ETHNIC RESTRATIFICATION IN RUSSIA 'S REPUBLICS

Robert J. Kaiser University of Wisconsin-Madiso n

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 910 17th Street, N.W . Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20006

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

Project Information

Sponsoring Institution : University of Wisconsin-Madiso n

Principal Investigator : Robert J. Kaiser

Council Contract Number : 813-18 g

Date : April 10, 200 0

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Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from researc h funded through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and Eas t European Research (NCEEER) . However, the NCEEER and the United State s Government have the right to duplicate and disseminate, in written and electronic form , reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract or Grant Agreements either (a) fo r NCEEER ' s own internal use, or (b) for use by the United States Government, and a s follows: (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments , entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) fo r dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy o f the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the Unite d States Government . Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipien t of this Report may use it for commercial sale .

* The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant fund s provided by the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds whic h were made available by the U .S . Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-Eas t European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis an d interpretations contained herein are those of the author . ETHNIC RESTRATIFICATION IN RUSSIA'S REPUBLICS

Robert J. Kaiser University of Wisconsin — Madison

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research 910 17 th Street, N.W . Suite 300 Washington, D .C. 20006

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

ProjectInformation*

Contractor: University of Wisconsin — Madiso n

Principal Investigator : Robert J . Kaise r

Council Contract Number : 813-18g

Date : April 10, 2000

Copyright Informatio n

Individual researchers retain the copyright on their work products derived from research funde d through a contract or grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Researc h (NCEEER). However, the NCEEER and the United States Government have the right to duplicat e and disseminate, in written and electronic form, reports submitted to NCEEER to fulfill Contract o r Grant Agreements either (a) for NCEEER's own internal use, or (b) for use by the United State s Government, and as follows : (1) for further dissemination to domestic, international, and foreign governments, entities and/or individuals to serve official United States Government purposes or (2) for dissemination in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act or other law or policy of the United States Government granting the public access to documents held by the United State s Government. Neither NCEEER nor the United States Government nor any recipient of thi s Report may use it for commercial sale .

The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by th e National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available b y the U.S. Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, as amended) . The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author . Executive summary

This paper is part of a project about the attempts by titular elites in the republics of the Russia n

Federation to build ethnic homelands – i .e., networks of ethno-social interaction that favor titular group members at the expense of ethnic others – in the post-Soviet period . An earlier paper assessed the degre e to which political indigenization has occurred in Russia's republics, analyzed the causes of politica l indigenization, and identified geographic variability in this process. This paper explores the impact o f titular nationalization on people's daily lives : to what extent has political indigenization resulted in a n ethnic restratification of the cultural and socio-economic spheres in the republics? It concludes that i n those republics where ethnic restratification has been vigorously pursued – mostly in eastern Russia an d the North Caucasus – the result has been the formation of two separate types of network of socia l interaction : Russian-dominated networks in the "productive economic sectors . " and titular dominate d cultural and political networks . An earlier working paper derived from this project assessed the degree to which politica l indigenization has occurred in Russia's republics, using a combination of newly available quantitative an d qualitative data at the republic and rayon level (Kaiser 2000) . The causes of political indigenization an d the geographic variability in this process were analyzed, and served as an indicator of the extent to whic h

Russia's republics should be considered titular homelands, i .e., networks of ethno-social interaction that

favor titular group members to the detriment or exclusion of ethnic others . A major geographic divisio n

in the Russian Federation was identified between the republics of European Russia on the one hand and those in the "periphery " (i .e . . Eastern Russia and the North Caucasus) on the other . In the republics o f

European Russia . Russification of the political sector predominated . while political indigenization toward titular groups was much more pronounced in the republics located in Russia's periphery . Overall, a rayon-level analysis also revealed that even the republics of European Russia are not ethnically neutral o r

"internationalized" places, and that ethnically defined networks of social interaction at a local geographi c

scale continue to exert a strong influence in mediating political behavior in all of Russia's republics .

The second major question raised in this research project assesses the degree to which the titula r nationalization that has occurred in the republics has had an impact on people's day-to-day lives . In othe r

words, to what extent has the political indigenization in evidence resulted in an ethnic restratification i n

the cultural and socioeconomic lives and "life-chances" of the population living in the republics . Thi s

question serves as the primary focus in the present report .

To examine this question — to the extent that it is possible in the cases of cultural an d

socioeconomic indigenization — I will again use the rayon-level data bases that were collected, correcte d

for data and geographic comparability. and connected to a set of boundary files in a Geographi c

Information System (Kaiser 1999) . Unfortunately, occupation data by ethnicity are not available afte r

1989. In addition, cultural restratification data are primarily available at the republic scale rather than a t

the local, rayon scale. Nevertheless, a newly available rayon-level data set of economic and demographi c

indicators from the republics for the period 1988-94 was acquired and is incorporated into this analysis .

Coupled with the rayon-level ethnic data from the 1989 census, this will allow for an assessment of ho w

1 titular rayons and non-titular rayons fared during the first half of the 1990s . ' Coupled with th

e republic-level cultural data, as well as qualitative information provided through surveys and interviews, this stud y represents the most comprehensive set of information that has been assembled to date for Russia' s republics overall, and should allow for a more accurate analysis of the cultural and socioeconomi c indigenization that has occurred iii Russia's republics during the post-Soviet era .

Cultural indigenization

This report begins with a review of the ethno-cultural restratification that has occurred in Russia ' s

republics, focusing on changes in the status of titular language usage in schools . This measure wa s

selected primarily because of the central role played by language in providing both symbolic an d

instrumental advantages to those who are most fluent in it . Improvements in the status of the titula r

languages in Russia's republics within the school system indicate that an attempt is being made by titula r

elites to ethnically restratify not only cultural but also socioeconomic relations in favor of titular grou p

members. This cultural indigenization — when aiid where it is occurring — places Russians in particular a t

a disadvantage, since few Russians living in these non-Russian places have more than a passin g

familiarity with the titular languages . On the other hand, the loss of a centrally mandated ethnic quota

system during the post-Soviet era has resulted in a further russification of political elites in the republic s

of European Russia, and a complementary process of more extensive linguistic russification rather than a

shift in favor of the titular languages is predicted as the dominant trend in these republics .

It is necessary to begin this analysis by noting that the status and utility of titular languages in th e

autonomous republics and oblasts of the RSFSR were generally lower than was the case for the titula r

languages in the former union republics . It is equally true that the position of titular languages vane d

significantly among the republics . During the period from 1958 to 1980, students could, in principle ,

study in the titular language through secondary school in the Tatar and Bashkir ASSRs, and through th e

Titular rayons are defyned as those where the titular group(s) comprise a majority or plurality of the population . Non-titular rayons are those in which the members of one non-titular group (most often Russians) make up a

2 eighth year in the Yakut and Tuvin ASSRs . At the other end of the spectrum, titular language schoolin g was not available beyond pre-school in Kalmykia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karelia, Chechen-Ingushetia ,

North Ossetia or Karachay-Cherkessia (Kaiser 1994. 414-15) . More recent data indicate that titular language schooling was also unavailable by the 1980s in the Buryat, Komi, and Udmurt ASSR s

(Goskomstat Rossii 1994, 90-92) . The same recently released data reveal that the number of titular language schools and the number of students enrolled in them declined dramatically during the 1980s i n

Tatarstan, Mordovia, Chuvashia, and Bashkortostan . In all of the republics, the Russian language wa s clearly dominant in the public schools, and was becoming more so during the late Soviet era – even i n those more peripheral republics where the titular languages had enjoyed greater standing in the past .

