Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

April 2021

Inside Introduction Pg 2 Denmark’s Changing Asylum Procedures Pg 3 Evolving Risks in Syria Pg 6 Women and Children First? Pg 8 Conclusion and Recommendations Pg 11 2 Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

the increasingly localised and context-dependent nature Introduction of security risk that is a lasting and direct consequence of the protracted Syria crisis. Secondarily, the asylum ince late February 2021, issues surrounding procedures themselves are rife with blindspots that Syrian refugee return and resettlement have create undue risk for vulnerable groups in Syria, come to the fore as a result of changes to asylum including women and children. Indeed, women are procedures for Syrian refugees in Denmark. broadly disadvantaged by an international asylum SThe changes stem from a Danish governmental framework that fails to recognise women’s protection determination that Damascus is “safe” for refugee concerns and which routinely affords women inferior or return, thus justifying the suspension of temporary subordinate protected status. Ultimately, it is hoped that protection status for some Damascene refugees — a first the debate provoked by events in Denmark will bring step toward eventual removal from Denmark. Pitched attention to the understudied security and protection debate within Danish society and government has concerns that Syrians contemplating return (or being been bolstered by a public campaign lodged by rights, forced to do so) face today and will continue to confront advocacy, and analysis organisations — including COAR for the foreseeable future. — concerning the data which informed the Danish government’s decision-making process. COAR has Methodology joined other organisations in condemning the decision and criticising the misuse of our expert testimony in the This report is based on primary and secondary research, processes that ultimately led to the denial of asylum for as well as interviews and informal discussions with some groups of Syrians. This brief report is a response numerous practitioners, experts, and peer entities. to the debate opened by these events. It assesses the Included in the analysis are qualitative data collected claims made by Danish authorities, examines the through semi-structured interviews with 25 Syrian Key asylum procedures employed in Denmark, and assesses Informants in two groups: those who recently fled Syria the relationship between these processes and relevant for neighbouring countries, and others who remain local context in Syria. inside Syria. The interviews were wide-ranging and included questions pertaining to livelihoods, mobility, In contrast with the Danish decision, this report employment, security, conflict history, and other concludes that no part of Syria is safe for return. subjects. While every attempt has been made to secure Most notably, it finds that the recent Danish decisions a diverse sample of respondents, access limitations concerning asylum procedures misconstrue the impeded efforts to employ a scientifically representative relationship between large-scale conflict in Syria and sample. All material cited in this report has been the security and protection conditions that relate to reviewed in its original language and, where necessary, return. These recent developments fail to account for translated by COAR. Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and 3 Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

Damascus. The Danish Refugee Appeals Board3 — the counterpart of the Immigration Service in the asylum Denmark’s Changing appeals system — subsequently4 declared its support for Asylum Procedures the COI report’s findings.5 At the same time, the Danish Immigration Service announced6 a change in national n February 2019, the Danish Immigration Service protection practices,7 and Minister of Immigration and and the NGO Danish Refugee Council (DRC) jointly Housing Inger Støjberg vowed that the cases of all published a Country of Origin Information (COI) Syrians who had received temporary protection status8 report on the security situation in Government of on the basis of general security conditions in and around ISyria-controlled areas, touching implicitly on issues Damascus would be re-evaluated. In their totality, these regarding return.1 The report was based on a fact-finding changes meant that — for the first time since 2013 — mission conducted in Beirut and Damascus in November Syrians were no longer guaranteed protection status 2018, when a dozen interlocutors, subject-matter in Denmark. In effect, the policy decisions were the experts, and organisations — including COAR — were first practical steps towards the repatriation of Syrian interviewed on subjects ranging from conflict-related refugees to Syria. security incidents and mobility, to the consequences of draft evasion and illegal exit and re-entry. The report Thereafter, in June 2019, a process was begun to reassess concluded that the security situation, particularly in the status of hundreds9 of Syrians who had been granted Damascus Governorate, “has improved significantly” temporary protection status in Denmark. A test case since May 2018. came in the same month, when the Danish Immigration Service denied the extension of residency permits for While the report refrained from making explicit six Syrians from Damascus, citing the improvement in policy recommendations, its overarching conclusion general conditions there.10 This decision was based in concerning the reduction in conflict-related violence large part on the findings of the COI report.11 Although in Syria echoed the prevailing political discourse in the Danish Refugee Appeals Board subsequently Denmark.2 It set off a chain of events that would lead to overturned the ruling and granted asylum under another the removal of asylum protections for some Syrians from legal provision in all six cases, by the end of 2019, some

