell, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate War," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 1 (February 1999): 5. 8
worldview and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts at achieving it."6 Because war termination and peace negotiations - including DDR - heavily rely on the parties involved to be truly committed to the process, spoilers pose a great threat to the overall success of a cessation of hostilities. Although Stedman contends that total spoilers cannot be eliminated, the majority of spoilers can be accommodated through various positive measures, such as addressing their grievances and including them in the peace process.
For both of these central concerns at the end of intrastate wars - the security dilemma and spoilers - the role of external, third-parties is stressed by many authors. Trevor Findlay emphasizes the importance of verification during war termination phases and peace processes. This verification by third-parties can help quell the security dilemma and also prevent spoilers from ruining the peace process. 7 External actors can do this through building confidence by supporting norms and implementing sanctions for breaking with agreements. Moreover, third parties can also support institutional reforms, such as elections, to help lesson security concerns and increase the overall confidence in the peace process at hand. With third-party enforcement and verification, "cheating becomes difficult and costly," and so, the likelihood of constructing a sound and sustainable cessation of hostilities mcreases.. 8
6 Stephen John Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes." International S ecuriry 22, no. 2 (1997): 5.
7 Trevor Findlay, ed., "The New Peacekeeping and the New Peacekeepers." In Challenges for the New Peacekeepers (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1-4.
8 Hwnphreys and Weinstein, "Disentangling the Determinants," 5. 9
DDR literature
Mats R. Berdal's paper Disarmament and Demobilization efter Civil Wars, published in 1996, provides a natural transition from the civil war termination and peacebuilding literature into the existing literature on DDR as a theory because his focus is on the short to medium-term after the cessation of hostilities. In this work, Berdal puts forth "a framework for thinking about the proper place of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants in settling internal armed conflicts." Berdal's central conclusion is that DDR requires thorough planning and third-party assistance. Moreover, the DDR process is an intrinsically political one, which depends heavily on resolving or lessening the root causes of the conflict - through economic and political reforms.9
Along with Berdal, Nicole Ball, Joanna Spear, and Virginia Gamba are important voices in the DDR debate. At the end of an armed conflict, there is a lot of uncertainty and mistrust between the parties involved - as put forth by the war termination literature.
Recognizing this, Gamba identifies the "establishment and maintenance of a security environment" as a principal issue that must be addressed early on in any peacemaking initiative.10 Without this security, it is unlikely that the transition from conflict to peace will occur effectively and with the hopes oflong-term sustainability. DDR is one process that, if implemented successfully, can be used to lessen this atmosphere of uncertainty.
9 Mats R Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars," Adelphi Papers 303: 5.
to Virginia Gamba, ''Post-Agreement Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration: Towards a New Approach," in Violence and R.econstruction, ed. John Darby (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 54. 10
The prevalence of arms at the end of an internal war, however, makes the creation of a security environment very complicated. Because of this, the presence of arms is an important part of the DDR debate. Disarmament tends to be ad hoc and many arms - especially light weapons that are easy to hide, dismantle, and reassemble - remain in circulation, making disarmament even harder to implement effectively.11 In this light, Berdal states that the abundance of arms in a state emerging from conflict poses a potential security problem. This challenge can, in theory, be confronted in one of two ways. First, the parties involved can be disarmed completely. The second and less ambitious method to confront the security problem posed by arms is to implement different forms of weapons control. Either one of these two approaches can be instituted either through coercion - as was the case in Somalia or through consent- for instance, through instituting weapons buy-back programs.12
Spear's chapter "Disarmament and Demobilization" takes a slightly different approach to the subject of disarmament. She writes that implementers of DDR processes around the world should emphasize the stage of demobilization more than disarmament - arguing that it is more move their weapons. She further argues that disarmament must be undertaken under the auspices of the local norms of arms possession.13 Although it is absolutely necessary to understand the local arms culture, it is just as important to bear in mind that
11 Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, "Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating Fighters," in Women Building Peace: What Thry Do, W01 it Matters (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 98.
12 Berdal, ''Disarmament and Demobilization," 24-33.
13 Joanna Spear, ''Disarmament and Demobilization," in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 141. 11
disarmament is an essential component of DDR, and that without disarmament, comprehensive and successful demobilization cannot be achieved.
Mirroring the broader civil war termination literature, Berdal also emphasizes the need for external support in successfully implementing DDR processes. Berdal writes that
"confidence and trust" must be generated by the planners and implementers of peace processes.14 Hartzell also stresses the significance of confidence-building measures to reassure antagonists that going through processes of DDR will not take advantage of the ceasefire and negotiations to achieve a greater victory than they could have fighting on the battle field. Confidence building measures can mean anything from introducing peacekeeping troops to form a buffer between conflicting parties to assurances by third party actors that violations of the ceasefire will not go unpunished.15
Other authors also point to the importance of third-party support in instituting DDR processes, but instead of focusing on confidence-building measures, highlight financial and economic contributions. Nicole Ball emphasizes the importance of national and more importantly, international funding in order to support each of the three phases ofDDR, especially long-term reintegration. She acknowledges that despite the fact that each of the three stages of DDR is an essential step towards peace, DDR is not a peace process in itself.
Due to this, she states that "DDR must be financed in a way that supports the peace
14 Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilization," 6.
1s Hartzell. "Explaining the Stability," 7. 12
process.16 As such, financing of the DDR stages must look beyond just the scope of the program, and instead must create a foundation for a sustainable peace. In a similar vein, Paul
Collier argues that it is likely that there will be a short-term reversion to crime following demobilization efforts if the ex-combatants do not have access to land in the reintegration phase. Conversely, there is likely to be a reduction in crime if ex-combatants are provided land access and ownership.17 Therefore, external agencies, states, and organizations charged with implementing DDR not only must build security for the process to continue, but must also provide enough financial backing in order to make the process sustainable.
Still, a relevant and often encountered concern that Gamba points out is the lack of coordination that tends to exist between these different agencies working for peace. This lack of coordination, she contends, can endanger the peace mission and, moreover, slow down the post-conflict reconstruction phase, including the DDR process.18 Similarly, Bruce
D. Jones posits that "international actors face recurrent challenges of coordinating their approaches and their efforts to implement peace agreements." These obstacles, however, have been overcome in past DDR processes in Guatemala and El Salvador through certain coordination measures such as Groups of Friends or by one or more states or organizations taking a leadership role. These two cases were also helped by the fact that only a handful of
16 Nicole Ball and Dylan Hendrickson, ''Review of International Financing Arrangements for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration," Stockholm Initiative on DDR, May 16, 2005, http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/54/02/95d6618c.pdf (accessed November 29, 2007), 11.
17 Paul Collier, "Demobilization and Insecurity: A Study in the Economics of the Transition from War to Peace," Journal ofInternational Development 6: 343-51.
18 Gamba, "Post-Agreement Demobilization," 54-55. 13
actors directly took part in the peace negotiations and that international organizations - such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States - were heavily involved.19
The United Nations
Most of the existing literature on DDR focuses on best practices and lessons learned from particular cases. Although this is important to the development and deepening of the field, a comprehensive collection of DDR theory is just as important. The establishment of
20 the "UN DDR Resource Center" - an online compilation of documents and reports, was essential in beginning to fill in the gap and consolidating the existing literature about the theories behind DDR processes.
The United Nations (UN) is a leading actor in many DDR programs around the world and has developed a division entitled "The United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center" in an effort to try and institutionalize the DDR process.
Due to this, it is important to include the UN - although not an individual scholar - squarely within this debate. The UN endorses an "integrated" approach to DDR processes, developed from field experience from around the world. Recognizing that several agencies, individuals, and nations may be involved in any single DDR process, the UN promotes an integrated approach that will ensure that everyone's efforts be working towards one,
19 Bruce D. Jones, ''The Challenges of Strategic Coordination" in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation ef Peace Agreements, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 89-90.
20 ''The UN Approach to DDR," United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center http://unddr.org/iddrs/02/ (accessed November 12, 2007). 14
harmonious goal. This is imperative because without an acute focus on DDR, the various agencies engaged in the process could very well compromise the end result. In addition, the
UN emphasizes flexibility at each stage of DDR, recognizing that each situation will be distinct and that oftentimes, DDR is undertaken under very volatile conditions. A third factor that is central to the UN's approach for integrated DDR is that a great focus is placed on the "long-term humanitarian and developmental impact of sustainable reintegration process" as well as the impact of that these processes have in creating a foundation for end unng . peace an d secunty. . ~
The UN and the WB: Different Organizations. Different Approaches
It is important to note that although the UN has taken a lead in DDR in terms of research and implementation, other international actors - namely the World Bank (WB) - also play a significant role. The WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) started directly supporting DDR activities in the 1990s. Although the WB/IMF's mandate is relatively narrow, this direct involvement was qualified by the fact that ''while its roots may be political, war to peace transition holds the promise of providing additional resources for development."22
Since the 1990s, the WB and the UN have been the two largest international organizations taking part in DDR initiatives around the world. Still, each has different
21 "The UN Approach," 40-41.
22 Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilization," 68. 15
policies. While the United Nations favors focusing on broad-reaching community reintegration programs, the World Bank questions this approach as being overly idealistic and unfeasible. Both the UN and the WB talk a lot about national oversight ofDDR programs, the UN has a tendency of not following through. This can partly be attributed to the fact that there are normally very tough UN controls and guidance over any given DDR project.23 These differing approaches to DDR became clear in the case of El Salvador between 1990 and 1995. The unsynchronized work of the UN and the WB in the implementation ofDDR programs made the overall peace processes even more fragile. 24
So, both organizations have faced obstacles. "The track record of the UN in tenns of running DDR isn't stunningly positive" and the World Bank has had its own problems.25
Collaboration or at least coordination between these two leading actors - as well as with smaller NGO's and national actors -is an essential step to try and overcome the shortcomings of prior cases ofDDR worldwide.
21 Nicole Ball, interview by author, Washington, DC, January 18, 2008.
24 Berdal, ''Disarmament and Demobilization," 69.
25 Ball, interview. CHAPTER THREE
HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE DDR PROGRAMS
Nicaragua: The Conflict
The Roots of the Conflict
For forty-three years, one family - the Samozas -were the dictatorial force that led
Nicaragua. Anastasio Somoza Garcia became president of the country in the 1936 national elections. Following his victory, he prudently organized and consolidated his power within the National Guard and gained complete control over the Partido Liberal Nacionalista de
Nicaragua (PLN - the National Liberation Party of Nicaragua). Moreover, Somoza Garcia worked diligently to divide his political opposition, while he gave key positions to family members and loyal friends. He strategically sided with the Allies during World War Two - thus ensuring the United States' support- both politically and financially. 26 The US also eagerly backed the Somoza dynasty because of its fierce anti-Communism and its "ability to maintain order" in the volatile Central American region.27
26 "Nicaragua: The Somoza Era, 1936-197 4," Library of Congress Country Studies, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ cgi-bin/ query/ r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ni0021) (accessed December 24, 2007).
27 William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 14. 16 17
With this careful planning, the groundwork was laid for the ensuing Somoza dynasty that dominated Nicaraguan politics. Somoza Garcia's relationship with the US became strained for many years due to his increasingly dictatorial tendencies. In 1948, Washington restored full diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. Still, Somoza Garcia had many fierce opponents within the country. On September 21, 1956, he was fatally wounded at a PLN party celebrating his nomination for presidency by Rigoberto L6pez Perez - a twenty-seven year old poet. Somoza Garcia died eight days later.28
Still, the dynasty survived and it easily deflected the divided civil opposition in the country through a mixture of repression and co-optation. The National Guard continued to be selected and carefully controlled by the Somozas and the support of the US offered the family even more legitimacy and strength.29 Over the next twenty-two years, Somoza
Garcia's two sons upheld the dynastic control over politics in Nicaragua. Somoza Garcia was succeeded as president by his eldest son Luis Somoza Debayle. During his reign of power, a major campaign of repression was carried out under which many political opponents were imprisoned and tortured, several civil liberties were suspended, and press censorship was enforced. In protest of the increasing repression, the Conservative Party refused to take part in the 1957 general elections. In order to maintain the fa<;ade of democracy, the Somozas
28 ''Nicaragua: The Somoza Era."
29 Jack Spence, ''War and Peace in Central America: Comparing Transitions toward Democracy and Social Equity in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua," Hemisphere Initiatives (November 2004): 22 18
fashioned a "puppet opposition party" called Partido Conservador Nacional (PCN - the
National Conservative Party). As was expected, Luis Somoza Debayle was easily re-elected.30
From Insurgency to Revolution: the S andinistas
As a result of this repression and lack of space for political participation, the Frente
Sandinista de liberacion Nacional (FSLN -the Sandinistas) was founded in 1961. The group was named after Augusto Cesar Sandino, a guerrilla leader who fought US military presence in
Nicaragua and was later assassinated on the orders of General Anastasio Somoza Garcia - the then commander of the National Guard, in 1934.31
Luis Somoza Debayle fell sick and died in 1967 and was to be succeeded by his younger brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle. To counter his campaign, the Union Nacional Opositora
(UNO-the National Opposition Union) was created and endorsed Fernando Agiiero as its candidate. Still, Anastasio Somoza Debayle easily won the elections through dirty campaigning. As commander of the National Guard and the President, Somoza Debayle consolidated his firm grip over the country, and repression and unrest continued to grow.32
A massive earthquake hit Managua on December 23, 1972 where an estimated 10,000
Nicaraguans died and another 50,000 families lost their homes. International aid began to flow liberally into the country to help the victims and to try and rebuild the infrastructure of
30 ''Nicaragua: The Somoza Era."
3l ''Timeline: Nicaragua," BBC News, November 7, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1225283.stm (accessed December 20, 2007).
32 ''Nicaragua: The Somoza Era." 19
the fractured city. Anastasio Somoza Debayle's insatiable greed and "appetite, in a tiny, poor country, appeared to have no limit." He funneled the majority of emergency aid funds into his personal accounts and away from their intended targets.33 It is estimated that the dictator's personal fortune soared to 400 million dollars in 1974.34 Jbis blatant corruption was condemned around the world and national opposition also grew.
The constant imposition of the Somoza's dictatorial rule was further shaken by the 1978 assassination of Pedro Joachim Chamorrro, owner and editor of Nicaragua's most important newspaper. Chamorro was a long-time opponent of the Somozas and member of one of the country's traditional ruling families from before the era of the Somozas. Chamorro's murder broke an unwritten rule of the Somoza dynasty- peasants or Sandinista guerrillas could be shot in plain sight, but anti-Somocistas of the bourgeois class could only be sanctioned economically or arrested for a short period. Closing Chamorros's newspaper fell well within these regulations - having him assassinated, however, did not.35
Chamorro's assassination was the trigger that ignited the Sandinista revolution, which lasted from 1978 to 1979, toppling the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Initially, the majority of Nicaraguans supported the revolution. The S andinistas came into political power on the basis of three central principals and promises for the Nicaraguan people: (1) to lessen the general importance of Managua, (2) to make development among the three main regions of the country more equitable, and (3) to diminish the vast disparities between urban
33 Spence, ''War and Peace," 23.
34 ''Nicaragua: The Somoza Era."
35 Spence, ''War and Peace," 24. 20
and rural Nicaraguans.36 After nearly 50 years of dictatorship by Nicaragua's richest family, the ideals and motives of the Sandinistas were vastly applauded in the country.
This internal support was mirrored by international sympathy in various parts of the world, especially with the Marxist countries of Cuba and the Soviet Union. However, this alignment, especially in the midst of the Cold War, created mistrust within many Central
American neighbors as well as the US.37 Despite Washington's aversion for the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the Carter administration fully attempted to retain as much power as possible in the region through a policy of "cautious accommodation." The administration approved 15 million dollars in emergency reconstruction aid for Nicaragua and then pushed a 75 million dollar aid package through Congress in 1979.38
The Counterinsurgency: the Contras
Soon after the revolution, disillusionment began to spread amongst the Nicaraguan people as well The government introduced the unpopular Seroicio Militar Patriotico (SMP -
Patriotic Military Service) law that created a national draft to bolster the strength of the national army.39 The elites especially began to become increasingly dissatisfied with the
36 David L. Wall. "Spatial Inequalities in Sandinista Nicaragua," Geographical Review 83, no. 1 Qan., 1993): 1.
37 Fernando Arocena, The International Commission for Support and Verification (GAV): Demobilizing and Integrating the Nicaraguan Resistance 1990-1997 (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 1998), 3.
38 Peter Kombluh, "The U.S. Role in the Counterrevolution," in Revolution and CounteTT11volution in Nicaragua, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 325.
39 Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Washington: South End Press, 1988), 136. 21
Sandinistas. Due to this, many of Nicaragua's upper class elites fled the country. Moreover, many opposition members of the govemmentjunta resigned in 1980.40
Amidst this dissatisfaction with the Sandinista government, demonstrations and riots began to break out in various parts of Nicaragua. A rural uprising was organized by the
Milicias Populares anti-Sandinistas (MILPAS - Anti-Sandinista Popular Militia) at the end of
1980 in the town of Quilali in Nueva Segovia.41 This was followed by uprisings in other communities in .northern Nicaragua and the Atlantic Coast. After these sporadic spurts of opposition, full-fledged civil war broke out in November of 1981. It was during this time that the various MILPAS movements joined forces with the 15th of September Legion of the
National Guard - which had set up camp in Honduras. The National Guard, with the funding of the US, was militarily more advanced and better equipped than the rural MILPAS organizations. The consolidation of the MILPAS and the National Guard resulted in the creation of the Frente Democrdtico Nicaragiiense (FDN -The Nicaraguan Democratic Front).42
This obvious dissatisfaction added to the US's antipathy towards the Sandinista revolution and government. The Reagan administration came into power with the intention to "replace President Carter's carrot with a heavy stick." Washington began a new policy of
4° Caroline A. Hartzell, "Peace in Stages," in Ending Civil Wars, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M., Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 354-355.
41 Arocena, The International Commission, 3.
42 A. V anolli, Arturo Wallace, and Diogenes H. Ruis, eds., La Comisirfn Internacional de Apf!Yo y V erificacirfn: La Desmovilizacirin y Reinsercirfn de la &sistencia Nicaragiiense (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 1998), 12. 22
strong actions in the Western Hemisphere in order to prevent another Cuban-style disaster.43
This ended in President Reagan suspending aid to the Sandinistas on January 23, 1981 -just three days into his presidency.44 In February of that year, the administration produced a document called "Covert Action Proposal for Central America" - one of the Reagan administration's earliest documents laying out plans for a counter-revolution in the region.