This linguistic "russification" is the cultural context within which the republics of the Russia n

Federation entered the period of Soviet disintegration . Not surprisingly, the language laws an d declarations of sovereignty that were passed in most of the autonomous republics, oblasts and okrug s provided an official status for the titular language(s), even while most also continued to accept Russian a s the language of "international communication, " and to proclaim that all peoples had the right to use thei r own languages (e.g ., Mares'yev 1993, I09-114; Chervonnaya 1996, 184-195 ; Guboglo 1992, 235-246 :

Iskhakov 1998. 48-58 : Guchinova and Komarova 1995 . 73-84: Shabayev 1994, 129-133 : Gostiyev and

Dzadziyev 1995 . 134-142). The special status of the titular language and the need for the republi c government — as the goveriiment of the titular groups homeland -- to promote and support it, is noted in several of the language laws . For example, the language law in the Komi Republic states that : "In the

Komi Republic, which is the sole and primordial territory of the Komi people . the Komi language is the object of special concern for the state aiid is placed under its protection " (Shabayev 1994, 129) .

Similarly, the language law of Mari-El proclaims that : "The Republic of Mari-El, being the only state formation of the Mari people, provides support for the retention and development of the Mari language, a s the basis of all its national culture" (Chervonnaya 1996, 184) .

majority or plurality of the population . In a review of the language laws published during the early 1990s, the need for the state to play a special role in protecting and promoting the titular language was particularly prevalent in the republics o f

European Russia . i.e ., those that had experienced greater levels of linguistic russification during th e

Soviet period . Nevertheless, a similar discourse proclaiming special status for the titular languag e because of its status as the language of the homeland nation, while at the same time declaring that there i s no discrimination on the basis of language or culture, was present in nearly all of the language laws o f

Russia's republics . This formula could be used to describe the post-Soviet titular nationalization projects generally, which tend to proclaim special proprietary rights for the titular nation as the one nationa l community that truly belongs in the republic, while at the same time declariiig that in the republic there i s no ethno-cultural bias or discrimiiiatioii . and that members of all ethno-national communities are treate d equally . To some extent, this may be a reflectioii of the continuing influence of Soviet era discourse s about "solving the iiational problem " . which were formulated on a similar dialectical approach that promoted both titular group privileges "at home " and interethnic equalization in the USSR overall (Kaiser

1994) .

Political elites writing and passing language laws and other legislation related to the cultura l status of the titular group in its home republic were also almost certainly attempting to strike a balanc e between the more exclusionary demands espoused by representatives of titular national reviva l movements on the one hand, and the interests and concerns of the sizable iion-titular populations living i n these republics on the other. Of particular concern in the latter category is the presence of a large Russia n population, which is important not only due to its iiumerical size and its socioeconomic significance i n most of the republics, but also because of its status as the state-nation in Russia as a whole .

This balancing act has been diffycult to maintain, and in nationalizing republics the tendency ha s been to side with cultural indigenization over interethnic equality when a choice has to be made .

Although the rhetoric of interiiational equality is maintained, increasing amounts of the nationalizin g republics' resources are being devoted to the support and promotion of the titular language and culture .

This "international in form, national in content" (and intent) approach has been most apparent in the

4 republics of the North Caucasus and eastern Russia, as is indicated in the analysis below . In European

Russia, while lip service is paid to the need for greater support for the titular language and culture, there i s very little evidence that this has been translated into cultural indigenization in these republics .

Analysi s

Utility of titular and Russian languages

A relatively unique set of data that was published as part of the 1994 Russian microcensu s provides a comparative assessment of first or native language claimed in the census . the language normally spoken at home . the language of instruction in school and the primary language spoken or use d at work (see Table I . below) . - The first thine to note about these data is the gap between the percentag e of titular group members who claim the titular language as their first or native language, and th e percentage who use it as their primary laiiguage at home . The higher percentage who claim the titula r language as their first language thaii the percentage who use the titular language at home provides a reasonably good indication that the census question on first language in the USSR and in the post-Sovie t era is not a measure of fluency or even utility, and should not be read as such . Rather, titular member s claiming the titular language as their first or native language in their home republics were and are usin g the language category as another means of expressing their ethno-national identity . In other words, th e high perceiit of titular group members living in their home republics who proclaim the titular language a s their first or primary language should be read as a vote for the titular nation and the primacy of it s language in its homeland . The gap between the first language cate g ory in the census and the language spoken at home could also be seen as the difference between a linguistic ideal imagined by titular grou p members (i .e ., the way things should be) and the linguistic reality of life in the republic (i .e., the wa y things are) .

The 1994 microcensus sur v eyed a five percent representative sample of the population . Problems with the accuracy of the representativeness of this microcensus have been raised . However, the language usage data do i n general conform to specific studies conducted in the past and during the 1990s on language fluency, responses to the Table 1

Titular and Russian Language Usage by Members of Titular Groups Living in Their Hom e Republics, 1994 (Percent)

Titula r Titula r Titular Titular Russian Russian Russia n Correlations First Home School Work First Home Schoo l Titular Home 0 .82 6 Titular School 0 .I31 028 5 Titular Work 0 .314 0 .492 0 .86 0 Russian First -0.948 -0 .826 -0.170 -0 .32 6 Russian Home -0 785 -0 .987 -0.298 -0 .49I 0 .83 7 Russian School -0.131 -0 .285 -I .000 -0 .860 0 .170 0 .29 8 Russian Work -0.314 -0 .494 -0.859 -1 .000 0 .326 0 .493 0.859 language question in censuses, and day-to-day usage of language in school and work (e .g ., Guboglo 1984 ; Drobizheva 1994) . The results of the Drobizheva survey questions on language usage are included as Table 2 .

6 The second interesting relationship that these data reveal is that the percentage of titular grou p members claiming the titular language as their first or native language is most strongly correlated wit h titular laiiguage spoken at home, but only weakly correlated with titular language use at school and work .

In terms of influence on linguistic assimilation and perceptual ties to the titular language, this suggest s that it is the language spoken in the home environment that determines attitudes toward the titula r language, and. more fundamentally, that titular group parents are a powerful nationalizing agent . It appears as though the language of instruction in school has little impact either on loyalty to the titula r language or on the language spoken at home, although obviously it will be more closely related to actua l fluency levels . This finding is certainly contrary to the belief typically expressed by titular nationalist s that the loss of titular language schoolin g results in denationalization, or "russification ." It reinforces th e notion of national identity as primarily a subjective sense of belonging that is not immediately or directl y affected by objective trends such as flueiicy iii the national language .

The correlation between the primary language used at school and work is much stronger than th e correlation between native language claimed in the ceiisus and principal language of instruction in school .

Interestingly, in comparison with the language of instruction in school, the primary language used at wor k was more stroiigly related with language spoken at home and first language claimed in the census . Th e cultural networks of social interaction revealed by these data indicate that self-identification with a give n language for titular group members living in their home republics is inter-related with language spoken a t home, which for most members of most titular groups continues to be the titular language . On the other hand, the socioeconomic networks of social interaction in most of the republics are dominated by th e

Russian language . In other words. the titular groups in iiearly all of Russia's republics have to continuall y negotiate between being m place " in their homes and neighborhoods, where the titular language an d culture predominate, and "out of place" at school and work, where the Russian language and cultur e remain hegemonic . It is only in Altay, Sakha, Tyva, and perhaps Chuvashia where this was not the case ,

according to the 1994 microcensus . In those republics, the socioeconomic networks of social interaction

were also dominated by the titular language .

7 In surveys coiiducted during the 1990s . this general division between home on the one hand, an d school and work on the other . is once again apparent for titular group members living in their hom e republics (see Table 2 . below). Not surprisingly, this cultural divide is less apparent in rural areas than i n cities . In addition, the stark division iioted above may be more apparent than real . since a fairly sizabl e percentage of titular group members in rural and urban areas claim that they use the titular language an d

Russian equally at work . and that their children go to schools where both the titular and the Russia n languages are used in instruction . The major cultural geographic divide within Russia ' s republics (or at least those where titular iiationalization is occurring) is betweeii the more titular/bilingual places in whic h titular group members live out their daily lives on the one hand . and the "Russian-only " network of socia l interaction that encompass Russians in nearly all aspects of their day-to-day lives in both urban and rura l settings within these republics .