1 DIS and DRC, “SYRIA, Security Situation in Damascus Province and Issues Regarding Return to Syria, the Danish Immigration Service, February 2019: https://nyidanmark.dk/-/media/Files/US/Landerapporter/Syrien_FFM_rapport_2019_Final_31012019. pdf?la=da&hash=1D3D1379FE87D3D296B05659F0447C25B0410736 2 Ministry of Immigration and Integration, February 2019: https://uim.dk/nyheder/2019/2019-02/flygtningenaevnets-koordinationsudvalg-har-i-dag- tilkendegivet-at-de-generelle-forhold-i-syrien-er-aendrede. 3 In relation to asylum, the Danish appeals system is two-tiered. The Immigration Service is first responsible for assessing a claim for asylum. If an asylum application is rejected, for the most part, the case is automatically referred to the Refugee Appeals Board. Decisions made by the Refugee Appeals Board are final. 4 In February 2019. 5 “Changing Conditions in Syria,” Danish Refugee Appeals Board, 27 February 2019: https://fln.dk/da/Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/2019/27022019. 6 In February 2019. 7 “The Danish Immigration Service is Changing Its Practice in Cases Concerning the General Conditions in Syria,” Danish Immigration Service, 27 February 2019: https://nyidanmark.dk/da/Nyheder/2019/02/Udl%C3%A6ndingestyrelsen-%C3%A6ndrer-praksis-i-sager-vedr%C3%B8rende-de- generelle-forhold-i-Syrien. 8 In 2015, the Danish government passed a law on temporary protection status according to the Danish Aliens Consolidation Act Article 7(3) in response to an increase of Syrian asylum seekers in Denmark. The purpose of this form of protection was “to ensure that foreigners whose protection needs are temporary, can be sent back to their country of origin as soon as conditions in the country of origin allow it”. In 2019, the focus on temporality expanded to two other forms of protection status – namely Article 7(1) and Article 7(2) – with the so-called ‘paradigm shift’ in Danish politics that introduced new immigration laws replacing policy objectives from integration to repatriation at the earliest possibility. 9 Approximately 4,700 Syrians received temporary protection status in Denmark between 2015 and 2019 based on the general conditions in Syria according to the Danish Aliens Consolidation Act Article 7(3), which was widely used in the case of Syrian refugees. 10 “Supplementary Written Observations in Application No. 6697/18,” The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 17 January 2020: https://menneskeret. dk/sites/menneskeret.dk/files/media/dokumenter/nyheder/indlaeg_fra_instituttet_2020.pdf; Ulrik Dahlin and Lasse Skou Andersen, “The First Syrians Have Now Been Refused a Residence Permit,” Information, 4 May 2019: https://www.information.dk/indland/2019/05/foerste-syrere-faaet-nej-faa- forlaenget-opholdstilladelse. 11 “Supplementary Written Observations in Application No. 6697/18,” The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 17 January 2020: https://menneskeret.dk/ sites/menneskeret.dk/files/media/dokumenter/nyheder/indlaeg_fra_instituttet_2020.pdf. 4 Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

Syrians were ultimately denied asylum at least in partial had their residence permits revoked. Many more are reference to the findings of the COI report.12 Conditions expected to face the same fate. This is in addition to for Syrians in Denmark became more tenuous when the the 17018 Syrians whose requests for residence permit Danish Refugee Appeals Board officially concluded that it extension were rejected in 2020 alone.19 no longer considered the general conditions in Damascus sufficient basis to warrant the issuance of new residence Despite losing protection status in Denmark, Syrians permits or the extension of existing permits.13 According cannot be repatriated to Syria involuntarily. Denmark to the official website of the Danish government, these remains unwilling to restore diplomatic ties with developments were prompted by the COI report prepared the Government of Syria, and the principle of non- by the Danish Immigration Service and DRC.14 refoulement and the prohibition on forced returns remain pertinent. Nonetheless, the initiatives that have come The COI Report’s Impact to be known in Denmark as “The Damascus Project”20 will force Syrians to confront a daunting dilemma. The More than two years after its release, the report has developments require that affected Syrians abandon come under scrutiny anew. The Danish Refugee Appeals homes, employment, and studies in Denmark as they Board has since ratified15 a February 2021 decision by choose between two disconcerting options. The first is the Danish Immigration Service to extend to Rural ostensibly voluntary return to Syria. The second is the Damascus Governorate the previous declaration that uncertainty of relocation to Danish “exit camps”. These Damacsus itself is “safe” for return. The decision sets camps are former prisons that have been transformed forth that security conditions in and around Damascus into deportation centers. The European Committee for have improved to the degree that there were no longer the Prevention of Torture recently described one such sufficient grounds for concluding that individuals centre as “one of the worst of its kind in Europe”.21 will be at risk according to Article 3 of the European Penitentiary-like conditions22 in the centres include Convention on Human Rights solely because of their poor sanitary conditions; punishment for telephone use; presence in these areas.16 As a result, between January inability to prepare one’s own meals; limited access and April 2021, 21017 Syrians living in Denmark have to outdoor exercise; and the use of forced restraint,

12 “Status Regarding Trial Cases of Persons from Syria,” The Refugee Appeals Board, 27 June 2019: https://fln.dk/da/Nyheder/ Nyhedsarkiv/2019/27062019; “The Refugee Appeals Board Ratifies Rejection of Asylum to Syrian Citizens,” The Refugee Appeals Board, 17 December 2019 https://fln.dk/da/Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/2019/17-12-2019 13 In Denmark, residence permits for refugees are initially granted for one year. Upon expiration, the grounds for protection are reconsidered. If the refugee is still in need of protection, the residence permit can be renewed for another two years. 14 “The Government Is Launching a Reassessment of Syrian Refugees’ Need for Protection,” The Official Website of the Danish Government, 28 June 2020: https://www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/2020/regeringen-saetter-gang-i-genvurdering-af-syriske-flygtninges-behov-for-beskyttelse/. 15 “The Refugee Appeals Board Upholds Decisions Regarding Syrian Citizens from the Rural Damascus Area,” Danish Refugee Appeals Board, 18 February 2021: https://fln.dk/da/Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/2021/18022021. 16 European Convention on Human Rights. Article (3): “Prohibition of torture: No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. For full text, see: https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf. 17 This figures includes Syrians who have obtained Danish residence permits through individual asylum claims as well as family reunification to Syrian refugees in Denmark. “Figures in the Area of Foreigners,” The Danish Immigration Service, 31 March 2021: https://www.nyidanmark.dk/-/media/Files/ US/Tal-og-statistik/seneste_tal_udlaendingeeomraadet_2.pdf?la=da&hash=4D7E61A285602278332D8E74C754007FAA2FCFE0. 18 “Figures in the Area of Foreigners,” The Danish Immigration Service, 31 March 2021: https://www.nyidanmark.dk/da/Tal-og-statistik/Seneste-tal- p%C3%A5-udl%C3%A6ndingeomr%C3%A5det. 19 “Denmark Must Not Send Refugees Back to Syria, as Conditions Are Now,” DRC, 17 February 2021: https://drc.ngo/da/om-os/presse/ pressemeddelelser/2021/2/danmark-skal-ikke-sende-flygtninge-tilbage-til-syrien-som-forholdene-er-nu/. 20 The majority of those affected by the “Damascus Project” are those who have received temporary protection status in Denmark based on the general conditions in Syria according to the Danish Aliens Consolidation Act Article 7(3) after 2015. 21 “Report to the Danish Government on the Visit to Denmark Carried out by the European Committee fo the Prevention of Torture adn Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,” Council of Europe, 2019: https://rm.coe.int/1680996859. 22 “Denmark,” Global Detention Watch, no date: https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/europe/denmark. Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and 5 Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