The approach was based heavily on the idea of low-intensity conflict (LIC) and consisted of four main areas: (1) paramilitary operations, (2) economic destabilization, (3) military operations, and (4) a propaganda war.45
President Reagan bolstered these counter-insurgency plans with heavy funding. On
March 8, 1981, he allocated 19.5 million dollars to expand CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) operations in Central America. In the fall of 1981, the Contra forces numbered a mere 250 combatants - most of whom were veterans of Somoza's National Guard. Under specialized
CIA training and with the help of millions of dollars from the US, these men were transformed into a counter-insurgency force complete with automatic weapons, planes, and trucks.46
By the mid-1980' s, the anti-5andinista movement had organized itself into three central blocs, totally numbering about 15,000 troops. The Fuerzas Democrtiticas Nicaragiienses (FDN -
43 Kombluh, ''U.S. Role in Counterrevolution," 325.
44 Hartzell, "Peace in Stages," 354-355.
45 Kombluh, ''U.S. Role in Counterrevolution," 325-328.
46 Kombluh, ''U.S. Role in Counterrevolution," 330-331. 23
Nicaraguan Democratic Forces) was based in Honduras and consisted of eighty percent of the total fifteen thousand combatants. The two leaders of the FDN were Adolfo Calero and
Enrique Bermudez and its main goal was to disrupt the Sandinista social and economic structures. The second bloc, the Bloque Opositor del Sur (BOS - the Southern Opposition
Bloc), was sizably smaller, consisting of only a few hundred troops. It was a moderate politically and was based out of Costa Rica. Indigenous Nicaraguans who were striving for regional autonomy made up the third key Contra bloc. This bloc was divided into three main groups: (1) MISURA -Miskitu, Sumu, Rama; (2) MISURASATA -Miskitu, Sumu, Rama, and Sandinista.r, and (3) KISAN -Kus Indian Sut Aslika Nicaragua.47
Despite these various groups and the growing opposition to the Sandinistas, there remained a lack of coordination and unity. Due to this, and in order to strike down the communist threat in Nicaragua, the US government stepped in and actively tried to further consolidate these various anti-Sandinsta structures. In 1985, the Unidad Nicaraguense Opositora
(UNO - the United Nicaraguan Opposition) was founded. The organization was led by
Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Rabelo, and Arturo Cruz. The triumvirate, however, was troubled from the start. The majority of the military strength of UNO was derived from Calero's
FDN, which was backed by the US CIA. The State Department, on the other hand, supported Cruz and Rabelo. When Arturo Cruz resigned on March 9, 1987, the UNO effectively collapsed.48
47 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 355.
48 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 487-489, 540. 24
In 1987, the different anti-Sandinista forces regrouped under the name Resistencia
Nicaragiiense (RN -the Nicaraguan Resistance), more commonly referred to as the Contras.
This consolidation, like UNO, came to be with the help of the US. However, the RN differed from UNO in that the support it received from the Reagan administration was far greater. The US Congress approved a military aid packet in 1987 for 100 million dollars for the Contras- guaranteeing that the combatants would be well trained and well equipped.49
The Contras - with US financial support and initial training by the Argentine military - became increasingly active. They used weapons from mines to grenades, from mortars to small arms in their pinpointed attacks on the symbols of the Sandinista revolution. Due to these attacks and the integration of the former National Guard into the Contras, and the fact that the FDN frequently attacked civilians in a brutal way, the RN became very unpopular
so W1.th many N.1caraguans.
At Conflict's End
A military stalemate was reached in 1987. The Contras lacked urban support, had to frequently take refuge in Honduras and Costa Rica, and lost the support of its indigenous constituency. Meanwhile, the Sandinistas had to make concessions in order to stop the
49 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comisirin Internacional, 13.
so Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 355. 25
immense damage that was done to the national economy.51 Still there was heavy fighting between 1987 and 1988 following the signing of a peace accord.
At the end of the war, the US had poured 400 million dollars into supporting the Contras.
About 30,000 individuals - one percent of the total population of Nicaragua - had died. An estimated five percent of the casualties were civilians. Moreover, 354,000 Nicaraguans became internally displaced, while another half a million people fled the country and became refugees in Honduras, Costa Rica, and the US. 52 In addition, Nicaraguan economy was in shambles.
Colombia: The Conflict
The Roots of the Conflict
Colombia is host to Latin America's longest running guerrilla war. The current armed conflict is based on many causal factors which are "internal and predominately social."53
The roots of Colombia's conflict can be traced as far back as its colonial days, or perhaps even farther back to the War of One Thousand Days that took place between 1899 and
51 Spence, ''War and Peace," 36.
52 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 356.
53 Cynthia J. Amson and Teresa Whitfield, ''Tbird Parties and Intractable Conflicts: The Case of Colombia," in Grasping the Nettle: Anafyzjng Cases of Intractable Cotiflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), 231. 26
1902.s4 The colonial legacy that still prevails is that of disparity, especially amongst white
Colombians and mestizos. There is an affluent upper class and a struggling lower class, with only a negligible middle class. So, the social and class distinctions in Colombia are very visible.
This social unrest and division culminated in the assassination ofJorge Eliecer Gaitan, the socialist Mayor of Bogota, in 1948. The assassination came after the electoral campaigns of 1945-1946. His murder sparked a string of riots in Bogota, known as El Bogotazo. This uprising sparked similar opposition throughout the rest of the country. Deep political cleavages between el Partido Liberal (the Liberal Party) and el Partido Conseroador (the
Conservative Party) fueled this phase of unrest - known as La Violencia - which lasted from
1948 to 1958, and claimed over 200,000 lives.ss
In 1957, the political leadership on either side agreed to share power through the creation of the National Front. This agreement, however, did not bring violence itself to an end in Colombia. Although the bi-partisan agreement equally divided representation in the various branches of government, it effectively excluded all other parties and negated their ability to transform the structure of the regime.s6 Furthermore, the National Front remained dominated by select members of the elite, upper class. Therefore, Colombian society became
54 Fabio Sanchez, Andres Solimano, and Michel Formisano, "Conflict, violent crime and criminal activity in Colombia," November 2002. http://www.santafe.edu/ files/ gems/ obstaclestopeace/ sanchezfonnisanoenglish. pdf (accessed November 11, 2007), 6.
55 Norman A. Bailey, "La Vio/encia in Colombia," Journal of Inter-American Studies 9, no. 4 (October 1967): 562.
56 Juan C. Jaramillo, Roberto Steiner, and Natalia Salazar, "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy in Colombia," Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (April 1999). 27
polarized in two directions: (1) through "vertical cleavages" separating supporters of opposing parties and (2) "horizontal cleavages" between elites who had access to political representation, and those that did not.57 In this way, the era of the National Front directly contributed to the increase of violent uprisings against the Colombian state. In 1974, the agreement between the Conservative Party and the Liberal party came to an end because of intense partisan struggle.
Augmenting this political divide, the issue of widespread landlessness also gave root to the current conflict in Colombia. Although Colombia is not viewed as having as great a degree of land inequity as other Latin American countries like Argentina, Peru, and Chile, the nation has had a history of unequal land distribution stemming back to colonial times. 58
The National Front governments were unable to change this course and to prevent farmers from being expelled from their lands. Also, any land reform bills that were passed were slow to be put into action and never fully implemented. Even by 1996, the disparity in property ownership in Colombia was staggering. It was estimated that about 44.6 percent of land pertained to just 0.4 percent of landowners and that 66.8 percent of farmers only had rights to 4.3 percent of land.59
5? Marc Chernick, "Negotiating Peace amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia," in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. Cynthia J. Amson (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), 162.
58 Robert Carlyle Beyer, "Land Distribution and Tenure in Colombia," Journal ofInter-American Studies 3, no. 2 (April 1961): 282.
59 Amson and Whitfield, "Third Parties," 238. 28
The Insurgency: the F ARC and ELN
Due to these complicated political and social issues, made even worse by the lack of space to try and alter them through politics, opposition movements began to organize themselves in the mid-1960s. The F ARC-EP - las Fuerz.as Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-
Ejercito de/ Pueblo (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army) - was founded in 1964, arising principally from peasants who felt alienated from the state and who practiced a sort of "agrarian communism."60 The F ARC was fashioned reflecting Soviet- style, communist ideologies with the stated objective to use armed revolution to overthrown the Colombian government and implement a Marxist regime in the country.61
According to the F ARC's account, the organization - which is now the largest guerrilla group in the Western Hemisphere - was created after a raid in May 1964 on a peasant
Communist cooperative, called "La Republica Independiente de Marquetalid' (Ihe Independent
Republic ofMarquetalia). The raid was allegedly conducted with the support of the US government. In the attack, an estimated 16,000 military soldiers descended upon a small community of 1000 individuals - only 48 of which were armed. Those that survived the incident helped to create the F ARC soon thereafter, which was led from then until now by
60 Amson and Whitfield, "Third Parties," 238.
61 "Profiles: Colombia's Armed Groups," BBC News, May 29, 2006, http:/ /news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/ 4528631.stm (accessed April 7, 2007). 29
Manuel Marulanda - a Colombian peasant who had been fighting the state since the period of La Violencia. 62
From its inception, the F ARC has had an alliance with Colombia's Communist Party
(Partido Comunista Colombiano - PCC). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the F ARC had to find alternate forms to fund its insurgency, and so turned to kidnapping, extortion, and taxation of coca trade routes. The group regularly recruits minors to fight in its ranks. The
PARC has a reported 18,000 combatants divided amongst about 70 fronts, which are further organized in regional blocs. It is estimated that the organization has control over between 40 to 60 percent of the nation, and conducts its operations with ease in these areas. Most of the
F ARC's strongholds are the rural areas, jungles, and plains south of the Andes and in eastern
Colombia, where the population levels are very low.63
The second major rebel group involved in the Colombian conflict is the sizably smaller
ELN (Ejercito de Uberacion Nacional or the National liberation Army). The group was founded by Colombian students who returned from Cuba after undergoing training and its main support base has remained to be radical students and clergymen. Its membership has fluctuated between a high of about 5000 in the 1990s to about 3500 today. The ELN's first military operations took place in the country's central-north region of Magdalena Medio.64
62 "Information about the Combatants," The Center for International Policy, December 5, 2004, http:/ /www.ciponline.org/ colombia/infocombat.htm (accessed December 20, 2007).
63 "Information about the Combatants."
64 ''Information about the Combatants." 30
Unlike the F ARC, the ELN has ideological connections with the Communist style of
Cuba. Like the F ARC, the ELN is fighting for state control. According to the group, the
ELN's main goal is to reach social justice, development, and "real participative democracy."
Furthermore, the group's objective is to achieve "national sovereignty'' and remove multinationals. Finally, the ELN wants a new military that is bound by the law and that respects human rights.65 The ELN, like the FARC relies on extortion and kidnappings in
order to fund its activities. In addition to this, however, the ELN has regularly targeted
foreign oil fields and pipelines in Colombia that carry petroleum from the east to the
Atlantic Coast. Still, the ELN has regularly extorted money from these same foreign oil
firms.66
Both the F ARC and the ELN have been involved in various unsuccessful peace talks with the government. The F ARC negotiated with the Betancur administration in 1984, which led to the creation of the group's political party- la Union Patriotica (UP - Patriotic
Union). This agreement, however, came to a halt after the UP was ruthlessly targeted and more than 2000 of its members were assassinated.67 The FARC then was involved in various negotiations throughout the early 1990s. Similarly, the ELN took part in peace talks with the
65 "~Por que luchamos?," ELN-Voces, http://www.eln-voces.com/ (accessed April 7, 2007).
66 Sanchez, Solimano, and Fonnisano, "Conflict, violent crime," 13
67 "Information about the Combatants." 31
government between 1991 and 1992, with the most recent talks taking place in Havana in
2006-2007.68
The Counterinsurgency: the Paramilitaries
The roots of the current Paramilitaries in Colombia - known as the Auto-Defensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC - United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) - like the guerrillas can be traced to the mid-1960s. The historical weakness of the Colombian state led to a sort of culture in which para-state actors came to be accepted, if not encouraged. Law 48, passed in
1965, legalized the arming of civilians by the Ministry of Defense. This law indirectly led to the creation of paramilitary organizations. By the time the law was abolished in 1989, many self-defense groups were active across Colombia. During the 1980s, these various armed, pro-state factions began to form small militias and irregular armies that served as security forces from the guerrilla forces for emerald companies, drug cartels, ranchers, and landowners. Oftentimes, these units were established with the aid of the army and some were even sanctioned directly by the Colombian military. 69
Through the 1990s, the growing strength of the paramilitary groups in Colombia mirrored the growth of the guerrillas - both of which were fueled, in part, by the booming cocaine trade. This lucrative trade funded the creation of larger and larger paramilitary armies. Some of these units had clear affiliations with the armed forces, while others
68 "Colombia Backs ELN Ceasefire Plan," BBC News, April 18, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6570253.stm (accessed December 27, 2007).
69 Amson, "Tbird Parties," 240. 32
operated more independently. All of them, however, had a vast range of targets: from guerillas to leftist politicians, from peasants to journalists, from human rights workers to judges. This quick upsurge in paramilitary power and activity, especially during the late
1990s, became a serious threat to peace.70
In 1997, Carlos Castano - leader of the paramilitary bloc in the northwestern part of the country- united the various paramilitary structures in Colombia under one group, the AUC.
Under this united front, the Paramilitaries grew quickly: from an estimated 4000 members in
1998 to about 13,000 four years later.71 This growth, although due to many factors, can principally be linked to changes in land ownership in Colombia based on the drug trade. It was reported in 1994 that ten percent of the most fertile land in Colombia - approximately
4.4 million hectares - had been purchased with cocaine proceeds. These new landowners were usurped into the paramilitary structure and became ardent members of the AUC's base.72
Like the guerrilla groups in the conflict, the AUC has been involved in various negotiations with the Colombian government. The last of these, started under the Uribe administration in 2003, culminating in an agreement by many of the AUC blocs to undergo
DDR initiatives. This process, well underway, has faced many obstacles, one of the largest of
70 Sanchez, Solimano, and Formisano. "Conflict, violent crime," 14.
71 "Information about the Combatants."
72 Amson,"Third Parties,"240. 33
which has been the para-politics scandal which has revealed a certain level of collusion between the AUC structure and the Colombian government.
The Conflict Continues
Unlike the case in Nicaragua, the conflict ensues in Colombia. The various armed actors involved all share responsibility for its results. The Paramilitaries and the state security units are often charged with the majority of the killings during the war. It is estimated that the
ELN and the F ARC together are responsible for most of the kidnappings that have transpired in Colombia. Still, the guerrilla groups are only accountable for twenty percent of the killings during the Colombian conflict - most of which were civilian non-combatants. 73
The conflict, as is always the case, has taken the greatest toll on the civilian population in
Colombia. Thousands of non-combatants have been killed or kidnapped and many of these crimes go unreported or untried. Furthermore, Colombia has the highest number of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in the Western Hemisphere and the third highest in the world - behind only the Sudan and Iraq. It is estimated that more than 3.9 million
Colombians were internally displaced through 2007 - making up about ten percent of the country's total population.74
73 "Information about the Combatants."
74 "Population Figures and Profile," Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, http:/ /www.intemal displacement.org/idmc/website/ countries.nsf/ (httpEnvelopes)/ CCOSB30C4C94EC96802570B8005A7090?0 penDocwnent (accessed January 4, 2008.) 34
Colombia: Past DDR Efforts
The current paramilitary demobilization is not the first in Colombia's long-running armed conflict. Throughout this five-decade-long conflict, there have been many DDR schemes, some seemingly more successful than others, involving many different actors - from the national government, to the Catholic Church, to NGO's, to the OAS. The following is a brief review of past DDR processes in the on-going Colombian civil war.
These many instances of demobilizations began in March 1990 with the M-19, which eventually led to the demobilization of 7000 combatants in nine separate periods. These demobilization initiatives were undertaken within the framework of negotiated agreements between the Colombian government and the armed groups. In other cases, the government has backed programs of individual demobilization for combatants who have not yet reached accords with the government. This "modality was initiated in 1994 and has been validated by a recent government decree" during the Uribe administration.75
March 9, 1990: Accord between the State, Political Parties, the M-19, and the Church
Ef Movimento 19 de Abril (M-19), was established in 1972 by Jaime Bateman, and became one of the most feared and most effective urban guerrilla organizations in Colombia.
At its peak, the M-19 had about 2000 members, becoming the second-largest guerrilla group in Colombia, after the PARC. The M-19, like other leftist groups, fought for social justice,
75 "Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia." Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo. http:/ /unddr.org/ docs/Colombia%20PA %20SADUenglishfinalrevised.pdf (accessed December 4, 2007). 35
but with two main differences. First, the M-19's urban apparatus included well-educated and middle class combatants and its leadership "nurtured a Robin Hood reputation among the lower classes" by stealing food and other materials and giving it to the poor. Second, the organization was known for conducting dangerous missions for the sake of symbolism, like stealing Simon Bolivar's sword from the Quinta de Bolivar.76
The demobilization of the M-19 began under President Betancur's administration (1982-
1986) through Decree 2711 which created the Comision Asesora, defining the legal requirements of demobilization. In addition Law 35 deemed guerrilla organizations in
Colombia to be legitimate political actors. Following this, the M-19 created a political wing, called theA/ianza DemocrtiticaM-19 (AD/M-19). Still, there was no peace accord between the National Government the M-19 until 1990, towards the end of President Barca's administration, stemming from his Iniciativa para la Pazprogram.77
The M-19 developed a working group for peace and national reconciliation, in alliance with the National Government, which ultimately culminated in the disarmament of the remaining factions of the organization on March 8-9, 1990. A Demobilization, Social
Reintegration, and Productivity Plan was also put forth. Furthermore, a follow-up committee was arranged to specify commitments by both sides and to make them feasible.
76 Bert Ruiz, The Colombian Civil War(Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 2001), 129.
77 Markus Koth, "To End a War: Demobilization and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Colombia," Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2005, http:/ /www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper43/paper43.pdf (accessed April 27, 2007), 16. 36
In addition, the safety and security of ex-combatants was assured by the national government both during and after the accords.78
It is clear that all ex-combatants of the M-19 were not completely satisfied with the 1990 peace accord. Due to this, a group of former M-19 members who had demobilized reorganized in 1994 to form a new criminal group called the Comando Jaime Caiion. Still, the strong presence of the M-19 in Colombian politics defends the peace accord and its DDR strength. AD /M-19 members actively participated in fashioning Colombia's 1991
Constitution and the party was co-president of the Constituent Assembly of Colombia.
Though the party is not as strong as it was during the 1990s and has become part of a larger coalition, the M-19 still has political power.
January 25, 1991: Accord between the Government and the PRT
El Partido Revolucionario de los Trabcyadores (PR1) was established in 1982, stemming from the central faction of the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist branch of the Communist Party of
Colombia. The PRT's main goal was to launch an armed struggle against the central government's forces. It is estimated that the group had about 200 combatants by 1990. In addition to its armed struggle, the PRT maintained a trade union organization called Corriente de Integracion SindicaL 19
78 Andres Solimano, ed., Colombia: Ess~s on Conflict, Peace and Development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000), 135.
79 ''Worker's Revolutionary Party of Colombia," Wtkipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Workers_Revolutionary_Party_of_Colombia (accessed April 20, 2007). 37
The accord, signed in Ovejas, Sucre, between the PRT and the administration of
President Barco guaranteed the transition of the PRT a criminal organization to a legitimate political actor through the registration and legalization of the party with competent authorities. The accord also stated that the PRT would gain representation in the
Constituent Assembly and that the government would pay for a political office for the new party in Bogoci. Furthermore, security measures were instated for the group, including an armored car and bodyguards. In addition, a program for education, training, and healthcare was discussed. Finally, a bilateral commission comprising members from both the PRT and the National Government was created to verify implementation of the agreement.
