US-led War on Terror: Impact on Pakistan Politics (2001-2011)
Submitted By: Saiful Islam
In Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science University of Peshawar, Pakistan 2015 ii
Declaration
This is solemnly declared that the undersigned has prepared this dissertation himself in accordance with the topic approved and format set by the University of Peshawar, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan) and that no dissertation of this sort has been submitted to any other university for a similar or any other degree.
Saiful Islam
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
First of all, all praises to Almighty Allah who endowed me with patience and courage to complete this research.
In the completion of this research, I offer my thanks and deep sense of gratitude to all of them. First and foremost, I would like to say special thanks to my supervisor Prof. Taj Moharram Khan and external supervisor Prof. Yunas Samad for their valuable suggestions and critical comments on my work. I would never forget their kindness, patience and immense contributions for enhancing my writing ability and improving my skills in conducting empirical research. Working with them was indeed an honour for me, a pleasing and rewarding experience and great assets of my life.
I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to my teachers in the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar especially Prof. A. Z. Hilali, Prof. Abdur Rauf, Prof. Zahid Anwar, Prof. Ghulam Mustafa, Dr. Ayub Jan, Mohammad Zubair, Aamir Raza, and the supporting staff including Shahzada Gulfam, Atif, Zahid, Murad, Tahir Khan of the University for providing me assistance during this research. Dr. Altaf Qadir and Dr. Salman Bangash from the department of History also helped me enormously.
My heartiest thanks go to those honourable politicians, academicians, journalists, political analysts and others who provided me assistance in conducting interviews without which this research would have been incomplete. They shared valuable ideas and gave their valuable time in fulfillment of this research.
I also thank the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan for the grant under International Research Support Initiative Programme which gave me an opportunity to conduct research for six months in UK which was a great time for me to benefit from the research environment of an academically advanced country of the world. These six months in the University of Bradford was the most important time in my life not only in research but also to see the life and culture in UK under the supervision of Prof. Yunas Samad and I would never forget those pleasant times of my life there. iv
I owe a lot of indebtedness to several friends of mine throughout the study period especially Masood Jan, Asfandyar, Saidul Amin, Fazal Alam, Khairul Bashar and Tariq whom I always found willing in extending their moral and material support.
Finally, a special thanks to my mother and wife, brothers, Noorul Islam, Jawad Khan, Ishfaq Ahmad and Ahmad Kamal and sisters, I also thank my wife and children Syed Hasnain and Khadeja who always missed my company during my research. Finally, a word of heartfelt gratitude to my deceased father Shamsul Islam who inculcated in me the habit of reading and research. I attribute all that I have gained academically so far to my parents. I dedicated this study to the loving memory of my father.
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ABSTRACT
US-led War on Terror: Impact on Pakistan Politics (2001-2011)
This research focuses on Pakistan’s participation in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ following the 9/11 (2001) attacks in the United States. It seeks to explain Pakistan’s joining the war on terror and the impact of the decision on the politics of Pakistan.
General Pervaiz Musharraf’s decision of jumping into the bandwagon of US is seen from the neo-realism perspective, which backfired in the proceeding years. From the neo-realism perspective, Pakistan’s relations with the United States, Afghanistan, and
Taliban are debated and analyzed particularly the question as to how Pakistan pursued her policy of marginal satisfaction in special reference to the United States. Pervaiz
Musharraf’s policy of neo-realism regarding war on terror produced mixed reactions in the then prevailing situation of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s suffering as a result of her joining the War on Terror proved unexpectedly devastating. It not only divided the nations on the pros and cons of the decision but the state institutions also severely got divided. Pakistan’s U-turn on Taliban policy produced sharp reactions particularly on the part of Islamic platforms and their supporters. The on-going militancy in Pakistan, for instance, is the direct consequence of the state policy of framing affiliation with the US. The substantial electoral support shown to the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (an alliance of six religious political parties) in
2002 general elections and particularly in two smaller provinces of Pakistan bordering
Afghanistan was a true reflection of the anti-US sentiments in Pakistan. That support was, however, withdrawn in the 2008 general elections indicating clearly the changing public opinion. The rise of militancy, government’s decision to launch military operations, the resultant reaction in the shape of sabotage activities targeting vi
both personnel of law enforcing agencies and the innocent civilians are all reflective of the turmoil that Pakistan suffered over the years. Politicians’ endeavor to find solution to the fast growing turmoil by concluding peace agreements with the militants also brought to the fore sharp differences between the politicians in power and the establishment. The division among political parties on issues pertaining to
Taliban and militancy did not help in resolving the menace of terrorism rather complicated it further with the passage of time. The institutional gap between the civil and military leadership on the issue of terrorism has caused irreparable damage to the needed harmony and consensus for tackling the challenges of terrorism.
The constitution Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC), apparently a pressure group but representing the sentiments of people belonging to different walks of life, is another attempt to bridge the gulf between state policies and the common man’s view on terrorism. The practice of holding All Parties Conference (APC) from time to time came as a healthy initiative towards developing consensus on the ways and means for curbing terrorism. Besides, the deliberations among parties of different shades on matters of national importance also manifest positive trends in the governance of
Pakistan.
While dealing with the above dimensions of the domestic politics of Pakistan, this study also focuses on the post 9/11 relations between Pakistan and the US and the fluctuating trends noticed therein. One irritating of the Pak-US relations has been disharmony, lack of understanding and trust deficit. Commoners in Pakistan have been questioning the step motherly treatment meted out to Pakistan by the US despite the human loses and worth billions of dollars of material loses sustained by the former. Pakistan could not find a credible place in the eyes of US policymakers particularly when seen in the context of Indo-US relations.
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Key Words: Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Tribal Areas, War on Terror,
Taliban, Militancy, Politics, Institutions, political parties. viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ANP Awami National Party APC All Parties Conference CIA Central Intelligence Agency CMC Conflict Monitoring Centre DPC Difa-i-Pakistan Council FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FCR Frontier Crimes Regulation FRC FATA Research Centre GHQ General Headquarters ICG International Crisis Group IED Improvised Explosive Device ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISI Inter Services Intelligence JI Jamaat-i-Islami JUD Jamaat-ud-Dawa JUI(F) Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) JUI(S) Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Samiul Haq) KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba MAK Maktab Al Khidmat MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal MQM MuttahidaQaumi Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NRO National Reconciliation Ordinance NWFP North West Frontier Province OBL Osama Bin Laden OEF Operation Enduring Freedom PM Prime Minister PML(N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) ix
PPP Pakistan Peoples Party PTI Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaf SC Supreme Court (The Highest Court in Pakistan) TBIJ The Bureau of Investigative Journalism THQ TheHurmat-e-Quran THR TheHurmat-e-Rasool TNSM Tahrik-Nifaz-i-Shariat Mohammadi TTP Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan WOT War on Terror WTC World Trade Centre x
TABLE OF CONTENTS Declaration ...... Acknowledgements ...... Abstract ...... List of Abbreviations ...... CHAPTER 01 INTRODUCTION 1.1. Background of the Study ...... 1 1.2. Aims and Objectives of the Study ...... 6 1.3. Research Questions ...... 6 1.4. Hypothesis ...... 8 1.5. Contribution to the knowledge ...... 8 1.6. Limitations of the Study ...... 12 1.7. Structure of the Thesis ...... 12 CHAPTER 02 LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORITICAL FRAMEWORK 16 2.1. Literature Review ...... 17 2.2. Theoretical Framework ...... 21-22 2.2.1. International Relations and Theory ...... 25 2.2.2. Classical Realism ...... 26 2.2.3. Neo-realism ...... 27 2.2.4. Neo-realism and Pakistan ...... 29 2.2.5. Musharraf and the War on Terror ...... 30 2.2.6. Social Constructionism of International Relations ...... 36 2.2.7. Afghanistan War-1980s ...... 38 2.2.8. 9/11 and the US War on Terror ...... 39 2.2.9. Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan ...... 39 2.2.10. 9/11 and Militancy in Pakistan ...... 48 2.2.11. Pakistan’s Role ...... 49 2.2.12. Institutionalism in International Relations ...... 50 2.2.13. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan ...... 55
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CHAPTER 03 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 3.1. US-led War on Terror: Impact on Pakistan Politics (2001-2011)-Proposed Study ………………………………………………… 62 3.2. Justification of the Research Topic ...... 62 3.3. Access to the Research Materials ...... 64 3.4. Selection of the Individuals for Interviews ...... 67 3.5. The Interview Process ...... 73 3.6. Questionnaire or Sample for Interview ...... 75 3.7. Data Analysis Process ...... 77 3.8. Methodological limitations ...... 78 3.9. My Field Experience as a Researcher ...... 79 3.10. Ethical Issues in Research ...... 81 CHAPTER 04 Musharraf’s Motives in War on Terror: Neo-realism Perspective 4.1. Pakistan Relations with India ...... 83 4.2. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations ...... 85 4.3. Afghan Taliban ...... 86 4.4. Taliban and Al Qaeda ...... 88 4.5. 9/11 Attacks and Pakistan-US Relations ...... 92 4.6. Musharraf’s Decision to join the US War on Terror…………… ...... 97 4.7. Pakistan’s Support in the War on Terror ...... 104 4.8. Pakistan’s Role in the War on Terror…. . …………………... 108 4.9. Marginal Satisfaction-Relationship between Pakistan and the US ...... 111 4.10. US Withdrawal and 2014-Pakistan’s Position in the Region ...... 117 4.11. Conclusion……………………………………………….… 118 CHAPTER 05 The Rise of Militant Groups in Pakistan: A Social Constructionism perspective 5.1. Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and Mujahideen ...... 120 5.2. Rise of Taliban ...... 123 5.3. Taliban and Al Qaeda ...... 126 5.4. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ...... 129 5.5. Militancy in FATA ...... 135 xii
5.6. Terrorism in Pakistan ...... 141 5.7. Military Operations and Peace Agreements-Confusion in Policies ...... 143 5.8. Drone Policy in FATA-escalation of Violence and Militancy ...... 147 5.9. Lal Masjid ‘Operation Silence’-Turning point in Terrorism ...... 149 5.10. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) ...... 155 5.11. Operations against TTP ...... 159 5.12. Conclusion ...... 164 CHAPTER 06 Political Developments in Pakistan and the War on Terror 167 6.1. General Elections 2002-Rise of MMA ...... 168 6.2. Anti-American Sentiments ...... 179 6.3. General Elections 2008 ...... 183 6.4. Parliament Resolutions Regarding Terrorism ...... 194 6.5. Joint Sitting of Parliament ...... 200 6.6. All Parties Conference (APC) ...... 208 6.7. Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) ...... 217 6.8. Conclusion ...... 225 CHAPTER 07 Civil-Military Tension in Pakistan-An Institutionalism Perspective 7.1. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan-Historical Perspectives...... 227 7.2 Civil-Military Relations and the War on Terror………………. 228 7.3. Raymond Davis Case-Street Agitation ...... 233 7.4. Abbottabad Operation-Institutional Failure and Trust Deficit ...... 241 7.5. Memogate Scandal-Institutional Gap between Civil-Military Relations …………………………………………………… 248 7.6. Salala attack-Institutionalize Relations ...... 253 7.7. Conclusion ...... 260 CHAPTER 08 CONCLUSION ...... 263 Bibliography ...... 281 Appendix One ...... 295 Appendix Two ...... 296 1
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the Study
This study is an attempt to discuss the war on terror and examine its impact on
Pakistan politics (2001-2011). Before introducing the study, the background of this study is very important to discover and construct an approach towards this project.
Before going into the details of the topic, the historical perspective is vital in this regard to highlight the menace of terrorism in the world, in general, and in Pakistan, in particular.
Pakistan’s struggle for independence was based on the struggle against the British as well as the Hindus in the subcontinent on the Two Nation Theory which means the
Muslims and Hindus are separate nations. This slogan was the base of their struggle.
After independence, a hot debate continued for many years as to which political system was suitable for the new country. The place of religion-Islam was finally incorporated in the constitution of Pakistan. “Islam will be the state religion” is the most important development in the constitutional history of Pakistan that law repugnant to Islam would be declared as null and void.1
The era of General Zia (1977-88) was the turning point in the strengthening and expanding the role of religion not only in the society but in the economy, politics and
Pakistan’s foreign relations as well. The state was, thus moulded according to the religious requirements.2 The old controversy of separate and joint electorate3 system
1 Farhan Hanif Siddiqi. The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements. New York: Routledge, 2012, p. 29. 2 Ashok Kapor. Pakistan in Crisis. New York: Routledge, 1991, p. 149. 2
in Pakistan was revived again ending with separate electorate, termed by the minorities as discrimination.
This developed religious intolerance in the country, on the one hand, and to use the religion for the political cause, on the other hand, exploited religion by every ruler and politician for their covert and overt motives.4
The Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s was the root cause of all violence and extremism on the basis of religion in Pakistan. This war, supported by the United States, Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan called the Afghan freedom fighters as Mujahideen was the result of making this a religious duty of every Muslim in the world to defend Afghanistan.
From every corner of the world, thousands of fighters were imported into the region without knowing the fallout on the region.5 Radicalization was developed in the
Muslim world and several militant organizations were established in Pakistan. To accelerate the process of Islamization in Pakistan, thousands of religious schools
(Madrassas) were established in tribal areas, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan to provide raw material for the war theatre.6 The entry of foreign militants developed a bond of unity among themselves for the holy cause not only in the Afghan war but this mutual cooperation was continued till 2014.
A culture of extremism with open display of weapons developed in the region, especially in Pakistan’s tribal areas. A new actor in the shape of militant commander emerged, enjoying the support of weapons and religion and culminating, finally, into a new militant organization called Taliban (knowledge seeker in religious education).
3 Joint electorate means that all citizens will elect their representatives irrespective of their religion. Separate electorate means that minorities will elect their representatives by their own communities. 4 Anas Malik. Political Survival in Pakistan-Beyond Ideology. New York: Routledge, 2011, p. 42. 5 Touqir Hussain, “Post-1979 Pakistan: What Went Wrong?” The Islamization of Pakistan (1979-2009) A Special edition of viewpoints. The Middle East Institute Washington, DC, 2009, p. 09. 6 Ian Talbot, “Religion and Violence- the Historical Context for Conflict in Pakistan” in John R. Hinnells and Richard King (Eds.). Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 148. 3
The emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan as a political force changed the landscape of the region (Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas), developed links with trans- national militant networks. These linkages developed the tribal areas into the safe havens for the militants. The role of militants (Taliban) weakened the traditional Jirga and Malik system and was ultimately replaced by the Taliban Shura as a result of turmoil in Afghanistan in the mid 1990s.7
The rule of Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1996-2001 provided a practical shape to their jihadist ideology which they had dreamed for many years. The Al
Qaeda developed links with the other militant groups in Afghanistan and made
Afghanistan the place for the trans-national and global agendas, especially against the
United States. Many militant groups established their camps in Afghanistan and made tribal areas the epicenter of their activities.8
The 9/11 attacks on the United States by the Al Qaeda terrorists turned the whole region into the most dangerous place in the world. The US response against the Al
Qaeda and their affiliates was indispensible and thus Afghanistan saw an attack by another super power in the beginning of the 21st century.9
The fallout of the US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Pakistan emerged in the shape of development of militancy because of the weak nature of the border between the two countries.10 There are also many factors in tribal areas which provided space for those militants. The weak political system operating on the British FCR (Frontier
Crimes Regulation) of the 1900s was repugnant to the modern day democratic system
7 John Cole, “Pakistan and Afghanistan: Beyond the Taliban”, Political Science Quarterly, 124, no.2 (Summer 2009), p. 229. 8 Nabi Misdaq. Afghanistan Political Frailty and External Interference. New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 191. 9 Chris Johnson & Jolyon Leslie. Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London: Zed Books, 2008, p. 29. 10 Lubna Abid Ali, “Religious Radicalization, Resurgence of Taliban and Curbing Militancy: Implications for Pak-Afghan Relations”, International Journal of Business and social Sciences, Vol. 1 No. 2. November 2010, p. 130. 4
in the country. The lack of political activities developed a vacuum in the areas which was filled by the militants. The lack of economic activities and illiteracy in the tribal areas multiplied their sufferings and remained on the mercy of those militants who have the power of guns and bullets.
The Musharraf government’s alliance with the United States in the global war on terrorism developed a nexus among those groups who had ideological links but now became diehard enemies of the government and its institutions. They believed the
Musharraf’s alliance was the deviations of Islamic principles and supporting of an infidel against Muslims.11 The Musharraf’s U-turn on Taliban led Islamists to entered the war into Pakistani territory as Pakistan army launched the first ever military operation in tribal areas in its history.
The military operations, initially started against the foreign militants, spread to other tribal areas and violence continued in the entire country in all the preceding years.
This violence spilled over to the rest of the country in the shape of suicide attacks, bomb blasts and many other sabotage activities, resulting in the killing of more than forty thousand innocent people and more than seven thousand security personnel along with thousands of injured.
The alliance with the United States, on the one hand, and support to some militant groups, on the other was the reflection of Musharraf’s “Pakistan comes first”. It was a neo-realist approach to safeguard its country’s interests in the region. The neo-realist approach developed in the preceding years by Pakistan and the United States respectively in their own national interest complicated the whole situation because both the states made responsible each one for their failures. The US demand of “do
11 Samina Yasmeen, “Pakistan and the Struggle for ‘Real’ Islam” in Shahram Akberzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (Eds.). Islam and Political Legitimacy. London: Routledge, 2003, p. 70. 5
more” and Pakistan “good and bad Taliban” policy not only developed differences between the two countries but made the region more vulnerable to violence.
The backlash of the war on terror in Pakistan emerged in the shape of an electoral victory for the MMA in the 2002 general elections which was the first ever victory of the religious parties in Pakistan in an over whelming majority in North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and established their own government there. The provincial government of the MMA not only gave legal and constitutional cover to its Islamization agenda, like the banning of music in public transport, ban on flying kites and discouraged the art and cultural activities in the province.12
The first military operation was started in the tribal areas by the military against the foreign militants but turned against the local Taliban with the passage of time and thus once the restive places in the country became a battleground between the security forces and local Taliban. The government policies regarding war on terror was not consistent according to the situation. The military operations against the militants and then peace agreement with them have complicated the overall security situation and turned the whole country into a mess of bad policies on these crucial issues.13
It is believed that there is a gap between the military and civilian leaderships on the issue of Taliban and on this how to deal with them (from 2001 till 2011 as it is the time period of the Ph. D thesis). This division between the two institutions (2001-
2011) has not only failed to develop a comprehensive policy towards this problem but even aggravated the situation from bad to worse. It is interesting to note that the differences between the two institutions are not the only aspect of this problem but the
12 Mohammed Waseem. Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Working Paper Number 05, January 2011, p. 12. 13 Ashley J. Tellis, “U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan’s Transformation”, The Washington Quarterly 28:1 Winter 2004-05, p. 97. 6
divisions among the political parties are also reflected in their policies regarding the
war on terror.
1.2. Aims and Objectives of the Study
The specific purpose of this research is to evaluate the impact of the war on terror on
Pakistan politics for the period from 2001 to 2011. As mentioned above, there is an
on-going debate on the war on terror in Pakistan and her alliance with the US has
been subjected to severe criticism by different segments of society from the
beginning. Therefore in order to explore the facts and impact of the current turmoil,
the current study has focused on the following objectives:
1. To point out the compulsions that made Pervaiz Musharraf to join the U.S. led war on
terror against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan;
2. To determine as to what factors led to the spread of violence and terrorism in
Pakistan;
3. To identify the gap between the civil-military relations regarding war on terror and
subsequent effects on the general elections in Pakistan especially in 2002 and 2008
respectively;
4. To analyze the overall impacts of war on terror on Pakistan politics during the period
under reference.
1.3. The Research Questions
While the study focuses on the impact of the US-led war on terror on the politics of
Pakistan, there are certain questions on which this research is based. To make the
research successful, the research questions are important part making the study to go
forward successfully.
The study seeks the answers of the following questions: 7
A. Is the US.-led war on terror, being fought in Afghanistan/Pakistan justified?
This question seeks to identify the factors which led to the start of the war on terror in
code name “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. This question will also
highlight the role of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and its activities which led to the 9/11
attacks in the United States and the world response to the US call.
B. What were the reasons which compelled Pakistan to join the war on terror?
This question aims to identify different factors which were responsible for Pakistan to
join the war on terror. These factors may be the use of external threat or the old policy
of strategic depth in Afghanistan. The Musharraf decision was to legitimize his
government in the world community would be an aspect of this alliance.
C. What factors or set of factors led to the growth of militancy in the tribal areas in the
post alliance period?
This question is little bit relevant or called to be a sub-question of the above one. But
there are more factors which are directly responsible for extremism and terrorism in
Pakistan. The government policies in the shape of military operations and subsequent
peace agreement are the cause of militancy. The external factor in the shape of US
drone attacks or repeated violation of Pakistan sovereignty would be a cause of
violence and anti-American sentiments in Pakistan.
D. Did the war on terror mobilize the public opinion in the general elections held in
Pakistan in 2002?
This question explores the impact on Pakistan internal politics especially of the
elections in the country. Did the public opinion affect the outcome of the elections
have also been analyzed. The suicide attacks on the political leaders have also been
discussed.
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E. Does there exist any gap in the government and the armed forces on the issue of
terrorism in the country?
Through this question, the researcher has attempted to scrutinize the relations between
the civil-military on the on-going war on terror in Pakistan and also the differences
among the political parties on terrorism and militancy has been discussed (2001-
2011). The opposing views gap of state institutions is the cause of unresolved war on
terror in Pakistan, is an interesting aspect of the internal politics of Pakistan. The
division between the civil-military relations (2001-2011), on the one hand, and among
the political parties, on the other hand, has aggravated the situation further and this
has been critically analyzed.
1.4. Hypothesis
While the war on terror is a new development in the region, the root of terrorism and
extremism remained there from the last twenty years. To critically pinpoint the real
causes of these disturbances in Pakistan, there are a few hypotheses on which this
research study is based.
A. Turmoil in Pakistan is linked with the repercussion of the Afghan war and the result
of the on-going war on terror in Afghanistan.
B. The alliance with the US in the war on terror and the subsequent policies of
successive regimes in Pakistan, are the consequences of militancy and extremism.
1.5. Contribution to the Knowledge
The US-led war on terror in Afghanistan is the result of the 9/11 attacks in New York
and Washington. The US threat to “back Pakistan to the stone age”14 compelled her to
cooperate with the former. Pakistan also took a take U-turn on its policies on
Afghanistan and Taliban. Pakistan agreed to become the “most vital ally”15 in the US
14 Pervaiz Musharraf. In The Line of Fire. A memoir. London: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 200. 15 The United States declared Pakistan, “A Major Non-NATO Ally” in 2003. 9
war against terror. It was not a new experiment for Pakistan to ally with the US rather she had been extending support to the Western bloc in its struggle against the Soviet bloc in the Cold war era.
There is a perception in the US administration that Pakistan is not doing enough and is playing a dubious role in the war on terror in the sense of dealing with the militants in “good and bad” perspectives. The international community and the US deal with them as militants only. These perceptions against Pakistan were seen in the military operations and the peace agreements with the militants in the tribal areas. Seen in this context, the relations between the two countries have witnessed many ups and downs in this period. Through this study, the researcher seeks to explore the gray areas between the two countries on the issues which are internal as well as external, have impacts on the relations between the two countries.
As the war on terror is a new development in the contemporary world and especially in Pakistan, there is little research work conducted on Pakistan and the way it has suffered from the war on terror. The present work would be a qualitative contribution on Pakistan, focusing on the outcome of Pakistan’s joining the US led war.
This study is divided into seven chapters. Each chapter focuses on a relevant theory of international relations and attempts to relate the said theories to the challenges which
Pakistan is confronted with at the moment. The application of this approach to the study of present day challenges faced by Pakistan will prove a landmark contribution.
As this study is based on empirical and analytical approach, much of the primary and secondary sources are available and are included in the respective chapters and an appropriate approach is made to make it more suitable and up to the mark of international standard. 10
The theoretical contributions are based on three theories which are relevant to this work and on which this research is based are;
The neo-realism theory of international relations is relevant to chapter four which discusses the relations of the United States with Pakistan after 9/11. Through the lens of this theory, the researcher has tried to explore the nature of this relation between the two countries and to pinpoint the stages of conversion and diversion in relations between the two. The non-state actors role in shaping these relations are also discussed. Pakistan supports the US war on terror, on the one hand, and safeguards its own strategic interests, on the other, are the most interesting aspects of this research work. The researcher analyzes the policies of Pakistan regarding Afghanistan, India and the US. These relations and their developments are based on the neo-realism in politics in which every actor attempts to safeguard its own interest and contributes to the state policies on realpolitik perspective. The Pervaiz Musharraf’s “Pakistan comes
First”16 is the reflection of this neo-realist Perspective that made him to offer unprecedented support to the US fight against terrorists.
The chapters five and six are based on the social constructionism Perspective in international relations, focusing on Pakistan’s internal politics from the perspective of war on terror. Through the lens of social constructionism in Pakistan, the role of religious parties in shaping militancy and extremism in the country and how these parties contributed to the increase of Talibanization in Pakistan.
Soviet-Afghan war (1979-88) created the whole mess that Pakistan inherited gradually, to make this period in depth analyses would be beneficial in this regard.
Many internal developments like the US drone policy in the tribal areas and interference in Pakistan’s internal politics led to the anti-American sentiments and provoked increased activities of jihadi and militant organizations. The Difa-i-Pakistan
16 Pervaiz Musharraf’s address to the nation on 17th September, 2001. 11
Council (Defence of Pakistan Council) establishment is worth to be mentioning in this regards.
The general elections in Pakistan in 2002 and 2008 have been specifically analyzed because both were influenced by the on-going war on terror in the region and the public opinion was influenced by the terror activities against the political leaders and party workers, the election campaigns in the country and terrorist attacks against some political parties are also be discussed.
The institutionalism in international relations is the last part (chapter seven) of the thesis to be discussed. The institutional gaps and differences between the US and
Pakistan are specifically mentioned like the Raymond Davis issue, Abbottabad operation and Salala attacks are some of the most important events in the turbulent years of Pak-US relations.
It is an acknowledged fact that terrorism in Pakistan has continued without any interruption, it is the cause of institutional gaps between the government and the army
(civil-military relations, 2001-2011) on the issue of terrorism in Pakistan. The difference of opinion among the political parties on militancy and terrorism is yet another factor weakening the capability of Pakistan to bring an end to militancy.
According to the researcher’s assessment and knowledge, very little scholarly work has been conducted on the politics of Pakistan, being played since 2001, with special reference to terrorism. This study will not only contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the subject but will also bring to the forefront such facts that are at the foundation of problems which Pakistan has been facing for the last one and a half decade. This study will also provide food for thought to the policymakers on institutional and political solutions of such problems. 12
This study is primarily based on the interviews conducted with the politicians, academicians, journalists and political and strategic analysts who provided an insight to the researcher on contemporary issues. These interviews were very helpful that they corrected an earlier perception of the researcher on terrorism and its implications on Pakistan politics.
1.6. Limitations of the Study
Like any other research work, the present research has also some limitations. The limitations of time period and the scope to a specific area of terrorism are some of the factors in this regards. By employing the historiographical lens to the contemporary development in Pakistan as a research project while analyzing the primary and secondary sources which are accessible on the present study have some difficulties in this regards.
As a human effort, it has some weaknesses on my part. The lack of resources and accessibility to the primary sources are some of them. While conducting research on a burning issue like terrorism in the context of Pakistan, there may remain many facets untouched or not fully elaborated which deserve more space and needed much thorough debates.
This study is not focused on the definitions and statistical methods or approach on terrorism and Pakistan politics, as there are more than a hundred of definitions available on it and the statistical data is also available in hundreds of sources. The main effort of this research is the analysis of the present study in its true sense.
1.7. Structure of the Thesis
While initiating a research study, the divisions of the study in different chapters or parts are made to make the research more comprehensive and coherent in its 13
assessment. It is the key pattern to fully grasp and evaluate the relevant data in the appropriate sections to understand it more succinctly. This attempt is an effort based on analytical research and a scholarly contribution of the researcher, the present research is divided into eight chapters in the following patterns:
Chapter one is based on introduction and background of the study. Aims and objectives are highlighted along with the research questions and hypotheses are also included in this chapter. Again contribution to the knowledge in context of theoretical or conceptual framework of the proposed study is discussed.
The second chapter consists of two parts; i.e., the literature review and the theoretical framework are mentioned in the end of this chapter.
Chapter three focuses on the research methodology of this study on which social sciences research is based on. This methodology is both empirical and analytical in perspective. Interviews are conducted in a manner to extract more analytical views of the respondents in this study. Why interview method was used and which kinds of respondents were selected for interviews are discussed thoroughly in chapter three.
Chapter four is based on the theory of neo-realism perspective in international relations in which the relations between the United States and Pakistan is viewed in the war on terror perspective. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and India and its role in the on-going war on terror are also discussed in a comprehensive way. The much debated Pervaiz Musharraf’s decision of joining the war on terror has also come into light. It also examines Islamabad’s support to the US in the war on terror and the fallout of this decision on Pakistan’s national security.
Chapter five focuses on the social constructionism perspective in international relations especially in Pakistan’s perspective. This chapter takes the historical 14
background of militancy which has a link with the Soviet Afghan war of the 1980s.
The respective government policies are contributed to the increase of Talibanization of the country in the last twenty years and the recent U-turn of the Musharraf’s government made militants the most dreaded in the present day Pakistan. The origin and growth of militant mindset and the infrastructure provided to this phenomena, is also discussed.
Chapter six is also based on the social constructionism and is the extended part of the chapter five but linked to its political context. The social construction of public opinion in the general elections in Pakistan in 2002 and 2008 respectively and highlighted the anti-American sentiments in the country in this regard. To increase the role of militant and religious political parties in Pakistan which has undermined the role of mainstream political parties in the proposed time period are also analyzed.
Chapter seven is based on the institutionalism perspective in international relations, focused on the institutional gap or divergence between the United States and Pakistan in the war on terror and the internal developments in which US is also a part of the problem, has been discussed. A trust deficit developed between the two countries in shape of Davis issue, Abbottabad operation and Salala attacks are worth mentioning in this regard. The differences among the political parties on the issues of terrorism and militancy have been critically analysed.
Chapter eight is the conclusion of this study. This provides detailed information which will contribute about Pakistan in the terrorism perspective and also provides a food for thought to the concerned agencies as to how effectively the menace of terrorism be handled. In this chapter, the overall development will be drawn into a summarized manner to grasp the whole picture of the thesis and recommend some concrete steps to avoid such situation in future which the state is confronting today. 15
The appendices and the bibliography are the last part of the final thesis in which all the relevant sources (primary and secondary) are included and appendices have been attached to make the thesis more authentic and qualitative. 16
Chapter Two
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Social science is very interesting area of research. While conducting research in applied or numerical sciences, social sciences are totally different from the former in conducting research and compiling data on the research project. Social science research cannot be isolated the society and surroundings in which it is conducted.
Pakistan’s present situation is caused by her alliance with the US-led War on Terror which is the root cause of all the developments taken place so far whether positive or negative. The Musharraf’s decision made Pakistan a frontline state against the Al
Qaeda and Taliban militants, on the one hand, and a battle ground for the extremists and militants, on the other. Thus a nexus of violence developed in the entire country among the militants and foreign non-state actors. This policy of alliance not only shifted the war on terror from Afghanistan into Pakistan’s tribal areas but to the rest of the country and severely damaged the social, political and economic structure of the society. It was the first time in its history that an insurgency like situation erupted in the tribal areas against the state and its effects were felt throughout the country.
An attempt has been made in this chapter to analyze the background of the 9/11 attacks and, after Pakistan’s joining the war on terror and its effects on the politics of
Pakistan. Initially, it was believed that the alliance with the US would not have any repercussion on Pakistan but as the war escalated, the security situation became more volatile and the war started in the country, with no end visible till this time (2001-
2011). 17
In this chapter, through the lens of literatures which are available on the issue of militancy, it would be examined that the historical narratives and linkages are essential to understand this new phenomenon in the shape of war on terror in
Pakistan. Therefore, an attempt has been made to historically locate the causes of these developments in the country.
There is abundance of literature on Pakistan, its relations with Afghan Mujahideen, the role of religious parties in Pakistan politics, the role of US in the region and relations with Pakistan with special reference to the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s and the developments after the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US attacks on
Afghanistan. The available literature reflects the overall picture connecting the past with the present and the responses of the respective governments in Pakistan. Many well-known writers both Pakistani and foreign have written on these issues.
The international organizations, for instance, International Crisis Group reports are also thought provoking and are recommended for policy thinking on the specific issues. Through all these literature, the on-going research would be more beneficial and development of a research work on the subject which is much debated in world, in general, and in Pakistan, in particular. The following review covers the broad canvas of Pakistan’s role in the region both in the Soviet-Afghan war of 1980s and the post 9/11 war on terror.
2.1. Literature Review
Abbas narrated the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan as an ultimate force when after the Soviet withdrawal, the war among the warlords for the capturing of Kabul continued for many years. This created a vacuum in the political atmosphere of
Afghanistan which was filled by the religious political forces. This was the turning 18 point in the history of Afghanistan which not only gave power to the religious forces but also implemented their religious ideology in the entire country.1
Farzana has discussed the relations between the Taliban and other militant groups in
Afghanistan. These linkages were strengthened by the Pakistani militants who provided sanctuaries to them and thus Pakistan became the victim of policies that she initiated in the 1980s. This created the nexus among the local as well as the trans- national militant groups which became a factor in the process of Talibanization in
Pakistan.2
The US/NATO incursions into Pakistan’s territory and attack on Pakistan army and militia led to anger within the army and resulted in more anti-American sentiments in the country. The most significant fallout of these attacks have been further recruitment for the Taliban and also pushed the Taliban into the arms of Al Qaeda.
The US attack on a Madrassa in Bajaur further aroused the flame of fire in the country.3
In his memoire, Bush has narrated the events of 9/11 which have changed the concept of international security. The priority of its administration was the war and in no time, the US has known its enemy. This attack, according to Bush, was a declaration of war against the United States. The author has discussed the whole picture which he saw on that day and the speech to the nation ad declaration of war against terror.4
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington that killed nearly 3000 people, were termed by President Bush as “the Pearl Harbor of the 21st
Century.” The attacks were conducted by a shadow enemy that had no country or no visible army. Two days after the attacks, Pakistan was threatened to cut off
1 Hassan Abbas. Pakistan Drift into Extremism-Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005. 2 Farzana Sheikh. Making Sense of Pakistan. London: Hurst & Company, 2009. 3 Shazadi Beg. “The Ideological battle: Inside from Pakistan”, Perspectives on Terrorism, July 2008. 4 George W. Bush. Decision Points. London: Virgin Books, 2011. 19 connections with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and support the US in every possible manner in her war on terror.5
Musharraf has narrated the events of 9/11 as the most important in the history of
Pakistan and in his life itself. He has referred to the US threat wherein Pakistan, in case of refusal to cooperate, was to be bombed back to the stone age, the interest of
Pakistan was considered to be the most important one. To secure the strategic assets and interests, Musharraf decided to ally with the US in her war on terror. He also mentioned the US demands which he approved after consultation with all the segments of Pakistani society.6
The deployment of troops and launching of military operations against the militants led to the emergence of insurgency like situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan. These operations against the ‘safe havens’ of militants further escalated violence when the
‘Operation Silence’ was launched by the army against the inmates of Lal Masjid
Islamabad in 2007.7
The ‘International Crisis Group’ report on FATA is worth mentioning. In one of its reports, the ICG criticized the government peace agreements in tribal areas with the militants which had caused more violence in the country and had strengthened position of the militants. In the report, the agreements with the militants were specially criticized on the ground that from those agreements, the government could not achieve peace but only an opportunity provided to the militants to expand their influence in the rest of the tribal areas and in the settled areas of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.8
5 Bob Woodward. Bush at War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004. 6 Pervez Musharraf. In the Line of Fire. London: Simon & Schuster, 2006. 7 Owen Bennett Jones. Pakistan-Eye of the Storm. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011. 8 International Crisis Group. Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants. Asia Report No. 125, 2006. 20
Khan has criticized the government policies towards curbing militancy in Pakistan.
The author has specially focused on two events which became the causes of violence and terrorism in the country. The US drone attack on a Madrassa in Bajaur Agency was the beginning of the eruption of violence because immediately thereafter a suicide attack struck a military training camp in Malakand. The next one was the Lal masjid operation in which the state power was arbitrarily used against the students of the religious seminary which triggered the militant attacks on the security forces and the state.9
Samad narrates the realities of the situations after Musharraf joined the war on terror.
He argues that the issues which Musharraf wanted to safeguard and then joined the alliance, all were compromised in the subsequent years of war on terror in Pakistan.
The religious parties were aroused against him and street agitations had become daily activities not only against the US but against the military role in the war on terror as well. All the strategic interests were backfired and the policy of Pakistan became more compromised.10
Siddiqa has narrated the position of President Pervaiz Musharraf as Army Chief who manipulated politics during his term of office. The political system was run by the
President-cum- Army Chief and that his power was not to be challenged by the ruling party which was reflected in the internal decision making based on the authoritarian character. Some members of the ruling party had termed the Parliament as a rubber stamp and its continuation was projected as a sign of stability and strengthening of democracy. The Parliament and the ruling party politics were subservient to the chief executive who was the president and the Army Chief at the same time.11
9 Imran Khan. Pakistan-A Personal History. London: Bantam Press, 2011. 10 Yunas Samad. The Pakistan-US Conundrum-Jihadist, the military and the people, the struggle for Control. London: Hurst & Company, 2011. 11 Ayesha Siddiqa. Military Inc.-Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. 21
Nawaz has discussed the military’s multi-layered historical analysis of the nature and its role in the politics of the country as well as the tense relations with the United
States. The author has not only examined the Pakistan Army and its connection with the US especially of the CIA and ISI. The author has also highlighted the country’s role as one of the leading Muslim states in the world’s toughest neighnourhoods.12
Rizvi has conducted a comprehensive study of the dynamics of civil-military relations in Pakistan. The author has examined as to the Pakistan military has acquired such a salience in the polity and how it continues to influence decision-making on foreign and security policies and key domestic, political, social and economic issues. He also examines the changes within the military, the impact of these changes on its disposition towards the state and society, and the implications for peace and security in nuclearized South Asia.13
Waseem has discussed the formation of six religious parties alliance in the aftermath of 9/11 called Muthahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and the role played by Madrassas in the success of this religious alliance in the 2002 general elections in Pakistan. The victory of MMA was the cause of anti-American sentiments in the country especially in the border areas of Pakistan. The mobility of the MMA leadership in the election campaign was also a cause of its success.14
Lieven has described the role of Awami National Party (ANP) in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) government while dealing with the Taliban which, according to him, was an utter confusion. The peace deal with the Swat Taliban and the events which turned the masses against them and the way a wave of operation was paved for, were discussed. Throughout the country, people supported the military
12 Shuja Nawaz. Cross Swords. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 13 Hassan Askari Rizvi. Military, State and Society in Pakistan. New York: St. Martin Press, 2000. 14 Mohammad Waseem. Democratization in Pakistan. A Case Study of the 2002 General Elections. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006. 22 operation and this was the first time that the provincial government endorsed it which facilitated the military crackdown to succeed.15
The establishment of Difa-e-Pakistan Council (DPC) was the outcome of the
US/NATO attacks on a check post in Mohmand Agency in November 2011. This
Council consisting mostly of the religious and Jihadi groups, works for two main policies; anti-India and anti-US sentiments on which this alliance is based on. This alliance attracted thousands of people in its rallies in big cities to demonstrate anti-US sentiments while conducting large gatherings.16
It was the year 2011 which saw many events turning the relationship between the military and civilian leadership tougher. On the issue of Memogate scandal, the civil- military relations had reached to a climax where both parties were led to an uncompromising position and a fear of another coup was imminent in the prevailing situation.17
2.2. Theoretical Framework
On 9/11, (2001), the terrorist attacks in the United States was an event that changed the security notions in the world. Prior to these attacks, states were generally worried about their security from their enemy states, located in the neighbourhood or in the region. After these attacks, a new element in the shape of non-state actors came to the limelight who have no country but may have presence in many countries.
The Al Qaeda declared war against the United States and other Western countries but targeted only US for many reasons. The first reason was that the United States, today is one of the most powerful states in the world, militarily and economically and from these attacks, Al Qaeda wanted to convey a message to the US and their allies that the
15 Anatol Lieven. Pakistan- A Hard country. London: Allan Lane, 2011. 16 Waqar Gillani. “Old man and the sea”. The NEWS, Islamabad, 2011. 17 I.A. Rehman. “The memo whodunit”, Daily DAWN, Islamabad, 2011. 23 militants can hit a powerful state wherever it wanted to strike. The other reason was the focus of world media in the United States. The attacks were to bring the Al Qaeda and his message to the world in headlines. The terrorists used US aircrafts for these attacks which proved more devastating than a bomb and other lethal weapons. No one could think that the terrorists would use themselves as suicide bombers and the aircrafts as weapons of mass destruction for their ulterior design.
The US President George W. Bush equated these attacks with the Pearl Harbor of the twentieth century because at the Pearl Harbor, soldiers protecting the state were killed, at the World Trade Center civilians who were supposed to be protected by the state were the victims.18
Why Bush equated this event to a military assault on its military base in 1941. To show the world its devastation, this event was equated with the most devastating act against the United States in its history. It should also be borne in mind that after the
Pearl Harbor attacks, the United States declared war against the Empire of Japan. In the same way, the sponsors of the 9/11 terrorist attacks were also termed as transnational terrorist organization. Psychologically, the United States was shocked by these attacks because as a super power in the world, it was a tremendous setback to the security apparatus and vulnerability to handle such like situation.19
This declaration of war against the Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations by the
United States gave her the leading role in the global security and thus emerged as a hegemonic state in the international politics. The undisputed position of the United
States enabled her to take forceful action globally on the basis of what was perceived as essential for her own and international security.
18 George Soros. THE AGE OF FALLIBILITY- The Consequences of the War on Terror. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006, p. 101. 19 Stephen Vertigans (Ed.). Militant Islam- A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences. New York: Routledge, 2009, p. 139. 24
Pakistan having close border with Afghanistan and Al Qaeda had sanctuaries there against whom the US declared war, was asked to cooperate. Without any hesitation,
Pervaiz Musharraf became willing to cooperate. Musharraf’s decision to join the US war against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan brought the General in a direct confrontation with the home grown militants and their supporters. To support the US, it was imperative that the support to Taliban and militants is curtailed and cut-off relations with them, if possible. This was a difficult decision because the relations between the army and the Taliban government in Afghanistan that had developed by mid 1990s, had been retained till that time.20
Pervaiz Musharraf’s decision was widely debated in the country on the ground that he had betrayed the Taliban and supported the West against the Muslims. Being widely condemned in the religious community of the country, large demonstrations were held against the government. Pervaiz Musharraf had only one choice; either to support the
US or the Terrorists. In case of support to the US, Pakistan was to gain many benefits but in the latter case, was to lose everything. The question irritating the minds of those at the helm of affairs in Pakistan was: Why to support those Taliban who had nothing in minds except destructions and militancy. The decision Pakistan took was to break up its relations with the world pariah and join the international community in the largest interest of Pakistan.21
Though the US has provided about $ 12 billion in military and economic aid in the last ten years and also supported the country’s economic growth so as to increase its exports, Pakistan has found the economic cost of her decision tremendously heavy.
Most of the industrial units in the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa) were closed because of the growing terrorist attacks in the province.
No foreign businessman is willing to come to Pakistan to invest as the bomb blasts
20 Frederic Grare. Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, 45, February 2006, p. 01. 21 Pervaiz Musharraf address to the nation on 17 September, 2001. 25 and suicide attacks occur almost on daily basis. Pakistan’s decision to join the war on terror has caused so far about $ 80 billion loses to the state economy.22
Serious that financial loss has been, the human loss which is neither repairable nor recoverable. Pakistani civilians loses in this war on terror is higher than the three wars
(1948, 1965, 1971) which Pakistan had fought with India. More than forty thousand people lost their lives.23 The war on terror has finally entered into Pakistan which no one had ever expected.
2.2.1. International relations and theory
International relations are complex relations among the nations because the interests of one state may prove stumbling blocks for others. No state can survive in isolation in the present global world which has influenced even the day to day internal politics of the state. The state policies are shaped in the context of global development and only those states can hope to be successful who manage to act according to the prevailing situation in the world. To understand the international politics, theories of international relations profoundly assist in judging the world political environment.24
The present situation and development in the shape of “war on terror” in global politics, it is important to know from the lens of theoretical framework the present development in the world, in general, and in Pakistan, in particular.
The present study titled: “US-led war on terror: impact on Pakistan (2001-2011), has been conducted in relevance to three international theories which the researcher focused on: Neo-realism Theory, Social Constructionism Theory and Institutionalism
Theory of international relations. There are three aspects of this study which are
22 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Federal Budget Statement, 2013-2014. 23 The NEWS, Islamabad, June 15, 2013. 24 Fred Chernoff. Theory and Metatheory in International Relations- Concepts and Contending Accounts. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, p. 80. 26 relevant to these three theories. The research questions which will explore these three theories are:
Is the on-going US ‘war on terror’ justified? What factors compelled Pakistan to associate herself with the US-led war on terror? These two questions are relevant to the neo-realism theory of international relations based on the US policies regarding war on terror in the world, in general, and relations with Pakistan, in particular, and internal politics of Pakistan while joining the war on terror.
What factor/set of factors gave birth to the growth of militancy in FATA in the post- alliance period and what were the reasons for the spread of terrorist attacks in the country, are the main questions based on Social Constructionism Theory on Pakistan.
What change occurred in the relationship between the ruling and opposition political parties, religious political parties and mainstream parties regarding war on terror in the country and are civil and military institutions in Pakistan on the same page while resolving terrorism in the country? These are the aspects of Institutionalism Theory which will focus on Pakistan.
A brief introduction of these theories and the framework on which this study is based is presented as under:
2.2.2. Classical Realism
Before introducing Neo-realism Theory, a description of the theory of classical realism in international relations is essential. According to classical realism, a desire for more power is rooted in the human nature. States are engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities. Each state is interested to make her presence felt in politics. In classical realism, the state’s external power position cannot be diverse from its internal situation and capabilities. The role of ‘statesman’ in running the affairs of the state is also of importance. Classical realists heavily rely on notions of 27 the state and its relations to society. It also acknowledges that the nature of domestic politics is vital in sustaining the state’s international goal.25
This theory focuses on the power in the shape of materials and especially in the military perspectives which also became a source of insecurity and chaos in the international relations. This theory also encourages the arms race and building huge forces which divert the meager resources to military preparedness.
2.2.3. Neo-realism
This is a widely discussed and most important theory of international relations.
According to this theory, the international system is anarchical because of the absence of a central authority in the international system. Every state feels herself sovereign and free in her affairs. The main objective of the state is her survival in the anarchical system of the world. It is the power of the state which can give guarantee of her survival and security against the other states. In this anarchical world, a state is to act as there is uncertainty about its security. Foreign occupation or invasion is the most pressing threat to its security and this create an arm race among the states to balance the security threat from the hostile state.26 To maximize its goal of security, the state is to act according to its own perceptions that another state is planning to attack her.
This theory gave advantage to the major powers in relation to its security.
This theory is used as a threat to world peace and harmony because it compels states to acquire more arms and put them in arms race and struggle among themselves. A sense of insecurity among the states would prevail and a constant threat to their security engaged the states for all the time in preparation for wars and arms stocking rather than to concentrate on development and welfare of the masses. This theory
25 Hans J. Morgenthau. Politics among Nations-The Struggle for Power and Peace (sixth Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1997, p.10. 26 Charles L. Glaser. Rational Theory of International Relations- The Logic of Competition and Cooperation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 02. 28 brings a complete fiasco in building confidence and mutual cooperation among the states because of the perception of insecurity among them.
The theory has encouraged the arms race not only in the shape of more weapons in quantity but in most sophisticated technology gradually leading to the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) causing thus a threat to humans worldwide.
This race is not limited to a few country, many more have developed their arsenals with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. This arms race to ensure security has wasted billions of dollars while establishing factories arms manufacturing and ultimately led to the collapse of their economies under the huge burden of arms.
Neo-realism and the declaration of war on terror against the Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have impact on the state sovereignty and security because of the anarchical situation in the world. The emergence of non-state actors and the US unilateral actions against them has weakened the security of the other states. The US policy of pre-emptive strikes has pushed the world into more insecure position and on the mercy of great powers for its security.
The concept neo-realism and the war on terror in the contemporary world politics have weakened the state concept of sovereignty because of the threat of attack from the states and terrorists. The threat of the use of “weapons of mass destructions” by
Saddam Hussain in Iraq in 2003 and the US attack on Iraq to destroy their weapons for the safety and security of the region was a clear example in this regard. After enormous search and inspection, there was no proof of the existence of WMD in
Iraq.27
The US drone attacks in the tribal areas of Pakistan is the part of war on terror campaign initiated by the US policy of pre-emptive strikes against the militants in the area. From the US perspective, these militants and terrorists are the potential threat to
27 op. cit., p. 155. 29 her security and thus should be punished and eliminated. This policy has not only violated the national sovereignty of state but has also given license to kill someone and somewhere who in the definition of the aggressive power are threat to its security.
In the neo-realism perspective and the new development in shape of war on terror, it has now authorized the states to declare any individual, group, or state which might pose a threat to its security and declare them the potential threat to the world security.
The Bush policy of “either you are with us or with the terrorist” have divided the states and individuals into two different camps.
The war on terror has determined who is able to act, not who is authorized to act and has shaped the world politics as the might is right. The war on terror and the concept of neo-realism have authorized the powerful states to intervene in the internal affairs of other states or depict them as “terrorism sponsored states” and thus impose sanctions and even attack in the name of international security. While attacking Iraq in 2003, it was also an allegation that the ruling Bath Party has links with terrorist organization-Al Qaeda and its dethroning from power is important for the regional security and allies in the region. Taliban government in Afghanistan was declared “a terrorism sponsored state” and war against it was authorized by the UN Security
Council and the world community supported the US move.
2.4. Neo-realism and Pakistan
The 9/11 attacks have direct threat to Pakistan’s security on many grounds. Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been India centric and the role of India cannot be ignored in the present security threat to Pakistan after 9/11. The Indian government’s offer of all kinds of support to the US immediately after the 9/11 attacks had jeopardized
Pakistan’ national interests and its own security at stake. The New Delhi’s support to 30 the US was only to malign Pakistan in the international community and to declare
Pakistan a state which is the supporter of terrorism in the region.28
As India has no direct links with Afghanistan, the US aircrafts flying from the Indian airbases would have been a great threat to its security and sovereignty. In that situation, Pakistan would have not been able to prevent the US forces to intervene from the Indian space to Pakistan and attack Afghanistan. As Pakistan was a close ally of Taliban government in the region, the Indian government propaganda to bracket Pakistan with Taliban in the new scenario could have damaged its international status and might face sanctions from the world community.29
As the US formally asked for support from Pakistan, the importance of Pakistan in the shape of an ally was better known to the US administration. The close border with
Afghanistan and a vast intelligence network of Pakistan in Afghanistan, the US needed Pakistan’s support in dislodging the Taliban government and to capture Al
Qaeda terrorists in a limited time. This was possible only with the help and support of
Pakistan. The US war policy of “light foot”30 in Afghanistan was materialized because of Pakistan’s logistic support and the airbases facilities which Pakistan offered to the US forces. As Afghanistan is a land locked country, Pakistan’s ports were the main supply route to Afghanistan for the US forces and the shortest as well as the most accessible route throughout the year was also a factor in seeking
Pakistan’s support.
2.2.5. Musharraf and the War on Terror
Pervaiz Musharraf response to the US demand was in affirmative because the state security and national interests were in threat. There were many factors which were in
28 Sanam Noor. Pakistan-India relations and terrorism, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 60, No 2, April 2007, p. 71. 29 Gareth Price. India’s Policy towards Afghanistan. Chattam House, Asia ASP 2013/2014, August 2013, p. 03. 30 Government of the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, p. 85. 31 the mind of Pervaiz Musharraf while supporting the US in her war on terror. While keeping in mind the US threat to Pakistan, Musharraf was realistic in his policies regarding the new development in the world and the region. Long before the 9/11 attacks, Musharraf banned many militant organizations in the country which the West and the US considered good sign in Pakistan and supported the initiatives.31
While supporting the US, Pervaiz Musharraf had many issues on the table which might be in danger, had Pakistan not compelled with the US demands. The first was the economic sanctions and aid embargoes which have already crippled Pakistan’s economy for the last ten years. The economy of Pakistan was weak and could not sustain its growth without the foreign support and assistance. How Pakistan could sustain its security and sovereignty when the country was in bankruptcy with very little in pockets. ‘The empty hands are the loser hands’32 is the simple statement while dealing with other nations.
The people of Pakistan always supported the nuclear programme and were concerned about its security and development in the country. All successive governments whether civilian or military, have jealously guarded Pakistan’s nuclear programme and taken steps for its preservation all the times. The strategic assets in the shape of nuclear weapons and technology have also come in direct threat from the US, had
Pakistan not supported the US. Pakistan has no such power to prevent the US aircrafts from entering into her territory and thus will be on the mercy of US. How could
Pakistan protect her weapons in such situations. Pakistan could not afford war with the US no matter even if her nuclear assets too have come in threat.
While supporting his decision of joining the war on terror, Pervaiz Musharraf was fully aware that the India factor in Pakistan internal and external policies is involved
31 Eamon Murphy and Aazar Tamana, “State Terrorism and military in Pakistan” in Richard Jackson, Eamon Murphy and Scott Poynting (Eds.). Contemporary State Terrorism-Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 57. 32 A popular Pashto Proverb. 32 and this was the reason that he wanted to get support from the masses when he mentioned that the India threat was imminent if we did not comply with the US demand.33 The fact was that India wanted to exploit the situation in its favour after
9/11 to make Pakistan scapegoat for the wrong done by the Al Qaeda and Taliban.
India would attack on our nuclear assets with the help of US forces. The Indian involvement in the Afghanistan affairs was only to make a ground for her to launch war against Pakistan and thus make the western borders insecure for us. There are no large scale bussiness activities of India in Afghanistan but still it has seven Consulates in Afghanistan near the Pakistan borders which were involved in the destabilization of
Pakistan.