conditions which have been criticised23 by human rights al-Roj camps in Syria’s northeast, arguably the most groups and international media alike.24 stable region of the country.

Those who do return to Syria voluntarily will be eligible Denmark’s Response for a repatriation support scheme25 through which they will receive a set cash payment26 from the Danish state On several occasions, DRC has disavowed the conclusions in order to “go home and re-establish themselves in of the COI report, arguing that an improvement in their country”.27 Few Syrians have willingly returned security conditions in and around Damascus does not in to Syria from Denmark or anywhere. In 2019 and itself equate to safe conditions for the return of Syrian 2020, 237 Syrians left Denmark with support through refugees.31 In a recent press release,32 DRC Secretary the repatriation scheme, yet there is no evidence or General Charlotte Slente stated that the view of Danish systematic follow-up to determine whether they actually authorities appears incomprehensible when compared returned to Syria.28 In fact, few Syrians have returned to with up-to-date reports on conditions in Syria. According the country, even from deeply unstable neighbouring to DRC, it is both premature and unsafe to encourage states. For instance, UNHCR reports that in 2020 9,351 Syrian refugees to return to Syria, including Damascus. Syrians returned from Lebanon voluntarily. In the first These criticisms were echoed in a joint statement three months of 2021, a mere 762 are reported to have signed among others, by COAR, on 19 April 2021.33 In done so despite the extreme privations brought on by response, current Minister of Immigration and Housing Lebanon’s economic upheaval. Measures to repatriate Mathias Tesfaye has remained unwilling to engage with Syrians means their re-establishment in a country that criticisms of the report, and he maintained his confidence Social Democratic Party29 spokesperson for foreign in the ability of Danish authorities to evaluate security affairs Rasmus Stoklund described30 as one of the world’s conditions in Syria.34 Both Danish Immigration Service most dangerous war zones. Stoklund’s characterisation and the Danish Refugee Appeals Board have stated that came when justifying Denmark’s unwillingness to they asked sources to verify inputs and they stand by the dispatch Danish civil servants to Syria to assist in the conclusions drawn from their interviews and research.35 return of 19 Danish children languishing in al-Hol and

23 “Reimagining Refugee Rights,” State Watch, no date: https://www.statewatch.org/media/documents/news/2019/mar/uk-dk-se-reimagining- refugee-rights-asylum-harms-3-19.pdf. 24 See for example: “Social Death in Denmark,” The Nation, 20 January 2019: https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/denmark-refugees-asylum- europe/ or “Uacceptable for people: Danish Asylum Centre Slammed in Anti-torture Report,” The Local, 7 January 2020 https://www.thelocal. dk/20200107/danish-asylum-centres-slammed-in-anti-torture-committee-report/ 25 In 2019, 100 Syrians returned to Syria with support from the Danish government’s repatriation law. 26 “What Support Can You Get?” Ministry of Immigration and Integration, 18 February 2020: https://uim.dk/arbejdsomrader/repatriering/hvilken- stotte-kan-man-fa. 27 “The Government Is Launching a Reassessment of Syrian Refugees’ Need for Protection,” The Official Website of the Danish Government, 28 June 2020: https://www.regeringen.dk/nyheder/2020/regeringen-saetter-gang-i-genvurdering-af-syriske-flygtninges-behov-for-beskyttelse/. 28 237 Syrians departed from Denmark in 2019 and 2020 with support from the Danish repatriation scheme. While these Syrians were said to have returned to Syria, there is no evidence to support their repatriation to Syria. In fact, on 8 April on the Danish debate programme “Debatten”, foreign affairs spokesperson for the Social Democratic Party Rasmus Stoklund conceded that Syrians who have departed from Denmark “could have gone anywhere”. See: “Debatten: Should the children return from Syria?” Debatten, 8 April 2021: https://www.dr.dk/drtv/episode/debatten_-boernene-hjem- fra-syrien_242933. 29 Denmark is currently governed by a left-wing coalition led by the Social Democractic Party. 30 “Debatten: Should the Children Return from Syria?” Debatten, 8 April 2021: https://www.dr.dk/drtv/episode/debatten_-boernene-hjem-fra- syrien_242933. 31 “Danish Refugee Council: There Is by No Means ‘Peace and Quiet’ in Syria,” Altinget, 27 March 2019: https://www.altinget.dk/udvikling/artikel/ dansk-flygtningehjaelp-vi-kan-ikke-sende-syriske-flygtninge-hjem. 32 “Denmark Must Not Send Refugees Back to Syria, as Conditions Are Now,” DRC, 17 February 2021: https://drc.ngo/da/om-os/presse/ pressemeddelelser/2021/2/danmark-skal-ikke-sende-flygtninge-tilbage-til-syrien-som-forholdene-er-nu/. 33 “Denmark: Flawed Country of Origin Reports Lead to Flawed Refugee Policies,” HRW, 19 April 2021: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/19/ denmark-flawed-country-oraigin-reports-lead-flawed-refugee-policies. 34 “Criticism of Syria Report Bounces off on Tesfaye: - Not my Job to Interfere,” TV2, 20 April 2021: https://nyheder.tv2.dk/politik/2021-04-20-kritik-af- syrien-rapport-preller-af-paa-tesfaye-ikke-min-opgave-at-blande-mig. 35 “Refugee Board Chairman District Judge Henrik Bloch Andersen Comments on Press Coverage of Syria Cases,” Danish Refugee Appeals Board, 2021: https://fln.dk/da/Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/2021/20042021. 6 Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