Following the signing of the accord, the arms caches of the PRTwere destroyed during a ceremony on January 26th.so
Despite the fact that the peace accords stated that the PRTwould commence a transition to a legal political party, this never happened. Instead many members of the organization decided to join the M-19. Other members chose, instead of organizing a political party, to become involved in social organizations, mainly focusing on human rights and the promotion of peace in Sucre and Bolivar.81
80 Solimano, Ess~s on Conflict, 136-13 7.
81 ''Worker's Revolutionary Party." 38
February 15, 1991: Accord between the Government and the EPL
El Ejircito Popular de Iibcracion (EPL) was established in 1967. This left-wing, Maoist inspired guerrilla group was founded by Colombia's Marxist-Leninist Party, which was an offshoot of the main Communist Party in the country that disagreed with the Soviet ideological beliefs. The EPL's main strategy was to promote a socialist revolution from rural areas that would eventually spread to the urban centers of Colombia, where the organization tried to establish urban cells. At its peak, it is estimated that the EPL had about 500 active combatants carrying out criminal activities and engaging in sabotage, leading to international observers labeling the organization as a terrorist group. 82
A political accord was agreed upon between the National Government and the EPL in
Bogota in 1991, under the administration of President Gaviria, which led to the demobilization of 2000 individuals affiliated with the EPL - both armed and unarmed. This agreement provided legal guarantees to ex-combatants in the form of ending penal activities and penalties. Protection for ex-members of the EPL was also guaranteed by the government through providing vehicles, escorts, and endowments. In addition, the EPL was granted official political party status. Also, under the accord, a reintegration plan was laid out. This comprehensive plan included programs to assist ex-combatants with the transition to civilian life, including education, training, and business consulting and participation.
82 "Popular Liberation Anny," Wikipedia,http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popular_Liberation_Anny (accessed April 24, 2007). 39
Finally, the accord called for both national and international supervisory bodies to verify programs. 83
Despite the group's official demobilization, a remnant of the EPL that refused to follow in the DDR process continues to operate today. It is believed that maybe a few dozen combatants remain, while the organization's leader, Francisco Caraballo, is in prison.84 Still, the guerrilla group did transform itself to create the political movement known as Esperanza,
Pazy Iibertad, which verifies that the accord has functioned, to some extent.
May 27, 1991: Accord between the Government and the MAQL
El Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL) - a leftist, indigenous guerrilla organization
- was established in 1984. The group was named after NASA tribe leader, named Manuel
Quintin Lame Chantre. MAQL based its operations out of the Cauca department and its central goal was to achieve territorial, economic, political, and cultural autonomy for the indigenous communities of the Colombia. Because of its criminal activities to achieve these ends, the group was labeled as a terrorist organization by authorities. 85
A final peace accord was reached between the administration of President Gaviria and the MAQL in Caldoiio in 1991. The agreement first called for the disarmament of the guerrilla group, under the supervision of the Confederation of Evangelical Churches in
83 Solimano, Esst!JS on Conflict, 138-139.
84 "Information about the Combatants."
85 "Movimiento Annado Quintin Lame," Medios para la Paz, http://www.mediosparalapaz.org/index.php?idcategoria=2458 (accessed April 22, 2007). 40
Colombia as well as the governments of Canada and Spain. As in incentive to lay down arms, several guarantees were granted by the government, including the ending of penal action, monthly assistance, health care, and housing. In addition, the administration guaranteed the safety of demobilized ex-combatants through vehicles, escorts, and equipment. A reintegration plan, which would span four years, was also laid out. This plan covered education, technical training, employment, as well as follow-up and evaluation of the process.86
April 9, 1994: Agreement between the Government and the CRS
El Corriente de Renovacion Socialista (CRS), was a dissident faction of the Ejercito de Iiberacion
Nacional (ELN). It was founded by Franklin Donado to represent the lower classes of the country in their quest for social justice.
The political agreement reached between the CRS and President Gaviria in Flor del
Monte laid out a comprehensive reintegration plan to be financed by the national government. This program included health care and treatment, education, and psychological support. In addition, operation centers were set up to assist with housing, land programs, transportation, and technical assistance.87
Despite the demobilization of ex-CRS combatants, it is clear that the National
Government has not been able to guarantee their safety and security. For instance, La Galleta
86 Solimano, Essqys on Conjlia, 140-141.
87 Solimano, Essqys on Conjlia, 142-143. 41
farm was given to the families of demobilized CRS members. Still, government-allied
paramilitaries have regularly accused these individuals of continuing collaboration with
guerrilla groups. Because of this, paramilitary forces abducted two ex-CRS combatants in
January of 2000 from the farm, and these individuals have since been added to the list of the
disappeared. Still, the demobilization of the group has not been completely negative.88 One
positive aspect of the CRS entering into the DDR program is that the founder of the original
armed group, Franklin Donado, has actively participated in politics in Colombia and
continues to represent his party in national politics.
May 26, 1994: Accord for Citizen Coexistence between the Government, Popular Militias, Independent Militias of Valle de Aburra, and the Metropolitan Militias of Medellin
Las Milicias def Pueblo para el Pueblo, or the Popular Militias, were the main militia
organizations that existed in Colombia up until the accord in 1994. The Valle de Aburra is
the valley where Medellin is located. Las Milicias def Valle de Aburrd were supported by
Colombia's second-largest guerilla organization, the ELN, though they were never
dependent on the larger organization. Las Milicias Independientes were a splinter group of las
Milicias def Valle de Aburrd. Las Milicias Metropolitanas de Medellin is the specific leftist-milita
88 "Colombia Peasant Community from La Galleta farm in Montebello Municipality, Department of Antloquia," Amnesty International, July 24, 2002, http://colhmet.igc.org/newitems/july02/aiuract.724.htm (accessed April 16, 2007). 42
group that was based out of the city of Medellin. These groups emerged and flourished during the 1980s and early 1990s.89
The peace accord reached focused mainly on first demobilization, and then the reintegration of ex-militia members back into civil society. As a result of this negotiation, it is estimated that about 650 members of the three-armed militias were demobilized. As part of the reintegration plan, participation in public administration was encouraged, and nine ex- militiamen took the jobs. In addition, the national government paid to promote the reintegration process through supporting television shows and disseminating over 3000 books to the community. Finally, an evaluating committee was organized.90
June 20, 1994: Accord between the Government and the Francisco Garnica Guerrilla Coordination Front
The Francisco Garnica Guerrilla Coordination Front was established as a Pro-Chinese, secessionist youth organization in Colombia. This leftist organiza#on grew out of the larger
Ejercito Popular de Liberacion guerrilla group, and continued to operate for a few years after the
EPL itself was demobilized.
The political accord agreed upon in Canaveral between the Francisco Garnica Guerrilla
Coordination Front and the administration of President Gaviria led to the demobilization of about 130 armed members. The accord heavily focused on reintegration initiatives, all of which were to be funded by the National Government. These programs included health
89 Francisco Gutierrez Sanin and Ana Maria Jaramillo, "Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security - the case of Medellin, Colombia," Environment and Urbanization 16, no. 17 (2004): 19-20.
90 Solimano Esst?JS on Coeflict, 145. 43
care, education, credit for productive projects, housing, and process promotion. In addition, the accord explicitly stated that the government would oversee the security of ex-combatants by protecting vehicles and providing escorts and equipment. 91
Nicaragua: DDR in the Peace Accords
Peace negotiations in the Nicaraguan conflict were not comprehensive, as was the case in
Guatemala and El Salvador, and did not occur smoothly. The path to peace was guided both by regional summits and national accords. The talks happened sporadically, with many setbacks mixed in with the successes. In the end, the Sandinistas made many concessions, ultimately being voted out of power. After the negotiated elections of 1990 and the inauguration of Violeta Chamorro, the Contras agreed to enter into a DDR process.
The Regional Peace Process
Contadora
Mexico organized a meeting of its foreign minister with the foreign ministers of
Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela in January 1983 on Contadora Island. The central philosophy behind this gathering was to have these Latin American countries guide Central
America from war to peace, while limiting the intervention of the US in the region and emphasizing nonalignment. Due to the fact that President Reagan had refused to negotiate
91 Solimano, Ess~s on Conflict, 144. 44
with the S andinistas, the Contadora countries aimed to produce a peace accord and in the end, confront the US with the outcome.92
Washington had an ambivalent attitude towards the Contadora process. In public, the
US had to support a regional peace summit as the best means to create peace in the hemisphere. In the background, the Reagan administration was backing multi-issue negotiations where close allies - particularly Honduras - could block any agreements or ideas that the US was against. Without Washington's support, the attending nations knew that no agreement reached at the summit could be successful. In this way, the US had a strong underlying presence at Contadora without actually being present.93
Each nation involved had its own motives and objectives for their participation in the
Contadora peace process. President Belisario Betancur of Colombia firmly believed that compromise and negotiation would resolve the on-going war in his country, and could also be applied to the conflicts in Central America. The Panamanian government, on the other hand, hoped that its involvement in the process would enhance its international image.94
Mexico, whose involvement was most complex, did not merely initiate the Contadora process out of sheer altruism. An internal document produced by the Mexican Foreign
Ministry states that "The failure to reach agreements endangers not only regional order but the security and the preservation of values and principles that are in the national interest of
92 William Goodfellow and James Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas to Sapoa and Beyond," in &volution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 371.
93 William LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment? The United States, Nicaragua, and the Search for Peace in Central America," International Security 11, no. 2 (Autumn, 1986): 99.
94 LeoGrande, Our Own Bac9ard, 349-350. 45
the Latin American countries, particularly the neighboring countries like Mexico."95 Despite these varying purposes, all of the Contadora and Llma countries were united by two things:
(1) a possible regional war that could spread if the Central American conflicts were not diffused and (2) intervention by the US armed forces.
The optimism of the Latin American countries, however, was quickly met with the reality that brokering a regional peace agreement would be challenging because the Central
American nations could not even agree on procedural processes. While Nicaragua called for bilateral pacts with Honduras and Costa Rica that included joint patrolling to prevent infiltration by the Contras, Honduras did not support bilateral accords. Instead, Honduras insisted, as did the US, that regional issues should be negotiated multilaterally and all at once
- something that was inherently complex and often seen as an indirect way to stall any type of settlement.96
The first great advancement made in the Contadora process came on September 9, 1983 when the five Central American nations signed a Document of Objectives, which created an agenda for negotiating a treaty. The tenns were agreed upon by all the nations involved, and were even endorsed by the US. With this tangible progress, the first draft of a document listing legally binding obligations was produced in June of 1984 and revised by September 7.
One of these commitments was internal democratization, something that the Sandinista government was expected to reject. To Washington's surprise, however, President Daniel
95 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 371.
96 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard," 350. 46
Ortega complied with the draft in its totality on September 21. On October 20, the National
Security Council released a report stating that 'We have trumped the latest
Nicaraguan/Mexican efforts to rush signature of an unsatisfactory Contadora agreement."97
This friction effectively derailed the process and created division amongst the other
Contadora countries. In September of 1985, the original four Contadora countries were joined by Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay, which became known collectively as the
Lima Group.98 This second attempt at the Contadora process produced a second agreement and also saw the Contadora foreign ministers going to Washington to appeal for a halt to US funding for the Contras - an effort that failed. 99
Esquipulas I
The advances made during the Contadora process transitioned into the following phase, which came about in May of 1986 when the five Central American nations came together for a summit in the Guatemalan city of Esquipulas, taking ownership of their futures. The five presidents - Vinicio Cerezo of Guatemala, Jose N apole6n Duarte of El Salvador, Jose
Azcona of Honduras, Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua - signed an accord known as Esquipulas I. In this agreement, the leaders agreed to meet periodically in an effort to analyze and resolve the region's most pressing issues and to follow through
97 Goodfellow and Morrell. "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 372.
98 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 357.
99 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 374. 47
on the agreements reached during the Contadora process. The further expressed the need to initiate processes of social and economic integration in the region.100
Towards the end of the 1986, both the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of
American States (OAS) unexpectedly offered their good offices, adding more legitimacy to the peace process. The foreign ministers of the original Contadora group and the Lima countries, along with the Secretaries General of the UN and the OAS, toured the conflict struck capitals of Central America from January 19-20, 1987. This trip had two main effects.
First, it constructed the framework for the involvement of the two international agencies in
Central America. Secondly, it irritated the Reagan administration - which was by now involved in the Iran-Contra scandal - and essentially placed the US in a supporting role in the peace process.101 Still, President Reagan publicly referred to the Esquipulas process s being
"fatally flawed."102
Esquipulas II
Despite Reagan's opinion of the first Esquipulas process, the five Central American presidents met a second time in Guatemala on August 6-7 1987 to discuss a regional plan put forth by Oscar Arias. At this meeting, the leaders signed the historic "Procedure to
Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America." This declaration supported peace in the region, economic integration, democratization, national reconciliation, cease-fires in
too Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, LA Comision Internacional, 17.
101 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 357.
102 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 517. 48
Central America, fair elections, amnesties, the tennination of support to insurgent and counter-insurgent forces by all governments, and the halt of using foreign land to destabilize any nation in the region. Furthermore, Esquipulas II created the Comision Internacional de
Verificaciony Seguimiento (CIVS- International Commission for Verification and Follow-up) - which consisted of the five Central American foreign ministers, the Contadora countries, and the Secretaries General of the UN and the OAS.103
Alajuela
Esquipulas initiated a string of meetings and accords amongst the five Central American presidents. The first of these occurred in Alajuela, Costa Rica on January 16, 1988. During this meeting, the CIVS was dissolved replaced by a regional verification body. It also became clear by this meeting that the Arias Plan of Esquipulas II was being most harshly applied to
Nicaragua. Despite this apparent double-standard, President Ortega made several concessions at the summit in an effort to avert the US funding the Contras again.104
Costa del Sol
On February 13-14 of 1989, the presidents convened in Costa del Sol, El Salvador with the objective of analyzing the regional peace process and ensuring its future success. At this meeting, President Ortega agreed to make political reforms in Nicaragua as well as
103 Arocena, The International Commission, 7.
104 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 381. 49
scheduling general elections on February 25, 1990. He further agreed to have international verification missions of the UN and the OAS observe that the elections are conducted in a fair manner. The Central American presidents agreed to elaborate on a plan to demobilize the N1caraguan. R es1stance. . 10s
The third major meeting of the regional presidents took place in Tela, Honduras on
August 5-7, 1989. Because Nicaragua had complied with the conditions put forth in
Esquipulas and President Ortega had made many unilateral concessions, he was now in a position to ask the other Central American nations to make progress on the issue most central to the Sandinistas-. the demobilization of the Contras. On August 7, the Tela
Agreement was signed. In it, the presidents agreed to accept the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance under the direction of the UN. The accord called for the creation of the Comision Internacional de Apqyo y Verificacion (CIAV - International Commission of
Support and Verification). This organization was to be under the auspices of the UN and the
OAS and was to monitor and facilitate the DDR of the Contras. 106 Under the Tela accord, the
CIAV mandate was to include, among other things:107
105 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La ComisirJn Internacional, 20.
106 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 365.
107 Arocena, The International Commission, 8. 50
Consulting with the Nicaraguan and regional governments, assistance organizations
and the RN during the implementation of the DDR program
Providing humanitarian assistance to refugee camps and ex-combatant camps
Implementing a voluntary repatriation program for demobilizing RN members
Dismantling RN camps
In addition, the Central American presidents agreed to stop letting irregular armed have free territorial access in their countries - something that would eventually disrupt the
Contra training camps in Honduras and Costa Rica.108 It was also agreed that the Contras be demobilized by November 4, 1989. 1bis goal, however was not met because the Contras resented these decisions made in their absence, and so, did not comply.109
The Tela agreement created a dilemma for the Bush administration in Washington. Bush fiercely opposed the demobilization of the Contra forces. Still, he had made a bipartisan agreement with Congress that he would back the peace process in Central America. The agreements reached at Tela made these two positions seem irreconcilable. However, the
Bush administration did manage to reconcile the two through simply disregarding the contradiction. He supported the overall Tela agreement, while adding that he still disagreed with the deadline put forth for demobilizing the Contras. 110
108 Rose J. Spalding, "From Low-Intensity War to Low-Intensity Peace," in Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, ed. by Cynthia J. Arnson (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), 36.
109 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 370.
110 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 557. 51
The Democrats in Congress also showed inaction towards the agreements made at Tela.
The reason for this was two-fold. First, there was change in the leadership structure. Speaker
Jim Wright had just resigned, with Tom Foley taking over. Second, and more importantly, the Democrats wanted to avoid confronting the administration with the volatile issue of
Nicaragua. The President had not brought up more aid requests the Contras for some time, so the Democrats chose to disengage from the issue and focus on domestic issues. Because of this, the "Tela accord was a signal to reinfiltrate into Nicaragua"111
San Isidro de Coronado
The next regional summit occurred in December of 1989 in San Isidro de Coronado,
Costa Rica. This emergency meeting was called by Nicaragua after the demobilization plans for the Contras put forth earlier had failed to be completed. The five presidents came to a consensus to demand that all remaining aid for the Contras be redirected to the CIAV and they also agreed to expand the UN's mission.112 The leaders postponed the Tela Contra demobilization date to February 5, 1990.113 President Ortega responded to these commitments by agreeing to authorize reintegrated Contra members to vote in the upcoming
February 25, 1990 presidential elections.114
111 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 389-390.
112 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 390-391.
113 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 370.
114 Arocena, The International Commission, 10. 52
The US was again, absent from this accord. In the background, however, President
Bush's Secretary of State, James Baker, was meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A.
Shevardnadze. During their conversation, Baker "made it absolutely clear, to the Foreign
Minister that the US would not tolerate the shipment of more Soviet arms to Managua and to Havana. Moreover, the Soviet Union would have to pay a political price if Moscow did not do everything in its power to ensure that the Sandinista government allows free and fair elections.115
Montelimar
The last major convention of the Central American Presidents happened in Montelimar,
Nicaragua on April 2-3, 1990 and effectively brought to a close the processes initiated by
Esquipulas II. Montelimar marked the last political summit of the regional presidents with an aim to promote peace, regional cooperation, and economic integration. The fairly conducted
1990 elections in Nicaragua were applauded as signs of democratization in Central America.
Moreover, the Montelimer accord reiterated the need to immediately demobilize the RN and particularly called upon the US government to support this DDR process.116
115 Friedman, Thomas L., "Baker, in a Call to Shevardnadze, Asks Action on Central America," New York Times, December 11, 1989.
116 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 22-23. 53
The National Peace Process
In the midst of the international and regional summits in which Nicaragua took part, the nation also involved in parallel internal peace negotiations that lined the road to the historic
1990 elections. These negotiations, like the regional process, were not effortless and occurred in spurts, reflecting the progress and obshtcles of the Central American accords. In addition to negotiating with the other four Central American presidents and implementing the accords reached with them, the Sandinistas took part in two additional series of negotiations: with opposition parties and with the Contras. 117
Implementing the Regional Accords in Nicaragua
Of all the Central American nations involved in the string of regional summits,
Nicaragua excelled in truly applying the commitments made in these accords, especially
Esquipulas. President Ortega agreed to move forward with the three central commitments put forth during the meetings: (1) to initiate talks with the Nicaraguan Resistance, (2) to negotiate with the political opposition in Nicaragua, and (3) to hold free elections. Moreover,
Nicaragua was the first Central American country to create a National Reconciliation
Commission, a goal put forth during Esquipulas II. To the surprise of many, President
Ortega appointed Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo as the chairman of this commission,
111 Spence, ''War and Peace," 9. 54
despite being an open and ardent opponent of the Sandinistas. 118 In addition, the Sandinista government agreed to reopen La Prensa, an opposition newspaper and to allow Radio Ca!Olico to restart broadcasting- effectively ending press censorship in the country.119
These moves can be seen as a shrewd tactic in the peace process. Nicaragua was aware that it alone could not force the US to stop funding the Contras. By firmly supporting the coalition created by the Central American presidents, President Ortega hoped that a sort of anti-intervention front could be created. This joint venture, the Sandinistas hoped, would be enough to pressure Washington from :financing the Contra war. Still a second motive behind the S andinistas many concessions was that the government realized its shortcomings and was trying to mend internal problems caused or intensified under their regime - something that, at the t:llne,. did not pose a threat to their . revo 1utlon. . 120
Sandinista Negotiations with the Contras
Nicaragua's commitment to the regional decrees was questioned in terms of whether or not the S andinistas would agree to negotiate with the Contras. For several years, the Sandinista government vowed not to sit at a table with the Nicaraguan Resistance. On November 5,
1987, however, President Ortega announced the start of talks with the Contras to discuss a ceasefire. These indirect talks between the two sides, which occurred in November and
December in Santo Domingo, were mediated by Cardinal Obando. It took years to get the
l18 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 379-380.