While supporting the US in war on terror, Musharraf continued his support to the
Taliban for some strategic interests. On the same time, Musharraf was an ally of the
US and also have soft corner for the Afghan Taliban to save them from total annihilation. For all these objectives to achieve, Musharraf had four prong strategies in the war on terror. To support the US in the war on terror, to check the Indian involvement in Afghanistan, to get support of the Afghan Taliban in its favour and support for the Kashmir cause.34
To counter the Indian involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s support was necessary for the US in Afghanistan. If India got involved in Afghanistan, the future government in Afghanistan might be anti-Pakistan, something unaffordable for
Pakistan on its western border.35 Again to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan, it was a good policy to support the Afghan Taliban as an asset for Pakistan and to install a pro-Pakistan government. On the one hand, Pakistan got support of the US and got
33 Pervaiz Musharraf’s address to the nation 17th September, 2001. 34 Ashly J. Tellis, “Pakistan and the War on Terror”, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008, p. 4. 35 Ashly J. Tellis, “Berader, Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban: What Gives?”, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2010, p. 6. 33 much involvement in Afghanistan affairs, on the one hand, and limited the India influence while supporting the Afghan Taliban, on the other.36
Afghanistan is located in a strategic area where the most powerful states are located.
The energy corridor is opened in Afghanistan from the Central Asian states and a gateway to link with Middle East. Politically, anti-US states are located near
Afghanistan such as Iran, China and Russia. The US wanted to check the regional development from the Afghanistan territory because from here, the US can counter
China, Russia and Iran, politically, militarily and economically. Pakistan had also apprehensions about the US involvement in the region and therefore had her right to support its own interests in the region. Pakistan could not isolate itself from the regional development and especially in Afghanistan because of its close border with it. The US, wanted to give greater involvement to India in Afghanistan than Pakistan and Pakistan was fully aware of it, therefore it also engaged other actors in its favour to counter Indian influence and make space for it in the future of Afghanistan.37
The Kashmir issue is a vital ingredient of Pakistan’s external policy. When Pakistan joined the US alliance in the war on terror, it was also an objective of Pakistan to save the Kashmiri freedom struggle from branding as terrorist movement. India tried to discredit the Kashmiri struggle and declared all the organizations involved in the freedom struggle as terrorist organizations. Pakistan tactfully neutralized the Indian propaganda in its favour. Pakistan also continued its support to those militant organizations which were involved in the Kashmir freedom struggle.
Pakistan’s support to the war on terror in Afghanistan was acknowledged by the US government on many occasions. Pakistan had impressed the United States by arresting and capturing many key Al Qaeda commanders including Abu Zubaydah in March
36 Ahmad Shayeq Qaseem. Afghanistan’s Political Stability- A Dream Unrealised. Surrey: Ashgate, 2009, p. 148. 37 Ibid, pp. 156-7. 34
2002, Ramzi Bin Al Shibh in September 2002 and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad in
March 2003.38 Besides these Al Qaeda leaders, Pakistan conducted the first military operation in South Waziristan in 2002 named “Operation Al Mizan” (The Balance) to capture and kill foreign militants like Chechen, Uzbek and Arab. In this operation,
Pakistan deployed more than 70,000 troops in the area which was the first grand military operation of Pakistan on its own soil.39
It was also revealed by the Abbottabad Commission report that ISI had carried out
891 operations against Al Qaeda in which it had killed 866 of its network operatives, including 100 key leaders. It had also apprehended 922 Al Qaeda personnel, including
96 high level targets and busted 42 networks.40 This policy of arrest and killing had a price to be paid by Pakistan as on December 2003, there were two assassination attempts on Musharraf while he was going to the President House from the Army
House.41 More than 40,000 innocent people lost their lives in terrorist attacks while the Pakistan Army lost two division of its operational capacity since 2004.42
Despite all these efforts and sacrifices in the war on terror since 2001, Pakistan’s position remained dubious on the war on terror campaign. There are views that
Pakistan was playing double game in this war. Pakistan is cooperating with the US against the Al Qaeda and Taliban and also took military operations against them in
FATA and rest of the country but on the other hand was not willing to take military operation in North Waziristan which was also a hub of its pro-Pakistan elements.
Turning blind eye to North Waziristan situation where the Haqqani network and many other militant organizations are located is a matter of grave concern for the US. Most of the attacks on the NATO/US forces in Afghanistan were conducted by these
38 Tommy Frank. American Soldier. New York: Harper Collins, 2004, pp. 305-06. 39 Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair. Counter Insurgency in Pakistan. Washington: Rand Corporation, 2010, p. 46. 40 Abbottabad Commission Report-2013, p. 264. 41 John R. Schmidt. The Unravelling-Pakistan in the age of Jihad. New York: Farar, Straus and Girous, 2011, p. 138. 42 Khalid Aziz. “End game in Afghanistan”, Dawn, September 30, 2011. 35 elements from North Waziristan. The Pakistan’s policy on Taliban (good/bad) has complicated the situation not only for itself but also for the US war on terror in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The other factor on which the West and particularly the US has expressed reservations is the peace deal with Taliban in FATA and in the settled district of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP). In these peace deals/agreements, Pakistan army stopped military operations against the militants, freed the arrested ones. As a result, the militants became more violent and strong in the region. They not only challenged the writ of the state in the tribal areas but also threatened to act in the settled areas of
Pakistan. This policy of appeasement in tribal areas has produced dire consequences throughout the country.43 Most of the people in the country believe that the army and
Taliban (Pakistani Taliban) are the two sides of the same coin and it is only a game, playing with the US. On the one side, it is supporting the US against Taliban and, on the other, it is helping Taliban in its survival.
From all these discussion, one can draw the conclusion that this policy of Pakistan has not only alienated the masses of the country, on the one hand, from the government efforts and remained a cause of militancy growth, on the other hand. This is all because of this dual policy regarding the war on terror. The Musharraf’s policy of
Neo-realism in the context of war on terror in Pakistan has backlash in the shape of more militancy and terrorism. This policy of appeasing and opposing has frustrated the entire nation and has created confusion in all segments of the society. On the one hand, the army is conducting military operations against the militants while, on the other hand, the government is making peace deals which have undermined the strength of the state and weakened the morale of the state institutions.
43 International Crisis Group. Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the militants. Asia Report no. 125, December, 2006, p. 34. 36
2.2.6. Social Constructionism of International Relations
Construction means that the ‘Actors’ socially construct its interests and identities and by commitment to change even the most seemingly immutable practices and institutions in world politics.44 According to this theory, the international phenomena and policies are framed by some powerful states and then draw the world opinion in its favour while keeping its own interests before them.
The relations between the states cannot be conceptualized as inevitable or natural but can be understood in constructed political practices. The main proposition of social construction is the idea that social reality is neither static nor universal but contingent and connected to prevailing discourse of the time. In social constructionism, the knowledge/ behavior is constructed through human interaction and of the objective observation of the world. Social power is not gained in isolation but in relation with other entities.
The human interactions invite a different kind of action from human beings. The constructivists are eager to enhance our understanding of fundamental and institutional transformations that are currently reshaping the world polity.
Constructivists argue that the material structures acquire social significance only by the ‘Actors’ behaviour response to the global phenomena through which that phenomena is perceived and understood. It will depend on the ‘Actors’ interests and identities which are socially constructed rather than locally produced.45
After 9/11, the world opinion was constructed in support of the US declaration of war against terrorism. The behavior of the US towards terrorism has changed the traditional concept of war and enemy. The non-state actors involvement in these attacks have compelled the world opinion in favour of US and the construction of
44 Andrew Bradley Phillips. “Constructionism” in Martin Griffiths (Ed.). International Relations for Twenty-first Century. New York: Routledge, 2007, p.61. 45 Ron Mallon. A Field Guide to Social Construction. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 2, No.1, 2007, p. 93. 37 world opinion against the terror not only in international perspective but in their own countries too.
In Pakistan, the indigenous environment where the militant organizations are operated is much complicated. It was not simple to make decisions against the militants and their networks in such diverse socially constructed environment. The social construction of society in favour of an event or decision where one has limited choice in decision is very difficult. The decision of Musharraf of supporting the US war on terror against the Al Qaeda and Taliban was one of the most difficult decisions in the history of Pakistan. The U-turn policy on Afghanistan and Taliban has contributed violence and terror activities in the country. To analyse the decision of Musharraf, we need to go in deep historical perspective that how these militant organizations emerged and developed unchecked.46
When Pakistan joined the war on terror, many militants and Islamists considered the decision as against the teachings of Islam and the brotherhood policy among the
Muslim countries.
The role of religion is very deep in shaping internal and external politics and relations are very profound. The creation of Pakistan based on the slogan of Pakistan ka mutlab kya- La Ilaha Ellallah (what is the meaning of Pakistan- there is no God but Allah)47, was the most popular and cherished one among the masses of the undivided India that time.
After the creation of Pakistan, many religious leaders demanded that Islamic laws should be implemented because the creation of this state was only for Islam. There was heated debate on this issue among the different segments of society but Islam remained a dominant factor in state policies. Foreign relations, domestic politics,
46 Beenish Hafeez. South Asia: Confronting religious extremism. Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, vol. xxxiii, no. 3, Summer 2005, p. 71. 47 Prof. Asghar Sodai poem in 1941 became a popular slogan in the Pakistan Movement. 38 economics and defense are all seen through the lens of religion-Islam through the history of Pakistan.48
After the 1977 general elections in Pakistan, an agitation was launced against Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto to dislodge his government. To mobilize the masses, Islam was used in the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa (the system of Muhammad) against an otherwise popular government in the country and it had done its work.49
General Zia knew it that if he wanted to remain in power with support of the religious parties and the masses in the country, he should focus more on Islamize the society and more appearing itself as pure Muslim in media. To Islamize the society, he introduced many steps to win the support of religious parties in his favour and prolong the rule.50 He became the Ameer ul Mumineen (leader of the faithfuls). Mardid-e- momin, Mard-e-haq, Zia ul Haq, Zia ul haq (a man of pure faith, a man of righteousness, Zia ul Haq, Zia ul Haq) was a slogan of its allies. That was the period which had changed its moderate face into an Islamist nature.
2.2.7. Afghanistan War-1979
The turning point in the emergence and growth of militant networks and influence of religious political parties in the country was the Soviet forces involvement in
Afghanistan. The border region of Pakistan-Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) became a hub of these militant and Jihadi organizations which had deconstructed the social structure of tribal society on the religious basis. The US support in financial and military gave them a space to act more openly in an anarchical environment.
48 Mohammad Abdul Qadeer. Pakistan- Social and Cultural Transformation in a Muslim Nation. New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 160. 49 Saeed Shafqat. “From official Islam to Islamism: The Rise of Dawat-ul-Irshad and Lashkir-e-Taiba” in Christophe Jaffrelt (Ed.). Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? London: Zed Books, 2002, p. 136. 50 Khurshid Khan and Afifa Kiran. Emerging Tendencies of Radicalization in Pakistan: A Proposed Counter-radicalization Strategy. Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, vol. xxxii, Summer & Autumn 2012, No. 2 & 3, p. 28. 39
This social construction of Pashtun society on religious grounds weakened the tribal structure of informal conflict resolution’s ‘actors’. The political struggle between the
Super powers was depicted as ‘The Holy War’ in Afghanistan and thus thousands of foreign radical Islamists were imported into the most poor and neglected areas of the world. The madrassas network accelerated their recruitment for this holy war and the young students were proud to be the Mujahedeen (fighter in the holy war) in this holy cause.
2.2.8. 9/11 and the US War on Terror
The 9/11attacks and the US war against terrorism have developed more radicalization in the border regions as well as in the rest of the country. The entrance of Al Qaeda and other foreign militants in the tribal areas of Pakistan drastically affected not only the administrative structure of FATA but the social fabric was also damaged by these hardcore militants. These foreign militants came in these areas with the radical ideologies which were shaped in their daily lives prompted other tribal people to follow them as they were considered the holy warriors.
2.2.9. Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan
To go into details of militancy and terrorism, we needed to know about the groups which are working on different issues and perspectives. There are the following main groups under which many organizations are working.
Pashtun groups
As the Afghan war in 1980’s developed the tribal areas and rest of the Pashtun areas into a war theatre for Afghan war, the young boys educated in madrassas, established for the recruitment of the war, were mostly belonged to these areas. The Afghan refugees who came to Pakistan for shelter, were again militarized through the US weapons and Saudi Arabia’s financial support. These are the local inhabitants of the 40
Pak-Afghan border areas and also of the settled areas of North West Frontier Province
(now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).51 These Pashtun groups include:
Haqqani Network
It is the network of Afghanistan Pashtun areas located near the Pak-Afghan border.
The leader of this network was Jalalud Din Haqqani but today his son Sirajud Din
Haqqani is the leader of this organization. In the Soviet-Afghan war, it played a very important role in the defeat of the Soviet forces. It has also close links with Afghan
Taliban and also an ally of it against the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan. The
Haqqani network is considered as the most immediate threat to the US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan because many successful attacks were conducted by this group against them.52 The Haqqani network has also sanctuaries in Pakistan’ tribal areas in
North Waziristan. The US and Afghan government repeatedly asked Islamabad to conduct military operation against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan Agency but Islamabad always denied the claims of the US and Afghan government. Haqqani network is a very disturbing element in Pak-US relations in the war on terror for the last many years.
Hizb-i-Islami
It is the Pashtun militant organization established in the 1970’s. Gul Baden Hikmatyar is the leader of this jihadi organization for the last few decades. It fought against the
Soviet forces and has close links with Jamaat–i-Islami, Pakistan. After the US
51 Christine C. Fair. Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani State. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, August-September 2011, Volume 53, No. 04, p. 07. 52 Gilles Dornosorro. Revolution Unending, Afghanistan: 1979 To The Present. London: Hurst & Company, 2005, p. 324. 41 invasion in Afghanistan, it supported the Afghan Taliban in its war against the coalition forces till this time.53
Tehrik Taliban Afghanistan
It was established by the madrassa students of the Afghan Pashtun in Qandahar in the late 1990’s as a result of chaos in the country. Mullah Omer is the supreme leader of this movement. Initially started for the establishment of peace, it converted into a strong force of thousands of Afghan and Pakistan’s tribal Pashtun. The rule of Taliban in Afghanistan in 1990’s developed links with other militant organizations in the region and at a time Afghanistan became the safe-haven for the global jihadi networks operated openly and freely. The Taliban of Afghanistan have close links with
Pakistani militants and Mullah Omer is regarded as the spiritual and supreme commander of the militants in the whole region.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
It was established in 2007 on the same line as was the Afghan Taliban movement but it is not a unified force but an umbrella organization of dozens of militant organizations in the country. The immediate cause of its establishment was the Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque) episode in Islamabad. Baituallh Mahsud was the first leader of this militant organization which is responsible for the attacks throughout the country for the last seven years.54 Beside the TTP, there are other groups in tribal areas which have their independent status like, Mullah Nazir group, Hafiz Gul Bahadur, Moulvi
Abbas and Lashkir Islam are the important militants organizations which have strength in their areas.
53 “Afghan Jihad and the Emergence of Transnational Networks” Center for research and Security Studies, Islamabad, 2010, p. 10. 54 Ryan Clarke “ lashkar-i-taiba: The fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist terrorism in india”, The Letort papers, march 2010, p. 63. 42
Kashmiri Groups
These are those militant organizations which are active in the Indian held Kashmir and supported by the Pakistan government. The Kashmir freedom struggle was turned into an armed struggle in the 1980’s when the Afghan war was nearly in the end.
These organizations are mostly located in Punjab, Azad Kashmir and Northern areas of Pakistan, located near the line of control or the Wahga border. Jash-i-Mohammad,
Lashkar-i-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkatul Mujahideen are the most important militant organizations in the total twenty three organizations in the country. These groups have support of the masses in the rural areas of Punjab, Azad Kashmir.55 The
Kashmir issue is the most important one in the militancy in the region. The government support of the Kashmir’s freedom struggle not only mobilized the masses for active support but also willingness to fight a holy war for the Kashmiris. These organizations recruited thousands of young boys for jihad in Kashmir, trained them in the use of sophisticated weapons and trained in guerilla warfare became now a threat to its own security. They are, to some extent controlled by the country intelligence agencies.
Punjabi Taliban
Punjabi Taliban is a new development in the evolution of militant organizations in the country. In the Afghan-Soviet war, those fighters who belonged to Pakistan were called Punjabi Mujahedeen and those who were fighting in Kashmir were called
Afghan Mujahedeen respectively. But the present Punjabi Taliban are not exclusively from the Punjab. Those militants who belong to Pashtun areas are Pashtun Taliban
55 Mohammad Adul Qadeer. op. cit., p. 173. 43 and the rest are called Punjabi Taliban. This notion does not relate to a region or ethnic connection to the militants as it is applied to the rest of the country.56
There are many Punjabi Taliban groups active in Punjab and Sindh and are much dreaded in their activities in heart of the country. This is also a network of different militant organizations like, Qari Zafar group, Amjad Faruqi and Fidayan-i-Islam are a few of them. Asmatullah Maoweya is the leader of Punjabi Taliban in the country.57
The attacks on Police Training Centre in Lahore, FIA Headquarter in Lahore and suicide attacks on General Musharraf were a few examples of these organizations.
These organizations have support base among the people in rural as well as in urban areas of the country.
Sectarian Groups
In Pakistan, there are dozens of sects living side by side from the long time. But two developments have turned the country on the road of sectarianism and violence, uninterrupted. The 1979 Iranian revolution encouraged the Shia sect of Islam to propagate the Iranian revolution in the countries wherever they were settled. The official support of Iran to those groups has encouraged other sects to establish their own organizations to counter them. The other factor is the Afghan war which had encouraged the Wahhabi/Deobandi ideology in the country on the radicalize line of action. The tension among different sects or factions led to the rise of more militancy in the entire country. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba and many others are the radicalized form of society on religious basis.58
56 Gilles Dornosorro. Revolution Unending, Afghanistan: 1979 To The Present. London: Hurst & Company, 2005, p. 301. 57 Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa, “The New Frontiers: Militancy & Radicalism in Punjab”, SISA Report No. 2, 2013, p. 14. 58 S. V. R. Nasar, “Islam, the State and the Rise of Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan” in Christophe Jaffrelt. op. cit., p. 84. 44
Linkages Among These Groups
All these militant organizations have linkages among themselves as they support one another. Qari Hussain-the master mind of suicide bombers in Waziristan belongs to the Punjabi Taliban working closely with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. Ilyas Kashmiri-a leader of a Kashmiri militant organization was a close ally of Al Qaeda and TTP in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Riaz Basra had close links with Afghanistan Taliban who belonged to the Punjab. Qari Saifullah Akhtar, a close associate of Mullah Omer in
Afghanistan, belonged to the Punjabi Taliban. Harkatul Mujahedeen and Jaish-e-
Mohammad have close links with TTP and the Southern Punjab now became a hub of militant activities because of the close association among themselves.59 Attacks on
GHQ Rawalpindi, Naval War College Lahore, Sri Lankan cricket team and many other terrorist attacks were the examples of closeness of these militants cooperation on sabotage missions.
Similarities Among the Militant Organizations
Ideology plays an important role in any successful insurgencies or movement in a region. The ideological indoctrination led to the large mobilization of the masses in millions not only of the young but the old and women also join that movement for a cause. The spread of militancy in tribal areas and the rest of the country is the cause of ideological attachment to an organization. This ideological commitment not only made them hardcore militants but also made them not to spare their lives for the cause. Ideology is the most important factor in its working. The militant Islamic ideology and the use of force in implementation of Islamic laws or Sharia is the basic stone of these organizations. The slogan of defence of Islam against the infidel is the
59 Gilles Dornosorro. op. cit., p. 303. 45 most popular one among them and the masses support has also got through this message.60
The Wahhabi/Deobandi groups have closeness because of the jihad ideology. People who are more religious turn to support these groups for the cause of Islam. All these militant organizations are based on ideology. The main reason for the whole hearted support from the society is the love for religion. Those who are mostly illiterate join these militant organizations because of their lack of knowledge and reasoning capacity in these matters. They don’t think of reasoning or critically view their activities and thus become prey in their hands.
The other factor is the ideology of rewards for them in the world hereafter where they will live a happy life forever. This incentive compels them to act and make their lives in danger. All these networks and militant groups have based on ideological affiliation and through these ideologies, they are active and have support in the masses. The current wave of violence is caused by the ideological affiliation of different groups.61
Trans-national links is another factor of similarities in these organizations. Most of them have support in other parts of the world. This support made them more active in achievements on its links with other groups. The Haqqani network has links in
Pakistan and Arab countries, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi having the links with Saudi Arabia etc. are but a few examples in this regard. This affiliation also is caused by the religious basis not on ethnic or linguistic perspective.
Human Capital
Every organization or group activities cannot be run without sufficient number of people. The supply line is the root cause of success for every movement and activities.
60 Joseph J. Collins. Understanding War in Afghanistan. Washington: National Defence University Press, 2011, p. 58. 61 Dietrich Reetz, “Migrants, Mujahidin, Madrassa Students: The Diversity of Transnational Islam in Pakistan”, Washington: The National bureau of Asian Research, April, 2009, p. 63. 46
The youth in the age of 15 to 30 are an important ingredient in the working of these militant organizations. The suicide bombers who are mostly under the age of 20 are the prime supporters of these organizations. These young recruits belong to the poor families who could not provide them jobs nor foods and thus allow them to join these groups.62 The remote areas of Pakistan are the breeding grounds for the recruitment in these organizations because there is lack of basic facilities there. The highest unemployment and illiteracy are the two basic factors for enrollment in these groups.
The militant groups pay them reasonable salaries which are higher than the government Para military forces in the tribal areas.
Weapons
All these militant organizations have access to sophisticated weapons, acquired through different means. The use of weapons training needs experts and they are always available in the shape of missionary people who fought in the Afghan war.63
In the tribal areas, most of the people know how to use heavy weapons in war. The supply of weapons is not difficult because there is no check of arms production and manufacturing in the whole country. The famous Dara Adam Khel bazar of weapons is the main supply market of weapons to the rest of the country.
Drugs and Cash Money
These are also the two main sources of income of the militant organizations in the country. The drug supply from Afghanistan to the rest of Pakistan by these groups has made them stronger in their financial position. The financial hubs of the country contribute in cash to these groups. For example, Karachi is the financial hub of activities but it is also the main supply route to the militants in the rest of the
62 “Madrassas, Extremism and the militancy” International Crisis Group, Pakistan, Asia Report, No 36, 29 July 2002, p. 23. 63 David Macdonald. Drugs in Afghanistan. London: Pluto Press, 2007, p. 128. 47 country.64 The other source is the establishment of charities for which people donate lavishly and thus came in the hands of those militants. The income sources of most of the militants in Sindh or in the Punjab are the industrial hub of Karachi city in which the business class donates funds to these organizations. Many religious political parties also have their funding sources like fund raising through their own members donations.
Madrassa Network
The most important element in the evolution and development is the establishment of madrassa network in the country. These madrassas not only provide the masses the message of the particular sect but also have an impact to mobilize the people for their mission. The madrassa network was developed during the Zia era and the Afghanistan war gave it more momentum to its flourishing. The US and Saudi Arabia were the main investors in the development of these networks in the region for the Afghan war.65 These madrassa are established on their own ideological perspectives to enroll and enhance their influence and propagate their own sect. the militant version of Islam is also a key element in these madrassa curriculum and this is the root cause of militancy and violence against the other sects/factions in the country. There are thousands of madrassas in the country, having their own Board of examinations. The traditional system of education in these madrassas, resisting of the government reform policies is also a cause of their lack of role in the society.66
Those who are educated in these madrassas have nothing to do in the society except of the duty of Pesh Imam (prayer leaders) in the mosque. This has alienated thousands of young people from the mainstream society and jobs other than the mosque. While
64 Ibid, P. 165. 65 Huma Baqai, “Extremism and Fundamentalism-Linkages to terrorism: Pakistan’s perspective”, International journal of Humanities and social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 6, June 2011, p. 245. 66 Nikil Raymond Puri, “ The Pakistan Madrassah and Terrorism: Made and Unmade Conclusions from the literature” Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 4, Issue, 4, October 2010, p.53. 48 studying in a traditional manner for many years in these madrassas and then performing duties in the mosques cut them off form the society, make them more inclined towards the old perception of life and consider the modern knowledge and lifestyle are the main hurdles in following of the true religion.
2.2.10. 9/11 and Militancy in Pakistan
Before 9/11, the region was more restive and peaceful and there was no such disturbance in the region. The sectarian violence continued but their momentum was limited to a few places. After the US involvement in Afghanistan and the crackdown against the Al Qaeda and other militant organizations have increased these violent activities. The Musharraf decision to join the US war on terror alliance and subsequent policies towards militancy has increased their militant activities. The people perceptions were constructed in favour of these militants while the anti-
American sentiments are the cause of these Islamists approaches. To evaluate the anti-
American sentiments in the country, there are many factors responsible for this kind of development in the society.
The US drone attacks are the most important factor in increasing terror attacks and militancy in the country. As the drone attack took place in tribal areas, the militants took revenge of that in the settled districts of Pakistan from the Pakistani security forces and law enforcement agencies. For example, the drone attack in Bajour in 2006 on a madrassa in which more than 80 students were killed, the militants attacked on the Punjab Regiment Centre in Dargai with suicide bombing which resulted in the killing of forty soldiers. The drone attacks are the result of violence in Pakistan. The frequent US drone strikes in tribal areas also compelled militants to shift to other 49 places and thus the violence reached to the restive places. When the US kills one militant in drone strike, ten more emerge as more violent than before.67
The killing of key Taliban leaders in drone attacks after some agreements with the government denounced the peace agreement and a new wave of violence in the breath and length of the country. The killing of Nek Mohammad in drone strike and his refusal to talk with the government made the situation more uncertain and violent.
They became more dreaded in their activities after losing their leaders.
Attacks on Pakistan forces check posts in tribal areas time and again is the cause of anti-US sentiments among the people. The Abbottabad operation in 2011 and the
Salala attacks were the grave violations of Pakistan sovereignty by the US forces.
These unilateral actions of the US have created an atmosphere of enmity against them and the militants got more people on their side.
2.2.11. Pakistan’s Role
While the government policies are also responsible for violence in the country, the military operations in the tribal areas without much concentration on the core issues of extremism also caused more violence in tribal areas. The first military operation against the foreign militant in South Waziristan in 2002, led to the local militants support for them. Once military operation started in a limited area spread to the rest of the tribal areas and then to rest of the country.
From the operation Al-Mizan to Operation of Zalzala, all were ended in more violence and destructions in the tribal areas. The government lost much areas and much authority there and ultimately made peace agreement with the militants. This
67 Iram Haleem, “1,2,3,…Coup! Of Violence, incursions on Sovereignty and Recourses in Pakistan” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2, Issue, 2 October 2008, p. 17. 50 enabled them to get more support in the areas and the weak administration in FATA made their job easier.68
The repeated mistakes in operation and the agreement with the militants made them the guanine stakeholders in the tribal areas which virtually weakened the state position in dealing with them. The gap between the masses and the government rose much when the government decided to launch a military operation against the Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque) inmates in 2007. This was a turning point in the escalation of tension and violence throughout the country. After the Lal Masjid operation, the militants declared the state of Pakistan enemy of Islam and announced Jihad against the forces of the country.
This operation not only gave a unified stance in the shape of Tehrik-e-Taliban
{Pakistan (TTP)- an umbrella organization of more than two dozens of militant organizations in the entire country, but people also thought after the operation that the government is supporting the US agenda and is therefore, against Islam, madrassa and mosque. This perception among the masses developed alienation and distrust between them which resulted in the failure of the government efforts in eradication of militancy and extremism from the country.69
2.2.12. Institutionalism in International Relations
Institutions rely on cooperation between the nations as contrary to the realist views of anarchy in the world. In institutionalism, the cooperation between the two is rational and based on the two self-interests. If both countries are trading and reach to the consensus to lower the tariff, it is based on the promoting of its own interests.
Institutions set rules, norms, practices and decision making procedures to overcome uncertainty. Institutions increase efficiency on issues, state negotiations on central
68 Christine C. Fair & Seth G. Jones. Pakistan’s War Within. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 51, No. 6, December 2009- January 2010, p. 174. 69 Ibid, p.175. 51 forum, established rules and norms that allow a wide array of states to quickly settle on certain course of action. Institutionalism provides explanation for international cooperation.
Institutions play an important role in defining an issue and to resolve the issue from different mechanism. This is the role of institution which sometimes develops a sense of cooperation and sometimes rivalry among the nation-states. State policies are framed by institution and implemented by also different institutions. If there is a gap between the two, the problem continues and persists. This gap sometimes complicates the state decision making process which needs a unified stance on any issue.
In all over the world, the military is the dominant player in national security issues, and therefore gets a special status in the state but this position becomes stronger when the state is coercive, undemocratic and not pluralist. Pakistan is one of them.70
It is important that the civilian control is the most vital requirement for all the development and consolidation of liberal democracy. Traditionally, the study of civil- military relations are seen in this context that who is master and who is the servant in civil-military relations and who “guards the guardians of the nation.”71
The history of Pakistan shows that the national security issues, external and internal were the main concern for not only the military but for the political leaderships too.
The hostile attitude of the Indian government and conspiracies towards Pakistan had compelled the state to focus more on security rather than on social sector development. This developed the military apparatus the most powerful institution in the country. The military’s aggressive policies; either domestically or externally have increased the significance of the armed forces, on the one hand, and increased the
70 Ayesha Siddiqa. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London: Pluto Press, 2007, p. 33. 71 Anatol Lieven. Military Exceptionalism in Pakistan. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol.53, No. 04, August-September 2011, p. 64. 52 state’s dependence on this institution, on the other. This not only gave a prominent position to the army in the state affairs but also enabled them to get more financial resources than the other.72
The annual financial allocation to the military in budget as the lion share reserved for military gave it a strong financial position in the country which undermined the development of other sectors. As it is the most powerful institution economically and militarily made it the pivot of state activities.
The role of internal security like conflicts, insurgencies have also emphasized on its importance in dealing with the domestic politics. The conflict in Balochistan and
FATA and other places gave the military more prominent position in the country as the sole organization which was dealing with the internal threat as well as the external too.
Throughout Pakistan’s history, the weak political environment has given the army the opportunity to get more power from the civilian leadership. The political parties which were personality oriented in nature and always struggling for government, asked support from the military to dislodge opponents was also a key factor in this regard.73 The Nawaz- Ghulam Ishaq Khan tussle and the opposition parties desire the army to intervene finally forced both to resign from power. The army played a role of broker in decision making and decisive one on many occasions.
There are many examples which strengthened the role of military and made it the sole guardian of the nation. The military parade in Islamabad on 23rd March every year not only shows its strength of hardware but also perceives to be the strong institution in
72 Frederic Grare. Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Traditional Democracy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2009, p. 14. 73 Talat Masood. Civil-Military Relations and the 2007 Elections in Pakistan: Impact on the Regional Security Environment. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 01, 2007, p. 55. 53 the country. The 6th September-Defence day of Pakistan is observed in the country to highlight the sacrifices of the armed forces in the defence for Pakistan.
The special dramas are telecast on television and radio to strengthen and build a better image among the people. The national anthem and national songs are played in favour of military as the protector of the nation boundaries- both territorial and ideological.
Special programme of marathon transmission on state channels are produced to highlight the services of the armed forces also undermine the role of civilian leadership in the country as are seen inept and corrupt and unable to deliver to the nation.
Zia introduced 8th amendment in the 1973 Constitution that made the Parliamentary system into more presidential in Pakistan. The power vested in the President in the shape of dissolution of National Assembly and the appointment of Services Chiefs made the Prime Minister subservient to the President who is otherwise, a titular or ceremonial figure in a true parliamentary democracy. This has strengthened the role of military and weakened the role of political leaders and the Parliament.74
Lack of consensus on national issues and democracy in the country among the political parties weakened their role not only in parliament but also among the masses.
The lack of democratic culture in the parties and politicians among themselves weakened the civilian leadership in the country. The ruling and opposition conflict on many issues have exposed the weaknesses among the politicians on the one hand, and provided an opportunity to the military to intervene on appropriate occasions on the other, have strengthened its position in political decision making process in
Pakistan.75
74 Marco Mezzera, Sofiya Aftab. Pakistan State-Society Analysis. Democratization and transitional Justice Cluster, January 2009, p. 24. 75 Talat Masood. op. cit., p. 58. 54
The foreign actors are also responsible for strength of the military in the country. The
United States collaboration with the Pakistan’s military in the shape of support in strengthening hardware supply made it more powerful than the other institutions.
From the 1950s till date most of the agreements were taken with the military dictators in Pakistan to pursue its own interests weakened the democratic environment in the country.
The US full support to the military dictators in Pakistan not only undermined the political parties role in the country but also gave more power in decision-making process whether it is the foreign policy or internal policies. The defence agreements between the two countries in undemocratic leaderships in Pakistan developed this perception in the masses that the US always supported the military dictators not the civilian leaderships.76 The reason of the military support was also a fact that dealing with the military was easy because of the powerfulness of this institution and dealing with one institution rather than a political leader who was surrounded by the peoples representatives and responsible to Parliament.
The relations between Pakistan and China were also strengthened by most of the agreements in defence sector in Pakistan. We have close relationship with China but the civilian and social sector development programmes are limited to a few one but most of the cooperation are based on defence production and procurements. The
Heavy Industries Taxila, Aeronautical Complex Kamra, Ordnance Factories Wah,
Nuclear Atomic Reactor in Khoshab, JF-17 Thunder aircraft and dozens of more military projects are the product of bilateral relationship of the two countries but very
76 Michael Hoffman. Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan. Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 01, February 2011, p. 82. 55 few civilian projects are under way to strengthen the economic and political development in the country.77
Form these relations with the United States and China, the relations were mostly revolved around the increase of military cooperation, military equipment, defence productions and increased military training and assistance have increased the capacity of the military institution in getting and acquired power and marginalized civilian institutions in the country.
The induction of army in Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) in
Nawaz government showed that the civilian authority is incompetent to deal with even civilian matters. These kinds of intrusion of the military in civilian institutions have weakened the morale of the civilian leaders in the country. In flood, earthquake and in all natural calamities, the army was called in for help and all the times on the mercy of the Army. The army’s willingness to intervene politically and economically stems from this belief that it is the preeminent guardian of Pakistan’s foreign and domestic interests and also the ideology of Pakistan.78
2.2.13. Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan
Musharraf took over in 1999 not only strengthened the military institution in the country but also weakened the civilian institutions in the coming days. The changing political landscape in the country with its own cronies politicians and banned the mainstream politicians from politics further weakened the fragile political environment in the country. Musharraf handpicked those politicians who were corrupt and inept in state policy making. He factionalized the political system to break the two main political parties into many factions to undermine their strength in street and
Parliament as well. The Pakistan Peoples Party (Patriot), PPP (Sherpao), Pakistan
77 Robert D. Lamb, “Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia-China’s Factor” CSIS Report, January 2014, p. 4. 78 Rand Corporation Report. Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State? 2011, p. 19. 56
Muslim League (Quaid), PML(Functional) and many more introduction in politics and strengthened its position in politics. Zafarullah Khan Jamali was only the puppet head of the government and all important decisions were taken by President cum
Army Chief in the country.79
After 9/11, the then government of General Pervaiz Musharraf, Pakistan joined the war on terror, without taking the Parliament into confidence on this crucial issue. This was the reason that for long time the politicians considered this war as the military of its own not of the people of Pakistan. This decision of Musharraf was the reflection of military’s mindset in dealing with the internal and external threats to its own perspectives. The relationship with India, Washington and Afghanistan were considered as their own prerogatives.
While institutionalized its role, Musharraf made himself President in a Presidential referendum in April 2002 in the country. The referendum result was ambiguous as most of the observers were of the view that only 15 to 20 percent votes were cast but the official figures stood for more than 80 percent. In a similar fashion, Musharraf followed Zia policies when he planned of staying longer in power.
“For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of reforms, end to sectarian and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of
Quaid-e-Azam, would you like to elect President General Pervaiz Musharraf as
President for five years?”80,was the question asked from the nation in the referendum.
In August 2002, President Musharraf promulgated Legal Framework Order (LFO) which was inserted of Article 152-A which established a National Security Council
(NSC) as a consultative body under the chairmanship of President which provided a constitutional cover to the role of the top commanders of the armed forces in policy
79 Aqil Shah. Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007-2013). Democratization, 2013, p. 07. 80 Ayesha Siddiqa. op. cit., p. 54. 57 making at the highest level. With the exception of Pakistan Muslim League Quaid
(PML-Q), all other parties were critical of the setting up of the NSC which provided a constitutional basis of their expanded role in the civilian political domain.81
The decision of Pakistan’s joining war on terror and taking U-turn on Afghanistan not only created a gap between the civilian leaderships but also among the people in the country. The unilateral policies of the military leadership led to more fragmentation in the society. The institutional gap between the civilian and military leadership in the country not only prolonged the volatile situation in the country but also complicated the problem and led it to more severe position.
The induction of armed forces in the civilian institutions further weakened the state’s other institutions and strengthened military’s political power. A number of retired military officers were inducted in public sector universities, corporations, financial institutions and social sector departments to get more financial benefits and privileges.
The key and decisive role assigned to the military in the internal and external policies not only undermined the role of civilian leadership but made the civilian institutions more dependent on the military.
The Governors of North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were the retired Corps Commanders in the Musharraf period concentrated civilian powers in the hands of military officers. Even the peace agreement in Waziristan in 2003 was made by the Corps Commander of 11th Corps, Safdar Mahmood who personally went there and garlanded to the militants. This approach has weakened the political administration in tribal areas which was already in a shaky position after the Al Qaeda and Taliban intrusion in the areas.
81 Pildat Discussion Paper. National Security Council. Civil-Military Relations, April, 2012, p. 20. 58
Raymond Davis Case
In January, 2011, an employee of the US Consulate at Lahore shot dead two Pakistani in the broad day light. The government decided to handle the issue according to the law of the land and no national and international pressure was to be accepted and the guilty was to be punished and the innocent was to get justice.82 Soon after the incident, the US Embassy in Islamabad and the State Department in Washington contacted Pakistani officials and called to resolve the issue. The political leadership was in immense pressure from the masses on the one side and the US tough messages on the Davis issue compelled the government to consult all the parties and to make a decision which could save the government from any deadlock on the relation with US.
The act of Davis and this episode triggered mistrust between the two countries at the highest institutional basis that both CIA and ISI developed suspicious about activities of each other. The controversy led the Congress to question further US aid to
Pakistan.( House of Representative 145 called for a “Freeze” on all monetary assistance to Pakistan until such time Davis was released.83 The Davis issue not only damaged the confidence and trust deficit between the two countries which was already in low ebb form the last few years widened further. This case not only brought the two governments at logger head but exposed Pakistan’s weak and vulnerable position while dealing with the United States. Finally the government acquitted Davis on Qisas and Diyat laws and the blood money was paid.
The Abbottabad Operation (May 02, 2011)
Relations between the US and Pakistan was tense after the Davis case in January 2011 but the US SEALS raid on Osama compound on May 02 provoked their intensity.
This was a major direct involvement of the US in Pakistan’s internal affairs and gross violation of the sovereignty of an ally in the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan.
82 THE NEWS, Islamabad, January 29, 2011. 83 Congressional Research Service. Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, June 7, 2011, p. 02. 59
All the political as well as the military leadership were in shock not on the killing of
Osama but on the violation of its territorial sovereignty. This operation not only exposed the weaknesses of the military, on the one hand, but also the institutional gap among the different stakeholders in defence-related matters, on the other. The military came from all segment of society in criticism and wanted for inquiry of the incident.
On May 03, 2011, the House of Representatives, the Pakistan Foreign Aid
Accountability Act, was introduced in the house and referred to the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. The Act would prohibit foreign assistance to Pakistan unless the
Secretary of State certifies that the government of Pakistan was not complicit in hiding Bin Laden.84 In Pakistan, on May 14, 2011, the joint setting of the Parliament reached on a 12-point resolution asking the government to set up an independent
Commission to investigate the covert US operation in Abbottabad. The Pakistan Air
Force, Board of Inquiry concluded that the May 2, 2011 raid on Abbottabad was an outcome of a “combined failure at all levels in assessing the intentions of the US.”85
According to the findings of the Commission, there was a significant trust deficit between the two countries and especially between the two armed forces.86 The
Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations (DCAS OP) said to the commission that the
Abbottabad incident was indeed one of the most embarrassing incidents in the history of Pakistan. It had tarnished the image of the Pakistan Armed forces including the
PAF and had adversely impacted the morale of the people of Pakistan.87
Memogate Scandal
In October, 2011, a new issue was raised in the newspaper that the government has sought US assistance against the possible military coup in Pakistan after the May 02
84 Ibid, p. 03. 85 Abbottabad Commission Report, 2013, p. 140. 86 Ibid, p. 141. 87 Ibid, p. 142. 60 incident. This issue which was named as the “Memogate Scandal” came into the light.
The gap between the civil and military leadership came to the surface when the government denied any such kind of memo but the military had an opposite view on it. The civil-military tussle had reached on such a level that both were seen on different page on their own stance.
A commission was established known as Memoagte Commission on the directives of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Some parties like Jamaat-i-Islami and Muslim League wanted a fair trial and enquiry of the issue while the government and its allied parties supported the government stance and termed the issue a conspiracy to derail the present process of democracy.
It was a meaningless effort on the part of the civilian leadership in Pakistan to get support from the US against the military which is an ally in the war on terror and always supported the military against the civilian leadership. The issue created a drift between the civilian and military leadership in the country and the element of trust deficit reached to the highest level. The government told that a Parliamentary
Committee on National Security will investigate the memogate affairs which will comprise 17 members.
Kerry Lugar Bill
The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) of 2009, commonly known as
“Kerry-Lugar Berman” or “KLB” was approved by the Obama administration in
October 2009. In this bill, financial assistance to Pakistan was raised to triple in non- military sphere. The EPPA authorized $ 1.5 billion annually for economic aid to
Pakistan from FY 2010- to FY 2014 to support the democratic institutions and the expansion of rule of law etc. The Act was seen as interference in Pakistan’s domestic politics. The “Conditional” assistance was the focus of criticism. It was severely criticized by the military on the ground that it was an intervention in its internal 61 affairs and expressed “serious concerned over the clauses impacting national security” in the 122nd Corps Commander meeting held in October, 2009.88
The literature review explains different developments through the lens of different sources. As the literature consists of different sources relevant to the theories of the thesis, this has connected different sources into different theories in a theoretical framework. The neo-realist perspective in international relations connected into
Pakistan internal politics which also a cause of making militancy in the entire country after 9/11 and joining Pakistan into the war on terror. The unending violence in
Pakistan is also a cause of civil-military differences on the issue of terrorism, reflected in the literature review.
88 Congressional Research Service. op. cit., pp. 08-9. 62
Chapter Three
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. War on Terror: Impact on Pakistan Politics (2001-2011)-Proposed Study
The aim of this study is to understand the new development in the region especially in
Pakistan that a culture of terrorism developed in the country for the last ten years. The
US Led on terror not only increased violence and extremism in Pakistan but also affected every aspect of life. To understand the impact of terrorism on Pakistan politics since 2001 till 2011 is the case study in this research. In this approach, the emphasis is put on the local setting (war on terror is a global phenomenon but in
Pakistan it is taken on both national as well as on local perspectives), the political aspects of Pakistan is taken as a case study.
3.2. Justification of the Research Topic (US-led War on Terror: Impact on
Pakistan Politics (2001-2011).
While discussing terrorism on larger perspectives, the war on terror once fighting in
Afghanistan has slowly and gradually entered into Pakistan territory. There are many discussions on terrorism on the international as well as on national level and this is a huge project for handling by a researcher in a limited time and resources. Therefore to focus more on specific aspect of terrorism in perspective of Pakistan would be more beneficial for research. Therefore, the researcher limited the war on terror to
Pakistan’s political aspect and to a limited time period (2001-2011).
As terrorism has influenced not only every aspect of governance like economics, legislation, law enforcement agencies, political and judiciary on the national perspective but locally it has also influenced the social, religious, cultural and day to day lives of the masses. All these aspects are not possible for a researcher to focus 63 because of limited time and resources. Therefore to pinpoint and more focused, the researcher selected the political aspect of terrorism in Pakistan. But there are multiple reasons for selection of this research topic in Pakistan.
Terrorism is basically a global political phenomena, as it has become now a security issue for all countries of the world, but the roots of terrorism if we want to scratch, these are political in nature. Therefore, the more focus on its political aspect, the more it will be explored in true perspective. In Pakistan, it has a political and historical background and therefore, it will be more relevant to discuss the political aspect of terrorism which it has its impact in Pakistan.
The role of political leaders on terrorism issue is also very important in Pakistan.
Every political party and its leader discussed it in different perspectives. There are differences of opinion on terrorism and its causes. There is a clear division among the different political parties and their political leaders in Pakistan and it is important to highlight these differences on the issue. If we did not consider their opinion and differences, the issues of terrorism will not be truly resolved.
In all democracies in the world, the decisions on national as well as on provincial or local levels are taken by the political leaderships of the country. In Pakistan, the role of the military in decision making is more dominant than the political leaders. To select the politics of Pakistan, the researcher wants to explore the decision making of the civil and military leaderships and how they viewed terrorism and how to handle this menace on the national level.
As there are differences of opinion among the political parties and their leaders on terrorism, the civil and military leaderships in the country have also some differences on tackling on terrorism. This division can be seen in their statements and sometimes in decisions making and in the government. As the military has dominant position in the decision-making process in the country, as both historically and in contemporary 64
Pakistan, the divisions between the two main actors in the country are important to discuss analytically.
In Pakistan, the elections in Pakistan are always hectic activities and every political party tries to convince the masses in its favour to vote for them. The war on terror beginning in 2001 had its impact on the 2002 and 2008 general elections in Pakistan and come hence with the scope of this research. Through elections, the researcher wanted to know how these elections were influenced by the terror activities and the elections campaign and the political activities in the country.
The relations between the United States and Pakistan are more strengthened in the war on terror as the later became an ally of the former but with the passage of time and some untoward incidents, these relations between the two countries reached to an almost break-up position. The researcher wants to highlight those events and developments and critically analyze them in the contemporary perspectives.
3.3. Access to Research Materials
Data collection process is not an easy task in general and in Pakistan in particular.
There are many difficulties in the collection of data materials. It is important to gain access to the data which are relevant to the present research. It needs travelling to get primary as well as secondary sources of data for the research. To get all those data, researcher contacted and visited different institutions and libraries which are very fruitful in collecting such information on the research topic. As it is a burning issue in the world in general and in Pakistan in particular, relevant documents are available in most of the institutions.
There are three kinds of literatures which are available on this research.
1. External sources. It includes Pakistan relations with the US from the Cold war era to the present time war on terror. Pakistan relations with India and her security 65 concern in the wake of development in Afghanistan by the Indian government.
Pakistan relations with Afghanistan in special reference to the Afghan war of 1980s and the subsequent development in the region is part of literature. These kinds of literatures not only reflect the past but the present development after 9/11 with special focus on Pakistan.
2. Militancy in the region. This literature is also an important aspect of this research because all developments in and around are caused by the militant groups which were established in the Soviet Afghan war period. This literature (foreign and local) reflects different kinds of militant groups operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan’ border areas from the 1980s. The transnational network of these militant groups and the bond of unity among them are part of this literature which is available in primary as well as in secondary sources of national and international literature.
3. Pakistan politics. This literature reflects the developments in Pakistan politics after
9/11 in shape of general elections in 2002 and 2008 respectively. The establishment of different Commissions and the role of Parliament in the war on terror and the debates of the politicians are worth of mentioning. Different kinds of alliances emerged in
Pakistan after 9/11, have significant impact on Pakistan politics are also part of the literature.
As these literatures are available in three different kinds, my contribution in this research is that the researcher have identified the gaps among the literatures and connected them into a unified shape.
Think of the primary source representing a firsthand analysis of the data, and the secondary sources representing a second look, usually by someone other than the author of the primary source.1 To collect the primary data, the visit to the National
Assembly and Senate of Pakistan Libraries in Islamabad have relevant data in the
1 Gary Thomas.op. cit., pp. 58-9. 66 shape of Parliamentary Debates because those sources are directly relevant and firsthand information on terrorism and politics in the country. These Parliamentary
Debates reflect seriousness of the Parliamentarians on the national issues like terrorism in the country in the prevailing situation. On the same perspective, the researcher visited the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former North
West Frontier Province-NWFP) Library to get the provincial assembly resolutions on terrorism in the present study period.
The 9/11 Commission Report 2004 and the Abbottabad Commission Report of 2013 are the primary sources for this research and many other have been collected for this purpose. Most of the government publications and reports are included in this study like the reports of the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Office, government of
Pakistan, the Kerry Lugar bill and the US Senate reports are important in this regard.
The biographies of different political leaders are also important sources of information in this study which have provided in-depth views of those leaders who are concerned with this issue directly and those who were in power in that period and who have the first hand information and were directly involved in it. These included;
George W. Bush’s “Decision Making”, Condoleezza Rice’s “No Higher Honour”,
Tommy Frank’s “American Soldier” and Pervaiz Musharraf’s “In The Line of Fire” are the most important sources which have deep understanding and could provide authentic information in this regard.
The reports of international organizations like; International Crisis Group, UN
Security Council, Conflict Monitoring Centre are also important for this study.
For this purpose, the researcher got advantage from the Department of Political
Science Library which has reasonable collection on the historical background of this research. The Central Library of the University of Peshawar has good collection of the 67 secondary sources on the research topic and access to them was easy because of its location in the university.
The researcher visited other libraries and institutions which had the relevant data on my research project. National library Islamabad is an important place for this research and I got their valuable materials for research purposes. To get the research oriented materials like research papers and research reports, the different think tanks working on international relations, security, and terrorism are helpful in this regards, so the researcher visited many think tanks in Islamabad like; Institute of Strategic Studies
(ISS), Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Centre for Research and Security Studies
(CRSS) and FATA Research Centre (FRC), which are most important and relevant to the present research topic.
Daily newspapers in Pakistan published articles of different columnists in their editorial pages which reflected the contemporary developments in Pakistan and the criticism on them are the valuable information on this topic. For this purpose, the daily DAWN and The NEWS International (both publish from Islamabad) are the most important and widely circulated newspapers in Pakistan are read and consulted.
3.4. Selection of the Individuals for Interviews
The justification for the selection of the research topic has already been discussed in the last pages, the selection of the individuals for interviews are the crucial decision in research. Both research topic and individuals are the two sides of the same coins because both are relevant and overlap each other in research. The selection of the individuals for any research is important as the research topic is concerned because the individuals would also proceed the process of research in the right direction and help in the findings of the researcher. 68
The knowledge and evidence are contextual, situational and interactional, and that this requires you to research a distinctive approach and to get what you really want to know about in each interview.2
In an interview, the researcher is reliant on the interviewee to provide honest and open answers, yet we know that people want to mention a sense of dignity, and want to protect some level of privacy. The bigger the ‘gulf’ between the interviewer and interviewee, the greater the chance it will influence the interview process.3 Target sample for this study includes politicians, political and strategic analysts, journalists and academicians who have knowledge and knowhow about terrorism and politics in
Pakistan. The reasons for selections of these groups for interviews are many but the following are the main factors on which these individuals are selected.
The core group of the individuals is the politicians which are directly involved in the policies on war on terror in the country. Most of the interviewees from the politicians are the former members of the MMA (a group of religious political parties who formed government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 2002-2007) government or the members of the Provincial Assembly. Others are the present members of Parliament or Provincial Assemblies. As the terrorism is a political issue, therefore to tackle it, the responsibility goes to the politicians on national as well as on provincial level.
The other factor on which the researcher selected the politicians for interviews are the historical background of extremism and fundamentalism in the country which were traced back to different government in the past, therefore to analyze the political development of religious extremism in the country, it is fully discussed by the politicians truly.
2 Jennifer Mason. Qualitative Researching. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 1996, p. 40. 3 Zina O’leary.op. cit., p. 162. 69
The law making process in the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies is the domain of the politicians. The Parliamentary and Provincial Assembly resolutions regarding terrorism are the working of politicians who are in the government or in the opposition, it can help us in seeking the working of the elected representatives of the masses. To select the politicians are also the reason for it to understand who the politicians are debated in the assemblies on the floor of the House on terrorism issue and how they viewed it while once in the government and then in the opposition.
The divisions among different political parties on the issues of terrorism are clearly seen in their statements on daily basis. This division is reflected different perception on terrorism in Pakistan. Therefore it is important to discuss their different views in interviews and its causes.
Terrorism and violence in the country has targeted hundreds of politicians in the election campaigns and rallies. Thousands of political workers and politicians lost their lives in political activities because they were more vocal in opposition to the militants and their activities. Some parties are thought to be more sympathizers towards Taliban (militants) and therefore they always enjoyed to conduct the elections campaign and rallies activities without any terror threat from the militants. The third group which I have discussed according to their views regarding militants are those who have sympathies for them and therefore, they are also exempted from the attacks of the militants. Therefore it is important to note that this division is remained in the political parties till this time (2011). The researcher contacted the following political parties of which the politicians are interviewed. They are: Awami National Party
(ANP), Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Muthhida Quami Movement (MQM), Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamait Ulema-i-Islam-Fazalur
Rehman (JUI-F), Jamait Ulema-i-Islam-Samiul Haq (JUI-S), Pakistan Tehrik Insaf
(PTI), Balochistan National Party (BNP), Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PMAP) and Jamait Ahle Hadith (JAH-Sajid). 70
Different political leaders are interviewed for this research.
Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Secretary General Awami National party (ANP) and
Information Minister and a key member of the cabinet, was interviewed who also lost his son in terrorist attack. Most of the time, he openly criticized the Taliban and their activities.
Siraj ul Haq, Amir Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan who is Senator and was Senior Minister in the MMA government in 2002-2008. He openly criticized the government policies regarding Taliban, military operations and support to the US in the war on terror.
Mir Hasal Bezenjo who is Senator and the Vice President of the Balochistan National
Party (BNP, Presently Abdul Malik Baloch is the Chief Minister of this party in
Balochistan Province) was also part of the interview schedule. The detail list of the politicians is attached in the Appendix Two at the end of the thesis.
It should be noted that the researcher only wanted to get the views of the politicians of the different political parties and this division is not based on the ethnic division of the parties because it is the national issue and only the views of the political parties are important not of their geographical location. For instance, the views of the Jamaat- i-Islami will be the same in Punjab and Sindh, therefore the easiest way to access to them for the researcher is the nearest location where these politicians are available.