Put simply, it is wrong, analytically, to equate a reduction in conflict-related violence in Syria with a Evolving Risks in Syria return to normalcy or conditions suitable for return. he Danish Immigration Service’s decision to Sustained and systematic human rights abuses under declare Damascus safe for return focused on the the Government of Syria are among the most pervasive slowdown in conflict-related security incidents, and well-documented in history.38 Government- emphasising the reduction in armed clashes controlled areas of Syria, including Damascus, continue Tand checkpoints in and around Damascus.36 Decreasing to witnesses varying levels of targeted assasinations, numbers of civilian casualties and their concentration arbitrary arrests, torture, and harrasment. A broad within certain regions of the country also factored in range of legal and procedural impediments effectively the determination. However, these conclusions offer an prohibit even apolitical forms of dissent, including incomplete picture of Syria as it is.37 They elide the fact agitation on fundamental issues such as LGBTQ+ and that the Syria conflict continues to evolve, and so too labour rights. It is therefore not surprising that KIIs do the types of risks that Syrians face on the ground. interviewed by COAR cite security — namely, the fear of Some — but not all — of the risks relate to protection targeted assassination and arbitrary detention — as the and security concerns that exist on a highly localised top concerns motivating recent or intended flight from basis; these are the lingering and direct consequences Syria. Arrests continue to occur across all demographics, of a violent conflict that has ebbed without a sustained to include refugees returning from abroad.39 These resolution. Arguably, better understanding these risks is concerns are particularly acute for Syrians who have the fundamental question that should inform security- left the country illegally. All KIIs interviewed by oriented debate on whether Syria is safe. COAR expressed the importance of obtaining security clearances from Government intelligence agencies — In some respects, the shift toward localised conflict typically by bribing40 an intermediary or “wasta” — dynamics is not specific to Syria. Rather, it is a before leaving Syria, a process that otherwise requires characteristic of protracted crises and modern conflict extensive, functionally unobtainable Government writ large. While the nature (and novelty) of the so- approvals. IDPs returning from other regions within called new wars is debated, it is clear that conventional Syria and Syrians who have undergone the process of security frameworks that emphasise the military- forced capitulation that is known euphemistically as political dimensions of conflict fall short when “reconciliation” also continue to face the risk of arrest. addressing the specific concerns that define the risk landscape of geographies akin to today’s Syria. The risks facing Syrians in Government-controlled areas are likely more complex, granular, and acute than ever. Regrettably, the media, academic, and governmental Not only are these risks less visible focus on large-scale conflict-related violence in Syria to outside observers, they are that was justified in earlier stages of the crisis has now become an impediment to a recognition of the context- also poorly understood, as access dependent risks that have always existed. Not only are restrictions make documentation these risks less visible to outside observers, they are also poorly understood, as access restrictions make and assessment more challenging documentation and assessment more challenging and and more dangerous. more dangerous.

36 Emil Høj and Ulrik Dahlin, “UN: The Security Situation In Syria Not Good Enough To Send Syrian Refugees Back”, Information, 16 March 2021 https://www.information.dk/indland/2021/03/fn-sikkerheden-damaskus-god-nok-sende-flygtninge-tilbage 37 Hani Mowafi and Jennifer Leaning, “Documenting Deaths in the Syrian War,” The Lancet (6 December 2017): https://www.thelancet.com/journals/ langlo/article/PIIS2214-109X(17)30457-6/fulltext; “Statistics of 2020,” SNHR (no date): https://sn4hr.org/blog/category/charts/statistics-of-2020/. 38 “Former Prosecutor: More Evidence of War Crimes against Syrian President Assad Than There Was against Nazis,” CBS News, 18 February 2021: https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bashar-al-assad-syria-60-minutes-2021-02-18/. 39 According to media sources, between January 2019 and October 2020, 237 returnees were arrested by the Syrian government upon return. Reportedly many of these returnees later disappeared, while others were tortured to death in detention centers. 40 One KII noted that smugglers coordinate with intelligence agencies to give them clearances and let them pass through checkpoints in exchange for bribes. Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and 7 Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

Reconciliation without Reprieve mobility.43 A January 2021 report by the Syrian Network for Human Rights documented the continued Reconciliation is perhaps the most wide-reaching tool persecution and detention in Damascus of individuals used by the Government of Syria to bring into being on a seemingly arbitrary basis, adding to a substantial what Bashar al-Assad has described as a “healthier body of evidence indicating that guarantees are not and more homogeneous society in the true sense”, honoured at the regional, local, or individual level.44 and it remains a fundamental aspect of vulnerability Repeatedly, KIIs interviewed by COAR describe such today.41 From 2016 to 2018, and sporadically since promises as “meaningless”. then, the Government of Syria has re-asserted military dominance over opposition-held areas through a The absence of open conflict and the decrease in security process entailing protracted besiegement and resource incidents in Damascus does not mean that Syria — or denial. This process has inevitably concluded with any portion of the country — is safe for return. Past a community’s surrender and the large-scale forced criticism of the Syrian state, unauthorised flight from displacement of local populations to northwest Syria. the country, and involvement with the political or armed Through reconciliation, Syrian Government authorities opposition are all factors which expose Syrians to the have systematically reshaped community demographics threat of persecution, harassment, and violence. In the and dismantled structures associated with the political case of Syria, a more relevant indicator will be to ask: At or armed opposition. This process has forcibly displaced what point will Syria be safe for those who have resisted individuals linked to virtually any donor-funded activity the continuing rule of Bashar al-Assad? that is seen as directly or indirectly undermining the supremacy of the state, including aid work, journalism, local councils, and civil society organisations (see: What Remains?: A Postmortem Analysis of the Cross-Border Response in Dar’a). Suspicion concerning participation in such activities persists, as do associated risks.42

