New Directions

Volume 11 | Issue 4 Article 8

10-1-1984 U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada Linus A. Hoskins

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Recommended Citation Hoskins, Linus A. (1984) "U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada," New Directions: Vol. 11: Iss. 4, Article 8. Available at: http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol11/iss4/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Directions by an authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INTERNATIONAL U.S.- Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada

By Linus A. Hoskins

n 1823 the Monroe Doctrine justified by Washington power brokers obsessed “U. S. interference in any and every­ with East-West relations.”2 thing not be her liking in either the Ambassador Young indicated that the INorth or the South of the continent.” purpose of the Caribbean tour was to con­ Such interventionist policy has since be­ vince Caribbean leaders that the Carter come a permanent feature of U. S. policy administration meant to pay more atten­ toward the Caribbean and the Western tion to what they said and what they hemisphere. wanted for their countries and to meddle The Caribbean has always been ic- less in how they and their people choose garded as an American backyard and, ipso to run their affairs, especially Guyana and facto, within the U. S. sphere of influence. Jamaica, the latter then under the stew­ Respect for the national sovereignty and ardship of Prime Minister Michael Man- integrity of the Caribbean nations and ley. He stressed that the Carter admini­ their people has been regarded as of stration did not look with hostility at their minor importance. choice of Socialism and did not see a Indeed recent events have shown that threat in their friendly ties with President the United States pursued a “big stick” Fidel Castro of Cuba.3 He also expressed policy of destructive engagement toward the idea of “an integrated Caribbean part­ specific Caribbean countries. This policy nership as being in the interest of the has been carried out in collusion with United States and its neighbors.”4 other selected Caribbean governments. Former Ambassador Terence Todman put the Carter policy toward the Carib­ The Carter Policy bean this way: When the Carter administration came to power, one of its first pronouncements U. S. official involvement with the Eng­ would be priority attention to the Carib­ lish-speaking Caribbean was extremely bean. This was supposed to mark “a new limited while our substantial involve­ ! era of friendship and cooperation be­ ment in the affairs of the Spanish­ tween Washington and a one-time Amer­ speaking Caribbean was, . . . often ican lake sprinkled with emerging new aimed in the wrong direction. In the ministates determined not only to be in­ past, security interests have been the dependent but to act independently.”1 overriding concern of the U.S. govern­ In August 1977, Rosalyn Carter, Sec­ ment in its dealing with the Caribbean, retary of State Cyrus Vance, and U.N. . . . what we seek in the Caribbean to­ Ambassador Andrew Young, visited the day is not domination, disproportionate Caribbean on goodwill missions “of influence, or the right to intervene in atonement of United States transgres­ other nations internal affairs. We seek sions in the region” as part of the Carter instead a mature, healthy relationship administration’s objective to “spin a new with all states in the region, founded on policy web around a region long neglected respect for sovereignty, recognition of

NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984 common interests and consultation on Training (IMET) funds. The proposed co­ New Jewel Movement led by Maurice matters of mutual concern . . . . 5 ordinated patrol force also included, in ad­ Bishop. The United States publicly ac­ President Carter also reaffirmed the dition to Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vin­ cused Cuba of instigating and assisting in “vital interest” of the Caribbean to the cent, and Dominica. the overthrow. However, a confidential United States and America’s firm commit­ Caribbean leaders, however, were CIA report dismissed the accusation and ment to human rights, democratization, much less alarmed at the spread of Cuban concluded that “as far as we can tell, the significant support for economic develop­ influence than was the Carter administra­ coup occurred . . . from local circum­ ment, acceptance and respect for ide­ tion. They have argued that acceptance of stances. The Soviets