One thing which is also important to note is that all respondents are male and no women are included in the lists. The researcher wanted to get the views of the women politicians but no one was willing to give interview on the subject. The researcher contacted more than ten women politicians and again and again called them but in vain. Most of the time, their mobile phones were attended by their close family members and told the researcher that she is not available for interview. The first reason was the prevailing security situation in the country which restricted their 71 interaction among the people. The second was the cultural environment that women are mostly not come into direct connect with the male despite the fact that she was the people representative. They avoid such activities. The other factor is the security situation in the country and the sensitive nature of the research topic on which mostly reluctant to comments. Most of the interviews are conducted in Peshawar while some in Nowshera, Mardan and Islamabad.
The academicians, journalists, political and strategic analysts are the prominent figures in society and they are in one way or other link to the study on terrorism. Most of the respondents in this category are involved in teaching or discussion on this topic and their views are also important in the proposed research. The journalists which the researcher have selected have wide understanding and knowledge on the issue like;
Salim Safi, Aqeel Yousafzai. The political analysts are also involved on the topic like;
Zahid Hussain, Rustom Shah Mohmmand, Brig (R) Mahmood Shah, Imtiaz Gul and in the academicians are; Zafar Nawaz Jaspol, Qibla Ayaz and many others have deep knowledge and understanding on terrorism and its impact on Pakistan politics. Many have their own books and publications on the present research topic.
Saleem Safi, a well-known journalist and anchor person in the Geo TV network. His current affair programme of ‘Jirga’ is the most interesting segment in which he invited party leaders and other expertise on Pakistan politics and terrorism. He also interviewed many Afghan Taliban leaders in Afghanistan and has deep understanding of the issues like militancy and terrorism in Pakistan.
Zahid Hussain is a well-known writer and author of many books on Pakistan and terrorism. Books like ‘Frontline Pakistan’ and ‘The Scorpion Tale’ are the most important. He regularly wrote in newspapers and has been invited by many news channels for comments on terrorism and militancy in Pakistan. His comments are 72 more balanced and critical than many writers who are inclined into one side or the other.
Aqeel Yousafzai is Peshawar based journalist who worked mostly in the volatile areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa like Swat and FATA. He wrote five books on Taliban and militancy in Urdu language which have deep information and analysis of the developments after 9/11. He wrote hundreds of newspapers articles in daily Mashriq and daily Aaj (both are local newspapers). He visited State Department on the invitation of the US government. He is currently working with the Centre For
Research and Security Studies (CRSS) Islamabad.
Imtaiz Gul is the Chief Executive of the Centre for Research and Security Studies
(CRSS)-a research think tank in Islamabad working on terrorism, Taliban, militancy and non-state actors in the region. Gul wrote many books in which include; ‘FATA-
The Most Dangerous place’ and the ‘Al-Qaeda and Taliban nexus’.
Brig® Mahmood Shah remained the Secretary Law and Order, FATA in the
Musharraf regime. This was the most important post which directly responsible for the security and peace in the region. He was also responsible for the protection of the border areas of Pakistan. He was directly in contact with the President, the Core
Commander of the 10th Core. He saw all the developments in the tribal areas and his information are the first hand regarding Taliban and terrorism in the prevailing situation in Pakistan.
Dr. Ashraf Ali is the President of a research think tank ‘FATA research Centre-FRC’,
Islamabad. This organization is focused on FATA only.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal is the Director of the School of Politics and International
Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. He is a well-known writer and researcher on Pak-US relations and wrote many papers on terrorism and Taliban. 73
Rustom shah Mohmand is the former ambassador of Pakistan in Afghanistan and has close contact with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He was the member of the ‘Dialogue committee’ of the Nawaz Nashrif government in 2014 between the government and the Taliban in the peace process. Currently, he belongs to Pakistan Tahrik-e-Insaf
(PTI).
Qibla Ayaz is the Ex. Vice Chancellor of the University of Peshawar, Pakistan. He wrote on Islam and militancy widely and his comments are valuable on these important issues. He regularly comments on state television on Islam. These are a few personalities who are interviewed by the researcher on this topic. The detailed list of the respondents is attached in Appendix Two at the end of the thesis.
3.5. The Interview Process
When prepared the programme for interview schedules, the researcher used his personal contacts with the target groups which the researcher got from different people by his personal efforts. These contacts were made mostly by mobile phone and sometimes visited the respondents before interview.
The researcher started his process of collecting data through interview in March 2013 till August 2013 after the course work completion of Ph. D and approval of research synopsis. The researcher visited Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera, and Islamabad for interviews. Interview schedule was prepared by the researcher in advance to minimize the waste of time and also to complete the interview process in time. The interview process started with politicians but other respondents of the group like academicians, journalists were also engaged in the interview process whenever they were available in the meantime. In advance, the researcher contacted politicians and academicians and journalists and then made the arrangement of time for interview. Sometimes the researcher interviewed three respondents on the same day but on many occasions, no one was available for interview after making a commitment of availability and taking 74 time in advance. This situation arose with politicians when they committed for interview but on the eleventh hour, left the place for the party meeting. For instance, the researcher take time from a member of National Assembly in advance and when the researcher went to the Parliament lodges next day and called him, he excused that he had gone for a meeting with party leaders in Lahore.
The quality of interviews depends on the environment in which it is conducted. The researcher conducted interviews in the venues which the interviewees had selected and where they were easily available. Some respondents invited the researcher at their homes while most of the interviews were taken in their working offices or party headquarters. For instance, the researcher conducted interviews of the ANP politicians in the Bacha Khan Markaz (party Headquarter) in Peshawar, Jamaat-i-Islami politicians interviewed in the Jamiat office (Al Markaz Al Islami) on G.T. Road in
Peshawar and PML (N) in F-8, Islamabad were conducted. Some interviews were taken in the Parliament Lodges (A residential complex for the Parliamentarians).
Some politicians of religious parties called me in their religious institutions,
Madrassa. Journalists take their interviews in their newspapers offices like, Salim Safi in Geo office in the Jang building in Islamabad, DAWN in Peshawar etc.
Academicians were interviewed in their respective universities and institutions.
All interviews were conducted in Urdu language for the convenience of interviewees for better expression in their local language. Sometimes, the respondent gave examples from the Pashto language on the topic and the researcher quoted them and expressed and translated them into Urdu or English in a suitable way.
The interviews focused on the key questions of the research, that is how do you see the Musharraf’s decision on joining the war on terror with the US alliance, what causes do you see of spreading militancy in Pakistan, how this war on terror influenced Pakistan politics and why the terrorism continued after the long ten years 75 in the country. Except these other questions were asked for in-depth analysis from the respondents.
Every interview has taken average time of forty five to one hour dependent on the interviewees responses. Some are involved in deep discussion and take the interview for more than ninety minutes while some limited it to thirty minutes because of their other engagements. While keeping the sensitivity of the research topic and situation in mind, all the interviewees are not willing to record the interviews on mobile phone or any other recorder.
3.6. Questionnaire or Sample for Interview (Interview Schedule)
Qualitative research needs to utilize in-depth investigation which is basically relies on interviews from which the required information and data are extracted. For this purpose, the researcher used interviews pattern. These interviews are based on some sample which is the basic documents on which the qualitative research is based on.
There is no hard and fast rule for defining a sample size in such enquiry. But it should be kept in mind by the researcher that the sample size would fulfill the needs of the on-going research, the purpose of research and the utility of the sample in it.
For the on-going research, the questionnaire is developed before the formal proceeding in the interview process and it was approved by the supervisor after many changes in the questions and its patterns. All questions are prepared with more efforts that no major aspects of the proposed study remain untouched. There are ten questions in the questionnaire which in the researcher’s point of view are helpful in the present study. The first question related to the Musharraf’s decision on joining the war on terror because it is the core question as all the future developments are in one way or another connected with this question. There are questions on how war on terror entered into Pakistan’s territory, what are the causes of anti-American sentiments in
Pakistan, is there any gap between the civil-military on terrorism, Lal Masjid 76 operation, drone attacks in tribal areas, impact on elections in Pakistan (2002 and
2008 respectively) and how this issue would be resolved in future are some questions which are included in the sample. All questions are preplanned and structured. The
Questionnaire is as following:
Question 1. Could I have your viewpoint on General Pervaiz Musharraf’s decision to join the US-led war on terror?
Question 2. Could you point out the factors that have brought this war to our cities from the border areas?
Question 3.A wave of anti-American sentiments are high among the masses in
Pakistan. What are its causes?
Question 4. Is there any division do you see among the leaders in political parties on the one hand and between the civil and military leaderships on the other hand regarding terrorism in Pakistan?
Question 5. What adverse effects of the war on terror do you see on the elections in
Pakistan with particular reference to the general elections of 2002 and 2008?
Question 6. What prospects of the cessation of war on terror do you see in the foreseeable future in Pakistan?
Question 7. The Parliamentary resolutions and conducting All Parties conferences
(APCs) against war on terror are the positive development in Pakistan. Do you see that these events have played any positive impact on reducing the threat of terrorism in Pakistan?
Question 8. Do you think that the Lal Masjid episode was a turning point in the escalation of terror attacks inside Pakistan? 77
Question 9. Do you see any division among the political parties on drone attacks in
Pakistan?
Question 10. Internal developments like, Davis issue, Abbottabad operation, memogate scandal and Salala attacks have any effect on Pakistan politics?
This questionnaire is also attached in the Appendix one at the end of the thesis.
3.7. Data Analysis Process
In this part of the research methodology, the data analysis process would take place.
As there are primary and secondary data used in this research, the analysis should be started after the data has been completed and interviewees are being finished.
Through this process, the research aims and objectives emerged from the data after compilation and then can be used in the relevant parts of the research thesis.
At the end of the interview(s), researcher noted key points in the interviews process and prior to analysis, transcribed and translated them into English. Data reduction techniques are used where the lengthy documents are involved in the in-depth interviews. Through this process, the data was condensed into different meaningful themes which were narrowed down the data into small and relevant section of research. Researcher incorporated data analysis after the data collection process. The data received from the interview process from the distinctive participants on the topic, was arranged in such a way to interpret it in a coherent way.
After finishing data analysis process, the data was displayed and incorporated in chapter four, five, six and seven respectively. The basic aim of the interview process was to get answers of the research questions from the participants in different perspectives to reach on a logical conclusion of the research thesis which is based on both qualitative and quantitative methodology. 78
3.8. Methodological Limitations
The aim of this research is to understand the war on terror and its impact on Pakistan politics in its analytical and critical perspectives and to provide or present the statistical information or data. As the primary data is also part of the research, however the most important thing in this research is the analytical approach towards war on terror and politics in Pakistan.
The aim of this research is to provide holistic approach towards this problem which required a lot of time in the field work in collecting data but due to limited time and resources constraints, the researcher was only able to visit a few cities in Pakistan.
The researcher has received no financial and research grants from any organization or even from the university from which this research is conducted and this restricted the activities of the researcher to visit the far flung or remote areas in his research in a specific time period.
The terrorist activities in the shape of suicide bombings, bomb blasts and many other terror attacks have not only impacted the lives of the masses but the research activities were also affected by it. Access to the public places like the Parliament or Provincial
Assembly in Peshawar was remain very difficult activities and most of the time, access to these areas were denied on the security reasons which have sometimes discouraged the researcher in the field activities. This was also the reason of the security situation that many politicians refused to meet for interviews in Peshawar and
Islamabad.
3. 9. Researcher’s Field Experience
Research on terrorism in Pakistan since 9/11 is not an easy job especially in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (former North West Frontier Province-NWFP) in the contemporary environment. Most of the time, it was difficult to explain on mobile phone to the 79 interviewees that the researcher is doing research on terrorism, therefore the supervisor advised me not to expose himself as researcher on terrorism in the remote areas of Peshawar or travelling into other cities.
To avoid any mishap, all the time the researcher presented the supervisor letter for conducting research on this topic and to take interviews. To introduce myself with the respondents, the researcher first presented his National Identity card (NIC) and then the university identity card to confirm my identity before starting formal interviews or enter into public offices and buildings to collect data. The researcher contacts with the respondents were made through friends and other dignitaries of the areas. Many interviewees personally gave the researcher the phone numbers of other relevant people who are to be interviewed. For instance, when I interviewed a journalist, he gave me the contact numbers of other journalists who then I contacted and interviewed, thus it made my work easy and the interview process continued without any problem in contacting other people.
As a researcher, I was aware of the culture, social problem and political environment in the country but the researcher always remained neutral while conducting interviews of the politicians because some people viewed that some politicians were supporters of militants in the country and indirectly responsible for terror activities in the country. All the respondents had fully cooperated the researcher, but still I know my real position in the process. All were keen and interested in this topic because all of them were directly or indirectly involved and some politicians had given daily statements on the issue in the newspapers and press conferences. Some of the respondents asked for a copy of the book (the thesis in shape of book) when it was completed and published of which the researcher promised.
Many people whom I contacted for interviews refused to be available, for instance, I asked time and again from Raheemullah Yousfzai-a well-known journalist and senior 80 analyst working with the Daily ‘The News’ as resident Editor in Peshawar, but he was not available for interview and then I dropped the idea to interview him. As like him, I contacted some politicians of Balochistan in Islamabad (Parliamentarians- living in the Parliament lodges) on mobile phone, but not invited for interview while some promised for interviews.
One thing which is common to all the respondents is the cultural and traditional norms and values which every respondents have fulfilled was the traditional hospitality for the guest. As a researcher, I was interested in academic activity and had no incentives for them, still everyone served me with cold drinks, tea with some bakeries and sometimes toke launch with the respondents. A respondent called me to meet in F-8 markaz in Islamabad in a hotel where he not only served me milk shake but gave a detail interview in a very pleasant environment. I think that when a man comes to a community with the motives of services to the religion (Islam), then how the people will not support them in traditional society like tribal areas where the foreigners were kept with honour, supported and defended against the enemies. Most of the interviewees called me in the interviews as “professor” or “doctor” from both of which I am far away but it was a gesture of respect and honour for the academics on this level. One of the problems in the field study in this research was the unsuccessful attempt to interview women and minority politicians for which I tried many times but remained unsuccessful.
3.10. Ethical Issues in Research 81
Research exists in a social world, where non-academics assist us in our work and where they are entitled to know what we are doing and to question the values inherent in the way we work.4
Informed Consent
Of all the values which exist as part of the research process, one of the most important one is the informed consent. When we ask people to take part in a research project, it is very important that we provide them all relevant information, so that they can decide for themselves whether they would like to participate. It is doing because to preserve the autonomy and independence of those who may become our respondents.
It would not be fair to persuade people to take part, without giving them the kind of information upon which they could take rational decision.5
Before the interview process, the researcher contacted the desired respondents on the topic and its aims and goals, and also informed that the sole purpose of this study is academic and scholarly pursuits. Their views would never be used against them in any forum.
Anonymity and Confidentiality
After voluntary participation in the interview process which is the two way process but without the respondent consents, these efforts would never be materialized in a good fashion. After this process, the two most important aspects of the interviews ethics are the confidentiality and anonymity because if these two are ignored or violated, the respondents which are the assets of the academicians would be disappointed and it would be set back to the research process. In all circumstances, the anonymity and confidentiality would be preserved. Keeping in mind these two aspects, the researcher never used the tape recorder or mobile phone device to record
4 Paul Oliver.op. cit., p. 123. 5 Ibid, p.124.see also Jennifer Mason.Qualitative Research. London: Sage Publication Ltd. 2002, p.101. 82 the interviews because all the interviewees were not willing to record their interviews due to the nature of the subject and sensitivity of the situation in Pakistan. I totally agreed with them.
Anonymity goes a step beyond confidentiality and refers to protection against identification, even from the researcher. Information, data and responses that are collected anonymously cannot be identified with a particular respondent.6
On many occasion, respondents shared sensitive information on the subject and sometimes additional data provided by them but told the researcher that these are the
“off the record” discussion which means you could not mention them in the research thesis. On such situations, the researcher stopped taking note of them.
In putting the data or views of the respondents on such issue, the researcher sometimes changed the names and locations of the respondents in an attempt to hide the identity of them from any mishap to them in future. Therefore, artificial names were given to the original names and to the places.
6 Zina O’Leary.op. cit., p. 54. 83
Chapter Four
Musharraf’s Motives in War on Terror: Neo-Realism
Perspective
Pakistan is situated in a complex geo-strategic location and truly can be truly called the victim of its strategic importance. On the Eastern border, a hostile state always in search of harming Pakistan not only militarily but now is trying to make it desert by stopping or diverting the flow of water on the rivers running towards Pakistan.
Afghanistan- a battleground for the last thirty years on its Western border not only disturbed its economic and social structure but also remained a source of tension for all the time. Iran, on its South-Western border, is in the grip of international embargos and the US-Iran tussle on its nuclear programme has also affected its relations with her neighbours. China is more comfortable for Pakistan as the latter is enjoying friendship in the shape of economic, military and scientific cooperation, not based on neo-realistic approach in international politics (no permanent friend or foe but own national interests), but on mutual understanding and respect for one another.
In this chapter, the researcher argued that the Musharraf’s decision to join the War on
Terror is seen by the neo-realism perspective as threat to Pakistan’s security was imminent at that time. That decision was a pragmatic one but with the passage of time it was compromised by some policy decisions and remained the sole cause of instability in Pakistan.
4.1. Pakistan’s Relation with India
Pakistan has a long history of strained relation with its two neighbours; India and
Afghanistan. These relations are strained because of some political and strategic differences which still exist. The hostile attitude and policies of the Indian government towards Pakistan compelled the latter to seek friendships with other states 84 for security. Because of these security threats, Pakistan joined military alliances such as CENTO and SEATO to balance the security environment in the region in her favour. The main dispute between the two countries is the issue of Kashmir which the analysts call the “unfinished agenda of the subcontinent”. This problem has not only lead the two neighbours to go to war in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999 but many small skirmishes have also taken place for the last sixty years. Both countries have spent billions of dollars on military buildup and arms race.
Both countries have engaged in proxy wars against each other in their own states. The
Indian involvement in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) crisis in 1971 was one clear example in this regard. Pakistan repeatedly blamed India for covert and sabotage activities in Balochistan and also the on-going conflict in tribal areas is worth mentioning. India blamed Pakistan for its support to the Kashmiri freedom movement.
India and Pakistan have had approximately fifteen conflicts and crises of varying severity. They can be categorized according to source: some are rooted in border dispute, some in nuclear concerns, and some in ethnic, religious and irredentists issues.1 The nuclearization of South Asia in 1998 when both countries tested their nuclear weapons, became the most dangerous place in the world. This has not only led to an expensive arms race between the two countries but has also worsened the peace in the region. The missile race and branding them on the names of the heroes of one and the foe of the other in their respective countries reveal that how much they look to the past in their present rivalries. Both countries have mistrusts in their dealings with one another not only in the civilian but in the military spheres, causing fear of conspiracies against each other.
These tensions led to weakening of Pakistan, economically. In conventional warfare with India, Pakistan has always been seeking support of the great powers in matters
1 P. R. Chari, Iqbal Pervaiz Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen. Four Crises and a Peace Process-American Engagement in South Asia. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007, p. 20. 85 related to Kashmir, border issues, water and dams, and ethnic issues. The third party involvement was always rejected by the Indian government that all out-standing problems will be resolved through bilateral dialogues. This approach has been resorted to for the last sixty years to resolve them in accordance with their own interests but in vain. The Sir Creek, Siachen, Kashmir, water projects and several other issues are still unresolved between the two countries with the reason that both countries are on the war path concentrating on the increase of military strength and the acquisition of modern military machines.
4.2. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relation
Afghanistan was the only country in the world which opposed Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1948. The relations between the two countries remained sour on two main issues and still face hurdles in normalizing relations. The separatist movement in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was fueled by the
Afghanistan government in the early years of its independence which is now dead but the past scares are yet to heal. The second issue which is still awaiting resolution is
Afghanistan’s claim on Pakistan’s territory and refusal to recognize the Durand line as the permanent border between the two countries. Almost all the successive governments in Afghanistan have not withdrawn from this claim and have refused to accept the border’s permanent status. Pakistan supported Afghan Mujahideen in
1980s against the Soviet Union and still providing hospitality to more than 2.5 million
Afghans living in Pakistan.
The growing relationship between Afghanistan and India is a serious threat to
Pakistan’s interest in the region. This relationship has not only endangered its
Western border but anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan are also active against
Pakistan’s interests. Pakistan is not against the relation of one state with the other but if it causes a threat to its security, then it would not be indifferent to such a situation. 86
Pakistan does not want an increasing influence of India in Afghanistan because of the past and present record of Indian enmity with Pakistan. Pakistan’s policy of Indo- centrism is on two grounds i.e., to decrease and minimize the Indian influence in
Afghanistan; and to gain ground there for a strategic depth against India in future wars or turmoil in the region.
4.3. Afghan Taliban
After the Soviet withdrawal, a new generation in the shape of militant mujahideen commanders emerged, having sophisticated weapons and thousands of men on their part. These mujahideen commanders were now the warlords and everyone was intending to govern the country as if he had defeated the Soviet forces alone. The
Afghanistan’s political as well as administrative structure disappeared during the war and now there was no central government, no military forces and no constitutional arrangement to run the affairs of the state. This created a vacuum in the power structure in Afghanistan which was filled by those who had more weapons and arms militia on their part. This internal strife had not only erupted violence in the country, on the one hand, but resentment among the people on account of their activities, on the other. Thousands of people died and many left Kabul for safe places during the intra-mujahideen struggle for power.
The Soviet withdrawal in 1989, had unleashed chaos and intra-Afghan violence in the country. Afghan Pashtun attempted to turn over a new leaf in their history, and a major shift in the power structures saw these Pashtun elements being led by clerics whose credibility had been increased by spearheading a successful armed resistance movement against the Soviets. A religio-political force emerged amidst the lawlessness, promising peace, justice and order. Given their background in the 87 madrassas (religious seminaries) on the Pakistani side of the border, they came to be known as “Taliban” or knowledge seekers.2
In the official history of Taliban, the movement’s genesis was traced back to a humble village of Kandahar province where Mullah Omer was studying. The lawlessness and chaos that descended over Afghanistan with the end of Soviet Union occupation reached a depth of iniquity that Mullah Omer and a brand of his comrades took up arms in rage to install some law and order.3 Some believed that Taliban were the creation of Pakistan but, in fact, they are neither a pure Pakistani creation nor an
Afghan phenomenon and the intermeshing of the two is a complex affair.4 Most accounts of the Taliban’s emergence acknowledge that they were a local phenomenon reflecting frustration with the mujahideen leaders and warlords, which was later backed by the Pakistan’s ISI.5
Pakistan’s political and strategic interests and the situation in and around Afghanistan pushed it towards the Taliban and it emerged as the most vital source of support for them. Pakistan‘s interest in the Taliban government was pragmatic. They were strong enough to provide stability in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan which was a matter of concern for Pakistan’s security.6
The entry of Taliban was a good sign for Pakistan in its strategic interests in
Afghanistan on many grounds. As Taliban were Pashtun and also related to the areas which were located to the border region of Pakistan which ultimately stabilized the border areas in their rule.
2 Hassan Abbas. Pakistan Drift into Extremism-Allah, the Army and America’s War on terror. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, p. 83. 3 Sana Haroon. Frontier of Faith: A History of Religious Mobilization in the Pakistan Tribal Areas, C. 1890-1950. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 154. 4 Olivier Roy. “The Taliban: A strategic tool for Pakistan”, in Christophe Jaffrelt (Ed.). Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation? London: Zed Books Ltd. 2002, p. 186. 5 Hussian Haqqani. Pakistan between the Mosque and Military. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005, p. 239. 6 Rasul Baksh Rais. “In the Shadow of the Past: Pakistan’s Foreign Policy” in Craig Baxter (Ed.). Pakistan on the Brink. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 43-5. 88
While Taliban were in Kabul and ruled on the ninety percent of the areas of the country, it was evident from the fact that they had authority on the majority of the areas. This Taliban’s rule also gathered other Pashtun on their side like Haqqani and other warlords which strengthened the Pashtun representation in Afghanistan and weakened the other elements who had no good relations with Pakistan. This weakened the anti-Pakistan elements in Afghanistan and also developed strong presence and influence in Taliban and its government.
As the Durand line is a serious issue and many past governments raised this issue repeatedly, Pakistan was satisfied with the Taliban in Kabul as they were not to touch this issue for the time being. This not only strengthened the Western border but also gave a bargaining position to Pakistan on the Taliban because Pakistan was the sole major contributor to Taliban and supporter of them. From the Taliban government,
Pakistan had minimized the Indian involvement and its influence there and the policy of strategic depth was, to some extent, succeeded in Afghanistan. The Taliban government contributed many hardships to Pakistan in the next coming days because of their policies. Many believed that Pakistan was the supporter of these elements in
Afghanistan which had developed mistrust in relation of other neighnouring countries with Pakistan. This not only created tension among these states but also lent a bad reputation to Pakistan in the world community.
4.4. Taliban and Al Qaeda
The Taliban government in Afghanistan provided a safe-haven to the radicals of the world who gathered there to promote their global agenda of Jihad in the world and especially in the West. Taliban, Al Qaeda and other elements were not new in
Afghanistan as they have a long history in the region. The root cause of all these extremism and militancy in the region was the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980s. The
CIA made Pakistan the frontline state in the war against the Soviet in Afghanistan, 89 injected some $ 10 billion worth of weapons in the Pak-Afghan border region.7
Pakistan border areas were converted into vast Jihad factories in the region which provided not only logistic support but also the training facilities to the mujahideen in the areas.
This was the reason that the CIA, ISI, and Al Istakhbar Al Ama (General Intelligence of Saudi Arabia) devised a joint operational strategy in relation to Afghanistan. The
ISI was the sole organization involved in administering the jihad infrastructure and implementing the war strategy on the ground. The Saudi government’s financial and material assistance to the Afghan Islamists cause motivated thousands of Islamists from the Arab world to come to Pakistan and to fight the Soviet “atheists”. A majority of these Islamists embraced the Islamist discourse preached by the founding fathers of
Sunni political Islamism namely Hassan Al Banna, Sayed Qutb, and Abul Ala
Mawdudi. These personalities had focused their Islamist agenda and political agenda on the goal of establishing an Islamic political order.8
Pakistan’s tribal areas became the epicenter of global Jihadi network for thousands of radical Islamists who came from different parts of the world and whose agenda was to wage war against infidels. These interactions of diverse political and social backgrounds of people developed into a united front, irrespective of their colour, race or nationalities against the west and especially of the United States in their policies towards the Muslim world.
The United States role in Soviet-Afghan war was very important because the whole war strategy was planned and implemented through its neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan remained the most influential external factor in Afghanistan, due to its role as a base for the anti-Soviet Afghan Islamic groups in the 1980s. Thousands of Afghans
7 G. D. Bashki. The Paradox of Pakistan-Collapse or Caliphate. New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2007, p. 119. 8 Rizwan Hussain. Pakistan and the emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan. Hampshire: Ashgate, 2010, p. 117. 90 received their education in Urdu in the madrassas established in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan by the US and Saudi Arabia’s assistance.
These madrassas imparted religious education-cum- military training in the tribal areas.9
In these madrassas, a new thinking was developed in the students that the Soviet
Union was the ‘Godless’ state and the militant struggle against it is obligatory on all
Muslims of the world. Interestingly, the West and the United States role in the
Muslim world sufferings was ignored and they were considered as the supporter of the Mujahideen in their holy struggle against the occupier. That thinking was transformed from the old mujahideen commanders into the young students of those madrassas after the Afghan war. Their enemy was now defeated but they turned towards other states which they thought were the usurper and had carried out atrocities against the Muslims in different parts of the world.
The entry of Arab and other foreign militants into Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas was a turning point to militarize the whole region in the 1980s. This nexus of
Pashtun Taliban with Arab, Chechens, Uzbeks and many others had developed a vast network of hardcore elements in the region whose main purpose was the establishment of Islamic rule or Sharia in Afghanistan and in their respective countries.
The Al Qaeda enlisted other extremist groups to fight on its behalf, such as the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Chechen fighters, the Uighur Muslims and many more.10 Many groups established their camps in Afghanistan with the help of Al
Qaeda and Taliban, provided safe havens to them and they continued their activities without any restrictions there. The Taliban not only welcomed them in Afghanistan
9 Christopher Canland. “Religious Education and Violence in Pakistan” in Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia Botteron (Eds.). Pakistan 2005. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 183. 10 Ahmad Rashid. Descent into Chaos. London: Penguin Books, 2008, pp. 05-8. 91 but provided them a congenial environment to flourish in all aspects of terrorism and militancy.
Bin Laden’s presence was a deep concern for the United States and Washington was trying to persuade Taliban to hand him over as he was the potential threat to its security and was planning to hit the United States interests in the world but the
Taliban refusal to such demands made the relations between them worse which were already tense.
With much pressure from the United States, Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring countries, Taliban were still not willing to extradite Bin Laden nor would they stop or restrict their support to the terrorist networks who were working on the global jihadi agenda in Afghanistan. Afghanistan became the hub of terrorist organizations, they used official cars and their movements were free in the country. This unrestricted movement encouraged them to freely travel to the rest of the country and even used the Afghanistan national airline ‘Arianna’ for their long journeys.
The relationship that developed between the Taliban and Al Qaeda had many reasons in Afghanistan. It was considered the matrimonial relationship between Mullah Omer and Osama Bin Laden had led to these close relationship but it had no proof and authenticity. The second was the religious one as both were the Sunni Muslims. Some called this relation as the result of Pashtun cultural norms of hospitality in their country. Pashtun has the culture and tradition to give shelter and security to anybody who seeks these from the native one. All Pashtun are obliged by this code of
Pashtunwali that he will protect his guest in trouble even if his own life came in jeopardy. One thing clear from the Taliban policies in Afghanistan in the later years of their takeover was that the Taliban leaderships came under the influence of the Al
Qaeda’s ideology of global Jihad and extremism in their policies.
92
4.5. 9/11 Attacks and the Pak-US Relations
Osama’s anti-American stance attracted other militant organizations to work for the cause of Islam and against the enemies of Islam. In 1998, Bin Laden issued a manifesto under the aegis of “The International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Christians”. A fatwa for which Bin Laden was not entitled to issue because he was not a religious scholar nor had the required knowledge on the issue and said, “the ruling to kill the American and their allies-civilians or military-is the duty of every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to”. This fatwa triggered many terrorist attacks against the West and especially against the United States in different parts of the world. In the same year, in August 1998, suicide bombers struck their cars having explosives with the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing hundreds of people and injured thousands others. In response to these attacks,
President Clinton had ordered to attack the Bin Laden camps in Afghanistan by
Cruise missiles but he remained unhurt. Further, in July 1999, President Clinton imposed sanctions on Taliban, freezing its assets in the United States and banning commercial and financial ties between Taliban and the US.11
The terrorist threat was imminent in the mid of the year but the exact nature was not known to anyone in the country. Everyone knew that Bin Laden was determined to strike the US but we were not told how he might carry out such attacks. The fact is that the United States was poorly prepared for September 11, 2001, for systematic and psychological reasons. Our homeland had been spared a major foreign attack since the
British burned the White House in the War of 1812. Yes, there had been a devastating
11 Amin Tarzi, “the Neo-Taliban” in Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (Eds.). The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008, p. 208. 93 attack on a military base in Pearl Harbor in the World War Second in 1941. No one was prepared for what happened on that awful day.12
On September 11, 2001, four airplanes were hijacked by the terrorists and devastating attacks were launched in the history of the United States. Two airplanes struck the twin towers of the World Trade Centre (WTC) and the one into the Pentagon. The numbers of casualties were estimated to three thousands.
It was reported that the hijackers were young between the ages of 20 and 28 years and unmarried. They discussed targets in code language, like “architecture” referred to the
World Trade Centre, “arts” the Pentagon, “law” the Capital and “Politics” the White
House. Atta used a riddle to convey the date in code-a message of two branches, a slash, and a lollipop, 11/9 would be interpreted as 11.13
In the political sense, the impact of 9/11 attacks was far-reaching, nationally, regionally and globally. It had not only affected the American people’s psyche but also the government policies regarding security and terrorism. The terrorists targeted the most powerful places in the United States, one the economic icon and symbol of capitalism-the World Trade Centre as targeted and the other was the US military powerful place in the world-the Pentagon that had never endured an attack of this nature in its history.
The 9/11 attacks were the reflection of one of the most sophisticated examples of terrorists planning and execution in the human history. It revealed a new type of enemy to the United States –one that penetrated all its conventional defence and
12 Condoleezza Rice. No Higher honor-A Memoir, My Years in Washington. London: Simon & Schuster, 2011, pp. 69-70. 13 Ibid, pp. 248-9. 94 destroyed with seemingly consummate ease iconic symbols of American power on its soil.14
It was Al Qaeda, the most powerful terrorist group of the modern age, killing thousands of people in a matter of minutes, but it achieved something the Soviet
Union never did: the mass murder of Americans on its soil.15
The 9/11 attacks had a direct impact on Afghanistan because the Al Qaeda’s leaderships were there and all the terrorist activities were operated from Afghanistan with the support of Taliban government. They were now to bear the brunt and put the
Taliban and Afghanistan on the hit list of the United States and its allies in the war against terror. The attacks had put the Muslim world in a very difficult position. In the
West, in general, and in the US, in particular, the Muslims were depicted as terrorists and extremists in the world. The Attacks on September 11, 2001, heralded the vanguard of the Caliphate- inspired dream of bloody confrontation. It seemed to touch a nerve of Muslim impotence.16
George W. Bush narrated the 9/11 attacks in his memoir that the first plane could have been an accident. The second was definitely an attack. The third was the declaration of war. We have suffered the most devastating surprise attacks since Pearl
Harbor. An enemy had struck our capital for the first time since the War of 1812.17
“It was a modern day Pearl Harbor. Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom, came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. We
14 Alastair Finlan. Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror. New York: Rutledge, 2008, p. 115. 15 Sebastian Gorka. “The Enemy: Understanding and defeating Jihadist Ideology”, in David Garten, Stein Ross & Clifford D. May (Eds.). The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theatre-Militant Islam, Security & Stability. Washington: FDD Press, 2010, p. 127. 16 Benazir Bhutto. Reconciliation Islam-Democracy and the West. London: Simon & Schuster, 2008, p. 03. 17 George W. Bush. Decision Points. London: Virgin Books, 2011, pp. 128-9. 95 will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed those acts and those who harbour them”.18
No one was expecting on that day that the terrorist would use the airlines in the deadly terrorist attacks as the weapons of mass destruction against its own people. The terrorists on that day were committed to die and they did it. The most advanced technology of aviation was used in these attacks.
On 20th September, 2001, the President addressed the nation and said, “The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. Our war on the terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated”.19
From this speech, the United States wanted to make an alliance with the world community to defeat all kinds of terrorist organizations in the entire world. The demarcation of the world into two groups; states which are against the terrorists and those who are supporter of them had divided the world into good and bad. In this policy statement, Bush focused solely on the ‘hard power’ concept in international politics while dealing with a problem and this was the reason that the entire world supported the United States in its war against terrorism despite some reservations.
18 Ibid, pp. 137-8. 19 The 9/11 Commission Report-2004, p. 337. 96
The use of hard power in internal or external conflicts have always complicated the issue and aggravated the situation from bad to worse and this was the reason that most of the power always supported the ‘soft power20’ technique in resolving the problem.
This war was basically focused on the ‘soft power’ concept because it was the war of hearts and minds, not of the military struggle between the militant groups. It has a long history of struggle for justice and the oppressive policies of some Western states towards the Muslim problems which they are facing today.
The war on terror and the Bush declaration of global war on terror has a far-reaching implications on national security, relations with the world community and civil liberties within the United States and abroad. It is the most important policy shaping the modern world history.21
The 9/11 attacks were considered as revenge of the American foreign policies in the
Muslim world, in general, and in Middle East, in particular. The United States unilateral policies in support of Israel and the dictator’s regimes in the Muslim countries have alienated the youth in those states and a sense of anti-American developed among them. The use of military power in conflicts in the Muslim states has strengthened the Jihadi elements in those respective states. Failure of the Israel-
Palestine conflict and support to Israel who was committed in crimes against the
Palestinians has developed hatred against the US and her policies.
While declaring the war on terror, the United States policies of “isolationist and unilateralist” were replaced by the “multilateral and mutual support” in international politics. For that purpose, Pakistan was asked for support in the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan.
20 The term “soft power” was coined by Prof. Joseph Nye in 1990. His book “The Paradox of American Power (2003)” has fully discussed the soft power ideas in world politics. 21 Stephen D. Reeze and Seth C. Lewis. “Framing the War on Terror”, Journal, Vol. 10 (6), 2009, p. 788. 97
4.6. Musharraf’s Decision to Join the US War on Terror
Pakistan was asked by the United States immediately after the 9/11 attacks to cooperate in the war against Al Qaeda and Taliban. There are many reasons for which
Pakistan’s support was required. It was the only country in the world which had diplomatic relations with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and it might convince them to avert the imminent attacks from the US to handover Bin Laden for the sake of security of the Afghan people and the region. It was also believed that
Islamabad had cordial relations with the Kabul for the last five years and most of the observers were of the opinion that the Taliban government had the overt and covert support of Islamabad therefore, to dislodge the Taliban rule in Afghanistan; Pakistan now had to cut-off its relations with them.22
The second reason was the strategic location of Pakistan in the region. Pakistan’s strategic location next to Afghanistan made its cooperation vital for the success of any military strike against Afghanistan. Pakistan’s close border for logistic support in war was important because it was the cheapest route to Afghanistan to supply arms and other equipment. The most important factors which the United States wanted in support from Pakistan was the vast human intelligence network in Pakistan for the last few decades and in the war on terror, the United States wanted to share Pakistan’s vital information with her to make the Afghanistan campaign successful. Without
Pakistan’s support, the United States also acknowledged that this war would be difficult to win and therefore while India offered the US full support in the War in
Afghanistan, it turned to Pakistan.
General Musharraf was forced to confront militants when they were strong enough in the region and the US quote Pakistan and secure its compliance in the war on terror in
22 Zahid Hussain. Frontline Pakistan- The Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto. New York: I. B. Taurus, 2008, pp. 37-8. 98
the face of immense popular opposition.23 Facing with a possible choice between
joining the US “War on Terror” or be ready to be “Sent back to the Stone age”,
General Pervaiz Musharraf opted for the former.24
While defending his decision to support the United States, Pervaiz Musharraf told that
there would be a violent and angry reaction from the United States if Pakistan did not
support them against the Al Qaeda elements located in Afghanistan. The support of
Pakistan was also important in the sense that it had vast information network inside
Afghanistan and the US needed it most at that time. The Al-Qaeda was based in
neighbouring Afghanistan under the protection of those international pariahs, the
Taliban. September 11 marked an irrevocable turn from the past into an unknown
future. The world will never be the same.25
On 13 September, 2001 the US ambassador to Pakistan presented the list of seven
demands to General Musharraf in Islamabad which included:
1. Stop Al-Qaeda operatives and end all logistical support for Bin Laden;
2. Provide the United States with blanket over flight & landing rights for necessary
military & intelligence operations;
3. Provide territorial access to the Unites States, including the use of Pakistan’s Naval
ports, air bases and strategic locations or borders;
4. Provide the United States immediately with intelligence, immigration information and
databases;
5. Continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts of September 11;
23 Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia A. Botteron. Pakistan 2005. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 199. 24 SaminaYasmeen. “Pakistan and the Struggle for ‘Real’ Islam” in Sharam Akberzadeh and Abdullah Saeed (Eds.). Islam and Political Legitimacy. London: Routledge Curzen, 2003, p.84. 25 Pervez Musharraf. In The Line of Fire. A Memoir. London: Simon & Schuster, 2006, p. 200. 99
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to Taliban;
7. Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban government and all support
for Taliban.
“We refused to give any naval ports or fighter aircraft bases. We allowed only two
bases- Shamsi in Balochistan and Jacobabad in Sindh, and only for logistic and
aircraft recovery. No attack could be launched from there. Then I went on national
radio and television on September 19, to explain my decision to the people”.26
The decision of General Pervaiz Musharraf was widely criticized by most of the
respondents in their views. “This decision was the root cause of all the problems of
Pakistan since 9/11. All the extremism and violence which occurred in Pakistan in the
last ten years was due to the Musharraf decision. “He not only made operations in his
own territory but weakened the Army strength while deployed in the length and
breadth of the country”.27 “Pakistan was in isolation in the world on the Taliban issue
before the 9/11, and it was the compulsion of the time to join the war on terror
because Musharraf had no option but to cooperate”.28 It was a rational approach at
that time because the entire world had no option but the alliance with the United
States but with the passage of time, we could modify the policies according to the
environment and the fall out of the decision was revealed in many developments in
the country. It was not a failed policy at that time.29 One analyst stated that where
there is war, there will be destructions and which has no boundaries to be limited. The
wise ruler is one who fights the war on the others land but Musharraf brought the
26 Pervaiz Musharraf. op. cit., p. 206. 27 Rustom Shah Mohmand. Former Pakistan’s Ambassador to Afghanistan. Interview, Peshawar, 07 March, 2013. 28 Salim Safi. A well known anchor person in Geo TV Channel Interview, Islamabad, 04 July, 2013. 29 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. Prof. and Director, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e- Azam University, Islamabad, Interview, Islamabad, 04 June, 2013. 100
‘others’ war into his own home and now we can see the repercussions of those policies today.30
The mainstream parties and political analysts have their opinions on Musharraf’s decision according to the needs of the time. Most of them think that the decision of
Musharraf was right on the ground that he was compelled by the prevailing situation of the world and it was a good decision but it had some repercussions on this ground that he never took the people’s representatives in its favour. “We are against the war and violence and we never support those decisions which led to more violence in the region. Musharraf was right in supporting the US but to become a party in the war, it was wrong”, said the ANP leader Mian Iftikhar Hussain.31
“Pakistan needed to support the world community and cooperate in building its relations with other nations. But this cooperation would not be based on to compromise of its national interests. Pakistan should cooperate with the international community with care to determine on what price we were going to support. We should now think what price we have paid in this cooperation in the war on terror with the US”.32 Most of the views that there was no option before Musharraf but only to join the US alliance but “this alliance should have been made on some rules and engagements. Without proper mechanism, this has created so many problems for
Pakistan”.33
“Pakistan has isolated itself regionally and internationally on the Taliban issue before the 9/11 attacks and this was the reason that the US openly asked Pakistan to explain its position. At that time even if Pakistan had opted to remain neutral, it would have
30 Akbar (pseudo name), Interview, Peshawar, 24 May, 2013. 31Mian Iftitkhar Hussain. Former Information Minister and General Secretary ANP. Interview, Peshawar, 27 May, 2013. 32 Sadeequl Farque. Former Information Secretary of PML (N). Interview, Islamabad, 16 August, 2013. 33 Brig (R) Mahmood Shah. Former Secretary Law and Order FATA. Interview, Peshawar, 03 March, 2013. 101 been considered that they are supporting and saving Taliban. Pakistan was to clearly declare: “friendship with the US or with the Taliban”.34
All politicians of religious parties condemned and declared that the Musharraf’s decision of joining the war on terror on these grounds that he took the decision on his own and did not involve the nation or Parliament on its part. The second reason was that he interfered in the affairs of an Islamic brother country and violated the Islamic laws in the sense that he supported an infidel state against an Islamic state. The religious parties thought and saw that decision in true Islamic or religious perspective and not on the neo-realism approach and on the relation in the modern political system where the national interests are more vital than the cultural or historical relations while seeking its country’s own interests. They saw the relations between the states on religious basis, not on the national interests and thought that Pakistan should support the Afghan government (Taliban regime) because they are Muslim and neighbours. They don’t think of the prevailing situation in the world and ignore the role of Taliban and its affiliations with the militant groups in the region and in the
9/11 attacks.
In their opinion, they never said or thought that there was any threat to Pakistan’s security and being a responsible state in the international community, it should cooperate in its own national interests. The complexity of the international environment on that occasion was not understood by those religious parties. “To support the US was against the teachings of Quran and Hadith because no Muslim could support yahood ao hanood (Jews and Christians) against the Muslims, he
(Musharraf) only supported the US for dollars and nothing else”.35
34 Ijaz Khan. Prof. Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar. Interview, Peshawar, 18 March, 2013. 35 Ali, Interview, Islamabad, 20 March, 2013. 102
On popular level, Islamic groups and tribal people marched on the streets of major cities in Pakistan against the imminent attacks on Afghanistan. It was estimated that
82 percent of popular opinion in Pakistan was opposed to intervention. The backlash was not surprising, giving the links between Islamic groups in Pakistan and the
Taliban. The Taliban had been educated in a network of madrassas in Pakistan and many had attended those run by Maulana Samiul Haq. He had led the pro-Taliban
Alliance in Pakistan, the Afghan Defence Council, and publically threatened
Musharraf on 14 September, 2001, saying he should be mindful of the sentiments of his under command.36
Musharraf did consult many political leaders in Pakistan on the decision to support the US in the War on Terror in Afghanistan but the most important one was the decision of the Corps Commanders of its armed forces. After long and heated discussion on the issue, he finally got the consent of the commanders and then informed the nation through his speech on state television and radio.
Pakistan now realized the hard reality of the situation that the Americans are now serious about the Al Qaeda and its safe haven and in the mood to deal them with full force. Musharraf wanted to resolve the Bin Laden issue in a peaceful way. For this purpose, in a last attempt, he sent the DG, ISI to Afghanistan to persuade Mullah
Omer to hand over Bin Laden to the United States and save his country from the war.
But Mullah Omer decided to stand with Bin Laden and rejected any such demand.
This was the last attempt on the part of Pakistan to avert war from the region but the rigid stance of the Taliban government paved the way for the US and its coalition attack on October 07, less than a month after the 9/11 attacks.
After Pakistan becoming partner of the United States in the global War on Terror, the
Islamists staged demonstrations throughout the country and a wave of anti-American
36 Yunas Samad. The Pakistan-US Conundrum-Jihadist, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control. London: Hurst & Company, 2011, p.40. 103 atmosphere was raised to pressurize Musharraf to alienate himself from the ongoing war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. These demonstrations had also strengthened its position to bargain with the United States.37
Musharraf had multiple reasons for supporting the United Sates- personal, strategic and economic. His regime lacked legitimacy, was politically isolated, subject to economic sanctions and embargos as well as the cessation of aid, and was teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. Joining the United States in the war on terror not only brought legitimacy for himself but also protected the corporate interests of the army.
By agreeing to join, he was turned from a pariah of the international community for destroying democracy in Pakistan into a staunch ally of the West in the global war on terrorism.38
Pakistan was given a good reputation in the world community and also got financial assistance from the G-8 and other countries especially the US. Musharraf’s anti- terrorism and pro American policies sparked opposition to the regime as evident of two unsuccessful assassination attempts on Musharraf in December 2003.39
Musharraf’s decisions to join the United States alliance in the War on Terror had been widely criticized in the country but he defended his decision in a press conference on September 19, 2001. Musharraf told the Pakistanis that had Pakistan not accepted the US demands after the September 11 attacks, her critical concerns would have come under threat. “When I say critical concerns, I mean our strategic assets and the cause of Kashmir. If these came under threat it would be a worse situation for us”.40
37 John R. Schmidt. The Unraveling- Pakistan in the Age of Jihad. New York: Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, p. 302. 38 Yunas Samad. op. cit., pp. 24-5. 39 Charles H. Kennedy and Cynthia A. Botteron. op. cit., pp.07-8. 40 Ibid, p. 262. 104
4.7. Pakistan’s Support in the War on Terror
Pakistan was a key ally in the war on terror and its support was evident from the efforts which Pakistan had made against the Al Qaeda and Taliban after 9/11. The support provided by Pakistan was critical for the military operations and its conditionality was why a “light footprint” was adopted.
Even still the Afghan doctrine required Pakistan to provide the US-led coalition forces with five air bases, with a major facility near Jacobabad. These facilities provided
400,000 liters of fuel a day for the operation, as well as other services, and a total of
57,800 sorties were initiated form Pakistan’s air space and facilities. Two-thirds of
Pakistan’s air space was used as air corridors for launching of air operations by the
US and Coalition forces. Naval facilities were provided to the US and Coalition war ships at Pasni. When the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) became involved, the airport and seaport facilities at Karachi were extended. 41 It was estimated that 3,000-4,000 Taliban troops were killed by the intervention, including
600-800 Afghan-Arab, members of Al Qaeda (out of a total of 2,000-3,000) and there were between 1,0000 and 13,000 civilian deaths.42
Pakistan’s support was appreciated in the “Operation Enduring Freedom” by top political as well as military leadership of the United States. By calling Musharraf as a close ally in the war on terror, the US President expressed his deep satisfaction in the media that it was Pakistan which has helped in removing the Taliban government in
Afghanistan within a short period.
Tommy Frank and Donald Rumsfeld also appreciated Pakistan’s role in capturing the
Al Qaeda and Taliban elements who were trying to escape from Afghanistan to
Pakistan tribal areas after the attacks. It was the second time in the history of Pakistan
41Yunas Samad. op. cit., P. 32. 42 Ibid, P. 62. 105 that a General was benefited from the Afghanistan crisis in the last twenty years. Zia was given international recognition after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 and now Musharraf was given a role in the fight against the Al Qaeda and Taliban after 9/11 attacks.
President Bush designated Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), in June,
2004, a status enjoying Japan, South Korea and Australia. It also gave an opportunity to Pakistan to the high technology weapons and other privileges.
When Musharraf’s regime pledged to cooperate, the Bush administration released $
600 m in emergency cash to Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves, then
$700 m were raised to $ 07 Billion by August 2002. During Musharraf’s regime, the
US provided $ 13 Billion in military and economic aid, the military aid was over two- third, mostly through Coalition Support Funds (CSF).43
The international community appreciated Pakistan’s decision to join the world community in the War against Terror and most of the Western leaders visited
Islamabad and were seen shaking hands with the Pakistani leader, Pervez Musharraf who was criticized for its unconstitutional act of take over and dismissal of a democratic government in the country two years ago. The European Union and the
US markets were open to the Pakistani products and many monetary organizations as well as many other countries re-scheduled their loans to Pakistan and some had written them off. Pakistan now became the frontline state in the war on terror campaign and center of the world activities against the Al Qaeda and Taliban in
Afghanistan.
The situation was not smooth sailing in Pakistan. Pakistan was the center of religious institutions- Madrassas in the region. More than 90 percent of the population are
Sunni Muslims, majority of them are the followers of Deobandi school of thought.
43 International Crisis Group. Aid and Conflict in Pakistan. Asia Report No. 227, 27 July, 2012, p. 04. 106
Pakistan’s internal situation was deeply influenced by the development in Afghanistan in the last few decades. The war in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union had a support base in Pakistan and showed their solidarity with the Afghan brothers in their struggle against the Soviet forces without waiting for the official support.
The fact that the CIA and ISI were supporting them but it was the deep love of these people towards Islam and for a neighbor Muslim state that they supported them with their own resources. The people of Pakistan, especially of the border provinces;
Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa after the
18th Amendment in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan) and the tribal people have the relatives on the other sides of the border. How the situation will remain cool and calm like these ground realities on both side of the border. The situation in Pakistan after
9/11 was deteriorated as most of the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters entered into the
Tribal areas of Pakistan through different routes. As these are the very hard areas and the security check post on both sides of the borders were not present at that time, the militants easily escaped into the areas and made the tribal areas their new base camps.
Pakistan had been caught in a spiral of violence since 9/11 as it could not have escaped the fallout of 9/11. It did not have the choice to insulate itself or side step the global response to 9/11 and ultimately the homegrown extremists and militants joined hands with the Al Qaeda remnants.44
Like the past, the tribesmen and the Pakthun on the other side of the border joined hands with the Afghan and Al Qaeda Islamists against the US invasion in
Afghanistan. The government of Pakistan was supporting the US forces in
Afghanistan this time but the people in the tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) mostly were contrary to the government policies, supporting the Taliban. The upsurge of militancy among the Pakistani Pakhtun after 2001 was due to the support to the US
44 Riaz Muhammad Khan. “Ten Years Later”, DAWN, September 11, 2011. 107 invasion of Afghanistan, and the influence of the Afghan Taliban on Pakistani
Taliban. The Al-Qaeda ingratiated with the Taliban partly through ideological affinity; partly through money; and partly because they supported the Taliban in their campaign against the coalition forces. This had created a link between them and
Pakistani militants in the tribal areas.45
Pakistan’s alliance with the world had created internal tension among the different stakeholders who had their own interests in Afghanistan and sympathies with the
Taliban in Afghanistan. The religious institutions- Madrassas have strong opposition of the US war on terror in Afghanistan, as they think, it is a war against the Muslims in particular, not against the terrorism. The religious political parties have a strong vote bank in the two border provinces, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa along with the Tribal areas, and have also strong ideological affiliations with the Afghan
Taliban and considered them as the true Muslims who are following Islam and are struggling to implement the Sharia in their country. The common people in Pakistan have the views that the role of Pakistan in the affairs of another country is not a positive one. Pakistan should abstain herself from the US coalition in this war.
A new phase in the war on terror was started in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In the aftermath of 9/11, no one in Pakistan was thinking that the spiral of violence will catch this land, irrespective of this fact that most of Pakistanis have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan or the role of Pakistan in this war. The situation was calm in the beginning of the war in Pakistan but slowly and gradually, the violence spread in the tribal areas in the first phase and then to the settled areas and now to the mainland cities of the entire country.
45Anatol Lieven. Pakistan-A Hard Country. London: Allan Lane, 2011, p. 408. 108
4.8. Pakistan’s Role in the War on Terror
Pakistan’s efforts in fighting terrorists in the country and support to the coalition forces in Afghanistan was the most vital one in the US campaign against terrorism in the region. Pakistan deployed more than 150,000 troops in its border areas to eliminate the Al Qaeda and other terrorist elements from the country. In all these efforts, Pakistan has been affected in all aspects of life; economic, political and social.
Pakistan’s security forces captured hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban militants while crossing the border after 9/11and handed them over to the CIA. This policy of
Musharraf was intensifying resentment among the Pashtun population in general, and in the militants, in particular, led to the rise of anti-American sentiments in the entire country.
The ISI has carried out 891 operations against Al-Qaeda in which it has killed 866 of its network operatives, including 100 key leaders. It has also apprehended 922 Al-
Qaeda personnel, including 96 high valued targets, and busted 42 networks.46
Pakistan had impressed the United States by arresting and handing over Abu
Zubaydah-a top commander of Osama bin Laden in March 2002.47
The US was more engaged in Pakistan, and the Musharraf regime enjoyed greater support in Washington than either Sharif or Bhutto in their interrupted tenure.