With greater cultural and economic decentralization after 1991 . one could anticipate increasing pressure for cultural indigenization . which would also result in aii ethnic restratification of economic life in favor of titular group members . As discussed above, this need for titular cultural revival was apparen t in several of the sovereignty declarations, and was even more prominently displayed in the language law s that followed . Targetiiig the language of iiistruction in schools . aiid attemptin g to expand the number o f schools in which the titular language serves as the language of iiistruction, is one of the most obviou s ways in which a nationalizing elite can bring about ethnic restratification of both cultural an d socioeconomic life in the republic . Even though this is unlikely to influence national self-consciousness , reinforcing the status and official standing of the titular languages in schools is certain to enhance bot h the symbolic standing of the titular group in its homeland . and also the instrumental utility of the titular language at work. The following section reviews the most recent trends regarding the language o f instruction used in schools in Russia's republics .

8 Table 2

Fluency and Usage of the Titular and Russian Language among Titular Group Members and Russians in Tatarstan, North Ossetia, Sakha and Tyva, 1994 (Percent of Urban and Rural Respondents )

Language of Language Spoke n Language Spoke n Language of Instruction Highest Fluency at Home at Work in Schoo l Titular Russian Both Titular Russian Both Titular Russian Both Titular Russian Bot h

Tatarsta n Urban Tatars 29 .8 24.1 46 .1 48 .4 22 .0 29 .6 14 . I 48 .4 37 .5 12 .1 65 .4 18 . 6 Rural Tatars 85 .6 1 .9 12 .5 98 .6 1 .4 0 .0 92 .1 1 .2 6.7 56 .6 23 .3 19 . 5 Urbaii Russians 0.3 98 .3 l .1 0.3 99.7 0 .0 0 .3 98 .5 1 .2 0 .4 84 .4 9 . 3 Rural Russians 1 .5 95 .4 3 .1 I .5 96.9 I .6 3 .9 92 .2 3 .9 0 .0 100 .0 0 . 0 North Osseti a Urban Ossetins 12.8 I8 .4 68.5 48 .0 I7 .4 34.6 15 .2 42 .2 42 .6 1 .0 52 .5 39 . 5 Rural Ossetins 37.9 3 .7 58.4 75 .6 3 .2 21 .2 37 .9 18 .9 43 .2 1 .6 27 .3 70 . 3 Urban Russians 0.0 98 .1 1 .9 0 .3 98 .4 1 .3 0 .3 99 .1 0 .6 0.0 89 .1 2 . 7 Rural Russians 0.0 100 .0 0 .0 0 .0 100 .0 0 .0 0 .0 100 .0 0 .0 0.0 97 .3 0 . 0 Sakha Urbaii Sakha 23 .5 24 .4 51 .8 47 .2 24 .0 28 .8 16 .3 49 .4 34 .3 14.8 53 .7 28 . 6 Rural Sakha 49 .9 5 .2 44.9 75 .1 9 .5 15 .4 64 .6 15 .9 19 .5 25 .3 21 .0 53 . 7 Urban Russians 0 .0 92 .5 7 .2 1 .5 94 .0 4 .5 l .8 93 .9 4 .3 0.0 94 .0 5 . 6 Rural Russians 5 .5 85 .2 9 .3 5 .6 92 .6 1 .8 4 .0 90 .0 6 .0 0.0 92 .1 7 . 9 Tyva Urban Tyvans 51 .9 6.7 4I .4 77 .4 7 .9 14 .7 35 .6 22 .7 41 .7 24.7 14.4 59 . 6 Rural Tyvans 46 .5 0.9 52 .1 85 .0 1 .9 13 .1 36 .1 11 .0 52 .9 16.4 11 .4 70 . 0 Urban Russians 0 .0 98 .6 1 .4 0 .3 98 .9 0.8 0 .3 98 .5 1 .2 0.0 94 .2 4 . 6 Rural Russians 0 .0 94.8 5 .2 1 .7 98 .3 0.0 1 .9 96 .2 1 .9 5 .9 88 .2 5 .9 Source: L . Drobizheva, Etnokul 'turnaya Situatsiya v Respublikakh Rossiiskoi' Federatsii, vypusk 4 (Moskva: Institut Etnologii i Antropologii RAN, 1994), pp. 11-14 .

9 Titular language schooling

According to the findings established in the first working paper, two relationships in the data o n language of instruction in schools are anticipated . First, in those republics where the titular language s were the most firinly established as languages of instruction in the Soviet period . I expect to find the mos t rapid increase in cultural indigenization during the 1990s . This certainly would track with the finding s regarding political indigenization : It was in those republics where titular groups were over-represented o r even dominant during the Soviet period that political indigenization proceeded most dramatically sinc e

1991 . This is somewhat counterintuitive . siiice it is in those republics where the titular language is in the weakest position that I fouiid the stroiigest support for the maintenance and promotion of the titular language, at least as this was expressed in the language laws aiid republic constitutions .

The second hypothesis regarding trends in titular language schooling is that in those republic s where political indigenization was most proiiounced . I also expect that titular political elites will mor e effectively promote the expansion of the titular language as the language of iiistruction in schools in their republics. Both of these hypothetical relationships should work together to create a growing gap betwee n those republics where ethnic restratification toward titular group dominance is well under way and thos e where either little indigenization or even russification is occurring in the post-Soviet period .

The trends in language of instruction during the 1990-95 period — the most recent period for which data are available are presented in Graphs 1 and 2 (at the end of this paper) . As to th e first hypothesis, the correlation between the percentage of students enrolled in titular language schools in 199 1 and the percentage point change in the same measure from 199I to 1995 was a relatively strong an d positive .508 . Tyva, Sakha and Tatarstan were not only three of the top five republics in terms of th e share of their students attending schools where the titular language was used as a language of instructio n in 1991 : they were also among the top five republics in the rate of increase in this measure of cultura l indigenization during the 1990s .

Altay and Chuvashia – two of' the top five republics in terms of the percentage of students i n titular language schools in 1991 — were not ranked in the top five by 1995 . The percentage of students i n

1 0 titular language schools did increase in Altay during the 1990s. but at a relatively slow rate . Nevertheless ,

Altay still ranked in the top five republics when the share of students in titular language schools wa s indexed to the titular percent of the republic's population (Graph 2) . Chuvashia actually experienced a declining perceiitage during the 1990s . both in the percentage of total students enrolled (Graph 1) and i n the indexed value adjusted for the titular groups' share of total population (Graph 2) .

The ranking and change in position during the 1990s in these two republics is due more to ethni c demography than to ethnonationalism . In Altay, the slow growth in the share of students in titular language schools is a reflection of the relatively small proportion of the total population in the republi c that is Altay by nationality . In Chuvashia. the high ranking in 1991 was more a reflection of the relativel y large share of the total population in the republic that is ethnically Chuvash . rather than a reflection of an y concerted effort to ethnically restratify the republic on the part of Chuvash nationalists . Chuvashia wa s also the only republic ranked among the top five in 199I that is located in the European part of Russia , where little if any nationalization is in evidence during the post-Soviet period, as I concluded in the earlie r working paper .

Several republics in Russia's periphery experienced rapid cultural indigenization during th e

1990s according to this measure . and these tended to be those republics in which political indigenization was also most pronounced (Kaiser 2000) . In addition to Tyva . Sakha and Tatarstan, which were alread y mentioned above, dramatic increases in the percentage of students enrolled in titular language school s occurred in Dagestan . Kabardino-Balkaria. North Ossetia, and especially Chechen-Ingushetia . For the latter three republics, there were no schools that used the titular language as the language of instruction during the 1980s (Goskomstat Rossii 1994 : 90-2) . This meant that new titular language curricula , textbooks and other teaching materials, and a new corps of titular language teachers had to be create d essentially from scratch, making the shift toward titular language schools during the first half of the 1990 s all the more impressive . Bashkortostan is the one republic that experienced substantial politica l

indigenization during the 1990s but where a dramatic shift toward titular language schooling did not

occur. However, when the percentage of students attending titular language schools is adjusted by th e

1 1

Bashkir percentage of the total population . Bashkorstostan's ranking increases from ninth place to third .

just behind Tyva and Sakha (Graph 2) .