119 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 360.
120 Spalding, ''Low-Intensity War," 35. 55
Sandinistas and the Contras to initiate such a discussion, and it took just months for them to break down. President Ortega wanted to focus just on the construction of a ceasefire while the Nicaraguan Resistance was intent on broadening the discussion to include political issues.• 121
Despite the regional process stalling at the time, Nicaragua made a commendable advance towards peace on March 23, 1988 when the Contras and the Sandinistas signed a cease-fire accord in Sapoa.122 The Contras were able to gain consent to most of their demands. The S andinistas committed to a general amnesty for members of the Nicaraguan
Resistance as well as for the remaining imprisoned Somoza-era National Guard.
Furthermore, exiles could return to Nicaragua and were given the right to be politically active. The Contras were granted the ability to take part in the upcoming National Dialogue that would convene various party leaders. In return, the Contras had to recognize the legitimacy of the Sandinista government in addition to agreeing to a sixty day ceasefire.
Moreover, the Nicaraguan Resistance agreed to move all combatants to cease-fire zones and the promised not to petition for external assistance, except for humanitarian aid. Equally as important to what was agreed upon, was what was not: the Contras did not agree to disarm during the Sapoa negotiations.123
When the sixty-day ceasefire lapsed, the peace process came to a halt again. In June of
1988, the Contras put forth several preconditions for entering into a DDR process. First, they
121 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 380.
122 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 362.
123 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 53 7. 56
demanded that the entire Nicaraguan Supreme Court must resign. In addition, the Contras called for the return of all property seized under the Sandinista agrarian reform. Another precondition put forth was that all draftees in the army had to be discharged.124 With the presentation of these demands, the ceasefire was destroyed.
The turning point that truly created the space necessary for there to be successful peace negotiations in the Nicaraguan conflict was the mutually hurting stalemate125 that became apparent in 1989. The Contras had few options because the US had pulled funding to the organization. The national economy was down and crumbling quickly, something that the
S andinistas could not allow to continue. Therefore, both sides involved in the conflict had to look to other strategies than continuing the conflict.
The Nicaraguan Resistance was the most resistant of the actors involved in the
Nicaraguan conflict to come to the negotiating table. Although there was a lot of division within the Contra camps and their political leadership wavered, the central military commanders of the Nicaraguan Resistance were adamant about their position and inflexible to the idea of entering into a dialogue with the Sandinistas. As Contra commander Edgar
Molinares stated ''We wanted to cut off Sandinism at the roots, like the Sandinistas did with
124 Spence, ''War and Peace," 39.
125 "Mutually hurting stalemate" (MHS) is a term coined by William I Zartman. It refers to a fleeting moment of ripeness in conflict in which the opposing sides are locked into a series of events that become more and more detrimental, with neither side gaining the upper hand. In moments like this, it is likely that the disputants will be open to other, less conflictual strategies. William I. Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond." 57
Somoza."126 The Contras, however, were essentially forced to the table - not by the Sandinista government, but by their ally: Washington. The US Congress voted in 1988 to end military assistance to the Contras and instead, just provide humanitarian assistance. Still, humanitarian aid was not well defined and the Contras already had a large store of weapons. Despite this, the announcement that the US was pulling military aid was a large blow to the morale of the
Nicaraguan Resistance. In the end, the organization began to crumble from the inside as divisions grew and leaders lost control over the combatants.127
The economic cost of the war was becoming all too evident. By 1985, the total cost of the war had soared to over 1.2 billion US dollars. The Nicaraguan economy was not able to modernize its infrastructure or its production, which was evident in the fact that the production level during the middle of the 1980s matched the numbers from the 1960s. Due to this, the nation's output level began to freefall below its average. Adding to these economic woes, the S andinistai defense spending was steadily rising, reaching 62 percent of the national budget by 1987. The Nicaraguan Central Bank tried to veil these statistics, but instead triggered inflation levels that hovered around 33,000 percent in 1988 - a reality that could no longer be covered up. So, even though the Sandinistaswere fully aware that the
Nicaraguan Resistance could not defeat them militarily, the economic decline in the country
126 Spalding, "Low-Intensity War," 36.
127 Spalding, "Low-Intensity War," 36. 58
did have the ability to ruin the revolution. Because of this, the Sandinista government was k een to negotiate. an en d to the confli ct. 128
Sandinista Negotiations with Political Opponents
Also in accordance with Esquipulas II, President Ortega announced that he would initiate a dialogue with his political opposition in order to increase political rights and liberties in the country. The Sandinista government solidified this commitment by approving new legislation that allowed equal access to the national media to the opposition. The law also relaxed the rules government domestic and foreign funding for campaigns. In addition, the new law officially commenced the National Dialogue between the Sandinistas and the political opposition parties in Nicaragua.129 This National Dialogue consisted of a twenty- two hour public dialogue that was featured on Nicaraguan television featuring President
Ortega and members of twenty opposition parties. At the end of this dialogue, all the parties agreed to take part in the upcoming national elections and the S andinistas agreed to postpone the military draft until after the February 25 election date.130
Chamorro Negotiates with the Contras
To the surprise of most, the S andinistas lost the historic elections of 1990 to US- supported UNO candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro -widow of Pedro Joaquin
128 Spalding, "Low-Intensity War," 35.
129 Arocena, The International Commission,10.
130 Goodfellow and Morrell, "From Contadora to Esquipulas," 388. 59
Chamorro. Only after this change of power did the Contras reluctantly agree to negotiate the tenns for their DDR. Soon after Chamorro's election, the Contras were hesitant to lay down their anns due to fact that the new administration had chosen to retain some high-ranking
Sandinista officials in the government as a sign of national unity.131
Toncontin Agreement
On March 23, 1990, President-elect Chamorro negotiated with the RN leadership in
Honduras and both parties signed the Toncontin Agreement. In the accord, the Contras recognized the Nicaraguan people's will to democratize, as seen through the elections.
Furthennore, they agreed to begin demobilizations.132 A deadline for demobilizations was set for April 20, 1990 under the oversight of international organizations. Still, this demobilization was only required of those Contras based in Honduras. A date for demobilization was not set for the rest of the RN forces. As could have been foreseen, many the Contra forces in Honduras began to cross the border into Nicaragua to avoid this demobilization.133 By the demobilization date, only one combatant had done so. The Contras were upset that Chamorro had decided to keep fonner-Sandinista General Humberto Ortega on as the Commander-in-Chief of the Anny.134
131 Hartzell, "Peace in Stages," 370.
132Arocena, The International Commission,18.
133 Mark A. Uhlig, "Honduran says Contras will Disarm," The New York Times, April 5, 1990.
134Arocena, The International Commission, 18. 60
Ceasefire Accord
On April 18, 1990, the Government and the Contra leadership met again-this time in
Managua - to renegotiate the terms of disarmament. The RN was represented by
Commander Ruben, Luis Angel Lopez, Aquilino Ruiz, and Osorno Coleman. Lacayo and
General Ortega were the government representatives at the meeting. The first seven zones of security where the Contras were to be demobilized as well as demilitarized zones were defined. The parties agreed that the RN should start gathering, with their weapons, at these specified sites beginning on April 22, with demobilizations to be carried out between April
25 and June 10, 1990.135
The Declaration of Managua
The Chamorro government invited the Contra leadership to another round of negotiations in Managua, resulting in the signing of the Declaration of Managua on May 4,
1990. In the document, Chamorro restated her vow to provide physical security to the combatants if they agreed to give up their arms agree to the terms of the April 18th accord.
She also promised to initiate a program whose goal would be to reduce the size of the national army by June 10, 1990 and to develop "development poles" by May 31, 1990. In
135 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 48-50. 61
return, the RN agreed to carry out the demobilization of their troops between May 8 and
June 10.136
Contra demobilizations started in the El Almendro security zone. By May 19, however, the fragility of this process was exposed. The Contras suspended demobilization and threatened to call it off altogether, stating that the government was not following through with its promises as per the Toncontin accord. The Contra leadership also called for the removal of the top police and army chiefs.137
The Managua Protocol
To end this deadlock, the government and the Contras agreed to renegotiate and the result of this dialogue was the Managua Protocol on Disarmament, signed on May 30, 1990.
This accord was far more detailed than those preceding it. It listed an extensive list of resources to be provided the demobilizing Contra forces. The government agreed to create twenty-three development poles where demobilized combatants would receive social services, housing, land, and credit. Contras whose land was confiscated in Sandinista land reforms would have their land returned. Moreover, representatives of the Contras would be given high positions within various ministries within the government. The lnstituto
Nicaragiiense de Reintegracion (fhe Nicaraguan Institute of Reintegration), a new government
136 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internadonal, 53.
137 Arocena, The International Commission, 19. 62
agency, would be created to oversee the process. In response to these compromises, the RN agreed to demobilize one hundred combatants per zone each day. 138
Table 1: Summary of Nicaraguan Peace Accords
Regional Agreements Contadora January 1983 -Initiation of Central American peace process -Appeal to halt US funding to Contras, which failed -Agreement to have presidential summits to discuss peace Esquipulas I May 1986 and disarmament in the region -The UN and the OAS offered their good services -Signing of "Procedure to Establish a Firm and Lasting Esquipulas II August 1987 Peace in Central America" -Creation of the Comision Internacional de Verificacion y Seguimiento (CIVS) Alajuela January 1988 -The CIVS was dissolved and replaced by a regional body -President Ortega agreed to hold internationally verified Costa del Sol February 1989 elections on February 25, 1990 -The Central American presidents agreed to formulate a plan to demobilize the Contras -Called for the creation of the Comision Internacional de Apf!Yo y Verijicacion (CIAV) Tela August 1989 -No illegal armed forces could be harbored by any Central American country -Contras to demobilize by November 4 -All remaining aid for the Contras to be directed to CIAV San Isidro de December 1989 -Contras to demobilize by February 5 Coronado -Demobilized Contras permitted to vote in February 25 elections -Last political summit of Central American presidents Montelimar April 1990 -Reiterated need to demobilize the RN -Called on US to support the DDR
138 Spalding, "Low-Intensity War," 40. 63
Table 1: Continued
National Accords -First meeting between Chamorro government and RN Tonocontin March 23, 1990 -Set April 20, 1990 as the last day to start demobilization -Ceasefire under international verification -Concentration of Contras in a security zone Ceasefire April 18, 1990 -Defined 7 demobilization security sites Accord -Demobilizations between April 25 and July 10 -Creation of development poles by May 31 Declaration of May4, 1990 -Reduce the size of the army by June 10 Managua -Demobilizations between May 8 and June 10 -Agreement to create 23 poles of development -Contra land confiscated by Sandinistas would be returned Managua May 30, 1990 -Contra leaders to be given high-level government posts Protocol -Creation of the lnstituto Nicaragiiense de Reintegracion -Demobilization of 100 Contras per site each day
Colombia: DDR in the Peace Accords
The accords that led to the demobilization of the AUC in Colombia were even less cohesive than the ad hoc negotiations that brought peace to Nicaragua. This is so because the goal of the dialogue between the Colombian government and the Paramilitaries was not peace at all, but just a DDR process. Therefore, although the accords initiated a DDR process, peace is still elusive in Colombia. Moreover, there was no regional process in
Colombia that paralleled the efforts of the Central American presidents to bring peace to
Nicaragua.
Although the Uribe administration was not the first to negotiate with the Paramilitaries, his is the first government in over ten years to have truly made progress in talking with them. 64
The Pastrana government held secret talks with Carlos Castano, Nobel-prize winning author
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and several conservative politicians from the Cordoba department.
Mediation was offered by Spain's Foreign Minister Abel Matute. These negotiations, however, did not lead to many results. Among other problems, Castano was unwilling to accept a demilitarized zone for the ELN in the Middle Magdalena Valley. This round of talks or the reasons of its failure was never publicized.139
President Uribe, unlike previous administrations, announced his intentions to negotiate with the AUC during his presidential campaign. In fact, his campaign slogan was "mano duro, corazon grande'' ("strong hand, big heart''), meaning that he intended to deal firmly with illegal armed groups, but was willing to talk to any group who would lay down their arms.140 This openness to negotiate was reflected by the Paramilitary leadership, who publicized their intention to talk to the government after Uri.he's August 2002 inauguration and declared a unilateral ceasefire.141
Law 782 and Decree 128
In December of that year, the Congress approved Uribe-endorsed Law 782 - which extended Law 418 of 1997 and law 548 of 1999. Article 3 of Law 782 proclaims that the
139 "Colombia: Negotiating with the Paramilitaries," International Crisis Group (September 16, 2003), 21.
140 General Mario Correa, interview by author, Washington, DC, February 1, 2008. Note: The interview was conducted in Spanish and the translation was done by the author.
141 "Executive Summary of the Report on the Demobilization Process in Colombia," Inter-American Commission on Human Rights - The Organization of American States, http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colombia04eng/summary.htm (accessed on January 29, 2008). 65
National Government has the authority to delineate a temporary neutral zone for the members of illegal armed groups who enter into dialogue, negotiations, or accords with the government. These zones may be within the national borders or on international territory, depending on the circumstances.142 Moreover, under this law and Decree 128, individual deserters who demobilized were guaranteed that if they did not have any outstanding warrants for their arrest for serious crimes against humanity, would automatically enter remsertlon. . sc h emes andb e granted amnesty. 143·
"Exploratory Phase"
President Uribe formed an exploratory commission headed by the government's chief negotiator, Luis Carlos Restrepo. The other members of the commission were Gilberto
Alzate, Ricardo Avellaneda, Jorge Castano, Eduardo Espinosa, Carlos Franco, and Juan
Perez. All of these individuals - except Carlos Franco who was a demobilized EPL combatant and head of the human rights program for the Vice President - had never previously been involved in negotiations with illegal armed groups. During the first months of 2003, the commission members, congressmen, and Catholic Church representatives held talks with various AUC leaders. The central goal was to reduce the overall level of crime in the country through demobilizing the Paramilitary units. The government said that any
142 "Resoluci6n No. 091 de 2004," Alto Comisionado para la Paz, January 31, 2006, http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co /hechos_paz/ junio_15 _ 04.htm (accessed January 6, 2008).
143 "Paramilitary Talks (5): Justice, victims' rights and accountability," Plan Colombia and Beyond, December 7, 2004, http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/blog/archives/000031.htm (accessed December 29, 2007). 66
negotiations resulting from these preliminary talks would not legalize the AUC though incorporating them into other armed or security forces. Still, they recognized that any negotiation with an armed group requires a certain level of generosity.144 Minister of the
Interior and Justice Fernando Lodoiio had gone further than this in January 2003 when he declared in a newspaper interview that "any peace process brings with it impunity."145
In March of 2003, following growing divides within the upper ranks of the AUC, the
Paramilitaries and the Colombian government put forth a joint communique stating their intent to go forth with negotiations and to better the AUC's implementation of the ceasefire.
Even though this declaration did not reveal many details, it did issue a call to the international community and Colombian organizations to support the talks, thus alluding to a formalization of the peace process.146
On June 25, 2003, the exploratory commission submitted ten broad points of recommendation to the Colombian govemment:147
1. The peace process should be continued with the overall goal of demobilization and
reincorporation to civil life of the AUC. It is further recommended that all parties
convene at one table of national peace.
144 "Colombia: Negotiating with the Paramilitaries," International Crisis Group, (September 16, 2003), 21.
145 El Tiempo,January 12, 2003, 1/3.
146 ''Negotiating with the Paramilitaries," 21-22.
147 "Comunicado de la Comisi6n Exploratoria," Presidencia de la Republica, June 25, 2003, http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/sne/2003/junio/25/19252003.htm (accessed November 30, 2007). 67
2. The maintenance and verification of the ceasefire should be a precondition put forth
by the government for continuing with the peace process.
3. The AUC should stop with all illegal activities including the cocaine trade, theft of
gasoline, extortion, and kidnapping.
4. A mechanism should be developed to concentrate the Paramilitaries as a way to
guarantee the next stage of the process.
5. Apply and prioritize the development of the Politics of Integral Security in the zones
of influence of the Paramilitaries.
6. Define and finalize judicial alternatives that will make progress towards a peace
accord.
7. Solicit the Catholic Church to continue serving as a facilitator and witness to the
peace process.
8. Solicit international oversight and accompaniment in order make the seriousness of
the process evident and to follow through on the compromises made by all parties
involved.
9. Develop the Reincorporation Program of the National Government in accordance
with the profile of the members of the AUC and list the necessary resources.
10. Design and apply a "State Politics" to deal with self-defense groups, with the goal of
avoiding the perpetuation and resurgence of this phenomenon in Colombia. 68
The Santa Fe de Ralito Accord (Ralito I)
The seven months of exploratory talks and the ten points put forth by the commission led to Ralito I. On July 15, 2003, the national government of Colombia and the
Paramilitaries signed an accord at Santa Fe de Ralito - marking the beginning of the demobilization process of the AUC. This accord was overseen by the Catholic Church and was signed by Carlos Restrepo - on the part of the Colombian government, and by Heman
Hernandez Ramiro Vaoy, Luis Cifuentes Francisco Tabares, Adolfo Paz Jorge Pirata,
Vicente Castano, Carlos Castano, and Salvatore Mancuso - on the part of the Paramilitaries.
The agreement was made in the effort of strengthening the Colombian State and returning
"the monopoly of force to the hands of the State."148 This meeting was significant because it resulted in the Paramilitaries agreeing to begin the demobilization all of their forces at the end of 2003, with the process to be completed no later than December 31, 2005.149
In the accord, the AUC accepted the final recommendations of the Exploratory
Commission, acknowledging that they are a means to move towards a peace between the organization and the Colombian government. The Paramilitaries further agreed to make
148 "Acuerdo de Santa Fe de Ralito para contribuir a la paz de Colombia.," Alto Comisionado para la Paz, July 15, 2003, http:/ /www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/ acuerdos/ acuerdos_t/jul_15_03.htm (accessed December 2, 2007).
149 "Informe trimestral de Secretario General sobre la Misi6n para Apoyar el proceso de paz en Colombia," Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos (May 11, 2004), 3. 69
progress in the reintegration of its combatants back into civilian life. The AUC also agreed to a unilateral ceasefire as a show of good faith and to support a Colombia without narcotics.150
In return, the Colombian government declared that it would take the necessary steps to help reincorporate the Paramilitaries back into civilian life. Both parties created the terms to have the AUC combatants be concentrated, for a time, in certain previously agreed upon areas in order to guarantee their security during the disarmament and demobilization processes. Moreover, these security zones would be open to AUC members of all ranks and would be protected by the National Police.151 The government also agreed to petition the support of the national and international community for this DDR process.152
Uribe's "Alternative Punishments" Bills
On August 21, 2003, Alvaro Uribe submitted an "alternative punishments" bill153 to the
Colombian Congress proposing that instead of prison time for the AUC members convicted of crimes, the Paramilitaries should be allowed to pay fines. The legislation would also have empowered President Uribe to decide which members of the AUC who have committed crimes and atrocities would qualify for a reduced or suspended prison sentence. In return for this leniency, the AUC combatant would have to agree to stay in Colombia, not run for
150 "Acuerdo de Santa Fe."