Implicitly, reconciliation has served as the primary This raises doubt whether any mechanism intended to reintroduce Government mechanism or process currently of Syria authority over formerly opposition-held communities and populations. However, neither in place allows Syrians to mean- reconciliation agreements nor the various amnesties ingfully guarantee their personal put forth by the Government of Syria for military service evasion or illegal flight, guarantee safety. This raises safety and protection status in doubt whether any mechanism or process currently in areas where the state security place allows Syrians to meaningfully guarantee their personal safety and protection status in areas where the apparatus holds sway. state security apparatus holds sway. The Government of Syria and its ally Russia, which served as guarantor of some reconciliation deals, have repeatedly failed to uphold the agreements’ terms, including the release of detainees, restoration of state services, and improved

41 Ben Hubbard, “Syrian War Drags On, but Assad’s Future Looks as Secure as Ever,” New York Times 25 September 2017: https://www.nytimes. com/2017/09/25/world/middleeast/syria-assad-war.html. 42 Worryingly, reconciliation has often empowered former opposition commanders as local proxies who operate with relative autonomy under the aegis provided by nominal loyalty to the Government of Syria. As a result, economic predation, physical security risks, and concerns over vendettas remain. 43 Jasmine el-Gamal, “The Displacement Dilemma: Should Europe Help Syrian Refugees Return Home?” ECFR, March 2019: https://ecfr.eu/archive/ page/-/the_displacement_dilemma_should_europe_help_syrian_refugees_return_home.pdf. 44 “The Most Notable Human rights Violations in Syria in January 2021,” SNHR 4 February 2021: https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Most_ Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_January_2021_en.pdf. 8 Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

and its 1967 protocol, the major international convention that regulates the protection of refugees.48 Research Women and Children First? has shown that women’s asylum claims are often oving beyond a state-centred approach dismissed as being unsubstantiated by a personalised allows for a fuller recognition of who will history of political persecution.49 Additionally, women be affected by actions like the immigration remain underrepresented among those seeking asylum procedures set in motion in part by the in industrialised countries.50 Despite the momentum MCOI report. In this case, it is especially worrying that growing behind inittiaives such as “feminist foreign the decisions will disproportionately affect women and policy” and the mainstreaming of gender, asylum children. The reasons for this impact are symptomatic systems continue to discount violence against women. of the outmoded norms that inform asylum processes For example, in Germany, asylum claims have been more generally. Historically, violence against women refused on the ground that rape is normalised in war has been treated as a matter relevant for private rather zones, and therefore is not considered a form of targeted than public life. It is therefore not surprising that absent persecution.51 Similar determinations have arisen in deeper analytic engagement, the gendered impacts the UK.52 of current refugee policies frequently go unnoticed.45 Women and men often experience contrasting drivers of displacement, they pursue different mobility strategies, Impacts for Women and Children and the obstacles and opportunities they encounter The majority53 of those who have received temporary while living outside their countries of origin differ protection status in Denmark under Article 7(3) of the widely.46 For instance, in conflict settings, as during other Danish Aliens Consolidation Act are women, children, times, it is typically men who are active in politics, are unaccompanied minors, and men above the age of 43. imprisoned or tortured, or face vulnerability as a result According to the most recent available54 figures, for of conflict with other social groups.47 It is generally claims made in 2019, women account for roughly three- men who enlist or are forced into military service with quarters55 of those who receive temporary protection national forces and rebel movements, and men are often status in Denmark.56 As protection status granted under more active and publicly involved in religious, media, Article 7(3) specifically relates to the general conditions and employment spheres — all areas which are more in Syria, it also constitutes the form of protection that is visible to outside observers. most easily revoked. As a result, women and children are heavily represented among the Syrian refugees whose Women are less likely to play visible roles in political status in Denmark is most tenuous. In some cases, opposition movements, and as a result, their fears of Syrian women are granted temporary protection status persecution are often deemed inadequate or unfounded even when their male partners or other family members according to the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention receive more robust guarantees under the Refugee

45 Fonseca et al., Introduction: A Gender-Sensitive Approach to Migration Dynamics, 2018. 46 Fonseca et al., Introduction: A Gender-Sensitive Approach to Migration Dynamics, 2018. 47 “The Danish Asylum and Integration Systems Discriminate against Women from Start to Finish,” refugees.dk 18 December 2020: http://refugees.dk/ en/focus/2020/december/the-danish-asylum-and-integration-systems-discriminate-against-women-from-start-to-finish/. 48 Fonseca et al., Introduction: A Gender-Sensitive Approach to Migration Dynamics, 2018. 49 Jane Freedman, Mainstreaming Gender in Refugee Protection, 2010: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233191017_Mainstreaming_ gender_in_refugee_protection. 50 Statistics that are available show that in Europe, for example, women make up only about one-third of the total asylum claimants (Freedman 2010) 51 Jane Freedman, Mainstreaming Gender in Refugee Protection, 2010: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233191017_Mainstreaming_ gender_in_refugee_protection. 52 Fonseca et al., Introduction: A Gender-Sensitive Approach to Migration Dynamics, 2018. 53 http://refugees.dk/en/facts/legislation-and-definitions/more-about-art-7-3-temporary-protection-status/ 54 For a statistical overview of previous years, please see the Danish Immigration Service website: https://www.nyidanmark.dk/da/Tal-og-statistik/ Tal-og-fakta. 55 Please see report with statistical overview for 2019 on the Danish Immigration Service website, p. 10: https://www.nyidanmark.dk/da/Tal-og- statistik/Tal-og-fakta. 56 Figures from 2017 and 2018 show a similar imbalance between men and women in terms of the types of protection status they receive. Data on gender dispersal from previous years are not available on the Danish Immigration Service website. Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and 9 Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