had nothing to do ological pluralism, unequivocal respect Cuban help did not signify embrace of with it or the Cubans either. ”8 for national sovereignty, strong encour­ Communist doctrine, but rather admira­ In addition, the development of ex­ agement of regional cooperation, an ac­ tion for those parts of the Cuban system tremely close ties between Cuba and tive Caribbean role in world affairs and — education, health and social organiza­ Grenada also worried the Carter adminis­ non-intervention in the Caribbean be­ tion — that worked in the very conditions tration to the extent that when Grenada cause America saw herself “as part of the that stymied progress in other Caribbean and Cuba established diplomatic relations Caribbean community” — a position islands. on April 16, 1979, Frank Ortiz, the United which was quite unpopular and suspect States ambassador to the Eastern Carib­ among many Caribbean peoples. bean stationed in Barbados, delivered a Perplexed by rapid turnovers of gov­ “Grenada... angered the note to Prime Minister Bishop in which ernments in the Eastern Caribbean (a the Carter administration indicated that coup in Grenada, the downfall of Patrick United States by voting the United States government would John’s administration in Dominica, the along with Cuba against view with “grave concern and displeas­ electoral defeat of John Compton in St. ure” any tendency on the part of Grenada Lucia, and the rising tide of discontent in the United Nations to develop military ties with Cuba.9 As a Guyana and Antigua), then Secretary of General Assembly riposte, Prime Minister Bishop in a radio State Vance dispatched State Depart­ broadcast denounced the United States ment specialist Philip Habib “to test the resolution... that strongly hegemonism as follows: Caribbean pulse, perhaps to help the Car­ condemned Soviet . . . No one, no matter how mighty and ter administration make some adjust­ powerful they are will be permitted to ments in the ‘bright-spot’ — ‘trouble-spot’ aggression in dictate to the government of Grenada evaluation. ”6 Afghanistan. ” who we can be friendly with and what It is noteworthy that Habib selectively kind of friendly relations we must have excluded Grenada from his itinerary. He with other countries . . . io visited St. Lucia and Antigua, where anti- Yet the Carter administration was ob­ Cuban sentiments were very strong, but sessed with the spectre of Soviet domina­ Grenada also angered the United ignored St. Vincent. A subsequent Habib tion of the Caribbean as supposedly States by voting along with Cuba against report urged an increase in the regional evidenced by the Soviet Union trying to the United Nations General Assembly aid program which totaled about $155 mil­ secure its base in Cuba by surrounding it resolution in January 1980 which strongly lion in fiscal 1979 to stem the tide against with friendly nations, by “totalitarian condemned Soviet aggression in Afghani­ an apparent Cuban Communist influence Marxist’s” control of Grenada, and Cuban stan; by its support for the Sandinistas in and aggression. advisers training guerrillas in Grenada for the Nicaraguan revolution; by its soli­ The Carter administration then estab­ subversive action in Trinidad, and by darity with the popular struggle against lished the Caribbean Task Force at Key Fidel Castro’s grand design to forge a the military dictatorship in El Salvador West, Florida, as one component of the Marxist axis running across the Carib­ (which the United States supports); and U.S. Forces Caribbean Command. Con­ bean from Grenada to Jamaica to Havana. by its support for the Palestine Liberation sisting of a staff of 75 persons, the Task As Abraham Lowenthal surmises: Organization (PLO) which the United States only recognizes as a “terrorist Force’s mission was to monitor develop­ . . . the preoccupation of the State De­ organization. ” ments in the Caribbean, conduct training partment and the White House with exercises, and devise contingency plans Fidel Castro (did) not sit well with most The second factor of concern to the for the use of U.S. forces, as a means of Caribbean leaders who perceive(d) United States was the election of leaders combating Cuban Communist infiltration Castro as only one of the many Carib­ in St. Lucia, who vowed to limit foreign into the island nations in the area. Under bean actors rather than as a Cold War investment and were especially friendly the plan, the United States, Britain, and instrument...7 toward Cuba; the third was the presence Canada would provide coast guard-type of 450 Cuban