USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Issue No. 407, 8 February 2005
Articles & Other Documents:
Senators Examining Quality Of CIA Intelligence On Ukraine Probe Uncovers Illicit Weapons Sales Iran What Bin Laden Sees In Hiroshima Homeland Security to build Maryland biological defense center Bush's Intelligence Panel Gains Stature U.S. Redesigning Atomic Weapons Defense Seeks Raise, Rock-Penetrating Nuke Mofaz: No Attack On Iran For Now Official: Iran Nuke Deal Close
Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center’s mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we’re providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It’s our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness. Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953- 7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved
Los Angeles Times February 5, 2005 Pg. 1 Senators Examining Quality Of CIA Intelligence On Iran By Greg Miller and Bob Drogin, Times Staff Writers WASHINGTON — The Senate Intelligence Committee has launched what its chairman called a "preemptive" examination of U.S. intelligence on Iran as part of an effort to avoid the problems that plagued America's prewar assessments on Iraq. Sen. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.) said in an interview Friday that he had sought the unusual review because the erroneous prewar claims about Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction had made lawmakers wary of the CIA's current assessments on Iran. "We have to be more preemptive on this committee to try to look ahead and determine our capabilities so that you don't get stuck with a situation like you did with Iraq," said Roberts, who also voiced concern about current intelligence on the insurgency in Iraq. The White House has made it clear that Iran will be a focus of U.S. foreign policy in President Bush's second term. In his State of the Union speech this week, the president identified Iran as "the world's primary state sponsor of terror, pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve." A recent CIA report concludes that Tehran is vigorously pursuing programs to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The aim of the Senate review, Roberts said, is to ensure that any weaknesses in American intelligence on Iran are disclosed to policymakers, and that U.S. spy agencies have adequate resources to fill gaps in information on the Islamic republic. Roberts said that the review was in its early stages and that the committee had not reached any preliminary judgments about the quality of U.S. intelligence reports on Tehran's alleged weapons activities. Senior aides on the committee emphasized that the panel was not opening a formal investigation or inquiry. Rather, they said that the review of intelligence on Iran was part of a broader shift in the way the committee approached its oversight responsibilities, toward anticipating problems rather than investigating intelligence failures after they occur. Roberts said the review of U.S. efforts to spy on Iran would largely take place behind closed doors, involving interviews with analysts and intelligence officials and a review of classified documents. Aides said that unlike the committee's review on Iraq, which culminated in a 500-page public report containing harsh criticism of the CIA, there was no plan to go public with its findings on the quality of intelligence on Iran. The top Democrat on the committee, Sen. John D. "Jay" Rockefeller IV of West Virginia, said Friday that he supported the review of intelligence on Iran. "One of the lessons we learned from Iraq was not to take all information at face value and to ask more questions in the beginning than in the end," Rockefeller said in a statement. A CIA spokesperson, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the agency was aware of the committee's plan to examine intelligence on Iran and would assist in the review. "We will, as usual, be working closely with the committee in this effort," the official said. Senior intelligence committee aides from both parties said that the panel also intended to examine U.S. intelligence gathering and reporting on other important U.S. espionage targets, including North Korea and China. Roberts said that the committee's efforts would focus on Tehran first because Iran had become "the big bully on the block" since the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Amid mounting speculation that the United States is contemplating a preemptive military strike against Tehran, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, now traveling in Europe, said Friday that such an option was "not on the agenda at this point in time." "We have many diplomatic tools still at our disposal and we intend to pursue them fully," she told reporters after meeting in London with British Foreign Minister Jack Straw. The European Union and Iran are expected to resume talks on Tehran's nuclear program next week in Geneva. A series of inspections in Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog group, over the last 18 months has exposed a long-hidden Iranian program to produce fissile material that could be used for nuclear weapons, but IAEA officials say they believe Tehran has frozen the program. Iran insists that its nascent nuclear program is designed to produce energy, not weapons. The CIA, in its recent unclassified report, said Tehran was using its civilian nuclear program as a shield for illegal weapons development. But U.S. intelligence officials have acknowledged that the CIA and other agencies have few reliable sources of information on the regime's alleged weapons-related activities. Roberts was also critical of the CIA's efforts to penetrate the insurgency in Iraq, saying that although the agency had deployed a large number of officers to the country, many CIA operatives were hunkered down in the heavily fortified sector of Baghdad known as the Green Zone. "They're inside looking at flat [computer] screens," Roberts said of CIA operatives. "They're not out there with that poor damn Marine out there getting his tail shot off." Roberts, a former Marine, said there had been quality reports on the insurgency. "We get, I think, pretty good briefings on who people are, how many, where they are, where they're going," he said. But he said key assessments had been significantly flawed. In particular, dire predictions about violence and expected participation in the Iraqi