Overall, the cultural indigenization pattern that is evidenced by trends in the share of student s

attending titular language schools during the 1990s confirms the conclusions drawn in the first workin g

paper regarding political indigenization . and supports the two hypotheses stated above . It also indicate s

that even though several of the republics in European Russia included more exclusionary soundin g

clauses regarding the status of the titular language in theyr language laws . they have not been able t o

ethnically restratify' cultural relations iii favor of the titular groups .

Because three of the seven republics that experienced rapid cultural indigenization during th e

1990s were republics with more than one titular group (i .e . . Dagestan . Kabardino-Balkaria and Chechen -

Ingushetia), a subsequent question arises as to the ethnic restratification in evidence : did this shift i n favor

of titular language schools benefit all titular groups equally or privilege some over others? Given th e

pattern of political indigenization found in these republics in the first working paper . I hypothesize tha t

cultural indigenization has also tended to favor one titular group over all others, as part of an overal l

"Kabardinization," and "Avarization" taking place in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan respectively . A

similar "Chechenization" is aiiticipated in Chechen-Ingushetia, primarily since it was Cheche n

nationalists who were pressing a separatist agenda during the early 1990s . The data for the individua l

titular languages in these republics are provided in Table below .

I 2

Table 3

Share of Students in Titular Language Schools, 1990-94 (Percent of Total Students )

Titular Group's % Republic/ % point of Total Populatio n Titular Language 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 change 1989 1994 Dagestan : Avar 3 .6 5 .5 6.9 7 .7 4 .l 27.5 29 . 2 Dargin 2 .5 3 .6 4.2 4 .6 2 .l 15 .6 15 . 6 Kumyk 1 .6 2 .5 3 .0 3 .3 l .7 12 .9 13 . 2 Lezgin 1 .1 2 .5 3 .2 3 .6 2 .5 11 .3 12 . 9 Lak 0 .8 0 .5 0 .5 0 . 4 -0.4 5 .1 4 . 2 Others 0.6 0 .9 l .0 1 .2 0 .6 7 .8 8 . 5 Kabardino-Balkari a Kabardin 4.8 I5 .4 12 .6 14 .5 9 .7 48 .2 48 . 8 Balkar 0.5 0.7 1 .2 1 .3 0 .8 9 .4 9 . 2 Chechen-Ingushetia Chechen 4.6 9.9 16 .2 na 11 .6 57 .8 na Ingush 0 .4 0.9 0.3 na _ -0 .1 12 .9 na

Sources: Education Data : Goskomstat Rossii . Obrazovaniye v Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Moskva. 1994) , pp. 90-2 . Population Data : Statisticheskiy Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv (SNG) . I togi Vsesoyuznoy Perepis i Naseleniya /989 Goda (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1993), vol. 7; Goskomstat Rossii , Raspredeleniye NaselenIia Rossii po Vladeniyu Yazykami (P o Dannym Mikroperepisi Naseleniya 1994 g.) (Moskva: Goskomstat Rossii, 1995).

1 3 As with political indigenization . in republics with two or more titular groups . ethni c restratification in the cultural arena is occurring unevenly, and has tended to favor the same titular grou p that is becoming politically dominaiit . In the realm of cultural indigenization this was most apparent in

Kabardino-Balkaria and Checheno-Ingushetia . where clear evidence of a Kabardinization and

Chechenization of schools occurred.' In Dagestan, the four largest titular groups all benefited from th e cultural indigenization occurring in the 1990s. Nevertheless. there was also a shift in the direction of a n

Avarization of schools . This somewhat more equivocal picture in Dagestan was also found regarding the political indigenization takiiig place in that republic. where a greater effort to support the equal status o f the titular groups was in evidence (Kaiser 2000) . 4

In those republics engaged in titular nation-building, the ethnic restratification of schools involve s not only a shift in favor of titular laiiguages, but also in favor of a more nationalized version of the subjec t matter taught in schools . New classes emphasizing the geography . culture . literature and history of the republic aiid the titular group have been introduced in several of the nationalizing republics in Russia' s periphery as part of the nation- and homeland-building projects . The republic-level production of teachiiig materials that emphasize a deeper kiiowledge and love of the republic have also been prominen t during the 1990s . Iii explaynin g this republican-ceiitric shift iii emphasis, Bashkortostan's minister o f

Education. Firdaus Khisamitdinova. declared that (as quoted in Graney 1999, 615) :

The goal of forming citizens of Bashkortostan must be pursued in all classes, not jus t civics class . For example . biology must be taught through textbooks dealing with loca l biology, our native land and species . so people learn to love it as their homeland this i s our land. We want to teach children to love their own Bashkortostan ! Although the above quote indicates a desire to create a homeland coiisciousness among the entir e population of Bashkortostan, the way iii which the republic is depicted in textbooks is predominantly a s

' The declining number of students in schools where Ingush was the language of instruction between 1991/92 an d 1992/93 may partially he explained by the fact that Ingushetia seceded from Chechnya in 1992 . However, the tota l number of students reported for the 1992/93 school year did not decline significantly, and no footnote explaining th e declining number of students in Ingush language schools as a consequence of Ingushetia's secession was included i n the published data . It may be the case that Ingush language schools were closed in 1992 in response to Ingushetia' s decision to sign the Federation Treaty with Russia and to secede from Chechnya . No subsequent educational data are available for either Chechnya or Ingushetia . 4 See also Ware and Kisriev (1999) . 1 4 the ancestral homeland of the Bashkir people, rather than as a multinational land where all have an equa l claim. For example, in a history textbook written for eighth and ninth graders . the relationship betwee n the "primordial Bashkirs and "foreign" ethnic others is described in highly confrontational terms (a s quoted in Graney 1999 . 624) :

From ancient times the Bashkins have lived on the land of Bashkortostan . It was here that they formed as an independent people . But even at the dawn of history, the Bashkir s were forced to take leave of their freedom and independence . Other peoples arrived i n the territory in the eighteenth century, making it into a multinational territory . Cultural and literary teaching materials overwhelmingly focus on the titular groups and thei r contributions, and this is true eveii of locally published materials in non-titular languages, includin g

Russian (Graney 1999. 624-5). This emphasis iii the new school curriculum on the local geography an d history, as well as the titular groups culture and literary achievements . is occurring not only i n

Bashkortostan and Tatarstaii . but in the republics throughout the North Caucasus and eastern Russia . The shift toward ethnic restratification in favor of the titular language has clearly been accompanied by mor e assertive exclusionary claims to these republics as the homelands of the titular nations .

Overall, cultural indigenization in the republics of Russia's eastern and southern peripheries wa s much more pronounced than it was in European Russia . In the latter region, titular language schoolin g increased only in Mordovia, aiid there oiily among the Moksha-speaking community (Goskomstat Rossi i

1994 : 91). Karelian, Komi and Udmurtian language schools had not been established by 1995.5 and th e percentage of students in titular language schools in Mari El and Chuvashia actually declined . This picture of continued cultural dominance of Russians and the Russian language in the republics located i n

European Russia reinforces the image of this region as one where Russians and their culture have attained a hegemonic position ; i .e . . their dominance is maintained not coercively, but through the consent of th e non-Russian titular groups . Even during a period when the opportunities for cultural indigenization are

much greater than in the past, the indigenous groups with homelands in the European core of the Russian

Federation are not willing or able to ethnically restratify cultural relations in their home republics . Of

Students could study the Karelian, Komi and Udmurt languages as subjects (Goskomstat Rossii 1996, 828) .

1 5 course, the trends with regard to political and cultural restratification in the republics of European Russi a toward further russification raise serious doubts regarding the degree to which titular nation-making an d homeland-makin g have occurred, or are likely to occur in the future .