151 Manual btisico para el desempeiio de las funciones de la mision, Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos, 10.
152 "Acuerdo de Santa Fe."
153 "Paramilitary Talks (5)." 70
public office, and pay money or transfer assets to the victims. This proposed law was met with national and international suspicion because it offered a great level of impunity without any provisions for impartial investigations or any mechanisms to have the victims of
Paramilitary violence appeal the President's decisions.154
Due to this criticism, a revised, more stringent bill was presented to Congress in April of
2004. This legislation would call for a minimum prison term of five to ten years for atrocities committed by AUC combatants, with time spent on designated concentration zones counting as a part of the prison sentence.155 Neither the bill introduced in August 2003 nor the one put forth in April 2004 came to a vote in Congress. The government said that declared that further revisions would be presented at the Cartagena Meeting on International
Support for Colombia on February 3-4, 2005.156
AUC and Central Bolivar Bloc (BCB) Accord
On March 31, 2004, the Paramilitaries and the BCB -which does not form part of the
AUC umbrella organization, signed an accord that established a single negotiating committee for the two parties. The committee was comprised of ten Paramilitary leaders - consisting of
Salvatore Mancuso, Vicente Castano, Adolfo Paz, Javier Montanez, Julian Bolivar,
154 "Colombia's Checkbook Impunity," Human Rights Watch, September 22, 2003 http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/checkbook-impunity.pdf (accessed November 14, 2007), 1-2.
155 "Colombia: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service: The Library of Congress, January 19, 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32250.pdf (accessed December 20, 2007), 8.
156 "Peace - or 'Paramilitarization'?," The Center for International Policy, July 2005 http:/ /www.ciponline.org/ colombia/0507ipr.pdf (accessed October 12, 2007). 71
Hernandez Hernandez, Jorge Cuarenta, Miguel Arroyave, Ramiro Vanoy, and Ernesto
Baez.157
Ralito II
On May 15, 2004, the High Commission for Peace - the Colombian Government - and the Paramilitary leadership met once again in Santa Fe de Rialto to sign an accord, this time with the accompaniment of the Catholic Church, and the Mision de Apqyo al Proceso de Paz en
Colombia (MAPP-OBA - the Organization of American State's Mission of Support for the
Peace Process in Colombia), represented by the head of the mission - Sergio Caramanga.
The accord established the Zona de Ubicacion (ZDU - Centralization Area), a 370-square kilometer piece of land where 400 AUC combatants and their ten-person negotiation team would be assembled. Law 782/02, which proclaims that leaders of illegal armed groups that are negotiating cannot be captured while they remain within a delineated geographical area, was immediately put into practice.158
Although the ZDU allocated for the Paramilitaries was greatly smaller than the Zona de
Despqe (ZDD - Demilitarized Zone) that President Pastrana offered to the F ARC, its function is similar. The ZDU, located in Tierralta in the department of Cordoba, was to create an area where further negotiations between the two parties would take place.
157 "Demobilizing the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?," International Crisis Group, Latin America Report, no. 8 (August 5, 2004): 2.
158 "Segundo informe trimestral del Secretario General sobre la Misi6n para Apoyar el Proceso de Paz." Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos (September 28, 2004), 7. 72
Moreover, it was established as a means of providing protection to the AUC members involved in talks, as well as to have them concentrated in a place that could be monitored closely by the Colombian government and the MAPP-OEA.159 Still, no new deadlines were created, so many viewed Ralito II as a step back from the progress made in Ralito I.
The Pardo "Truth, Justice, and Reparations" Bill
By the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005, there was mounting resistance to the
"alternative punishments" bills put forth by the Uribe administration. This coalition of opposition included various human rights groups as well as Colombian politicians. The effort was spearheaded by former defense minister, and ally of President Uribe, Senator
Rafael Pardo.160 It was also supported by Senator Wilson Borja, a leftist politician who the
Paramilitaries attempted to assassinate in 2000.161
Pardo's proposed legislation called for a maximum prison sentence of ten years for any
AUC combatant convicted of committing atrocities. The maximum sentence, according to
Colombian judicial law is forty years.162 The 25-page proposed legislation would also create various special units to oversee the demobilizations, like a Prosecutor for Truth, Justice, and
Reparations. A National Reparations Council would be created to maintain a fund for
159 ''Demobilizing the Paramilitaries," 2-3.
160 "Peace - or 'Paramilitarization'?," 2.
161 "Paramilitary Talks (5)."
162 Juan Forero, "Colombia Proposes 10-Year Terms for Paramilitary Atrocities," The New York Times, November 16, 2004. 73
victims' compensation, with money coming from fines charged to AUC combatants. In addition, the bill would guarantee that victims would have a right to the truth and to know what happened through a public archive of all cases maintained by the government. The proposed legislation would also make a real effort to dismantle AUC structures by obligating demobilized Paramilitaries to provide thorough accounts of the organization, what they had stolen, and their knowledge of the AUC's financial and command structures. If they did not comply, they could be transferred to the regular criminal justice system, thereby facing much stricter sentencing. Like the Uribe bills, Pardo's would grant amnesty to those demobilizing
Paramilitaries who had not committed crimes against humanity.163 The proposed law, however, remained silent on the central issue of the possible extradition of Paramilitaries to the US to be tried for drug charges.164
The AUC responded vocally to Pardo's bill. The Central Bolivar Bloc issued a statement threatening Wilson Borja and declaring that the proposed legislation was nothing more than
"a series of mortal traps set against peace" and one that "no organization outside the law would allow itself to fall."165 The Pardo bill was defeated by President Uribe, Luis Carlos
Restrepo, and other congressional supporters.166 They reintroduced another bill - modifying those put forth in 2003 and 2004 - with one that incorporated shades of Pardo's bill, but still
163 "Paramilitary Talks (5)."
164 Forero, "Colombia Proposes 10-Year Terms."
165 "Paramilitary Talks (5)."
166 "Peace - or 'Paramilitarization'?," 2. 74
allowed a level of greater impunity and focusing more on individual demobilizations instead of the collective ones in Pardo's bill.
The "Justice and Peace" Law
On July 25, 2005, the Colombian Congress adopted Law 975, more commonly referred to as the Justice and Peace Law. Article I of the 35-page law states that the objective of the law is to facilitate the process of peace and the individual or collective reincorporation members of illegal armed groups, while guaranteeing the rights of the victims to the truth, justice, and reparation. The Law calls for maximum prison sentences of five to eight years for demobilized Paramilitaries - including those that were found guilty of committing atrocities like massacres. Moreover, it allows the two years that AUC commanders spent on ranches while negotiating the demobilization to count as part of their prison sentence.
Paramilitary leaders convicted of committing crimes against humanity would only have to serve a twenty-two months sentence, most of which can be served at a ranch facility. 167
The law, in addition to Law 782, forms the judicial framework for the Paramilitary demobilization. Still, it has been met with international resistance by the United Nations,
NGO's, lawyers, and governments. The United Nations High Commissioner on Human
Rights issued a press release stating that the Justice and Peace Law does not succeed in creating a comprehensive legal framework for the Paramilitary demobilization in Colombia
167 "Ley 975 de 2005." Alto Comisionado para la Paz. July 25, 2005 http:/ /www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/justicia_paz/ docwnentos/Ley1_975.pdf (accessed December 13, 2007). 75
that reintegrates combatants, respects the rights to truth, and offers sufficient reparations to the victims.168
The Demobilizations Halt
In October 2005, the AUC demobilizations - that were being carried forth bloc by bloc
- came to a halt. Diego Fernando Murillo, one of the Paramilitaries top commanders, was transferred from house arrest to a high-security prison. This move set off speculation that the Colombian government was preparing to extradite him to the US to face charges of drug trafficking. As a result of this fear, the AUC stopped the DDR process and stated that they would not resume demobilization unless they received a guarantee that their leaders would not be extradited.
Initially, the Colombian government responded aggressively, stating that it would dispatch the army if the AUC did not continue with the process. Following this, however, talks were restarted between the Paramilitaries and the government in an effort to break the deadlock. The Colombian government consented to reexamine the conditions of the jails where AUC commanders would likely be held. Following this interruption, the Paramilitaries agreed to continue disarming. Due to this complication, Pretelt announced that the original
168 "The regulations regarding the ''Justice and Peace Law' do not adequately ensure due respect for the rights of victims," The High Commission on Human Rights -The United Nations, January 4, 2006, http:/ /www.hchr.org.co/ publico/comunicados/2006/ cp0601EN.pdf (accessed December 19, 2007). 76
December 31, 2005 deadline for the completion of AUC demobilizations would have to be extended. A new deadline date was not announced.169
Table 2: Dialogue to DDR in Colombia
Pre-1992: secret talks The Pastrana government, Carlos Castano, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and conservative politicians from Cordoba held secret talks whose details remain unknown 2002: presidential campaign Uribe announced that he would be willing to negotiate with any illegal armed group if they would demobilize August 2002: unilateral ceasefire The AUC announce their intention to negotiate and declare a unilateral ceasefire December 2002: Law 782 The law states that the government can delineate a security zone for demobilizing armed groups; individual combatants who demobilize and don't have an outstanding warrant for arrest will be given amnesty and will enter reinsertion programs January-July 2003: "Exploratory phase" President Uribe formed an exploratory commission headed by chief government negotiator, Luis Carlos Restrepo; the Commission - along with the Catholic Church and congressman - held talks with the AUC; the Commission submitted 10 recommendations to the Colombian government July 15, 2003: Ralito I Marked the beginning of the DDR process of the Paramilitaries; goal was to strengthen the State's power; AUC agreed to begin demobilizing by the end of 2003 and to complete the process by December 31, 2005 August 21, 2003 and April 2004: "Alternative Punishments" bills Bills proposed by Uribe that called first for no prison time for AUC combatants, then a minimum of 5 years and the right for the President to decide who deserves a lenient sentence; never came to a vote in Congress March 31, 2004: AUC and Central Bolivar Bloc (CBC) accord Accord which allowed created a single negotiation team for the AUC and the CBC May 15, 2004: Ralito II The government, the Church, the MAPP-OEA, and the AUC met to negotiate the terms for the Zona de Ubicaoitfn
169 "AUC milita 'reswnes disarmament,"' BBC News, November 17, 2005. 77
Table 2: Continued
End of2004-Beginning of2005: Pardo "Truth, Justice, and Reparations" bill Pardo's counter-bill in response to Uribe's "Alternative Punishments" bills; maximum prison sentence of 10 years, the rii.!ht to know the truth for the victims, and stricter terms for the AUC July 25, 2005: The "Justice and Peace" law The Uribe-endorsed bill passed by Congress that has become the legal framework for AUC demobilizations; maximum prison sentence of 8 years; has been met with international criticism CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS OF THE DDR PROGRAMS
DDR: Stage by Stage Comparison
Disarmament
Disarmament marks the beginning of any DDR process. It is an important stage because it is the spark that can propel the peace process forward, or it can bring it to a halt. As
Joanna Spear writes, there are two main types of disarmament in any given peace process: cooperative and coercive. Cooperative disarmament occurs in settlements and negotiations where there is no clear winner in the conflict. 'Ibis was the case in El Salvador where there was a mutual stalemate between the insurgent group - Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion
Nacionaf (FMLN) - and the national Armed Forces.170 The second kind - coercive disarmament - happens in a situation where there is a clear victor or when disarmament is implemented by outside forces.171 'Ibis can be seen in the demobilization that happened in
Nicaragua, where outside forces - namely the UN and the Organization of American States
(OAS) - demobilized the counter-insurgent Contra forces.
Comprehensive disarmament can help quell the mistrust that exists between warring parties, allowing there to be a space for negotiations to happen. Still, it is important to bear
170 Charles T. Call, "El Salvador's Transition from Civil War to Peace," in Ending Civil Wars, eds. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M., Cousens (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 387.
171 Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," 142. 78 79
in mind that disarmament is never one-hundred percent. This is so because in the complicated and often fragile environment of a peace process, lingering on absolutes such as expecting full disarmament of armed structures is inefficient. It is impossible to expect that all combatants involved in a DDR process will hand over each and every weapon because
"disarmament is often ad hoc, with many weapons remaining in circulation."172
It is even unrealistic, according to a high-ranking OAS official, to expect that every combatant will turn in a single weapon. In fact, it is standard in most DDR processes that the ratio of combatants to weapons turned in is about two to one.173 That is, it is average to collect half as many weapons as there are combatants involved in a DDR process. Still, it should be noted that some cases of disarmament did achieve levels much higher ratios of weapons collected per combatant. An illustrative case is that of El Salvador. For the 11,000
FMLN combatants that entered into the DDR program in 1992, 10,200 weapons were collected - a weapons-to-insurgents ratio of 0. 93. In the case of Burundi from 2004 to 2006, the ratio was even higher-1.2.174
In spite of these cases of a high number of arms collected in comparison to insurgents, the majority of DDR programs average a ratio of 0.5 or below. For instance, the disarmament in Mozambique resulted in a weapons-to-combatants ratio of 0.58 in 1996.
Angola fared worse between 2002 and 2006 with a ratio of 0.34. The disarmament processes
172 Anderlini, ''Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating," 98.
173 Anonymous OAS official, interview by author, Washington, DC, November 14, 2007. Note: Every interviewee was given the option to remain anonymous.
174 Albert Carames, Vicen<; Fisas and Eneko Sanz, "Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs existing in the world 2006," Barcelona Autonomous University's Peace Culture School (March 2007), 30. 80
in Indonesia and Liberia in 2005 had a 0.28 ratio of arms-to-insurgents. So, in the majority of
DDR cases in recent history, there have been far fewer weapons collected than combatants taking part in the processes. Although collecting only half as many weapons as combatants may seem like incomprehensive disarmament, it is considered to be quite ample because this stage sets the momentum for the entire DDR program. Following an initial collection of weapons, governments tend to leave the door open for ex-combatants to continue handing over their weapons in exchange for social or economic incentives like employment, micro-
. 175 ere di ts, or e d ucatlon.
Still, it is important that disarmament be comprehensive. Comprehensiveness in disarmament cannot be spared for the sake of moving a process along quickly. As disarmament is the foundation for a DDR process, a faulty beginning will likely lead to a less-than-satisfactory overall outcome. As such, a satisfactory number of weapons must be collected, stored and destroyed. It is bad practice for the implementers of the disarmament stage to ignore shortcoming in the collection of weapons in the hopes that the ensuing phases of demobilization and reintegration will cover up the weaknesses. The stages must give strengths to one another, not pass on weaknesses.
Disarmament: Nicaragua and Colombia
The Contra! weapons-per-person ratio was 0.8, considerably greater than the average 1 :2 ratio. For the 22,373 RN members that had demobilized by July 6, 1990 - the official end of
175 Carames, Fisas and Sanz. "Analysis ofDDR Programs,"30-31. 81
176 177 the demobilization process - ONUCA had collected 17,833 weapons. In the case of
Colombia, the disarmament ratio was just about one weapon turned in for every two
combatants.178 The 30,915 AUC members that had demobilized by the summer of 2006
handed in 17 ,540 weapons.179
Table 3: Weapons-to-insurgents ratio
# of demobilized #of weapons Weapons-to-insurgent insurgents collected ratio Nicaragua 22,373 17,833 0.80
Colombia 30,915 17,540 0.57
In both cases, a variety of arms and weapons were turned in by the counterinsurgency
forces. In Nicaragua, the overwhelming majority of arms were small caliber. In Colombia,
seventy-six percent of the AUC weapons collected were long arms, seventeen percent were
short arms, and the rest were support weapons. Because the minimum average of about two- to-one was achieved, the disarmament phase of the DDR processes of the Contras and the
176 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 372.
177 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis,.La Comisitin Internacional, 65.
178 According to a personal interview with an anonymous OAS official, there was a bit less than one weapon turned in for every two Paramilitaries. "Analysis of the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) Programs Existing in the World During 2006" reports that the ratio was about 0.57 - that is a bit more than a 1:2 weapon-to-combatant ratio.
179 "Septimo informe trimestral de Secretario General sobre la Misi6n para Apoyar el proceso de paz en Colombia," Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos (August 30, 2006), 16. 82
Paramilitaries was considered to be enough of a success to move forward with the remainder of the DDR processes.
Still, the overall averages of disarmament and weapons collected neatly masked many underlying problems that both countries faced. An enormous challenge in the disarmament stage is what is done with the weapons collected. In the majority of cases of DDR, "there exists a certain lack of control and poor monitoring of the final destination of the weapons collected, with the consequent risk of them being diverted towards illegal markets."180
In Nicaragua, ONUCA destroyed the weapons collected from the Contras quickly after they were turned. The ONUCA had the capacity to destroy 400 weapons per day on site in each security zone where demobilizations of the Contras took place. The number of arms destroyed per site varied considerably and the amount also fluctuated by month. At the end of April, for instance, no arms were destroyed, while in the middle ofJune an average of
1500 weapons were destroyed per day.181
A few months after disarmament, though, it became apparent that many more RN combatants than had been thought had not turned in their weapons and had kept stockpiles of arms in the mountains.182 Checking inventories can help curb this issue, an essential step to DDR that was not taken in Nicaragua.183 Moreover, following the collection and
18°Carames, Fisas and Sanz. "Analysis of DDR Programs," 30.
181 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 66-67.
182 Alejandro Bedaiia, Demobilization and &integration in Central America: Peace-Building Challenges and "Responses Q'vianagua, Nicaragua: Centro de Estudios Intemacionales, 1999), 43.
183 Denise Spencer, ''Demobilization and Reintegration in Central America," Bonn International Center for Conversion, February 1997, http:/ /www.bicc.de/publications/papers/paper08/paper8.pdf (accessed December 6, 2007), 62-63. 83
destruction of this weaponry, the ONUCA's mandate ran out and the CIAV took over.184
1bis transition from one organization to another, in a sense, distanced the disarmament
process from the rest of the demobilization and reintegration process in Nicaragua.
In Colombia, the destination of the weapons collected from the AUC was even more
uncertain. Nearly three years after the first disarmaments in the DDR process took place no
weapons had yet been destroyed, leaving large amounts of stockpiled arms accessible. The
MAPP-OEA stated its apprehension about this situation in its seventh report on the DDR
process in Colombia, declaring that the "el tema de la destroccion de armas, la cual nose ha iniciado,
continua siendo de preocupacion en la agenda de vetificacion de la Mision" (the theme of the destruction
of arms, which has not yet started, continues to be a concern in the verification agenda of
the Miss1on. . ) 185
There were even greater setbacks in the disarmament of the AUC in Colombia. Some
Paramilitary blocs fell well below the national average - and the average that is understood
to be ample in disarmament stages of DDR. In the Northern Bloc (La Mesa), for instance,
the ratio was 0.32. In the Northern Bloc (Chimila), the weapon-to-combatant ratio was just
0.28. The Ortega Self-Defense Forces fared even worse, with a ratio of 0.27 percent. The
worst level of disarmament was reported by the Tolima Bloc, with just a 0.24 ratio -
meaning that about one weapon was turned in for every four Paramilitary combatants.186
These ratios, along with other Paramilitary blocs, make the national average of weapons-to-
184 Hartzell, "Peace in Stages," 371-2.
l85 "Septimo Informe," 5. Please note that the report is written in Spanish and the translation was done by the author.
186 "Septimo Informe," 5. 84
combatant ratio - reported by both the Colombian government and international organizations, like the OAS - questionable.
Figure 1: AUC blocs with weapons-to-combatant ratio less than national average
Tolima Bloc
Self-Defense Forces
Northern Bloc (Chimila)
Northern Bloc (La Mesa)
AUC National Average
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Source: "Septimo infonne trimestral de Secretario General sabre la Misi6n para Apoyar el proceso de paz en Colombia," Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos (August 30, 2006).