personnel in Jamaica, in­ training in Barbados and possibly sell pa­ The Cuban Furor cluding alleged high-ranking Cuban intel­ trol boats to that country and others. The Carter administration’s concern ligence officers (DGI), some of whom had Barbados took the lead in forming a about the restlessness and revolutionary Soviet (KGB) connections; the fourth coast guard and in return for its pro-West­ mood sweeping through the Caribbean was the presence of 100 Cubans in ern efforts received $5 million in Foreign resulted from several factors: the first Guyana, 350 in Grenada, and 15 in St. Military Sales (FMS) credits and $84,000 was the March 13, 1979, overthrow of the Lucia. in International Military and Education Eric Gairy government in Grenada by the As is evident from Prime Minister

NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984 Bishop’s statement, his government al­ was in ferment. It also saw a revolution in altruism. The Reagan people are moti­ ways opposed United States hegemonic Grenada coming on top of the earlier vated primarily by fear that the Cubans policy toward the Caribbean and inter­ Cuban revolution. It was therefore wor­ and behind them the Russians, will be ference in Grenada’s internal affairs. ried about a revolutionary virus spreading coming across our southern borders if However, Grenada had always sought throughout the region. Even though Gre­ we don't involve ourselves aggressively “normal and friendly relations” with the nada is a small country, any revolution in the area . . . 11 United States and insisted that “countries there was significant to the United States President Reagan himself has stated must have the right to pursue their own due to the fact that it could serve as a par­ that the Carter administration was “woe­ process.” The government of Grenada adigm to other Caribbean islands that are fully lacking” in its response to alleged also viewed the decision of President Car­ experiencing similar conditions. Soviet-backed subversion in the Carib­ ter to increase United States military bean and Communist activity in Central The Reagan Policy presence in the Caribbean as “unjustified” America. The President has interpreted and a “very serious threat” that was not When the [Reagan] administration came his 1980 political mandate as “the restora­ only designed to contribute to tension in to power, its primary foreign policy goal tion of the nation’s power and prestige in the region but also to serve as a counter­ was to stem the tide against perceived response to a heightened neglected So­ productive force against “progressive viet threat. ” This interpretation refers to change” in the region. One retaliatory the so-called Reagan Doctrine which measure the PRG took was to organize a means the “subordination of all major pol­ “popular army and a people’s militia” to “The administration sees icies to revitalizing the containment of defend its sovereignty. the Caribbean ‘as an area Soviet expansion.”12 In addition, in May 1979 the govern­ The Reagan administration has re­ ment of Grenada accused the CIA of hav­ of opportunity for the jected the “strategic passivity” of the Car­ ing drawn up a pyramid-shaped plan to U.S.’” ter administration and is convinced that destabilize Grenada. The plan called for, the Carter administration’s reaction to inter alia, instigating and organizing the “most brazen imperial drive in his­ strikes throughout the island, planting tory” by the Soviet Union and its ally, false reports about Grenada in [the me­ Cuba, had been too little and too late. dia], and encouraging prominent per­ There are three major components of sons, organizations, and governments in the Reagan administration’s policy to­ the region to attack the Grenadian ward the Caribbean: revolution. (i) Support for free elections and The government also accused the broadly based democratic institu­ United States of complicity in a June 19, worldwide Soviet aggression in general tions as the best way for each country to 1980 bomb explosion directly under the and to “draw the line” against supposed pursue its development according to the platform from which the Prime Minister Cuban Communist adventurism in the wishes of its people; was addressing a mass rally. [He] was not Caribbean and Latin America, in (ii) The Caribbean Basin Initiative hurt but two persons were killed and sev­ particular. (CBI) to help Basin economies overcome eral others were severely wounded. And There is no hesitation on the part of the structural underdevelopment. This pro­ in November 1980, the security forces Reagan