elections proved wrong. Asked about the overall quality of intelligence on the insurgency in Iraq, Roberts said, "I don't know how to rate it except to say we can do better." He declined to disclose details from the latest assessments on the scope and composition of the insurgency. The CIA spokesperson staunchly defended the agency's recent intelligence on Iraq, noting that in an appearance Thursday before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had praised a recently issued, classified CIA report that focused on the motivation of Iraqi insurgents. "The CIA has received a positive response from many in the policy community with respect to our reporting in Iraq," the spokesperson said. Asked to comment on Roberts' statement that agency operatives were confined to watching "flat screens," the spokesperson said, "There are CIA officers who are risking their lives on a daily basis in Iraq and elsewhere around the globe." After an extensive review, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a scathing report in July on U.S. prewar intelligence failures in Iraq. The panel concluded that most judgments about Iraq's suspected nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs were "either overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting." Last month, the agency issued the first in a series of planned reports acknowledging that its prewar assessments on Iraq had been wrong, and that Baghdad likely had abandoned its chemical weapons programs after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-fg-intel5feb05,1,3018344.story
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Boston Globe February 5, 2005 Ukraine Probe Uncovers Illicit Weapons Sales 6 arrested in deals with Iran, China By Aleksandar Vasovic, Associated Press KIEV -- A government investigation into illicit weapons sales by officials loyal to former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma has led to indictments or arrests of at least six arms dealers accused of selling nuclear-capable missiles to Iran and China, a high-ranking intelligence official said yesterday. The deals with Moscow-allied nations, which violate international nonproliferation treaties, put pressure on Ukraine's new president to halt the country's well-established illegal arms trade as he tries to boost ties with and join NATO and the European Union. President Viktor Yushchenko has promised to investigate illicit weapons-dealing, including a US allegation that Kuchma approved the sale of a sophisticated Kolchuga radar system to Iraq despite UN sanctions against Saddam Hussein's regime. Kuchma denied the allegations. Ukraine's intelligence agency, the State Security Service, launched its investigation of the case involving Iran and China on Feb. 14, 2004, during Kuchma's presidency. But the inquiry was not publicized until this week, when lawmaker Hrihoriy Omelchenko -- a reserve colonel in the intelligence service -- wrote Yushchenko asking him to pursue a full investigation. Six missiles purportedly ended up in Iran and another six allegedly went to China, although export documents known as end-user certificates recorded the final recipient of some 20 Kh-55 missiles as ''Russia's Defense Ministry," according to Omelchenko's letter. He did not say what happened to the eight other missiles. The missiles allegedly sold to Iran were unarmed, but are designed to carry 200-kiloton nuclear warheads. Western nations have accused Iran of trying to develop a nuclear weapons program, an allegation Tehran denies. China is a declared nuclear weapons state. A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, and a Defense Ministry spokesman, Colonel Vyacheslav Sedov, said Ukraine had not informed Russia of the allegations that missiles meant for Moscow had been diverted, and that Moscow would await Ukraine's investigation. Russia's state arms export company, Rosoboronexport, declined comment. Omelchenko's letter to Yushchenko and another to the prosecutor-general, Svyatoslav Piskun, refer to a Ukrainian Security Service report that includes details of the allegations. At least three people were arrested and another three were secretly indicted last year in connection with the illicit arms trade -- including some of those mentioned by name in the letters -- according to the intelligence official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. According to Omelchenko, in 2000 Russian national Oleg Orlov and a Ukrainian partner identified as E.V. Shilenko ''exported 20 Kh-55 cruise missiles through a fake contract and end-user certificate" with Russia's state-run arms dealer and with a firm called Progress, which has corporate ties to Ukrspetseksport -- Ukraine's weapons exporting agency. Last year, Ukrainian prosecutors indicted Orlov and Shilenko in absentia for illegal weapons trading, the intelligence official said. Orlov was detained on July 13 in the Czech Republic. There is an ongoing extradition procedure to return Orlov to Ukraine for possible prosecution, a spokesman for the Czech Justice Ministry, Petr Dimun, confirmed yesterday. Dimun said the procedures were interrupted recently because Orlov suffered a stroke, although he is recovering. Shilenko remains at large, Omelchenko said. Orlov is reputed to be a prominent weapons broker. In its 2001 report, the UN Security Council implicated Orlov and his company, E. M. M. Arab Systems Ltd., in sanctions-busting related with ferrying weapons and supplies to Angola's rebel UNITA group. Profits from the sales were estimated at $2.1 million or more. The Kh-55, known in the West as the AS-15, has a range of 1,860 miles and is designed to carry a nuclear warhead with a 200-kiloton yield. Iran does not operate long-range bombers but it is believed Tehran could adapt its Soviet- built Su-24 strike aircraft to launch the missile. The missile's range would put Israel and a number of US allies within reach. Ukrainian weapons dealers ferried missiles to China through a Ukraine-based cargo company run by a former secret service agent, according to Omelchenko. http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2005/02/05/ukraine_probe_uncovers_illicit_weapons_sales/?rss _id=Boston+Globe+--+World+News