Pakistan had managed to arrest a significant Al Qaeda figures every month, usually at a critical moment. In September 2002, Ramzi bin Al shibh wanted to the US in connection with the 9/11 event was caught in Karachi, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad who planned many attacks on US and on the World Trade Centre was caught in
March 2003.48
46 Abbottabad Commission Report-2013, p. 264. 47 Tommy Frank. American Soldier. New York: Harper Collins, 2004, p. 304. 48 Ibid, pp. 305-06. 109
General Musharraf was threatened by the militants when he fully launched operations in the country against them. This was the time when Pakistan changed its policies toward Islamists and militant organizations in the country. Musharraf wanted to change the old policy of appeasement with radicals and militant groups and he announced to ban many militant groups in the country. There was a price to be paid for this policy and siding with the United States. The Musharraf government had to face down a steady drumbeat of protest demonstration organized by the religions parties. The Al Qaeda and its Pakistani allies proceeded to shift their target from
Westerners to high ranking Pakistani officials. In December 2003 there were two separate assassination attempts against Pervaiz Musharraf.49 To acknowledge the efforts of Musharraf, President Bush called him “a courageous leader” who had risked his life to crack down the Al Qaeda terrorist network.50
The internal image of President Musharraf had also risen. He is viewed as a moderate, balanced and progressive ruler. He had shown courage and foresight. He also received tremendous coverage in the global news media. In the press, Pakistan had gained in stature as key country in the region and even in the world. The West now had a stake in supporting him and in keeping Pakistan afloat as a viable country. Significant economic dividends had already been secured by Pakistan.51
It was the first time in Pakistan’s history when Pakistan Army entered into the tribal areas to chase the militants and dismantle their hideouts in the areas. In 2002, Pakistan commenced Operation Al Mizan (The Balance) in the South Waziristan Agency to kill or capture the foreign militants who had threatened the Pakistani government and involved in the cross border attacks on the US and NATO forces. In this operation,
Pakistan deployed 70,000 to 80,000 thousand forces in the area which was the first major operation of Pakistan on its own soil with such a heavy deployment. Major
49 John R. Schmidt. op. cit., p. 138. 50 Sonni Efron. “Bush lauds the efforts of Pakistani ally”, Los Angeles Times, December 05, 2004. 51 Cary Schofield. Inside the Pakistan Army. New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2011, p. 201. 110 units included the following: Two division headquarters, eight brigade headquarters,
20 infantry battalions, six engineer battalions, one special services group battalion, two signal battalions and 39 Frontier Corps wings.52According to an official, Pakistan
Army has so for lost two division of its operational capacity since 2004. This war is not ending any time soon.53
The numbers are estimated to more than seven thousands of armed personnel along with the paramilitary forces are included. These are the highest numbers of casualties than to the combined casualties of US/NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan. More than forty thousands of civilians have died in the suicide bombing, terror attacks and the military operation in the country in the year 2001-2011. Only in 2009, the civilian casualties in Pakistan have more than in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism.
After the ten years long war, it has now appeared crystal clear that it is now our war because of the heavy losses to our civilians as well as security forces.54
According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan (2009-2010) direct and indirect costs for war on terror has exceeded to $ 40 billion. While the total cost is estimated to $
100 billion in the last ten years.55
Hillary Clinton visited Pakistan in October 28th, 2009 and denounced the daily attacks on Pakistan civilian and security personnel. She appreciated Pakistan’s sacrifices in human and national terms and acknowledged the role of its armed forces in fighting militants in Swat and South Waziristan.56
52 Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair. Counter Insurgency in Pakistan. Rand Corporation, 2010, pp. 46-7. 53 Khalid Aziz. “Endgame in Afghanistan” Dawn September 30, 2011. 54 HumaYusaf Ali. “Weather Terrorism”, Dawn September 12, 2011. 55 Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, 2011. 56 Cary Schofield. op. cit., p. 07. 111
4.9. Marginal Satisfaction-Relationship between Pakistan and the United States
The relations between Pakistan and the United States were very close in the first few years in the war on terror. Both had mutual understanding on the issues of terrorism, militancy and extremism in the region. Despite Pakistan’s efforts in the war and the
US support to the government of General Musharraf, there were some apprehensions between the two countries towards each other. The relations were sometimes more friendly while some events made them tense in the prevailing situation.
Pakistan’s Perspective
Pakistan-US relations are traced back to the very first day of the establishment of
Pakistan. Those were the times when the Cold War era had started between the US and the Soviet Union. To tackle the Communism in the region, the United States wanted an ally in South Asia. Pakistan was a fragile country at that time, wanted to build up its armed forces and to ensure its security from a hostile neighbour-India. A relationship was built up in the shape of signing CENTO and SEATO in the 1950s and thus developed its forces and security. The first bad experience came in the 1965
War between Pakistan and India when the United States stopped military supplies to
Pakistan. This had created some uneasiness in the relations between the two countries.
The war in 1971 was also remembered by the Pakistanis when the US pledged for support but it never materialized and Pakistan lost not only the war but its one part too. In the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan became once again a close ally of the US.
Billions of Dollars were given in aids but when the General Boris Gromov’s 40th
Army tanks left back into Soviet on 15th February, 1989, the United States packed its bags and left the region. It left in place the “Kalashnikov culture” and violence in the 112 region.57 Not only the US left Pakistan, but made sanctions against Pakistan and weakened its economic and military position in the region. While supporting the US in the war on terror in Afghanistan, Pakistan has the opinion that as like in the past, the US will also leave the region and Pakistan helpless, then why to endanger its interests in the region for the sake of United States. Therefore, Pakistan not only helped United States but also remained in touch with the Taliban for future in
Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s relation with Afghanistan was not cordial from the very first day of its independence. Afghanistan was the only country who refused to recognize Pakistan.
The main issues between the two countries were the Durand Line and Pakhtunistan.
Since Pakistan’s independence, successive Afghan governments time and again rejected the Durand line as a boundary status and wanted the unification of the
Pashtun on both sides of the border but Pakistan called it as permanent and final. But soon after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, this issue lost its significance as more than three million Afghan entered into Pakistan and took refuge here, mostly in
NWFP.58
Pakistan always supported those elements in Kabul who were not making disturbance on the other side of the border. The Taliban government in Afghanistan was the most favoured and peaceful in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. Therefore, the dethronement of Taliban and the entry of Northern Alliance (NA) in Kabul was a serious threat to its security on the Western border and strategic interest in the region.
The decision to join the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan and support to the
United States was also the reason to neutralize the influence of the Northern Alliance
(NA) which was backed by India, Iran and Russia. This was the reason that the entry
57 Shuja Nawaz. “Pakistan’s Security and Civil-military Nexus” in Daveed Garten, Stein Ross & Clifford D. May(Eds.). The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theater-Militant Islam, Security and Stability. Washington: FDD Press, 2010, pp.25-6. 58 Nasreen Ghufran. Pashtun Ethno nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Asia Survey, Vol. XLIX, No. 06, November/December, 2009, pp.1101-02. 113 of NA forces in Kabul was resented to by Pakistan and asked the US to restraint the forces from actions against the pro-Pakistan elements in Kabul.
Pakistan’s security dilemma has pushed it to make Afghanistan as its “strategic depth” for possible future war against India. This policy of Pakistan has influenced the security interests in Afghanistan for the long time and whenever India wanted to secure influence there, it tried to push them out. Every move on the part of India was suspected by the military establishment in Pakistan and was perceived as encirclement of Pakistan on the Western border.
The relations between Afghanistan and India was always to seek Pakistan a nexus against her and therefore it wanted to have a role in Kabul in decision making and foreign policy with the neighbour countries. Historically, India developed its relations with Kabul in the years of King Zahir Shah period when the former had a cordial relations with the latter but these relations reached to the lowest ebb in its history when Taliban took over Kabul regime in 1996 and its influence became as nil against
Pakistan. Then India forged alliance with the Northern Alliance of Ahmad Shah
Masud.59
In October, 2011, President Karzai signed a strategic partnership agreement with
India. This was the first of its kinds that the government in Kabul had signed with a foreign country. Under the agreement, India was to train the Afghan security forces and police. To bolster Afghanistan’s security capabilities, India had provided $ 8 million worth of equipment and more is in pipeline to be delivered. All these agreements and cooperation were possible because of US and ISAF presence in
Afghanistan.60 This pact between India-Afghanistan is a “red alert” for
59 Sumit Ganguly. India’s role in Afghanistan. CIDOB Policy Research Project, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective”, January, 2012, p. 03. 60 Ibid, pp. 02-04. 114
Pakistan61because not only the two countries but their notorious intelligence agencies would destabilize Pakistan’s border region in the pretext of this agreement.
By strengthening Afghanistan, India advances its own security objectives. India wanted to eliminate safe havens for terrorists who have attacked India and continue to do so in future. The other is that India wanted to expand its sphere of influence throughout Asia and Afghanistan is one of them. To make security arrangement and bolster its position as regional power and gain access to other countries against China.
The main goal of India in Afghanistan is certainly to minimize Islamabad’s influence in Afghanistan and endure to advance its broader domestic and regional interests against its rival Pakistan.62
The tension between Pakistan and India was obvious from the fact that both countries wanted their influence and presence according to their own interests but the case of
Pakistan is different from India. As Pakistan has a border with Afghanistan (disputed status according to the Kabul policy), and volatile areas on its border in shape of militants (foreign and local) and US/NATO/ISAF presence, thus any movement on the part of other states would provoke Pakistan sentiments about its security.
As India-Pakistan has a long history of conflicts between the two countries and still there is animosity and trust-deficit; the apprehensions of Pakistan are genuine in
Afghanistan. It is also clear from the fact that the more presence of one in Afghanistan is the decreasing influence of the other and vice versa. The deep rivalry between the two countries was also evident from the statement of Army Chief General Ashfaq
Kayani in February, 2010 when he stressed that the military’s security posture would remain “India-centric”, until the Kashmir issue and water dispute would not be
61 Tariq But. Indo-Afghan pact a ‘red alert’, The News, October 09, 2011. 62 Larry Hanauer, Peter Chalk. India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region. Occasional Paper, Rand Cooperation, 2012, p. 01. 115 resolved.63 This was the time when terrorist attacks were frequent in Pakistan and a strong wave of violence continued in the country which threatened even the General
Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi.
The relation between Pakistan and the United States were more cordial in the war on terror in the first few years. Pakistan’s efforts and sacrifices were acknowledged by almost all US officials in their visit to Pakistan from time to time but these relations remained not the same for long time. The trust deficit between the two countries rose with the passage of time when most of the issues regarding terrorism were revealed to both. The national and regional interests on many issues became opposite and these have created something of divergence between the two. While conducting relations with the two countries, the US delinked the two countries on the regional perspectives.
Pakistan is a close ally of the US in the war on terror and was provided economic and military assistance to recover its economy and strengthen its forces. But the real and close economic, trade and strategic interests of the US lies in India. To counter
Chinese influence in the region, the United States signed Strategic Partnership
Agreement with India in 2004 and in 2005, signed a landmark agreement in the civil- nuclear technology which would open the access of India to nuclear supplier group for more nuclear assistance in this field. As regard concluding such agreements with
Pakistan, the US administration refused to have one with Pakistan. On the one hand,
Pakistan was helping the US in its strategic interests in the region while on the other hand, it was denied of any such agreement which would have resolved its energy crisis in the country. This preferential attitude of the US has developed a sense of alienation in Pakistan’s civil and military establishment.
63 International Crisis Group. Pakistan’s Relations with India: Beyond Kashmir? Asia Report No 224- 03 May, 2012, p. 12. 116
The India-Afghan strategic partnership which was backed by the United States was also a thorn in flesh of Pakistan which is a key ally in the US led war on terror in
Afghanistan. The CIA and RAW collaboration in Afghanistan was responsible for covert operation in Balochistan and in the settled districts of Pakistan.
In Afghanistan, the United States would not give more space to Pakistan than India.
The US believed that Pakistan did not take action against those elements who are attacking on the US/NATO forces in the country. It also believed that those militants, cross border from Pakistan’s tribal areas with the silent support of Pakistan army. The
US specially focused on the Haqqani Network which are targeting the US interests in
Afghanistan.
Named after its founder and veteran Mujahideen commander Maulvi Jalaluddin
Haqqani, the Haqqani network is the centre of heated debate, senior US official have levied blunt warnings and accusations, claiming that this group of insurgents is responsible for majority of US losses in Afghanistan.64 These allegations were triggered by the September 22 Congressional testimony of former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, during which he alleged that the Haqqani network was the “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s ISI.65
These kinds of remarks not only exposed the differences between the two countries but also brought them in media that how trust deficit exists in cooperation. Carl Levin,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services warned Pakistan that the US will cut ties with Islamabad if it continued to support the Haqqani. He said in a gathering that if the only option Pakistan presented us in a choice between losing an ally and continued to losing our troops, then we will choose the former.66
64 MushtaqYousafzai. Network of terror. The News, October, 02, 2011. 65 S Iftikhar Murshed. An Afghan Policy appraisal. The News, October 30th, 2011. 66 Wajid Ali Syed. Trust not verified. The News, October 30th, 2011. 117
Pakistan-US relationships underwent the worst strains since 9/11 against the backdrop of a growing perception in Washington that Islamabad had been a treacherous ally. It is also believed that ISI has provided extensive assistance to the Taliban and Haqqani network in the form of training, funding, munitions and safe havens and it is thought to retain considerable influence over them.67 The US facing serious failure in
Afghanistan and still has no proper solution to the problem of Afghanistan, but the US is not ready to accept its failure there,68 thus playing blame game with each other to avoid the real problem.
Pakistan also complained to the Afghan government and NATO forces to stop cross- border infiltration of Afghanistan-based Pakistani militants into Pakistan’s border areas or take actions against those militants who have safe havens in Afghanistan like,
Fazalullah.
The “do more” mantra had its origin in the US belief that Pakistan was less keen to support the American-NATO war objectives than to safeguard its future interests in
Afghanistan and the region around it. Pakistan ignored quite some incidents or only protested mildly, but the raid on Osama’s compound was seen as an act of unmitigated treachery and to this day Pakistan’s military’s actions and postures are influenced by the memory of that “stab in the back.”69
4.10. US Withdrawal and 2014-Pakistan’s Position in the Region
Regional dynamics are fast unfolding as India and United States have close cooperation with the Afghan government to extend Indian presence in the region which ultimately weakened Pakistan’s position in the region. The more the one presence in Afghanistan, the more the other ousted from the region.
67 Larry Hanauer, Peter Chalk. India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region. Occasional Paper, Rand Cooperation, 2012, p. 28. 68 Salman Abid. Much more is at stake. The News, October 02, 2011. 69 I. A. Rehman. Shrinking choices. The News, October 02, 2011. 118
Despite the long struggle with the US in the war on terror involving numerous sacrifices and deteriorating economic, political and social structure in the country, it has now no considerable place in the US policies in Afghanistan in post-2014 period.
As India has no direct role in the contribution in the war on terror, still it got major share in Afghanistan in the shape of influence and investment. This has created genuine security concerns for Pakistan which needed visionary, independent and populist political resolve to preserve Pakistan’s security, economic and social interests and peace in the region.
Conclusion
Pakistan must focus on the internal security situation in the country because it has now become an existential threat to its survival. The overall security environment should be arranged with all the stakeholders in the country because it is not the only responsibility of the military but the civilian leaderships would also come to make the country out of this quagmire. The role of non-state actors in foreign policy should be discouraged because it has not only brought bad name for the country but also isolated it in the region. They worked sometimes independently which scapegoat Pakistan in the end. Afghanistan’s situation is rapidly changing and Pakistan’s stance in the historical perspective is not relevant in the prevailing situation in the region. Pakistan must act as responsible state while dealing with complex situation in the region.
The international forces and world community also addressed Pakistan’s concerns related to the regional perspectives and build more understanding with each other through developing anti-terrorism mechanisms and regional cooperation. The
Americans should realize the need to evaluate the anti-American sentiments in
Pakistan. It should re-examine, re-define and re-structure their policies with
Afghanistan and Pakistan. 119
Pakistan has many options on its part to secure its own interests in the region. A triangular relationship with Iran, China and Turkey would strengthen its economic and military interests by curtailing reliance on the US. To accomplish its own interest,
Pakistan must adopt proactive foreign policy and should rearrange its relationship parameters with other powers especially the United States.
Pakistan’s relations with her neighbours as well as with the United States were always focused on her security. The joining of Pakistan in CENTO and SEATO are only because of her threat to its security and the present war on terror is also the reflection of neo realist approach in this regard. The relations between Pakistan and the United
States were always more beneficial to the later and more counterproductive in the long term to the former as we have seen in the Cold War era and in the present circumstances.
In neo realism perspective, the decision of the Musharraf’s was realistic one at that time but it backfired because the government was not fully aware of the strong role and presence of religious groups in her society. It was also aggravated by some policies which were considered as unilateral and not according to the national interests of the state.
120
Chapter Five
The Rise of Militant Groups in Pakistan: A Social
Constructionism Perspective
The history of Pakistan begins from the movement which the Muslims of Indo-Pak subcontinent launched for the emancipation of Indian Muslims from the subjugation of Hindu majority in the united India. The Muslim League called for the unity of
Indian Muslims to get an independent state where they could live according to the teachings of Islam. Pakistan Ka Matlab Kya, La Ellaha Ellalla1(what is the meaning of Pakistan-there is no God but Allah), was the cherished slogan which gathered all the Muslims of India for a separate homeland. It is established on the basis of Islamic ideology. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, a debate started among the religious and other political parties what the constitution and system in Pakistan would be; Islamic or Western democracy. This debate continues even today.
In the social constructionism perspective, the researcher argued that the formation of different militant groups in Pakistan were caused by the Afghan war in 1980s. The state policy of support to these militant groups for her policy objectives has compromised the democratic process and the strong hold of the religious groups in the
Pakistani society. These networks on the basis of social construction in the society on religious grounds became stronger which ultimately led to instability and militancy in
Pakistan. When the state decided to crake down against them after the 9/11, the strong bond of unity among them by the ideology made hell the lives of those were against them and challenge the writ of the state in Pakistan.
5.1. Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan and the Mujahideen
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was a turning point in the
Cold War era. It was considered a fatal mistake on the part of Soviet Union to enter a
1 Prof. Asghar Sodai (1926-2008) famous poem wrote in 1944 which became a popular slogan in the Pakistan Movement. 121 country known as the “graveyard of Empires.” No foreign troops succeeded to subjugate the inhabitants of this land in the past. On the other hand, the United States got this a golden opportunity to make Afghanistan a Waterloo for the Soviet forces and a final blow to its existence. The Vietnam War memories were still fresh in the mind of US leadership and it was a God gifted opportunity to level its business with the Soviets in Afghanistan. On the hand, Zia’s regime in Pakistan was in isolation in the world community because of the military coup in the country and hanged a political leader, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. It was an opportunity for him to make his government acceptable to the world community to stand united with the Afghan fighters against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and started covert support to the
Afghan fighters then known as Mujahedeen- the fighters in the Holy War.
The Soviet-Afghan war of 1980s was not a religious war in the beginning and the
Afghan were struggling to liberate the country from the Soviet Union but then it was given the status of Holy war to mobilize people on the spirit of Islam. During Zia’s rule (1977-88), Pakistan became a staging ground for the war against the Soviet
Union which was labeled as Jihad. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) recruited thousands of Afghan refugees2 in Pakistan for Jihad in Afghanistan. Students from religious schools (Madrassas) also volunteered themselves for fighting in the name of God. The students from poor family background at madrassas were taught an obscurantist understanding of Islam with no modern subjects, making them easy prey for their handlers.3
The religious elements were now on the fore front who were generously funded from outside with American Stinger missiles on their shoulders and fighting a Holy War
2 Afghan refugees. After the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, millions of Afghans left their homes for safe places in the nearest countries- Pakistan and Iran. Those who came to Pakistan were mostly settled in the tribal areas, North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan. Most of the refugees were part of the Pashtun population of Afghanistan. 3 Ziad Haider, “Ideologically Adrift”, in Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). Pakistan– Beyond a “Crisis State”. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.122. 122 against a Super Power “Infidel”. This encouraged other Muslims in the world to rally with them and become the heroes of Islam in fighting Jihad.
This war theatre of Afghanistan provided an opportunity for CIA and ISI to make an alliance against the Soviet Union and train thousands of Arab and Pakistani volunteers to become diehard jihadis.4 In the Arab world, Saudi Arabia- an oil rich leading
Muslim country enjoying worldwide respect for being the location of holy places, was persuaded by the United States to play her role for the Muslim cause as leader of the
Muslim world.
The tension between the West and the Soviet Union continued throughout the Afghan war. As long as Communism remained a threat to the West, Afghanistan was the focus of Western world. It received coverage not only in the Western media but also in Hollywood, where the Afghan Mujahedeen fighters were depicted as heroic figures.5
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early
1990s, the features of international terrorism took a new face. With the changing geopolitical situation following the end of the East- West conflicts, a third radical concept evolved in the form of twenty first century terrorism. There was no Soviet
Union, no Warsaw Pact, no Cold War and no consensus on what came next. Instead of retreating into their nationalistic or religious cocoons, some of these terrorist groups adapted and evolved into truly global trans-national organizations.6
The relation between the Arabs and Afghans as well as the Pakistani Islamists built up on the religious basis in the Afghan war and made connections between Arab and
Pakistani Islamists to extend the Arab militant organization and an ideology of global
4 Keki N. Daruwalla. “Conflicting currents in the polity” in Ajay Darshan Behera, Methew Joseph C (Eds.).Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context. New Delhi. Knowledge World, 2004, p. 138. 5 Shahid M. Amin. Realism in Politics. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2005, p.40. 6 Unaiza Niaz. Wars, Insurgencies and Terrorist Attacks- A Psychosocial Perspective from the Muslim World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 15-19. 123 unification of Muslims to Pakistani madrassas, both in the settled districts and in the tribal areas.7
As the Soviets began their withdrawal, the jihadi leaders debated what to do next. Bin
Laden and Azzam agreed that the organization successfully created for Afghanistan should not be allowed to dissolve. They established what they called a Base or
Foundation (Al-Qaeda) as a potential general headquarters for future jihad. Though
Azzam had been considered number one in the MAK (Maktab Al Khidmat), by
August 1988 Bin Laden was clearly the leader (Amir) of Al-Qaeda.8
The most toxic fallout was the growth of religious extremism and the advent of militancy in the country. Some 20,000 to 30,000 foreign nationals from the Muslim world were imported to the region by the US- led international coalition that armed and trained them for jihad against the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet withdrew from
Afghanistan, a sizeable percentage of those foreign nationals left the country but majority stayed. Army was to morph into Al Qaeda and other militant groups that came to threaten Pakistan as well as the global security.9
After the Soviet withdrawal, the war between different factions of mujahideen erupted for power and, as a result, thousands of people were killed and injured but no one could establish government in Kabul. In such a situation, it were the common people worst affected by the continued strife among the different factions of Afghanistan.
5.2. Rise of the Taliban
Prior to the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, different warlords ruled different parts of the country. The stalemate in Afghanistan made life for ordinary Afghans very difficult. The once respected mujahideen had now become dreaded soldiers in the armies of warlords who looted and raped unarmed Afghans. In such circumstances, a
7 Sana Haroon. Frontier of Faith: A History of Religious Mobilization in the Pakhtun Tribal Areas, C. 1890 – 1950. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p.193. 8 Ibid., p.56. 9 Maleeha Lodhi, “Beyond the Crisis State”, in Maleeha Lodhi (Ed).op. cit., p. 62. 124 group of religious students challenged the warlords in the southeastern province of
Kandahar.
The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 unleashed chaos and Intra-Afghan violence. The
Afghan Pashtun attempted to turn over a new leaf in their history and a major shift in the power structure saw these Pashtun elements being led by clerics whose credibility had increased by spearheading a successful armed resistance movement against the
Soviets. A religio-political force emerged amidst the lawlessness, promising peace, justice and order. Given their background in the seminaries on the Pakistani side of the border, they come to be known as “Taliban” or knowledge seekers.10
In the official Taliban history, the movement’s genesis is traced back to a humble village in Kandahar province where Mullah Omar was studying. The lawlessness and chaos that descended over Afghanistan with the end of Soviet occupation reached such a depth of iniquity that Mullah Omar and a band of his comrades took up arms in rage to install some law and order. The declared aims of the Taliban were to restore peace, disarm the population and enforce Sharia. 11
Most accounts of the Taliban’s emergence acknowledge that they were a local phenomenon reflecting frustration with the mujahideen leaders and warlords, which was later backed by Pakistan’s ISI.12
The vast majority of the Taliban cadres were Pashtun Afghan refugees that had grown up in the refugee camps in Pakistan. They were imbued with an orthodox religious education in the madrassas mostly affiliated with the Deobandi – Wahhabi Pakistani
10 Hassan Abbas. Pakistan Drift into Extremism- Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, p. 83. 11 Sana Haroon. op. cit., p.154. 12 Hussain Haqqani. Pakistan between Mosque and Military. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005, pp.238- 39. 125 religious organizations. This slanted vision led the Taliban to regard the Kabul government as impious and unIslamic.13
The movement was widely popular in the South because it promised security of life and property to a region that lacked both. Its ‘law and order’ platform initially overshadowed the movement’s radical Islamist ideology which the Taliban did not implement in full until they got themselves fully established.14
The Taliban movement could hardly be considered a revolutionary one, although they constituted an original movement. They are, in fact, the offspring of two different traditions: charismatic mullahs in tribal societies and the Deobandi madrassas network.15
There is definitely a conflict of generation between the Taliban and the former tribal aristocracy or ulema’s establishment. The only modernity of the Taliban is that they are also a result of the crisis of the traditional Pakthun society.16 In fact, the Taliban are neither a pure Pakistani creation nor an Afghan phenomenon and the intermeshing of the two is a complex affair.17
On 4th April, 1996 in Kabul, Mullah Omer was nominated as the Amir ul Momineen- leader of the Faithful, an Islamic title for the leader which made him the supreme leader in Afghanistan. The victory of Taliban was the result of changing position of the Ulema in Afghan society. Traditionally, the Afghan Ulema were reluctant to involve in politics, but in the last century, they gained political prominence because of their opposition to foreign aggression.18
13 Hassan Abbas. Pakistan Drift into Extremism-Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, p.186. 14 Thomas Barfield. Afghanistan- A Cultural and Political History. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010, p.257. 15 Olivier Roy. “The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan”, in Christophe Jaffrelt (Ed.). Pakistan: Nationalism without a nation? London: Zed Books Ltd, 2002, p.157. 16 Ibid, p.158. 17 Ibid, p.186. 18 Gills Dorronosoro, “Pakistan and the Taliban: State Policy, Religious Network and Political Connection”, in Christophe Jaffrelt (Ed.) op. cit., p.162. 126
Pakistan’s political and strategic interests and the situation in and around Afghanistan pushed the former towards the Taliban and it emerged as the most vital source of support for them. The political and military vacuum in the country, the loss of hope in the mujahedeen parties, political fragmentation and chaotic economic and security conditions played a significant part in the popularity of Taliban. Pakistan’s interest in the Taliban government was pragmatic. They were strong enough to provide stability in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan which mattered for Pakistan’s security.19
5.3. Taliban and Al Qaeda
With all these developments in Afghanistan, the Taliban not only strengthened their links with other militant organizations in Pakistan but also provided sanctuaries for them in safe places.20
Pakistan soon found itself the victim of policies pursued by the Taliban, notably the decision to host Al-Qaeda but it also failed to achieve her objectives designed to enhance national security. The Taliban refused to recognize the Durand Line or drop
Afghanistan’s claim on parts of the NWFP. The Taliban fostered Pashtun nationalism, albeit of an Islamic character which began to affect Pakistani Pashtun. They are now held responsible for the spread of so called Talibanization in Pakistan, now seeming to provide strategic depth to the Afghan Taliban.21 This nexus of the local militant organizations with trans- national organizations like Al Qaeda developed a sense of oneness in achieving any objective in the global jihad even in their own country.
The Taliban and Al-Qaeda soon developed a mutually beneficial relationship. The
Taliban provided Bin Laden and his associates with a vast sanctuary for their training camps and other terrorist operations, while Al-Qaeda became the Taliban’s chief
19 Rasul Baksh Rais. “In the Shadow of the Past: Pakistan’s Afghan Policy”, in Craig Baxter. (Ed). Pakistan on the Brink. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 43-45. 20 Farzana Sheikh. Making Sense of Pakistan. London: Hurst & Company, 2009, p. 171. 21 Ibid. p. 208. 127 source of military and financial assistance.22 This was the result of this cooperation that between 1996 and 2001, the Al Qaeda established camps and trained more than ten thousand people for terrorist activities and Afghanistan became a terrorism sponsor state in the world. The Maktab Al Khidmat once established for the services of Arab volunteers in the Soviet-Afghan war was transformed into Al Qaeda organization to spread the ideology of radical Islam in the world.
The other Islamist groups had set up camps in Afghanistan for Jihad against the
United States with the help of Al Qaeda and the cover up of Taliban government in
Afghanistan made them more dreaded in their policies towards the West. These bonds became stronger when the Afghans and the militant came closer through personal attachments like marriages of the Afghan women with Arab men.
Taliban not only welcomed Al Qaeda militants in Afghanistan but many from other militant organizations from Chechnya to Indonesia also travelled to Afghanistan for safe havens in the hope that they would replicate Taliban like movement and government in their respective countries. These organizations included: The Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Chechens, Indonesians, Uighurs, and Kashmiri separatists. Most of them were present in the Afghan war period and limited their activities only to the liberation of Afghanistan from the Soviet Union but now they are engaged in their homelands.
Pakistani Taliban with the help of Al Qaeda and other militant organizations played a prominent role in the Afghan civil war, now have the enough power to wrest control of the area from the traditional leaders. Other disaffected groups like Jaish-e-
Mohammad developed links with Al Qaeda and carried out attacks inside Pakistan.
Al Qaeda’s 3000 volunteers acted as shock troops for the Taliban in the civil war or as their security force. The Al Qaeda infrastructure served the Kashmiri and other
Jihadis from various parts of the world which were drawn into fighting for the
22 Devin T. Hagerty. “The United States- Pakistan Entente: Third time’s a charm ?”, in Craig Baxter. op. cit., p.08. 128
Taliban. The Al Qaeda and other Jihadis melded into the Taliban infrastructure and the acceptance of the US demands was tantamount to losing the civil war.23
The relationship developed between Taliban and Al Qaeda had many reasons in
Afghanistan. It was considered that the matrimonial relationship between Mullah
Omer and Osama Bin Laden led to these close relationship but it has no such proof and authenticity. The second was the religious one as both were the Sunni Muslims.
Some called this relation the result of Pashtun cultural norms of hospitality in their country. The Pashtun has the culture to give shelter and security to anybody who is alien to the land. The Bin Laden support to the Taliban government, financially and militarily was caused only when the Taliban leadership was ready to accept him as a guest and his organization Al Qaeda as the supporter in the Afghanistan internal affairs. One thing was clear from the Taliban policies in Afghanistan in the later years of their takeover that the Taliban leadership came under the influence of the Al Qaeda ideology of global Jihad and extremism in their policies.
Pakistan joined the War on Terror with the US and its coalition forces against Al
Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11 attacks. Before the Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, most of the tribal areas were in a deep restive position. After the Afghan war in 1980’s, most of the Islamists quit the areas and went to their respective states but some decided to stay here. The relationships between the tribal people and the foreign guests were very cordial and it was strengthened more with the matrimonial relation between them. They were now part of that tribal society and traditional culture. After the Soviet-Afghan war, there never remained any law and order situation in the tribal areas. Traditionally and religiously, Pakthun were influenced by the religious leaders in their social and political life mostly. The political and religious ideology of those “Guests” now became the part of their society influenced by them with the passage of time unnoticed by anyone in the areas. It was
23 Devin T. Hagerty. “The United States- Pakistan Entente: Third time’s a charm ?” in Craig Baxter (Ed.). op. cit., p. 31. 129 evident from the past history that the Pakthun always supported the movements which were started in the name of Islam and for the supremacy of it. They wholeheartedly invested all their resources in the name of Allah and Islam without thinking of any worldly benefits. The case of Arab and other foreign fighters was the same. They gave them not only shelter but put them in high esteem and followed them in their preaching. They were also considered as Mujahideen and the fighters for the cause of
Islam. Interestingly, these foreign guests only selected the tribal areas of Pakistan for their living and not the other parts of the country. The government on all these activities of those foreign elements was not in action against them and of their presence in the tribal areas and even not notice the changes of their relationships between them and the tribal peoples.
5.4. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas, generally called FATA or tribal areas of
Pakistan, consist of seven Agencies and six Frontier Regions (FR). It has an approximately 10,500 sq. miles of area as roughly the size of the State of Maryland and share three hundred miles of border with Afghanistan. The entire Pak-Afghan border is 1640 miles of difficult, widely differentiated terrain, from the Southern deserts of Balochistan to the Northern Mountains of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.24
The international boundary between Afghanistan and the British India was demarcated in 1893 with the name of Durand Line. This demarcation was considered as the “Great Game” policy between the British and Russian Empire to safeguard their respective territories from encroachment by making Afghanistan as the “Buffer
State.”
This demarcation also effectively divided the Pashtun population in half, thus sowing the seeds for a permanent conflict. The Pakistani side of the Durand Line includes the provinces of Balochistan, North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)
24 Daniel Markey. “ Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt”, The Center for Preventive Action, CSR No. 36, July 2008, p. 03. 130 and FATA. The Afghan side of the border extends from Nuristan province in the
North East to Nimroz province in the South West.25
Since Pakistan’s independence, the successive Afghan governments have time and again, rejected the Durand Line as a boundary status as they want the unification of
Pashtun on both sides of the border but Pakistan calls it permanent and final. But soon after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, this issue lost its significance as more than three million Afghans entered into Pakistan for taking refuge, mostly in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.26
This boundary line physically divided the Pashtun population but it did not affect its ethnic and family connection on both sides of the border. The weak physical position of the border and the strong ethnic and family relations of the Pashtun never deter them to cross it any time, even in the War times. They consider it an identification mark and not a border as in the territorial context of two sovereign countries.
Sometimes, the herds enter the border leaving the herd keeper on the other side of the border. Sometimes, the herd keeper sits in the shadow of a tree while the herds go to the opposite side for grazing. Boys playing on the one side, sometimes cross the border in playing games and no botheration for the border managers for their crossing the border. The marriage ceremonies take place across the border and the relatives attend the ceremony without any hesitation while crossing the other side of border.
Along the Durand Line, the British government gave the tribal areas a new set-up, the semi-autonomous status by creating tribal agencies. This status was also retained after the independence of Pakistan and was given a constitutional status as called Federally
25 Zahid Hussain. “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective”, CIDOB, Policy Research Project, December, 2011, p.13. 26 Nasreen Ghufran. Pashtun Ethno Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Asia Survey, Vol. XLIX, No.06, November/December, 2009, pp.1101-02. 131
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan 1973.27
The people of FATA, from the time immemorial, have lived independently and have never allowed any external power to subject them militarily. This was the internal spirit of their freedom that they want to live without any external authority. But the colonizers in the past formulated certain powers made some laws and methods which gave them the power to made control of them through some inhuman laws. The
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) of 1901, a British colonial era set of laws, which is instrumental in governing the area. Under the FCR, the FATA has different set of administration different from the rest of Pakistan.28
The state dealt with the tribal chiefs and elders whose responsibility, it was to ensure that the tribes did not indulge in any activity that was deemed illegal or against the interest of the state.29 Originally drafted in 1872, the FCR was promulgated with amendments in 1901 and applied by Pakistan to NWFP until 1963 and Balochistan until 1977. The British created this harsh law to manage and control their Indian
Empire’s restive frontier belt. According to the government’s official Rules of
Business, the responsibility for the “overall administrative and political control of
FATA” falls under the Federal Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON).30
Parliament is the legislative body of Pakistan. It has two Houses, the National Assembly (lower House), elected by the adult franchise having the total numbers are 342 in which Fata members are 12, Senate (upper House and the total strength is 104 and Fata members are 08. The Senators are nominated by the Provincial Assemblies and have equal representation of the provinces in it but Senators for FATA are nominated by the National Assembly of Pakistan. 27 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, Article 246(c). 28 Brian R. Kerr. “A Progressive Understanding of Pashtun Social Structures amidst Current Conflict in FATA”. Pak Institute of Peace Studies, Vol. 03, No. 04, October-December, 2010, p. 03. 29 Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed. Sub national governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan. A Report of the CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation. June 2012, p. 21. 30 International Crisis Group. Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants. Asia Report No. 125, 11 December 2006, p. 05. 132
In societies that are dominated by tribal structures like that of Pakistani tribal areas, tribalism may directly merge with religious affinity and religious extremism as in the case of Deobandi Pashtun tribal militias.31
The Colonial era administration under the Political Agents (PA) and Assistant
Political Agents (APA), denied basic constitutional rights and political enfranchisement and the reign a formal legal and economic system. The result is extreme poverty, alienation and the lawlessness that provides both sanctuaries and ideal breading grounds for militant groups.32
Levies and Khasadars are the main forces in the Tribal areas for keeping law and order situation and to protect the government buildings and roads. They are ill-paid, ill-trained and ill-equipped. While the government provides arms to the Levies, it is interesting to note that the Khasadars are responsible for collecting their own arms and ammunitions for performing their duties. A poor tribal man having a rife or
Kalashnikov and a dozen of rounds how would he be able to fight the strong and fully equipped militants in the areas. This was the reason of its weakness that in 2009 alone, more than 1,000 Levies left their jobs in Khyber Agency because of the threat to their lives from the militants.33 The Frontier Constabulary (FC) is another force which is trained on the pattern of provincial police. Its head is the Inspector General
FC (IG FC) and under the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan.
The laws of Pakistan are not applied here and Parliament cannot make legislation for the tribal areas in spite of the fact that the tribal areas have representatives in both
Houses of the Parliament. Till 1996, political activities were not allowed in FATA and the members of Parliament were elected by the Maliks who enjoyed the right to votes. There is still no local government system with no elections for local bodies
31 Ekaterina Stepanova. “Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict, Ideological and Structural Aspects.”Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 23 2008, p.137. 32 International Crisis Group. “Aid and Conflict in Pakistan”. Asia Report No. 227, July 2012, p.27. 33 Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed. Op. cit., p. 36. 133 throughout the history. It is because of no political activities that the role of other non- state actors has increased and they have dominated the masses in the tribal areas. A survey conducted in FATA revealed that 94 percent of the respondents were not satisfied with the current administration setup in FATA.34
Tribal areas, from the very beginning, have been neglected in every aspect of governance. This was evident from the fact that it is the poorest part of the country where the per capita income is only $ 250 per annum which is the lowest compared to other parts of the country.35 More than 70 percent are living below the poverty line.
The literacy ratio is very bleak as not more than 20 percent are literate in male while the female ratio is not more than 05 percent. The health sector is too disappointing that an infant mortality rate in FATA is 87 per 1,000, significantly higher than the national average of 69 per 1,000.36 It has just 41 hospitals and per doctor ratio of
1:6,762 as compared to the national 1:1,359 ratio which is very disappointing.37 There is no medical college, no engineering university, no post graduate college for women and no public or private university in the whole 10,500 sq. mile areas and having a population of more than 3.5 million.
The backwardness of the tribal areas is confirmed from these facts that no successive governments have planned any business and trade activities in this area. There were no industrial zones and no any such infrastructures have been developed there.
The main sources of income of the people in these areas are smuggling across the border, irrigation in limited areas and mining in some areas. Mohmand and Khyber
Agencies are the hub of foreign goods, smuggled from Afghanistan through different routes. Vegetables and many foods items are supplied mostly from the settled areas of
Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan.
34 FRC- FATA Research Centre, Islamabad. Report -2012, p. 24. 35 Ahmad Rashid. Descent into Chaos. London: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 27. 36 International Crisis Group. “Pakistan: No End to Humanitarian Crises.” Asia Report No. 237, 09 October 2012, p. 16. 37 International Crisis Group. Op. cit., p.09. 134
Pashtun areas have their own culture and tradition and are based on its own code of life. Pashtunwali- A code of life for Pashtun, the unwritten but strictly followed in the
Pashtun area is always cherished by its own people. It has its own virtues which the
Pashtun continue to loved. Hospitality, bravery, granting pardons, respect for women, respect and honour for the religious leaders and teachers are the main features of the code of life. The Pashtun have great respect and love for two institutions in their areas; Mosque and Hujra (a common place for guests and the community centre).
Mosque is for religious practices and Hujra for resolving the community problems and hospitality for the guests. When a conflict arises in the area, Jirga (an informal conflict resolution institution) is formed which decides the issue in the Hujra. Jirga is designed to deliver verdicts on minor civil and criminal disputes quickly and inexpensively.38
Despite the backwardness of the tribal areas, many scholars of international repute considered it the most important place in the world. The North West tribal belt of
Pakistan has been at the centre of decisive movements in the mankind’s history.
Professor Toynbee, according to Tommy Frank, characterized the region as the
“Cross-roads” of civilization. The region, due to its strategic location is one of the most sensitive areas in Pakistan and indeed in South Asia.39
The Pashtun area and particularly the Tribal areas have got less coverage in the national, regional and international community in the last fifty years. It was only on two occasions that the area attracted attention the entire world. The Soviet invasion in
Afghanistan in 1979 was the turning point which brought drastic changes in the area.
The second was the 9/11 attacks in the US by Al Qaeda militants, linked with Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan that brought the region into focus. The geo- strategic location of the tribal areas and the development in Afghanistan turned these areas sensitive in the whole region.
38 Robert D. Lamb, Sadika Hameed. op. cit., p. 34. 39 Tommy Frank. American Soldier. New York: Harper Collins, 2004, p. 304. 135
5.5. Militancy in FATA
The situation in Afghanistan has direct effect on Pakistan, in general, and on FATA and NWFP (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) in particular in the last thirty years of development in the grooming of militant organizations. These organizations have developed connection among themselves for a global cause i.e., the Islamic Sharia in
Afghanistan and the neighbouring countries. The Islamic order that was established in
Afghanistan provided a ‘Role Model’ for a theocratic state in which the Sharia would be enforced along the puritanical lines of the Deobandi school of thought. The Sunni militants dreamed the Talibanization of Pakistan in the foreseeable future.40
The influx of the Afghan refugees in the area as a result of war against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan made the tribal society militarized. With the establishment of
Deobandi madrassas in the tribal areas, the rise of religious extremism in the Pashtun majority borderlands became apparent. The network of Pakistani and Afghan militants spawned in these seminaries forged ties with Arab fighters during the
Afghan Jihad.41 The madrassa network was established there to provide foot hold for the soldiers Holy war, made the Mullahs more powerful than the Maliks, turned the authority into the hands of madrassa students and their teachers. The heavy weapons and the fighting past made those commanders the role model for the youth of the tribal areas.
“The present situation was caused by the Zia’s policies in the Afghan war. He made the syllabus pro-militant in nature and this created violent trend in society. From our bad policies, this fire is now burning on our land”, said by an ANP leader in an interview.42 Pakistan tribal areas became the most restive areas in the country. The developments in Afghanistan since 1980 have disturbed the overall situation in the
40 Ian Talbot. “Religion and Violence: The Historical Context for Conflict in Pakistan”, in John R. Hinnells and Richard King (Eds.).Religion and Violence in South Asia Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 154. 41 M. Maqbool Khan Wazir. “Geopolitics of FATA after 9/11.” Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Journal xi, No. 01 (Winter 2011), p. 61. 42 Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Interview, Peshawar, 27 May, 2013. 136 tribal areas. It has not only affected the social, political but also the administrative structure of the region in a wider perspective. The nature of the Durand Line was in true perspective disappeared and the movement across the border did not matter for anyone in the region.
To understand the growth of militancy in the tribal areas of Pakistan, it is essential to know the weak nature of the border dividing the Pakhtun tribes of Afghanistan and
Pakistan: weak in terms of physical control by the two sides, but even more importantly in the minds of the tribesmen themselves. As noted, the anti- Soviet war of the 1980s weakened this border further with Pakistani Pakhtun encouraged by both
Pakistan and the West to see the Afghan refugees and the Afghan mujahedeen as their brothers and to fight alongside them.43
This was the nature of the weak border which was violated by the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-
Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM- a Malakand based religious movement) volunteers who entered into Afghanistan to fight alongside Taliban against the US in October, 2001.
There were more than 10,000 tribesmen including madrassa students who took part in war against the US troops.44
The tribal system is in crisis and that it can no longer provide peace, income, a sense of purpose of a social network to the local youth who then turn to radical movements
(collectively known as the Pakistani Taliban) as the only outlet where they can express frustration and earn the prestige once offered by the tribal system.45
When Taliban and Al Qaeda were defeated in Afghanistan, their cadres then moved across the highly porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border into the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), where they took advantage of the utterly hostile topography, the old tribal tradition of hospitality to strangers, and the absence of a strong Pakistani
43Anatol Lieven. Pakistan- A Hard Country. London: Allan Lane, 2011, p. 419. 44 Justine Fleishner. “Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Swat valley.” Center for Strategic and Security Studies, October 2011, p. 09. 45 Antonio Giustozzi. Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo – Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. London: Hurst & Company, 2007, p. 39. 137 state presence.46 The withdrawal of the Afghan Taliban from Afghanistan into the tribal areas of Pakistan, and the mobilization of Pakistani Pakhtun in support of them led the US to demand Pakistan of launching what became in effect a civil war on its own soil.47 This has turned the tribal areas more insecure and violent as the entry of
Taliban and Al Qaeda militants brought the war into Pakistan’s tribal areas from
Afghanistan.
The reorganization of the Taliban in FATA enabled Al-Qaeda to re-establish a base area and pursue its role in providing training and financing to its global affiliates.48 To an academician: “Pakistan and Afghanistan are linked together in peace and vice versa. Historically, there are sympathizers of Taliban in FATA and thus they establish their networks there and became a hub of all militants in the region”.49
In an another interview, “after the US attack on Afghanistan, most of the militants left
Afghanistan for tribal areas and in hot pursuit, the US chased those militants and thus the war zone expanded into Pakistan tribal areas”.50 Using modern means of communication, shared ideology helps connected the fragmented, dispersed, isolated or informally interlink elements of modern networks.51
These relationships among the militants was the result of shared ideology irrespective of their origin and nationality. Fighters from Central Asia, Western China, Turkey and various Arab countries combined with radicalized Pakthun tribesmen to train a new generation of Pakistan and European Muslims Militants, Al-Qaeda resurfaced in the tribal redoubts of North Western Pakistan with a vengeance.52
46 Ashley J. Tellis. “Pakistan-Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, 2009, p. 02. 47 Anatol Lieven. op. cit., p. 410. 48 Ahmad Rashid. op. cit., p. 281. 49 Qibla Ayaz. Ex. Vice Chancellor, University of Peshawar. Interview, Peshawar, 28 May, 2013. 50 Noman Sattar. Prof. Area Study Center, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. Interview, Islamabad, 04 June, 2013. 51 Ekaterina Stepanova. op. cit., p. 134. 52 Ayesha Jalal. ‘The Past as Present’ in Maleeha Lodhi (Editor).op. cit., p. 17. 138
Linked to Afghan Taliban by bonds of tribal affiliation, Pakthun identity, a broadly shared ideology and a common nexus with Al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban also began to pursue local goals to impose Sharia in areas under their influence. This brought them into direct confrontation with Pakistan’s security institutions on which they declared war for being ‘agents’ of the Americans.53
“The basic reasons for spreading militancy in FATA are historical. It has links with the Kashmir problem too. Those groups inspired from Al Qaeda at the later stage.
9/11 gave them space and a relationship developed among them on organizational basis. Foreign factors like India’s involvement also developed here. Thus there are many factors which have contributed to the militancy in FATA”.54 The War on Terror has infuriated the Pashtun population on both sides of the border who made an alliance against the US/NATO forces in the tribal areas. That has resulted in the anti-
American sentiments in the region and the militants groups easily embraced those
Pashtun in their networks which in the past have no such affiliations with them. This developed radicalization in FATA in the first phase.
The main ingredients to establish the Taliban network in the FATA and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa were the historical relationship between the Afghan Taliban and
FATA’s Afghan war fighters. These fighters living in FATA were Pakthun who fought against the Soviet Union in 1980s. After the Soviet withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan, they came back to their home territory along with many foreign mujahideen friends like Arabs, Chechen, Uzbek etc. They were living there, married with local women and started their own lives in an open area lacking of government writ.
The establishment of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan and then captured
Afghanistan by those less trained Afghans bolstered the Pakhtun on the other side of the Durand Line to join them in their rule. In all these times from the Soviet invasions
53 Ibid, p.65. 54 Imtiaz Gul, Interview, Islamabad, 04 June, 2013. 139 to the capture of Kabul by Taliban, FATA remained a peaceful entity with no visible effect on the local structure of the area. But a wave of Taliban’s rule like situations were preparing in the minds of those war mujahideen in one way or the other but they have no suitable environment or situations which triggered them to such a big jump.
After the 9/11 event and the US attack on Afghanistan, those fighters (Taliban and
Arabs) left Afghanistan and came to FATA and stayed here, as it was not a refugee for them because they have no care or importance to the Durand Line. The host tribes welcomed them and provided shelter to them in their areas as not knowing or considering that it is a violation of state’s laws and challenged the writ of the state.
They give more importance to their code of social life, hospitality and shelter than to the laws of the state. This is due to the weak structure of the administration.
In a briefing to President Obama the Director National Intelligence (DNI) explained that the immediate threat to the United States was not from Iraq or Afghanistan but from Pakistan- an unstable country, having a population of 170 m, a 1,500 mile border with Southern Afghanistan and possessing 100 nuclear weapons. The priority one would be of the ungoverned tribal regions along the Pakistan – Afghanistan border where Osama Bin Laden, his Al-Qaeda network and branches of extremist insurgent Taliban have 150 training camps and other facilities. These seven regions forming FATA are about the size of New Jersey.55
“There was a social and political vacuum in the tribal areas which was filled by powerful militants. The tribal areas were used for militancy purposes and all kinds of militants shifted from Pakistan’s main cities and the rest of the region, to train their men and then started their activities in Pakistan and in other parts of the world”.56
55 Bob Woodward. Obama’s Wars-The inside Story. London: Simon and Schuster, 2010, p. 03. 56 Ijaz Khan, Interview, Peshawar, 18 March, 2013. 140
After gaining ground in FATA, the tribesmen also mixed with them on their ideological front. After shifting to Pakistan’s borderland, the Afghan Taliban collaborated with their Pakistani counterpart on the issue of war against the US. The relationship strengthened when the Pakistan Army launched search operations in
FATA and then led to full scale military operations. These military operations developed a sense of insecurity on their own soil on which from the last sixty years had no such military movement was seen in the area against them. This sense of insecurity strengthened the bond of unity and resistance among them which led to a violent struggle against the army. In a few years, they reached to the conclusion to establish an organization as like in Afghanistan to become a combined force.
The Al Qaeda and Taliban militants are not captured because they have been driven into the arms of their supporters, where they have well-established networks but by bin Laden and which include built, tunnels, caves, and training camps for the
Mujahideen. The lack of US troops in the border regions means that every time the
Pakistan Army gets near them, they slip over the border out of their reach.57
The Al-Qaeda operating from the border land managed to transform and replenish itself with new recruits from among the Pakistani militant groups. This enabled the group in survival from capturing and killing of many its senior operatives. Founding members, mostly from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya, known as Sheikhs, continued to provide ideological leadership, but the rank and file of the network increasingly comprised of the new militants from Pakistan and other countries including Somalia,
Turkey, Indonesia and Bangladesh who managed to ship into the border region.58 A scholar explained the situation in the tribal areas thus: “The tribal system is based on
57 M. Maqbool Khan Wazir. op. cit., p. 43. 58 Zahid Hussain. “Battling Militancy” in Madeeha Lodhi (Ed.).op. cit., pp. 141-2. 141 revenge against the enemy and Taliban insurgency should also be seen in that perspective in mind.”59
“There was confusion in the military how to deal with the militants in the tribal areas.
They have not adopted such policies which could restrict this war limited to the border and this had created problems in Pakistan.”60 An insurgency broke out against
American-Pakistani attempts to root out the Taliban fighters that took refuge in FATA after the US invaded Afghanistan. A “war economy” has persisted in the border areas, sustaining training camps and fighters. Militants established their writ in the areas and challenged the state authority openly. The Taliban leaders issued declarations about what is “Islamic” and used these to legitimatize their attacks on internal and external claimants to their authority. These acts helped to consolidate their control within specific territory and to word off outsiders who try to intervene. FATA has become
“the most armed and militant region where the writ of the state appears almost non- existent.”61
5.6. Terrorism in Pakistan
The US asked Musharraf to take action against the Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the tribal areas and he promised to flush them out from the hide outs. This policy of arrest and attacks against the militants was not planned properly while keeping the tribal structure and the society norms in mind and the prevailing situation that time.
When the search operation was started in the tribal areas, core leadership shifted to other cities of Pakistan where they had ideological sympathizers and no problems in hiding there. During search operations, many foreign militants were killed and captured but still they were active as their network could not be fully dismantled.
59Akbar S. Ahmad, Interview in programme ‘Jirga Salim Safi keSath’ on Geo TV, Islamabad, on 15. 2. 2014. 60 Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Interview, Islamabad, 04 June, 2013. 61 Zahid Hussain. Frontline Pakistan- the Path to Catastrophe and the killing of Benazir Bhutto. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007, pp. 141-2. 142
Pakistan finds itself with a number of difficulties in trying to track down Al Qaeda.
The rise in anti-American sentiments, the presence of Al Qaeda militants, embedded with the local tribes, the difficult mountain terrain and a lack of real time intelligence and equipment, night vision kit and attack helicopters for rapid response, all play a part in failing to apprehend these militants.62
The emergence of groups like Jundullah showed how new jihadi cells were quickly formed after others were wounded up. The rise of small terrorist cells made the task of containing them harder. These terrorist groups multiplied with the escalation of
Pakistani military offensive in the northwest and tribal regions. Some of these groups had just four or five members making them hard to detect.63
The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was launched in 1996 by breaking away with the Sunni-
Deobandi extremists of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The Laskhar today is believed to have deep links with Al Qaeda and Taliban and is considered to be the most violent terrorist organization operating in Pakistan with the help of its lethal suicide squad. The government of Pakistan designated the LeJ a terrorist organization in August 2001 and the US declared it as a foreign terrorist organization in January
2003.
The rising trend of joining militant organizations from the mainstream political parties is a serious threat to the existing system and the country itself. This rising threat was ignored by the state institutions and the governments for the last thirty years which has now become a monster out of the bottle.
In 1972, there were 30 religions organizations in Pakistan but were not very active and influential. All major jihadi and sectarian organizations emerged during the period of Afghan Jihad. Religious sentiments pervaded the atmosphere in the country and these organizations took advantage of the situation.