administration as to what U.S. posed integrated program of trade, in­ defused an attempt to overthrow the Peo­ policy should be toward the Caribbean. vestment, and financial assistance has as ple’s Revolutionary Government of Gre­ The administration sees the Caribbean its centerpiece a U.S. offer of one-way nada (PRG). Again direct United States “as an area of opportunity for the U. S. ” free trade to the region’s smaller coun­ involvement was evidenced by the sei­ This immutable policy stance differs tries. It also seeks authority to offer U. S. zure of documents which proved that drastically from that of the Carter admin­ firms significant tax incentives for new in­ three American ships from Miami were to istration, which has been accused of pur­ vestment and to increase direct financial arrive at three strategic coastal locations suing a regional policy of failure and assistance for both urgent balance-of- in Grenada, viz, Gouyave, Grenville and inability. For example, the Carter admin­ payments problems and longer term Westerhall, to deliver arms and about 100 istration is accused of being unable to de­ structural imbalances; mercenaries. termine just what the Cubans and the The reasons for the United States at­ Soviets were up to in the region, how vis­ (iii) Collective security efforts and tempts to destabilize Grenada have al­ ible the U. S. should be in the Caribbean, security assistance to help democrat­ ready been outlined. What needs to be and whether and how it should compete ically-oriented governments resist vio­ emphasized here is that the United States with the ubiquitous Cubans. lent, externally supported insurgents government did not care much about what In comparing the two administrations’ who would impose totalitarian regimes the Grenadian revolution was doing for policy objectives/positions toward the hostile to the United States. the masses of Grenadian people. What Cubans, one State Department official is It is interesting to note that the admin­ was important was the so-called security reported to have said: istration’s Caribbean policy also has im­ interest of the United States. . . . The Carter administration got in­ plications beyond the Caribbean. As a The United States was well aware that volved with the region out of a sense of result of its determination to counter per­ the poverty stricken Caribbean region well-intentioned but vaguely focused ceived growing Cuban and Soviet intru­

NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984 sion into the region, the administration Central America and the Caribbean, ” the It seems simplistic for the administra­ has mistakingly placed Caribbean issues administration has described the follow­ tion to assume that Cuba will “crumble within a Cold War, East-West confronta­ ing development “as a state of danger in under tough talk.” The administration’s tional matrix. Ipso facto, it has annihilated the Caribbean Basin,” viz, the fact that policy toward Cuba consisting of threats, President Carter’s policy of respect for there is a: pressures, and the confrontational ap­ national sovereignty and “ideological plu­ proach has not worked. And it will never ralism” in the Caribbean. . . . new Cuban strategy for uniting the work. Sooner or later the United States While Caribbean governments regard left in the countries of the region, com­ must deal with Cuba. the area as a “zone of peace,” the Reagan mitting it to violence, arming it, train­ It took the United States almost 25 administration regards the area a “battle­ ing it in warfare, and attempting to use years to normalize relations and to deal ground in the global confrontation with it for the destruction of existing govern­ with Chairman Mao’s Communist China. the Soviet Union. ” ments . . . History may well repeat itself if the U. S. The Reagan administration came into The administration’s charge is that continues to pursue its hostile policy to­ office loudly expressing its determination ward Cuba in view of the fact that diplo­ to turn back the Cuban Communist tide matic relations were broken in 1961. It is sweeping the Caribbean. As a result, hoped also that future U.S. administra­ Cuba’s activities abroad became the “It took the United States tions will accept “the policy of gradual en­ “focal point” of the administration’s atten­ almost 26 years to nor­ gagement”— toward Cuba— a policy that tion and it sounded the warning signal that would not produce “miracles” overnight, alleged Cuban adventurism abroad as re­ malize relations and to but one that will start a dialogue, a con­ flected by the deployment of 40,000 to deal with Chairman Mao’s structive process. 