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Washington Post February 6, 2005 Pg. B1 Nuclear Nightmares What Bin Laden Sees In Hiroshima By Steve Coll, The Washington Post At a conference on the future of al Qaeda sponsored by Los Alamos National Laboratory last month, I posed a dark question to 60 or so nuclear weapons scientists and specialists on terrorism and radical Islam: How many of them believed that the probability of a nuclear fission bomb attack on U.S. soil during the next several decades was negligible -- say, less than 5 percent? At issue was the Big One -- a Hiroshima-or-larger explosion that could claim hundreds of thousands of American lives, as opposed to an easier-to-mount but less lethal radiological attack. Amid somber silence, three or four meek, iconoclastic hands went up. (More later on the minority optimists. They, too, deserve a hearing.) This grim view, echoed in other quarters of the national security bureaucracy in recent months, can't be dismissed as Bush administration scaremongering. "There has been increasing interest by terrorists in acquiring nuclear weapons," Mohamed ElBaradei, the Egyptian director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the world's chief nuclear watchdog, said in a recent interview, excerpts of which were published in Outlook last Sunday. "I cannot say 100 percent that it hasn't happened" already, he added, almost as an afterthought. Worried yet? Then you might agree that there is too little specific, rigorous, apolitical discussion of this threat available to the public. In an era when Americans know they have reason to be afraid -- yet seem at times to know more fear than reason -- even the unthinkable requires transparent debate. Here's a provocation, in service of the cause of inspiring such debate: In focusing all-out on nuclear aspirants such as Iran and North Korea, the United States may be distracting itself from an even graver problem. A time machine traveler tuning in to the American discussion about nuclear proliferation early in 2005 might think the dial had been set to 1965 by mistake. Then as now, American arms control debate focused heavily on the fear that too many governments would go nuclear. The Bush administration recognizes that catastrophic terrorism has changed the context in which states own or seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Yet traditional nonproliferation thinking, focused on governments, still dominates U.S. policy. When President Bush mentioned nuclear dangers in his State of the Union address last week, he referred only to the problem of governments seeking weapons. That challenge remains urgent, but it does not explain the gloom at Los Alamos. A startling number of U.S. nuclear and terrorism specialists I have talked with during the last year believe that the threat of a jihadi nuclear attack in the medium term is very serious. They recognize that as a technical and scientific matter, such an attack can be very difficult for private groups to pull off. They fear it anyway. They may have professional incentives to conjure the worst case, but I believe this to be their honest assessment. At the center of their pessimism stands the unique figure of Osama bin Laden, still at large, still espousing his ideology of mass-casualty attacks against Americans, with a special emphasis on nuclear weapons -- an ideology that seems destined to outlive him. Some of these analysts, confronting uncertainty, may lean toward pessimism because, with the stakes so high, they would rather be wrong than fail to anticipate a preventable attack. Back in 1998, when he was still an obscure White House aide, Richard Clarke was accused of scaremongering about a little-known terrorist named Osama bin Laden in order to win budgetary funds from Congress. "I would be delighted three or four years from now to say we've wasted money," he replied. "I'd much rather have that happen than have to explain to the Congress and the American people why we weren't ready, and why we let so many Americans die." September 11 taught us that Chicken Little sometimes gets it right. But the failures to correctly assess Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction showed that he sometimes gets it wrong. Once again, the stakes are very high and once again, the adversary is hidden and dynamic. Among other difficulties, the al Qaeda near the heart of the current nuclear threat is not the same al Qaeda feared by Clarke seven years ago. At its birth in 1988, al Qaeda was a poorly equipped summer camp for volunteer soldiers near Khost, Afghanistan. By the summer of 2001, it had a formal headquarters, management committees, a dozen or more training facilities, global recruiting centers, a few thousand sworn members and thousands of other followers. Today al Qaeda is no longer much of an organization, if it can be called one at all. Its headquarters have been destroyed, its leadership is scattered or dead or in jail. Osama bin Laden remains the chairman of the board, increasingly a Donald Trump-like figure -- highly visible, very talkative, preoccupied by multiple wives, but not very effective at running things day-to-day. He is an unusual terrorist leader in that he has produced a broad and sustained body of interviews, pamphlet essays and videotaped speeches, even after going into hiding. In these lie the jihadi nuclear doctrine, in plain sight. Since the late 1980s and certainly since 1991, bin Laden has seen the United States as the principal invader of the Muslim world because of its support for the Saudi royal family, Israel and other Middle Eastern governments he labels apostate. In often tedious debates with comrades during the 1990s, he has argued that only by attacking distant America could al Qaeda hope to mortally wound the Middle East's frontline authoritarian governments. His inspiration, repeatedly cited in his writings and interviews, is the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which he says shocked Japan's fading imperial government into a surrender it might not otherwise have contemplated. Bin Laden has said several times that he is seeking to acquire and use nuclear weapons not only because it is God's will, but because he wants to do to American foreign policy what the United States did to Japanese imperial surrender policy. Listening to him on tape after tape, it is difficult to doubt bin Laden's intent. There is evidence that he and his allies have experimented with chemical and biological weapons, typically low-level toxins. But in public, bin Laden talks mainly about nuclear bombs. As far as is known, he and his followers lack the capability to carry out a significant attack. Given the pressure he is currently under, it is difficult to imagine how bin Laden himself will ever reacquire the space he would need to carry out or closely supervise such a complicated attack himself. Yet as long as he is at large, he will at a minimum seek to inspire others to act on his behalf. He has already helped to radicalize several individual scientists associated with Pakistan's nuclear program. And by now bin Laden's rationale for attacking the far enemy with massive force has been globally distributed, on satellite television and across the Internet. But wait, you may say: There hasn't been an attack of any kind on U.S. soil since Sept. 11., 2001. There are probably multiple explanations for this fact: a lack of effective al Qaeda cells in place; U.S.