Convention. This creates fault lines within families Ultimately, gender-based violence and associated and increases the likelihood of split return. It may also protection and security risks in Syria are important, pressure women to return to an area where their fathers, multifaceted issues that demand a holistic, multi- husbands, or brothers may still be wanted by the Syrian sectoral response. However, they remain subjects on authorities, and where they will be vulnerable to new which research is scarce. They are also under-addressed types of protection risks as a result. in implementation, as they require an aid response that not only delivers services and carries out activities, but which also addresses legal, economic, and social One Size Fits All (Men) protections for women that are extremely difficult Broadly speaking, women’s vulnerabilities are often to sustain in the current environment in Syria (see: overlooked or treated as irrelevant to their asylum The Business of Empowering Women: Insights for status.57 Evidence of this is seen in the fact that the Development Programming in Syria). Danish COI report mentions the word “women” only twice. In substantive terms, it also fails to address gender-specific protection risks. This oversight is The Protection of Children especially notable because Denmark has placed strong Impacts for children are also inadequately addressed in emphasis on gender mainstreaming, while issues the Danish process. Based on the most recent figures surrounding gender equity have been a mainstay from 2019, roughly 45 percent of those who received of wider debate on the integration of foreign-born temporary protection status according to Article persons in Denmark. Additionally, Denmark has signed 7(3) are under the age of 17. While data detailing the and ratified the Istanbul Convention, and the Danish demographics of Syrians who have lost their residence population at-large generally espouses concerns over permit since 2020 is scarce, it is known that children gender equality and gender awareness. A version of constitute a large portion of those who have had or the COI report updated in 2020 references “women” are at risk of having their residence permit revoked. 36 times. However, the treatment of gender remains According to media sources, 70 Syrian children received superficial, and almost all of these mentions are made a formal rejection notice59 from the Danish Immigration in reference to two dynamics: women’s preferential Service in response to applications for the renewal of treatment at checkpoints and instances of women being detained as leverage against male relatives wanted by authorities.58

This is not to argue that women are at comparatively As protection status granted greater risk upon return to Syria than men. Rather, it is important to recognise because the failure to under Article 7(3) specifically address gender-specific protection risks is indicative relates to the general conditions of a shortcoming that pervades the international asylum system and legal frameworks more broadly. in Syria, it also constitutes The refugee as perceived by the Refugee Convention the form of protection that was an individual persecuted by a totalitarian regime because of his or her political views or activism. The is most easily revoked. As a persistence of this limited framework has important result, women and children are implications, and it creates gaps in the legal protections afforded to women. Factors such as these must be heavily represented among the accounted for. Regrettably, current norms mean that the Syrian refugees whose status in specific vulnerabilities experienced by women are often rendered invisible or irrelevant. Denmark is most tenuous.

57 Jane Freedman, Gendering the International Asylum and Refugee Debate, 2nd ed. 2018. 58 DIS, “SYRIA, Military Service,” May 2020: https://nyidanmark.dk/-/media/Files/US/Landerapporter/Syrien_FFM_rapport_2019_Final_31012019. pdf?la=da&hash=1D3D1379FE87D3D296B05659F0447C25B0410736 59 These cases will now be processed by the Refugee Appeals Board. 10 Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

their residence permit between 2020 and mid-April has significantly disrupted education in Syria.65 Already, 2021.60 Some of those who were minors when they were one in three schools inside Syria is non-functional due initially granted temporary protection have now spoken to conflict-related damage, destruction, or requisition for publicly about their status.61 The punitive measures that military purposes. Children who do attend school often will be applied by the Danish authorities show no sign do so under acutely poor conditions;66 OCHA estimates of differential treatment; children who refuse – or whose that 94 percent of children in Aleppo, Idleb, and Rural parents refuse – to repatriate after having their grounds Damascus reside in areas with “challenging, extreme or for protection discredited will spend their remaining catastrophic educational conditions”.67 time in Denmark in “exit camps”. According to a report62 by Danish Red Cross, as many as 61 percent of children While some of the appeals made by Syrian children have who reside in one of the Danish detention centers are yet to be processed by the Danish Refugee Appeals Board, likely to meet the criteria for a mental illness, while 50 the process raises significant concerns over children’s percent of the 11- to 17-year-olds experience PTSD. When legal footing within the asylum framework more comparing them to newly arrived refugee children, the generally. One of the ways in which a rejection by the psychologist behind the report estimates that children Danish Immigration Service can be overturned is if the who live in this detention center have double the risk of child in question can document that he or she is at risk developing a mental disorder. of individual persecution in Syria. However, producing evidence to support such a claim can be functionally The large majority of the children who have received impossible for children, especially for those who have temporary protection status after 2015 have attended lived in protracted displacement for long periods of Danish schools for the past six years. Those who lose time. This is a perverse dilemma, given that an absence status will be forced to resume their education at a of documentary or other evidence may itself be a direct detention center, while others63 will be prevented consequence of the circumstances that give rise to the from completing their education altogether. need for protection in the first instance.68 According to a While residence in the Danish detention centres is report by the Norwegian Refugee Council, most displaced purposefully uninviting, conditions inside Syria are far Syrians lack the necessary civil documentation to return worse, including for education. A majority of the KIIs and reintegrate within their respective communities.69 interviewed by COAR cite serious concerns for the future Possession of civil documentation, such as national of their children in Syria as a push factor. At present, identification documents, family booklets, passports, it is estimated64 that more than one third school-aged birth certificates, and marriage certificates, is essential Syrian children do not attend school, a number that has to access basic government services such as healthcare likely increased due to the impact of COVID-19, which and education.70 However, gaining such documentation