Economic restratificatio n

One of the original goals of this project was to collect data on the ethnic restratification o f occupations that is occurring in Russia ' s republics. The hypothetical relationship I expected to find wa s that. as with trends in the political and cultural sectors, those republics that had become titular homeland s

(i .e . . networks of social iiiteraction dominated by the titular nations and their exclusionary claims to thes e places) would also be undergoing a process of economic restratification in favor of the titular group . I expected to measure this by examining the changing ethnic composition of elite or high statu s occupations, as well as socioecononic changes in peoples daily lives at the local geographic scale . In regional terms. I expected to find much more of this economic indigenization outside European Russi a than inside . In republics with more than one titular group, I expected to find that economic indigenizatio n favored one titular group over others. and that this was leading to increasing tensions and a geographi c fragmentation among the titular groups in these republics .

Unfortunately, iio occupation data by ethnic group are available for the 1990s . and according t o several representatives of Goskomstat with whom I spoke . none has been collected. This lack of ethni c occupation data was confirm 1 by labor analysts at the Iiistitute of Ethnology and Anthropology of th e

Russian Academy of Science . This is true within Russia's republics as well as for the Russian Federatio n as a whole. It is therefore not possible to provide a broad-based statistical analysis of economi c iiidigenization patterns comparable to those provided for political and cultural indigenization, at least no t until Russia's first post-Soviet census is taken .

Nevertheless, I was able to acquire previously unpublished ethnic occupational data from th e

1989 census for Russia's republics . In addition . I was able to collect information on a number o f socioeconomic indicators for many of Russia's republics at the rayon-level for the period 1988 to 1994 .

1 6 Although not the ideal, these data coupled with the results of surveys and interviews conducted during th e past two years provide the most comprehensive set of information about ethnic restratification o f socioeconomic life in Russia's republics to date .

Titular and Russian elites in the late Soviet perio d

During the Soviet era, indigenization programs tended to focus on ethnic restratification in favor of titular group members in their home republics primarily within the political and cultural spheres, an d this of course had an impact on the occupation structure . Titular elites tended to be concentrated in political, governmental, health, educatioii and cultural sectors of white collar employment, while Russia n elites tended to be concentrated iii the "productive" sectors of the economy, including enterprise directors . the engineering and building professions . and scientific-technological specializations . Overall, greater titular over-representation existed In the local political . governmental and cultural occupations than in th e elite sectors of the "productive" economy, which continued to be dominated by Russians throughout th e

Soviet era .

The 1989 census provided ethnic data for 300 employment categories, including 97 white colla r job categories for the first time (Goskomstat Rossii 1992) . However, the published data provide d information only for the country as a whole. As part of this research project I was able to acquire the comparable ethnic occupation data for Russia's republics . ' Although these data are for only one point i n time, and cannot be used to establish any trends regarding iiidigenization or ethnic restratificatio n processes . they are useful in detailing the geography of ethnic stratification in Russia's republics at th e end of the Soviet era .

A number of titular groups held a majority or plurality of the elite occupations in their republics .

This was the case in North Ossetia, Tyva, Tatarstan, Sakha, Kalmykia, Chuvashia, for the Kabardins i n

6 These data sets may be accessed on the website created as part of this research project (Kaiser 1999) .

1 7 Kabardino-Balkaria . and for the Avars in Dagestan . Of these titular groups, only the homeland of th e

Chuvash is located in European Russia . As was clear in the trends regarding cultural indigenization . the privileged position occupied by the Chuvash during the Soviet era has been eroded during the post-Sovie t period. The other six republics cited were all identified as places that were undergoing intensive ethni c restratification toward further titular political and cultural dominance . This reinforces the impressio n derived from the first working paper and the discussion above that by the end of the Soviet era the titula r groups in these republics had attained a more privileged status in their home republics, and that th e republics themselves had become relatively exclusionary homelaiids operated in the name of the titula r nation and its interests .

In addition to those republics where the titular group held a majority or plurality of positions i n the elite occupation categories . several of the titular groups were also over-represented in most of thes e high status positions (see Table 4 . below) Because Soviet indigenization programs measured th e attainment of interethnic equality (i .e . . their ultimate goal) as proportional representation, titular over - representation may be seeii as evidence of titular privileging that goes above and beyond centrally - mandated directives .

The Chechens also made up a majority of the work force in Chechen-Ingushetia overall, but were under - represented in many of the elite occupations, where Russians tended to dominate . Over-representation exists when the ethnic group's share of the positions in the given occupation is greater than it s share of the total work force. The total work force as the denominator is obviously a more precise measure tha n percent of total population, particularly during the Soviet era when unemployment for all intents and purposes wa s zero. For a list of the occupations included in this analysis, see the notes at the bottom of Table 4 .

1 8

Table 4

Titular and Russian Over-Representation in High Status White Collar Occupations in Russia' s Republics by Urban and Rural, J989 (Percent of 24 Elite Occupations in which Titular Groups an d Russians were Over-Represented )

Urba n Rural Republic Titular Russian Titular Russian European Russi a Chuvashia 8 .3 91 .7 33 .3 70 . 8 Karelia 29 .2 87 .5 34.8 73 . 9 Komi 62 .5 91 .7 47 .8 69 . 6 Mari-El I6.7 79 .2 12 .5 70 . 8 Mordovia 29.2 66 .7 33 .3 66 . 7 Udmurtia 12 .5 91 .7 4.2 83 . 3 North Caucasus Adygeya 70 .8 20 .8 83 .3 20 . 8 Chechen-Ingushetia '0 .8 70 . 8 Chechen 25 .0 16 . 7 Ingush 45 .8 54 . 2 Dagestan 62 .5 54 . 2 Avar 41 .7 41 . 7 Dargin 29.2 0 . 0 Kumyk 29.2 58 . 3 Lezgin 70.8 62 . 5 Kabardino-Balkaria 33 .3 79 . 2 Kabardin 54 .2 37 . 5 Balkar 66 .7 37 . 5 Kalmykia 69 .6 26 .1 63 .6 68 . 2 Karachayevo-Cherkessia 25 .0 54 . 2 Karachay 62 .5 37 . 5 Cherkess 62 .5 58 . 3 North Ossetia 58 .3 45 .8 79 .2 50 . 0 Eastern Russia Altay 9 .1 40.9 7 .3 77 . 3 Bashkortostaii 45 .8 54 .2 37 .5 47 . 8 Buryatia 87 .5 8 .3 79 .2 29 . 2 Khakassia 41 .7 58.3 2I .7 87 . 0 Sakha 75 .0 37 .5 66 .7 50 . 0 Tatarstan 45 .8 58.3 70 .8 37 . 5 Tyva 39 .1 52 .2 26 .1 73 .9 Source : 1989 census . Figures for the occupation structure in Russia's republics were provided by Goskomsta t Rossii, and are available at the website created as part of this project (Kaiser 1999) . Note : To determine over-representation, the titular and Russian percentages of a given occupation in 1989 wer e divided by the titular and Russian percentage of the work force . The occupations analyzed for this table included : directors of governmental offices and ministries ; directors of party organizations ; directors of economic enterprises ; engineering and technical specialists (including leading specialists, engineers, and builders) ; leading specialists in agriculture and forestry; leading doctors ; scientific workers ( including directors of scientific research, scientists and university professors); directors of libraries, theatres and museums ; artists, painters and sculptors ; managin g directors of retail trade ; leading economists and economic planners .

1 9 This condition of over-representation was the case for the Adygeys . Buryats, Balkars, Karachay ,

Cherkess. Lezgins, and Komis iii the cities, and for the Adygeys . Buryats, Ingush . Kumyks . Lezgins, and

Cherkess in the rural regions of their home republics . Several of the titular groups that held a majority o r plurality of positions among the elites were also over-represented in most of these job categories ,

including Kabardins, Ossetins, Sakha and Kalmyks in the cities, and Tatars, Sakha, Ossetins, an d

Kalmyks in rural areas . The level of under-representation among the titular groups who held majority o r

plurality status in these occupation categories is particularly strikiiig in the case of the Chuvash, whic h

provides an additional indication that their majority or plurality status in these occupation categories i n

1989 derived from their demographic strength in the republic, and not from successful indigenizatio n

efforts on the part of nationalizin g Chuvash elites .