-led disruption efforts; and bin Laden's inability so far to inspire any significant following in the United States. But many al Qaeda watchers also believe that bin Laden or his followers may be husbanding their resources, planning and waiting until they can carry off an attack big enough to match or exceed the last. What is the specific character of the threat as it may unfold over several decades? Imagine the faculty lounge in the theoretical physics, metallurgy and advanced chemistry departments of an underfunded university in Islamabad or Rabat or Riyadh or Jakarta. The year is 2015. Into the room walk a group of colleagues -- seven or eight talented scientists, some religiously devout, all increasingly angry about events abroad. At night, between sporadic electricity outages, they watch satellite television and chat in cyberspace, absorbing an increasingly radical, even murderous outlook toward the United States. By day, as they sip coffee and smoke furtively in each other's company, these scientists spontaneously form a bond, and from that bond emerges a resolve to act -- by launching a nuclear or biological attack on American soil. Unlike states, which so far have proved deterrable by the threat of retaliation even when led by madmen, this faculty cell may be utterly indifferent to and beyond the reach of the traditional mechanisms of nuclear deterrence. This scenario of radicalization tracks the narratives preceding half a dozen recent conventional al Qaeda attacks, including the Madrid bombings last March and the suicide bombing in Casablanca in 2003. As terrorism analyst Marc Sageman has documented, the Madrid conspiracy highlights an emerging problem of spontaneous cell generation, incubated by al Qaeda ideology. The conspiracy involved independent, fluid group decision-making fueled by mixed motives, including religious idealism, criminality and greed. The cells that carried out the Madrid and Casablanca attacks did not contain talented scientists. But the notion of a semi-independent cell of self-aggrandizing Islamist scientists is, unfortunately, not invented. The faculty lounge cell is just an extrapolation of the story of A.Q. Khan,the founder of Pakistan's nuclear program, who sold secrets to global customers for profit. From where might such undeterrable jihadi nuclear cells emerge during the next several decades? The movement bin Laden now seeks to inspire draws from at least two channels. One is the spontaneous identification of individual Muslims with his cause -- self-declared affiliations by jihadis acting essentially on their own. These are often alienated, transnational migrants in the pattern of Ramzi Yousef, architect of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, who was born in Pakistan, raised in Kuwait, educated in Britain, trained in Afghanistan and inspired by targets in New York. The jihadi movement also draws from more conventional guerrilla movements, especially a loose coalition of jihadi- infected insurgencies from Southeast Asia to north Africa. Some of these groups seek national status in separatist causes. Like government leaders throughout the atomic age, they may be reluctant to jeopardize their territory and political claims by involving themselves in a spectacular attack on the United States -- just as Hamas, for example, has been reluctant to target Americans even while endorsing much of bin Laden's creed. Yet in the long run, infected by Osama's ideology, some of these guerrilla groups may be difficult to deter. In Pakistan today, some Islamist insurgents, such as those in the frontier territory where bin Laden is presumed to be hiding, receive almost-state sponsorship or failed-state sponsorship. Individual officials or sections of a corrupt bureaucracy join with these radicals for a variety of reasons -- cash payoffs, ideology, venality, or a blend of all three. These fluid relationships threaten to render irrelevant the traditional postures of nuclear deterrence, in which governments frighten other governments into nuclear restraint, usually by credible threats of massive retaliation. President Bush's pledge after 9/11 to make "no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them" does not seem likely to intimidate a future jihadi nuclear cell. If it had been discovered that the A.Q. Khan network intended to carry out a direct attack on the United States, who in its ranks would be deterred by Bush's threat? The government of Pakistan, which today claims it did not know what Khan was doing? Khan himself, who seems to have been in it for money and glory? His business partners in Malaysia and Dubai, with no political assets to defend? So it's not hard to play Chicken Little. The next question is: What to do? A sustained campaign to contain the jihadi nuclear threat might draw on diverse approaches. More aggressive efforts to secure nuclear materials, a reformulation of deterrence strategy to address gray networks, and a broad reduction in the sources of jihadi radicalization would be places to start. National laboratories such as Los Alamos helped identify Soviet nuclear weapons scientists after the collapse of communism; they are needed now in the Middle East. Helpful above all would be to elevate all these issues to the prominence accorded Iran and North Korea. Fear not: I haven't forgotten about those Los Alamos optimists, the ones who raised their hands to say that the chance of any nuclear fission attack on U.S. soil during the next few decades was less than 5 percent. Why are they hopeful? They, too, do not doubt bin Laden's intent, but they question the tradecraft of his most committed followers. They read the history of terrorism in the atomic age and see no case where a nuclear cell has come