These numbers were worrisome because the AUC of Colombia was always a very well- coordinated paramilitary group - with a vast pool of resources stemming from the booming narcotics trade. Still, the OAS - which has been charged with the verification of the DDR process in Colombia - says that the disannament record in the most recent disarmament process in the country has been sufficient enough to move forward with the remainder of
DDR. One OAS official relates that the AUC claim that they lived by the slogan that 85
"combatants leave, the weapon never sleeps," meaning that the Paramilitaries had more
combatants than guns and that when one individual was not using a weapon, he or she
passed it on. Moreover, not all AUC members were reported to be active combatants, thus
not requiring a weapon of their own.187 In the case of the Paramilitaries and the Contras, both
groups had large networks of support that included various unarmed personnel.
In the end, "18,000 weapons are 18,000 weapons turned in. That is good in itself." Still,
"no one would argue that all the weapons have been turned in."188 Still, there have been
opposing reports by victims groups and civil society organizations. For instance, Ivan
Cepeda - the Executive Director of Movimiento Nacionaf de Victimas de Crimenes de Estado en
Colombia, a Colombian victim's rights organization - states that "Los paramifitaros han escondido
annal' - that "the paramilitaries have hidden arms" and that they have not been honest in
the disarmament part of DDR. Because of these serious deficiencies in disarmament, Cepeda
is convinced that the overall DDR process is not sincere. In fact, he believes that "fos paramifitaros tienen una dobfe-agendd' ("the Paramilitaries have a double-agenda").189
Others share in this skepticism because the Paras are a very well funded organization,
backed by the millions earned in the cocaine trade. This wealth allows them to be equipped
far better than other insurgent forces. Add to this the running speculation that the billions of
dollars given to the Colombian army by the US have been partially funneled into arming
Paramilitary units. The Defensoria def Pueblo (Colombia's Public Advocate) reported that
l87 Anonymous OAS official, interview.
188Virginia Bouvier, interview by author, Washington, DC, November 27, 2007.
189 Iv:in Cepeda, interview by author, phone call to Bogota, Colombia, November 6, 2007. Please note that the interview was conducted in Spanish and that the translation to English was done by the author. 86
between January and September 2004 - early on in the Paramilitary DDR process - it had received about 350 complaints that the Paras had breached the cease-fire and had used weapons to perpetrate massacres, kidnappings, and selective homicides. Colombian NGO's, like the Comision Colombiano de Juristas (CCJ - Colombian Commission of Jurists) says these numbers of armed attacks by the Paramilitaries over the first eight months of 2004 were even higher.190 Reports like this lend credence to Cepeda's uncertainty about the validity of the disarmament phase.
In both the case of Nicaragua and Colombia, as it is always the case in DDR schemes, the goal is to finish each step as quickly as possible. Still, rushing through disarmament to get to the next phases can prove to be costly. "The pervasiveness of small arms and light weapons, portable and easy to hide, often dismantled and assembled in a matter of minutes, makes disarmament" difficult to implement.191 In situations like post-conflict Nicaragua and current-day Colombia, weapons are readily available. In societies where security is such a concern "even granny has a gun ... granny has two guns."192 Insecurity was a constant fear for the demobilizing Contras and the Paramilitaries. So, as could have been expected in either case, combatants turned in lesser and poorer weapons than they actually had. In any case, there is a great risk with leaving these weapons in the hands of ex-combatants because they may tum out to be instruments of hostility, creating further instability in the future.
190 ''The Paramilitary Demobilization Process to Date," Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/colombia0105/2.htm (accessed November 29, 2007).
191 Anderlini, "Disarming, Demobilizing, and Reintegrating," 98.
192 Ball, interview. 87
Demobilization
Disarmament and demobilization are often viewed as the same process. Both elements require a level of commitment by the combatants undergoing DDR. Both stages also require that the implementers verify progress, as well as problems, closely and thoroughly. Though related, it is important to understand that each phase is distinct and the two should not be lumped into one entity. Demobilization depends on disarmament. As such, comprehensive disarmament must precede demobilization; conversely, it may run parallel to the demobilization process. Disarmament, however, cannot follow demobilization.
There are many factors that, together, make demobilization comprehensive. First, and most important, demobilization can only be substantive and successful "si ht!Ja la voluntad de desmovilizarse", that is, "if there is the will to demobilize."193 This means that the parties undergoing the process must be committed to it. Demobilization, much like the rest of
DDR and peace negotiations, depends on a certain level of trust and confidence in order to progress forward. Without this sincere and genuine commitment to demobilize, the entire
DDR program - and whatever peace process there may be -will be negated.
Second, it is important that demobilization address the possibility of what Joanna Spear refers to as a type of a security dilemma from operating. It should be expected that ex- combatants will fear that armed conflict could reignite and they will be left unprotected should the opposition choose to strike. The positioning of quartering cites is central to
193 Cepeda, interview. Please note that the interview was conducted in Spanish and that the translation to English was done by the author. 88
this.194 One way to lessen this insecurity, as mentioned above, is to create some sort of confidence through the prior stage of comprehensive disarmament. By eliminating weapons and thus lessening the threat of a return to violent conflict, it is more likely that all the parties involved will be more willing to move forward. So, despite the fact that
"demobilization plays a far greater role in ensuring successful peace implementation" than does disarmament, the latter relies heavily on the comprehensive execution of the former.195
Demobilization: Nicaragua and Colombia
In contrast to other cases of DDR in Latin America - like the FMLN in El Salvador - the Contras did not demobilize slowly, in phases as government promises were met. Instead, the RN demobilized all together and rapidly. This can be attributed to many factors. First, the Nicaraguan government and the RN were under a lot of international pressure to demobilize quickly. Also, the Contras were rather confident that about the terms that were negotiated upon with the Chamorro government. Due to this, the CIAV was overwhelmed with the process of having to oversee the demobilization of 22, 413 Contra members in a period of less than five months - between April 25 and the end of September 1990.196
194 Spear, "Disarmament and Demobilization," 146.
195 Spear, ''Disarmament and Demobilization," 141.
196 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 41, 108, 75. 89
Table 4: Contra demobilizations
Time period Number demobilized Percent of total April 25 - May 30 3,271 14.55 June 15,257 68.10 July 1 - end of September 3,885 17.33 Total 22413 99.98
Source-. Hector A. Vanolli, Arturo Wallace, and Diogenes H. Ruis, eds, La Comision Internacional de Apqyo y Venficacion: La Desmovilizacion y Reinsercion de la Resistencia Nicaragiiense (Washington, DC: Organization of American States, 1998), 197.
Unlike the quick demobilization that occurred in Nicaragua, the Paramilitaries took a
couple of years to demobilize all of their forces. 1his slower pace of demobilization can be
linked to the sheer size of the AUC compared to the RN, and the size of Colombia
compared to that of Nicaragua. Moreover, Chamorro could control the leftist enemy of the
Contras because many of them remained part of her government. 1his is not the case in
Colombia. The F ARC and the ELN remain to be strong entities outside of the state's
control. So, the Colombian government cannot control the AUC's enemies in the way that
Chamorro could, leaving the Paras in a state of insecurity. In addition, the Paramilitaries
continue to face the possibility that top leaders could be extradited to the US for narcotics
trade charges.
Despite its slower pace, the demobilizations of the AUC in Colombia took place in grand fashion, with combatants joining en masse in football stadiums and arenas.
Paramilitary blocs demobilized bloc by bloc between 2001 and 2005, with many more individually demobilizing between August of 2002 and September of 2007. Over these years, 90
an approximate 45,300 people demobilized - 31,671 of which were products of the
negotiations with the Uribe government.197
Table 5: AUC Demobilizations
Year Collective Individual Total 2002 1000 700 1700 2003 2600 2500 5100 2004 10,400 3000 13,400 2005 17,600 2600 20,200 2006 ----- 2500 2500 2007 ----- 2400 2400 Total (approximate) 31,600 13,700 45,300
Source: Li Estrategia de &integracirJn: Un &to que &quiere la ParticipacirJn de Todos, Alta Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n, 2.
In both Nicaragua and Colombia, the demobilization took place in security zones
delineated by prior accords and agreements. The Chamorro government provided the
Contras with an initial seven zonas de seguridad (security zones) under the April 18 Ceasefire
accords. An additional zone was previously defined for the Frente Sur (Southern Front) of the
RN. Each numbered zone was surrounded by a zona demilitarizada (demilitarized zone) of 20
kilometers. This area was off limits to armed actors of any type - like the military and the
police- and was put under sole control of the ONUCA.198 Like the Chamorro government,
the Uribe government granted the Paramilitaries with a Zona de Ubicacion, also surrounded by
197 La Estrategia de Reintegracion: Un Reto que Requiere la Participacion de Todos, Alta Consejeria para la Reintegraci6n, 2.
198 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 63. 91
a demilitarized zone. Unlike Nicaragua, the government granted only one demilitarized area to the AUC and it was primarily for the leaders of the Paras. 199
An important part of the demobilization phase is an initial economic package that is given to the combatants. In Nicaragua, under the Managua Protocol, the Chamorro government promised a onetime cash payment for each demobilized Contra member. Every ex-Contra was accorded fifty US dollars, which the CIAV distributed through cash payments made by the Nicaraguan Development Banks throughout the country.200 The initial economic package for the demobilized AUC combatants was 155 US dollars per month for a year and a half.201 Once this initial time period of economic assistance expires, it will be interesting to see whether or not the majority of Paramilitaries remain disarmed and demobilized, or whether they revert back to crime and violence. Therefore, although the numbers of AUC members who took part in the ceremonies was grand, the true impact of the demobilization has yet to be seen.
A formal demobilization ceremony is not the end of this phase of DDR. In fact, the ceremonies are not telling of whether or not a true demobilization is taking place - especially as illustrated in the case of the Paramilitaries. In Colombia, there are allegations that certain
AUC leaders orchestrated a plan in which they paid local peasants to play the part of combatants in the demobilization ceremonies. A twenty-nine page investigative report by the
Colombian Attorney General's Office documents many alarming facts that authorities
199 "Segundo Infonne," 12.
200 Arocena, The International Commission, 31.
201 Carames, Fisas and Sanz. "Analysis of DDR Programs," 32. 92
learned when the leader of the Northern Block, Rodrigo Tovar Pupa's (alias "Jorge 40'') laptop was confiscated. Tovar kept detailed accounts of the fact that he recruited local peasants to play Paramilitary fighters during the demobilization process. Tbis was done through a special bank account that was created in order to give money to unemployed peasants - "the more the better." According to the report, Tovar took great care in preparing the peasants for the demobilization day so that they knew "how to march, sing the hymn [of the AUC] and respond to prosecutors' questions." Meanwhile, Tovar gave orders for some of his actual fighters to retain their arms and guard ''vulnerable zones."202 It should be noted that as of now, Jorge 40 has not received punishment for these deceptive demobilization tactics.
Fraudulent activities such as this during the demobilization phase help account for the fact that prior to the DDR phase the AUC had a reported 16,000 to 18,000 members, yet after the first two phases ofDDR were over, more than 30,000 individuals had demobilized.
It is likely that many local peasants did accept the offers of Paramilitary leaders like Tovar to participate in demobilization in order to earn a significant amount of money quickly and be uplifted from poverty. Tbis "funny math" may also be attributed to allegations that some drug traffickers took part in the demobilization ceremonies in order to avoid being prosecuted for their crimes, which would hold heavier sentences.203
202 Juan Forero, "In Colombia, a Dubious Disarmament," The Washington Post, October 17, 2006.
203 Bouvier, interview. 93
Reintegration
There seems to be an understanding that successful reintegration of ex-combatants back into civil society is the ultimate goal to DDR. For instance, the General Secretariat of the
OAS emphasizes that the successfulness of the peace process in Colombia depends heavily on the "effective reintegration of demobilized combatants."204 Moreover, reintegration is viewed as a means to initiate a true transition from war to peace. Although this is true, it is important to recognize that disarmament and demobilization cannot be disregarded to move hastily towards reintegration. Without the firm foundation of a comprehensive disarmament and demobilization, reintegration will be fruitless. So, it is important to have weapons surrendered and the command and control structures of illegal groups broken before phasing ex-combatants back into civilian life.
The reintegration phase is essentially the reintroduction of ex-combatants back into civil society once they have completed the disarmament and demobilization phases. There is growing debate as to whether this stage should be short-term -which is often referred to as reinsertion - or whether it should be stretched into a long-term process. This third phase of
DDR can then range from providing basic needs and transportation of the ex-combatants back into their communities, to providing them with "sustainable means for living."205
Whichever definition is decided upon, reintegration is the most complicated phase of
DDR essentially because it relies on the comprehensive completion of the previous two
204 "Septimo Informe," 4. The General Secretariat also points to the importance of victims' rights, as well as land issues.
205 Carames, Fisas and Sanz. "Analysis of DDR Programs," 33. 94
phases. Conversely stated, "If reintegration fails, the achievements of the disarmament and demobilization phase are undermined, instability increases, and sustainable reconstruction and development are put at risk."206 In addition, reintegration requires the most resources in order to implement and verify because it is often the case that the combatants have been immensely transformed by war and violence and so, have forgotten what it means to be a civilian. Because of this, it is important to have a sound disarmament and demobilization as a firm foundation for the reintegration process.
Reintegration: Nicaragua and Colombia
Reintegration proved to be the most difficult part of the DDR process in Nicaragua, and continues to be the most challenging in Colombia. The reintegration phase of the RN DDR was initiated at the polos de desarrollo (development poles) - an initiative of the Chamorro government proposed in the Managua Protocol negotiations. These poles were meant to be a sort of enclave in a delimited geographical area where the Nicaraguan Government would oversee and implement projects for the demobilized Contras and the nearby communities.
Each development pole was to have a variety of services and structures to aid in the reintegration process, including: schools, clinics, warehouses, housing, water systems, power systems, roads, and areas for agricultural projects.207
Despite these intentions, these development poles proved to be one of the weakest parts of the DDR program. The centers were often located in the middle of demilitarized zones
206 "Social and Economic Reintegration," United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Resource Center. http:/ /www.nnddr.org/iddrs/04/30.php (accessed January 3, 2008).
207 Arocena, The International Commission, 28. 95
on hundreds of kilometers of land that was very difficult to access. As a result, the delivery of food, medicines, and other supplies was often delayed.208 Moreover, many projects implemented by the government left the ex-Contras feeling as though they were gaining very little compared to what the government had promised. For instance, a common project at the various development poles was to have the men build houses. Upon completion of the construction, the wives or other female members of their family would be given money for the services. This lack of compensation became very frustrating for many demobilized combatants.209 Due to all of these deficiencies, the development poles were dubbed
"abandonment zones."210
The DDR program involving the Paramilitaries in Colombia has also been difficult for similar reasons. There have been many negative accounts of the centros de reintegracion
(reintegration centers) created for ex-AUC combatants throughout Colombia. It has been reported that the number of demobilized Paramilitaries do not match up with the number of ex-combatants identified by the Colombian Police during the reintegration process.
Moreover, it is alleged the humanitarian aid allocated for ex-AUC members does not actually go into supporting their socio-economic reintegration back into civil society- perhaps accounting for why some of them are returning to crime.211
208 Bedaiia, Demobilization and Reintegration, 44.
209 Ball, interview.
21° Bedaiia, Demobilization and Reintegration, 44.
211 ''Noveno infonne trimestral de Secretario General sobre la Misi6n para Apoyar el proceso de paz en Colombia," Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos Ouly 3, 2007), 9. 96
As of now, only one municipality - the city of Medellin - has excelled in terms of providing reintegration packages to ex-Paras and ensuring that they fully comply with the concessions that they made. 1bis has happened largely because the Alcaldia de Medellin (the municipal government) has created and implemented their own program targeted at the
"urban-type Paramilitaries" from the area.212 Further strengthening its program, Medellin's municipal government has regularly put one to two percent of its budget into reintegration programs for ex-A UC members.213 What is worrisome is that this case has not been duplicated in any other large city in Colombia; and as for a stand-out case of reintegration of rural Paramilitaries, there simply does not exist even a single example.214
Recognizing that the reintegration stage in Colombia has been faltering, responsibility was transferred from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice to the Alta Consqeria para la
Reintegration (The High Commission for Reintegration), headed by Frank Pearl. According to the OAS, this new system of overseeing the reintegration process has been faring much better, "but it's too soon to tell" what its real impact will be.215 Still, the program is facing many difficulties. The central problems in implementing the reintegration are due to the slowness in strengthening state institutions, the lack of clarity in how to reorganize the program, and a severe deficiency in coordination between the national center and the various
212 Anonymous OAS official, interview.
213 Adam Isacson, interview by author, Washington, DC, February 1, 2008.
21 4 Anonymous OAS official, interview.
2l5 Anonymous OAS official, interview. 97
municipal governments and private sector.216 So, a year and half into the tenure of Pearl as the Reintegration Czar, it is surprising that there is so much disarray in the reintegration of the demobilized Paramilitaries.217
As it should have been expected, the reintegration phase has been the most complicated and difficult stage in the DDR processes of the RN and the AUC. Still, with the problems that the previous two phases encountered, the setbacks during reintegration were, in a sense, foreshadowed.
Friendly Governments
Although the DDR processes in Nicaragua and Colombia have been very different, reflecting the vast differences between the two nations, there are many interesting trends that appear to be rather similar as well. One noteworthy similarity is that the Contras and the
AUC are the only two right-wing insurgent forces to be demobilized under conservative governments in Latin America in recent history. Although the level and depth of connection between the illegal armed actors and the governments in power varied, both cases are similar in that these links were well documented and they did ease the paths to negotiations.
Links: the RN-Chamorro and the A UC-Uribe
In both countries, the illegal armed actors had clear links with the Chamorro and the
Uribe governments. In Nicaragua, the Contras openly backed Chamorro for President in the
216 "Noveno Informe," 8.
211 Isacson, interview. 98
1990 election, even helping to campaign for her. Several important members of the RN's
Political Directorate - including Alfredo Cesar, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios, Azucena
Ferrey, Adolfo Calero, and Alfonso Rabelo - dropped their arms in order to support
Chamorro's UNO opposition party.218 Cesar, a high-ranking leader of the RN, who was one of three Contra commanders to sign the Sapoa Agreement, ultimately became Chamorro's chief advisor for her presidential campaign.219
Therefore, the links between Violeta Chamorro and the RN is well documented, with many individuals serving as "a bridge between the two."220 Still, it should be noted that this bridge weakened greatly over time. The various liaisons between the RN and the Chamorro government grew estranged because of several divisive issues, like class and regional base.
Soon, Cesar and other pro-Contra forces within the Chamorro camp splintered off into various political movements. In the end, "in the absence of effective liaisons" the Chamorro government came to "regarded the Resistance as a force to be diffused rather than a constituency to be represented."221
In Colombia, the link between the government and the AUC was far deeper than in the case of Nicaragua. Throughout the decades-long conflict, "the Paramilitaries had a relationship with the state."222 This historic relationship was developed around the 1980s when many branches of the Paramilitaries were "established directly by the armed forces" in
218 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 364.
219 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 53 7, 560.
