Niger

Klaas van Walraven

Two years into president ’s second term, relations with the opposition were as poor as ever, despite a brief improvement during talks on elec- toral reform, as administration hardliners were determined to neutralise opposi- tion leader Hama Amadou for good, in part tied to manoeuvring ahead of the 2021 elections. The opposition aimed to strengthen its position with a new platform and boost its international standing by posing as the moderate alternative to Issoufou’s implacable government. However, its marginality left a void that was filled by civil society groups, which mobilised continuing discontent over 2017/18 budget measures. The administration dug in its heels and, after several demonstrations, cracked down on NGO leaders, using the threat posed by armed jihadists as an ex- cuse to ban protest. With regard to the latter problem, the armed forces held their own, benefiting from Western hardware and collaborating with the French and US military. The foreign military presence (object of popular displeasure) only grew. now harboured the second largest US presence on the continent. Western powers continued to see Niger as a key interlocutor on migration and terrorism, to the point of ignoring social discontent and administration heavy-handedness.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004417663_016 Niger 135

Donor aid continued to stream in. In the north-west and south-east, attacks by in- surgent groups continued intermittently. The situation in the west was compound- ed by declining security on the border with , now also an operational zone for jihadist groups. Insurgents kidnapped a German aid worker and an Italian missionary. In the south-east, violence by Boko Haram forces increased during the last quarter. As in the previous year, several women were abducted and taken to hideouts in Nigeria or Chad. Economic performance benefited from higher oil pric- es and a rebound in Nigeria. New taxes, applauded by the IMF and EU, were intro- duced to tackle the growing deficit. Both at the Algerian border and in the east, new oil wells were struck. Heavy rains led to floods, destroying houses, fields, and cattle and damaging infrastructure, including the Arlit-Agadez- motorway, vital for the country’s uranium exports.

Domestic Politics

On 12 April foreign minister Ibrahim Yacouba resigned his post to establish a new political party, the ‘Front Patriotique’. President Issoufou, who had declared to re- spect the constitution’s ban on a third term, spent much time on foreign travel, earning him the nickname ‘Rumbo’, after a local bus firm. It allowed Issoufou’s closest acolytes to try and solidify their position. Those in Issoufou’s inner circle and possible presidential hopefuls for 2021 included finance minister Hassoumi Massadou, and interior minister and government strongman . Though a minority Arab, the latter’s presidency of the ruling ‘Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme’ (PNDS) afforded him a power base amidst an admin- istration marked by numerous ministerial posts (43) and advisory positions (whose accompanying perks were the object of popular criticism). The multi-party opposition struggled on, controlling only 33 of the National Assembly’s 171 seats. It was also hindered by the exile in of its leader, Hama Amadou, of the ‘Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien’ (Moden-Lumana). He had been condemned on appeal in 2017 to one year in prison for alleged involve- ment in a baby-trafficking scandal. On 11 April this sentence was confirmed by the Supreme Court. While Amadou maintained his silence, even as opposition leaders consulted him on all major decisions, others attempted to fill the void. Principal among these were Amadou Ali Djibo, the interim leader, who controlled meet- ings of the alliance of opposition parties, the ‘Front pour la Restauration de la Démocratie et la Défense de la République’ (FRDDR), and Soumana Sanda, Moden chief for the capital, Niamey. Faced with two competing coalitions, the ‘Front de l’Opposition Indépendante’ (FOI) and the ‘Front des Partis Politiques Non Affiliés pour l’Alternance Démocratique’ (FPNAD), the FRDDR’s opposition was far from