as close to launching as governments repeatedly have done. They suspect jihadism has hit its high-water mark, that it is in decline even if we cannot see it clearly yet. They point out that too much focus on worst-case WMD scenarios may blind us to al Qaeda's potential to carry out catastrophic attacks by conventional means -- a problem that plagued American analysis of bin Laden in the run-up to 9/11. And a few of the optimists joked about the greatest deterrent of all: The requirement, in the faculty lounge cell scenario, that half a dozen tenured, ornery and egotistical physicists cooperate with each other on a demanding project. ("Yeah -- but what about the graduate students?" one professor in our group quipped. "They're dangerous!") It's cheering to place one's faith with these optimists, to stop worrying and ignore the jihadi bomb. But it might be safer, and more reassuring, if the pessimists involved in our defense had some running room to chase the new enemies they see inexorably rising. Steve Coll, The Post's managing editor from 1998 to 2004 and now an associate editor, has written about nuclear proliferation issues for more than a decade. He is the author of "Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001," published in paperback last month. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A365-2005Feb5.html
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GovExe.com February 4, 2005 Homeland Security to build Maryland biological defense center By Mike Nartker, Global Security Newswire A recently completed environmental review conducted by the Homeland Security Department found that a proposed biological defense center to be built in Maryland would pose "negligible to minor risks" to the health of workers and local residents, according to a notice published today in the Federal Register. As a result, the department has decided to move forward with construction of the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) at the U.S. Army's Fort Detrick in Frederick. Construction is set to begin in summer 2006 and is expected to be completed in 2008. The facility is expected to cost about $130 million, according to reports. "The NBACC facility will provide the nation with a much needed biocontainment laboratory space for biological threat characterization and bioforensic research," the Homeland Security Department said in a fact sheet separately released this week. The planned facility would house the National Bioforensic Analysis Center, which is intended to help authorities identify the perpetrators of biological attacks, and the Biological Threat Characterization Center, which would conduct research to guide the development of countermeasures against current and future biological threats, according to the departmental fact sheet. The new center is expected to be about 160,000 square feet in size, consisting in part of Biosafety Level-2, -3 and -4 laboratory spaces. About 120 researchers and support staff are expected to work at the center. The Homeland Security Department decided to proceed with the new facility on Jan. 26, following an eight-month review of potential environmental impacts and public comment periods. In the record of decision issued today, the department said the center would pose little negative impact on the surrounding environment and the health of workers and area residents, and would "allow DHS to address a critical national shortage in BSL-4 [Biosafety Level 4] facilities." What little health risk exists can be mitigated through application of existing safety guidelines, the notice says. Several alternatives, such as constructing the facility on either private- or government-owned land outside of Fort Detrick, were rejected as "unreasonable," the notice says. http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0205/020405gsn1.htm
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Washington Post Bush's Intelligence Panel Gains Stature Duties Expanding Amid Uncertainty By Walter Pincus Washington Post Staff Writer Monday, February 7, 2005; Page A19 President Bush's commission to study intelligence, appointed one year ago yesterday, has taken on greater importance as the administration struggles to restructure the U.S. intelligence community as required in the bill passed by Congress in December. Vice President Cheney yesterday described the president's panel, officially titled the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, as "one of the most important things going forward today." Noting during his appearance on "Fox News Sunday" that the panel's report is expected next month, Cheney said, "I think that will be a very important piece of work . . . for us to use as guidelines for further ways in which we can improve our capability." Since its appointment Feb. 6, 2004, Bush has given the commission additional responsibilities beyond reviewing intelligence successes and failures over the past four years. For example, after the president signed the intelligence restructuring bill on Dec. 17, the panel was ordered to review how it could be implemented. Bush also directed that CIA Director Porter J. Goss send the panel his recommendations for increasing by 50 percent the number of case officers and analysts. And the president ordered the Pentagon and CIA groups looking at future handling of clandestine paramilitary operations to send their reports to the commission. Cheney, who has played a major behind-the-scenes role on intelligence within the Bush White House, yesterday praised the panel, chaired by retired federal judge Laurence H. Silberman and former senator Charles S. Robb (D- Va.). "They've done, sort of quietly outside the glare of publicity . . . I think a very, very thorough job of reviewing our intelligence needs and requirements across the board," Cheney said. Administration officials may be waiting for guidance from the commission report because the White House has been unable to name a new director of national intelligence, one of the key elements of the restructuring, because under the statute, the powers and authority of that individual are unclear. The presidentially appointed director of the new National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also has not been selected. The statute charges that the director, set to be the central strategic planner in the fight against terrorists at home and abroad, report to the president on clandestine counterterrorism operations and the director of