220 William LeoGrande, interview by author, Washington, DC,January 16, 2008.
221 Spalding, ''Low-Intensity War," 38.
222 Bouvier, interview. 99
order to combat the growing PARC forces in the country. Many other factions of AUC
blocs were supported by the State.223 In essence, over the years of the intractable conflict in
Colombia, the Paramilitaries became a strategic arm of the state where there was no state
presence - though the organization did have other motives for existing as well, including its
involvement in the international narcotics trade business.
lbis relationship between the Colombian state and the AUC has become increasingly
close under the Uribe administration. Since he was Senator and then governor of Antioquia,
there have been allegations that President Uribe had ties with the Medellin drug cartel and its
infamous boss, Pablo Escobar. Moreover, there has always been speculation about Uribe's
links to the State-sponsored peasant organizations known as Convivir in the Antioquia
department. During the time Uribe was governor, there was great impunity for these Convivir
brigades in Antioquia, as many murders and disappearances went unsolved and
unprosecuted. In 1998, these same Convivir forces from around the country united under
one, single banner - that of the AUC.224 So, there has always been unease with the fact that
"Uribe came from the sector where Paramilitarism was born" - los ganaderos (the ranchers) of
northern Colombia.225
Although Uribe has vehemently denied these accusations throughout his years as a politician, they have continued to follow him. Recent events have given even more credence
to these conjectures. Currently, the Colombian government is mired in what has become
223 Amson and Whitfield, 'Third Parties," 240.
224 Tom Feiling, "President Uribe's Hidden Past," Colombia Journal, May 24, 2004 http://www.colombiajoumal.org/colombia185.htm (accessed November 10, 2007).
22s Isacson, interview. 100
known as Para-gate or the Para-politics scandal. Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (alias "Jorge 40") - second-in-command of the Northern Bloc of the Paramilitaries - demobilized on March 10,
2006. Soon thereafter, Jorge 40's right-hand man-Edgar Ignacio Fierro (alias "Don
Antonio")-was arrested and a laptop belonging to Tovar was confiscated. The laptop fueled the Para-poltics scandal because it contained detailed information on 558 murders committed by the AUC and it also listed connections with several authorities in the government. 226
The Colombian Congress was the first to be maligned by the Para-politics scandal - and the list of congressmen implicated continues to grow. The first three arrests made as a result of the scandal were congressional Senators Alvaro Garcia and Jairo Merlano, and
Representative Erick Morris-all from the Sucre department and members ofUribe's party.227 As of April of 2007, two politicians were in sentenced and in prison, eight others were under investigation, another eight were charged by the Attorney General's office, and nearly fifty others were under investigation.228
Opposition Senator Gustavo Petro held a congressional debate on Paramilitary- government links in Antioquia-the department that Uribe previously represented as a
Senator and Governor. Rooted in depositions by former AUC combatants and official governmental documents, Petro claimed that combatants regularly met on Uribe's
Guacharacas farm and his brother Santiago's ranches. So, accusations have moved up the
226 Hugh Bronstein, "Colombian Warlord Incriminated by His Own Laptop," Reuters, October 13, 2006.
227 Elber Gutierrez Roa, "Articulo breve guia practica para entender todo el esc:indalo de la para-politica," Semana, March 06, 2007.
228 "Updated Para-Politics List," Plan Colombia and Beyond, April 24, 2007. http:/ /www.cipcol.org/?p=380#more-380 (accessed December 11, 2007). 101
political ladder all the way to President Alvaro Uribe.229 In fact, Colombian Senator Jorge
Enrique Robeldo put forth another name for this scandal-Para-uribismo--- insinuating that the scandal involves allies of President Uribe.230 New allegations arising in June 2007 of campaign contributions by the AUC have further put the Uribe administration on the defensive.231
This history of connections between the Colombian government and the Paramilitaries has led some to believe that "los Paramilitares no son mas de una parte de un poder politico" ("the
Paramilitaries are nothing more than a part of a political power") of the State.232 Whether the connections between the State and the illegal armed actors are truly this strong is unclear.
What is certain, however, is that the Chamorro government and the Uribe government - to a greater extent - have had clear ties and relationships with the illegal armed actors that demobilized under their administrations.
Timing: Elections, Then Demobilizations
Bearing these connections in mind, it is interesting to note that both the Contras and the
Paras agreed to demobilize immediately after the inaugurations of President Violeta
Chamorro in Nicaragua and President Alvaro Uribe in Colombia. In February of 1990, the
Sandinistas lost the national election to the UNO. On April 25, 1990, Chamorro was sworn in
229 Juan Forero, "Colombian Senator: Death Squads Met at Uribe's Ranch," Washington Post, April 18, 2007.
230 "Parapolitica gener6 enfrentamiento entre congresistas y ministros," El Tiempo, February 28, 2007.
231 Forero, "Colombian Senator."
232 Cepeda, interview. Please note that the interview was conducted in Spanish and the translation was done by the author. 102
as the new Nicaraguan president in the national stadium.233 In accordance with the political wing of the RN - as well as because of pressure from the United States - the Contras "agreed to support the Chamorro government and present the electoral outcome as their shared victory." The RN, who had consistently refused to lay down its weapons before, agreed to demobilize immediately and by the end of July 1990, effectively the entire Contra membership had demobilized, bringing an end to the Contra war in Nicaragua.234
This series of events was mirrored in the case of Colombia. The members of the
Paramilitaries had been fighting for decades against the guerrillas of the F ARC in an intractable conflict that seemed to show no signs of ending. However, upon the election results of 2002, they readily agreed to lay down their arms. In August of 2002, Alvaro Uribe was inaugurated as President. In December of the same year, the AUC leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire and agreed to negotiate terms for a DDR.
What is public information about this quick turnaround is that President Uribe said that he would be willing to negotiate with all actors in the conflict if they agreed to disarm. Still, whatever occurred behind the scenes to motivate the AUC to come to the negotiating table remains unknown. Normally, groups decide to "demobilize when [they] are losing power.
The Paramilitaries were at their height of power" when they laid down their weapons and decided to enter into talks with the Uribe government. Moreover, the Paras had no evidence
233 LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 563.
234 Spalding, "Low-Intensity War," 36-37. 103
in 2002 that F ARC guerillas - their enemies for five decades - would be defeated or that
. 235 they were 1osmg power.
So, by reviewing the conflicts in either country and looking at the timing when the DDR processes were initiated, it seems clear that having Chamorro and Uribe in power helped to bring the illegal armed actors to the negotiating table and to discuss the terms of their demobilizations. 'We don't know the full story of why the bargain[s] [were] struck."236 What is certain is that having the friendly governments in power facilitated the road to negotiations.
True Negotiations?
Negotiations, according to Daniel Druckman, can be seen as talks in which "opponents
2 7 exchange concessions." ' Bargaining and making compromises are "common features of most, if not all, negotiations.238 If parties involved in a talk do not participate in making concessions, then there is no negotiation at hand. Due to the links between the Chamorro and Uribe governments and the illegal armed actors in both countries, many have stated that neither Nicaragua nor Colombia truly saw negotiations prior to the DDR processes.
For instance, Ivan Cepeda - leader of the National Movement for Victims of State
Crimes - declared that "La paz no se crea entre los amigos; la paz se crea entre los enemigos. Los
235 Isacson, interview.
236 Bouvier, interview.
237 Daniel Druckman, "Negotiating in the International Context," in Peacemaking in International Coriflict, ed. I. W. Zartman (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 87.
238 Druckman, "International Context," 98. 104
Paramilitares y el Estado son amigos." (''Peace is not created among friends; peace is created
among enemies. The Paramilitaries and the State are friends"). 239 Virginia Bouvier of the
United States Institute for Peace in Washington, DC concurs. She stated of the talks between the Uribe government and the Paras that ''when it is a negotiation between parties
that agree, it is not a negotiation."240
The basis for these comments can be observed in three main areas in the cases of
Nicaragua and Colombia. First, it is true that the Contras and the Paramilitaries were able to negotiate terms that many have criticized as being far too lenient for the crimes committed by both organizations. In Nicaragua, the Chamorro government offered a general amnesty
to the Contras - something that was also done in Guatemala.241 Similarly, in Colombia, national and international organizations have stated that the Justice and Peace law - which provides the majority of the legal framework of the AUC demobilization - is far too lenient,
allowing for radically reduced prison times for some of the worst crimes committed over the
course of the Colombian conflict.
Second, both the Chamorro government and the Uribe government offered a lot of incentives during negotiations to the RN and the AUC- beyond those normally offered
during DDR negotiations. In Nicaragua, the Chamorro government pledged land titles to all
demobilizing Contras. Although access to land was a great concern for the RN members, and
one that had to be taken into account by the Nicaraguan government during negotiations,
239 Cepeda, interview.
240 Bouvier, interview.
241 Isacson, interview. 105
the amount offered seemed overzealous.242 In the case of Colombia, one of the greatest incentives offered by the Uribe government during negotiations - to the irritation of the
American government - was that the leaders of the Paramilitaries would not be extradited to the US on the basis of drug charges. 1bis verbal agreement was shrewdly transferred into law through article 64 of the Justice and Peace law. The law defines paramilitarism as sedition - effectively classifying it as a political crime. The Colombian constitution declares that individuals guilty of political crimes cannot be extradited to other countries.
Furthermore, article 20 of the Uribe bill states that crimes linked to paramilitary activity - including the trafficking of narcotics - fall under the same category as paramilitarism. 1bis essentially means that narco-trafficking is not an extraditable crime.243
Third, the deals struck between the parties in both cases during negotiations seemed to reflect a "joint desire ... to forget the past." There seemed to be a lack of interest in truth, effectively excluding the victims from process.244 In Nicaragua, general amnesties were offered to the demobilizing RN members, while the victims of the conflict were left with not much more than Truth Commissions.245 In Colombia, many Congressmen, activists groups, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations have expressed their concerns about the lack of interest in the victims of Paramilitary crimes during the DDR negotiations. For instance, Michael Friihling- head of the Bogoci field office of the UN
242 Deena I. Abu-Lughod, "Failed Buyout: Land Rights for Contra Veterans in Postwar Nicaragua," L:Jtin American Perspectives 27, no. 3, Violence, Coercion, and Rights in the Americas. (May, 2000): 33.
243 "Truth, Justice, and Reparations: taking a beating in Colombia's Congress," Plan Colombia and Beyond, April 6, 2005 http:/ /www.cipcol.org/?p=72 (accessed October 14, 2007).
244 Isacson, interview.
245 Isacson, interview. 106
High Commissioner for Human Rights - declared "It seems that too little of the advice we have provided so far has been taken into account" by the Colombian government, going on
to say that the Uribe Justice and Peace bill "runs the risk of becoming a legal framework that is incompatible with the rights to truth, justice and reparations" for the victims.246
Despite these three negative factors of both negotiation processes and the many comments denouncing the negotiation processes in Nicaragua and Colombia, it is apparent that negotiations did take place in both cases. It is inaccurate to say that no negotiations took place because all parties involved had to compromise on certain issues, and there was serious
debate and disagreements at the negotiation tables. How deep and how sincere these negotiations were, is a separate issue.
Rearmament
Despite getting to the negotiation table with friendly governments and receiving many
concessions and incentives, the RN and the AUC remobilized shortly after demobilizing. It
should be noted that in Nicaragua and Colombia, certain factions did not enter into the
DDR processes. Still, it has been well documented that groups of ex-RN members and ex
Paramilitaries that did demobilize, also took up arms again. If the negotiations between the governments and the armed actors were total conspiracies, why did this rearmament occur?
246 ''Truth, Justice, and Reparations." 107
Nicaragua
Following negotiations with the Chamorro government and taking part in the DDR
program, various factions of the RN remobilized. The remobilization occurred for two main
reasons: (1) they felt insecure and (2) they ex-Contras felt betrayed by the Chamorro government. Contrary to other peace processes - such as those that took place in El
Salvador and Guatemala - the demobilization of the RN in Nicaragua was not paralleled by
a complete restructure of the State's security forces. Due to this, many disarmed and
demobilized RN members faced reported harassment, abuse, and human rights violations -
oftentimes by state structures. This situation caused great insecurity among the Contras. 247
Compounding this, towards the end of the reintegration phase, the RN felt that the
Chamorro administration had not followed through with the promises that it had made
during the DDR negotiations. The government had assured the Contras six main items that
the ex-combatants felt that they did not receive:248
1. Monetary reimbursements for the number of years served
2. Grants of urban plots in Managua and other departments
3. Medical attention for a period of two years
4. Access to productive land
5. Technical or vocational training
6. Support for micro-business projects
247 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 115.
248 Rab/an los Desmovilizados de Guerra: Nicaragua, El Salvador y Mozambique, (Managua, Nicaragua: Colecci6n Conflictos y Cambios, 199 5), 45. 108
Of these complaints, land was the greatest issue of concern for the ex-Contras - the majority of who were originally farmers.249 As of June 1991, only 53 percent of demobilized
RN members had access to land, with those that did get access to land only receiving certificates - not full titles - to the land. Moreover, these ex-Contras were not eligible for bank credit. A third of the Contra members had claimed to have land and other resources expropriated by the Sandinistas. Only one third of this group was compensated.250
Because of this lack of complying with the compromises made on the part of the government for the RN during the negotiation phase, the demobilized Contras began to organize themselves again and to protest against the Chamorro government. These protests, however, were largely ignored. Soon thereafter, civil protests turned into rearmament- "la reaccion mas extrema ante el vado de opciones viable y espacios de apqyo" ("the most extreme reaction before a lack of viable options and support.")251
The three main leaders of the R.econtraswere Francisco Valdivia (alias "Dimas"),
Encarnacion Valdivia (alias ''Tigrillo") and Angel Moran (alias "Indomable"). They led small groups of rearmed ex-Contras who undertook criminal actions at the beginning of 1991, such as taking control of certain towns and attacking political and social cooperatives of the
Sandinistas. Although the number of demobilized Contras that joined these groups was small, their knowledge of the rural mountains of the country and the remaining support of some
249 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 123.
2so Spalding, ''Low-Intensity War," 41.
251 Zoilamerica Ortega, Desmovilizados de Guerra en la construccion de la paz en Nicaragua, (Managua, Nicaragua: Centro de Estudios Intemacionales, 1996), 21, 23. Please note that the original text is in Spanish and the translation was done by the author. 109
farmers allowed them to extend their networks from the departments of Matagalpa and
Jinotega to the Atlantic coast, as well as central and southern Nicaragua.252
By April of 1991, it was reported that there were nine different Recontra groups with a total membership of 900 combatants.253 1bis was far less than the fighting force of the RN prior to the DDR process. Still, the rearmament of nearly a thousand ex-Contras was great setback for the Chamorro government. By 1994, Chamorro was able to renegotiate a surrender of anns with the Recontras by providing the economic incentives that the government had promised before. Still, "a number of anned bandits continued to operate in the countrys1.d e, d emanding government trme. and attention. . ,,254
Colombia
The DDR of the AUC in Colombia also followed a similar outcome. Shortly into the reintegration phase, it became evident that some demobilized Paramilitaries were reorganizing themselves and picking up arms once again. In various areas of the country, the appearance of these anned groups began presenting themselves as the "nueva generacion def paramilitarismo" ("new generation of Paramilitarism").255 Although these new groups - oftentimes known as the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles) - do not yet have the reach of the
AUC, their membership is steadily increasing.
252 V anolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 117.
253 Vanolli, Wallace, Ruis, La Comision Internacional, 191.
254 Hartzell, ''Peace in Stages," 373.
255 "Septimo Informe," 6. 110
Unlike Nicaragua, these new armed groups were not homogenous and did not arise from the same reasons. Some of these new groups are being led by commanders of the AUC that never agreed to demobilize and did not participate at all in the DDR process. Other groups are being led by mid-level Paramilitary commanders that had demobilized.256 So, contrary to
Nicaragua, it appears that a lot of the ex-AUC combatants were not being pushed back into a life of crime based on economics. Instead "they were pulled in by existing networks" of gangs and criminal units in Colombia.257
In addition, it should be noted that many newly emerging armed groups are alliances between the Paramilitaries and cocaine traffickers in Colombia. The cocaine trade in
Colombia is so lucrative, that it is essentially impossible for the government to offer economic incentives that can come even close to rivaling the possible money that can be made by being part of the narcotics business. So, the narcotics trade adds an additional layer of complexity to the Colombian case - something that the Chamorro government did not
.th . N. 25s h ave to contend wt m 1caragua.
Although the numbers of demobilized Paramilitaries rearming is not known for certain, it is estimated by some that about 9000 AUC members that took part in the DDR process have now taken up arms once again and have joined one of these many illegal armed groups.259 According to an anonymous OAS official, this number is significantly less. The organization estimates that only about 17 percent of ex-Paramilitaries have reorganized into
256 "Noveno Informe," 1.
257 Isacson, interview.
258 "Noveno Informe," 1.
259 Isacson, interview. 111
groups such as theAguilas Negras. 260 Major General Mario Correa - the Defense Attache at
the Colombian Embassy in DC - says that the newly emerging armed groups "son grupos de
delincuentes commune!' ("are groups of commom criminals") and that only in some cases, they
are "desmovilizadoes desilusionado!' ("disillusioned demobilized combatants").261
Regardless of the exact number of demobilized Paramilitaries that have taken up arms
again and have joined these new groups, combating them has proven to be difficult - as it was with the AUC. According the MAPP-OEA, a sort of predictable cycle has arisen in
terms of these newly emerging armed groups and the Colombian government's reaction to
them. It can be summarized as follows:
Figure 2: Rearmament Cycle of Demobilized Paramilitaries
Operations by the government forces against the new armed structure.
Expansion Withdrawal
Stengthening Reorganization
Source: ''Novena informe trimestral de Secretario General sobre la Misi6n para Apoyar el proceso de paz en Colombia." Misi6n de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia - Organizaci6n de los Estados Americanos. July 3, 2007.
260 Anonymous OAS official, interview.
261 Correa, interview. Please note that the interview was conducted in Spanish and the translation was done by the author. 112
Other Factors
What accounts for the remobilization of the RN and the Paras after initiating DDR processes? Despite the fact that the Contras and the AUC demobilized under friendly governments, their DDR processes were by no means trouble-free. In both countries, several factors have contributed to the obstacles encountered and the skepticisms on the part of the international community. Four of these central issues are: the lack of comprehensive accords, the weak state institutions, over-promising, and a lack of international verification of the DDR schemes. These factors go beyond the political or ideological alliances between the governments and the demobilizing armed structures and so, seem to be more important in determining the success or failure of a given DDR process.
Narrow DDR Agreements, Not Comprehensive Accords
Although DDR should not be confused with a peace accord, the two are normally closely related. A DDR agreement born out of a comprehensive peace process tends to be stronger than one that stands alone or one that is part of narrow agreements.262 Neither the
DDR of the Contras in Nicaragua nor the DDR of the Paramilitaries in Colombia developed from a comprehensive peace accord, as was the case in El Salvador and Guatemala - where the DDR processes were deemed to be much more successful.
In Nicaragua, the hurting stalemate between the Sandinistas and the Contras "did not lead to a comprehensive peace agreement, but rather to a negotiated election followed by a series
262 Ball, interview. 113
of narrow accords."263 The DDR of the Contras did not come about from peace talks amongst all parties involved in the conflict. Instead, they were solidified only when the 1990 election was scheduled. Even then, the Contras dragged their feet. It wasn't until Chamorro came into power that the RN truly agreed to demobilize. Therefore, the DDR of the group was a sort of afterthought to the peace accords in Nicaragua.
In Colombia, not only were there no comprehensive peace accords, there was no peace accord at all. The demobilization negotiations that happened between the Uribe government and the leaders of the AUC cannot be viewed as peace accords because they did not include the other main parties involved in the conflict, namely the PARC and the ELN. The DDR of the Paramilitaries is unique because it has taken place amidst an intractable war that continues on. This distinction has helped make the DDR process of the AUC complex. One reason for this is that the security dilemma for many ex-Paras continues because their enemies still have their weapons.