62 Yunas Samad. op. cit., p. 42. 63 Zahid Hussain. “Battling Militancy” in Madeeha Lodhi (Ed.).op. cit., pp. 142-43. 143
After 9/11 events, Pakistan emerged as an ally of US in the war against terror. To improve their images in the public, many militant platforms established charity and welfare wings under their organizations. This has not only give them support base in the community but also expanded their financial and logistic bases in operations throughout the country.64
The Al-Qaeda is now not alone in her activities in Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban and
Punjab-based militant groups like LeT and LeJ have deep links with the Al Qaeda.
5.7. Military Operations and Peace Agreements-Confusion in Policies
The decision of military operation in a specific area to capture foreign militants was a fatal mistake. Initially, it was considered to be a short operation with limited resources and efforts to gain the desired results but unaware of the ground reality in the tribal areas, the crackdown caused heavy sufferings to the security forces of Pakistan in the proceeding years of operations in different parts of FATA.
The Operation Enduring Freedom launched in Afghanistan against Taliban and Al
Qaeda was now directed against them in the tribal areas and the rest of Pakistan. The
Pakistan Army and intelligence agencies took several operations and captured hundreds of Al Qaeda militants and leaders in tribal areas as well as in other parts of the country. The American administration supported Pakistan’s efforts and acknowledged its services in handing over of top Al Qaeda leaders in search operations. Meantime, the Taliban leaders and militants got sidelined in the moment because the whole concentration was on the Al Qaeda militants. This policy strengthened the Taliban network in the main cities with other militant organizations and established network throughout the country.
According to an analyst, the militancy did not spread to other parts of country rather the militants came to FATA from different parts of the country. The main reason of
64 Muhammad Amir Rana.“The militant’s landscape – Pakistan’s Islamist organizations and their impact on the body politic” in Ashoutsh Misra and Michael E. Clarke (Eds). Pakistan’s stability paradox – Domestics, Regional and International Dimensions. New York: Rutledge, 2012, p. 80. 144 this was the banning of many militant organizations by the Musharrraf government.
Those organizations established their camps in the tribal areas with full support of the
Al Qaeda and Taliban. Foreign militants along with the local militants used specific parts of FATA for their activities.65
Pakistan’s policy of military operation against the foreign militants was not prepared according to the ground realities because those militants were given shelter by the local people, according to their own culture and traditions. Likewise, the government did not consult the political administration on this issue to get support of the masses from these areas. Therefore, when the military operation started, people not only supported the militants but also stood against the security forces which was the sole and main reason of the latter’s failure.
In December 2003, the then Governor NWFP announced amnesty for those foreigners who voluntarily surrender themselves to the government with the promise to allow them to live in the Agency in accordance with the tribal customs. In March 2004, the military launched a major search operation in South Waziristan Agency against the foreign militants and their local 72 Ahmedzai Wazir tribesmen allies. The March
2004, Kalosha operation was spread over 50 sq. kilometers areas near Wana, the district headquarters, around some villages which were under the control of five
Islamist militants- Nek Mohammad, Noor ul Islam, Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz- all had links with Afghan Taliban too. The operation backfired heavy losses to the forces and many became hostages.66
“The entry of Army intervention has disturbed the whole structure of the political administration of tribal areas and dismantled the civil institutions there. The Frontier
Constabulary (FC) was the best option in FATA which should be strengthened instead of deploying regular army unit deployment.”67
65 Ijaz Khan, interview, Peshawar, 18. 03. 2013. 66 International Crisis Group. op. cit., p.14. 67 Brig. (R) Mahmood Shah, Interview, Peshawar, 07. 03. 2013. 145
An agreement was struck between the government and the local militants in Shakai, the stronghold of local Taliban Commander Nek Mohammad. ‘The Shakai Peace
Agreement’ gave local militants amnesty and financial incentives in return for their renouncing violence. They were also asked to surrender Al Qaeda and other foreign militants or get them registered with the authority and ensure that they would not use
Pakistani territory for cross border attacks.68
This agreement in the first attempt recognized the power and status of the militants in the tribal areas and this was the first agreement between the government and the local militants in which the militants were given a status of powerful element which can challenge writ of the state in future. The political administration as well as the tribal
Maliks and elders were gone in the back and marginalized in due time of the events.
This weakened their position as more violent activities were coming. Three years of military campaign has not only failed to eliminate the foreign militants but also strengthened the tribal Taliban.69
In September 2006, the government and the local Taliban reached another agreement with the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe through which the government would “stop air and ground operations” against the militants, release all the militants arrested during the operations and refrain from arresting them in any incident of the past. It had undermined the government writ and strengthened the militants. It was estimated that there were fifteen to twenty small, local militant groups in South Waziristan Agency and ten to twelve in North Waziristan Agency.70
These fierce young squads with heavy weapons marching from one place to the other, enforcing their own view of Islam on the gun points, proliferated to other parts of the country.
68 International Crisis Group. op. cit., p. 15. 69 Frederic Grare. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, South Asia Project No. 72, October, 2006, p. 06. 70 Ibid, p. 21. 146
None of these agreements long lasted. These agreements gave new spirit to the militants and put their activities in more robust manner. After every agreement, the writ of the state got limited and that of the militants expanded. They, thus became a factor in the stability of the area and all this was done with the poor policies applied to the tribal areas.
Such deals expanded the political sphere of Islamists without producing peace, effectively providing them a sphere of influence not only in the tribal areas but also in certain settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa particularly the district of Swat.71
With all these developments in the tribal areas, the militants now openly interfered by establishing a parallel administration in the North and South Waziristan Agencies.
They attacked the music shops, videos and CD stores, and closed barber shops. They established a parallel system of Justice in the areas under their control meaning that the old system of Jirga was discarded. The role of Malik was minimized and the
Mullah got prominent position in the affairs of the tribal areas. Now they are spreading their influence to other parts of the agencies and thus the process of
Talibanization started in the tribal areas as well as in the settled areas of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa.
The situation worsened in 2006 when the Taliban groups sprang up in the adjoining areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In the Bajaur Agency, the militants threatened the NGO workers and stopped them from working there. In Khyber
Agency, the Laskhar-e-Islam (LI) instructed the people to pray five times, grow beard, put caps on their heads, stop music in the vehicles and not to shave beard. For all these activities, the militants used the unauthorized FM radio stations which were a powerful instrument in their hands for propagating ideology and threaten the opponents.
71 International Crisis Group. Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge. Asia Report No. 164, 13 March, 2009, p. 05. 147
The militancy or Talibanization was initially limited to the North and South
Waziristan Agencies. It was spread to Bajaur Agency which was previously a peaceful area but a trend of militancy started there. Other areas such as Mohmand,
Orakzai, and Kurram Agencies as well as the settled areas of Bannu, Laki Marwat,
Tank, Kohat, Dera Ismail Khan were came under the influence of militant networks.72
The Al-Qaeda grew in strength due to the new alliances it made with Pakistani militants. These new blood of young Pakistanis joining Al-Qaeda, were committed to the cause of global jihad and have acted as a magnet for radicalized Muslims, including a number of Western Muslim citizens who travelled to Pakistan to receive training in camps in tribal areas.73 The peace agreement of the government with the militants not only gave them breathing space in the tribal areas but also provided them an opportunity to recruit many young people in their organizations.
5.8. Drone Policy in FATA-Escalation of Violence and Militancy
Some events caused the spread of violence in the tribal areas as well as in the entire country. The external elements are also responsible for the escalation of violence and terrorism in the country. The US drone policy in the tribal areas was responsible for more violent attacks by the militants in Pakistan. The militants (Al Qaeda, Taliban and other groups) whose members were killed in those attacks, held Pakistan responsible for their killings and to take revenge, they targeted Pakistani security forces in different parts of the country.
Bajuar Drone Attack on a Madrassa
The October, 2006 drone attack on a madrassa in Chingai, Bajaur Agency was widely seen as the catalyst for the suicide attacks against Pakistani security forces in FATA and NWFP. The madrassa was run by the TNSM deputy Chief, Maulvi Liaqat who
72 Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair. Op. cit., p. 27. 73 Zahid Hussain. “Battling Militancy” in Madeeha Lodhi (Ed.).op. cit., pp. 131-2. 148 also died in the attack.74 In this attack, at least eighty people were killed, of them sixty two were children below the age of eighteen. A few days later, the militants took revenge by a suicide attack on a military training camp of the Punjab Regiment Center at Dargai, Malakand, killing forty two army recruits.75 This was the major first reaction of the militants and the war started between the security forces and the militants in different parts of the country.
The writ of the state and that of the local administration got paralyzed in the tribal areas by 2006-2007. More than 500 elders and pro-government Maliks were killed brutally in the tribal areas and hundreds of them shifted to Peshawar and Islamabad for their safety. A survey conducted in this regard also confirmed when 53 percent of the respondents expressed their fear of being not expressing their views in public places such as mosque, market, Hujra and Jirga due to the overall insecurity in the region.76
It is not difficult to understand FATA in terms of war. When the civilians are bombed with impunity and drones are falling at their homes, there is rising hatred and intolerance of state policies. The state’s war with militancy is hardly popular among the tribes who simply believe that government is sold out to America in exchange for dollars. There is need to understand the psychology of those who have lost their families, in areas where the code of revenge is a century-old tradition. When they see their children killed, they don’t care whether it is a Pakistani or a foreigner killed in the suicide attacks, it is simply a revenge.77
There are different views on the drone attacks in Pakistan. According to a politician,
“All the leaders whether they are military or the civilians, are telling lies to the nation.
They are making the nation fool and a policy of duplicity is continuing on drone
74 Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair. Counter Insurgency in Pakistan. Rand Corporation, 2010, p. 27. 75 Imran Khan. Pakistan – A Personal History. London: Bantam Press, 2011, p. 306. 76 Fata Research Centre FRC, Islamabad, Report, 2012, p. 14. 77 Razeshta setha.“The forgotten frontline” DAWN September 20, 2011. 149 attacks. They know that drone will not be stopped through resolutions or demands.
The US is very clear about them. Kill the terrorists or we will do it”.78
There is also a common view in all political parties, journalists, academicians and analysts that the drone policy of the US is a gross violation of Pakistan sovereignty and it was also a cause of tension and violence in the country, in general, and in the tribal areas, in particular. In all those attacks, many innocent people including women and children were killed. One view that the current policy of drone is continuing with the covert support and consent of the federal government and with the United States.
According to a respondent, “there are different groups who are against the drone strikes. One is the supporter of Taliban, the other is the human rights organizations and civil society who are opposing because of the violation of human rights in those attacks. The third group consists of those who are supported by the government itself to pressurize the US to take the drone technology from them. This was also the fact that what the government could do against the US”.79 There is a lot of debate in the
Parliament and media but the solution lies nowhere but with the government of
Pakistan itself. The root cause of those attacks are there in the shape of foreign elements still staying on Pakistan’s soil. This is one reason why Pakistani government’s ‘strong protest’ against drone attacks falls flat on the US.
5.9. Lal Masjid (Red Mosque)- Operation Silence, a turning point in terrorism
Another incident responsible for the spread of violence was the operation of Lal
Masjid (Red Mosque) against the students who had challenged the writ of the state in the centre of the capital, Islamabad. The largest Deobandi mosque in the capital, was run by two brothers Abdul Aziz and Abdur Rashid Ghazi known collectively as the
Ghazis. In addition to the mosque, they managed two madrassas. One, the Jamia
Hafsa for female students was part of the mosque complex. The Jamia Faridia for male was located several miles away from the mosque. The Ghazi brothers were
78 Ahmad, Interview, Islamabad, 71 June, 2013. 79 Malik, Interview, Islamabad, 09 April, 2013. 150 among the many Islamic fundamentalists who stridently opposed the Pakistani decision to support the US war on terror after 9/11.80
The Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) founder, Maulana Mohammad Abdullah, was an outspoken cleric supporting the US-led war against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
The clerics and students of mosques and madrassas across Pakistan still breathe resentment over the ‘betrayal’ or the reversal of the military leadership under General
Musharraf to sack the US and other Western nations in the War against Terror.81
It was early in 2007 that events began to spin out of control. The issue was the building of Deobandi mosques on public land in Islamabad without government permission and the local authorities crack-down against them. In protest over the action, and presumably at the instigation of the Ghazis, the female students from the
Jamia Hafsa stormed and occupied a government library next door to the Lal Masjid complex but the authority took no action against them.
Emboldened by this, the Ghazis proceeded to set up “virtue squads” composed of students from both madrassas who were sent out into the city to intimidate the shop owners not to sell CDS, DVDS and other symbols of Western decadence. The authorities condemned the actions but still did nothing. “This was the example of poor governance. It was primarily a duty of SHO (Station House Officer) of police department but due to his failing to cope with the situation, the army had to be called in”.82
Meanwhile, Abdul Aziz gave the Pakistani authorities a week to implement Sharia rule throughout the country or suffer the consequences but still the authorities declined to rise to the boat. The fact that young girls and women were directly involved was an important complicating factor. In April 2007, the local authority of
Islamabad took limited action by arresting eleven madrassas students for vigilante
80 Huma Yusuf. “China Factor in Afghanistan” DAWN, October 10, 2011. 81 Dietrich Reetz. Migrants, Madrassa Students: The Diversity of Transnational Islam in Pakistan. The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Project Report, April 2009, p.65. 82 Brig (R) Mahmood Shah, Interview, Peshawar, 03 July, 2013. 151 activities. In May, the madrassa students kidnapped four local policemen, who were held hostage at Lal Masjid in return for the release of arrested students. In June, a virtue squad raided a Massage parlor operated by Chinese nationals and held several of them briefly at the mosque complex. This provoked a protest from Beijing. In the beginning of July, the authorities threw up a security cordon around Lal Masjid. On
3rd July, the students attempted to overrun a neighboring government building.83
More than one thousand madrassa students evacuated the complex, among them was
Abdul Aziz Ghazi. Before the final operation, several attempts were made to resolve the situation peacefully but failed. On July 10, an operation “Silence” was launched in which more than 100 people were killed, Abdul Rashid Ghazi was one of them.84 The death and destruction that resulted from the final assault had triggered a strong public backlash. It was widely believed that the authorities had overacted. The impact of Lal
Masjid assault on radical Islamists was even more electric, throughout Pakistan.
It was forced upon Pakistan by the Chinese whose citizens had been kidnapped by the
Lal Masjid activist. The Lal Masjid operation had a severe repercussion in FATA and
NWFP. This is evident from the steep rise in suicide bombing, IED attacks and attacks on Army. After this operation, Pakistan lost its support from the local tribes.
The Taliban had taken full advantage of the local peace deals, the Pakistan Army had made in the FATA and KP, which regrouped the Taliban for new offensive against the state.85
In a statement, Osama Bin Laden called upon the Muslims of Pakistan to “rebel against the apostate’, Musharraf. The aim of Bin Laden in Pakistan was to encourage
83 John R. Schmidt. The Unravelling- Pakistan in the age of Jihad. New York: Farar, Straus and Girous,2011, pp. 145-7. 84 Ibid, p. 148. 85 G.D. Bakshi. The Paradox of Pakistan- Collapse or Caliphate. New Delhi: Manas Publication, 2007, p.123. 152 unrest to the point that the soldiers and officers might regard co-operation with the US in the ‘war against terror’ as essentially un-Islamic.86
Ayman Al Zawahiri released a videotape, day after the siege ended urging the faithful to take up jihad against the Pakistani state. Pakistani Taliban renounced the North
Waziristan agreement and disowned the cease-fire arrangements in place between themselves and the Pakistan army. Before the siege reached to its bloody conclusion, violence broke out in the tribal areas.
After the Lal Masjid Operation, a wave of violence erupted throughout Pakistan. The domestic terrorism campaign had begun. The terrorist attacks that took place in the immediate aftermath of Lal Masjid were an explosive reaction to the storming of the mosque complex, the use of terror against domestic targets was destined to develop into a major weapon in the war between the Pakistani Taliban and the Army that was about to begin.87
Pamphlets distributed in Miramshah at the end of July warned that suicide bombs would bring soldiers “the gift of death”. We know that you have become America’s slave and are serving infidel Musharraf and have become a traitor to your religion for food, clothes and shelter.88
“The war was limited to the FATA but the Lal Masjid assault effected the whole country. Those militants who were fighting in the tribal areas shifted their activities to the rest of Pakistan and a war was declared against the state.”89 In August 2007, 53 percent people said that the Lal Masjid operation was the reason for the growing terrorist attacks.90
86 Brain Cloughly. War, Coups & Terror- Pakistan’s Army in Years of Turmoil. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword military, 2008, p. 182. 87 John R. Schmidt. op. cit., pp. 148-50. 88 Cary Schofield. Op. cit., p. 175. 89 Zahid Hussain, Interview, Islamabad, 04 July, 2013. 90 Ijaz Shafi Gillani. The Voice of the People- Public Opinion in Pakistan 2007-2009. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 44. 153
This was not the first time or the last- that action was taken by the Pakistan Army against its own people. Pakistan’s history has been one where the most violent and powerful arm of the state has been used against its own people on numerous occasions. However, this was the first time that a military action of such proportion had taken place in the heart of the capital in Pakistan.91
The Al-Qaeda’s edge in terrorism expertise influenced the Taliban and other militant movements in the region which had been under immense pressure from the state after
9/11. The Al Qaeda’s support in the form of improved capabilities and techniques for striking their targets was a virtual life line for them. To kill as many members of opponent tribes, sects and political adversaries as possible, even if they were civilians.
More destructive suicide jackets were developed to maximize the impact.92
The Lal Masjid seize was a turning point. It changed everything. Between the start of
2002 and the end of 2006, there were 22 suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan, in 2007 these rose to 45. The militants inside the mosque by no means represented Pakistani society as a whole.93
The mosque students were fundamentalists, not terrorists and should have been punished for the specific crimes they had committed. It was only a police matter.
They were stoking opposition to him and making vigilante style attempts to curb what they saw as immoral activities in Islamabad – threatening DVD shops and even kidnapping some Chinese women alleged to be working as prostitutes. They were infuriated by Musharraf’s campaign of reform for madrassas, his demolition of mosques built illegally on state ground and his attempt to impose Westernizations as part of his so called “Enlightened Moderation”. In their eyes, he stooges out to destroy
91 S. Akbar Zaidi. Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011, p.186. 92 Muhammad Amir Rana.“Advantage Al Qaeda” DAWN, October 3, 2011. 93 Owen Bennett Jones. Pakistan eye of the storm (Third Ed). London : Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 08-10 154 true Islam. Musharraf took a heavy handed approach towards this problem despite several other ways to resolve.94
In an interview with a journalist, he talked about a speech of Maulana Abdul Aziz before the Lal Masjid operation in which he said: “If a military operation was launched by the army against the mosque, a chain of suicide bombers will emerge in the whole country”.95
After the Lal Masjid operation, the militants took their guns against the security forces while the people of Pakistan also stood against the Musharraf and his allies in the
West. They termed the attack on their religion and innocent people who were ordinary people living in a peaceful place and without any agenda. Their hatred against the army was heightened in those days that army officers were directed not to appear in public places in uniform. Those who supported the government in the “war against terror” were treated by the Taliban as equal enemy like the US. Those imams of mosques and madrassas who gave verdict or fatwas against the suicide bombing in
Pakistan, were killed in various cities of Pakistan as they were considered damaging the struggle against the infidels. Their views were termed as anti–Islamic and pro–
American. On the other hand, those denouncing the military operations in FATA and condemning the drone attacks were viewed as Taliban sympathizers.
All of the interviewees were of the same opinion that the Lal Mosque operation was the main cause of spreading violence and terror activities in Pakistan. This was an unnecessary action taken by the military because it could be resolved through negotiations and through police actions. The military operations in tribal areas and the killing of many militants had infuriated the militants and Islamists and this incident put fuel to the fire in shape of violence.
94 Imran Khan. Pakistan .op. cit., pp. 267-8. 95 Tahir Khan, Interview, Islamabad, 03 June, 2013. 155
5.10 The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
On December 14, 2007 some forty militant commanders gathered in South Waziristan to form a united platform against the US and Pakistan government under the banner of
Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP, Students Movement of Pakistan). Baithullah
Mahsud was nominated as the Amir (leader) of the TTP. The Shura was attended by almost all the Taliban or militant leaders in their respective areas, not only from the tribal areas but also of some settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa like Swat,
Buner, Dera Ismail Khan, Tank were also present. An eight point agenda was approved in which the enforcement of sharia and the armed struggle against the
US/NATO was to continue in Afghanistan. The TTP also declared that they were fighting a defensive Jihad against the Pakistan government in the country.
It was a turning point in the escalation of violence in the country and a new wave of violence started in the country. The relations between the TTP and Al Qaeda were more close as the TTP was now thought of an extension of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. The
Taliban insurgency spread into all the tribal areas and to the settled districts of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. The TTP also welcomed many other militant organizations operating in the country but now they had an alliance which it will give not only cover but also the resources in fighting against the military in the country. A new wave of suicide attacks was erupted in the country in almost all districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and also in Punjab.
These actions infuriated the militants into launching suicide attacks in Pakistan which continue even today. Many argue that suicide attacks spread in Pakistan due to the government’s support for American. The suicide attacks mushroomed only in 2007 after the Lal Masjid attacks and not in 2001. The US drone attacks worsened the situations further.96
96 Niaz Murtaza. “Afghanistan war or peace?” Dawn October 4, 2011. 156
In the close days of 2009, violence in Pakistan reached to an unimaginable level.
Suicide bombings at security check posts, offices, bazaars and even mosques claimed hundreds of innocent lives. The victims of these blasts were ordinary citizens and the perpetrators of these terrible crimes were fellow citizens who followed the same path.97
In 2011 alone, 41 suicide attacks were carried out in which 606 people were killed including 358 civilians and 856 injured. Before Lal Masjid operation, 33 suicide attacks were recorded in six and half year period (from 2002 to July 2007), while 43 suicide attacks were observed in just six months after the operation. In total, the militants had carried out 301 suicide attacks in Pakistan between 2002 and 2011 in which 4810 people had been killed. The highest numbers of suicide attacks in
Pakistan were carried out in 2009 when the militants made 76 such attacks killing 949 people.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has always remained the most vulnerable province where 162 (53%) of the total attacks took place since 2002. In Punjab 55 suicide attacks, FATA 53 and in Sindh and Balochistan are 15 suicide attacks took place in those 9 years. Only in 2011, 60% of the suicide attacks were carried out at public places, 59% of those killed and 85% of the injured were ordinary civilians.
Peshawar, the most affected city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, saw 35 suicide attacks during the said nine years.98
Unlike the past, when sectarian clashes had been accounting for 70 percent of terrorism in Pakistan, such clashes now accounted for only 4.96 percent of the total fatalities (1850 out of 37226 victims) from 2004 to 2011. Another survey conducted by Junaid Bhatti and his group for the period from 2002 to 2009 assessing,
“epidemiological patterns of suicide terrorism in the civilian population of Pakistan”
97 Iftikhar Malik. Pakistan- Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation. London: Holland Press, 2010, p. 06. 98 Conflict Monitoring Center. Islamabad. “Decline in Suicide Attacks”, Annual Report, 2011, pp. 04- 07. 157 based on 198 events empirically established the yearly shifting trend of targeted attacks against foreigners (in 2002) and sectarians (between 2003-2005) and to government functionaries, general public or security forces (in the period 2006-2009).
During 2009, the mean average of daily fatalities was 32 lives lost.99 In all these attacks, the prime targets were the state institutions and security forces.100
Over the past few years, the rate of terrorism increased in Pakistan. By the end of
August 2007, 80 percent Pakistanis felt the rate of terrorism increased. A question was asked in the survey, “who is responsible for the suicide attacks in different parts of the country?” 31 percent identified US while 21percent held religious extremists responsible.101
As militant violence in Pakistan has escalated, it has grown not only in number but also in sophistication. A host of violent extremist groups, which were once loosely associated or were previously at odds with one another, have formed an increasingly interconnected web. Close collaboration is emerging between Pakistani militant groups including the Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.102
The Taliban inspired groups in Pakistan to emulate them such as the emergence of the
Tahrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and spread their influence among Islamic groups in
Pakistan, goes beyond Sarhad (border), and this was highlighted by the Lal Masjid crisis in the heart of Islamabad.103
By July 2009, 90 percent of the respondents agreed that religious extremism was a serious problem, 86 percent stated that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were a serious problem and 60 percent supported the army fighting against the Militants in the
Malakand Division.104
99 Mohammad Fayyaz. “Conceptualizing Terrorism trend in Pakistan- an empirical perspective” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 07, Issue 01, 2013, pp. 76-9. 100 Ibid, pp. 06-07. 101 Ijaz Shafi Gilani. op. cit., p. 43. 102 Zahid Hussain. “Battling Militancy” in Madeeha Lodhi (Ed.).op. cit., p. 131. 103 Ibid, p.15. 104 Ibid, p. 163. 158
The rise in the number of cadres from mainstream Islamic political parties joining the militant war against Pakistani forces has made the threat to the country more serious.
Over the years, the Pakistani government and the military underestimated and ignored this rising threat. A policy of appeasement from 2001 to 2009 allowed the Taliban to establish control not only in all the seven tribal agencies of FATA but also sweep parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.105
This ill-disguised indictment of tribal Pakthun is unwarranted. They have never been at war with the rest of Pakistan and the question of negotiating peace with them also not arise. They are the major victims of Terrorism. Their men have been ruthlessly slaughtered for resisting the barbarity of the Tehrik-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP), their homes were razed to the ground and they were compelled to live in the settled areas as
IDPS.106
In a span of only three years, Baitullah Mehsud emerged as one of the strongest leaders in Taliban’s movement and in 2008, he was named as one of the world’s top
100 most influential figures of the year by Times magazine. His Taliban forces overran several army forts, and in, August 2007, took 240 soldiers hostage in one single incident. Baitullah was declared as Pakistan’s public enemy number one, on a par with Osama and Mullah Omer. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan establishment has two main benefits to the Taliban. One that now their activities are coordinated and well established and, the second, that the efforts to support one another in different parts of the FATA are coordinated under one central Amir.107
The fallout from these security operations in FATA and Balochistan led to a radical escalation suicide bombings against official installations and public institutions in major cities. The years from 2007 to 2009 turned out to be especially violent in
Pakistan, with hundreds of people killed in frequent suicide bombing attacks,
105 Ibid, p.146. 106 S Iftikhar Murshed. “The Beatles and the APC” The NEWS October 9, 2011. 107 Claudio Franco. “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan”, in Antonio Giustozzi (Ed.). Decoding The Neo Taliban. London: Hurst & Company, 2009, pp. 279-81. 159 targeting rallies, hotels, public places, military personnel, policemen and security staff. The frequency of these terrorist attacks throughout 2008 and 2009 demonstrated the resourcefulness and commitment of their planners and perpetrators while turning
Pakistan into an unsafe place.108
5.11. Operations against TTP
In 2009, the TTP gained momentum in Swat and FATA. Pakistani public opinion supported military operations to restore order across the battered nation. Negotiations of the ANP government with radical FazlulUllah in Swat failed and, instead, a parallel coercive authority established its own writ by demolishing schools. The TTP activists began to filter into Swat and Malakand and with this the suicide bombings multiplied.109
Taking advantage of a peace deal with the government in 2009, the Taliban not only established retrogressive rule in Swat valley but also expanded their influence in the neighboring districts of Dir and Buner. The advance of the Taliban to areas just 70 miles from the capital raised a nightmare scenario of militants raging out of control.
The alarming development raised serious concern in Washington and other Western capitals.110
It was the Taliban’s ascendance in Swat, with destruction of hundreds of schools, beheadings of innocent citizens, stockpiling of ammunition and establishing of warlords that gradually brought a significant change in public perceptions.111
The Swat offensive, code name Rah-i-Rast (just path) represented a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s military objectives in the region. The Army had originally gone into the tribal areas under the strong US pressure specifically to hunt the Al Qaeda militants.
Its original clashes with the Pakistani Taliban were an unwanted by-product of this
108 Ibid, pp. 145-6. 109 Ibid, p. 42. 110 Ibid, p. 146. 111 Ibid, p. 08. 160 effort. But now the target had shifted. In Swat and in subsequent army operations in the tribal areas, its primary objective would be to seek out and engage Pakistan
Taliban forces. The gloves had come at least pathway off. The Pakistanis had drawn their own lessons from Lal Masjid.112
The Swat operation started in May 2009 against the Taliban using heavy weapons of artillery, tank, air force jet and helicopters. More than 30,000 troops launched the operation. It was the biggest military operation in its history against its own wrong people to convert into the Rah-e-Rast. Because of this operation, thousands of people were killed, including the civilians. More than five hundreds armed forces personnel martyred in the operation. Meanwhile, more than two million people left their homes for safer places in different parts of the province during the operation. It was the biggest human exodus of people within the country for shelter.
The bloody war turned the valley of paradise on earth into a place of death and destruction. Beautiful scenery of Swat set fired by the militants or during the operation damaged to an irreparable extent for a long time. The fear and anxiety in the air of Swat was seen and felt in the eyes and faces of the people. Once living in their sweet homes, now compelled to live in tented camps as Internally Displaced People
(IDPs). This was a human tragedy. The government was equally responsible for the people suffering because it ignored the activities of Taliban and militants in the areas and people were left on their mercy.
The expansion of militants from one area to the other was reported by the people and media but the government and military were not aware of such a huge catastrophe which proved imminent in the coming days. Only the people were the biggest sufferers in the operation against the militants. The rehabilitation of the area and the people to bury the scares of the war will need a long time. The brutal killings, beheadings of the innocent people in public, hanging the dead bodies in the square or
112 Ibid, p.150. 161 the electricity poles, and dishonoring the dead ones in the graves turned the blood cold in the veins. These were the hardship borne by the Swatis.
Hundreds of militants marched to the Swat valley from different parts of the tribal areas, as was the researcher told in Malamjaba (a Summer resort in Swat) by a local that they never saw such like people. They were tall, physically strong and speaking
Pashto in different dialects with Swati people. Though they appeared to be from tribal areas, some of them were unable to speak Pashto fluently.113
The successful military operation against the militants broke the back of the Taliban in Swat. They ran to other parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and attacked on the security forces and military installations with new vigour and force. This operation was supported by the US and other Western countries wholeheartedly because of the fear that nuclear technology might fall in the hands of militants and fundamentalists, which will be a threat to the world security. Pakistani nation wholeheartedly supported this operation because of a number of reasons and the political leadership of the country and especially of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa once supported the military operation in the valley. This was the first military operation in the country which was not only supported by the whole nation but by the world community also.
Operation Rah-e-Nijat
The Operation Rah-e-Nijat (path to salvation) was launched by the Pakistan Army against the Taliban and other militants in the South Waziristan Agency on June 19,
2009, another major ground offensive was subsequently launched on October 17,
2009. The aim of this operation was to eliminate the militants by dislodging them from their fortifications, sanctuaries and hideouts. Pakistani officials called it “the mother of all battles” with the involvement of 30,000 troops.114
113 Ikram, Interview, Malamjaba on 22.08.2012. 114 Claudio Franco. “The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan”, in Antonio Giustozzi (Ed.).op. cit., p.70. 162
The war against terror is our own, because simply it is our society that has turned into an inferno. According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan (2009-2010), the direct and indirect costs for war on terror has exceeded to $ 40 billion.115
The military operations could kill a number of non-state fighters but they can pose long term set back in case of heavy losses to manpower to the security forces but also revenge terror attacks on civilians. According to official, Pakistan Army has so for lost two division of its operational capacity since 2004.This war is not ending any time soon.116
According to a survey conducted by British Council Pakistan that the jihadis are from the mainstream Pakistani society. Majority of them are from the public schools in
Pakistan than from madrassas, and their education ratio is higher.117
Only in 2009, the civilian casualties in Pakistan were more than the Afghanistan war against terrorism. After the ten years long war, it is now appeared as a crystal clear that it is now our war because of the heavy losses caused to our civilians as well as security forces.118
Pakistanis are more vulnerable and terrorized than any other country in the world.
There are hundred definitions of terrorism but there is no legally binding definitions of terrorism, but all have some kind of similarities; violence is asymmetrical, the targets are non-combatants and the goal is to create harassment and fear. Terrorism, in the sense of ideologically motivated attacks by extremist groups, seeks to target and thus weaken and undermine the state.119
Even after six years in collaboration with Washington, Islamabad was still under US pressure which kept asking for doing move in the tribal belt against al Qaeda and
115 Economic Survey of Pakistan. The News, 03 June, 2013. 116 Khalid Aziz. “Endgame in Afghanistan”, DAWN, September 30, 2011. 117 M. Zaidi, “Poverty and Extremism”, DAWN, November 28, 2011. 118 HumaYusaf Ali. “Weather Terrorism”, DAWN, September 12, 2011. 119 Ibid. 163
Taliban so as to dismantle their network.120 The military operations against the
Taliban in FATA and Swat resulted in massive internal displacement of civilians. The large number of IDPs that fled to the adjoining districts had become a social and infrastructural strain on them.121
During the fighting between the forces and Taliban militants, thousands of families sought shelter in camps as well as with relatives. According to the UN estimates, 60% of the 2.5 million of IDPs were women who left their homes unaccompanied by men.
A simple “yes” to the question, “are you with us” led Pakistan to face the music and
“enjoy” the reward for being the “frontline state” in the “war on terror”. Before the
9/11 attacks, there were only two isolated suicide attacks in Pakistan’s history, one at the Egyptian Embassy and the other in a local newspaper office. From 9/11 till April
2009, in the eight years, 167 suicide attacks occurred with the largest in NWFP
(Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) followed by FATA. All the four provinces suffered from such attacks.122
Pakistan became the first line of defence in this “war on terror.” The most distressing aspect of this war is the amount of destruction, damage, and killing of innocent civilians of the affected regions. Ironically, the damage done following the declaration of this war is, to a large extent, higher than the losses which resulted due to the actual terrorist incident of 9/11 in New York.123
Anti-Americanism becoming a potent factor in Pakistani politics. In particular, the
Pakistani religious parties seem to be on a warpath against the US or “America” as they prefer to call it.124
120 Moonis Ahmar. “Perceptions on Pak-US Relations after 9/11” in M Saleem Kidwayi (Ed.).US policy towards South Asia. Delhi: Academic Excellence, 2008, p. 223. 121 S. Akbar Zaidi. op. cit., p. 176. 122 Unazia Niaz. Wars, Insurgencies, and Terrorist attacks- A Psychological Perspective form the Muslim World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 74. 123 Ibid, p. 63. 124 Shahid M. Amin. Realism in Politics. Karachi : Royal Book Company, 2005, p. 71. 164
Linked with the complex post- 9/11 geo-politics, FATA and the adjoining Swat,
Malakand and Dir districts have recently become the battleground between the forces of extremism and reform. The growth of an indigenous Taliban movement is a post –
9/11development and its recourse to militancy has flourished due to civilian casualties in the war on terror and the marginalization of moderate elements as a result of perception that Islamabad is signing with the anti-Muslim external forces. As a consequence, Pakistani officials are seen as serving only the interests of the US and
UK, and not those of their own people.
Extremism has gone deeper as more civilian deaths have occurred at the hands of the security forces and as a result of American drone missile attacks. The loss of civil authority in Swat in 2008-09 and the local Talibanization was seen as an alarming development throughout the country. The Pakistan government was compelled to undertake massive military operations in Swat and the neighbouring districts during the summer of 2009, with the result that more than two million people left their homes. The army still took time for flushing out the militants.
“All operations were conducted and focused on the extremist only but there was negligence on the part of government and its institutions in that during operations and afterwards, thousands of people left homes for the safety of their families but the government did not concentrate on the rehabilitation of the masses.”125
5.12. Conclusion
From all the developments taking place in the country during 2001-2011, there has been historical link to the Afghanistan war in the 1980s. The past government policies have not bothered attentions to the society on which basis it was constructing the nation. The social construction of the state and society on the religious basis and promoting Jihadi culture to support and promote the state policies or those of the regimes in that time have developed complex phenomena in the country. The war
125 S M Zafar, Interview in programme ‘Capital Talk’ on Geo TV on 14.3.2013. 165 situation in Afghanistan had also contributed to the growing violence in Pakistan but there are mistakes committed by the regimes which brought Pakistan to this stage of instability.
The government policy to support the US in its war against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan without objectively assessing its repercussions for Pakistan, established madrassas network to enroll thousands of young people and then sending them to participate in the holy war in Afghanistan. The role of religious parties tremendously increased and their links were also developed into the Arab countries. The flow of money also boost up their activities which marginalizing the mainstream parties in
Pakistan. State used religious sentiments of the masses in its policy and relations with the US, India, Afghanistan and rest of the world, therefore, the militant network in
Pakistan established their links with trans-national militant groups and made Pakistan the centre of global Jihadi activities.
The state institutions, negligence regarding security of the borders and failed to check the movements of foreigners, further complicated the security situation of the country.
The open travelling of the Afghan refugees (those Afghans who took shelter in
Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan war of 1980s) in the length and breadth of Pakistan without any check and mixing up with the masses in cities and towns have developed links with militant groups which have strengthened their activities even against the state.
With the absence of clear policies on Taliban, the military operations, dialogue and peace deal further complicated the situation in Pakistan and confusion was seen in the government institutions in this regards. The division among the political parties on terrorism and Taliban and especially on the military operations not only confused the masses but the state activities remained doubted on all these issues. When the confusion continued for long time, the problem would also persist and when the problem continues, then it affects all activities of the state and its capacity and morale 166 of dealing with the militants weakens in the long term. The military operations without clear targets led to many innocent casualties which further developed anonymity against the army and the state among the tribes.
The tribal areas have been neglected for the last sixty years of their political as well as economic rights which, in turn, have affected the state authority and its administration there. There were no civil rights against the political administration which have compelled them towards the Taliban like system in which speedy and free trials were available for them.
This chapter draws the conclusion that the Musharraf’s government was not fully prepared to handle the new development in the region in shape of terrorism after 9/11 attacks. The social construction of tribal areas on the basis of religion was ignored by the government as it was the force which ultimately brought those militants against the state. This was the reason that the weak physical border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan also played no role in restricted their movement and activities beyond the border.
In Pakistan, from the social constructionism perspective, the spread of violence was caused by many factors in which the state and non-state actors were also involved. On the one hand, when the government was trying to make peace through different process and policies while dealing terrorism in Pakistan, some elements had complicated the situation which led to more violence in the country. There is a need for more consensus on these issues because only through consensus, this menace could be defeated. 167
Chapter Six
Political Developments in Pakistan and the War on Terror
In this chapter, the researcher argues that the role of religious parties and groups in
Pakistan became more dominant in the military regime than in the democratic government. The establishment of religious alliances and the victory of religious parties in the general election in Pakistan in 2002 are caused by the US intervention in
Pakistan’s internal politics and the anti-American sentiments in the country. This also weakened the role of democratic forces in Pakistan, resultant in the growth of religious groups and their power in the decision making process in the country.
Pakistan’s history is replete with the events which have turned it from the one extreme to the other. In the last days of the twentieth century, Pakistan saw another coup which was the turning point in the history of Pakistan. The Musharraf’s rule (1999-
2008) not only strengthened the role of religious political parties but also militant wings which have directly threatened the state and its institutions. On the one hand, there was a strong reaction against the Musharraf policies towards Taliban and militants, and on the other hand, people anti-American sentiments were also high in the country in the prevailing circumstances. These anti-American and anti-Musharraf sentiments were directly reflected in the political scene in Pakistan. In this chapter, the researcher analyzes the impact of the war on terror on Pakistan politics, in general, and the general elections of 2002 and 2008, in particular. The anti-American sentiments are also discussed and the factors which resented the Pakistani people against the United States. The role of political parties and politicians regarding war on terror, in general, and in the Parliament, in particular, is analyzed. The non-state actors in the politics of Pakistan are highlighted in the later part of this chapter.
168
6.1. General Elections 2002-Rise of MMA
The start of 2000 marked an important factor as the emergence of Islamic parties in the political process of Pakistan. For the first time ever, Pakistan’s religious parties were able to build an alliance which continued to hold, and to achieve an unprecedented electoral result, making this religious alliance an important component of the electoral process in Pakistan. Until the 2002 elections, religious parties were not central to the electoral process in the country, but by disallowing the three leaders of the most popular political parties to contest elections, General Musharraf had allowed the elected Parliament to be dominated by the religious rights.1
Islamic parties are in Parliament largely because of the particular conditions and specific circumstances which exited at the time of the 2002 elections- the US role in the region and Musharraf’s support for it, the exile of the three main political leaders
(Nawaz Sharif, Benazir Bhutto and Altaf Hussain). The electoral presence of the
Islamic parties should not be seen as a manifestation of the desire by Pakistanis for an
Islamic theocratic state, these parties have been resoundingly routed in elections in the past.2
The Ulama of Pakistan had formed the Pakistan Afghanistan Defense Council
(PADC) a group of 35 parties led by Maulana Sami ul Haq to express solidarity with
Taliban. It was from the PADC that the MMA emerged in January 2002 to fight the election in October 2002.3
There are six religious parties in MMA which included; Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamait
Ulama-i-Islam Fazal (JUI-F), Jamait Ulama-i-Islam-Sami (JUI-S), Jamait Ulama-i-
1 S. Akbar Zaidi. Military, Civil Society and Democratization in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2011, p. 22. 2 Ibid, p. 42. 3 Kalim Bahadar. “The Rise of the MMA in Pakistan” in Ajay Darshan Behera, Mathew C. Joseph (Eds.). Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004, p. 197. 169
Pakistan (JUP-Noorani), Jamait Ahle Hadith (JAH) and Islami Tehrik-i-Pakistan
(ITP, former Tahrek-e-Jaferia Pakistan).
Having made numerous interventions and amendments in the electoral process such as disallowing those who were not graduates to contest the elections (or 94 percent of the population) and disallowing the two previous elected prime ministers from contesting elections again -the election gave rise to many unexpected results. The first element was the creation of a party known as “king’s party.”4
The religious parties emerged as the main opposition group in Parliament, its rise and prominence is almost entirely a result of President Musharraf support of US policies in the region after 9/11. When the US decided to invade Afghanistan, it used frontline
Pakistan as a major conduit and stepping stone. The Afghan Taliban and the international Al Qaeda, were all active in Afghanistan with many having strong links in the areas bordering the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The US- led attacks against the Taliban- who had a great deal of support and sympathy in the bordering NWFP province in Pakistan- led to a strong anti-American reaction in the two provinces bordering Afghanistan viz. Balochistan and NWFP. Claiming that the Americans were anti-Muslim, Anti-Islam and anti-Taliban, the MMA was able to launch an effective electoral campaign in the NWFP and Balochistan, gaining a majority in the former and a coalition government in the later. They emerged as the main opposition party in the Parliament. Yet it has also been a major bargaining chip which allowed
General Musharraf to garner US support in a post 9/11 world.5
Musharraf’s strong support for US policy after September 11, 2001, produced a black lash. His policies added fuel to raise anti-American feelings in NWFP and
Balochistan, the provinces contiguous with Afghanistan. Among the MMA’s most prominent actions was to impose Sharia law in the province under their Nizam-e-Adl
4 S. Akbar Zaidi. op.cit., p. 62. 5 Ibid, pp. 63-4. 170
(system of justice) programme. The MMA worked autonomously inside NWFP in return for withdrawing their challenges to the national incumbent. The MMA sacrificed principle for its political survival to compromise with the Musharraf government at the centre.6
The Taliban enjoyed their greatest popularity among their fellow Pashtun so much so that their defeat at the hands of the Americans and Northern Alliance allies triggered a backlash in the NWFP provincial elections held in October 2002.7
In the weeks and months following October 2001, the Council organized demonstrations across the country in support of Taliban regime. This new found unity was predicated on a shared perception of the post – September 11 world and anti – US position. Its electoral success came on a wave of strong anti – American sentiments among Pakistan’s Pashtun population. The main religious political parties Jamaat-e-
Islami and Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam have strong affiliation with the jihadist groups from a long time. Several members of the provincial assemblies and parliament remained the commanders in Afghan jihad and in Kashmir.8
This has been a vote against the United States and Musharraf for his pro- American policies. It had also been a vote that had announced a paradigm shift in the traditional equation of power in Pakistan. For the first time, a large number of Pakistanis had considered the mullahs fit to rule over them. Thus, where the United States had cut off one head of the hydra in Afghanistan, many more heads are now growing in
Pakistan.9
6 Ibid, pp. 140-1. 7 John R. Schmidt. The Unraveling- Pakistan in the age of Jihad. New York: Farar, Straus and Girous, 2011, p. 130. 8 Zahid Hussain. “Battling Militancy” in Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). Pakistan Beyond a Crisis State. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 133. 9 Hassan Abbas. Pakistan- Drift into Extremism- Allah, the Army and America’s War on Terror. New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2005, pp. 14-5. 171
There was a marked increase in attacks on US forces and their Afghan allies by the
Taliban who then fled back to the Pakistani Pashtun tribal areas. The MMA electoral success also carried long- term political implications at home as the battle for the very soul of Pakistan intensified.10
The MMA campaign was at two levels. At the constituency level, MMA focused on the common problems like water, electricity, improvement of civic amenities, road construction, corruption, etc. At the second level, the MMA candidates raised the broader national issues with ideology overtones. However, there were different explanations for the good showing of the MMA. Mainly two reasons were advanced for MMA’s exceptionally good results. One, the widespread anti American sentiments aroused in the NWFP and Balochistan in the wake of the American attack on
Afghanistan. Second, General Musharraf’s decision to keep out two popular leaders
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz, from the election fray. Critics point out that these reasons for the good results of the MMA ignore the complex interplay of the socio- economic factors responsible for the success of the MMA.11
There are multiple reasons of the success of MMA in 2002 general elections in
Pakistan. The main reason was the candidates of high stature in the public eyes as the religious scholars were widely respected. The other reason was the alliance of the religious parties because in the past, most of the politicians were of the view that these religious leaders don’t pray in the same row but now they are united and this has created favourable opinion in the masses about the religious parties and their leaders.
ANP and PPP were given chances of governance and they failed in the expectations of the masses and this time a new alliance was tested for the ruling how they govern the province was also a factor.
10 Zahid Hussain. Frontline Pakistan- the Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto. New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008, p. 183. 11 Kalim Bahadar. op. cit., p. 199. 172
The ethnic factor played a significant role in their electoral victory in as much as
Pakthun nationalism was subsumed under Islamic politics in the wake of the US- led war against Taliban. The fact that the Taliban were predominantly Pakthun and that
Musharraf’s sudden shift to policy away from Taliban after 9/11 was held responsible for the displacement and destruction of large segments of the Pakthun population under the impact of the US bombardment in 2001-2002, greatly helped MMA win elections in NWFP.12
The Islamists had taken the lead over the leftists in denouncing the US. They accused
American of interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs and, in particular, acting as the principal foe of the country’s nuclear program.13 “Terrorism has not much affected the elections but its campaign was affected in the country.”14
It constantly discredited the traditional political leadership for corruption, and put hurdles in its campaign activity. Simultaneously, it did not stop Islamic parties from freely mobilizing people through new message of upholding the “Book,” which was their election symbol. In this context, the new requirement of a bachelor’s degree to qualify for contesting elections helped the electoral candidates of the Islamic alliance.
The success of MMA is partly based on sympathy for the Taliban and on anti-
American sentiments, but largely it is due to popular disenchantment with the nationalist and mainstream political parties. The Pro-Taliban feelings still run deep in
Pakistan and well beyond the Pakhtun territories.15
The religious political parties espousing a purist form of Islamic order such as Jamiat- i-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-i-Islami were the main beneficiaries in the elections
12 Mohammad Waseem. “Political Sources of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan” in Ian Talbot (Ed.). The Deadly Embrace- Religion, Politics and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947-2002. London: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 156-7. 13 Shahid M. Amin. Realism in Politics. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2005, pp. 71-2. 14 Ijaz Khan, Interview, Peshawar, 18 March 2013. 15 Rasul Baksh Rais. “In the Shadow of the Past: Pakistan‘s Afghan Policy” in Craig Baxter (Ed.). Pakistan on the Brink. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 45. 173 due to an increased accent on political Islam in the Muslim world amidst a formidable wave of anti-Americanism. In Pakistan, these groups were more acceptable to
Musharraf, as he feared mainstream political parties and through the presence of religious-political elements in the assemblies, he could also flag his own indispensability to his Western friend as “The last bastion against an encroaching extremism.” The Religious- political parties structured themselves into the Combined
Action Forum (Muthahida Majlis-i-Amal, or MMA), their own interests and expediency kept them together until 2007, when serious cracks within the MMA began to emerge especially because of the anti-Musharraf campaign led by the civil society.
The West prioritization of security over democracy worked in Musharraf’s favour, but this was at the expense of country’s long-term prerogatives.16 This had strengthened the Islamists to enforce the Shariah law on the government level irrespective of the opposition of the mainstream political parties.
The MMA’s leadership was very active in this respect as it traveled across the country to rally support for the alliance’s candidates. The Islamic alliance also figured in the only serious attempt at train march, in contravention of the regime’s ban on rallies.
One reason behind the MMA’s relative success in cross–district and cross–province mobility was the fact that its components i.e., Islamic parties already enjoyed a sprinkling of the religious vote throughout the country.17
It whipped up strong resentment against the military operation in parts of the tribal belt and sought to incorporate Pakthun nationalism in its wider Islamic worldview.
Underlying both the nationalist commitment of the Pakthun population and its
16 Iftikhar Malik. Pakistan- Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation. London: Holland Paper, 2010, pp. 51-3. 17 Mohammad Waseem. Democratization in Pakistan. A Case Study of the 2002 Elections. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 133. 174 commitment to Islamic identity was an effort to synthesize a new equation that would rob the nationalist parties of their nationalist credentials.18
It was the Pashtun religious politicians such as Maulana Fazalur Rehman, Qazi
Hussain Ahmad and Samiul Haq who were in the best position to make use of
‘Islamic rage’ in the wake of American operations against the Pashtun Taliban in
Afghanistan.19
Among other civil society organizations, the role of madrassas was of direct consequence to the outcome of elections. These religious schools are spread across the country, often run by parties of the MMA. Trained in a patriarchal tradition, the students of these madrassas proved to be the most committed and diligent workers for the new Islamic alliance during the election campaign with such an army of dedicated workers, the MMA was seen as the most mobilized and organized party alliance in the campaign. The ideological attachment of madrassas was obvious from the way
Islamic scholars and imams of mosques took the MMA’s message to the public through the Friday sermons. Students of madrassas were seen organizing the public meetings and rallies for the MMA. The institutions of mosque and madrassas provided the Islamic leadership with an unrivalled opportunity to reach out to the people.20
A Maulana (a prayer leader) supported the MMA election campaign on this narration before the people as, “cast vote to those people who are standard on the religious ground-Sharia. Those who are pious, Aalim (those who have the religious knowledge) deserve your vote because vote is a trust. If you give vote to those people, you are free from any responsibility to God but if you give vote to those who are not worthy of this, you have double mistake on you. One that your decision is wrong and the other is
18 Ibid, p. 138. 19 Joshua T. White. “Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier-Islamic Politics and US policy in Pakistan’s North West Frontier” Center on Faith & International Affairs. Arlington, 2008, p. 48. 20 Mohammad Waseem. op. cit., p. 151. 175 before Allah that you have given vote to a wrong person who was ignorant of
Islam.”21
Groups that had developed links with Al-Qaeda sought to destabilize the Musharraf regime because of its ‘front line’ status in the “war on terror”. Assassination attempts against its leading figures and sectarian killings remained their preferred mode of operation.22
The results of the elections challenged Musharraf’s goals, but the outcomes seemed to had ultimately served his policy interest. Most surprising was the unexpected success of the MMA (Muthahida Majlis-i-Amal)-a six party alliance of religious parties, which secured the third largest hatch of seats in the National Assembly and which was able to gain plurality in the NWFP and later to form a government in that province.
The PPP also showed strong votes despite the Benazir Bhutto absence in the election.
On November 21, 2002, a government was formed by Mir Zafar Ullah khan Jamali-
Pakistan’s first Baloch Prime Minister from Balochistan province. He was a member of PML (Q)-a party loyal to Musharraf, while the coalition government included some small parties and defectors from several other mainstream political parties like PPP and PML (N).23
The political agenda was set by the religious parties who had the pulse of the people in their hands and who could draw the crowds in the streets. In fact, despite the fact that the MMA got only 11 percent of the popular votes in the 2002 elections, it had really emerged as a big winner. What is most remarkable about the MMA performance in the elections was its astounding margin of victory. The MMA victory
21 Maulana Mohammad Ali, Interview, Nowshera, 20th September, 2002. 22 Ian Talbot. “Religions and Violence, the Historical Context for Conflict in Pakistan”, in John R. Hinnells and Richard King (Eds.). Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 160. 23 Charles H. Kennedy. “A User’s Guide to Guided Democracy: Musharraf and the Pakistani Military Governance Paradigm” in Charles H. Kennedy, Cynthia A. Botteron (Eds.). Pakistan 2005. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 142-3. 176 in the elections was a localized phenomenon. It was primarily in the NWFP and the
Pashtun belt of Balochistan and few seats in Karachi, its performance in Punjab and
Sindh was almost negligible.24
The MMA succeeded beyond the expectations of the Musharraf government which was widely criticized even by its supporters for an over killing of the traditionally dominant political families and leaders.25 “Anti-American sentiments were high in
2002 and it supported the MMA but the said factor had less effects on the 2008 elections.”26
Anti–American sentiments were more significant in NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) than the rest of Pakistan, either because Pakhtun actively supported the Taliban or because they were concerned for Pakhtun living in Afghanistan and affected by the
American action. The success of MMA was also because of the nationalist parties representing Pakhtun in NWFP were all but wiped out in this election mainly for their not condemning the US invasion of Afghanistan. The MMA’s policies threatened the moderate face of Islam that Musharraf portrayed to the West.27
The MMA had fully mobilized its workers with missionary zeal. They approached the public during the October 2002 elections campaign against the backdrop of their one
– year old protest campaign, launched against the US led invasion of Afghanistan. A previously mobilized public was an ideal constituency for campaigning along similar lines, characterized by anti – establishment feelings combining with anti –
Americanism.28
24 Sushant Sareen. “The Army and the Democratic deficit?” in Ajay Darshan Beheara, Mathew Joseph C. (Eds.). op. cit., p. 174. 25 Mohammad Waseem, “Political Sources of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan” in Ian Talbot (Ed.). op. cit., p. 15-20. 26 Qibla Ayaz, Interview, Peshawar, 28 May, 2013. 27 Katharine Adeney. Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.139. 28 Mohammad Waseem. op. cit., p.132. 177
In the NWFP, the ANP suffered the heaviest defeat of its history. It failed to win a single seat in the National Assembly. The ANP’s Pakthun nationalist leadership emerged as less credible with its secular credentials than the proto – Taliban Pakthun electoral contestants, who asked the electorate to vote for the Book. The religious appeal of the MMA, feeding on the Afghan war (2001 – 2002), won 27 out of the 29
National Assembly seats in Pashto – speaking districts. The Taliban factor integrated the religious and ethnic identities of Pakthun as never before. Although the Taliban were ethnically Pakthun, the popular discourse surrounding them was fundamentally religious in nature.29
The MMA candidates went to the electorates asking whether they wanted to vote for the Quran or America. The results were predictable. Once they came into power, their many rigid stance became soften on many issues. “Power and authority streamlined their policies in the national context. Their participation brought peace to the people and constructive engagement. Had they not participated in the electoral process, what had they been doing?”30
The Muthahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Council - MMA) winning 53 seats out of directly contested 272, managed the highest number of seats for any Islamist group since Pakistan’s creation in 1947. The MMA government launched its Islamization campaign in the province, started with a crack-down on cable TV operators, cinema owners and musicians, attacked on the billboards featuring women, smeared such billboards with black point. Further, the MMA espoused terminating co-education, veiling women and Islamizing education curricula. The NWFP (now Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa) Assembly adopted a Sharia Bill in June 2003 to bring the judicial, educational and economic systems of the province in consonance with the injunctions of Islam as interpreted by them. Even the MMA members in Balochistan Assembly
29 Ibid, p. 159. 30 Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Interview, Peshawar, 27 May, 2013. 178 led an attack on a circus destroying it, killing the animals and confiscating the earnings. It was done because the circus was deemed un-Islamic.31
In 2006, the MMA Government of NWFP attempted to institutionalize Amr Bil
Maroof Wa Nahi Anal Munkir at the official level, through a proper legislative procedure by moving a Hisba Bill in the NWFP Provincial Assembly. The idea was to establish a government institution similar to the one that had functioned under the
Taliban, headed by a Mohtasib. The PPP and ANP opposed the bill in the Assembly calling it “a government of mullahs”.