national intelligence on other programs such as threat analyses and distribution of terrorist information. Meanwhile, the NCTC, which combines the Terrorist Threat Integration Center with counterterrorism elements from the CIA, the FBI, the Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security, is being directed by senior CIA official John O. Brennan. Goss, whose agency by law is now independent, supervised the formulation of the $40 billion-plus fiscal 2006 budget for the 15 agencies that make up the intelligence community, although more than 80 percent of the total will be spent by Defense Department agencies. On Capitol Hill, there is a recognition that last year's legislation may need some changes before implementation can be completed. In January, Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and a prime mover on the intelligence bill, said she recognized that the legislation "reflects compromises and may well need to be 'tweaked.' " http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3162-2005Feb6.html
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New York Times February 7, 2005 Pg. 1 U.S. Redesigning Atomic Weapons By William J. Broad Worried that the nation's aging nuclear arsenal is increasingly fragile, American scientists have begun designing a new generation of nuclear arms meant to be sturdier and more reliable and to have longer lives, federal officials and private experts say. The officials say the program could help shrink the arsenal and the high cost of its maintenance. But critics say it could needlessly resuscitate the complex of factories and laboratories that make nuclear weapons and could possibly ignite a new arms race. So far, the quiet effort involves only $9 million for warhead designers at the nation's three nuclear weapon laboratories, Los Alamos, Livermore and Sandia. Federal bomb experts at these heavily guarded facilities are now scrutinizing secret arms data gathered over a half century for clues about how to achieve the new reliability goals. The relatively small initial program, involving fewer than 100 people, is expected to grow and produce finished designs in the next 5 to 10 years, culminating, if approval is sought and won, in prototype warheads. Most important, officials say, the effort marks a fundamental shift in design philosophy. For decades, the bomb makers sought to use the latest technologies and most innovative methods. The resulting warheads were lightweight, very powerful and in some cases so small that a dozen could fit atop a slender missile. The American style was distinctive. Most other nuclear powers, years behind the atomic curve and often lacking top skills and materials, settled for less. Their nuclear arms tended to be ponderous if dependable, more like Chevys than racecars. Now, American designers are studying how to reverse course and make arms that are more robust, in some ways emulating their rivals in an effort to avoid the uncertainties and deteriorations of nuclear old age. Federal experts worry that critical parts of the arsenal, if ever needed, may fail. Originally, the roughly 10,000 warheads in the American arsenal had an expected lifetime of about 15 years, officials say. The average age is now about 20 years, and some are much older. Experts say a costly federal program to assess and maintain their health cannot ultimately confirm their reliability because a global test ban forbids underground test detonations. In late November, Congress approved a small, largely unnoticed budget item that started the new design effort, known as the Reliable Replacement Warhead program. Federal officials say the designs could eventually help recast the nuclear arsenal with warheads that are more rugged and have much longer lifetimes. "It's important," said John R. Harvey, director of policy planning at the National Nuclear Security Administration, which oversees the arsenal. In an interview, he said the goal of the new program was to create arms that are not only "inherently reliable" but also easier to make and certify as potent. "Our labs have been thinking about this problem off and on for 20 years," Dr. Harvey said. "The goal is to see if we can make smarter, cheaper and more easily manufactured designs that we can readily certify as safe and reliable for the indefinite future - and do so without nuclear testing." Representative David L. Hobson, an Ohio Republican and chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, praised the program in a speech on Thursday and said it could lead to an opportunity for drastic cuts in the nation's nuclear arsenal. "A more robust replacement warhead, from a reliability standpoint," Mr. Hobson said, "will provide a hedge that is currently provided by retaining thousands of unnecessary warheads." But arms control advocates said the program was probably unneeded and dangerous. They said that it could start a new arms race if it revived underground testing and that its invigoration of the nuclear complex might aid the design of warheads with new military capabilities, possibly making them more tempting to use in a war. "The existing stockpile is safe and reliable by all standards," Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, said in an interview. "So to design a new warhead that is even more robust is a redundant activity that could be a pretext for designing a weapon that has a new military mission." The reliability issue goes back to the earliest days of the nuclear era. At first, the bombs were huge and trustworthy. The first one, dropped in 1945, weighed five tons. The first deliverable hydrogen bomb, which made its debut in 1954, weighed four times as much and had hundreds of times the destructive power. It measured nearly 25 feet long from nose to tailfins. Over the decades, American designers worked hard to trim the dimensions. Small size was prized for many reasons. It meant that warheads could fit into cramped, narrow missile nose cones, which streaked to earth faster than blunter shapes and were less buffeted by winds during the fiery plunge, making them more accurate. It also meant that ships, bombers and submarines could carry more nuclear arms. By the 1970's, warheads for missiles weighed a few hundred pounds and packed the power of dozens of Hiroshima- sized bombs. The arms continued to shrink and grow more powerful. The last one for the nation's arsenal was built around 1990. Designers had few doubts about reliability because they frequently