The general division of titular group concentration among political and cultural elites, an d

Russian concentration among economic elites was supported by this analysis of the ethnic stratification o f

occupations in Russia's republics . Russians tended to be over-represented in the scientific-technologica l

professioiis, among enterprise directors. and among engineers aiid builders . Titular groups tended to b e

over-represented among goveriimental and political elites, medical professionals, educators, artists, an d

museum and theater directors . Titular groups also tended to be over-represented among agricultura l

specialists and agronomists in their republics. and among economists and planners . These more economi c

categories may appear somewhat out of place. but they are economic occupations that would require a

greater degree of local knowledge aiid so would tend to be more likely to attract members of the titula r

group. In addition, eveii the most elite . prestigious positions iii the agricultural sectors of the economy d o

not necessarily hold high status, and this would tend to diminish the demand for these professions amon g

Russians .

The geographical division of the country ' s non-Russian republics into a Russian-dominate d

European region and a titular-dominated peripheral region generally holds in this analysis of ethni c

stratification among elite occupations, although, as I noted above . the degree of titular economic

dominance even in the North Caucasus and eastern Russia is not as strong is the level of titular politica l

2 0 and cultural dominance . Russians were over-represented in nearly every elite occupation in the republic s of European Russia . in both urban and rural settings. Titular groups in European Russia were under - represented in approximately three quarters of the elite occupations on average in both the cities and th e countryside. Russian over-representation among these occupations was greater than titular over - representation in both the urban and rural areas of all the European republics (see Table 4 . above) .

In the North Caucasus, titular group members held a majority or plurality of elite occupations i n all republics except Adygeya and Karachay-Cherkessia, both of which were autonomous oblasts durin g the Soviet era (i .e., a lower position within the federal hierarchy) . In each of these two cases the titula r group made up less than half of the total work force . However, in these two republics titular over - representation among socioeconomic elites was among the highest, and Russian under-representatio n among the lowest, in the region . ln the North Caucasus titular elites dominated not only the political aii d cultural occupation categories . but also several of the economic professions . including enterpris e directors, leading engineering-technical specialists, scientists, and leading economists . This wa s particularly the case in North Ossetia . Kalmykia aiid Kabardino-Balkaria .

A similar condition of titular over-representation and dominance existed at the end of the Sovie t era in the republics of eastern Russia . Titular group members in this region tended to hold a large shar e of elite positions, and to be over-represented in them . The division between political and cultura l occupations dominated by titular elites and the economic occupations dominated by Russians does tend t o be more clearly in place in this region than in the North Caucasus . Russians were especially dominan t among enterprise directors, engineers and builders, and scientists . On the other hand . titular elites tended to dominate and to be over-represented among university professors, economic planners and agricultura l specialists. Russian dominance and over-representation tended to be particularly high in the forme r autonomous oblasts of this region (Altay and Khakassia), again indicating that status within the federa l hierarchy influenced the degree to which socioeconomic indigenization could take place during the Sovie t era .

2 1 Two republics in eastern Russia appear somewhat anomalous . Buryat dominance and over - representation was somewhat higher than anticipated, given the relatively more limited cultura l indigenization that has occurred In that republic . Tyvan under-representation among economic elit e occupations in Tyva was also somewhat unexpected . given the much greater levels of political and cultural indigenization in that republic . The Tyvan case is not as aberrant as it at first appears : Tyvan s hold a majority or plurality of positions in 13 of the 23 elite categories examined, and not only among th e political . cultural . and educational elites . but also among scientists, leading agricultural specialists . leading economists aiid leading doctors . The reasoii for their relatively high level of under-representatio n is partially explained by the fact that they hold a very large share of all positions in the work force . an d this makes the attainment of over-representation more difficult to achieve . fn the case of Buryatia, th e limited degree of cultural indigenization aiid of ethnic restratification toward titular language school s in particular has not proved an Impedimeiit to the titular dominance of nearly all elite occupationa l categories in both urban and rural areas . This Is particularly surprising, because the standard way o f conceptualizing the sequencing of ethnic restratification tends to depict cultural indigenization as a precursor to economic indigenization . The limited degree of Buryat cultural dominance in Buryatia wa s becoming a growing source of concerii during the 1990s . An increase in the perceived need for mor e titular language schools and for more titular language television and radio broadcasting was clearl y apparent in surveys conducted in Buryatia in 1995 and 1996 (Karnyshev 1997 . I59) .

In general . the titular groups were in a comparable position within the economic sectors of life i n their republics as they were Iii the political and cultural sectors at the end of the Soviet era . As the evidence provided above indicates, ethnic restratification toward the titular groups in the political an d cultural sectors occurred in most of the republics on Russia's periphery during the 1990s . and was drive n by titular nationalization (i .e ., ethnically exclusionary nation-building and homeland-making pressures ) from below . In the republics located in European Russia, political and cultural restratification in favor o f

Russians has tended to dominate. The titular groups in these republics were clearly more subordinated t o

Russians among elite positions within the republic economies, and it is anticipated that the titular groups with republics in this region of Russia will also lose ground economically to the Russians during th e

1990s . The following section assesses the ethnic restratification patterns in evidence with regard to th e economic position of titular groups and Russians in Russia's republics .

Post-Soviet economic indigenizatio n

First, it is necessary to restate that no direct measures of ethnic restratification within th e economic sector exist for the 1990s . Second. this is a period of dramatic economic changes, disruption and in general decline for all regions of the former Soviet Union . This makes it difficult if not impossibl e to provide conclusive evidence that titular restratification is the cause of changing standards of living an d quality of life . Nevertheless. with these caveats and data limitations in mind, I was able to acquire a set o f socioeconomic indicators for most of the republics at the rayon level for the period 1988 to 1994 . At the rayon level, it is possible to compare how titular rayons (i .e . . those with an overwhelming titular population) and non-titular rayons fared in the same republics . Within this data set, urban and rura l differences were accounted for. Regional differences between European Russia and Russia's periphery were also analyzed at the rayon level . A summary of the results of this analysis is provided below .

The most complete data sets of socioeconomic indicators at the rayon-level were used to test th e

hypothesis that an ethnic restratification in economic life was occurring in the 1990s in favor of titula r

group members, at least in the nationalizing republics in the North Caucasus and eastern Russia . Change

in eight different indicators was correlated with titular percent of the population. Russian percent of th e

population, urban perceiit, rural percent . and region of Russia in which the republic was situated (se e

Table 5) . 9

More direct economic measures such as income/capita or unemployment were either missing from the database, o r were missing from so many of the republics that they did not prove useful in this broad-based assessment o f socioeconomic change at the rayon level for all of Russia's republics .

2 3 Table 5

Rayon-Level Correlation Coefficients : Ethnic Composition and Socioeconomic Chang e

Socioeconomic Indicators Titular % Russian% Urban % Rural % Regio n

Crude Death Rate, 1989-94 -.209 .250 .108 -.108 -.42 1

('rude Birth Rate, 1989-94 - .145 .050 - .025 .025 - .20 1 Infant Mortality, 1988-94 - .074 .032 .065 - .065 - .01 4 New Capital Funds , 1988-94 - .156 - .112 - .024 .024 .10 2 Housing Construction, 1991-94 .065 - .265 - .078 .078 .13 4 lndustrial Employment . 1991-94 .066 - .220 -.305 .305 .23 6 Agricultural Employment . 1991-94 - .243 .1 - 7 .382 -.382 - .05 3 Registered Crime 1990-94 - .15S .293 .078 - .078 - .462

Source : rayon-level data base of socioeconomic indicators for Russia's republics and autonomous territories, 198 8 to 1994 . This database was provided by the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation, and is included as part of the website constructed for this project (Kaiser 1999) .