60 Emil Hoj and Ulrik Dahlin, “Syrian Refugee Children Can Look Forward to Returning Home or Mentally Stressful Conditions at the Exit Centre,” Information, 20 April 2021: https://www.information.dk/indland/2021/04/syriske-flygtningeboern-kan-se-frem-hjemrejse-psykisk-belastende-forhold- paa-udrejsecenter. 61 The story of the 19-year old Aya Abu-Daher received significant media attention after the renewal of her residence permit was denied only three months before her gradation from Danish highschool: Aljazeera, 12 April 2021 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/12/danish-plan-to-repatriate- syrian-refugees-sparks-controversy 62 https://www.rodekors.dk/sites/rodekors.dk/files/2019-04/2019.03_Sj%C3%A6lsmark_V09_Final_1.pdf 63 Typically those who have turned 18 during their residence in Denmark. 64 “No Lost Generation Advocacy Brief,” June 2020: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/no-lost-generation-2020-advocacy-brief. pdf. 65 “The Most Notable Human rights Violations in Syria in January 2021,” SNHR 4 February 2021: https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Most_ Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_January_2021_en.pdf, p. 7. 66 “The Most Notable Human rights Violations in Syria in January 2021,” SNHR 4 February 2021: https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Most_ Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_January_2021_en.pdf. 67 Emil Hoj and Ulrik Dahlin, “Syrian Refugee Children Can Look Forward to Returning Home or Mentally Stressful Conditions at the Exit Centre,” Information, 20 April 2021: https://www.information.dk/indland/2021/04/syriske-flygtningeboern-kan-se-frem-hjemrejse-psykisk-belastende-forhold- paa-udrejsecenter. 68 “Beyond Proof: Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems,” UNHCR, May 2013: https://www.unhcr.org/51a8a08a9.pdf. 69 “The Darkest Decade: What Displaced Syrians Face if the World continues to Fail Them,” NRC, March 2021: https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/ reports/2021-darkest-decade/darkest-decade/the-darkest-decade.pdf, p. 7. 70 Ibid. Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and 11 Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

outside Syria is both costly and challenging, especially for as IDPs and abroad, as refugees — is all too likely. The women and children whose family members have died or growing pressures for refugee flight from Syria are both have been detained.71 Such documentation is also directly little-recognised and disconcertingly strong. It is hoped linked to the Syrian Government’s security apparatus; that this report can contribute to broader undertakings to a lack of documentation can create a heightened risk of correct the record concerning refugee return and refocus arrest or detention. attention on the possibility that refugee outflows from Syria remain distinctly possible. These risks are on top of continuing security concerns in Syria. The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented Further considerations regarding asylum procedures the death of 36 children in Syria in January, including and Syrian refugee return are offered below. six who were killed by Syrian Government forces.72 According to the same report, children are also at risk of arbitrary arrests by Government forces. Moreover, Do No Harm according to a report73 by the European Institute of Among analysts and practitioners focusing on Syria, Peace, there is precedent for family members not being the Danish government’s decisions concerning Syrian permitted to return as a group, with permissions given asylum-seekers have prompted debate about the to some family members and not others. In some cases, politicisation and instrumentalisation of analysis and individuals who were forcibly evacuated during so- reporting. This is an important lesson for analysts and called reconciliations report being asked to disavow researchers to carry forward in future work and in other family members as a condition for return.74 contexts. It is equally vital that institutional donors, governments, and aid practitioners remain mindful of the potential political and reputational risks created by their approaches to contexts such as Syria. Syrian state media have seized on the events in Denmark to promote the Government of Syria’s own false narrative Conclusion and concerning refugee return. Citing a publicity campaign Recommendations in Copenhagen, the Syrian Arab New Agency noted that Danish positioning on Syrian refugees “confirms the he international community remains fixated fact that Syria became safe after most of its territories on Syrian refugee return. Regrettably, refugees have been liberated from terrorism.”75 Throughout the have too often been treated as a wedge in conflict, the Syrian Government has endeavoured to craft international and domestic political posturing. a more favourable public image by distorting minority TRecent initiatives such as the Russian-sponsored returns opinion, political debate, and procedural events abroad, conference in Damascus add to the politicisation of particularly in the West. Seldom have the Government refugees as long-practised to significant effect by of Syria’s spin doctors been offered such rich material regional host states Lebanon and Turkey (see: Syria for their propagandising. Update 2 November 2020). Despite the outsize attention paid to refugee issues, seldom have sustained, voluntary, large-scale returns taken place, and few if any indicators The ‘Economic Migrant’ Myth suggest that such returns will occur for the foreseeable In Denmark, as in other countries where asylum and future. On the contrary, crisis dynamics, including immigration concerns have become matters of pitched lingering security and protection concerns, in addition political and social debate, developments like Syria’s to Syria’s economic collapse and widening service gaps, ongoing economic collapse have bolstered claims that suggest that further displacement of Syrians — internally economic concerns — not security and protection issues