exploded arms in Nevada at an underground test site. But in 1992, after the cold war, the United States joined a global moratorium on nuclear tests, ending such reassurances. In response, the federal government switched from developing nuclear arms to maintaining them. It had its designers work on computer simulations and other advanced techniques to check potency and understand flaws that might arise. The cost of the nuclear program began at $4 billion a year. It is now more than $6 billion and includes a growing number of efforts to refurbish and extend the life of aging warheads. By the late 1990's, top officials and experts began to openly question whether such maintenance could continue to stave off deterioration and ensure the arsenal's reliability. As a solution, some called for a new generation of sturdier designs. The new program involves fewer than 100 full- and part-time designers and other experts and support staff, said Dr. Harvey, of the National Nuclear Security Administration. "There's not a lot of hardware," he added. "It's mostly concept and feasibility studies that don't require much fieldwork." Dr. Harvey emphasized that the effort centered on research and not arms production. But he said the culminating stages of the program would include "the full-scale engineering development" of new prototype warheads. Both Congress and a future administration would have to approve the costly, advanced work, and an official said no decision had been made to seek such approval. The current goal of the program, Dr. Harvey said, is to "relax some of the design constraints imposed on the cold war systems." He added that a possible area of investigation was using more uranium than plutonium, a finicky metal that is chemically reactive. He said the new designs would also stress easier manufacturing techniques and avoid hazardous and hard-to-find materials. "Our goal is to carry out this program without the need for nuclear testing," Dr. Harvey said. "But there's no guarantees in this business, and I can't prove to you that I can do that right now." Another official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the topic is politically delicate, said that such testing would come only as a last resort and that the Bush administration's policy was to maintain the moratorium. The program, Dr. Harvey said, should produce a wide variety of designs. The Defense Department, which is participating in the effort, will help decide which weapons will be replaced, he said. "What we're looking at now is a long-term vision," Dr. Harvey said. "We're tying to flesh this out and understand the path we need to be on, and to work with Congress to get a consensus." Some critics say checking the reliability of the new designs is likely to require underground testing, violating the ban and inviting other nations to do the same, thereby endangering American security. Dr. P. Leonardo Mascheroni, a former Los Alamos scientist who is critical of the new program, said that it would require not only testing but also changes in delivery systems costing "trillions of dollars" because of its large, heavy warheads. Federal officials deny both assertions, saying the goal is to have new designs fit existing bombers and missiles. Dr. Mascheroni has proposed that federal designers make lighter, robust warheads and confirm their reliability with an innovative system of tiny nuclear blasts. That would still require a revision of the test ban treaty, he said in an interview, but it would save a great deal of money and avoid the political firestorm that would probably accompany any effort to resume full-scale testing. Robert S. Norris, a senior nuclear expert at the Natural Resources Defense Council, a private group in Washington that advocates arms control and monitors nuclear trends, said too little was known publicly about the initiative to adequately weigh its risks and benefits, and that for now it raised more questions than it answered. "These are big decisions," Mr. Norris said. "They could backfire and come back to haunt us." http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/07/science/07bomb.html?oref=login
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Washington Times February 8, 2005 Pg. 9 Defense Seeks Raise, Rock-Penetrating Nuke Study of weapon included in $419 billion request By Bill Gertz, The Washington Times The Pentagon is seeking $419.3 billion for fiscal 2006, a 4.8 percent increase, and wants to renew work on a rock- penetrating nuclear bomb that could be used against underground bunkers in places such as Iran and North Korea. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld recently asked the Energy Department to spend $18 million over the next two years to finish a study on the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, or RNEP, which congressional opponents of nuclear weapons sought to kill this year by cutting all funding. "The reason the money was put in the budget was the result of a direct request from [the Defense Department] to finish the study," said Anson Franklin, a spokesman for the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration. "The secretary of defense was consulted, and based on that information we put it back in the budget." Little has been stated in public about the new warhead. Pentagon officials say it is needed because countries such as Iran and North Korea have set up underground facilities to produce and store nuclear and other arms. The RNEP is being designed to burrow through as much as 300 feet of rock or earth before detonating a high-yield nuclear explosion. Under the defense spending plan, which Congress must approve, funding for missile defenses will be cut by $5 billion over the next six years, and a plan to build an interceptor capable of shooting down enemy missiles in the early phase of flight would be eliminated. Last year, the Bush administration fielded the first elements of a U.S. defense system capable of shooting down long-range missiles. At the Pentagon, Mr. Rumsfeld said the new defense budget reflects efforts to transform the military into a "more agile, lethal and expeditionary force." "As a nation at war, an overriding priority must be to ensure that commanders have the troops and the equipment that they need to prevail in the global struggle against extremists," Mr. Rumsfeld said. "At the same time, we have to prepare for future threats, both conventional and asymmetric, and continue to reform the