Socioeconomic Indicators : Crude Death Rate: Deaths/ 1000 population . Change in rate from 1989 to 1994 . Crude Birth Rate : Birth/1000 populatioii . Change in rate from 1989 to 1994 . Infant Mortality : Infant deaths . 1000 live births . Change Iii rate from 1988 to 1994 . New Capital Funds: all sources . thousands of rubles/capita. Sum of new capita l funds/capita from 1988 to 1994 . Housing Construction : square meters/capita . Sum of housing construction per capita from 1991 to 1994 . Iiidustrial Employment: Iiidustrial workforce as a percent of total population . Change from 1991 to 1994 . Agricultural Employment : Agricultural workforce as a percent of total population . Change from 1991 to 1994 . Registered Crime : Number of registered crimes 1000 population . Change from 1990 t o 1994 .

2 4 Overall, the correlation coefficients were very weak, and it is difficult to see much of a statistica l relationship between socioeconomic changes in Russia ' s republics on the one hand, and titular ethni c

identity on the other . The "region " correlation coefficients were a bit stronger, but even these were not a s

large as one would have expected, given the striking regional differences in political and cultura l

indigenization patterns . What these correlation coefficients strongly suggest is that the demographic an d

socioeconomic changes occurring in the first half of the 1990s. as measured by these variables, was

influenced much more strongly by other factors : and that in particular the overall collapse of the USSR

and the socialist economy overwhelmed the relatively minor impact of more localized factors such a s

ethnic composition of the populatioii or even "region . "

These data sets were next examined using regression analysis . with the change in socioeconomi c

indicators as the dependent variables and the ethnic and regional measures as independent variables . The

R-squares for these independent variables were extremely low . and none explained more than a smal l

percentage of the rayon-level variation in the rate of socioeconomic change . Overall, this confirmed tha t

the socioeconomic changes taking place during the first half of the 1990s in Russia ' s republics were no t

greatly influenced by nationalization agendas. at least as this can be measured with the available data a t

the local geographic (i .e ., rayon) scale .

This is not to suggest that being a member of the titular group in nationalizing republics wa s

unimportant in lessening the negative impact of the economic transition . or iii increasing one's life

chances . Surveys, observations in the field and anecdotal evidence all suggest that being a member of the

titular group and being well-coiinected to the titular political elites in nationalizing republics were bot h

important in improving one's socioeconomic circumstances during this traumatic period o f

socioeconomic disruption . A review of surveys conducted in four republics where titular nationalizatio n

projects were prominent follows .

In surveys conducted during the 1990s, respondents from the titular and Russian communities in

the cities of Tatarstan, Tyya, Sakha and North Ossetia (i .e ., four of the republics where ethni c

restratification as part of a titular homeland- and nation-building agenda has been quite pronounced) were

2 5 asked whether they had experienced any infriiigement of rights due to their national identity . The percen t that stated they had experienced no ethnic discrimination was much higher for both the titular and Russia n respondents than the percent that said they had experienced discrimination . Interestingly, in three of the four republics surveyed in 1994 the percent of titular group members that said they had experience d ethnic discrimination was higher than the Russian percent . Only in North Ossetia was the Russia n percent higher in both of the affirmative categories (i .e., "yes." and "sometimes"). One reason for th e stronger feeling of ethnic discrimiiiation among titular group members is that this survey was conducte d in cities, where Russians had attaiiied a dominant socioeconomic status during the Soviet era .

The higher titular percent claiming ethnic discrimination remained true in 1998 in Sakha . but i n

Tatarstan more than twice as high a perceiitage of Russians as Tatars claimed to have experienced ethni c discrimination . This shift may reflect the relatively more assertive titular nationalization projects tha t have become institutionalized in Tatarstan duriiig the I 990s . However. it is also the case that both i n

Sakha and Tatarstan the percent claiming not to have experienced ethnic discrimination iiicrease d between 1994 and 1998 .

As part of the same 1994 and 1998 surveys, titular and Russian respondents were asked to stat e whether interethnic relations were better . worse or unchanged over the previous 2-3 years with respect t o government, daily life, aiid work (see Table 6 . below) . First. the majority or plurality of titular an d

Russian respondents felt that there had been iio change in interethnic relations in four of eight cases with respect to government . in five of eight cases with respect to daily life . and in all eight cases with respec t to work. The percentage of those who said that interethnic relations had iiot changed also increase d across categories, from less than one third of all respondents for assessments of government to around on e half of all respondents for daily life . and nearly two thirds of all respondents for work . This also track s with the lag time in titular nationalization that was commented on earlier : ethnic restratification tends t o begin in the political and cultural spheres, but is much more difficult to accomplish in the socioeconomi c sector .

2 6 Table 6

Assessment of Changing Interethnic Relations in the Government, in Daily life and at Work (Percent of Titular and Russia n Respondents )

Tatarsta n Sakh a N . Osseti a Tyv a

Titular Russian Titular Russian Iliubar Russian "Titular Russia n Goveriimeii t No Chaiige 38 .9 29 .5 28 .0 24 .0 28.4 32 .6 30.2 20 . 1 Worse 12 .4 6 .1 20 .8 4 .1 5 .1 2 .4 25 .2 10 . 3

Daily Life No Change 62.3 63 .1 48 .1 47 .2 38 .1 36 .5 35 .1 22 . 5 Better 11 .2 17 .2 21 .8 32 .9 52 .3 5I .9 21 .4 51 . 9 Worse 10.4 5 .0 15 .5 5 .0 2 .1 3 .5 27.6 12 . 1

Work No Chaiige 69 .2 68.3 64 .2 65 .9 72 .0 72 .8 47 .7 38 . 1 Better 7 .5 9.8 5 .2 13 .4 15 .3 14 .5 14 .2 24 . 9 Worse 9 .0 2 .7 15 .1 4.5 2 .0 1 .2 26.5 11 .8 Source : L . Dobrizheva, Etnopoliticheskaia situatsiia i Mezhnatsional 'nye otnosheniia v Respub likakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii, vypusk 3 (Moskva : lnstitut Etnologi i i Antropologii, 1995), pp . 16-20 .

2 7 For titular respoiidents in three of the four republics, a higher percent felt that interethnic relation s with respect to government had improved than the percentage that felt they had worsened . In Tyva .

Sakha. and Tatarstan political indigenization and politically sponsored ethnic restratification in favor o f titular group members undoubtedly had an affect on this more positive assessment . In North Ossetia, th e conflict with the Ingush and Iiigushetia over the Prigorodniy region. as well as the issue of Osseti n refugees from Georgia dur ing the early 1990s almost certainly iiifluenced the higher titular negative assessment there. This was not necessarily a reflection of worsening titular-Russian relations, however .

Titular respondents assessed changing interethnic relations in daily life more negatively . The negative titular percent in this category was higher in every case than was the percent of titula r respondents who said that interethnic relations with respect to government had worsened . The percentag e of titular respondents who said interethnic relations in daily life had worsened was also higher than th e percentage of titular respondents who said they had improved in Tatarstan . Sakha and North Ossetia . The titular percent that said interethnic relations in daily life had improved was higher only in Tyva . and here the reason for the more positive assessment was the timing of the survey . Violent ethnic conflict betwee n

Russians and Tyvans occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s . The survey — conducted in 1994 — aske d respondents to assess interethnic relations during the previous 2-3 years . i .e . . between 1992 and 1994 , when the worst of this earlier outbreak of interethnic violence was over .

The percentage of titular respondents that felt interethnic relations had improved in the workplac e was higher than the percentage that felt they had worsened in three of the four republics . Again, it was in

North Ossetia where those reeling that conditions had worsened outweighed those who felt they wer e better. This suggests that in Tatarstan . Tyva and Sakha, where assertive titular nationalization program s were underway by the early 1990s . economic indigenization was at least beginning to improve condition s at work for titular group members. A higher percentage of titular professionals and specialists in thes e three republics expressed positive assessments of changes in interethnic relations at work (Drobizhev a

1995, 42-3), indicating that economic indigenization – to the extent that it is occurring – is occurrin g among the socioeconomic elite .