71 “Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity,” European Institute of Peace, July 2019: https://www.eip.org/wp- content/uploads/2020/06/EIP-Report-Security-and-Refugee-Return-in-Syria-July.pdf, p. 36. 72 “The Most Notable Human rights Violations in Syria in January 2021,” SNHR 4 February 2021: https://sn4hr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/The_Most_ Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_January_2021_en.pdf, p. 15. 73 “Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity,” European Institute of Peace, July 2019: https://www.eip.org/wp- content/uploads/2020/06/EIP-Report-Security-and-Refugee-Return-in-Syria-July.pdf. 74 “Refugee Return in Syria: Dangers, Security Risks and Information Scarcity,” European Institute of Peace, July 2019: https://www.eip.org/wp- content/uploads/2020/06/EIP-Report-Security-and-Refugee-Return-in-Syria-July.pdf, p. 36. 75 “Refugees: You Can Return to Your Homeland, to Sunny Syria as Your country Needs You,” SANA, 17 April 2021: http://sana.sy/en/?p=230158. 12 Point of No Return? Recommendations for Asylum and Refugee Issues Between Denmark and Damascus

— are the motivating factor behind immigration. Whilst to exert greater pressure concerning their own refugee deteriorating socioeconomic conditions undoubtedly do populations. Actions in Western Europe may reverberate contribute to decision-making regarding displacement, throughout the European neighbourhood. KIIs interviewed by COAR indicate unambiguously that security concerns remain the primary reason for leaving the country. Of 25 research participants, all Cracks in the Refugee Convention cited security and protection concerns as the primary The events in Denmark can erode global refugee motivating factor in recent or intended displacement. protections even if no asylum-seeker is ever repatriated to Syria. Subversion of the Refugee Convention in the current case reveals the fragility of the underlying Some Syrians Are Too Poor to Leave asylum framework, and it shows the worrying degree Many Syrians are simply too poor to displace, irrespective to which the system is susceptible to politically of the justified protection concerns they must confront. motivated interpretation. The shortcomings concerning The high cost of bribes and transit needed to flee the vulnerability criteria for women and children in country means that the Syrians who have remained in particular are emblematic of the blindspots that pervade the country are likely disproportionately among the the global asylum system, which is already at risk of most disadvantaged and vulnerable. being rendered meaningless in the context of the evolving norms of modern conflict.

Future Displacement Is Probable Security and protection concerns have a two-fold Does Europe Trust Damascus? significance in the context of displacement in Syria. The displacement of Syrians today is essentially linked Concerns related to detention, arrest, military to the conflict itself, which is in turn a product of misrule conscription, and other factors have routinely been by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Since the onset of identified as primary push factors driving Syrians the popular uprising in 2011, Western governments have to displace as refugees. They also remain barriers to expended considerable effort and resources supporting return.76 Therefore, the needs of current and future alternate civil society, governance, administrative, and refugees must, to some extent, be addressed by targeting service systems to those offered by the Government of the same root causes. Syria, based on the reasonable expectation that al-Assad would be forced to accede to popular demands and surrender power. Many of the same foreign governments Beware Bad Precedent still maintain that al-Assad’s rule is the fundamental Bad asylum decisions create bad precedent. Denmark impediment preventing them from engaging in is the first EU member state to rule that law-abiding economic and political normalisation to return Syria to refugees can be sent back to Syria. Pressures elsewhere the wider community of nations. Al-Assad’s persistence are growing, however. In December, Germany’s ban on in office will be a paramount challenge for the Syria deportation to Syria was allowed to expire, although response and the international community for the basic protections against deportation remain in place foreseeable future. Syrians themselves will also contend except for Syrian nationals who have committed with thorny considerations over al-Assad’s staying criminal offences or who are deemed a serious risk to power. Those who feel justified fears over protection public security.77 More recently, Austrian officials have and security risks are unlikely to place confidence in the stated that they are following the progress of asylum guarantees of safety made by the Government of Syria, procedures in Denmark as a potential guide for actions so long as the international community itself remains in Austria.78 Waning social and political support for equally unwilling to engage Damascus. Refugee host refugees creates a risk that other states will follow suit. governments should not ask refugees to make leaps of Such developments may embolden regional host states faith which they themselves refuse to undertake.

76 See for example: Peace & Recovery, Policy Brief, “Returning Home? Conditions in Syria, Not Lebanon, Drive the Return Intentions of Syrian Refugees,” September 2020: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PR%20Syrian%20Refugees%20Policy%20Brief_2020.09.25.pdf or Immigration Policy Lab, Working Paper No. 20-08, “The Dynamics of Refugee Return: Syrian Refugees and Their Migration Intentions,” 9 November 2020: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/7t2wd/ 77 Benjamin Bathke, “What the End of Germany’s Deportation Ban Could Mean for Syrians,” Info Migrants, 8 January 2021, https://www.infomigrants. net/en/post/29514/what-the-end-of-germany-s-deportation-ban-could-mean-for-syrians. 78 Raja Abdulrahim, “Syrians Are Stripped of Refugee Protection in Denmark: Now You Are Telling Us to Go?” 17 April 2021: https://www.wsj.com/ articles/syrians-are-stripped-of-refugee-protection-in-denmark-now-you-are-telling-us-to-go-11618660800 The Wartime and Post-Conflict Syria project (WPCS) is funded by the European Union and implemented through a partnership between the European University Institute (Middle East Directions Programme) and the Center for Operational Analysis and Research (COAR). WPCS will provide operational and strategic analysis to policymakers and programmers concerning prospects, challenges, trends, and policy options with respect to a conflict and post-conflict Syria. WPCS also aims to stimulate new approaches and policy responses to the Syrian conflict through a regular dialogue between researchers, policymakers and donors, and implementers, as well as to build a new network of Syrian researchers that will contribute to research informing international policy and practice related to their country. The content compiled and presented by COAR is by no means exhaustive and does not reflect COAR’s formal position, political or otherwise, on the aforementioned topics. The information, assessments, and analysis provided by COAR are only to inform humanitarian and development programs and policy. While this publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union, its contents are the sole responsibility of COAR Global LTD, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.