50,000 Cuban soldiers was not only a “se­ Since the United States recognizes and rious problem” but also a “threat to peace China. History may well conducts business with Communist coun­ and stability around the world.” In the repeat itself.. . ” tries like the Soviet Union, China and the perception of the administration, Cuba Soviet bloc, the question that now arises symbolizes Soviet influence in the area Cuba’s President Fidel Castro is capitaliz­ • is why wouldn’t the U.S. normalize rela­ and acting as a “stooge for the Soviet ing on “targets of opportunity” in the Car­ tions with Cuba, a country that can hardly Union,” Cuba is attempting to turn the ibbean to facilitate Soviet control over an be regarded as a serious threat to the na­ Caribbean into a “Red Lake.” According area the administration views as vital to tional security interest of a superpower to President Reagan: the national security interests of the like the United States? . . . I f we do not act promptly and de­ United States. More specifically, the ad­ This same historical irony of U. S. pol­ cisively in defense of freedom, new ministration has accused Cuba of receiv­ icy toward the Caribbean is nowhere Cubas will arise from the ruins of to­ ing a massive flow of Soviet arms which more evident than on the small island of day s conflicts. Make no mistake, the not only ossifies Cuba’s ability to project Grenada. With a population of 110,000, an well-being and security of our neigh­ military power outside its own territory area of 133 square miles, and nutmeg as bors in this region are in our own vital but also represents a tremendous strate­ its major export, it is not the most likely interests . . . gic gain for the Soviet Union in terms of threat to (any) world power. its global and hemispheric aims. Nevertheless, ever since the New Administration officials have publicly The administration is also concerned Jewel Movement ousted the dictatorial stipulated the following terms for im­ that now Cuba is the strongest power in and repressive government of Eric Gairy provement in relations with Cuba, viz., Latin America, and that the Cubans, with in a coup on March 13, 1979, U.S.-Gre­ Cuba should: continuing Soviet assistance, will have nada relations had been icy and rocky at (i) withdraw its internationalist forces considerable success in their determina­ best. U.S. officials were convinced that from Africa and Nicaragua tion “to exploit the situation (in the Carib­ under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, (ii) abandon its program of supporting bean and Central America) in ways that the People’s Revolutionary Government leftist guerrillas in Central America and pose a potential threat to U.S. security of Grenada “seem(ed) to be on the road to “wars of liberation” in Africa and interests.” The security threat that con­ becoming another Cuba.” They were cerned the administration was the tri­ futher convinced that Cuba was bent on (iii) accept the return of 2,555 Mariel angle between Cuba, Nicaragua, and developing Grenada as a “first bridgehead boatlift criminals who are being held in Grenada. for exporting socialist revolutions to the U.S. jails. In terms of the “massive” flow of So­ English-speaking Caribbean and a base The administration’s warning of an im­ viet arms into Cuba, the administration for Cuban intervention in South America, pending Cuban Communist encirclement, has estimated their value at over $1 billion Southern Africa and U. S. shipping lines. ” as contained in a State Department re­ in 1982, exceeding the $600 million worth Reagan administration officials also pub­ lease, “Cuba’s Renewed Support for Vio­ of weapons in 1981. The Soviet arms in­ licly denounced the denial of human rights lence in Latin America,” was that “first in clude “Turya” hydrofoil torpedo boats, in Grenada, lack of freedom of the press, Africa and now in Latin America and the M124 “Hind” assault helicopters, a the detention of political prisoners, and Caribbean,” Cuba’s policy has again squadron of supersonic MiG23 fighter air­ the non-scheduling of general elections. shifted to re-emphasize the Caribbean. In craft in an air force of 200 modern planes, In addition, U. S. officials said that most another release, “Strategic Situation in naval vessels and 140 SAM-3 missiles. Cubans in Grenada were “military ad­

NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984 visers, some of whom infiltrate the gov­ tober 23, 1983 from five members of the consisted of intelligence reports which ernment to the extent of participating in Organization of Eastern Caribbean States warned that since September 1983 the top-level decisions in almost every gov­ (OECS)13 for the United States “to assist Soviet Union’s activities had signaled its ernment ministry.” This conclusion has in a joint effort to restore order and de­ “determination to move into the Western led the administration to believe that Gre­ mocracy on the island of Grenada.” Both Hemisphere as an imperial power and to nada’s 250 to 2,000-member army and Barbados and Jamaica joined the OECS stay. ” several thousand-member militia “could members in that request. The request According to U. S. intelligence calcula­ pose a threat to Grenada’s neighbors.” was made in accordance with Article 8 of tion, the appointment of four-star General Grenada’s foreign policy actions also the June 1981 OECS Treaty of Gennadiy I. Sazhenov as Moscow’s offical disturbed the administration. Grenada’s Association. ambassador to Grenada, signaled the So­ establishment of close diplomatic ties In a White House statement on Oc­ viet Union’s intention to use Granada as with Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union tober 26, 1983 President Reagan gave the “a Soviet new world arsenal as well as an and countries in the Eastern Bloc had following reasons for his “decisive action” air, sea and communications base.” In ad­ caused deep strategic concern for the ad­ against Grenada: dition, the administration has stated that ministration. According to Defense Sec­ it captured a “treasure trove of docu­ retary Weinberger, in his fiscal 1983 ments” which have shown that there report to Congress: were agreements for the Soviet Union, “The primary goal... is to Cuba and North Korea to supply weapons . . . in Grenada, Cuban influence has to Grenada under the Bishop govern­ reached such a high level that Grenada transform the new Gre­ ment. The documents included five mili­ can be considered a Cuban satellite nada into a showcase for tary assistance treaties for arms deliv­ Reaganomics and eries from 1980 through 1985, including As a result of these beliefs and convic­ democracy.” 3,050 used and re-conditioned Soviet AK tions, the administration tried to isolate 47 assault rifles from the Soviet Union, and undermine the popular Grenadian 1.000 AK 47s from North Korea, 2,500 First, and of overriding importance to revolutionary progress by undertaking a used Soviet carbines, 7,000 mines, protect innocent lives, including up to series of action to: 15.000 grenades, 1,050 pistols, 293 1,000 Americans, whose personal sniper rifles and 74 rocket-propelled gre­ □ destabilize and overthrow the safety is, of course, my paramount con­ nade launchers. Another supply agree­ government; cern. Second, to forestall further chaos. ment with the Soviet Union called for the □ dissuade the European Economic And third, to assist in the restoration of delivery of 12,600 military uniforms, Community (EEC) from funding the $71 conditions of law and order and of gov­ 25,200 pairs of socks and 6,300 belts, million airport at Point Salines; ernmental institutions to the island of helmets and pairs of boots. Grenada . . . □ undermine the government’s rule Under these five military treaties, Gre­ through selective military and economic And in a nationally televised broadcast nada was also to receive $25.8 million in exclusion, particularly exclusion from on October 27, 1983 President Reagan aid from the Soviet Union and $12 million participation in the Caribbean Basin Ini­ elucidated these reasons by indicating from North Korea. And as a final effort to tiative (CBI); and that U.S. forces discovered a “complete prove that the Grenada invasion was □ deny diplomatic recognition to PRG’s (Cuban) base with weapons and com­ “right,” the administration publicly dis­ representatives in Washington. munications equipment” which implied played the 451 tons of captured munitions that Cuba was planning to occupy the is­ at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland Invasion of Grenada land. According to the President, “weap­ on Veterans Day, November 11, 1983. On October 25, 1983 [following events ons and ammunition (were) stacked Some of the items from Grenada included which led to Maurice Bishop’s murder], almost to the ceiling enough to supply 5.