Weak Institutions, Compromised DDR
In both cases, the State institutions in charge of implementing, overseeing, and monitoring the DDR processes were weak, overstretched, and underfunded. So, in both
Nicaragua and Colombia, the National Governments lacked the institutional strength and the financial capacity to successfully see through the demobilization programs.
During the DDR of the Contras, Nicaragua was emerging from a bitter internal conflict.
Due to this, the Nicaraguan state institutions were greatly weakened. Augmenting this was
263 Spence, ''War and Peace," 6. 114
the fact that the country was deep into an economic crisis. In the early 1990s, the country's foreign debt was more than ten billion US dollars. Because of this, international financial institutions had a great amount of influence over the actions of the Nicaraguan government.
Moreover, the police force and the judicial system in the country were overburdened and underfunded. 264
Institutional shortcomings in Nicaragua made the implementation of the various elements of the RN DDR process difficult. The situation was so bad, in fact, that
"functionaries at government ministries in charge of providing social services" to the demobilized Contras "were found to be unaware of the commitments made in the accords."265 These types of institutional shortcomings and weaknesses frustrated the demobilized RN members, who felt increasingly abandoned by the government.
Institutional weaknesses were also abundant in the case of Colombia, but not due to economic crisis, as was the case in Nicaragua. The Colombian government's Programa de
Reincotporacion a la Vida Civil (PRVC -Program for Reincorporation into Civilian Life) had allocated a period of two years in which ex-combatants may access certain benefits allocated to them under the DDR program. Despite this, the OAS Mission found many shortcomings in the provision of health benefits to ex-members of the AUC and their immediate families in terms of what the government had promised to them. For instance, only 47percent of ex combatants who have been in the system for more than 6 months, have been entered into the government's social security system. Psychosocial attention also continues to be one of
264 Spalding, ''Low-Intensity Conflict," 51-52.
265 Spalding, ''Low-Intensity Conflict," 41. 115
the PRVC's weakest points, with only 12 percent of ex-combatants participating in workshops during the second quarter of 2006. The Mission also found that the focus on vocational training for the demobilized Paras has been greatly insufficient.266
Initially, the Ministry of the Interior and Justice was in charge of monitoring the reintegration process of the AUC. On September 7, 2006, President Uribe created a new government body called the Alta Consejeria para la rcintegracion (Ibe High Commission for
Reintegration), transferring the duties from the Ministry of the Interior and Justice. The Alta
Consejeria was charged with several duties, including: to be the voice of the National government with respect to the reintegration program; to develop, execute, and evaluate reintegration programs; and to receive and disperse resources and funds to the demobilized combatants. 267
The Alta Consejeria has continued to face challenges and is overwhelmed by the number of demobilized Paras that it has the responsibility to process. As of 2007, education and health for ex-A UC members continues to lag behind. The MAPP-OEA reported that many of the beneficiaries eligible for education and health have yet to receive these benefits - even though they have been in the reintegration program for about two years now.268
So, although the Alta Consejeria system is an improvement over the prior institutions in charge of overseeing DDR in Colombia, it continues to face serious challenges. The primary concern of the institution, as is usually the case, is the sheer lack of funding. Frank Pearl, the
266 "Septimo Informe," 8-9.
267 ''Decreto Nfunero 3043," Presidencia de la Republica, September 7, 2006 http://www.presidencia.gov.co / prensa_new/ decretoslinea/ 2006 / septiembre / 07 / dec3043070906.pdf (accessed November 11, 2007).
268 "Noveno Informe," 9. 116
current Reintegration Czar has been candid in admitting the lack of resources and money necessary to properly implement and oversee reintegration programs for the ex-AUC combatants.269
Over-Promising and Lack of Follow-1brough
An important rule in DDR for governments and international organizations, and one that is often not followed, is to "be realistic" and not to "over-promise." In Sierra Leone, for instance, the inexperienced staff of the UN offered radios to each combatant. In the end, they never fulfilled this promise. 1bis may seem like a trivial or minute detail of DDR, but not following through on concessions made and incentives pledged can reverse any progress made. Therefore, the State or organizations in charge of a DDR process have to make certain. to de Ii ver w h at 1s . prormse . d .270
1bis did not happen in Nicaragua or Colombia. The National governments promised more to the RN and the AUC during negotiations than they could actually deliver during the
DDR programs. In Nicaragua, the Chamorro government supported a land for peace program with the Contras. This was a good strategy because it took into account the fact that most Contra members were previously farmers and that after demobilization, they would likely prefer to return to farming. Although this strategy "succeeded in the short run in taking guns away from armed persons, it created expectations that could not be fulfilled."
The demobilized Contras reported that they had been promised 50 manzanas (0.67 hectares),
269 Isacson, interview.
no Ball, interview. 117
or approximately 86 acres each. Not only were the ex-RN members offered land, but they were promised fertile, arable land.271
This gesture by the Chamorro government during negotiations was meant to pacify the factions of the RN that were still showing resistance to the idea of demobilizing. It was obvious that government would not be able to follow through with this offer, however, because Nicaragua was steeped in an economic crisis at the end of Contra war. As such, "the massive infusion of resources" that would have required to follow through with the promise of farmable land for the demobilized RN combatants were simply not available. In fact, at the time of the DDR process of the Contras, the Chamorro government was contracting many of its activities in an attempt to lessen Nicaragua's fiscal deficit.272
In the end, the government did not follow through on its land for peace offer. The inability of the Chamorro government to fulfill the promises that it made during the negotiation phase embittered many demobilized Contras who "felt betrayed" by the State.273
This frustration turned into resentment for a government that once was an ally of the RN, and ultimately caused some ex-Contras to take up arms again.
The Colombian government offered a similar level of incentives to the demobilizing
Paramilitaries. Like the Nicaraguan government, the Uribe administration did not follow through with their promises. For instance, the Uribe government stated that Paramilitary leaders could serve part of their prison terms in lofty-ranches and that they did not have to
211 Abu-Lughod, "Failed Buyout," 33, 35.
212 Spalding, ''Low-Intensity Conflict," 40.
273 LeoGrande, interview. 118
serve time in various maximum security centers. When Colombian government officials
transferred AUC commander Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano (alias "Don Berna" or
"Adolfo Paz") to the Combita maximum security prison in Boyaca from house arrest, the
entire DDR process was put in doubt.274 The AUC feared that this move - one that the
government had ensured them that they would not make - was a step towards extradition to
the United States, another thing the Uribe administration had promised the Paras would not
happen.
So, despite the fact that the Chamorro and Uribe governments were friendly at some
point with the demobilizing insurgent groups in Nicaragua and Colombia, they did not
"bend over backwards to take care of the re rank-and-file."275
Lack of International Verification
In Nicaragua, the international organization in charge of verifying the DDR of the
Contras - the OAS - was not prepared. This was due to two main things: inexperience and
politicization. At the start of the 1990s, the OAS had very little prior experience in the implementation and monitoring of peace negotiations. Moreover, the mandate of the CIAV was ''biased in favor of the Resistance" and twas tailored to the short-term without looking into the future. 276
274 Logan, Sam and Michael Shoemaker, "AUC disarmament talks may be derailed, again, " International Relations and Security Network, October 14, 2005 http:/ /www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/ details.cfm?ID=13144 (accessed December 17, 2007).
275 Isacson, interview.
276 Spalding, "Low-intensity War," 38. 119
Compounding the inherent problems in the CIAV mission, by the early 1990s, there was
"international fatigue" when it came to Central America.277 The international community had
overseen the peace processes at the end of the Guatemalan and Salvadoran conflicts just
prior to the peace process in Nicaragua. When it came time to demobilize the RN, the
donors and the volunteers had seemed to dwindle. Therefore, the lack international
verification partly explains the additional years of violence in Nicaragua after the initial
demobilization of the Contra forces.278
International verification has been even scarcer in the case of Colombia, where the
demobilization has not happened in a post-conflict context. Colombia has had a tradition of
not wanting international interference in its domestic affairs. The country has historically
been resistant to third-party intervention and has always been very nationalistic.279 Despite
this, there was an agreement between Cesar Gaviria of the OAS and President Uribe on
January 23, 2004. In February of that year, the OAS's Security Council passed the resolution
that created the MAPP-OEA. Unlike Nicaragua, the OAS was not the leader in overseeing
the DDR process of the Paras in Colombia; its mission was to serve as a support to the
Colombian govemment.280
By the time of the DDR of the AUC, the OAS had gained the experience that it had
sorely lacked in Nicaragua. The organization had developed a "quite sound verification methodology." The MAPP-OEA recognized that it could not verify the demobilization
211 Isacson, interview.
278 Spence, ''War and Peace," 6.
279 LeoGrande, interview.
280 Anonymous OAS official, interview. 120
process from a headquarters Bogota alone, and so it developed eight district offices and a mobile team that went to other regions of the country. Despite these improvements, the
Mission has been severely compromised because the total number of representatives that it has in Colombia is one hundred. Out of these OAS officials, only forty percent are internationals and only they do verification work.281 This means that in a DDR process where more than 30,000 armed actors demobilized, only 40 international monitors are overseeing their progress - far too few to ensure the best results.
2s1 Anonymous OAS official, interview. CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS
Hypotheses
Easier Negotiations, Not Easier DDR
What can be said about illegal armed actors undergoing DDR programs under friendly governments in Latin America? Is the process easier because of this ideological or political alliance? Is DDR easier to follow through? From the cases of the RN in Nicaragua and the
Paramilitaries in Colombia, it seems that demobilizing under friendly governments does not automatically render the DDR process effortless and unproblematic.
What does appear to be a trend in these two cases, however, is that the tasks of getting to the negotiating table and coming to a DDR agreement is facilitated when there is a link between the insurgent group and the government in power. This tendency is apparent in other negotiations as well. For instance, for the five years that Uribe has been President of
Colombia, he has not been able to convince the F ARC to sit down and negotiate on any given issue. When the left-leaning Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez offered to talk to the
121 122
282 leftist guerrilla group, a humanitarian exchange was negotiated within months , with the
F ARC recently announcing that it would release three more hostages to Chavez.283
Still, in the case of Chavez and the F ARC, there were setbacks after the negotiations occurred, namely the postponements of the hostage releases. This was also mirrored in the
DDR programs of the RN and the AUC. After getting to the negotiation table and laying out the ground rules and incentives for the demobilizations, the processes faced obstacles and setbacks. From this, it can be deduced that it mqy be easier to start negotiations when insurgents who demobilize under friend/y governments, but that these negotiations do not necessari/y lead to simple DDR processes.
Bilateral Talks, Not a Comprehensive Peace Processes
It seems that one of the greatest challenges faced during DDR processes of insurgent groups demobilizing under friendly governments is that demobilization of one armed group is often conflated with a larger peace process. DDR is not a peace process. This is especially true when a single insurgent group demobilizes under a friendly government.
Colombia is an illustrative case of this. The Paras agreed to demobilize under the friendly
Uribe government. This does not mean, however, that a comprehensive peace process is underway. The main reason for this is that the other parties involved in the conflict - namely the F ARC and the ELN - are not part of the process. The Uribe government negotiated with the leaders of the AUC, determining the terms of the DDR. Many people believe that
282 Simon Romero, "Colombian Rebels Free Two Hostages," New York Times, January 11, 2008.
283 "Colombia Says Rebels to Hand 3 More Hostages to Chavez," Reuters, February 4, 2008. 123
Uribe followed this course largely based on the fact that the Paramilitaries were the easiest group for the government to level with.284 Whatever the reasoning, two main actors in the
Colombian conflict played no part in the DDR negotiations.
The case of Nicaragua was a bit different because the demobilization of the RN took place in the context of larger peace process. This does not mean that the DDR of the Contras was the Nicaraguan peace process. By equating the two, there is the risk of saying that the peace process failed when only the DDR process did. Alternatively, it can be wrongly said that the DDR process failed when the peace process did. This happened in Sierra Leone where three or four peace processes took place. In the end, it was said that DDR failed.
However, "DDR didn't fail; the peace process failed."285
DDR and a peace process are linked. Still, the demobilization ofan insurgent armed group under a friendfy government often excludes other parties involved in the coeflict. In other cases, DDR happens within the larger context of a peace process. In either case, however, DDR is not equivalent to a peace process.
What about the Victims?
Similar to the exclusion of other warring parties, the demobilizations of the Contras and the Paras under friendly, right-wing governments resulted in the exclusion of the victims of the conflicts. In Nicaragua, general amnesties were offered three times by the Chamorro government between 1990 and 1993 in an effort to forget the past and move on into the
284 Bouvier, interview.
285 Ball, interview. 124
future. 286 In doing so, however, the victims of the Contras were essentially sidelined and impunity was widespread.
Colombia is going through a similar process at the moment. Many human rights and victims organizations are outraged at the leniency of the government in terms of prosecuting demobilized AUC members and ensuring that their victims are compensated. Due to this,
Ivan Cepeda, like many others, insists that "no hqy una reparacion para fas victimal' ("there is no reparation for the victims").287 Juan Mendez, President of the International Center for
Transitional Justice, agrees, stating that the Justice and Peace Law "regrettably constitutes a lost opportunity to establish an appropriate balance between the need to demobilize paramilitaries and the obligation to bring justice to victims."288
From examining the DDR processes of the Contras and the Paras under the conservative
Chamorro and Uribe governments, it is clear that the rights of the victims of these armed groups were made secondary. So, in D DR processes involving combatants demobilizing under friend/y governments, it is like/y that the victims will be the least compensated group.
The Other Side - Left-Left DDR
Both of the cases studied in this research involve right-wing insurgent groups demobilizing under right-wing, conservative governments. What of left-wing armed actors
286 Spalding, "Low-Intensity War," 47.
287 Cepeda, interview.
288 "Brief on Justice and Peace Law Presented to Colombian Constitutional Court," International Center far Transitional Justice, January 17, 2006 http:/ /www.ictj.org/ en/news/press/release/767.html (accessed October 30, 2007). 125
undergoing DDR processes under left-wing governments? There are still some leftist insurgent groups operating in Latin America- including the Sendcro l.Jtminoso in Peru and the
F ARC and ELN in Colombia. All three of these organizations have been fighting the government for decades, refusing to negotiate.
If friendly governments - or friendlier than the current ones - were to come into power, would the DDR processes follow similar trends to those of the RN in Nicaragua and the
AUC in Colombia? For instance, if the Polo Democrdtico - an opposition party to the left of
Uribe's party-were to win the next presidential election in Colombia, would negotiations with the F ARC and the ELN be easier? Could there be a DDR process with the FARC and
ELN similar to the AUC demobilization program?
From observing the demobilizations of the Contras and the Paras under friendly conservative governments, it can be deduced that there would be similar trends during DDR processes of left-wing insurgent groups under left-wing governments. Getting to the negotiation table would likely be made easier. For instance, Senator Piedad Cordoba - a left leaning congresswoman from Colombia - has had a much easier time negotiating with the
PARC than the conservative Uribe government. She has been allowed access to high-ranking officials and has aided President Chavez in the negotiations to release hostages.289 Senator
C6rdoba's interaction with the left-wing F ARC can be seen as a foreshadowing of what might occur in the future if a left-wing government was to come into power in Colombia.
289 Simon Romero, "A Lawmaker Whose Nation Dislikes Her Friends," New York Times, March 1, 2008. 126
It is also probable that the terms of the DDR would be made as easy as possible. In both
Nicaragua and Colombia, the governments faced criticism based on the fact that the demobilizing groups got lenient terms, if not a general amnesty, while their victims had to fight for reparations. This is true of many other DDR cases simply based on the fact that
DDR is a process that is meant to occur in a short period of time. In cases of armed groups demobilizing under friendly governments, this process can be further rushed.
As can be observed from the Contras and the Paras, the dynamics of DDR tend to be consistent from one case to another similar case. So, the patterns observed during the demobiliZf1tion of right-wing insu'fl!,ent forces in Nicaragua and Colombia under the .friendfy Chamorro and Uribe governments would likefy repeat themselves in cases of left-left demobiliZf1tions.
Future DDR Programs: Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations
There are several lessons that can be taken from the DDR processes of the Contras and the Paras. By being prepared for the obstacles that were encountered in both of these cases, it is possible that future DDR programs of insurgent armed groups under friendly governments will face fewer setbacks, like rearmament.
1. A DDR program in the context of a comprehensive peace process tends to be
stronger.290
Comprehensive peace processes helped to facilitate successful DDR process in
Guatemala and El Salvador. The lack of these larger processes may have contributed
290 Ball, interview. 127
to the complications encountered in the Nicaraguan and Colombian cases. Still, it
should be noted that a comprehensive peace process may not be possible in certain
cases. For example, it is likely that there may never be a comprehensive peace
process in Colombia where all actors come to the table to negotiate.291
2. The state institutions overseeing the DDR process have to be strong.
There is an increasing trend to have states oversee DDR processes instead of leaving
everything up to international actors.292 This nationalizing of DDR is good, but at the
same time, it places a greater burden on National Governments. Implementing a
DDR program is a great strain on any given government- as can be seen in the
cases of Nicaragua and Colombia. It is important that state institutions, especially
those charged with implementation and oversight of different aspects ofDDR be
strong enough to handle the process. If they are not, it is likely that demobilized
combatants will feel frustrated and betrayed by the friendly government.
3. Allow international oversight and secure funding.
Even though state actors are becoming more important in DDR programs, it is
important to have the international community involved as well. First, it is unlikely
that any one state can sufficiently finance a DDR program - especially if it is of the
magnitude of the processes that took place in Nicaragua and Colombia. So,
international donors are central to the success ofDDR. Moreover, it is important to
291 Isacson, interview.
292 Ball, interview. 128
have international oversight in monitoring the progress of a program because in any
DDR process, "clproccso de scguimicnto cs m~ importantc'' ("the process of verification is
very important").293 This is especially true in cases of insurgents demobilizing under
friendly governments. International verification is necessary to monitor that these
connections do not go so far as to compromise a legitimate DDR process.
4. Promise what you can give; give what you promise.
In Nicaragua and Colombia, the governments offered incentives to the demobilizing
insurgent forces that they did not follow through on in the actual DDR processes.
Although making concessions and presenting offers are integral parts of negotiation,
over-promising during negotiations can stifle or even derail DDR. As such,
governments must offer packages to demobilizing groups, but only those they intend
to follow through with.
5. Look beyond just the negotiations.
In implementing DDR programs, especially under friendly governments, it is
important not to have a short-term outlook. Getting to negotiations is not the end of
a DDR process. Without taking a long-term approach to the process, easier
negotiations may make a demobilization scheme harder in the end.
293 Correa, interview. 129
Points of Future Research
DDR is a relatively new field of study. As such, there are many aspects of this area that have yet to be explored. It would be interesting to investigate whether there are similar trends to those found in the cases of the RN in Nicaragua and the Paramilitaries in
Colombia in occurrences of left-left demobilizations. That is, are there parallels that can be drawn in situations of left-wing insurgents demobilizing under friendly governments Latin
America? Are these trends visible in other cases of DDR in other regions of the world?
Also, as of now, the rearmament of the AUC in Colombia continues to be a challenge.
The Colombia government has not been able to slow down the expansion of newly armed illegal groups or to stop other demobilized AUC members or other individuals from joining this new wave of paramilitarism. Will this rearmament be diffused, as was the case in
Nicaragua, or will groups like the Aguilas Negras turn into a powerful force like the AUC?
Whatever the result may be, it is certain that the narcotics trade is a factor that will make
DDR of any armed group in Colombia far more complex than the case of the Contras in
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