For the US-led coalition and the Afghan government, the most worrying outcome of the elections was the creation of an MMA provincial government in the NWFP (now
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), with the Chief Minister, Akram Khan Durani. He categorically said that he would not allow the US agencies to operate in the province and also banned alcohol and gambling.
In May 2003 in the NWFP, the MMA adopted a Sharia, or Islamic law bill that threatened to introduce Taliban-styled Islamic measures in the province. Schools in the NWFP were ordered to replace student uniform of shirts with traditional dress and changed the dress from black colour to the white-a colour was considered to be valued and loved by Prophet (peace be upon him). The girls were told to cover their heads.32
The MMA calculated now that they were in a strategically advantageous position, they could push through their favorite Islamization project. They had already begun to implement their agenda by the passing of the Sharia Act in the NWFP Assembly on
31 Hassan Abbas. op. cit., pp. 227-9. 32 Ahmad Rashid. Descent into Chaos. London: Penguin Books, 2008, pp. 159-60. 179
June 2, 2003. The MMA youth wing had given evidence its future plans under Sharia
Act through the ransacking of the Peshawar cinema billboards and music shops, etc.33
There had been widespread concern within the country and outside about the passage of the Sharia Act in the NWFP. It is openly alleged, not without reason that the situation in the province is going the Taliban way. The Sharia Act in the NWFP was only the first step in the general program of Islamization. Many people in the country had voted for the MMA’s cause, while the liberal parties like the PPP and the PML
(N) had been politically paralyzed, the MMA alone was opposing the aggressive policies of the US.34
6.2. Anti-American Sentiments
The main reasons of anti-American feelings in Pakistan after 9/11 were the US role in
Afghanistan, its intervention in the tribal areas of Pakistan, supporting Musharraf and ignoring the feelings of the people of Pakistan.35
Musharraf’s popularity was dropped from 30 percent in the early 2007 to 22 percent by the end of the year clearly showing that the policies of the regime were not according to the will of the people.36 American interference increased in Pakistan during past seven years, 75 percent Pakistanis believed in 2002-2007.37
In 2007, in Gillani Polls, the result showed high level of mistrust against the
American government and its policies and discontent over the US role in Pakistan’s internal affairs. 73 percent considered the US responsible for the rapidly increasing
33 Kalim Bahadar. “The Rise of the MMA in Pakistan” in Ajay Darshan Behera, Mathew Joseph C. (Eds.). op. cit., p. 202. 34 Ibid., p. 204. 35 Moonis Ahmar. “Perception on Pak-US Relations after 9/11” in M. Saleem Kidwai (Ed.). US Policy Towards South Asia. New Delhi, 2008, p.230. 36 Ijaz Shafi Gilani. The Voice of the People. Public Opinion in Pakistan 2007-2009. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 06. 37 Ibid, p. 12. 180 scale of terrorism and uncertainty in these areas. 54 percent Pakistanis gave the US government a below average rating in the poll.38
During the period war against terrorism, the agenda for democracy in Pakistan again lost momentum. It was practically rendered irrelevant by the world community led by the United States. At the one end, the installation of an MMA government in NWFP and its coalition partnership with PML (Q) in Balochistan on the other end meant that the religious parties alliance had developed vital stakes in the political system.39
Musharraf consistent support for the US ‘war on terror’ put him at odds with his own people who, not surprisingly, objected to the fact that US aircraft were regularly killing Pakistani civilians in air raids in the Tribal areas.40
A poll in September 2007 indicated that only 38 per cent of Pakistani supported
Musharraf, while Osama Bin Laden’s approval rating was 46% and the poll did not include the tribal areas of NWFP.41
86 percent of the respondents held the view that Pakistan was moving in the wrong direction only 12 percent approved Islamabad’s policies. 61 percent viewed religious extremism a serious problem, and 71 percent supported a policy of dialogue rather than military operations against them, only 9 percent favoured military operations. 61 percent believed economic development and education to be the key for neutralizing religious extremism.42
The most telling example of this was the agenda drawn up for the three rounds of strategic dialogue between Pakistan and the US that took place in March, July and
38 Ibid, p. 80. 39 Mohammad Waseem. “Political Sources of Islamic Militancy in Pakistan” in Ian Talbot (Ed.). op. cit., p. 161. 40 Owen Bennett Jones. op. cit., p. 383. 41 Brian Cloughley. War, Coups & Terror- Pakistan’s Army in years of turmoil. South Yorkshire: Pen & Sword military, 2008, p. 189. 42 International Republication Institute, Survey Report, June, 2008, p. 170. 181
October 2010. Thirteen sectors were identified for engagement where Islamabad either sought American financial or policy help. This showed the extent to which the ruling elite had come to see outsiders as catalytic agents to solve their problems.43
External intrusion in Pakistan’s domestic affairs – a familiar theme in the country’s life – loomed large in the high drama of the politically changed year of 2007.44
In recent years, the US presence has become more pervasive and reveals a strategic shift in US thinking on Pakistan. According to media reports, of the 240 plus members of the 2002 National Assembly, thirty five members had US nationality.
Now almost all aspects of internal law and order, regional relations, counter terrorism, anti-money laundering and non – nuclear proliferation policies are influenced one way or another by the relationship with Washington. Most ministries (including
Interior, Defence and Finance) have bilateral arrangements with the US. The commander (CENTCOM US Central Command) makes regular trips to Pakistan.
What all this means is that the Pakistani state is hard to put to make a case for sovereignty so deeply penetrated that its ally is involved in its internal affairs.
Pakistan’s governance issues are no longer internal, as outside help – especially economic support – has become essential to govern the country. While power elites collaborate, convince and compromise to consolidate this structural presence it leads to occasional official outbursts against outside interference which deepens the existing resentment against the US on the street.45
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has assisted US in the war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in a manner that has weakened his country’s stability and has run counter to its genuine national interests. Musharraf has done all that he could for the United
43 Maleeha Lodhi. “Beyond The Crisis State”, in Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). op. cit., p. 62. 44 Ibid, p. 68. 45 Saeed Shafqat. “Praetorians and the people”, in Maleeha Lodhi (Ed.). op. cit., p. 102. 182
States without risking civil war in his country and yet US leaders continue pushing him to do more.46
A ‘deal’- agreement was made between Musharraf and Benazir by the US and UK government to support the Musharraf’s weak position in the country, giving him legitimacy and mobilized the masses against the extremism. Both had support for one another. Bhutto needed an opportunity to come back and supported by international community while Musharraf wanted to remain in power in the country. The deal supported by the US and UK policy to gather the secular and political forces up with
Musharraf to eradicate the militancy in the region. But on many issues, Musharraf refused to fulfill the promises, the US government ignored the regime betraying from his promises.47
Americans pressurized Musharraf to make political adjustment to strengthen his position. For this purpose, he visited London and Dubai to meet with Bhutto, guaranteed by the US and UK government. The ‘deal’ was made as Musharraf was to be re-elected, and the PPP parliamentarian would abstain from the voting. Musharraf announced NRO (National Reconciliation Ordinance) which provided amnesty from all cases of corruption charges against Bhutto and all other politicians from 1988 to
1999. This was a political development only with the help of foreign countries involvement in the political affairs of the state to support a dictator and continue to govern with the political backing.
In the public opinion survey, people were asked the question whether the country was heading in the right direction or in the wrong one. In response, in May 2007, 14 percent said in the right direction while in March it increased to 40 percent because of the general elections of 2008 were held. While 73 percent said in wrong direction
46 Michael Scheuer. Marching toward Hell: America and Islam after Iraq. New York: Free Press, 2008, p. 64. 47 Ahmad Rashid. op. cit., pp. 376-7. 183 while in the same period, 59 percent clearly indicate the government policies regarding the war in terror.48
The popularity of Benazir Bhutto dropped her rating to 27 percent as the deal between
Benazir Bhutto and Musharraf was struck in 200749 while 50 percent people opposed the deal in November 2007 while 33 percent were in favour. In the deal, the NRO
(National Reconciliation Ordinance) was considered negative for democracy in the country claimed by 51percent in the poll survey.50
Through the American and British efforts, he entered into a secret power-sharing deal with her in 2007. This power-sharing was not based on any party political agreement but on the basis of that Washington and London urgently needed Islamabad to continue the fight against the Taliban.51
6.3. General Elections 2008
As the elections in Pakistan were drawing nearer, the terrorist activities also continued uninterrupted. Most of the election campaign was restricted to the corner meetings of the political parties in the country. Big rallies and huge gatherings were restricted to the full proof security clearance prior to the rallies were the routine activities. Most of the leaders were aware of the terrorist threats and therefore they had restricted their appearance in the public meetings and avoided open movement in the election campaign. Benazir Bhutto was also threatened by the terrorist groups and she was aware of these threats and was asked by the government to restrict her public appearance in big rallies.
48 Ijaz Shafi Gilani. op. cit., pp. 02-3 49 Ibid, p. 26. 50 Ibid, pp. 38-9. 51 Iftikhar Malik. Pakistan- Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation. London: Holland Paper, 2010, pp. 38-9. 184
Terrorism turned to new violence which reached to its climax when on 27 December,
2007, Pakistan People’s Party chairperson, Benazir Bhutto was killed in a suicide and shooting attacks after she spoke to a large gathering in Liaqat Bagh, Rawalpindi. This was the second attack on her. In the earlier attack, which occurred in Karachi in
October that year, after she returned from self-exile in Pakistan, more than 179 people were killed and more than 600 were injured. This was the largest causalities in a single terrorist attack in Pakistan. Everyone attending the rally had been searched before entering the park, and the speech passed without incident. None of the people outside the park had been screened. It was there she made a fatal decision. She put her head and shoulders through the sun roof of the vehicle to wave at the crowds. In a few movements she was dead.52
The attack was presumably carried out by anti-American Islamists based in Pakistan’s tribal regions who were wary of Islamabad’s support for the US-led war on terror.
Bhutto’s earlier statements criticizing Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other militants had not endeared her to a wide range of anti-American group intent on eliminating her. 53
On the death of Benazir Bhutto, Condoleezza Rice visited Pakistan Embassy in
Washington and signed a condolence book, where he wrote, “This is a day of great tragedy and great mourning. She was a courageous woman, the way to honor her memory is to continue the democratic process in Pakistan so that the democracy she so hoped for can emerge.”54
During the election campaign, there were restrictions and limitations imposed on the media in terms of freedom of expression and information. Private TV channels, provided contesting parties and candidates pluralistic and comprehensive coverage.
However, the media exposure was uneven with the PPP getting more airtime than the
52 Owen Bennett Jones. op. cit., pp. 01-02. 53 Iftikhar Malik. op. cit., p. 38. 54 Condoleezza Rice. No Higher Honour – a memoir. London: Simon and Schuster, 2011, p. 621. 185
PML (N) and in contrast public broadcasters did not provide balanced coverage and tended to give greater exposure to Pervaiz Musharraf, the government and the PML
(Q) at the expense of other parties.55
All that Musharraf had done was to be proved as a US involvement in Pakistan’s political affairs like the forced deportation of Sharif on September 10, 2007, endorsed the controversial Presidential Elections on October 2007 and striking a deal between
Bhutto and Musharraf.56
Benazir Bhutto had become a visible critic of the Pakistani Taliban and of the forces of radical Islam in Pakistan. She had been particularly vocal in her condemnation of the vigilantism associated with Lal Masjid and had sharply criticized the government for failing to move against it sooner.57
Pervaiz Musharraf had outlasted his welcome. His cronies were unpopular. Large- scale manipulation had been vetoed by the new Chief of Army Staff. The elections were cautiously rigged to deny any single party an overall majority in accordance with the US-brokered deal with Benazir.58
The 2008 general elections in Pakistan were a blow to Musharraf as well as the religious parties alliance, which lost its stronghold to the secular Awami National party (ANP). The Peoples Party emerged as the largest party with 120 out of a total of
342 seats in the National Assembly closely followed by Sharif Muslim League with
55 Yunas Smad. The Pakistan-US conundrum. Jihadists, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control. London: Hurst & Company,2011, p. 202. 56 Moonis Ahmar. “Perception on Pak-US Relations after 9/11” in M. Saleem Kidwai (Ed.). op. cit., p. 225. 57 John R. Schmidt. op. cit., p. 153. 58 Tariq Ali. The Dual- Pakistan on the flight of American Power. London: Simon & Schuster, 2008, p, 255. 186
90 seats and the ANP with 13. The pro Musharraf Muslim League won 51 and the
MQM 25. The defeat for the religious front was decisive.59
After the general elections of 2008, there was an atmosphere of mutual agreement among all the political forces who showed willingness to act for the benefit of the people. The PPP and the PML (N) agreed to act collectively and pledged to restore the judges who were deposed by Musharraf. “ANP was given vote in 2008 for peace.”60
“Zardari policies were more effective in countering terrorism and modifying foreign policy on account of its being an elected government. The ANP was also clear in its policies and more concerned about terrorism. Had ANP not been in government in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the whole country would have fallen in the grip of militants.
They (ANP) have affectively tackled them.”61 The PML (N) support for talks and distancing from the US part of the strategy emphasized to seeking to undermine both the Pakistani Taliban and the Jamaat-i- Islami by drawing away their supporters into mainstream politics. PML (N) leaders estimated that in the February 2008 elections which the Jamaat had boycotted, 40 percent of Jamaat voters nonetheless turned upon to vote PML (N).62
The MQM’s appeal to the masses of Pakistan was restricted still further by its strong stand against the Taliban, which reflected a mixture of genuine hostility to Taliban ideology, ethnic hostility to the allegedly pro- Taliban- Pathan of Karachi, and a strong play for American and British support. The MQM had identified Karachi as an essential route for US and NATO supplies to Afghanistan and was determined to exploit this strategic opportunity to the best of its ability.63
59 Ibid, p. 269. 60 Jehanzen Khan. Prof. Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan, Interview, Mardan, 15 August, 2013. 61 Akel Yousafzai, Interview, Peshawar, 05 March. 2013. 62 Anatol lieven. op. cit., p. 247. 63 Ibid, p. 250. 187
The victory of PPP in 2008 elections, widely seen as the freest and the fairest in
Pakistan’s electoral history, gave her legitimacy. The 2008 elections had been held in the most favorable possible conditions for the PPP. The PPP iconic leader, Benazir
Bhutto, had been assassinated and throughout Pakistan there was a wave of sympathy for her party.64
By the time the elections were held on 18 February 2008, the rise in suicide bombing, the public disgust over the breakdown of law and order, Bhutto’s assassination and the severe public disenchantment with US-led policies in the region translated into an overwhelming anti-Musharraf vote.65
The MMA and Musharraf were seem as being completely ineffective in combating disorder and, in fact, were viewed as causing the increased militancy inside and outside the country. As a result, both were decisively trounced in the elections of
2008.66
The Pakistan elections of February 2008 spawned several new important developments, including the decisive role of civil society, the primacy of the ballot over the bullet, the rejection of one man rule, a constructive engagement with activities and militants rather than sheer force, and an undiminished demand for the primacy of constitutional policies.
“The failure of MMA was reflected in the comeback of ANP and PPP in the 2008 elections as people gave vote to these parties for peace, especially to ANP. The ANP proved of it in making peace agreement with the militants in Swat.”67 It was against this background that ANP achieved an electoral comeback in 2008. It was a vote for bringing an end to the conflicts in Swat, the tribal areas and other parts of NWFP.
64 Owen Bennett Jones. op. cit., p. 36. 65 Iftikhar Malik. op. cit., p. 65. 66 Ibid, p. 133. 67 Ashraf Ali, Interview, Islamabad, 04 June, 2013. 188
After the elections, the ANP leaders believed that they could talk to fellow Pakthun in the Pakistani Taliban, the TNSM and other organizations, and by appealing to
Pakthun unity persuaded them to stop fighting, but they never succeeded.68
Emphasizing dialogue with the tribal elders and resisting the military option, the
National Assembly and the new ANP-led provincial government in the NWFP evoked some positive responses from FATA, which unnerved Washington. The US efforts in
2008 to persuade the new regime in Islamabad through a carrot- and-stick policy could afford to ignore wide spread Pakistani public resentment.69
Crucially, the election results dealt a blow to the religious-political parties who had failed to deliver on promised reforms in their respective provinces. In their place, the mainstream parties gained the centre-stage, espousing global and secular solutions, referring dialogue and democracy over violence and intolerance. These elections proved that democratic processes, rather than coercion were the best antidote to religious militancy.70
After the 2008 elections in Pakistan, a split mandate came out in all the four provinces, no party was in a position to make its own government. Even in the provinces, the split mandate compelled the political parties to establish coalition governments in centre as well as in the provinces. The main parties that emerged in the elections of 2008 were the PPP, PML (N), PML (Q), ANP and MQM. All the parties in one province or the other remained coalition partner at the center also. The war on terror also affected the political parties working in the government.
The coalition government was also an outcome of the war as most of the political leaders knew that they could not afford to street agitation because of the bad law and order situation. Most of the leaders remained indoors and tried to avoid public
68 Owen Bennett Jones. op. cit., p. 39. 69 Iftikhar Malik. op. cit., p. 164. 70 Ibid, p. 139. 189 appearance and gathering because many political leaders and workers remained on the hit list of the terrorists. This also brought all the political leaders to negotiation and conciliation politics rather than confrontation.
The election results were seen by many religious parties as conspiracy against the foreign actors and internal elements in Pakistan, in general, and in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, in particular. They thought that all the anti-Islam elements combined against the religious parties in the 2008 and 2013 elections in Pakistan. According to them, the US had much influence in Pakistan’s internal politics and it needed such results which could support her agenda.
Another factor which facilitated alliances among the political parties was the threat of terrorist attacks which had threatened the state writ and even its existence. This also brought change in the minds of the leaders to become united against this monster and support each other in this era of horror. Every political leader in public meeting and on the official level, spoke on terrorism. The terrorism was the top priority or agenda of most of the official meetings or interaction with the foreign dignitaries.
A mutual trust developed between the civil and military leaderships in the wake of war on terror because both of them were the main stakeholders in this regard. The decision of the military operations was endorsed by the political leadership who thought of the actions taken by the military against terrorism a need of the hour.
Before this, the military was solely responsible for action against the terrorist inside
Pakistan.
In 2008 elections, ANP experienced a surprising resurgence, when it soundly defeated religious political alliance (MMA). This victory reflected Pashtun discontent with the poor performance of the Islamist provincial government in NWFP, growing concerns about Islamist militancy, and the belief that MMA was accommodating the militant agenda and activities too much. 190
The unilateral actions taken by the Army had become unpopular during Musharraf’s regime and was willing to conduct operations only if they had the full support of the civilian authorities. The Army had indicated that it was ready to act but expected the
PPP-led coalition to take political fall-out that was inevitable.
The ANP-the leading partner in the NWFP government insisted the federal government in accepting the deal with the Taliban in Swat. When the Sharia Bill was debated in the National Assembly, they temporarily walked out of the National
Assembly accusing the PPP of resorting to delaying tactics. However, the Taliban saw the negotiations as a sign of weakness and they poured out of tribal areas first into
Swat to consolidate their position and then expanded into Buner, only 100 miles from
Islamabad. Public opinion in Pakistan was becoming increasingly hostile to cooperating with the United States on the war on terror-the figure had increased from
46 percent against cooperation in September 2006 to 80 percent by July 2009.71
In April 2009, the provincial government agreed to enforce the Nizam e Adl
Regulation in Swat-a demand of local population. Qazi courts were to be established.
President Zardari referred the agreement to the Parliament, which endorsed it but was opposed by the MQM. International media and the US government condemned this agreement.
According to estimate, the Awami National Party lost more than 700 political workers including several and leaders in the terrorist attacks. Its top leadership in the province was attacked. Asfandyar Wali Khan, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, Maulana Fazlur-
Rehman, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, were all targeted by the terrorists in different times.
Members of the Provincial Assembly lost their lives in the suicide attacks. Shamsher
Khan, Alamzab Khan, Bashir Ahmad Bilour were the victims of terrorist attacks.
Close relatives of the members of Provincial Assembly were also targeted. Pir
71 Yunas Samad. op. cit., pp. 162-3. 191
Muhammad, a cousin of Amir Muqam lost his life, while Mian Iftikhar Hussain lost his son in the terror attacks.
Everyone in the province, in one way or the other has been affected by these attacks.
If someone escaped from the terrorist attacks, the close relatives or friends became the victims instead. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province witnessed the most violent period of its history. The war on terror which started in Afghanistan had spilled over to
FATA and then to the province. The largest military operations in Pakistan history were conducted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Malakand Division and other parts of the province. The largest population displacement was also recorded in the 2009-2011 period.
The Taliban’s violent activities in Swat turned the world attention to this region. After the 2008 elections, the new provincial government of ANP, its leaders had appalled by the widespread suffering and destruction caused by the continuing fighting in Swat and decided to negotiate an end to it. They managed to reach a deal with Mullah
Fazalullah in May 2010 in which the ANP agreed to the implementation of Shariah
Laws in Swat in return for TNSM agreement to lay down its arms. The agreement lasted for a month. Mullah Fazalullah, a leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan refused to disarm his men until the army removed its forces from the valley. An offensive operation was started against the Taliban in Swat. Taliban destroyed tourist infrastructure, killed local politicians, including officials of ANP and others driven from the valley. Girls schools were burnt and destroyed, punishment was meted out for watching television, singing and dancing and failing to grow a beard.72
President Zardari used the bargain and compromise principle of an elitist democracy to settle the issues peacefully. Pakistan’s democracy survived amid the rise of Al-
72 John R. Schmidt. op. cit., pp. 156-7. 192
Qaeda’s nihilism fuelled by anti-Americanism is its basic strength. Most of Pakistan’s militant groups allied with Al-Qaeda, rejected the constitution and democracy.
“The mindset, which is currently attacking the ANP workers, will target others in future. Let me clear one thing that this is not the sole responsibility of our party to save the system. All political forces should sit together and formulate the joint line of action against terrorism”73 told Asfandyar Wali in a press conference.
ANP politicians in Swat and elsewhere were killed by the Taliban in large numbers.
From their elections to the NWFP government in February 2008 and to the counter- offensive in Swat in May 2009, the ANP’s policy towards the Taliban presented a picture of utter confusion, of calling for tough military action while bitterly condemning every action that caused civilian causalities and of attacking the military for covert links to the Taliban while continued to pursue talks with the Taliban themselves.74
In February 2009 the ANP government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa negotiated a settlement with the Taliban of Swat based on the adoption by the national government of Nizam-e-Adl (system of justice) regulation for Swat and the adjoining districts of the Malakand administrative division. This stipulated an exclusive rule of the Islamic justice in Swat district, as well as amnesty for all Taliban. In return, the Taliban were to cease attacks on the army, police and local population. On 13 April, the agreement was passed into law by the National Assembly and signed by President Zardari. It was supported by the majority of Pakistanis, except the mohajirs of Karachi. Responding to the will of the electorate, all the political parties in the National Assembly except the MQM voted for the agreement. Nizam-e-Adl Agreement proved to be the start of
73 Dawn, December 26, 2012. 74 Anatol Lieven. op. cit., p. 450. 193 what appeared to be an important turning point in Pakistan’s struggle with the
Taliban.75
Nizam-e-Adl Agreement, so much criticized at the time, contributed enormously to the reversal in the Taliban's fortunes, because Taliban also misinterpreted it to mean that they were winning and the army was on the run. Four Taliban acts were responsible for transforming public opinion concerning the need to fight against the
Taliban. The first was to extend its campaign of terrorism from the Pathan areas to
Punjab, including the attacks on Marriot Hotel and Lahore. The second was the publicly caning of a seventeen year old girl for “immorality” in Swat by Taliban. This film was widely shown on Pakistani television captured by a mobile phone camera.76
The speech of Sufi Mohammad in April in which he stated that we hate democracy and we want Islam in the entire world. We don’t believe in elections and democracy.
There will be no appeal against the Shariah courts in the highest Court of Pakistan.
This showed Pakistanis that the Taliban were by no means just good Muslims, aiming at over- throwing the existing state and imposing their own rule. Again the Taliban sent their forces to capture Buner much closer to the settled districts of Mardan and
Swabi.77
The ANP leadership ordered its own supporters and activists to support the military operations and to stop criticizing the military for civilian casualties. The ANP propaganda began stressing the number of ANP politicians who had been killed by the Taliban and the Taliban's threat to democracy in the province. This changed the behavior of ANP leadership from peace to military actions.78
75 Ibid, p. 456. 76 Ibid, p. 458. 77 Ibid, p. 459. 78 Ibid, p. 461. 194
6.4. Parliament Resolutions Regarding Terrorism
The Musharraf take over in October 1999 was a positive development for the US after the 9/11 because it was Musharraf only in the region who gave full support to the US in the war on terror against the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. This was the U-Turn of
Musharraf’s regime which turned his own people against him and the Army.
Majority of the people were disagreeing with the Musharraf policy towards the war on terror and Afghanistan. All the main issues regarding war on terror were in the hands of general Musharraf and he was tackling them without sharing his power with the politicians in his early years. This political development which had some time challenged his authority but the grip of Musharraf was still strong on the issues regarding war on terror and alliance with the United States.
One thing very encouraging in the Parliament and in the Provincial Assemblies especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was that they always spoke against Pakistan’s flawed policy on terrorism and presented people sentiments on the floor of the
Assemblies.
As the role of the parliament was very weak from the very first day in Pakistan, the issue of terrorism was highlighted time and again reflecting the political leader’s seriousness on the issue. The parliamentary debates reflected the grave situation in the country and they wanted to resolve the terrorism issue in the national interest of
Pakistan and not on the dictations of foreign powers.
It was a fact that the Parliament (National Assembly and Senate) had discussed all issue, but it was also a hard reality that it did not give full weightage on this problem, as revealed from the debates held and resolutions adopted in the Houses.
The resolutions which are divided in majority and consensus or unanimous have different effects. The resolutions passed with majority are not binding to enforce them 195 but the unanimous or consensus resolutions were those on which the government was bound to work or implement them in letter and spirit. The Resolutions reflected the sentiments of the House, in other words, the honourable members views and ultimately of the people of Pakistan sentiments on many issues. The resolutions which were passed related to terrorism concerning the people and their leaders, on the one hand, and to chalk out a policy, on the other hand.
The first resolution which was unanimously passed in the National Assembly of
Pakistan regarding terrorism was on November 2003. “It has been moved that this
House condemns the terrorism in all its forms and manifestations presently prevailing in Pakistan and conveys its appreciation to the President of Pakistan General Pervaiz
Musharraf for his courage and consistent support to the war on terror. The House condemns the terrorist act of bombing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as a result of which about twenty one persons were killed and several injured. The House also condemns the killing of all Pakistanis and the foreigners through act of terrorism and sends its profound condolences to the bereaved families here in Pakistan and in the world.”79
On a call attention notice,80 a Resolution was passed on the loss of human lives due to
Wana Operation in March 2004. In that debate, leader of the Jamiat-Ulma-e-Islam (F)
Fazlur Rehman warned the government that the tribal area was on the verge of explosions, if you put flame to it, then the fire will not be stopped.81 On the same session, the Jamaat-i-Islami Amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad addressed the House in these words:
“General Pervaiz Musharraf without consultation with the nation took the U-turn on the war on terror and changed all the previous policies in one stroke. Those policies would not be allowed to be changed with one man decision. Because of the Musharraf
79 The National Assembly of Pakistan. Debates: Official Report, Vol. X. No. 37, 2003, pp: 2614-15. 80 The National Assembly of Pakistan. Debates: Official Report, Vol. XII. No. 9, 2004, pp: 1374-75 81 Ibid, page 1387 196 policies, the nation is in confusion and this has created many problems and ambiguities in the nation. We are involved in such a war which has no end.”82
From 2002 to the end of 2011, fourteen National Assembly Resolutions were passed regarding war on terrors and condemned them. Two resolutions were passed by the joint sitting of the parliament because of the importance of the situation and matter.
Resolution regarding the condemnation of terrorists attacks on Shaukat Aziz (August
2004), terrorist acts in Samara, Iraq (March 2006), attacks on a Madrassa in Bajaur
Agency (October, 2006), bomb blast and suicide attacks (February, 2007), terrorist attacks on Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao (April 2007), tragic death of Benazir Bhutto in terrorist attacks (April 2008), NATO attacks in Angoor Ada (September, 2008), defused tension in South Asia (December, 2008), attacks on G.H.Q (October, 2009), target killings in the country (September, 2010) resolution on Swat situation (January,
2009), terms of engagement with US/NATO/ISAF (April, 2012). Two resolutions of joint sitting of parliament of the In-Camera session (October, 2008) and (May, 2011) were the main resolutions regarding terrorism in the country.
Three calling attention motions were also raised in the House about terrorism in the country while ten adjournment motions were raised with the urgency of the matter.
Most of the adjournment motions were about the Lal Masjid tragic accident in 2007.
Eight resolutions were also passed in the Senate from 2001 to 2011 period, only one resolution regarding Drone attacks in Pakistan.
The main event in the war on terror campaign in Pakistan was the Lal Masjid episode which had changed everything afterwards. Through a calling notice in the National
Assembly of Pakistan, the honourable members of the Assembly talked on an issue when some students of the Jamia Hifsa had occupied a nearby children library adjacent to Lal Masjid saying that some female students had kalashnikovs in their
82 The National Assembly of Pakistan. Debates: Official Report, Vol. X. No. 13, 2004, p: 1977. 197 hands standing near the madrassa and the government should take notice of the issue seriously.83 After February till the end of July 2007, there were no serious efforts made on the floor of the House which could resolve it without any bloodshed of the students of the madrassa.
After the Lal Masjid operation, the 42nd Session of the National Assembly started from 30th of July, 2007, discussion took place on the incident in ten adjournments in a single day but it was now fruitless to discuss it as the war started in the country against the state of Pakistan immediately after the “Operation Silence.”84
In the Senate85 of Pakistan, the Senators discussed terrorism widely as ten resolutions were passed on the security and terrorism. The Senate’s resolution of condemning US attacks on 13th January 2006 in Damadola village in Bajaur Agency was the first resolution adopted unanimously against the foreign attack, the discriminatory attitude towards Maulana Sami ul Haq in Brussels in 2005, continued in one voice against any foreign aggression and terrorism in the country.
The first comprehensive resolution adopted in the Senate was on the 6th August 2008.
The Senate of Pakistan, “Conscious of the grave threat posed by terrorism and extremism; reaffirming Pakistan’s commitment to effectively fight the scourge of terrorism and extremism; reaffirming also Pakistan’s determination to strengthen bonds of brotherhood and close collaboration with Afghanistan; condemned the cowardly attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul and rejected the baseless allegations leveled against Pakistan in that regard.”86
83 The National Assembly of Pakistan. Debates: Official Report, 8th February, 2007. Vol. XXXIX. No 3, pp: 282-286. 84 Operation Silence was the Code name of the operation against the inmate of the Lal Masjid. 85 Senate is the second upper chamber of Pakistan Parliament, consisting of 104 members divided equally in all the federal units (Provinces). 86 (R.D. No. 39- 45/2008-D). The Senate of Pakistan 6.8.2008. 198
But again the foreign incursion into Pakistan’s territory continued despite government’s strong protest in the Parliament and other public forums. The US/ISAF attack on Angor Ada, was condemned in a resolution in the Senate.
The Senate of Pakistan strongly condemned the attack by the Coalition / USAF troops on village Zulali near Angor Ada on 3rd September, 2008, in a grave violation of
Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any incursion inside our territory and resulting loss of innocent lives is unacceptable. The House called upon the government to take all necessary measures to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and repel such attacks in future with full force.87
As the foreign incursions continued in the tribal areas, the drone attacks were the main concern in Pakistan but the first resolution adopted in the Senate regarding the drone attacks was in September 2008, despite the fact that the drone attacks continued from 2004 when in the first drone attack the Taliban commander Nek Muhammad was killed. It was believed that it was the first drone attack in Pakistan since the war of terror started in 2001. Till September 2008, dozens of attacks took place but the government was silent on the issue in the Parliament and most of the Pakistanis considered that they are conducted with the government consent.
In September 2008, the government strongly condemned drone attacks in the Senate for the first time because the people, civil society and all segments of society in the country had raised the issue on every forum and it was now impossible to ignore the public opinion on this matter. The other factor was also the new government which was truly people representative and the role of General Musharraf was now reduced on the vital issues. The third factor was the main opposition party – the Pakistan
Muslim League (N) which was against Musharraf in strong terms and criticized his polices on every occasion. The PML (N) always spoke against the war on terror
87 The Senate of Pakistan. R.D. No 10-46/2008-D, 4.9.2008. 199 policy in the country which was initiated by Musharraf and wanted to make changes in this regard. Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) also mobilized the masses against the drone attacks in the country. The religious parties especially Jamait
Ulama-e-Islam (JUI-F) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) were the main opponents of the US policy of drone attacks in Pakistan.
“The Senate of Pakistan strongly condemns the missile attacks by drones in Pakistan territory resulting in immense loss of life; Emphasizes that such attacks are most unfortunate and constitute a gross violation of our national sovereignty and territory; underlines that continued incursions into Pakistan’s territory are harming the government’s efforts to seek political solutions through dialogue; declares that attacks inside Pakistan territory are unacceptable and the government should take more effective measures to stop them; Calls upon the government to convey Pakistan’s strong protect to the US and NATO/ISAF authorities and seek assurances for full respect of Pakistan’s sovereignty.”88
Again when the Salala incident took place, the Senate strongly condemned that attack and a unanimous resolution was passed and requested the government to stop such attacks in future and act upon the joint resolutions of the Parliament adopted in
October 2008 and May 2001 respectively.
It was observed in the Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan debates that most of the terrorist incidents were raised in the House by the members from the respective provinces.
Terrorism in Pakistan and the US forces involvement in the violation of Pakistan’s territory were the two main issues which were hot debated in the Parliament but no concrete steps were taken either by the government or the opposition in this regard.
88 The Senate of Pakistan. R.D. 9-47/2008-D. 27.10.2008. 200
6.5. Joint Sitting of the Parliament
The background of the first joint sitting of the parliament and in-camera session on terrorism, violence in the country and then a consensus resolution was passed. In July
2007 after the Lal Masjid operation, the wave of terror attacks spread many times in the country. On the one hand the military and militants war was continuing in FATA and KP while, on the other hand, the US incursion in Pakistan’s territory also continued.
The drone attacks multiplied manifold and every drone attack in FATA multiplied
Pakistan’s enemies in the country. The US involvement in Pakistan’s internal matter was felt by many Pakistanis as a violation of national sovereignty and a security threat. Many times, the US/NATO forces crossed the border and attacked on militants on Pakistani side of the border. Pakistan repeatedly asked Washington to stop violation of its territory but the US continued it without any heed to these request. In the early 2008, the new government of PPP was established at the centre and ANP in
KP province, there was a thinking developed among all segments of society that some changes might be brought in the policies towards US and terrorism, contrary to the previous government.
2008-2009 was the most violent period in the history of terrorism in Pakistan as on the daily basis there occurred a suicide attack in different parts of the country.
Peshawar, Lahore, Islamabad and every major city saw that violence. Every drone strike also created many human bombs who targeted security forces and masses as they wanted to take revenge from the Pakistanis because the Americans were far away from their range.
This surge of violence in the country and the US and NATO forces violation of
Pakistan’s territory compelled the Parliamentarians to chalk out some policy to take 201
up all these issues with the United States. For this purpose, an in-camera89 session was
convened in Islamabad on October 2008 to review the situation. This session
continued from 8th of October till 22nd October, 2008 and at the end of the joint sitting
of the Parliament, a consensus resolution was passed. The 14 point resolution was the
first comprehensive move towards war on terror, militancy and extension, violence
and violation of its territory and asking for a comprehensive plan of action in this
regard. The main features of the resolution include:
An independent foreign policy was needed to restore peace and combating terrorism
in the country;
Dialogue will be the main focus of the government to resolve the issue of terrorism
and violence. Pakistan’s territory will not be used against any other country.
Democracy will be strengthened in the country and resources will be brought to the
rest of the country. Writ of the state will be established in different conflict zones and
the local laws and customs of the area will be used to enhance confidence among the
people. The internally displaced people will be rehabilitated and victims of terror will
be paid and public opinion will be moulded against terrorism through media and
religious participation. For all these development and to achieve the desired results, a
special committee of the parliament will be constituted to monitor the implementation
of the resolution.90
The main theme of the resolution was a foreign policy based on its own national
interests, combating terrorism through dialogue and local customs like Jirga, and
economic opportunities.
89 In-Camera session of the Join session of Parliament was attended by the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), DG (ISI). They briefed the Parliamentarian on the security situation in the country. The meeting was not open to the media and all proceedings were confidential. 90 Library, National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad. 202
On May 2nd 2011, the US special operation forces, SEALS conducted a military operation “Operation Neptune” in Abbottabad in which the most wanted to the US,
Osama Bin Laden, leader of the Al Qaeda was killed.
This raid was widely celebrated in the US and the West as a great victory against the terrorists but in Pakistan, it was considered to be a grave violation of its sovereignty and highhandedness of the US in its relations with Pakistan. Before the operation,
Pakistan was not informed about such activities inside Pakistan and the people of
Pakistan were shocked not on the killing of Osama Bin Laden but on the blatant violation of its territory despite the fact that Pakistan is the most important ally of the
US and NATO forces in the war against terrorism. A strong criticism was developed in the media against the political as well as military leadership and they were criticized on this issue. In the Parliament, there was a hot debate and the government was unable to defend its position on the May 2, incident.
To make a foreign Policy of its own, independent from the foreign powers involvement and respect of its “red line,”91 a special meeting of the two Houses was convened on 13-14 May 2011, to discuss the issue and chalk out a future plan of action. The in-camera session of the Parliament was briefed by the Director General
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Director General, Military Operation, D.G MO and
Deputy Chief of Air Staff (Operations). The joint sitting of the two Houses resolved:
“Pakistan again condemns the US raid in Abbottabad and drone attacks and warns of blocking the NATO supplies of the US/NATO;
Pakistan will uphold its sovereignty and national security and safeguard its national interests;
91 The territorial sovereignty of the State. 203
To support the armed forces of Pakistan by the government and the people, and also to work on the recommendations of the previous joint session of the parliament in
October 2008 and on the recommendations of Parliamentary Committee of National
Security in April 2009 in formulating independent foreign policy to safeguard its national interests. This resolution also called upon the government to appoint an independent commission on the Abbottabad operation and fix the responsibility of the inability of those who were concerned about the security of the state.”92
In this resolution, the main focus was on the national security and sovereignty of the state and for the first time in the war on terror, the government through Parliament conveyed a strong message to the US/NATO forces that Pakistan may block the
NATO Supplies if its sovereignty was violated again. It was a strong message for the
US/NATO but again, the violation of territorial sovereignty continued in the shape of drone attacks in tribal areas. The second major development in this session was the establishment of a commission which worked on the incidents.
All these resolutions have reflected the sentiments of the people on serious matter such as security and sovereignty of Pakistan. All these resolutions reflect the seriousness of the problem and the commitment of political leadership to resolve them peacefully. In all the resolutions of National Assembly and Senate, one thing was clear that they wanted to end the violence in Pakistan through peaceful means.
Another issue, highlighted in these resolutions was the US interference and violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.
Sometimes, the US /NATO/ISAF forces directly crossed the border and attacked the tribal areas, killed many people including women and children. These gross violations were recorded and condemned in clear terms. The two resolutions adopted in the joint sitting of the Parliament were based mostly on the US gross violation of its territory.
92 Library, National Assembly of Pakistan. 204
The political leadership of the country always talked about it and they also chalked out a roadmap but the same was rarely executed in their letter and spirit.
The unanimous resolutions of the parliament are binding on the government to implement them but they never did that because there was a gap between the political and military leadership on how to resolve the issue of terrorism in the country. There is a gap between the government and opposition on this issue again and also a very deep gap between the political parties and policies towards this issue.
The role of Parliament is more important but these are not binding on the government.
“If the government decision was not exercised, then how the role of Parliament remained active.”93
Some think that “it was a good trend because most of the parties are people representatives and to discuss every issue in Parliament is the reflection that the political system is mowing in the right direction. The briefing of the ISI and the presence of Army Chief among the politicians was a good sign for democracy.”94
The violence in the province is totally and purely based on the war on terror in the region and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province has taken this issue very seriously and always at the top of all issues.
The members of Provincial Assembly mostly spoke on this issue and lengthy debates were recorded in the provincial assembly meetings. If we see the record of the
Provincial Assembly, there were 61 resolutions passed in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Assembly during 2008-2011, i.e., the governing period of the newly elected government after the MMA government for 2002-2007 period.
93 Zamrud Khan, Interview, Islamabad, 14 April, 2013. 94 Babar Ghauri, Interview, Islamabad, 21 April, 2013. 205
The Provincial Assembly of KP first resolution was passed against the terrorist act in which Benazir Bhutto was killed in December 2008, the second elected government after the military take-over in 2009.95
During all this period, 2008-2011, every issue of national or provincial matter was discussed in the Provincial Assembly and resolutions were passed to resolve the problem in the province because of the immediate affectees which the inhabitants of this province are. Not only the masses but the political leaders and workers are also targeted in the province.
In the Provincial Assembly, the members were concerned towards these developments. A resolution was also passed in the Assembly to rehabilitate those people who were internally displaced during the insurgency and violence in Swat operation.96
Resolution condemned the border violation of NATO forces in Kurram Agency and requested the federal government to immediately take actions against them and ensure that such attacks will never be repeated again.97
In a Resolution, the Provincial Assembly requested the government to make arrangement temporarily for school students to continued their studies as the terrorist destroyed hundreds of schools in Swat and different parts of KP.98
All those resolutions passed by the Parliament were also supported in the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Assembly and similar resolutions were passed in the Assembly but many urgent matters were left by the federal government or Parliament which had been a matter of concern in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
95 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly Resolutions No 2, 28-03-2008, p. 90. 96 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly, Resolution No. 24, 12-03-2009, p. 91. 97 Ibid, Resolution No. 94, 13-08-2008, p. 96. 98 Ibid, Resolution No. 113, 15-01-2009, p. 99. 206
For example the rehabilitations of people in tribal areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa who had been affected by insurgencies and terrorist attacks and of subsequent military operations, no resolutions were recorded in the parliament for them. Debate on such issue would have provoked heated debate in the Assembly.
These schools especially of the girls were mostly destroyed in the tribal areas as well as in the KP but the provincial government had no such comprehensive plan to build them on emergency basis. For the IDPs, a resolution was passed in the KP Assembly wherein the camps in different parts of KP, the people were suffering from the lack of food and clean drinking water facilities, which had threatened the lives of children and women at large.99
It was also noted in the Assembly session that the in-camera briefing in the Parliament by the armed forces to the Parliamentarians, the members of the Provincial Assembly also requested the federal government in a resolution that they should also arrange an in-camera session for the members of Provincial Assembly to make much awareness of the alarming situation in FATA and KP and about the military operations in different parts.100
The Provincial Assembly passed two resolutions against the drone strikes in FATA, one on 17-03-2009 and the other on 18-04-2011. In the later resolution, the Assembly requested the US government through the federal government to transfer drone technology to Pakistan to be effectively used by the government itself against the terrorists.
“From the present drone attacks, the hatred is increasing among the tribal people because all the tribal are not and have nothing to do with them. We will continue this
99 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Provincial Assembly, Resolution No. 169, 05-03-2009, p. 103. 100 Ibid, Resolution No. 175, 25-02-2008, p. 104. 207 war against the enemies of humanity and it is the war for the state sovereignty and to safeguard our generations.”101
The sixty one resolutions passed by the Provincial Assembly in the five years period of its existence revealed the fact that how the members of the Provincial Assembly were handling the problem from time to time. Most of the working of the Assembly was consumed by the law and order debate in the Assembly and discussion on the terrorist activities in the province.
Dozens of times, the Assembly sessions started with prayers of the departed souls in the terrorist attacks in the province. The law making process was badly affected due to poor law and order situation in the province. Even a time came when the terrorist attacks were so frequent that the provincial government was thinking to shift the provincial capital to Abbottabad. Despite all these threats, the political leadership of the KP stood firm in their stand to root out militancy from the Province.
If we compare the Parliament and the Provincial Assembly working and resolutions, the provincial government and Assembly were more concerned than the former because of the daily bomb blasts, suicide attacks in the province, hundreds of terrorist attacks took place in the province but the Parliament took the issue a few times only which showed its lack of seriousness in the matter. In contrast, Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, talked about the issue not only on the floor of the Assembly but on every other forum of the country.
The condemnations of terrorist attacks, support to the victims of terrorism, to declare the province as a terrorist affected areas, condemned drone attacks, waiver in the taxes, rehabilitation of the internally displaced people, demanding shelter for those whose homes were destroyed in the terrorist attacks or in the military operation’s
101 Ibid, Resolution No. 555, 18-04-2011, p. 135.
208 reconstructions of destroyed schools etc., are the issue on which the Provincial government had been voicing concern all. In other words, this war is against the terrorists by the army and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa only and the rest of the country has little worry about this.
6.6. All Parties Conference (APC)
The US allegations and Pakistan’s response to the new development on 29th
September 2011, Pakistan’s role in the war on terror has been acknowledged by all the US high officials from the very first day of its beginning. The Bush administration’s declaration of Pakistan as a major “Non-NATO Ally” was a real landmark in its relationship with the US and NATO regarding the role in the war on terror. The overall 70 percent of NATO supplies were made via the Pakistan’s boarder areas of Chaman and Torkham. Thousands of Al Qaeda militants including its top leadership were captured or killed. The real information which led to the killing of
Osama Bin Laden was made by the Pakistan intelligence agencies efforts. Despite all these contribution of Pakistan, acknowledged by the US and NATO, the relations between the two got strained because of one or another reason. These relationships were sometimes reached to a very hostile and aggressive stage and were used to compel Pakistan to reshape its policy regarding its own interests.
After the Abbottabad operation on May 2, Pakistan changed its working relationship with the US and NATO to safeguard its own national interest and security of its “red line” i.e. respect of its sovereignty. Many issues which were tackled by the Musharraf government on its personal commitment were now written in black and white. The government was now aware of the precarious situation of the country and needed to change state policy regarding war on terror and to make every decision in written and through a formal procedure. The US policy of “Do More” had annoyed Pakistanis and had undermined its contribution in the war on terror, and it hurt its mutual co- 209 operation and assistance in Afghanistan and in the region. On many occasions, the
Pakistani leadership clearly stated that “No Do More” on the Pakistan side but now
“do more on the US side” to help Pakistan and combat terrorism into full support its major Non NATO Ally.
The US government policy of putting pressure on Pakistan on various issues from time to time was considered by the latter which not only brought the military and political leadership on the same page but the people of Pakistan also showed their resentment over US policy towards Pakistan. An allegation of US General against
Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) had made the political and military leadership to chalk out policy and develop a consensus on the grave situation.
In September 2011, in a militant attack in Kabul on US Embassy and NATO offices in which 16 people were killed, the US military commander called Pakistan to launch a crack down against Haqqani Network in the tribal areas. Even the Defence Secretary
Leon Panetta issued a statement that the United States could launch operations inside
Pakistan to eradicate the Haqqani Network.
“I think the message they need to know is: we are going to do everything we can to defend our forces,”102 Panetta warned Pakistan after commenting on the Kabul attack.
Panetta statements and other US official blame game against Pakistan and its institutions (Army and ISI) had made the relationship worsened as these kinds of statements and threats to attack inside Pakistan had called the government of Pakistan to safeguard its own national interest and sovereignty.
“He (General Kayani) reiterated resolve and commitment of Pakistan in the struggle against terrorism while underlining Pakistan sovereignty, right to formulate policy in accordance with its national interests and the wishes of the Pakistani people” an ISPR
102 Dawn, September 17, 2011 210 statement said of General Kayani’s speech at a meeting of NATO Chiefs of Defence in Spain.103
While the US Ambassador Cameron Monter also warned Pakistan in an interview on
Radio Pakistan as “We will not allow this to happen again. Obviously, we are going to defend ourselves. We have always said we well, and we always have because when our soldiers are attacked we are not going to let that happen. The way we want to see that is through working with our Pakistan friends to deal with this group.”104
The Haqqani network is said to be the main obstruction in the normal relationship between the two countries and also in the war against terrorism. The US Senators time and again accused Pakistan’s relation with the militant groups especially of Haqqani network who, allegedly, had the safe-havens and sanctuaries in Pakistan’s North
Waziristan Agency. The government and the Army reiterated its commitment to fight against the terrorists but they have also some limitations in operation in the war against terror.
This Haqqani network was the main concern for the US, as it was involved in the attacks in Afghanistan against the US and NATO forces. The seriousness of the US government was evident from the March 25, 2009 executive order which offered 5 million reward for information leading to the location, arrest or conviction of Siraj ud
Din Haqqani, who was, reportedly, coordinating in Pakistan to cross-border attacks in
Afghanistan.
On July 23, 2010, the then State Department Spokesman, Philip J. Crowley noted that all UN members must implement a travel ban restriction, asset freeze and arms embargo against leaders of the Haqqani network. Pakistan, as a UN member must implement this international action.
103 Dawn, September 17, 2011 104 Dawn, September 17, 2011
211
On May 11, 2011, the State Department designated another network leader Badruddin
Haqqani, a foreign terrorist commander who “operates from North Waziristan” in
FATA.
In the State Department Annual Report of 2011, groups such as Haqqani network using Pakistan’s Western border against attacks on US and NATO forces in
Afghanistan.
In a meeting between the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Pakistan’ Foreign
Minister Hina Rabbani Khar in New York on 19th September, 2011, in a three and a half long session, the main focus was on the counter-terrorism and especially of the
Haqqani network.
The main focus of the US officials was the Haqqani network and the terrorist organizations which are operating in Afghanistan but had safe-havens in tribal areas of Pakistan. Pakistan clearly stated her resolve to fight against terrorism and also stressed that whenever there was a massive attacks on the US and NATO, they blamed Pakistan while it was the main responsibility of the US and Afghan forces to take action against them instead of blaming Pakistan and undermine its efforts in the war against terrorism.
Meanwhile, the US troops presence became limited after the May incident, relation between the two countries was not cordial. The numbers of Special Operation trainers were dropped from 140 to fewer than 10. This was reflected in the volatile nature of its relations between the two countries caused mainly of the Drone attacks and raid of
US forces on May 2, 2011 in Abbottabad.
Not only the Secretary Defence, Leon Panetta threatened to take “operational steps” against Pakistan, but also the US military Admiral Mike Mullen accused Pakistani ISI 212 of having used the Haqqani network as a “Veritable” arms for its terrorist attacks in
Afghanistan against US and NATO forces.
Again the Pakistani political and military leadership came under pressure from the
United States on a “Non-State Actors” role in the terror issue. The Haqqani network, a terrorist organization designated by the US, working in planning, attacking and sabotaging activities in Afghanistan against the US interests, Pakistan was clearly threatened of an action by the US, if Pakistan failed to do of its own against it.
Interior Minister Rehman Malik denied any allegation against the ISI role in helping the Haqqani network. “The Pakistani nation will not allow the boots on our ground never. Our government is already co-operating with the US… but they must also respect our sovereignty” told in an interview, insisting that Islamabad wanted US intelligence, no troops to flush out insurgents inside Pakistan.105
The US Senate Appropriation Committee also warned Pakistan that it should fight against the Haqqani network if it wants economic and security assistance from the
US.
The restrictions were included in the US Department of State, foreign co-operation and related programmes. Appropriations Bill for the fiscal 2012, the Senate passed on evening by a 28-2 vote.106
On a point of order in the provincial Assembly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the
Provincial Information Minister Mian Ifrikhar Hussain warned the US that we will not tolerate any attack on our territory.107
In the prevailing situation, the special Corps Commanders Conference of the Army was convened to discuss the security situation in the country aimed the US allegations
105 Dawn, September 23, 2011 106 Dawn, September 21, 2011 107 Dawn, September 24, 2011 213 against the Army and ISI on September 26, 2011 in GHQ, Rawalpindi. On the political front, the government was trying to mobilize the national political leadership on the issue to stand a united front against the US pressure and allegations against
Pakistan. For this purpose, the Prime Minister called the leaders of all political parties to discuss the security situation in the country.
It was for the second time after the May 2, US raid in Abbottabad that the Prime
Minister reached out to heads of all political parties to discuss the security situation.