2 8 Although most Russians also tended to claim that they saw no change in interethnic relations wit h respect to government, daily life and work, the contrast with titular respondents when comparing th e relative strength of positive and iiegative assessments is striking . A higher percentage of Russians fel t that interethnic relations had worsened than had improved in all four republics and in all three categories .

In seven of twelve cases, a higher percentage of titular respondents felt that interethnic relations were changing for the better, while in all twelve cases more Russians felt they were changing for the worse . In addition, the gap between positive and negative assessments of changing interethnic relations among th e

Russian respondents was much larger than it was (on average) among the titular respondents . The highes t negative assessments of interethnic relations among Russians were with respect to goveriiment i n

Tatarstan and Sakha, and in daily life in North Ossetia and Tyva. This difference is understandable, sinc e popular or mass-level interethnic tensions and conflict had broken out in both of the latter republics . while in Tatarstan and Sakha, ethnic restratification was occurring as part of the nationalization projects o f titular political elites who had gained political power . Overall, Russians had much higher negativ e assessments of changes in interethnic relations iii Tyva and North Ossetia, and the least negative assessments in Tatarstan .

A similar question about whether interethnic relations had improved, worsened or remaine d unchanged during the previous two years was again asked in 1998 in Tatarstan and Sakha (Drobizhev a

1998, 9) . Unfortunately, the question asked respondents about changes in the republic as a whole, rathe r than about changes in government . in daily life and iii the workplace . and so the results are not directl y comparable . Iii Tatarstan . 68 percent of Tatars and 65 percent of Russians felt that interethnic relation s were unchanged, 25 percent of Tatars and 2I percent of Russians felt that they had improved, and onl y one percent of Tatars and iiine percent of Russians said that they had worsened . This appears to represen t a substantial improvement in outlook among both Russians and Tatars, indicating perhaps that Tatarstan' s efforts to promote titular national and homeland building while at the same time seeking to improve th e loyalty of Russians to Tatarstan are working .

2 9 In Sakha. 62 percent of Sakha respondents and 54 percent of Russians felt that there had been n o change in interethnic relations, 23 percent of Sakha and 5 percent of Russians felt that they had improved . and 12 percent of Sakha and 38 percent of Russians claimed that they had worsened . This picture appear s

little different from the one drawn from surveys conducted in 1994 . Indeed, if anything the percentage o f both titular and Russian respondents that feel interethnic relations have worsened was higher at the end o f

the 1990s than it was at the beginning . More tenuous economic conditions in Sakha, coupled with fairly

assertive political political and cultural indigenization programs . and perhaps more limited efforts t o

achieve titular hegemony by gaining the consent of the Russians for these changes, are all responsible fo r

the continuation of this gap between titular and Russian assessments .

Economic indigenization is apparent iii the republics of Russia's periphery where political an d

cultural iiidigenization were also occurring . although it is more difficult to directly measure ethni c

restratification in the socioeconomic sector due to a lack of adequate data . and also to the massiv e

disruption in peoples day-to-day lives that has been caused by the collapse of' the USSR and the socialist

economic system . Surveys of interethnic attitudes taken throughout the I 990s indicate that titular an d

Russian perceptions vary markedly . and that while overt ethnic discrimination may not be felt by a larg e

segment of either population, titular residents hold a more positive outlook about the changes i n

iiiterethnic relations taking place in government, at work, and iii their daily lives than do Russians, wh o

are losing their dominant status not only in political and cultural arenas . but increasingly in th e

socioeconomic sectors as well .

Conclusion s

During the 1990s, cultural indigenization programs have been promoted by titular national elite s

m nearly all of Russia's republics . In the republics of eastern Russia and the North Caucasus, this ha s

resulted in a shift in favor of titular language schooling, and educational materials that stress th e

geography, history and cultural contributions of the titular group and its ancestral homeland . Some, such

as Tatarstan, have even made the study of the titular language mandatory for all . This has tended to

3 0 marginalize Russians and ethnic others in these republics, although the Russian language has retained a legal status as the language of iiiterethnic communication, and remains the primary language in school s and at work. Titular elites have attempted to accommodate Russians and to a lesser extent ethnic other s discursively using the language of interethnic equality, even while they have worked to ethnicall y restratify cultural life in the republics toward the titular group .

In European Russia on the other hand, although political elites have passed language laws tha t stress the special status of the titular group and its culture in its "homeland," there has been little cultura l

indigenization in these republics . A russification of political elites in these republics following the loss of the centrally-mandated ethnic quota system from the Soviet era has been accompanied by the continue d hegemony of Russians and the Russian langua g e in the cultural life of these republics. This inability t o bring about a cultural iiidigenization in the republics of European Russia should not be seen as the resul t

of the forcible acculturation or "russification" of unwilling, nationally conscious titular communities, but

rather as a reflection of the relatively limited degree to which iiation-making and homeland-making have

succeeded in nationalizing the titular groups in this region of the Russian Federation .

In Russia's natioiializing republics, by the end of the Soviet era two separate types of places (i .e .,

networks of social iiiteraction) existed : a Russian-dominated place in the "productive economic sectors" ,

and titular-dominated political and cultural places . Under normal circumstances, one would hav e

anticipated the ethnic restratification of the economic sector in favor of titular group members to have

proceeded along with the political and cultural indigenization in evidence . However, although the data

are somewhat inconclusive in this regard, it appears as though this division of the republics into two type s

of places continued throughout the 1990s . The main reason for this is the economic disruption caused b y

the disintegration of the USSR and the socialist economic system . It is also typically the case that there i s

a lag time between political and cultural indigenization on the one hand, and economic indigenization o n

the other. One can anticipate that a more pronounced ethnic restratification of economic life in favor o f

titular group members will occur in these republics when economic conditions begin to stabilize, an d

when political and cultural indigenization processes are more fully underway . Titular nationalist

3 1 homeland-making is perhaps best defined as an ongoing effort to eliminate the number and significanc e of networks that are domiiiated by non-titular groups . with the ultimate goal of bringing about a convergence of the political, cultural and socioeconomic networks of social interaction into one plac e

(i .e . . one network) within which the titular nation and its interests are hegemonic .

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1984 . Sovremennyye Etnoyzykovyye Protsessy ' SSSR . Moskva: Nauka . Guchinova, E. and G. Komarova. eds . 1995 . "Zakon o Gosudarstvennykh Yazykakh ." In Kalmykia : Etnopoliticheskaya Panorana . vol . 1 . pp . 73-84 . Moskva : Tsentr po Izucheniy u Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy Instituta Etnologii i Antropologii RAN .

Iskhakov. D . . ed. 1998 . "Zakon Respubliki Tatarstan ot 8 iyulya 1992 g . .O Yazykakh Narodo v Respubliki Tatarstan' . " Iii Suverennyy Tatarstan, vol . 1 . pp . 48-58 . Moskva : Tsentr po Izucheniyu Mezhnatsional'nykh Otnosheniy Instituta Etnologii i Antropologii RAN . Kaiser, R . 2000 . "Political Indigenization and Homeland Making in Russia's Republics ." Workin g paper for the NCEEER Research Grant on "The Geography Of Nationalization And Nationalis m In Post-Soviet Russia . " Washington, DC: National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, March 2000 . . 1999 . The Ethnic Territories of Russia GIS Project . Website address : http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/creeca/kaiser .

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Statisticheskiy Komitet Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv (SNG) . 1993 . Itogi Vsesoyuzno y Perepisi Naseleniya 1989 Goda . 12 volumes . Minneapolis : East View Publications . Ware, R . and E. Kisriev . 1999 . "Political Stability and Ethnic Parity : Why is There Peace in Dagestan'? " In Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia . edited by M . Alexseev. pp. 95-130. New York: St . Martin's Press .

3 4 Graph 1

Students in Titular Language Schools, 1991-95 (Percent) Graph 2

Students in Titular Language Schools, 1991 and 1994 (Indexed to Titular Percent of th e Republic's Population in 1989 and 1994 )

Republics