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition; the United States invaded the sovereign thousands of terrorists. ” The weapons in­ 86,332 rounds of 23mm antiaircraft am- nation of Grenada. As a result of the pres­ cluded small arms, assault rifles, machine muntion; 1,200 sticks of dynamite; 1,626 idential invasion order signed at 6:00 guns, mortars and an “extremely lethal” Soviet AK 47 rifles; 180 Soviet M1945 p.m. on October 24, 1983, “Operation anti-aircraft battery. President Reagan submachine guns; ten 82mm mortars; Urgent Fury” was set up in motion. The warned futher that Grenada was “a So­ 1,824 grenades; and eight 73mm SPG9 military operation consisted of a dispro­ viet-Cuban colony being readied as a ma­ recoilless guns. portionately overpowering contingent of jor military bastion to export terror and The Reagan administration, therefore, 1,900 Marines, 5,000 paratroopers of the undermine democracy.” The President concluded that, based on the huge volume 82nd Airborne Division, a war fleet of 20 concluded his broadcast by assuring the of weapons and the captured ammuni­ ships, and several units of Rangers, to­ American people that “we got there just tions, Grenada was “building a military gether with about 300 troops from Ja­ in time.” force out of proportion to the island’s size maica, Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, The evidence the administration has or military needs.” Or in the words of Antigua and St. Vincent. offered to prove its case that the military Vice President Bush: “I guess everything President Reagan has stated that his buildup in Grenada was indeed a serious we heard is true. This . . . awesome dis­ decision to invade Grenada was dictated threat to the security of the Caribbean play of arms . . . doesn’t look like a by an “urgent, formal request” on Oc­ and by extension to American security, friendly type of an arsenal to promote

NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984 tourism somehow,” alluding to slain allowed the President, under the 1973 ments, at least in the English-speaking Prime Minister Maurice Bishop’s oft re­ War Powers Resolution [WPR], to intro­ Caribbean, so as to protect “perceived” peated reference to the PRG’s program to duce troops in a hostile area before trig­ American security interests . . . promote tourism.14 gering the resolution’s restrictive The unknown variable in this geo-polit­ Needless to say, the administration re­ provisions. ical equation is: Which Caribbean nation is ceived much public fulcrum for its action. It was also decided that another 2,000 next in line for an invasion? □ For example, Admiral Wesley L. “non-combat” troops would remain for an Linus A. Hoskins, Ph.D., is an assistant professor McDonald, the Atlantic Commander-in- indefinite period. The casualty toll from in the International Studies Program, School of chief who ran the military operation, has the invasion was high; provisional figures Human Ecology, Howard University. The above stated that the President was justified in as of mid-November indicated that for was excerpted from his 95-page study on “U.S.-Car- ibbean-Grenada Relations: Before and After invading Grenada because of the Cuban Cuba there were 57 wounded, 634 cap­ Bishop. ” military build-up on the island beween tured as prisoners and 71 dead; for Gre­ October 6-18, 1983; the impersonation as nada, there were 160 killed, 111 REFERENCE construction workers by Cuban soldiers; wounded, and 68 captured; the casualty xDon Bohning, “How the U.S. Has Faltered in and the existence of a terrorist training figures for the United States were 18 Caribbean.” The Miami Herald. (October 14, base. killed, and 113 wounded with none 1979) Also, a Newsweek Poll on Intervention missing. 2Ibid. published November 7, 1983 indicated 3 Kathleen Teltsch, “Young Spearheading A As a post-mortem to the invasion, the Good-Will Mission.” The New York Times. (Au­ that 53% of the respondents approved the Reagan administration announced that gust 14, 1977), p. 12. invasion of Grenada, 69% agreed with the the Agency for International Develop­ 4Ibid. President that his action was necessary ment (AID) would carry out a $3.5 million 5 Quoted in Bohning, op. cit. “to protect the lives of Americans on the disaster assistance program in Grenada. 6“U.S. Habib’s Caribbean Assignment,” Carib­ island and assist those who want to The program allocated $750,000 for bean Contact. (September 1979), p. 11. leave,” while 48% agreed that the invas­ drinking water-related equipment, $1.5 7Abraham Lowenthal, “The Caribbean.” The Wilson Quarterly. (Spring 1982), p. 137. ion was justified in order “to replace the million for roads, $250,000 for “mobiliza­ Marxist revolutionaries who had seized 8Jack Anderson, “Storm Warnings at our Door­ tion of social and community organiza­ step. ” Parade. (September 21, 1980), p. 18. power. ” tions” and $500,000 for health programs. 