“Political differences in the domestic politics do not come in the way of national and foreign policy issues, which are above the party politics”, Said Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gillani in a handout of Prime Minister House.108 It was need of the time that all the political parties adopted a unanimous policy for the national security instead of setting swayed by petty political considerations.
Meanwhile, the President, the Prime Minster and Chief of Army Staff met in the
Presidency on 28th September, 2011 to work-out a strategy for the All Parties
Conference (APC) on the national security and also to show that political and military leaderships were on the same page in the standoff with the US.
More than 50 political leaders of almost all political and religious parties had participated in the All Parties Conference (APC) held on 30th September, 2011, to discuss the situation arising out of the serious allegations leveled by the US against
Pakistan’s armed forces and the ISI.
The proposed APC pinned to evolve a framework for the country’s foreign and security policies to set direction for progress on a pragmatic way. The top military leadership also attended the conference to give answers to the questions relating to the war on terror and relations with the US and NATO. The conference was one-point
108 Dawn, September 26, 2011
214 agenda – national security in the aftermath of security challenges emerging from outside the country.
As the tension continued between the two states, convening an APC on the issue of all political leaders in Islamabad, the White House also realized the Mullen’s grave allegation and importance of its relations with Pakistan. The White House refused to endorse Admiral Mike Mullen’s description of Pakistan’s links with the Haqqani network. The officials in Washington were unhappy with the Mullen’s statement about ISI, reported in the Washington Post.
The 13-point resolutions adopted by the APC endorsed the government to initiate dialogue with our own people in the tribal areas. The APC resolution which was signed by all the parties leaders did neither mention the Haqqani Network nor it made a direct reference to the US pressure on Pakistan to take military action against the
Haqqani.
The premier categorically stated “our national interest must be respected and honoured. Pakistan cannot be pressured to do more.”109 “give peace a chance” with the slogan indicating a change in the policy dealing with the terrorism.
The resolution said: “The APC recognized that there has to be a new direction and policy with a focus on peace and reconstitution. “Give peace a chance” must be the central guiding principle henceforth.”110
The opposition also stressed the government to implement the previous Parliamentary
Resolutions and recommendations of the joint Parliamentary Committee on National
Security and a Parliamentary Committee was to be formed to oversee the implementation on the APC resolutions and be make it public on monthly basis. The
109 Dawn, September 30, 2011 110 Dawn, September 30, 2011 215 political leaders extended full support to the armed forces and assured the complete political unity in case of any threat to national security.
The new development of initiating the All Parties Conference (APC) on national issues was very encouraging in this regard. The respondents were of the view that it was a good exercise to consult all the stakeholders on national issues but they had criticized this on many grounds. According to a respondent, “it was only a show of power and nothing else. When something is done it is needed to be in time, not once the damage has been caused.”111
“These kinds of APC have no benefits in resolving the issues, it is only point scoring on the part of politicians and only to show the world and inside the country that they are on the same page but in reality they are divided.”112 Another respondent viewed these developments in new perspective as he said, “After Musharraf period, politicians showed much maturity on national issues and especially on the system of democracy in the country. From all the recent development, we have realized the weaknesses of our institutions and this has led us to resolve the problem through a consensus of all the political parties in the country.”113 A respondent was of the view that “the APC did not play any role on political issues. It was only a tactic to reduce the pressure of the foreign countries and to raise the morale of the government and the masses. It would have been a positive step, had it been in the true spirit but most of the participants were not serious.”114
“These are very good development in the country on national issues. If the government is facing a big problem and it wants to get support of all the parties to bring a united stance, it is good. If the government initiated its own efforts on issues like dialogue with the Taliban without letting support from all the stakeholders, there
111 Jehanzeb Khan, Interview, Mardan, 21 March, 2013. 112 Mir Hasil Bezenjo, Interview, Islamabad, 03 July, 2013. 113 Sadeeq ul Farooq, Interview, Islamabad, 16 August, 2013. 114 Rustam Shah Mohmmand, Interview, Peshawar, 07 March, 2013. 216 may be much criticism in the country but if all the stakeholders get united, then these efforts may produce good results.”115
Another respondent said, “It was a good opportunity for interaction among different stakeholders on vital national issues but it has one basic flaw in it that how to do or how to implement a policy decision, no one had the answer of this question. There was no roadmap that how to practically do a thing. The important thing in APC was the implementations of the decisions if there was no working on it then it was wastage of time.”116
This was the first kind of All Parties Conference which was convened regarding war on terror and relations with the US. In this APC, the political as well as the military came close to chalk out a new policy towards the US and NATO because of the grave threat from the US. It was imperative for the government as well as all the stakeholders to start a dialogue process with the militants to peacefully resolve the terrorism issue because the force and military actions in FATA had alienated many tribesmen and had no support from the religious political parties in the country.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is the most affected province in the country. Most of the political parties which have a vote bank in the province always talk of the dialogue and always speak of it seriously to end this violence in the country especially in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while the other parts of the country were least interested and concerned with terrorism.
A respondent admitted this fact that “The Punjab or other parts of the country had not seriously taken this issue because they were not the prime target of terrorism, only the
115 Mian Iftikher Hussain, Interview, Peshawar, 27 May, 2013. 116 Salim Safi, Interview, Islamabad, 04 July, 2013. 217 people of KP and FATA felt it with utmost urgency because of the immediate effects of terrorism.”117
Others were of the view that “these kinds of APCs are nothing worth but only of point scoring. They only want to show the people that they are united but they are divided in their policies in clear terms.”118
All the respondents were of the view that Parliamentary resolutions and All Parties
Conferences (APCs) were good for democracy and for promoting consensus on national issues. These provided a platform for all parties in which everyone presented his views and reservations on vital issues. These would have proved much better, had the decisions taken in the APCs or in the resolutions been implemented in true sense.
The lack of implementation on the demands which are taken in those APCs are important and if there is no implementations or actions then it would lose its utility.
Still it was good exercise in Pakistan and should continue.
6.7. Difa-e-Pakistan Council (Defence of Pakistan Council-DPC)
Pakistan is a breeding ground for establishing and nurturing Islamic groups for the last few decades. Afghan jihad created dozens of groups which were active during the
Afghan war but they turned their focus to the neighboring states to achieve their militant agenda there. Sectarian violence erupted because of the religious and sectarian differences by these new established organizations. The young blood and illiteracy in the region increased militancy and violence in the country.
After the Soviet-Afghan war, no government gave heed to this problem because of the internal fragile political situation and after the 1988 General Zia’s sudden demise.
Only four governments ruled Pakistan in just eleven years of period till 1999 when another military ruler toke over.
117 Noman Sattar, Interview, Islamabad, June, 2013. 118 Akel yousafzai, Interview, Peshawar, 05 March, 2013. 218
Before the 9/11 event, General Musharraf had banned a few militant organizations but again they reemerged with new names and continued their activities while being more active and aware of the development in the country.
After 9/11, these militant organizations supported directly or indirectly the Afghan
Taliban and Al-Qaeda and the links between these groups continued during the war.
During the war on terror campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s support to the US, these organizations put their guns against the state and its institutions and waged war along with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. When the US involvement in Pakistan’s internal affairs increased in the shape of US drone strikes and repeatedly attacks inside the Pakistan territory by the US/NATO/ISAF forces provided an opportunity to many Islamists and religions parties to join hands for the cause of defending Pakistan against the foreign invasion. To achieve these aims, in the end of 2011 a new alliance
Difa-e- Pakistan Council (Defence of Pakistan Council) was established.
The DPC is an umbrella organization of more than forty (40) religious political parties to join hands for the defense of Pakistan. It was established after the NATO strikes in
November 2011 on a Pakistani security check post in Mohmand Agency in which more than two dozens of soldiers were killed. The images of breaking the chain in the two hands at the billboards at the rally and at the other, the show of different weapons which Pakistan has made were the main agendas which could be read on those billboards. The breaking of chains indicated freedom from the US influence and independent foreign policies.
The leaders of the alliance have two main agendas on which it was working i.e., the anti-India sentiments in the alliance and anti-US elements to join together for a united stand. The main parties or religious groups/parties which included in this alliance are:
Jamiat Ulama-i-Islam (Samiul Haq), Jamiat Ahle Hadith, Awami Muslim League,
Pakistan Muslim League (Zia), Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Jamaat-ul-Dawa, Sipaha-e- 219
Sahaba Pakistan, Tanzeem-e-Islami, International Khatam-e-Nubawwat and many more.
The leader of JUI (S), Maulana Sami ul Haq is the chairman of DPC. One thing which is very interesting is that Jamiat Ulama-i- Islam (F) has not joined this alliance. It was the view of the JUI (F) leadership that they would not join that alliance which has militant organizations and were involved in violence in one way or the other and that the defence of Pakistan is the responsibility of armed forces not of the political parties. The flags which have written the kalma tayeba along with a long sword showed their policy of jihad against the West and India. Once the government decided to close the NATO supplies from Pakistan, the DPC always talked of not to restore that supply anymore and for the purpose to achieve, they started rallies and long marches in different cities of Pakistan.
In a rally, they demanded to end the military operations in FATA and Balochistan.
They termed the unrest in Balochistan as an international conspiracy against Pakistan.
The DPC is also demanding the release of the missing persons.
Jamaat-I-Islami (JI) Ameer Munawar Hassan told in a rally that they would block the
NATO supply line if the government dared to reopen it. He also said that if the NATO supplies continued, drone attacks and Salala like incidents would not stop.
The DPC also observed Balochistan Solidarity Day on March 11, 2012 and took rally in support of Baloch rights, on a banner it was written “Hamra Dil, Hamari Jan,
Balochistan, Balochistan (our heart, our soul, Balochistan, Balochistan).”
The establishment of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council is the outcome of the US violation of sovereignty and the growing violence and terrorist activities in the country. This alliance which includes leaders who stood for jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir in the past, still have the same agenda in the present circumstances and are active 220 participants in the political activities. There are some groups which were banned by the government in the past but are also part of this alliance and the government has no interest or worry about their political activities.
Maulana Sami ul Haq-a Taliban sympathizer and leader of its own faction of Jamiat
Ulama-e-Islam and teacher and mentor of Darul Uloom Haqqania, Akora Khattak,
Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, Chief of jamaat ud Dawaa, Ijaz ul Haq, son of General Zia ul Haq, Maulana Ahmed Ludhianvi, Chief of defunct Sepah-e-Sahaba Pakistan,
Munawar Hassan-Ameer of jamaat-e-Islami, General Hamid Gul, a strong supporter of Taliban and a key figure in Afghan Jihad in the 1980s, Sheikh Rasheed, a strong supporter of anti-India element all are the leaders of the alliance.
“We are fighting for the sovereignty of Pakistan and against the American’s dominance.”119 The alliance declared agenda is to oust America from the regions, break Pakistan-US ties, back the Taliban militants, force the government to revoke the
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India and not let the NATO supplies pass through Pakistan. These organizations are now openly advocating their larger agenda in public, fighting Jihad in Kashmir and supporting Taliban despite the fact that some organizations are banned in Pakistan but still they are rallying in the big cities.
This alliance has two aims in the current situation in Pakistan, the first is to pressurize the US and India not to start any operation against Pakistan overtly or covertly because the US and India are trying to wage an operation or even at least ban their organizations and activities. The other thing was to revive the jihadi organizations and give a platform for them to get united if some crackdown started against any one of them. These organizations who take support from one another may join hands with the political forces in the country.
119 Maulana Hamid ul Haq, interview, Nowshera, May 15, 2013. 221
Many political leaders whose parties have joined the DPC have a large vote bank in their constituencies and have support in the masses. These political leaders like Ijaz ul
Haq, Sheikh Rasheed, Munawar Hassan who have strong political parties or a role in politics and have presence in the Parliament, also strengthened this alliance. Because of these political leaders in the active politics and Parliament, they may block or make an effort to law making against these defunct organizations. They can influence the
Kashmir policy (interestingly the Chairman of the Kashmir Committee of the
National Assembly is the leader of a religions political party) and the policy of the government regarding terrorism and US. The first rally of this alliance was held at
Lahore in December 2011, gathering a large numbers of people and the second was held in Rawalpindi. They have the plan to stage big rallies in all big cities of the country to get support of the large masses of population and convey a strong message internally and externally to those elements who have influenced Pakistan’s foreign policy and have been creating instability in Pakistan.
“We are neither a political alliance nor have aim to overthrow the government but only want that American interference in Pakistan should be ended” said Allama Tahir
Ashrafi.120
The main component of this alliance is a militant charity Jamaat ud Dawaa having the jihad wing Laskir-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan. By the end of 1990, the LeT emerged as the biggest Jihadi group in Kashmir operating against Indian forces.
Another umbrella alliance Tehreek Hurmat-e-Rasool (THR) on the model of THQ was established when in the European newspapers some caricatures of the Holly
Prophet (PBUH) were published. They also popularized the theme of Jihad among the people. Although the component parties of the THQ, THR and DPC overlap the theme of DPC is more secular and more populist. Those who did not join the THQ
120 The News, December, 2011. 222 and THR alliances now easily aligned themselves with DPC because of its anti-
American and anti-Indian stance. The DPC success lies also in the fact that how much anti American and India feelings are available among the people than on the constructive engagement of societies.
The DPC an alliance of more than three dozen of political and religious groups/parties have proved this fact that the people may be gathered on the slogans of anti-US and anti-West rather than pro Pakistanis.
They always talk about the dangers which Pakistan and Islam are facing from the
West and especially from the United States. This alliance (DPC) has also undermined the mainstream parties in Pakistan which have not even gathered a few parties in an alliance against the NATO/US forces in the country. It showed a strong presence of these elements in the street politics and showed its presence in Pakistani society and in the big cities of the country.
The first rally organized by the DPC was in Lahore on December 18, 2011 which was attended by more than 70,000 charged young and madrassa students along with the supporters of different political parties. It was a shock for liberal or mainstream political parties because the new alliance was established ahead of general elections in
Pakistan which may influence the masses behaviour towards the secular or the mainstream parties as was shown in huge crowd in the centre of politics i.e., Lahore.
It was also an attempt to create an alliance like the previous PNA, IJI and MMA in the past which got majority of seats in the Parliament and mobilized masses in their favour.
Form this show of power, it was also confirmed that such groups/parties can mobilize or gather huge crowd in the name of Islam and anti-American feelings anywhere in the country which reflected the deep-rooted influence of these jihadi organizations on the masses. 223
These rallies strengthened the pro-military political forces as the general elections in
2013 were near, on the one hand, and the speeches of the leaders of the Council showed that they are paving the way for the fuller use of jihad as an instrument in the emerging regional scenario.
The show of power in Lahore also affected the military policy because, on the one hand, they taken operations against them and, on the other hand, these Jihadi groups supported the armed forces which mean that a nexus between the two emerged. The rally speakers clearly stated that the defence of Pakistan can only be achieved through jihad against the US and India.
America ki barbadi tak, Jang rahaygi, Jang rahaygi, india ki barbadi tak, jang rahaygi, jang rahaygi, and sabiluna, sabiluna, aljehad, aljehad (the war will continue, the war will continue, till the America’s destruction, the war will continue, the war will continue, till the destruction of India, our way, our way, Jihad, Jihad) were the popular slogans in the rallies.
It was also astonishing that some groups had publically stated in the rallies that the youth are trained in Jihad which showed how they had utilized their workers for militancy and armed resistance if the time needed of them.
The alliance also wanted to stage demonstrations in Muzzafarabad, Kashmir to show its street power to India in the prevailing situation and was a warning for India that they may start its armed struggle against it if they don’t stop interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
The first rally of Difa-e-Pakistan Council which was held in Lahore on 18th of
December 2011, the stage of the rally was covered with 60 feet long hoarding board 224 showed the Pakistan army’s arsenals as a symbol of war and Jihad against, what the participants of the gathering termed, “evil axis.”121
The point on which they focused was the wholehearted support to the Afghan Taliban which was also a violation of the non-state actor involvement in the neighbouring country’s internal matters. Another factor of their support to the Taliban was the weak border position between the two countries which was violated by these elements without any difficulty. The third element which is binding them was the ideological affinity among themselves and this was the reason that they never heeded to the border violations on both sides of it. These groups which have also the political forces on their side showed that they have some acceptable agendas towards one another and for the outside world.
From the Defence of Pakistan Council, it is a reality that the Militant or Jihadi organizations have also their stake in Pakistan politics and they can change the public opinion in their favour. In the past, these kinds of organizations had also been established for specific purposes by the military establishment to achieve some political goal. These types of organizations or alliances were the product mainly of the foreign aggression or threat from the neighbouring state i.e., India.
Pakistan’s internal politics was influenced by the events in Afghanistan from the last thirty years, and in these years different kinds of militant or extremist organizations had grown to boost extremism and militancy in the internal politics of Pakistan.
The religious extremist and political groups in an alliance showed that they may work together for their mutual interests and united for some cause and could mobilize the masses in its favour. Some political parties also wanted to get benefit from such alliance of which the only cause of its creation was the extreme views of anti-
American and Anti-India stance.
121 War Gillani, “Extreme defence”. The News, Islamabad, December 25, 2011. 225
The show of power by the DPC in different big cities of the country also strengthened their bases at the gross root level and became a force to pressurize the government on certain regional and international issues.
The joining of Ijaz ul Haq and Sheikh Rashid Ahmad – the two main stream political leaders also was a feature of this alliance that some other parties than the religious one are the supporters of this kind of alliance through which they wanted to show their presence in the political environment, on the one hand, and get support of the energized young in its favour in future. But the stances of these leaders in developing hatred and violence was a negative aspect of such leaders and parties because such groups and leaders only earned bad name for their country and discouraged healthy political environment in Pakistan.
Conclusion
In this part of social constructionism in Pakistan, the political environment was influenced by the terror attacks in Pakistan and most of the political developments were the result of terrorism here. The people’s sentiments were cashed by the six religious parties alliance in Pakistan in 2002 when the anti-American sentiments were high in the country after the US attacks in Afghanistan. The masses were easily influenced by the religious slogans and sentiments by the politicians in Pakistan from the very first day. ‘Islam is in danger’ like slogans have turned the events in its favour when such slogans were raised. But with the passage of time, such sentiments lost attractions when people thought about their problems on realistic grounds. Such effects were also seen in the 2008 elections when the people saw that the previous regimes failed by making their pledges to the masses and new political forces were given opportunities to serve the people. In all those periods, new developments in the shape of conducting all parties conferences on vital issues was a healthy sign in
Pakistan. The war on terror which on the one side divided the political parties on this issue while on the other hand, most of the political parties combined their efforts in 226 tackling this issue at national level. From the present poor law and order situation in
Pakistan, all the political parties are of the opinion that this terrorism could be defeated by one single element provided all the forces get united against it.
The role of political parties in consensus building is very important for internal as well as external relations with other states. If the parties are divided on issues, it would not be resolved on proper manner. The united stand of the parties on national issues are cementing the bond of unity among the masses and this lead to the more proactive policies on many issues of national importance. The moulding of public opinion or sentiments in favour of any state policy is the most important act on part of the political parties in the world in general and in Pakistan, in particular where the people are less educated and more prone to religious slogans.
This chapter argued and proved from the historical evidence that whenever there developed the foreign intervention in Pakistan’s internal politics, the role of religious parties became more active than the democratic parties. This has compromise and weakened the role democracy and strengthened the role military dictator in Pakistan.
The construction of politics on the basis of religion is caused by more militancy, violence, intolerance and extremism in Pakistan as we have seen from the last thirty years. 227
Chapter Seven Civil-Military Tension in Pakistan: An Institutionalism
Perspective
Institutions play an important role in the overall development of a country. This role becomes more important when the country faces internal and external challenges to its security and its existentialism is in question. Pakistan, today, is facing such like situation in the on-going war on terror in which it is a frontline state along with the
US and NATO forces in the region.
Before going into the details of Pakistan-US relations and the gaps on institutional and bilateral perspectives between the two countries, the civil-military relations in
Pakistan needs to be discussed in the present circumstances. The civil and military leadership in Pakistan are on the same page or have differences of opinion on the war on terror is also an objective to find out the reality in this regard. Is it a fact that the present unending violence in the country is the cause of civil-military differences on the issues? This chapter focuses on the gaps between civil and military leadership on vital national issues.
7.1. Civil Military Relations in Pakistan- A Historical Perspective
Since 1947, twenty-nine out of the thirty-eight elected provincial assemblies were prematurely dissolved. During this period, forty-four out of seventy-seven chief ministers were dismissed by the federal government and another thirteen resigned because they failed to win support in the provincial assemblies. Pakistan took twenty- three years to hold her first national elections, and this too surprisingly, under a military dictator, General Yahya khan.1
1 Khalid Mahmood Arif. “The Role of Military in Politics” in Hafeez Malik (Ed.). Pakistan: Founders Aspirations and Today’s Reality. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 90. 228
Pakistan’s centrist, mainstream political parties cannot hope to come to real power and runs government effectively, unless several indicators point in the same direction at the same time.2 In fact, the long term involvement of military in civilian affairs has an equally deleterious effect on its professional competence and institutional cohesion.3
The US efforts against the Soviet Union unintentionally strengthened Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies, their supremacy over civilian institutions and rising
Jihadis growth which has engulfed both the country and the region. After the 9/11, US military and economic assistance has strengthened the hands of Pakistan’s military at the cost of civilian government and democratic institutions.4
In view of the global trend and US international agenda, it has affected Pakistan’s democratic future. There is no doubt that General Musharraf had not been in powers if
9/11 had not occurred or if he had not supported the war on terror. The US preferred to work with a General than with an elected civilian government.5
These fluctuations in relationship were influenced mostly by the Cold War and aftermath of the cold war environment. After the 9/11 event, Pakistan once again became the center stage of the world attention in the region and thus became an ally of the US in the war on terror.
7.2. Civil-military Relations and the War on Terror
In 2006, the two main political parties, PPP and PML (N) signed Charter of
Democracy (CoD) in which they agreed on the limited role of Army and supremacy of political or civilian leadership as following; According to the CoD Clause 32, the
2 Stephen P. Cohen. The Idea of Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005, p. 158. 3 TalatMasood. Civil-Military relations and the 2008 elections in Pakistan: Impact on the regional security environment. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 5, No. 1, 2007, pp. 54-5. 4 S. Akbar Zaidi. “Friends with benefits”, The News, October 02, 2011. 5 Ibid, p. 90. 229
ISI, MI and other security agencies were to be held responsible to the elected government through Prime Minister Secretariat, Ministry of Defence and Defence
Committee of the Cabinet (DCC). The political wings of all agencies will be disbanded. Clause 33, all indemnities and changes introduced by the military regimes in the constitution shall be reviewed. Clause 34, defence budget shall be placed before the Parliament for debate and approval. It has been never too late to move towards the correction of civil-military imbalance in Pakistan.6
Musharraf’s ouster in 2008 happened not due to the growing unpopularity of military strategic doctrines, but it reflected the fatigue of Pakistanis with the centralized military rule. It was in the 2007 to 2008 as the second movement in our history where the military as an institution was scrutinized by the public and openly criticized.7
Soon after the general elections in 2008, General Kayani withdrew a certain number of military personnel from the civilian institutions and even directed the ISI to stay away from the politicians8 which was the reflection of military withdrawal from the political scene for the time being, at least.
After the civilian government came into power, the role of Parliament and its
Committees and Defence Committee of the Cabinet has increased. The military had been frequently attending the meetings and briefings on the security issues to the
Parliament and civilian leaders had strengthened the role of political leaders.9
In a step toward civilian oversight of the military, two pages of the 2008-9 defence budget were laid before the Senate for debate, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, it signaled potentially a new era in which the military would acknowledge civilian oversight. But at the same time, in 2008, the Prime Minister Gillani issued an order to
6 Raza Rumi, “The way forward” The News, May 22, 2011. 7 Raza Rumi, “Will the civilians seize the movement?” The News, June 19, 2011. 8 Farah Zia, “State of permanent imbalance” The News, October 03, 2010. 9 PILDAT, Discussion Paper-National Security Council, Civil-Military Relations, April, 2012, p. 43. 230 place the ISI under the jurisdiction of the Interior Ministry. The Prime Minister was forced to reverse the order due to an uproar from the military. The military’s rejection and the civilian government backtracking clearly showed the lingering anomalies in the civil-military equation. On Kerry-Lugar Bill which granted Pakistan $7.5 billion in civil aid, the army vehemently opposed to provisions to monitor the progress on civilian oversight of the army. The bill was passed but a message was conveyed that regardless of what the elected politicians said, still the army remains a factor in the determination of foreign affairs and defence policy.10
During the war on terror campaign, Pakistan’s support to the US was seen in the country as if the former was doing much in its capacity to support the latter in the war on terror. Many times, the US incursions into Pakistan’s territory by aerial violation in the shape of drone attacks have developed some uneasiness ties in their relationship.
But the first and real drift came between the two states in the early 2011 which proved to be a turning point in the war against terror, in general, and Pak – US relations, in particular.
The role of Parliament proved very active and the politicians showed very much maturity and understanding of the prevailing situation in the country and the region.
This role of Parliament on the national issues was seen very encouraging because the political and democratic governments were in place while in the previous era of
General Musharraf there were no such debates and decisions used to be taken by a single man, unilaterally.
A survey conducted by the British Council, the Centre for Education and the Herald in 2009 revealed that Pakistani youth were thoroughly disillusioned with politics.
According to the survey, half of the youth did not cast vote, 60 percent expressed more confidence in the military than the civilian government. Less than 10%
10 Sheila Fruman. op. cit., pp. 15-6. 231 supported government institution, 78% rejected active politics while less than 1% desired an active role in politics.11
The mixed response of the major political parties towards “war on terror” complicated the issue both inside and outside the Parliament. The PML (N) criticized the government of PPP which was simply following the policies of Musharraf. The JUI
(F) called for dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban. ANP supported the peace with those elements who were willing to surrender to the state. JI condemned the war on terror and wanted to change the policy of military action in the country.
There is a difference of opinion among the politician, journalists, political and strategic analysts and the academicians on the national issues like terrorism and violence in the country. Commenting on the matter, a leading journalist said:
“While dealing the issue of terrorism in Pakistan, there is wide gap between the masses and the government. The government policies were not according to the wishes of the people. The government was unable to take the masses into confidence.
The people sentiments are on the one side while the government policies are on the other side on tackling the issue of terrorism. Even the military and civilian leadership are not on the same page”.12
According to Zahid Hussain, “This gap was more widened between the government and the people because the government policies are mostly secret and confidential and no one knows what the government is doing now and what policy the government is perusing regarding terrorism in the country. The government policies regarding drone attacks in tribal areas is dubious and this has created massive uncertainty inside the country. The military is conducting operations against the militants while some religious political parties consider it not our war. Most of the political parties
11 HumaYousaf. “A Different Menu”, Dawn October 31, 2011. 12 Salim Safi, Interview, Islamabad. 04 July, 2013. 232 including PPP and ANP are divided about Taliban and militancy have expressed their strong reservations about Taliban and militants. Religious political parties as JI and
JUI (F) strongly oppose the government policy on the subject. There are also differences between the political parties and the government regarding the military operations in FATA. As a result, the problem is becoming more complicated with the passage of time”.13
“This war has divided the political parties. Religious parties like JI and JUI have soft corner for those militants because of their ideological affiliations with them but they openly cannot support them because of their political stand on democracy. Other parties, such as ANP and PPP are targeted and some are silent on this issue which means that they all stand demoralized and have shut their eyes from the reality of situations”.14
“Exactly, there is gap between the government policy and the people’s perception.
People do not want cooperation with the US and after the Salala attacks, the military also acknowledged this by termination supplies to NATO and asking vacation of the
Shamsi Base by them. After the Salala attacks, the government also brought all the agreement on clear terms and conditions. There seems to be a lack of seriousness on the part of the government because of the turmoil in internal politics. The religious parties such as JI, JUI (S) and JUI (F) are supporting the Taliban, the PML (N) and
PTI have sympathies with them while the ANP, PPP and MQM oppose them and thus are the targets of militants. How can the problem resolve in such divisions?”,15 A respondent thus commented.
All journalists and political analysts are of the same view and they are agreed on this point that there is total division among the political parties on the issue of terrorism
13 Zahid Hussain, Interview, Islamabad. 04 July, 2013. 14 Jehanzeb Khan, Interview, Mardan, 25 April, 2013. 15 Brig (r) Mahmood Shah, Interview, Peshawar. 07 March, 2013. 233 and Taliban in Pakistan. All are not on the same page on this long war for the last ten years despite the fact they have conducted many All Parties Conferences on this issue.
There is also confusion in the state institutions on how to deal with the militants and terrorism in Pakistan.
“The differences among the government and the opposition parties are visible on the issue on the one hand, and the military and the religious parties, on the other. Many political parties have sympathies with the militant wings for various reasons”.16
Everyone is against terrorism and wants to root it out but there is no consensus on how to deal with it permanently. In an interview, JUI (F) leader, an ally of the government in Islamabad, stated thus:
“The keys to resolve the issues of Taliban, terrorism and dialogue in Pakistan are in the hands of GHQ (General Headquarters) and the real decision making authority is in the hands of Army”.17 This statement of a political party which was also in the government at that time reflects the institutional weakness in Pakistan that only the military has the power to deal with such issues and the position of the political leaders and parties is like spectators and only to endorse the decisions of the GHQ in
Parliament or in the cabinet meetings.
7.3. Raymond Davis Case- Street Agitation
The strains between Washington and Islamabad were detectable from the very beginning of the campaign against the Taliban regime. Musharraf was desperately trying to manage the situation and present it in its most acceptable height to Pakistani public opinion. General Musharraf was also extremely sensitive to the US troops being present and operating on Pakistani soil, first denied and then conceded that there was substantial presence at various military installations particularly in Sindh
16 Fida Hussain, Interview, Islamabad, 03 July, 2013. 17 Maulana FazalurRehman, Interview in Capital Talk, Geo News on 12 February, 2014. 234 and Balochistan. The issue of hot pursuit, raised by the US General Franklin L. Hagen
Beck, increased the friction between GHQ Rawalpindi and Pentagon.18
The year 2011 was the most disturbing one in the history of Pak-US relations after the
9/11 and the joining with the later in the war on terror as an ally. In the early days of
2011, i.e. on 27th of January, 2011 an accident took place in Lahore. Raymond Davis, a US national and an employ of US Consulate in Lahore, shot two persons dead at broad daylight, calling it in self-defence.19
Davis was the man who was detained in December, 2009 while entering the cantonment area of Lahore with sophisticated weapons, but was released after the intervention of US Consulate. Davis, in this case was guilty of several violations. One that no member of a diplomatic mission in a country is allowed to keep and carry arms without license.
Meanwhile, the Law Minister of Punjab, Rana Sanaullah said in a press conference that the government would not give in to any “national or international pressure” in
Davis trial. He further told that the province would “strongly resist” any such move.
The guilty will be punished and the innocent will get justice.20
A murder case (FIR No. 47) at the Lytton Road Police Station had been registered against Davis. Soon after the incident, the US Embassy in Islamabad and State
Department in Washington contacted Pakistani officials to discuss the Davis issue and to resolve it.
In a meeting the President Zardari, a delegation of six US Congressmen sought the release of Davis because of his being a diplomat. The demand was, however, turned down and the President said that the matter would be decided by the court. From the
18 YunasSamad. The Pakistan- US Conundrum-Jihadists, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control. London: Hurst & Company, 2011, p. 26. 19 DAWN, January 28, 2011. 20 The News, Islamabad, January 29, 2011. 235 very first day, the US government and embassy were trying to put pressure on the provincial and federal government to get Davis released despite his killing of two
Pakistanis in broad daylight without justification. Pakistan wanted Davis to face court trial.
As tension and anger aroused among the people on the Davis issue, the government was also aware of the public sentiments and the opposition stance on it, the government stated in the National Assembly that there would be no favour shown to him and relevant laws would be acted upon.21
The State Department spokesman P. J Crowley, in a press briefing told the journalists that Pakistan is violating the Vienna Convention by detaining one of its diplomats.
“When he was detained, he identified himself to police as a diplomat and repeatedly requested immunity under the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations” said the spokesman.22
The right wing parties took the issue to the street and anti – American sentiments were raised in the country without waiting for the investigation and the court’s judgment in the case. “If the government declines to extend help in contesting the cases of the victim families against American shooter Raymond Davis, this mob of thousands of patriotic Muslims will fight their case”, said a Jamaat-i-Islami leader in a gathering of not less than 30,000 people.23
As the Davis issue was a hot one in Pakistan, the two states were also engaged on it at high level. The Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called on President Zardari through telephone, that “Washington is losing patience on the “illegal custody” of a US citizen. The behaviors and statement of the US government was very hard and harsh about the Davis issue.
21 Dawn, February 2, 2011. 22 Dawn, February 3, 2001. 23 Waqar Gillani, “The new face of jihad,” The News, February 6, 2011. 236
On the other hand, the Foreign Office had categorically stated that he was a non- diplomatic staff member of the US Consulate, who was given certain level of state immunity but not absolute immunity. A six member delegation called on President
Zardari to discuss the Davis issue. They talked with the Army Chief and the US ambassador also called on the President. The Pakistan’s ambassador to the US was called four times during the week to tell Islamabad that the issue must be resolved soon.24
As the pressure was mounting on the government by the US authorities, President
Zardari contacted leaders of many political parties to discuss the issue and proposed a round table conference of all political parties to discuss the Davis issue. The government did not want to act lonely and without the approval and support of other political parties because of the public reaction. This incident exposed the weakness of the government that how a simple issue was made complicated and problematic. The government was caught between the two extreme; the rising public opinion/emotions in the country and the US pressure regarding consequences to the government. The government wanted to release Davis but in a way that could honour government disposal of resolving such issues.
Senator John Kerry visited Lahore on February 15, to discuss the Davis issue with the authorities and also to meet with leaders of major political parties. He also expressed regrets on behalf of the American authorities and over the loss of lives in the
“unfortunate incident”. In a press conference, the President Barak Obama urged
Pakistan to abide by the Vienna Convention, treat Davis as a diplomat and release him.
One of the dead’s wives, Shumaila, a 19 year old widow committed suicide by eating up rat poison as a despair of getting justice for her husband’s death. She told
24 Anwar Iqbal, “US only discussing Davis’s release”, Dawn February 9, 2011. 237 journalists on the occasion before her death in the hospital that she was committing suicide because “I will not get justice.” This inflamed large scale demonstrations in the country and the anti – American feelings grew more than ever. “I will not get justice”, illustrated the anger and lack of faith in the government and its institutions.
On the issue, the internal differences in the government was also exposed as the
Foreign Minister tendered resignation from the cabinet as a protest have not only put pressure on the government on the political front in the country on the one hand but the division on the issue between the Foreign Office and the Executive also exposed the lack of coordination among the state institutions on an internal issue on the other.
The sensitivity of the situation is evident from the fact that the trilateral talks between
Pakistan, Afghanistan and US had to be postponed till new dates because of the tension between the two states on the Davis issue. It exposed the institutional gaps between the two countries as the issue could be resolved in an amicable environment.
The United States did not try to understand the people sentiments in Pakistan on the
Davis issue and repeated statements also made very difficult for a democratic government to reject the masses sentiments. These kinds of activities on the part of
United States had made the situation worst for the PPP government to act as the US wanted.
The act of Davis triggered mistrust between the two countries because of the covert operations and spies in the country using diplomatic passport and immunity at large.
The mistrust and anger of the masses against the US in the Davis case showed that his covert position made him the suspected man working on another agenda other than on a diplomatic mission in the country. The issue of Davis raised very serious questions regarding Pakistan’s internal security, the US involvement in covert operation in
Pakistan’s mainland cities and double game of the US in the grab of diplomacy and security. Raymond Davis case basically had reinforced what has been known even 238 before, the manipulative role of the CIA and the US security establishment play all over the world to secure its interests and pursue its objectives.25
While the US was stressing Pakistan to abide international laws on immunity and legality of the issue and release Davis, she was not herself abiding and honouring the international human rights laws and had made violations of the state sovereignty through drone attacks in Pakistan a policy for herself.
His acts, provoked by his victims, had become allegory for the acts of the US itself with his vanquishing on ultimate revenge against the devaluation of Pakistani lives so easily scarified in the course of the conflict largely perceived as America’s alone.26
The arbitrary approach of the US on Davis issue had not only damaged the confidence and trust between the two countries which was already damaged in the last few years, but also brought the governments of the two countries at loggerheads at the highest level. In this case, Pakistan used public opinion as a tool of foreign relations in a few step further.27 The issue totally discussed in the streets of Pakistan by all the stakeholders while the US government used threats of economic sanctions and suspended bilateral meetings as a tactic in resolving the issue. A resolution was moved in the US House of Representatives which urged Pakistan to release Raymond
Davis or brace itself for a freeze on all monetary assistance.28 The President’s role and
Parliament’s hue and cry had completed the ugly picture of what decision making had become in Pakistan.29
The political environment in Pakistan is not mature and therefore had been exploited in the name of security, defence and threat to Islam. The politicians, in general, and religious leaders, in particular, had staged rallies in favour of victims and popularized
25 Imtiaz Gul. “Cobweb of spy network”, The News, Feb 27, 2011. 26 Rafia Zakria, “The cost of covert war”, Dawn, February 16, 2011. 27 HumaYousaf, “The more serious issue”, Dawn, February 28, 2011. 28 “US Resolution links aid to Davis release”, Dawn, March 10, 2011. 29 Syed Talat Hussain. “The Davis case!A glorious mess”, DAWN, February 07, 2011. 239 the issue, made emotional slogans and statements to arouse the people sentiments and get the people support in street politics which had nothing to do with politics but it was a criminal case and diplomatic issue but was exploited by the politicians and right wing parties throughout the country.
The time has come for a serious rethink of our foreign policy and this cannot be done in the glare of publicity. The need of the hour is to cool down tempers and clarify to
Washington that we do not have to entertain more of the likes of Raymond Davis on our soil.30
The seriousness of the Davis issue was seen in the US administration from the efforts undertaken by all the three pillars of the United States government i.e. White House,
Congress and Pentagon. The Raymond Davis issue led the security agencies to clamp down on the movements of US personnel and the withdrawal of trainees attached to the military. Now there are two types of wars within Pakistan; one is against the militants in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the other is to check the US activities within the country.31
It was clear that the courts were not the place where the Davis fate was to be decided.
Political leaders and even Foreign Office officers have the opinion that the final verdict had to come from Pindi-Aabpara combine-a reference to the military and ISI headquarter. This perception that the Army holds the key to Raymond Davis controversy by this fact that the relations between the ISI and CIA have been frayed to a virtual breakup.32
From the Davis case, the position of Pakistan was exposed as a weak and vulnerable country both politically and economically.
30 Zubaida Mustafa, “After Davis what?”, Dawn, March 2, 2011. 31 Khalid Aziz, “Endgame in Afghanistan”, Dawn, September 30, 2011. 32 Syed Talat Hussain. “The downside of US friendship”, Dawn, March 07, 2011. 240
The United States needs to win war against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, Pakistan vulnerable position economically is the result of the increased interference in the domestic affairs for the governance to the economic management of the country by a super power for settling our domestic political issues, we thus inviting and re-inviting the external intervention. Islamic laws were used to let Davis however, its question regarding the status a spy, a diplomat, or a consular, remains in dark.
In the Davis case, Pakistan’s sovereignty and its laws were violated in the broad daylight and its “red lines” were repeatedly crossed by US despite the former’s repeated protests. The outrage over Davis acquittal was shared equally by Pakistanis across the country. Under Qisas and Diyat laws, Davis was released on the blood- money but Washington denied any blood-money giving to the heirs of the victims. It was reportedly arranged by another friendly state which is revealed from the facts that how much interference is involved in internal affairs of the state by its foreign friends.33
Because this was the anger and despair of the government and people, the repeated killings in drone attacks and military operations. This case also showed the apathy of the Pakistani government as the case was decided through the “blood money.” It was against the principles of the Islamic laws, as the two parties were not the same citizens of a same country. One was American, the culprit, while the dead ones were the victims- the Pakistanis. In the Davis issue, the relevant institutions in Pakistan and the political enclave in Islamabad were not on the same page at any point. Institutionally, both within the security and diplomatic establishment, there have been little sympathy for the US position all along. Lack of institutionalism, also implies growing dysfunctionality in the system overall. If individuals in positions of power circumvent
33 Murtaza Rizvi. “A metaphor for secularism”, Dawn, April 3, 2011. 241 their own state institutions on a regular basis, policies and strategies are liable to reflect a disconnection.34
7.4. Abbottabad Operation-Institutional Failure and Trust Deficit
The 9/11 attacks on US and the US declaration of war against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan was the beginning of an unending war against terrorists in the world.
The US declared Osama Bin Laden, the enemy No. 1 of the humanity and the most wanted man in the world. During the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), OBL left
Afghanistan for safe havens and might entered Pakistan’s tribal area from Tora Bora, where he was narrowly escaped from the US attacks.
From Tora Bora, no one knew his new location while the US intelligence agencies were searching for him but in vain. OBL presence in the cantonment area of
Abbottabad surprised everyone in Pakistan when the US SEALS raided on Osama compound on the mid night of 1st and 2nd May, 2011. The US raid team flew from
Bagram airbase and reached in two helicopters of stealth technology. After killing the male inmates of the compound i.e. Osama and his guards, the team recovered computers and other items used by Osama and took them away.
Obama announced his death to the nation in a speech, and jubilation was continued in the US that the main terrorist was killed who had killed thousands of Americans on
9/11. The killing of Osama Bin Laden was the top news story of 2011, according to an annual poll of US editors and news directors.35 Pakistan’s media channels ran the news in “Breaking News” all the day and commentaries continued for many days. The whole nation was surprised and shocked to know that the US- an ally of Pakistan, not informed the government and in the darkness of the night, it completed its mission
34Moeed Yusuf. “Lesson from Davis saga”, Dawn, March 14, 2011. 35 Dawn, December 18, 2011 242 without the prior approval or permission. It was a grave violation of its space and territory and betrayal in relationship.
Many religious parties offered Nimaz-e-Janaza (the last ritual before burial) in absentia including many lawyers forum in Lahore and Peshawar, and called Osama
Bin Laden hero and mujahid (the fighter for Islam) of Islam against the infidels i.e.
Soviet Union and US. The Jamaat-i-Islami and other religious parties including PML
(N) and Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) also organized mass rallies and declared Bin
Laden a martyr of Islam. Hafiz Saeed of Jamaat-ud-Dawa reminded the US that the war is not finished with the death of Osama Bin Laden. He was an innocent martyr and his sacrifice will strengthen jihad because it is not a war against terrorism but crusade against Islam. Even the Jaish-e-Muhammad publication ‘Al-Qalam’ termed
Bin Laden a great hero and defender of Islam.36
Many militants reacted on the Bin Laden death in strong words. “Don’t worry. I assure you that millions not thousands, are furious over this act, their chests are boiling with anger. They can kill the person, but they cannot kill his philosophy. We are all Osama Bin Laden”, said a teacher belonging to a defunct organization.37
In her book, Condoleezza Rice stated that in September 2006 visit of Musharraf to the
US, the President made it clear to him that the US would take action itself if we learned of an imminent threat to our territory or of if we learned that key Al-Qaeda figures were being harbored there. We considered it our prerogative to act without permission of possibly Islamabad’s knowledge.38
Before the raid of May 2, the US officials repeatedly told the Pakistan government that they would not spare Bin Laden, if they got the opportunity. If we (the US government) had known where Bin Laden was, we would have done absolutely
36 Waqar Gillani. “Tiger of Islam”, The News, April 29, 2012. 37AounSahi. “Restrained Reaction”, The News, May 15, 2011. 38 Condoleezza Rice. No Higher Honour. London: Simon & Schuster, 2011, P. 444. 243 everything in our power to take him down. Over the subsequent years there were multiple “sighting” of Bin Laden but none of them panned down. There was a deep disappointment, since we dreamed of the day that the American people would have to closure that his capture would bring. In May 2011, the United States finally got Bin
Laden. I felt a great sense of relief and pride as well as gratitude to President Obama for the bold decision to launch the raid that had led to his killing.39
All the political as well as military leadership shocked of the US operation not because of the Osama’s killing but because of the state’s sovereignty violation. Soon after the raid, on May 14, the two Houses of Parliament reached on the 12 points resolution asking the government to set up an independent commission to investigate the covert US operation in Abbottabad. The government appointed a Commission headed by Justice Javed Iqbal, a sitting judge of the Supreme Court and three other members including Ashraf Jahangir Qazi, Abbas Khan and Mohammad Nadeem to investigate the matter and hold responsible for this failure.
The commission formation was opposed by many politicians on the ground that it would create more problems and would not resolve the issue. “It was wrong to involve judiciary in all issues, including such technical areas like intelligence or related security issues”, told Chaudhry Shaujaat, the Chief of PML (Q) in a statement.
The PML(N) was also not satisfied with the terms of reference prepared by the government for the commission and believed that the commission under the existing
TOR will be a powerless body and will not be able to call senior military officials or even record the statements of the intelligence agencies. JUI (F) declared it against
“national interest”.
The Abbottabad Commission not only summoned the military personnel, but the diplomats working in the US and UK too, to record their statements on whatever they
39 Ibid, pp. 119-20. 244 knew about the May 2 episode. During the inquiry, the main questions before the
Commission were whether the person killed in the operation was Osama Bin Laden and the other question was whether any government official was aware of the US raid.
The Commission examined more than 100 witnesses, including government officials,
Osama’s family members, media persons, armed forces and many others who had any kind of information regarding May 2 incident.
The Abbottabad operation had brought shame and disgrace to the nation on the one hand that it was conducted without Pakistan’s awareness and violated the state sovereignty and, on the other hand, proved the overall security institutions poor performance and proved vulnerability and many flaws and mistakes while making planning and implementation of a decision. Pakistan’s image of a frontline state against the war on terror has damaged its credibility despite heavy sacrifices and support to the world community. The US had especially expressed her concerned about the presence of Osama in a cantonment area of Pakistan and the role of intelligence agencies became dubious in the matter.
The Abbottabad Operation had taken place at a time when the relations between the
US and Pakistan were still tense as a result of the Raymond Davis issue. The Davis issue had developed a state of confrontation between the states, the May 2 Operation exposed further the two countries the trust-deficit between the two and the manner in which they were pursuing their interests without taking the other on board.
The military leaderships, particularly, came under severe criticism in Pakistani media as to why they were unaware of the US operation in a cantonment area. It also put a question mark on the capability of the intelligence agencies in the country for their complete ignorance of the US design and planning. The weaknesses in the state institutions were exposed to such an extent that even the military as well as the intelligence agencies confessed their poor performance in the wake of May 2 incident. 245
The security lapse had also exposed the weak position of the military and the planning in any untoward accidents. It was the first time in the history of Pakistan that media, civil society and the masses criticized the military openly and demanded for its accountability. The public opinion towards the Army was all time low.
The political leadership of the country was also criticized on the ground that it had no idea as how to tackle a situation arising of the interference into its sovereignty. The congratulation of Pakistani President to Obama on the May 2 Operation showed that how Pakistani leadership was fulfilling its responsibilities and seriousness of the situation. This also showed the very poor approach of the political leadership on the occasion how to deal with a situation or event in which the most wanted person to the world was killed and, on the other side, the grave violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty had taken place and what was to be done on such occasion were the questions beyond the approach of the leadership both civil and military.
The May 2 raid by the US commandoes to kill Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad caused further distrust in the already uneasy relationship between the two countries. It was a triumph for the US and a cause of embarrassment for Pakistan.40After the May
2 incident, Pakistani authorities had withheld ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) for
229 US visa requests during the crisis.
During the operation, one US helicopter crashed, the US demanded Pakistan to hand over the crashed helicopter to her because they feared that Pakistan might hand it over to China for further research. That indicated clearly the level of mistrust between the two countries.41
This Pak-US relationship has never been based on trust. It had been and remains to be, a strategic alliance based on complementary interests. When the two countries
40 RahimullahYousafzai. “In the right domain”, The News, March 25, 2012. 41 S. M. Masud. “Mistrust among allies”, The News, August 5, 2012. 246 came together in the post 9/11, there were no talks of shared goals or dreams-it was a clear case of “us” versus “them”.42
Pakistan was reducing the foot print of US officials in Pakistan, the United States warned of whole scale consequences in convincing the military leadership to reconsider its decision of drastically reducing American intelligence and military footprint in the country. A letter which showed some consequences Pakistan could face in the proceeding times, were the overhauling of MI-17 helicopter fleet, halting of supply of equipment like night vision goggles and spares for cobra helicopters, delays in the coalition support funds and ceasing of intelligence information.43
The Pakistan Air Force Board of Inquiry concluded that the May 2, 2011 raid on
Abbottabad was an outcome of a combined failure at all levels in assessing the intentions of the USA. There was never any mistrust between Pakistan and the United
States armed forces. As a result, there were no apprehensions regarding US intentions.
This situation was exploited by the US to launch its surprise raid.44 According to the findings of the Commission, there was a significant trust deficit between the two countries and especially between the two military forces.45
The Deputy Chief of Air Staff Operations (DCAS Op) narrated to the commission that the Abbottabad incident was indeed one of the most embarrassing incidents in the history of Pakistan. It had tarnished the image of Pakistan’s armed forces, including the PAF and had adversely impacted the morale of the people of Pakistan.46
After the Abbottabad Operation, the government position was very weak to defend itself from the internal and external criticism on the issue. Even the military was on a
42 “After Osama-Pakistan’s relation with the US, China and India”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Special Report, 104, June 2011, p. 45. 43 BaqirSajjad Syed. “Military forced to reconsider steps”, Dawn, July 1, 2011. 44 Abbottabad Commission Report, Government of Pakistan, 2013. p. 140. 45 Ibid, pp. 140-1. 46Ibid, p. 142. 247 weak position on the violent criticism from the masses through the electronic and print media and was unable to defend its position as to why they failed to know exactly on time the US intentions regarding the raid in Abbottabad. There was no clear policy of the government and the military to work jointly on the same ground.
There was a lack of coordination between the civil-military leadership on the key issues regarding war on terror and relations with the United States.
7.5. Memogate Scandal-Institutional Gap between Civil-Military leadership
Memo issue was raised in October, 2011 when a Pakistani American businessman
Mansoor Ijaz, in a chat with The Financial Times, claimed to had helped delivered a message from President Zardari to the then US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Mike Mullen seeking help against a possible military takeover. This secret communication was denied by the government. Admiral Mullen too initially denied but then acknowledged having seen memo.
The Information Minister Firdous Ashiq Awan described the document authored by businessman Mansoor Ijaz as engineered and fabricated to bring about confrontation between Pakistan’s state institutions. The opposition urged to debate the issue in the joint session of Parliament which they saw an act of treason for a confidant of the
President of Pakistan. The ruling Pakistan People’s Party Core Committee decided to give a chance to Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US on the issue of memorandum.
Mansoor Ijaz, speaking to a private TV Channel, told that the memo was written on the instruction of Hussain Haqqani and he could provide evidences before any inquiry commission if he was called to appear before such a commission. The issue which remained in a heated debate for a few months, a consensus was developed that a high 248 level inquiry will be conducted to ascertain who had written the memo and on whose instructions.
The main opposition party, the PML (N) urged the Supreme Court to set up a commission to investigate the issue of a secret memo because it had proved that someone had written this who was in the government. Leader of the opposition in
National Assembly, while expressing his concern over the matter said: “Sovereignty of the country would be protected by all means and any attempt to undermine it would be foiled. Civil society, senior judges and members of National and Provincial
Assemblies should be made members of the commission”.47
On the other hand, the US also stated that they clearly supported the democratically elected government of Pakistan as well as its constitutional process, State Department spokesman Mark Toner told in a briefing.48 The White House and Pentagon underlined their links with both civilians and military establishment in Pakistan while refusing to take sides in a crisis that threatened to undo the current democratic set up.
The memogate scandal, denied by one but claimed to be authentic by another, was a fact that something had been written or had been in circulation. The main issue was that who was the real and actual supporter of initiator or the brain child of this issue.
The memogate scandal had divided the opposition and government. The opposition main parties PML (N) and JI wanted a fair investigation of the issue and punish those involved under the law of high treason. The government and its allies like the ANP had supported Haqqani and his stance and termed the issue a conspiracy against the government and to derail the process of democracy. The main actors against whom this memo was written were the army and ISI against whom support was urged from the US military high command.
47 Dawn, November 18, 2011. 48 Dawn, November 20, 2011. 249
A support against Pakistan’s military establishment from the US military establishment was illogical because the military of both the countries had always good relations and the second was the fact that the Pentagon had no authority to interfere in the affairs of other countries. These were the White House and State Department authorized to direct the Pentagon and CIA to do that and refrain to do something.
To seek support from the US military establishment without involvement of the White
House and State Department was a futile exercise and meaningless efforts against an ally of the US in the war on terror (Pakistan Army). The other thing which was in favour of the US policy towards Pakistan was that the US supported General
Musharraf against the politicians and he (Musharraf) ruled the country with the backing of the US and discouraged the politicians and democratic process in the country because he was more beneficial to the US than the Pakistani politicians.
The so-called democratic process was supported by the US to the extent in which the role of Musharraf was to be intact and remained an indispensable actor in the democratic process of the country. The US was aware of the Pakistan’s army role in fighting the war on terror particularly the great sacrifices against which Pakistan had been offering terrorism and extremism in the region.
Hussain Haqqani announced his resignation on twitter to end this fruitless debate and it was perhaps the first time in history that an ambassador had announced his resignation on social media. Haqqani resigned on the instruction of Prime Minister so that the investigation could be carried out fairly. Soon after Haqqani’s resignation, the government announced “an appropriate level” inquiry against the outgoing envoy and pledged that the probe would be “carried out fairly, objectively and without bias”.49
From the memo issue, the fact once again revealed that the political government was so vulnerable and weak and the US involvement in Pakistan’s internal affairs was so
49 Dawn, November 23, 2011. 250 deep that the government allegedly wanted support from the US military for its safety and continuity of the democratic government. This was a deliberate move to drag foreign interference in Pakistan’s politics. Because of this issue, the whole nation was also shocked on such development that an institution wanted support from a foreign country against another institution to resolve its internal problems.