defense establishment accordingly." One program facing cuts is the Air Force's F-22 fighter. The budget calls for producing 179 of the advanced jets instead of the original 275 sought by the Air Force. The Navy will cut its aircraft carrier battle groups from 12 to 11. The Pentagon is seeking a total of $1.9 billion for a new round of military base closings. Changes to the Army and Marine Corps ground forces are a central element of military restructuring, officials said. The Marines will receive two additional active-duty ground forces battalions by 2008. The Army will grow from 33 combat brigades to 43 brigades. The number of U.S. reservists also will be expanded. Military personnel will receive a 3.1 percent pay increase under the budget. Vice Adm. Robert Willard, head of the Joint Staff force structure, resources and assessment branch, said cuts in missile defense were the result of narrowing options to weapons "showing the most promise and development." The carrier battle group cut will be met through a Navy rapid-deployment plan that calls for sending six carriers and accompanying warships in 30 days, and one or two more in 90 days, Adm. Willard said. On the burrowing warhead, Mr. Franklin said, $4 million would be spent beginning in October and another $14 million for fiscal 2007. So far, $16.8 million was spent on the program since 2002, he said. Mr. Franklin said the program will be narrowed down to adapting a B-83 nuclear warhead into a rock-burrowing, penetrator warhead. Earlier work at two U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories called for using either a B-83 or B-61 warhead inside the digging package. http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050207-110637-7973r.htm
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Jerusalem Post February 8, 2005 Mofaz: No Attack On Iran For Now By Arieh O'Sullivan, The Jerusalem Post A military strike against Iranian nuclear targets was not on the agenda, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said following a Monday morning meeting in Jerusalem with visiting US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. "I think we see eye-to-eye [with the United States] that the diplomatic path is the correct one at this time," Mofaz said. "We did not speak of other options." Asked during an interview with Army Radio whether a military strike was possible, Mofaz said "it was not on the agenda at this moment." Mofaz said he told Rice he hoped the United States would bring the issue of Iranian nuclear weapons program to the United Nations' Security Council. The council could then impose sanctions and demand "wide and penetrating" inspections of all Iranian nuclear installations. "The Iranians are very much concerned with the fact that the Americans are leading the termination of the Iranian nuclear program," Mofaz said. "At this point in time, this is certainly the correct path." Regarding the release of Palestinian prisoners, the defense minister said he was personally against releasing those involved in murdering Israelis. "I also very much propose that we be very tolerant and give Abu Mazen [Mahmoud Abbas] a chance," Mofaz said. "I know we need a measure of patience and stamina because the other alternatives if this process fails are not good." Mofaz also revealed that the defense establishment had intelligence that Hizbullah agents would try to sabotage the Sharm e-Sheikh summit on Tuesday. This may include suicide attacks and attacks along the Lebanon border. Mofaz said an attempt to assassinate Abbas could not be ruled out. The defense minister said the Palestinians were still trying to carry out attacks, but that Israel had agreed to halt its hunt for terrorists. "This is a temporary freeze," Mofaz said. "We have not pardoned anyone." "If there is a ticking bomb in the Palestinian-controlled areas and our coordination with the Palestinians does not result in real-time action," Mofaz said, "then we won't have any option but to act against these ticking bombs." Mofaz said that on Thursday, IDF and Egyptian military officers would meet to finalize the agreement to deploy Egyptian forces along the border to prevent weapons smuggling into the Gaza Strip. He said the final agreement would be signed by military officers and not government officials. "I don't plan to be the one who signs the understanding. I think it has to be on the military level because it is more a military and not a political matter," Mofaz said. There have been reports that the matter had caused tension between the defense and foreign ministries since both wanted to claim credit for Israel's enhanced relations with the Egyptians. http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1107769477893&p=1078027574 097
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Moscow Times February 8, 2005 Pg. 4 Official: Iran Nuke Deal Close By Reuters Russia is preparing to sign a deal with Iran this month to start atomic fuel shipments for a Moscow-built nuclear reactor there, a nuclear official said Monday. The move is certain to enrage the United States, which says Iran can use Russian fuel to secretly make a nuclear bomb. Washington has long called on Russia to drop the plans. The source in the Federal Atomic Energy Agency said Moscow and Tehran had largely settled all remaining technicalities and were preparing to sign the accord when Alexander Rumyantsev, the agency's head, travels to Iran at the end of February. "This time the deal will be signed. Of course you can't be 100 percent certain about anything but the probability of that is very high," said the official, who is close to the Iran talks. The comments confirmed earlier hints by Moscow-based diplomats that Russia and Tehran had overcome disagreement over the deal's terms and were moving closer to signing it after years of talks. The source said the first containers with fuel would be supplied about two months after signing. The $1 billion plant will be then launched in late 2005 and reach full capacity in 2006. Spent fuel will be sent back to Siberian storage units after about a decade of use -- a condition Russia thinks will remove U.S. concerns that Iran will use it to make weapons. On Sunday, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rohani, said the West could offer Tehran nothing that would persuade it to scrap a nuclear program. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/02/08/016.html
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