9 “Grenada Leader Says United States Applied Not to be outdone, certain members of The overall $3.5 million assistance Pressure.” The Washington Post. (April 16, 1979), the OECS came out in their support of the package was in addition to the $475,000 p. A. 28. invasion. According to Prime Minister in emergency aid already given to Gre­ 10 Ibid. John Compton of St. Lucia, the Cuban nada. In addition, Congress has ear­ 11 John M. Goshko, “Reagan Developing a ‘Car­ “military build-up” was the main reason ibbean Basin’ Policy. ” The Washington Post. (May marked “up to $15 million” for develop­ 25, 1981), p. A. 8. that the OECS sought U.S. help. “The ment assistance to Grenada over the next 12 Robert E. Osgood. “The Revitalizing of Con­ United States came to our aid because we 11 months, while the Pentagon has agreed tainment.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 60 No. 3. (Fall thought the military build-up was threat­ to pay the costs of the 300-member Car­ 1982) . ening the whole of the southern Carib­ ibbean police force to the tune of $6 13The membership of the OECS consists of bean,” he said. Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Gre­ million. nada, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Montserrat. Dominica’s Prime Minister Eugenia The administration also sent an “inter­ 14John M. Goshko, “Captured Documents’ Charles, who once described the modus agency private sector team” to Grenada Contents Outlined.” The Washington Post (Oc­ operandi of the PRG as an “aberration,” to ascertain to what extent the American tober 31, 1983), p. A.l. Patrick E. Tyler, “Seized Grenada Papers Show Disarray. ” The Washington suggested that: “It is not a matter of an business community (capitalists) can as­ Post (November 5, 1983, p. A.l.; and Rick Atkin­ invasion. It is a matter of preventing this sist in the economic re-vitalization of son, “Bush Views ‘Awesome’ Captured Arms Dis­ thing (Marxist revolution) from spreading Grenada. The primary goal here of course played.” The Washington Post, (November 11, 1983) , p. A.l. to the islands.” The administration also is to transform the new Grenada into a 15 Toward the end of November, the administra­ received support from right wing-Grena- showcase for Reaganomics and democ­ tion allocated another $15 million for a military dians in the United States. Francis Paul, racy. This strategy is analogous to the 24- training program for Grenada and the eastern Car­ vice president of the Grenada Democratic member blue-chip private sector group ibbean nations because such defensive precau­ tions are “urgently required to train, equip, supply Movement, for example, indicated: “I that President Reagan set up for Jamaica, and provide logistical support” for the Caribbean don’t consider the envent as an invasion; I which culminated in the joint Jamaica- Peace-Keeping Force. This is just one link in the consider it a liberating force.” American Private Sector Committee.15 long chain of increased U.S. militarization of the Caribbean to protect U. S. interests and those gov­ Postmortem The administration’s policy toward ernments friendly to those interests. Moreover, By November 3, 1983, the administration Grenada indeed sends a clear signal to the White House appointed inter-agency team has was convinced that hostilities had ended other Caribbean nations that President recommended that the interim government “con­ sider revising tax codes, investment codes and in Grenada so that the troops (described Reagan is determined that no Caribbean ease other restriction placed by the previous by President Reagan as “heroes of free­ country would be allowed to become a Marxist government.” In addition, The White dom”) could be withdrawn. However, the camp from which a leftist/progressive House has secretly urged private business execu­ tives to invest in Grenada, especially for tourism, White House had decided that 2,300 revolutionary “virus’Vprocess can be ex­ now that the administration has ensured that “they troops would remain in Grenada to be ported to other neighboring Caribbean won’t have to worry about a leftist government withdrawn by December 23, 1983, thus states. The administration’s policy is to seizing their property.” These actions indeed sup­ port the contention that Grenada will be trans­ falling within the initial 60-day period that install right-wing, conservative govern­ formed into a showcase for Reaganomics.

NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1984