This memogate scandal also created a drift in civil-military relations in Pakistan and an atmosphere of mistrust and trust deficit was clearly visible. The tense relation between the two institutions remained for a few months but actually the trust gap continued till the end of the government despite government’s clarification at every forum that we (military and civilian leaderships) were on the same page.50
“It is my point of view that the May 2 US operation and memogate have some links with each other and it is the job of the commission to find out whether it is true or false”, said Khawaja Asif, an MNA of PML (N).51
The government announced to establish a Parliamentary Committee on National
Security (PCNS) to investigate the memogate affairs and interrogate former
Ambassador Hussain Haqqani who was directed not to leave the country till the completion of Commission proceedings. The Parliamentary Committee was to comprise of 17.52
The issue did not cool down despite the government assurance to the opposition that they would fairly inquire the issue and would board all the stakeholders on the issue but the opposition had its own approach towards this scandal. The opposition thought that a trusted Ambassador of the President raised the issue and it could not be fair of inquiry against its own accusation and therefore it would be wastage of time. To know and be aware of the past record of the present government, the opposition wanted to
50 Dawn, November 25, 2011. 51 Dawn, November 29, 2011. 52 Dawn, Ibid. 251 settle this scandal in a much fair and transparent manner at very impartial manner for which the Supreme Court of Pakistan was the only appropriate forum. Therefore the
PML (N) Chief Nawaz Sharif decided to file a petition in the SC against the memo issue for investigation and to decide who was responsible in this matter. The Supreme
Court constituted a nine members bench to take up on December 1 a set of petitions against the memo scandal.
“That the petition so filed before this court may kindly be fixed at a very early date in the interest of justice, national integrity, sovereignty and the existence of our state”,
Nawaz Sharif said in his plea.53
This triggered political wrestling in the country between the two rival political parties i.e. PPP and PML (N) on the issue. The PML (N) wanted to get support from the
Supreme Court in dealing with the issue and its settlement while the PPP leadership accused the PML (N) to play its game on the shoulder of judiciary while the issue was still under consideration in the Parliamentary Committee of the National Security.
This had also created another stage for political war between the judiciary and the government as it was scored a political victory of opposition especially of PML (N) against the PPP government. In their replies, both the Army Chief and the DG ISI had accepted the memo’s existence and called for a thorough investigation, while the federal government sought dismissal of the petitions on the ground that a
Parliamentary Committee was already investigating the matter.
This was a clear division between the civil and military leaderships on the memogate issue because the military was interested in enquiry through the judiciary while the government announced that in the presence of Parliamentary Committee, the judicial investigation was unnecessary.
53 Dawn, November 30, 2011. 252
On submitting their statements in the SC by the Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervaz
Kayani and DG ISI Ahmad Shuja Pasha, the Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gillani called their statement “unconstitutional and illegal”, because of their being without approval of the competent authority, under the rules of business. It was clear division between the army and the political leadership on the memogate issue because the military was unwilling to submit their replies through the formal procedure.
7.5. Salala Attack-Institutionalization of Relations
Pakistan and the US have uncertain relations from the very beginning. These relations have been affected by different events with the passage of time. After 9/11 attacks,
Pakistan joined the US led war on terror, supported US to eliminate terrorism.
Pakistan’s support was so vital that more than five hundred Al-Qaeda terrorists were captured by Pakistan by losing more than forty thousand people including security forces.
Despite this deep cooperation between the two countries, many events have disturbed the equilibrium of relationship between the two countries. These events in which the
United States was the prime actor caused violation of mutual respect of the sovereignty of an ally state. In all these events of violation, the 2011 was a very turbulent one because in this year from the very beginning, events occurred in which were directly involved the US and its forces in a way to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs. The Raymond Davis issue was a violation of Pakistan’s laws in a broad daylight and pressurized Pakistan to release the accused. This has generated a hue and cry in Pakistan’s length and breadth and demonstration took place in the entire
Pakistan in support of the victims and against the Davis and US government high handedness.
The temperature of Davis issue had not come to the normal position, when a very unexpected and a critical event happened on May 2, 2011, when the US Special 253
Forces killed Osama Bin Laden in a raid in Pakistan’s city Abbottabad. This operation was a direct assault on Pakistan’s sovereignty deep in a cantonment area and close to
Islamabad. Though the nation had not worried about the Osama Bin Laden killing, everyone was shocked that Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty was violated in a very rude manner. The reason and events to be evaluate, a commission was established for the purpose which was as known as “Abbottabad Commission”.
On November 26, 2001, the NATO helicopters and a warplane carried out strikes on two Pakistani posts volcano and boulder in Salala area of Mohmand Agency in which twenty four troops including two officers of Pakistan Army were killed and 13 others were injured. The attacks continued for an hour.
The Salala attack was a turning point in relations with the US which had changed the mind of the military as they thought of reviewing the relationship with the US.
Pakistan strongly condemned the attack and people put pressure on the government to not only review its relations with the US but also withdraw from the war on terror and ceased to cooperate with the US. This event also had a psychological impact on military which had sacrificed thousands of soldiers in this war and was now under attacks of an ally for which it has suffered heavily.
All parties condemned the attacks and held protest demonstrations throughout the entire country. The United States and NATO described the air strikes on Pakistani posts as an “unintended incident”. The NATO Secretary General said in a statement,
“we will determine what happened, and draw the right reason”.
The incident deeply angered not only the masses but the government circles also felt a betrayal of US in the war on terror support on Pakistan side. The Defense Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) had taken the decision to block the NATO supply routes as well as the vacation of Shamsi air base by 11th of December 2011. In a statement of the
Foreign Minister, it was clarified that such strikes demonstrated complete disregard 254 for international law and human life and were in utter violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.54
A decision was also taken by the government to boycott the Bonn Conference on
Afghanistan as a protest and showed the international community her reservation on the repeated violation of its security and sovereignty. This decision was not taken as a reaction to loss of soldiers but its sovereignty had come under attack. Soon after the decision, the German Chancellor Angela Markel requested Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gillani to reconsider the decision about boycotting the conference. A similar request was made by Afghan President Hamid Karzai to Pakistan to review its decision of not attending the Bonn Conference.
An adjournment motion and a resolution were moved in the National Assembly of
Pakistan against the NATO strikes on border posts in Mohmand Agency. The motion says, “Pakistan is a sovereign country and this attack is clearly on its sovereignty, thereby committing flagrant violation of the international laws. Pakistan has rendered innumerable sacrifices in the war on terror and its every citizen is affected by it but this attack of the international forces associated to this war is becoming a danger for
Pakistan’s security”.55
“Well, we take the matter very seriously and we understand concern that members of the Pakistan government as well as the Pakistani people, have about this incident. And that’s why we are very interested in having it investigated and finding out exactly what happened”, said White House Press Secretary jay Carney on 28th November,
2011.56
“Despite Pakistan’s continued efforts to play a positive role for stability and peace in countering terrorism and militancy in the region, the sacrifices of the nation had not
54 Daily Dawn, November 28, 2011. 55 The News, November 30th, 2011. 56 Dawn, November 29th, 2011. 255 been recognized. Actions such as these attacks were contrary to the spirit of partnership and business as usual, were no longer possible”, an extract from the cabinet decision.57
The US appointed one star air force general to probe NATO air strikes that had further eroded US Pakistan relations. In Beijing, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said China was “deeply shocked” by the NATO air strikes and demanded an investigation into the incident. Violation of state sovereignty, including in the cases of planning and carrying out anti – terrorist operations, are unacceptable, said in statement by the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In Jeddah, the OIC termed the NATO strikes on check posts in Mohmand Agency an attack on the “country’s sovereignty and integrity. We condemn NATO attack on Pakistani check posts”, OIC
Secretary General Akmal uddin Ihsan said.
Pakistan sent a letter to the Presidents of the UN Security Council and the General
Assembly, protesting the attack of NATO / ISAF on Mohmand Agency. The letter was circulated as an official document of the Defense Committee of the Cabinet of
Pakistan.
This attack also led Pakistan to review its relation with the US which was supporting the later for the last ten years. It was revealed that the Musharraf government had signed at least nine pacts, some of them secret with the United States in 2002 to join
Islamabad and play role in the war on terror, the Ministry of Defense placed copies of nine pacts before the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS). It was for the first time that these pacts were made available to Parliamentarians for review.
The secret deals of the Musharraf government with the US damaged the role of political leaderships in the country. From the secret deals with the US, it was also confirmed that the military was the sole powerful institution in the country and the
57 The Nation, November 30th, 2011. 256 war on terror and the relation with the United States was the sole domain of the military institution in the country.
A unanimous resolution was passed against the NATO attacks and also rejected the plea that the attack was the result of some misunderstanding. The resolution also said that the attack was a violation of international laws and the UN Charter. The House also demanded immediate implementation of the resolutions adopted in the recent All
Parties Conference (APC).
In a message to the Army, General Kayani permitted its forces to retaliate with full force against any aggression by the United States and NATO troops regardless of its consequences and cost. He also clarified that the troops could respond on their own when attacked, without waiting for orders from the high command. This had also changed the military high command’s approach towards forward posts in a volatile region and boosted the morale of the soldiers in the sense that they could now retaliate without waiting from the Corps HQ or GHQ for instructions. Now they were open in response to any aggression. As the attack came from the highly sophisticated weapons of allied forces and not from the Taliban or militants, therefore the military establishment decided to deliver anti-aircraft and anti-gunship weapons, to effectively respond to any future attacks. Before the attack, the main focus was to stop the militants from incursion, now it was the responsibility of the army to ensure the safety and security of the border from the so-called ally in Afghanistan.
One thing which was clear from the aftermath of the attack was that anything which came into written on government level like in Parliament or Cabinet with the backing of the elected representatives that decision was honoured and respected by the world community and was endorsed by the state institutions. It then laid a line of action in the future policy implementations. It is clear from the fact that Pakistan decided to boycott the Bonn Conference in retaliation to the NATO attacks in the Defense 257
Committee of the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Committee of the National Security, the US as well as many other countries asked to review its policy of boycott but at the same time they knew it that once a decision is taken by the government on a platform, it becomes a policy of the state and no one can change that.
The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa cabinet asked the country’s political and military leadership to reexamine cooperation with the NATO in Afghanistan. The cabinet also termed the NATO attack a violation of the national security, survival and law of the land”, said Provincial Minister Iftikhar Hussain in a news conference. It supported the decisions taken by the political and military leadership at the federal level and said there was a need to reconsider the Pakistan’s cooperation with NATO forces in
Afghanistan.58
The entire future engagement of the international community was based on the hope that peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban will progress, and
Pakistan was the key to this process” German Newspaper Die Welt noted. The Bonn
Conference was turning into force, if Pakistan’s cancellation was maintained, then the conference was to turn virtually pointless on many issues, wrote the Financial Times
Deutschland. “If they stick to decision to cancel it would be a setback”, Said German
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle.59
The relations between US and Pakistan had been on a downward position since the year and the attacks could possibly lead to the breakup of ties between the two countries.
It was very rare in the political history of Pakistan that the foreign policy review was made by the government while inviting and getting suggestions from the ambassadors
58 Dawn, December 8, 2011. 59 Dawn, December 3, 2011. 258 and envoys in different countries. It was to help reorient the policy to be closely linked with security and development requirements.
This relations ranged from the secret agreements with the US by General Pervaiz
Musharraf, within or otherwise reached to a position of redefined those agreements and arrangements in a new perspective according to the national security and interests. These attacks not only brought the political and military leadership on the same page which had got divided on the memo issue, but the people of Pakistan as well as the government of Pakistan stressed to redefine its ties with the major powers.
All the people in one voice stressed the need to review its policy towards war on terror and reshape its cooperation with NATO / ISAF and US forces on some rules of engagements. Politically, this incident had turned all the political parties irrespective of their differences and came close to stand united against any foreign aggression.
This political atmosphere continued for many weeks and the government was forced to review its relationship with other powers in the national interest.
In the National Assembly and the Senate heated debates continued for many days on the issues. Parliaments adjourned its routine law making process and discussed the incident thoroughly. The National Assembly and Senate passed unanimous resolutions against the attack which clearly reflected that all law makers were on the one page on the issue and the Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) also approved concrete steps and measures to take more serious decisions on the national security. The involvement of provincial assemblies especially the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa was also encouraging in that it not only passed the resolution against the attacks but the provincial cabinet also asked the federal government to review its policies towards the war on terror. These kinds of events had brought changes in the 259 rule of engagement between the two countries and a mechanism of information was developed to avoid such incident in future.60
Conclusion
The war on terror in Pakistan has not only affected every aspect of national life but the government’s functions as well. The internal politics reflects differences on the issues of terrorism and violence as most of the religious parties are of the view that these terrorist activities are the result of cooperation of Pakistan with the United
States in the war on terror campaign. They (JI, JUI (S), JUI (F) are all of the view that
Taliban are not involved in terror activities but these are the acts of foreign intelligence agencies and call them ‘the hidden hands’ active to malign the religious organizations in Pakistan.
The division among the political parties has also divided the nations in two groups.
Some are against Taliban while others have sympathies with them. These differences have not only weakened the government commitment to resolve the problem but have made confusion how to effectively tackle it on state level.
Some domestic events which were created by the United States not only caused tension but also severely damaged the relations between the two countries. On the
Davis issue, the two countries differences clearly came to the light. The people sentiments in Pakistan involved in the two countries relations on some issues have complicated the relations led to more to an uneasy situations. When the issues were tried to resolve on streets rather than at genuine forum/ institutional level, the road in relations would be bumper.
The uneasy relations between Pakistan and US reflected the trust deficit as was evident from many events in Pakistan in 2011 despite the long working relationship in
60 Ismail Khan, Interview, Peshawar, 06 March, 2013. 260 the war on terror. Despite their being allies in the war, still there were trust deficit between the two countries on institutional level. These were reflected in the covert operation in Pakistan by the US forces at Abbottabad in May which reflected grave suspicious between the two countries about each other while this operation also reflected the government institutional failures to defend the state territory. The government institutions also lacke of coordination among them, was also reflected on such occasions. The intelligentsia had been questioning government’s ability to respond to the challenges courageously.
These issues continued till the end of the year on which the government at last decided to chalk out policies in relationship with the US and other countries. This was the time when the government decided to regulate all war related activities with other countries in clear terms and conditions. When everything is handled in accordance with the laws of the state, then there is no confusion to come across. Therefore, it is important that institutions like Parliament are made to chalk out any policy and endorsed by the people representatives would give no chance to anyone to resort to pressurize tactics against the government and nothing can be kept hidden from masses regarding foreign relationships.
On the issues of Taliban and militancy, there was a total control of the military. The civilian leadership had lesser influence on these issues. All the tribal areas developments including operations and peace deals with the militants were in the hands of military which had weakened the civilian government’s capability to functions on its own terms and conditions and according to the policies of the parties in power. The differences between the two (civil and military) on policy matters cropped up on many occasions.
If all state’s institutions work on the same direction and the civil-military relations are chalked out in a manner to enable the former enjoy an upper hand, the state policies 261 would be more flexible and open to criticism. The ownership of a decision is the most important because when there is no political support to any military or government policy, the failure would be a natural outcome. Therefore, to make the government more responsible, more power needs to be shifted to the civilian control on domestic as well as external relations of Pakistan.
The most important thing in relationship with other countries is the role of Parliament to decide the approval of agreements and no one would be allowed to independently take decisions on national issues like security. When the Parliament takes a decision or makes rules on agreements in relations with other states, then the foreign countries also respect that decision because they know the importance of the Parliament and the value of decisions taken by representatives of people. They would never take pressure on the government because they also follow the laws of the lands in their respective states.
262
Chapter Eight
CONCLUSION
The terrorist attacks on 9/11(2001) in the United States, deep in its territory, reflected the vulnerability of security on conventional level against the modern day sophisticated techniques used in the terrorist activities. The US-led War on Terror is response to the said attacks.
It is the war on terror that started in Afghanistan which has been responsible for increasing Islamist insurgency and terrorism in the region including Pakistan since
2001. The US military presence in Afghanistan and its impact on the situation in
Pakistan is one of the strongest arguments for the withdrawal of foreign troops for the sake of stability in the region, in general, and Pakistan, in particular.
Pakistan today is facing a growing threat from the extremists within its own people.
The several causes of violent activities are rooted in history. Pakistan became the frontline state in the international war against the Soviets in Afghanistan but the blow back turned Pakistan more vulnerable to extremism and violence. The sectarian violence and intolerance are the outcome of the policies that Pakistan adopted during
1979-88. It is unfortunate that every government in Pakistan has supported the United
States in her regional agendas irrespective of the price which the nation was to pay for it as a consequence. The policies adopted for the purpose in the past have not only weakened the state institutions but have also harmed the democratic process which suffered from sustainability problem in the subsequent years.
The alliances with the US both during Zia and Musharraf regimes not only strengthened the role of religious parties in the country but also caused challenges to the credibility of state institutions. The lack of political will and the absence of public 263 representatives in decision making process further alienated the masses from the government and its policies and thus a sense of deprivation emerged. This was more so in tribal areas and Balochistan which suffered tremendously from sabotage activities. The militants, on such occasions developed distances between the state and the people. They(militants) also developed linkages with transnational organizations in an attempt to create nexus not only against the US in the region but also against
Pakistan.
The US intervention in Afghanistan and a crack-down against Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Pakistan by the security forces, deteriorated the situation from bad to worse.
Likewise, the interaction among different militant organizations got strengthened against the US interests and particularly against the Pakistani security forces on account of its being a coalition and support to the US against the militants and extremists. These militant organizations have existed from the last twenty years with the support of US in Afghan war and the later by the Pakistan army against
Afghanistan’s strategic depth policy and in Kashmir. In both the situations, Pakistan has now changed its policies with regard to the international pressure.
Pakistan abandoned its policy of supporting Taliban and other organizations which are active in Afghanistan and tribal areas before the 9/11 attacks. As the Taliban have very close linkages with Al-Qaeda, the pressure put on the Al-Qaeda infuriated both and a tussle between the Pakistan army and the two organizations erupted. As Al-
Qaeda and Taliban no worries about financial and human resources, they quickly challenged the writ of the state in the tribal areas in the first stage and later expanded its area of influence. In the meantime, other local organizations also joined them because of Pakistan’s support to the US in Afghanistan which was considered to be the betrayal of the Army from the Muslim and Islamic cause.
Pakistan’s relaxing the Kashmir policy after the attack on the Indian Parliament in
December 2001 by a militant organization based in Pakistan was also a matter. In this 264 area of activities, many militant organizations were actively involved in the armed struggle in Kashmir supported by the Pakistan army. When a ban was announced against those organizations with a crackdown started against their leaders, offices were closed and finances were curtailed by many means. At that time, they sought help from the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in FATA and a network of mutual interest and activities developed among themselves. This has built up a source of strength for them because they share the militant activities and targets in respect of their agenda.
Another factor which also weakened the state writ and strengthened the network of militants was the ban on the sectarian organizations in Pakistan. They were operating in Pakistan with the support of different stakeholders, a cause of sectarian violence continued for the last twenty years. These organizations now became the killers of the public officials, security personnel and even the innocent civilians in suicide attacks, irrespective of the fact that the civilians no sentiments against them.
The overall picture of insecurity and lawlessness has triggered by another factor of the most dangerous and lethal nature against the state, society and its existence. This is the foreign factor involved in the terrorist activities in Pakistan. Foreign countries and their intelligence agencies are involved in destabilizing the country. They provided necessary funding to these militant organizations which are on the logger head with the Pakistani security forces. These organizations are now funding, aiming and tactics are on full scale in different parts of the country to destabilize the state, weaken its institutions, and also weaken the confidence among the people towards the army and the state sovereignty.
During the last ten years (2001 – 2011), two countries were invaded directly i.e.
Afghanistan and Iraq while Pakistan faced the fall out of terrorism in the neighboring country. Thus Al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups entered into Pakistan’s tribal areas.
They first established their safe places there and then slowly entered into the mainland 265 of Pakistan. Pakistan’s weak law and order situation provided a ground to the terrorists to act whenever they wanted.
In all these years, more than 40,000 people in Pakistan lost their lives. Every city, big and small suffered from the terrorist attacks, destruction of lives and property and wealth. The social life as well as the family life was badly affected in these years.
Thousands of children became orphans while thousands of women became widows as a result of sabotage activities.
Pakistan almost reached to collapse as the terrorists attacks were so frequent that one suicide attack each day, by average, occurred. In certain places, people would ask each other as to which area had affected from suicide attack that day.
More than 4,000 law enforcement personnel and security forces died in those attacks, almost double of the US and ANTO personnel in Afghanistan. More than 150,000 armed forces of Pakistan, almost double of the US troops in Afghanistan were deployed in different parts of Pakistan, especially in FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Province for counter – terrorism operations and check the militancy in those areas.
Some 40,000 police men were recruited in KP Police Department in these ten years to strengthen law and order situation in the province. Despite all these figures, dozens of small and large scale military operations were conducted in Pakistan as it appeared to be the real battleground between Pakistan’s armed forces and the Al-Qaeda elements.
In the last ten years, Pakistan’s territorial sovereignty was violated repeatedly in the shape of the drone attacks by US predators, air space violation of the jet fighters of
NATO and US, the Afghan forces bombardment on the civilians and security check posts of Pakistan, terrorist infiltrations into Pakistan territory are but a few examples of the sabotage activities almost on daily basis in different parts of Pakistan. These violations of sovereignty led to many tough decisions like suspending supplies to
NATO through Pakistan’s territory. Most of the time, this created a sense of hatred 266 and distrust in the security forces as well as among the people towards the West and especially the US.
The Memogate scandal, raised a rift between the military and civilian leadership, and, on one occasion, had created an alarming situation for the democratic set up. The gap between the military and political leadership on vital national issues especially regarding the war on terror, had become open on different occasions.
The wave of violence or insurgency in Pakistan is not single faceted. There are many elements which are involved in terror activities in different parts of the country and it is not wise to blame or hold any one element or group responsible for such events.
Criminal gangs, sectarian groups, nationalist and separatist elements in Balochistan,
Islamist or Taliban like-minded people in tribal areas or in different parts of the country, foreign militant or terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and trans-national networks, foreign intelligence agencies involvement in the internal politics are all factors in one way or the other responsible for these sabotage activities in Pakistan.
These militant elements are in our lives. They live among us. These elements have their roots in the society. All the people living side by side never know who is extremist at one time and otherwise at another time. Only an event, an accident can spark the flames of terrorism and extremism among these elements which then engulf the whole society slowly and gradually. It is clear from the fact that peoples were non- familiar with any militant activities prior to the 9/11 events in the tribal areas.
Thousands of Arabs, Chechens, Uzbeks and other foreign nationals in FATA lived for many years without interference in the affairs of the tribal life and the administration of FATA. They were the sleeping giants having nothing to do with the affairs of the state of Pakistan. But once the 9/11 took place and the moment state took action against them, uprising started in the whole FATA region. They were not alone in the foreign land, the natives were their strong supporters and even fought for their security. This is the reason that they have the roots with enormous support in the local 267 community. In Swat also, the situation was not different when the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-
Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) was launched by Sufi Muhammad in the area, thousands of people gathered around him. They have wholehearted love for Islam and for those who raised the banner of Islam, they extended to them their manpower and material support. Because of this deep love for Islam, strengthen the demand for the enforcement of Shariah in the region, and when Fazalullah took the banner in his own hands, his followers fought against the state for the cause of religion.
The root cause of this problem is the love for the religion in which they do not tolerate any interference by the state or its institutions and whenever there came some kind of interference, then they do not spare the state, its people and its institutions. They only adhered to religion and those who take the banner of religion. Their extremist views can be brought to a level of normalcy provided their guanine demands are met, otherwise this disturbance and uprising will erupt time and again in future, with severe consequences for the whole state. The new generation, if given proper education and training, can be made to live with peace and tolerance.
Pakistan’s growing internal security challenges from “within” is a serious threat to its ideological foundation. Unrest in the entire FATA with the elements of jihad and
Islamic Emirates established in FATA is growing more concern in the country. The situation is so serious that most of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) is under pressure from them and their terrorist activities all the times spill over to the adjacent settled areas. More than 25,000 sq.km area is affected and the 74,000 sq.km of KP is indirectly affected by their violent activities.
Another front of conflict is in Balochistan where there have been established “no go areas” for the local. The unrest in Balochistan is triggered by the military operations in the areas as well as by the involvement of external elements in the sabotage activities. A large part of Balochistan territory is under attack from the internal 268 separatist elements operating and targeting their own people and damaging the vital national economic infrastructures.
The third factor is the Southern Punjab acting as a nursery for extremism and intolerance in the province. The whole of South Punjab reflects poverty which is the main cause of militancy and unrest in the province. The element of illiteracy also boosts lawlessness in the province. The militant organizations once involved in the
Kashmir, is yet another factor as they now, have no front for fight. Now they have opened the front against their own fellow Muslims in security forces and those who do not agree to their agendas.
Sindh is also under violence especially Karachi, its capital. Ethnically divided, the most populated city with a population of more than 10 million, this hub of national economic activities is divided into Mohajir, Pakthun, Punjabi and other smaller ethnic groups.
The US led drone attacks further deteriorated situation in the tribal areas as the victims in those attacks were mostly innocent people especially women and children.
This has also encouraged anti American sentiments in the country and many people have chosen the way of violence instead of living under constant fear. Because of the military operations in Pakistan, millions of people left their homes for safer places in different parts of the country. In the world’s history of displacement, Pakistan is an example of suffering from the biggest displacement of people in their homeland in the last ten years.
Pakistan’s relations with the United States are very complex in nature. The US interests generally clash with those of Pakistan. Therefore, the pattern of Patron -
Client position should be discouraged and revised. Pakistan must see its own interest first in relationship with big powers, it must be people oriented and state interests be 269 safeguarded. Every policy or agreement with the foreign states is needed to be open and not behind the door.
To end this war, basic changes in the foreign policies are required and all the nations including China, India, Iran and Pakistan come on the one page, otherwise war will continue in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively. All this depends on the strength of the government.
Whenever there is no peace in Afghanistan, the idea of a peaceful Pakistan can only partially materialize. To normalize its relations with the neighbour countries like
India, Afghanistan and Iran, most important issue is non-interference in the internal matters of other countries. Pakistan should play a key role in promoting stability in the region through discouraging the non-state actors. As dialogue is the key to solve the internal problems, this mechanism should be applied to strengthen the bilateral relations between the countries. Political problems should be resolved through peaceful means.
There are reasons for the failure of state policies in matters related to terrorism; there is no coherent system of presenting policies before the government, no perspective planning, and no effective mechanism for coordinating the actions of different parts of the government, a dangerous policy vacuum exists in Pakistan.
Pakistan has fallen into the ravine of deep dependency; donors, by the government and international lending agencies. Pakistan needs to change this relationship in order to protect its dignity and sovereignty.
Pakistan is facing polarization, with liberal elements of its once vibrant middle class on the defensive and it was all done because of the neglecting of state on increase in the activities of militant organizations. The blind eye approach towards this menace developed their links with each groups and a strong network established in Pakistan.
The democratic as well as liberal elements were targeted by them. They were 270 threatened of curtailing activities and were also warned of not to criticize them in public forums.
When the political as well as the military stop our dual policies regarding terrorism and not changed our foreign policies according to the interests of the state, we could not developed peace in our country. This war only be ended, it depends upon the political leadership whether they continued it till the end or to the conclusion.
The war will not immediately be stopped, its shaped may be changed with the passage of time. It is a long phenomenon and may extend to more ten years. It should be eliminated through social, political, economic as well as psychological approaches.
All the soft power should be used in this regard. To give more incentives to those who are isolated and it needs long term planning and programme.
It is a long issue and needs much time in eliminating it, the state must be made stronger and new laws should be made. All institutions should be developed. All must unite against terrorism and violence. This need a comprehensive plan in which all factors should be included and it needs time. All the stakeholders should come on the same page.
It is not a wise policy to kill your own children to save other people. Pakistan has only focused on terrorist not on the causes of terrorism. Dialogue is the proper way to resolve it. To achieve peace, the government must relax its stance. It will take time and the government must engage people and stop the new people to go to militancy again. It will diminish slowly. Long and short term policies should be implemented in this regard.
This issue must be resolve through political process. When the US leaves the region, then peace will come. Till the US is here in Afghanistan, peace will not occur. It all depends on the American withdrawal. If there developed consensus on Afghanistan, 271 the effects on Pakistan are also be clear. If there was disturbance, then Pakistan will come in its grip. All want peace but the willingness to do is important.
Now the war is clear. On the one side are the armed forces of the state, police and civilian people and those supporting the state and its institution, while on the other side, are the total militant organizations, their supporters and sympathizers in the state. The bad and good concept should be finished. If all are not on the same page, it will not end.
Pakistan’s major problem in dealing with rising militancy is lack of a comprehensive and integrated counter – terrorism strategy. In the areas that have been cleared of militants, there is still no effective civil administration that has been put in place making it more difficult to consolidate military gains. The use of military force alone cannot win the war against rising militancy, which poses the highest internal security threat to the country.
To reverse the tide of militancy, there is a need to take a holistic approach which should include the political mobilization of the people to combat terrorism. Although public opinion seems to have turned against militancy, the absence of a concerted government effort to leverage this as part of evolving a coherent strategy means that the most important aspect of reversing the tide of militancy remains to be addressed.
Important gains have been made in the past several years, but unless these are reinforced by non – military measures to naturalize the militants and their toxic creed and buttressed by effective governance, these gains may turn out to be ephemeral.
An even more complex challenge is to reverse Pakistan’s progressive and significant political, economic and diplomatic marginalization in the regional and global power relations. This is the result of several years of strategic confusion, internal discard, economic weakness, external dependency as well as the reversals imposed on
Pakistan by the war on terrorism and India’s active diplomacy. 272
The role of foreign countries involvement in the internal matters in Pakistan is worrying in this specific period of time. These countries not only played role of destabilizing but even deteriorated the complex situation in the country. The US drone policy of targeted killings in the tribal areas has escalated the violence in Pakistan.
The traditional ‘revenge’ culture in the tribes has created difficulties for Pakistan not for the United States because the immediate response of them was against its own people and institutions. Pakistan should make clear its policies regarding drone strikes in its territory and a consensus must be developed in the country and also highlighted in the world community if the government is against those attacks and the dubious role should be discarded.
The role of foreign agencies in destabilizing the country and sabotage activities are confirmed in many government reports, therefore it is needed to strictly monitor the activities of foreign elements working in Pakistan in covert activities. The intelligence network should be extended and strengthened through institutional development and sharing information with other agencies of the country. For this purpose, a single intelligence directorate should be established to coordinate the intelligence networks of all the agencies on one platform.
To counter terrorism and violence in the country from the foreign elements within and outside the country, the border security is the most important one because the weak border could create the problem of law and order situation in the country. To check the border infiltration, many border check posts should be established and a special border force should be established to secure the border with latest technology like bio- metric system for entry and exit in Pakistan.
The sources of funding that support extremist outlets need to be dried up. It is not known exactly where the funds for terrorist come from but they have multiple sources on their hands which are to be eliminated. The funds are flowed from private sources through different channels which are needed to be exposed and blocked. 273
Tolerance is the best option which must prevail in society towards all sects. For this purpose, the curriculum in the schools and colleges should be changed according to the needs of the time. The real picture of Islam should be shown to the people and those Ahadith (sayings of the Prophet) in which the respect for humanity is directed should be acted upon to make the society more plural.
Curriculum in education is the key to transform the human resources on the way for goal which the state wants to achieve. The curriculum in Pakistan is outdated in all disciplines and not according to the needs of the present day world. The religious intolerance in the last regimes have further alienated the youth to broadly develop their thinking on all issues including religion and relations with other faiths. More focus should be given to a tolerant society and it would be achieved through education at all levels. Modern technology and science disciplines be given more weightage in education because only through science and technology we can compete the propaganda of the enemies. The madrassa network which has considerable contributions in knowledge transferring to the Muslims, should include some contemporary subjects in their curriculum to become a part of mainstream education system. There are criticisms on madrassa education that it only produces maulvis and the people graduating from these institutions have no role or job placement in society, therefore they should include more modern subjects to educate young graduates in subjects of present day requirement.
Non-investment in human capital does sow the seeds of extremism and radical behaviour among the population of Pakistan and especially in the tribal areas.
Development of tribal areas of the country needs to be undertaken. Pakistan has the human capital and the need is to reverse its direction from the militancy to development and democracy in the country. Education is the most important element in pulling the weak engine on its right direction. More schools, colleges, universities 274 should be established in the country especially in the remote and poor areas where the young could be engaged in healthy activities.
To tackle with terrorist activities in the country, unfortunately, there is no coordination among the state institutions. To establish a prime institutions as like in the US and UK, the government of Pakistan is unwilling to develop such institutions on broad based level. The intelligence sharing and data among the intelligence agencies are most important to tackle terrorism in the country.
Forensic laboratories should be established in every major city to collect data from the scene in short time. This would require induction of experts in this field to scientifically develop skills to scrutinize the terrorist activities.
There needs to be a fair trial system of judicial procedure to seek trial of the terrorists in courts. The cases must be speedy and special courts be established in different parts of the country where the access of witnesses and their security be ensured. There must be made special procedure that the eye witnesses must not be the lone evidence but many other scientific tools in the terrorist activities like DNA, finger prints and CCTV recordings should be used as evidence. As it is the most sensitive issue and many people do not come to record evidence because of the threat to their lives and their families, the video conference or ‘evidence in private’ should also be accepted in judicial procedure. Because of the lack of evidence or lack of proper evidence, about
70-80 percent terrorists or militants get freed.
Special courts with judges having knowledge of terrorism, should hear the cases.
Laws must be made flexible because of the prevailing nature of terrorism techniques and activities. Coordination between the police/agencies and prosecution department should be closed because it is important to convict a guilty to provide sufficient evidences and good preparation of cases. Witnesses should be provided full-proof 275 security and their identity should be kept secret and they should be given some monetary rewards.
Speedy trial of terrorists and conviction is important. Because of the lack of decision in the cases, the terrorists and criminals are not discouraged to do anything because they know that there is a lack of proper investigation and, hence, they will be freed.
Proper counter terrorism legislation is very important in the present and future course of time. The existing laws are not effective and, therefore, cannot counter the present crisis in shape of terrorism because through normal laws, their convictions and punishments are mostly negligible. It is evident from the fact that there are hundreds of terrorists in prison are convicted but their punishment could not be carried out.
During the period from 2007 to 20012, no terrorist was punished to death who are waiting for their turn. The government should be responsible that whenever a terrorist is not given punishment, other will not be discouraged to follow their path.
Strong civil – military relationships are necessary for the political stability in the country. The main problem in not resolving the issue terrorism is the institutional gap at all levels. These gaps are seen between the religious and mainstream political parties on the one hand and between the government and the military to tackle the problem of terrorism in Pakistan. During the ten years, we couldn’t develop a consensus among the institutions how to deal the problem. This is also an irony that still we are unable to know who is our enemy and who is terrorist. Again we are all confused as a nation how we can resolve this issue and how we can develop a consensus among the people.
All the institutions should work in their own sphere and be made accountable and effective in their decision making process. Transparency in decision making and agreements signed with other states should be made public and their validation should be made from the Parliament through resolutions. All the decisions of the government should be made on proper platforms and no one be made superior to law while 276 dealing decisions. All agreements signed with the foreign states should be placed before the Parliament for ratification.
The issue of terrorism is confined to a single state institution and all other stakeholders are less concerned about it. This war has divided the nation in many sections in which everyone has a difference of opinion towards terrorism and violence. Today’s turmoil and turbulence are such that there is no concerted official effort to plan for Pakistan’s future. The most important action towards the country’s priority will be the security situation in the country
The responsibilities, in one way or the other lies with the federal government and it must take action on it. Effective governance is must as it became a state successful and strong one. Electoral and political reforms with emphasis on young educated class will provide a new space in Pakistan’s political development and strengthen its political culture and institutions. This will bring a new change.
They always get support from the masses through playing with their religious sentiments while keeping blind eyes to their failure to the fulfillment of their commitments to the masses to get vote and elected.
The main reason for continued violence in the country is that there is lack of consensus among all the stakeholders on the issue. When there are differences among the institutions on an issue, it would complicate than to resolve it. The more the problem continues, the more the confusion will continue, which ultimately leads to the failure of the state policies on the issue. The more the confusion, the more the problem remains persistent. An element which is the most important for all institutions is the oneness of all the stakeholders on national issues. The differences of political parties on vital national issues are harmful to the state and its institutions in the long run. 277
People participation in decision making and governance is must and democracy is the only way to achieve sustainable development in this regard. People’s representation on local and national level on state institutions will encourage them to participate in state activities and own the results of every policy of their own. Only through this policy, peace will prevail in the country and democracy will flourish in its true sense.
The role of national Parliament and political parties is important in resolving the issue of terrorism and violence in the country. These are the elected institutions and their decisions are people oriented. If they take a decision on national issue, they must own it through their implementation.
All political parties should abide by law and constitution. If we work in accordance with the vision, we can resolve our problems. To dismantle the scourge of terrorism in the country, all the stakeholders should come to a common platform including those sitting in the mosques and seminaries.
Law making process is more important in dealing with new developments in the country but the most important thing is the implementation of those decisions and laws which are already available and exist. The will of the state should be cleared in policy implementations. It is also a fact that in Pakistan there are less attentions in law making process in general and the new development in the country like terrorism in particular, the role of legislature and executive are not encouraging. The previous government worked through some of the adhoc measures like ordinances, but permanent laws are not made. The current threat of terrorism and violence caused by the non-state actors cannot be dealt with through the old pattern of laws.
The dialogue is a process and not the solution of the problem. It is also not an event and one day the dialogue is conducted and the next day, there will be peace. It is a process and mechanism through which someone leads to the resolution of the problem. Dialogue is continued for long time as we see in the Middle East for many 278 years. There are two options to resolve an issue like terrorism in Pakistan; the military power and the dialogue. Through the first option, this problem still continues with substantial damage caused to the state and its institutions. The military power which was used in the tribal areas and many other parts of the country have even complicated the problem and expanded the scope of terrorism and violence to the rest of the country. This option is used for the last ten years but it is not a solution to the problem but a step to the resolving the problem.
Since violence and terrorism has many spectrums in Pakistan, a thorough and multi- faceted approach is needed its solution. Only military operations is not a solutions and only dialogue is also not a solutions but may strengthened the position of the militants as we see in the last decade in both operations and peace processes. All the militant groups should be included in the dialogue process because if some groups are included in that process and some are left, the situation would not be stabilized because the militant activities would not stop. Therefore, it must be kept in mind that all stakeholders participate in the dialogue process.
The military operation is not the sole solution of the problem. It needs ideological front to be defeated and for this all the militant groups must be included in national mainstream politics. These elements should be encouraged to participate in the democratic process and stop the violent activities in the country.
Economic zone should be developed and established in the remote and marginalized parts of the country especially in tribal areas and Balochistan because only through the economic opportunities the people would come to constructive activities.
To resolve any issue like terrorism in Pakistan, the most important thing is the concrete steps towards a problem in which all institutions put their input while making policies. Policies made in hurry or through one institution, neither have solid results nor do they on sustain in the long term perspective. The role of think tank on 279 policy framing and giving feedback on specific issues is important. Pakistan needs to establish many think tanks of research-oriented to train the human resources on their specific field and get feedback and analysis on their fields.
The menace of terrorism in Pakistan has many facets and it could only be tackled through multi-faceted approach. This issue is not limited to violence but the mindset of the violent is the reflection in action in society. Therefore, the government, civil society, religious parties and leaders, political parties, education system and economic opportunities, justice and punishment system through speedy trial, are all to come forward to root out terrorism in Pakistan.
Elected platforms like the Parliament and Local Bodies can initiate public awareness measures. These are the organs where people can record their complaints in a peaceful and democratic way. This problem cannot be solved in a few days, it will take time and slowly and gradually through many measures which the researcher has already mentioned, the terrorism would be stopped. The social welfare aspect of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan as enshrined in the Objective Resolution of 1973 Constitution needs to be activated. This will go a long way in eliminating the roots of terrorism from this land of the pure.
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Research Papers and Articles
Ali, Lubna Abid. “Religious Radicalization, Resurgence of Taliban and Curbing Militancy: Implications for Pak-Afghan Relations”, International Journal of Business and social Sciences, Vol. 1 No. 2. November 2010.
Baqai, Huma, “Extremism and Fundamentalism-Linkages to terrorism: Pakistan’s perspective”, International journal of Humanities and social Sciences, Vol. 1, No. 6, June 2011.
Haleem, Iram, “1,2,3,…Coup! Of Violence, Incursions on Sovereignty and Recourses in Pakistan” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 2, Issue, 2 October 2008.
Hafeez, Beenish. South Asia: Confronting Religious Extremism. Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, Vol. xxxiii, no. 3, Summer 2005.
Cole, John, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Beyond The Taliban. Political Science Quarterly, 124, No. 2, Summer 2009. 288
Fair, Christine C. & Seth G. Jones. Pakistan’s War Within. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 51, No. 6, December 2009- January 2010.
Fair, Christine C. Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Pakistani State. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 53, No. 04, August-September 2011.
Fayyaz, Mohammad. Conceptualizing Terrorism Trend in Pakistan- An Empirical Perspective. Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 07, Issue 01, 2013.
Fleishner, Justine. Governance and Militancy in Pakistan’s Swat valley. Center for Strategic and Security Studies, October 2011.
Ghufran, Nasreen. Pashtun Ethno Nationalism and the Taliban Insurgency in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Asia Survey, Vol. XLIX, No. 06, November/December, 2009.
Lievan, Anatol. Military Exceptionalism in Pakistan. Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol.53, No. 04 August-September 2011.
Mallon, Ron. A Field Guide to Social Construction. Philosophy Compass, Vol. 2, Issue 1, 2007.
Hoffman, Michael. Military Extrication and Temporary Democracy: The Case of Pakistan. Democratization, Vol. 18, No. 01, February 2011.
Khan, Khurshid and Afifa Kiran. Emerging Tendencies of Radicalization in Pakistan: A Proposed Counter-Radicalization Strategy. Institute of Strategic studies, Islamabad, Vol. xxxii, No. 2 & 3, Summer & Autumn 2012.
Masood, Talat. Civil-Military Relations and the 2007 Elections in Pakistan: Impact on the Regional Security Environment. China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 01, 2007.
Kerr, Brian R. “A Progressive Understanding of Pashtun Social Structures amidst Current Conflict in FATA”. Pak Institute of Peace Studies, Vol. 03, No. 04, October- December, 2010.
Mezzera, Marco, Sofiya Aftab. Pakistan State-Society Analysis. Democratization and Transitional Justice Cluster, January 2009.
Noor, Sanam. Pakistan-India relations and terrorism. The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Horizon, Vol. 60, No. 02, April 2007. 289
Puri, Nikil Raymond, “The Pakistan Madrassah and Terrorism: Made and Unmade Conclusions from the literature” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, Issue, 4, October 2010.
Reeza, Stephen D. and Lewis, Seth C. “Framing the war on terror”, Journal, Vol. 10 6, 2009.
Tellis, Ashley J. “U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan’s Transformation”, The Washington Quarterly 28:1, Winter 2004-05.
Shah, Aqil. Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007-2013). Democratization, 3013.
Wazir, M. Maqbool Khan. “Geopolitics of FATA after 9/11.” Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Journal, Vol. xi, No. 01, Winter 2011.
Newspapers Articles
Abid, Salman. “Much more is at stake”. The NEWS, October o2, 2011.
Ali, HumaYusaf. “Weather Terrorism”, DAWN, Islamabad, September 12, 2011.
Ali, HumaYusaf. “Weather Terrorism”, DAWN, Islamabad, September 12, 2011.
Aziz, Khalid. “End game in Afghanistan”, DAWN, Islamabad, September 30, 2011.
But, Tariq. Indo-Afghan pact a ‘red alert’, The NEWS, Islamabad, October 09, 2011.
Gillani, Waqar, “Extreme defence”, The NEWS, Islamabad, December 25, 2011.
Gillani, Waqar. “The new face of jihad”, The NEWS, Islamabad, February 6, 2011.
Gillani, Waqar. “Tiger of Islam”, The NEWS, Islamabad, April 29, 2012.
“US Resolution links aid to Davis release”, Dawn, Islamabad, March 10, 2011.
Efron, Sonni. “Bush lauds the efforts of Pakistani ally”, Los Angeles Times, December 05, 2004.
Hussain, Syed Talat. “The Davis case! A glorious mess”, DAWN, Islamabad, February 07, 2011.
Hussain, Syed Talat. “The downside of US friendship”, DAWN, Islamabad, March 07, 2011.
Gul, Imtiaz. “Cobweb of spy network”, The NEWS, Islamabad, Feb 27, 2011. 290
Iqbal, Anwar. “US only discussing Davis’s release”, DAWN, Islamabad, February 9, 2011.
Khan, Riaz Muhammad. “Ten Years Later”, DAWN, Islamabad, September 11, 2011.
Masud, S. M. “mistrust among allies”, The NEWS, Islamabad, August 5, 2012.
Mhrshed, S Iftikhar. “The Beatles and the APC”, The NEWS, Islamabad, October 9, 2011.
Murshed, S Iftikhar. “An Afghan Policy appraisal”, The NEWS, Islamabad, October 30th, 2011.
Murtaza, Niaz. “Afghanistan war or peace?” DAWN, Islamabad, October 4, 2011.
Mustafa, Zubaida. “After Davis what?”, DAWN, Islamabad, March 2, 2011.
Rana, Muhammad Amir. “Advantage Al Qaeda”, DAWN, Islamabad, October 3, 2011.
Rizvi, Murtaza. “A metaphor for secularism”, DAWN, Islamabad, April 3, 2011.
Rumi, Raza. “The way forward”, The NEWS, Islamabad, May 22, 2011.
Rumi, Raza. “Will the civilians seize the movement?”, The NEWS, Islamabad, June 19, 2011.
Rehman, I. A. “Shrinking choices”, The NEWS, Islamabad, October 02, 2011.
Sahi, Aoun. “Restrained Reaction”, The NEWS, Islamabad, May 15, 2011.
Setha, Razeshta. “The forgotten frontline”, DAWN, Islamabad, September 20, 2011.
Syed, Baqir Sajjad. “Military forced to reconsider steps”, DAWN, Islamabad, July 1, 2011.
Syed, Wajid Ali. “Trust not verified”, The News, Islamabad, October 30th, 2011.
Yousaf, Huma. “A Different Menu”, DAWN, Islamabad, October 31, 2011.
Yousaf, Huma. “The more serious issue”, DAWN, Islamabad, February 28, 2011.
Yousafzai, Rahimullah. “In the right domain”, The NEWS, Islamabad, March 25, 2012.
Yousfzai, Mushtaq. “Network of terror”, The NEWS, Islamabad, October, 02, 2011.
Yusuf, Huma. “China Factor in Afghanistan”, DAWN, Islamabad, October 10, 2011. 291
Yusuf, Moeed. “Lesson from Davis saga”, DAWN, Islamabad, March 14, 2011.
Zaidi, M., “Poverty And Extremism”, DAWN, Islamabad, November 28, 2011.
Zaidi, S. Akbar. “Friends with benefits”, The NEWS, Islamabad, October 02, 2011.
Zakria, Rafia. “The cost of covert war”, DAWN, Islamabad, February 16, 2011.
Zia, Farah. “State of permanent imbalance”, The NEWS, Islamabad, October 03, 2010.
International Organizations and Think Tank Reports
Tellis, Ashly J., “Pakistan and the War on Terror”, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008.
Tellis, Ashly J., “Berader, Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban: What Gives?”, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 2010.
Center, Conflict Monitoring. “Decline in Suicide Attacks”, Islamabad, Annual Report, 2011.
Centre, FRC- FATA Research, Islamabad, Report, 2012.
Fruman, Sheila. Will the long march to democracy in Pakistan finally succeeded?. USIP, Peaceworks, No. 73. July, 2011.
Ganguly, Sumit. India’s role in Afghanistan. CIDOB Policy Research Project, “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective”, January, 2012.
Grare, Frederic. Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, 45, February 2006.
Grare, Frederic. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, South Asia Project Number 72, October, 2006.
Grare, Frederic. Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Traditional Democracy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2009.
International Crisis Group. Aid and Conflict in Pakistan. Asia Report No. 227, 27 July, 2012.
International Crisis Group. Pakistan: No End to Humanitarian Crises. Asia Report No. 237, 09 October, 2012. 292
International Crisis Group. Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge. Asia Report No. 164, 13 March, 2009.
International Crisis Group. Pakistan’s Relation with India: Beyond Kashmir?. Asia Report No 224- 03 May, 2012.
International Crisis Group. Pakistan’s Tribal areas: Appeasing the Militants. Asia Report No. 125, 11 December, 2006.
Hanauer, Larry, Chalk, Peter. India’s and Pakistan’s Strategies in Afghanistan: Implications for the United States and the Region. Occasional Paper, Rand Cooperation, 2012.
Hussain, Touqir, “Post-1979 Pakistan: What Went Wrong?”, The Islamization of Pakistan (1979-2009), A Special edition of viewpoints. The Middle East Institute Washington, DC, 2009.
Hussain, Zahid. “Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective” CIDOB, Policy Research Project, December, 2011.
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS). “After Osama-Pakistan’s relation with the US, China and India”, Special report, 104, June 2011.
Jones, Seth G., Fair, C. Christine. Counter Insurgency in Pakistan. Rand Corporation, 2010.
Lamb, Robert D., Hameed, Sadika. Subnational governance, Service Delivery, and Militancy in Pakistan. A Report of The CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation. June 2012.
Markey, Daniel. “Securing Pakistan’s Tribal Belt”, The Center for Preventive Action, CSR No. 36, July 2008.
PILDAT Discussion Paper. National Security Council. Civil-Military relations, April, 2012.
Price, Gareth. India’s Policy towards Afghanistan. Chatam House, Asia ASP 2013/2014 August 2013.
Rand Corporation Report. “Pakistan: Can the United States secure an insecure state?” 2011. 293
Lamb, Robert D., “Regional Dynamics and Strategic Concerns in South Asia-China’s Factor” CSIS Report, January 2014.
Reetz, Dietrich, “Migrants, Mujahidin, Madrassa Students: The Diversity of Transnational Islam in Pakistan”, Washington: The National bureau of Asian Research, April, 2009.
Siddiqa, Ayesha, “The New Frontiers: Militancy & Radicalism in Punjab”, SISA Report No. 2, 2013.
Stepanova, Ekaterina. “Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict, Ideological and Structural Aspects.” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Research Report No. 23, 2008.
Tellis, Ashley J. “Pakistan-Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief, 2009.
Waseem, Mohammed. Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Working Paper Number 05, January 2011.
White, Joshua T. “Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier-Islamic Politics and US Policy in Pakistan’s North West Frontier” Center on Faith & International Affairs, Arlington, 2008.
Survey Reports
International Republication Institute, Washington, Survey Report, June, 2008.
President Pervaiz Musharraf address to the nation on 17 September, 2001.
294
Appendix One
QUESTIONAIRE
Question 1. Could I have your viewpoint on General Pervaiz Musharraf’s decision to join the US-led war on terror?
Question 2. Could you point out the factors that have brought this war to our cities from the border areas?
Question 3. A wave of anti-American sentiments are high among the masses in Pakistan. What are its causes?
Question 4. Is there any division do you see among the leaders in political parties on the one hand and between the civil and military leaderships on the other hand regarding terrorism in Pakistan?
Question 5. What adverse effects of the war on terror do you see on the elections in Pakistan with particular reference to the general elections of 2002 and 2008?
Question 6. What prospects of the cessation of war on terror do you see in the foreseeable future in Pakistan?
Question 7. The Parliamentary resolutions and conducting All Parties conferences (APCs) against war on terror are the positive development in Pakistan. Do you see that these events have played any positive impact on reducing the threat of terrorism in Pakistan?
Question 8. Do you think that the Lal Masjid episode was a turning point in the escalation of terror attacks inside Pakistan?
Question 9. Do you see any division among the political parties on drone attacks in Pakistan?
Question 10. Internal developments like, Davis issue, Abbottabad operation, memogate scandal and Salala attacks have any effect on Pakistan politics? 295
Appendix Two
List of Respondents
Politicians
Engineer Hamidul Haq. Member of National Assembly, Pakistan Tahrik-i-Insaf.
Ghulam Mustafa. Secretary Information, Awami National Party (ANP), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
Ikram Ullah Shahid. Ex Deputy Speaker in MMA Government in NWFP and Provincial General Secretary, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Samiul Haq), JUI (S).
Junaid Akbar. Member National Assembly, Pakistan Tahrik-i-Insaf.
Maulana Amanullah Haqqani. Member Provincial Shora and Ex Member Provincial Assembly, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (FazalurRehman), JUI (F).
Maulana Fazalur Rehman Madani. Ex Advisor to Chief Minister, NWFP in MMA Government and Provincial Amir of Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith Pakistan.
Maulana Hamidul Haq. Ex Member National Assembly, Leader of Jamiat Ulema Islam (S) and Muthahida Deni Mahaz and Son of Maulana Samiul Haq.
Maulana Mohammad Ismail. Provincial Niab Amir, Jamaat-e-Islami, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
Maulana Zakir Shah. Provincial Nazim Aala, Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith Pakistan and Ex Member Provincial Assembly in MMA Government.
Mian Iftikhar Hussain. Ex Member Provincial Assembly, Minister of Information, Awami National Party (ANP), KP.
Mir Hasel Khan Bizenjo. Senior Vice President, Balochistan National Party.
Mufti Abdu Shakoor. Provincial Deputy General Secretary and Coordinator FATA, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (F) KP.
Musanif Shah. General Secretary, Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), FATA.
Sadeequl Farooq. Senior Politician and Leader of Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz (PML-N). 296
Sardar Hussain Babak. Member Provincial Assembly, Awami National Party (ANP), KP.
Sirajul Haq. Deputy Central Amir, Jamaat-i-Islami, Member Provincial Assembly, Senior Minister.
Journalists
Akeel Yousafzai. Journalist, writer.
Fida Hussain. Journalist, Islamabad.
Ismail Khan. Journalist and Bureau Chief, Daily DAWN.
Rahamanullah. BBC Reporter, Peshawar.
Saleem Safi. Journalist, Geo News, Islamabad.
Tahir Khan. Journalist, BBC World Service and Express Tribune, Islamabad.
Academicians and Political and Strategic Analysts
A.Z. Hilali. Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar.
Ashraf Ali. President, FATA Research Centre (FRC), Islamabad.
Babar Shah. Chairman, Institute of Regional Studies, University of Peshawar.
Jehanzeb Khan. Chairman, Department of Political Science, Abdul Wali Khan University, Mardan.
Mohammad Noman Sattar. Director, Area Study Centre, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
Qibla Ayaz. Ex. Vice Chancellor, University of Peshawar.
Zafar Nawaz Jaspal. Professor and Director, School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
Ijaz Khan. Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar.
Imtiaz Gul. Chief Executive, Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad.
Mahmood Shah (Brigadier). Former Secretary Law and Order, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar.
Rustam Shah Mohmand. Former Ambassador in Afghanistan.